Legislature(2017 - 2018)GRUENBERG 120
04/11/2017 05:30 PM House JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB170 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 170 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HB 170-AK SECURITIES ACT; PENALTIES; CRT. RULES
5:36:49 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the only order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 170, "An Act relating to securities,
registration, exempt securities, exempt transactions, broker-
dealers, agents, investment advice, investment advisers,
investment adviser representatives, federal covered securities,
federal covered investment advisers, viatical settlement
interests, small intrastate security offerings, Canadian broker-
dealers, and Canadian agents; relating to administrative, civil,
and criminal enforcement provisions, including restitution and
civil penalties for violations; relating to an investor training
fund; establishing increased civil penalties for harming older
persons and vulnerable adults; relating to corporations
organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act;
amending Rules 4, 5, 54, 65, and 90, Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 602, Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure;
and providing for an effective date." [Before the committee was
HB 170, Version 30-LS0333\J.]
5:37:50 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to HB 170, Version J, Sec. 45.56.670(a),
page 92, lines 16-18, which read as follows:
(a) ... A person convicted of violating a
regulation or order issued under this chapter may be
fined, but may not be imprisoned, if the person did
not know of the regulation or order.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted there was much discussion during the last
bill hearing in that the section created a misdemeanor crime
without a mental state, and was pondering the merits of an
amendment to remove that language, and the amendment would read
there wasn't a misdemeanor crime without a mental state.
5:38:50 PM
KEVIN ANSELM, Director, Division of Banking and Securities,
Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development
(DCCED), offered her understanding that the committee may decide
to delete the language on page 92, lines 16-18, and offered that
the division would not oppose the amendment. Although, she said
she wondered whether the result would be that there then would
not be a lesser penalty, and prison would be on the table for
anyone convicted of violating a regulation or order, as oppose
to this exception.
CHAIR CLAMAN offered concerns from the members regarding the
whole notion of having some lesser crime without a mental state,
and noted his sense that the members were not bothered by having
a misdemeanor crime that wasn't a felony in the world of
criminal enforcement. There appears to be a great deal of
discomfort with having that strict liability, he stated.
MS. ANSELM asked the question that the fact that this language
is within the "intentionally section," whether there would be an
interpretation that it would still need to be an intentional
requirement.
5:41:08 PM
RENEE WARDLAW, Assistant Attorney General, Commercial and Fair
Business Section, Department of Law, said she agreed with
Director Anselm in that intentionally is currently the mental
state for a felony crime. Currently, it's written that if
someone were to violate the statute or an associated regulation,
they would be liable for a class C felony. She referred to the
discussed language and said she did not see a provision related
to a misdemeanor; therefore, her interpretation and review of
the law, which she may have misstated during the previous bill
hearing, was that currently there actually is no misdemeanor
punishment in the law. In the event the committee did proceed
with a criminal manner it would only be for a felony, and the
Department of Law (DOL) would have to prove that that particular
wrongdoer performed the act intentionally, which is a higher
mental state.
5:42:32 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP related that there does not appear to be a
misdemeanor offense in this penalty structure.
MS. WARDLAW answered correct.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that if a person was not guilty of a
felony, the person could then only be guilty of a violation. In
other words, he related, in the event the crime did not meet the
class C felony standard that the person did not know of the
regulation or order, the person would be subject to a fine, and
it would be prosecuted as a civil offense, noncriminal.
MS. WARDLAW answered correct.
5:43:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP surmised that violating any regulation of
this chapter is felony conduct if the crime was committed on
purpose. He asked whether an argument could be made that all
intentional violations rise to the level of felony prosecution,
and noted surprised that the only mental state attached is
intentionally, and all violations would be considered a class C
felony. He then asked whether there was a place for a
misdemeanor or a lesser violation in the bill because now there
is a gap between a felony and a traffic ticket.
MS. WARDLAW related that DOL has a host of punishment avenues
available, such as an administrative action for someone
violating the statute, a civil avenue contained in the
enforcement section, AS 45.56.660, and criminal avenues. The
intention is that if DOL did have a violator, the administrator,
together with advisement from the attorney general's office,
would determine [the level of the offense] based upon the facts.
Representative Kopp was correct, she offered, that if the
criminal avenue was chosen, that violator would have had to act
intentionally with regard to their action against investors, or
what acts they performed. For example, she said, if they
intentionally sold or offered a security to investors which was
actually a junk bond or a security with no value, criminal
action could be taken. Although, there would be other factors
DOL would consider to determine whether an administrative
action, civil action, or a criminal action, would be best.
Therefore, the intention for the enforcement section was to have
all of these avenues available so when the administrator looked
at the particular facts of the case, together with advisement
from the attorney general's office, they could make their
decision accordingly.
5:46:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN, with regard to the traffic ticket,
commented that "$100,000, that's one heck of a traffic ticket."
He acknowledged that he is murky regarding "knowing violation
versus unknowing violation," and pointed to [Sec. 45.56.670,
page 92, lines 16-18] subsection (a) and related that if the
description was that the felony mentioned here necessitates an
intentional violation, then clearly the discussion was not about
the felony. In the event this deals with a fine of up to
$100,000, just the fact that someone made an intentional act but
they didn't necessarily know the act was contrary to the section
continues in the strict liability category, he related, unless
he was missing something.
5:47:56 PM
MS. ANSELM remarked that she may not have understand
Representative Eastman's question correctly, but under criminal
enforcement, the mens rea is intentional, except currently, if
there is a violation of a regulation or order it is usually a
"lesser sort of issue." In essence, she explained, there are
two different standards in there, and "one says you can go to
jail -- you can go to prison, the other one says, no." As to
the civil penalties, the division would like to see it increased
up to $100,000 per violation, but that does not mean that is
what the division would use because it is careful in how it
accesses civil penalties. The division wants its response to
fit the activity and, she opined, that would not change when
raising the amount that can be paid for a violation.
5:49:06 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered an analogy that he happened to
unknowingly trespass on someone's property because no signs were
posted. He said he violated because it was his intention to go
to that area, except it wasn't a knowing violation. In this
type of situation, he asked, what would be the requirement for a
degree of negligence, or something else. He said he would hope
that it was not simply that the person did not know there was a
regulation, the person violates the regulation, and now the
person is on the hook for, perhaps, a large penalty.
MS. ANSELM referred to some of the enforcement orders she had
discussed during the last bill hearing, and noted pointed out
that within some of the orders there are quite egregious
activities. For instance, taking money from an ailing and
elderly Alaska halibut fisherman through cold calls, the
division only went after a civil penalty and nothing criminal.
She then referred to the people who arrived in Alaska from Texas
and stole $3.1 million from Alaskans, the division did not
propose a criminal penalty. She explained that "it would have
to be an egregious sort of situation," and noted that,
currently, Alaska has not had many criminal cases, but it also
has not had the enforcement tools necessary to deal with
enforcement that this Act would give the division. Therefore,
she said, she could not offer any good examples.
5:51:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether there are any other
elements to the offense other than strict liability and a
regulation was violated, such as any degree of negligence that
would normally be required in order to issue a fine.
MS. WARDLAW referred to Sec. 45.56.670, [page 92, lines 12-18]
and advised that the mental state is still "intentionally" and
the last line [lines 16-18] merely allow the DOL to have a
lighter version of a felony. In the event a person who violated
the law did not know about the law or the regulation associated
with the law, they could not be imprisoned which, she explained,
is why the last line was included. A class C felony means that
in the event someone violated the law, and they could either be
imprisoned or receive a fine up to $100,000, except in the event
they did not know about the law, they could only be fined up to
$100,000, and not imprisoned. She remarked that the committee
was using the word "knowingly," which had some legal meaning,
but in this case the language was simply saying that if a person
did not know the law, they were not subject to imprisonment, but
were subject to a fine.
5:53:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked why a person must have knowledge of
something in order to have committed a crime, usually mens rea
means that a person actually intends to do something, not that
they know whether its legal or illegal. She then asked whether
there [are other laws or regulations] in which an agency adopts
a regulation and the agency regulation sets forth an actual
criminal act. She pointed out that the legislature decides what
are, and are not, crimes. She referred to Sec. 45.56.670(a),
[page 92, lines 12-16], which read as follows:
(a) A person who intentionally violates this
chapter, a regulation adopted under this chapter, or
an order issued under this chapter, except AS
45.56.550 or the notice filing requirements of AS
45.56.330 or 45.56.445, is guilty of a class C felony
punishable by imprisonment under AS 12.55.125 or by a
fine of not more than $100,000, or by both.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX stated that the legislature's prerogative
is to actually determines what is a crime, and asked whether,
other than securities law and this bill, there was any place
where the legislature lets an agency decide what is a criminal
act.
5:55:19 PM
MS. ANSELM responded that she would have to research that issue,
and was unaware whether Ms. Wardlaw knew the answer at this
moment.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX stressed that she was uncomfortable with
the idea of allowing an agency determine what is a crime.
5:55:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD inquired as to which agency would make
the decision as to whether [an offense] was a felony.
MS. ANSELM responded that the decision would be made by
Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development
(DCCED), working with the Department of Law, Attorney General's
Office as that is the state's attorney.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that no court would be
involved.
MS. ANSELM answered that, of course, a court would be involved,
[a complaint] must be filed with the court, and there must be a
trial before someone was [convicted].
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the division would file
the charges, and to explain the process.
MS. ANSELM replied that the charges would be filed by the
attorney general's office or the appropriate law enforcement
agency.
MS. ANSELM, in response to Representative Reinbold, advised that
it is her understanding that the case would proceed as a regular
court case.
5:57:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX questioned that even though the case
proceeds like a regular court case, the department actually
created the crime through a regulation, and not by appearing
before a legislative committee to advise that "A, B, and C"
should be elements of a crime. She again stressed that she is
uncomfortable with [that authority given to an agency].
5:57:57 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that to the extent the committee passed
this bill with this section included, the committee created the
crime, the department was not creating the crime in that it
would create the regulations that read what a person had to do,
and then if they didn't, that becomes a crime. He opined that
this does not give the agency the authority to write regulations
defining crimes differently than what the legislature was saying
in the bill. He commented that he may be wrong.
5:58:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX stressed that if the language is nothing
other than what is in the bill, then a regulation is
unnecessary. Obviously, she expressed, it is giving the
department authority to take this chapter and construe it in
such a manner that a person could end up with a felony for
violating a regulation.
MS. ANSELM answered that she was unsure this language gives the
department any more authority to issue regulations than in any
other situation. Although, she advised, if someone violates a
regulation there are a number of things that can happen to that
person. Regulations must arise from laws, and regulations do go
through a process by which they are vetted before they are put
in place, and she was unsure whether that was different from any
other [regulation process].
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX said, presumably, the legislature does not
let the Department of Public Safety (DPS) come up with its own
interpretation of [laws], and through regulation say one thing
or another, that authority belongs to the legislature.
MS. ANSELM reminded the committee that a judge would always be
involved in any sort of criminal activity.
6:00:50 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN explained that that was not the issue
Representative LeDoux raised, the issue was whether the
department can issue a regulation that becomes a crime, as that
authority is limited to the legislature. He remarked that the
legislature could make it a crime to violate the regulation, the
question was whether the regulation itself created a crime.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX nodded her head in agreement.
MS. ANSELM answered that she did not know whether there were
situations where crimes were established through regulation, and
deferred to Ms. Wardlaw.
6:01:46 PM
MS. WARDLAW explained that the language on the first line is
model language and it may or may not fit the Alaska State
Legislature and its authority. In a practical sense, she
offered, she sincerely doubted the division would take a
criminal action if someone did not violate a statute outlined
under AS 45.56. In the event the committee was uncomfortable
with "us taking criminal enforcement against the regulation that
was adopted into the chapter, or an order issued under this
chapter," it probably would not make a difference in the tool
kit of enforcement abilities, she said.
6:02:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that Representative LeDoux and she
agreed on this issue and she would co-sponsor legislation with
Representative LeDoux regarding administrative law. She asked
Ms. Anselm, for transparency purposes, to advise the committee
which organization encouraged this law to be brought before the
body.
MS. ANSELM advised that the original bill had been presented to
the legislature a number of times, and generally brought forth
through the Division of Banking and Securities through the
Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development
(DCCED), and had several times been introduced as a governor's
bill.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD advised that that was not her question,
and noted their conversation prior to this hearing and the
mention of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (ULC). She said she wanted that organization on
record, and asked whether Alaska had state membership or state
representation.
MS. ANSELM responded that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) provides a number
of uniform state laws, and none of the states belong to this
organization. The NCCUSL is considered a learned group of
scholars from across the country in various disciplines, it
works with everything from probate law to securities law, and
several pages of different laws. She explained that the NCCUSL
suggests to states that their laws be uniform [with other
states], thereby, assisting businesses operating state-to-state,
for example.
6:06:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said she is a fan of state sovereignty
and federalism, and asked whether any organizations fund "these
scholars," or whether any type of lobbying was involved in any
manner.
MS. ANSELM answered that she was not aware of any lobbying or
funding for NCCUSL.
6:07:14 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified to Representative Reinbold that the
NCCUSL is also called the Commission on Uniform Laws, which is
the same commission that brought forward the Revised Uniform
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act to this committee. The
legislature tends to see uniform laws come forward on a regular
basis through that process, and all 50 states are members of the
group, he advised.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Chair Claman to bring the answers
to her request to the committee.
CHAIR CLAMAN offered that, for example, Commissioner Deborah
Behr is one of the designed Alaska commissioners on the
Commission on Uniform Laws, and approximately 4-6 retired
persons from Alaska are involved in the group.
6:08:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP explained to Representative Reinbold that
the Commission on Uniform Laws was established over 50 years
ago, and his direct experience with the commission involved:
interstate extradition acts for people with felony warrants; how
states agree to extradite offenders wanted in other states on
felony warrants; an extraditable offense; and whether or not
those states will extradite. The Commission on Uniform Law sets
uniform laws that apply to child custody cases depending upon
where the child was born, if the custodial parent is from the
state making the claim for the child, or if the custodial
parents have moved, there are many factors states have worked
out together. For example, in situation "A," if these factors
apply then this is how "we, as states," will resolve it without
fighting, basically. It is a long established commission, he
pointed out, there is nothing nefarious or hidden in there, it
has been necessary for states to be at peace with one another
and resolve a whole list of administrative issues that otherwise
would literally be a lawsuit every time. It's the way states
interact in commerce, administrative, family, and criminal law,
and it is very effective, he described.
6:09:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether Alaska has state
representation as commissioners, such as Deborah Behr, because
it was said that there was no state membership, and no state
representation.
CHAIR CLAMAN stated that rather than vetting the question "what
does the uniform law commission do," when Ms. Anselm was not the
correct person to answer that question, he could talk with her
off record because the committee does not need to spend more
time on it today. He advised Representative Reinbold that it
would have been a good question to ask when the committee took
up the fiduciary asset act, which was a Uniform Law Act.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD argued that "She said that they brought
this bill forth" and Representative Reinbold wanted to know the
origin of this bill.
CHAIR CLAMAN responded that the question had been answered, the
structure of the bill started from the Commission on Uniform
Laws, and Ms. Anselm was clear in that explanation. He
reiterated that Ms. Anselm should not be asked to respond to
questions regarding the Commission on Uniform Laws because she
was not directly involved with the commission.
6:11:52 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP referred to the language in [Sec. 45.56.670,
page 92] lines 13-14, and said that as Representative LeDoux
mentioned, the committee could be promulgating regulations by an
administrative agency that could end up determining felony
conduct. He suggested the committee decide whether it prefers
that language in the chapter because the DOL appeared to have no
commitment one way or the other as to deleting the language.
He said that it was his hope that if conduct was a felony, it
would be a felony because it was dealing with laws pertaining to
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and many
of those laws are felonies. In the event the committee was
actually basing this on the United States Code, which does say
whether something is a felony or not, then there could be a good
reason for having some leeway in there as long as it was tied to
conduct that was already a federal felony. He commented that
his comments were directed to Chair Claman as an attorney, and
he was unsure whether this was the time to visit that issue.
6:13:02 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN suggested that because amendments on this bill will
be heard tomorrow, the sensible thing would be to ask someone
from the Department of Law (DOL), Criminal Division to appear
and offer input because this subsection was making everyone
uncomfortable, curious, and worried. He noted he did have an
amendment drafted with regard to subsection (a) on page 92.
6:14:14 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to [Sec. 45.56.670], subsection (a), and
commented that as he read the subsection, a person charged under
this felony provision would be subject to a fine of up to
$100,000, but not imprisonment under the language in the last
sentence, "if the person didn't know of the regulation or
order." He asked whether he was correctly reading that the fine
would be up to $100,000.
MS. ANSELM answered in the affirmative.
6:15:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX opined that somewhere she read that
anything with a fine over "X" amount of dollars was a felony,
and if less than $5,000 was a misdemeanor. She commented that
"$100,000, as Representative Eastman said, that is one hell of a
traffic fine."
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX then pointed out that a person receives
certain protections when charged with either a felony or a
misdemeanor, foremost is the right to a jury trial. In the
event an action was simply a violation, the person then does not
receive their right to a jury trial, and she remarked that it
was problematic that someone could be fined up to $100,000
without the right to a jury trial.
[REPRESENTATIVE KOPP spoke off record and could not be heard.]
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX laughingly opined that Representative Kopp
was pointing her to the Sixth Amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD opined that Representative LeDoux and
she now have agreed on a second issue.
6:17:06 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN said that to make this even more complicated, he
turned to the last sentence in subsection (a), [page 92, lines
16-18] and said the way it reads, this is actually not a
misdemeanor provision. He described it as a felony provision
and paraphrased, "A person convicted of violating a regulation
or order under this chapter ... so, the only conviction can be
for the felony." Now, he remarked, there is this conviction for
a felony which actually requires that the person intentionally
violated the chapter, and explained that intentional violation
of a law, under traditional construction in criminal statutes,
means knowledge of the circumstances, the thing the person is
violating, such as the illegal act of breaking into someone
house, for example. The problem is that "now you have this
thing you are trying to say, you don't know it's -- you don't
know that it's -- you don't know about the regulation or order
but that's the very thing you are supposed to know about to make
an intentional violation." He pointed out that there is a
problem with this sentence because, how can a person be
convicted of intentional action if the person didn't know of the
regulation or order.
6:18:47 PM
MS. ANSELM commented that she did not believe many criminal
actions would arise from this Act, as there are civil violations
and administrative violations. She said she understand why the
committee was focusing here, but there are a whole panoply in
this law of actions that the division can take, in concert or
not, with the attorney general's office. She then deferred to
Ms. Wardlaw.
MS. WARDLAW said, in deference to Sec. 45.56.670, she would
defer to her earlier testimony regarding criminal liability for
a violation of a regulation or an order. Based upon the
committee's discussion, she offered a potential amendment to
delete the language on lines 13-14, and she paraphrased as
follows: "a regulation adopted under this chapter, or an order
issued under this chapter, ...." thereby, making the language on
lines 16-18 null and void. She related, "If, in fact, we only
associated criminal liability" with the violation of a section
of the chapter - meaning statutory language, then it becomes
irrelevant if someone knows about a regulation or an order
issued under this chapter.
6:20:52 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX responded to Chair Claman's comment that
in order to be guilty of something, the person has to know it
was against the law. In that regard, she said, "You couldn't
say," that a person from a country which practices cannibalism,
and the person didn't realize cannibalism was against the law.
She opined that the intent, the mens rea is that the person
actually has to know what they are doing, they don't actually
have to know that it's against the law. For example, there are
countries that practice honor deaths, and a person cannot come
to the United States and kill their daughter because she was
fooling around, and the defense be that it was perfectly okay in
their country and; therefore, expect to be exempt from the law
because they don't know the law. She said that isn't mens rea
"kind of, not knowledge of the law, but not -- but you knowingly
intended to do something, and knowledge actually that it's
illegal or not has nothing to do with it."
6:22:16 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN offered that the distinction raised was between
"malum in se offenses versus malum prohibitum offenses." He
referred to the situations about killing your child because
that's the custom, or cannibalism because that's the custom in
another culture, and in the United States, that conduct is wrong
in and of itself for malum in se. Whereas, the notion that
"knowing misrepresentations" by not putting specific information
in a securities disclosures is wrong, not because it's
inherently wrong, but because there are laws that say that when
a person offers a security disclosure, these are the five things
they are supposed to say, for example. In theory, he offered,
those are not as inherently known to be improper, which gets
into malum prohibitum and gets into the question of knowledge
about the fact that that particular conduct was illegal, as
opposed to killing the neighbor which is clearly illegal, unless
it's self-defense. A tax return, for example, the person would
have to be able to show knowledge of what they are actually
supposed to be reporting to be able to show that was enough to
be criminal conduct, he explained.
6:23:55 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that under Title 45, there is intentional
language similar to subsection (a), and the chair of the House
Labor and Commerce Standing Committee, Representative Kito, will
bring a list of the offenses involved that are based on
intentional violations and how that works so there is a bigger
picture.
CHAIR CLAMAN, in response to Representative Reinbold's note,
explained the Latin phrases he had offered, as follows: Malum
in se essentially means, "evil in and of itself by the act
itself." Malum prohibitum, prohibitum being some variation of
prohibited, means, "evil because we decided that it is an issue
to a law or regulation that says so." For example, start with
the 10 Commandments, Thou shall not kill thy neighbor, except in
self-defense, is malum in se; and malum prohibitum would be Thou
shalt pay your taxes every year and fill out your tax returns,
and truthfully report your income. He explained that in the
event a person had a pattern of knowingly not disclosing that
information it would be malum prohibitum.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether those are legal terms
because she did not remember those phrases from law school.
CHAIR CLAMAN answered that they are legal terms.
6:26:53 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether anyone was interested in a sectional
analysis or to gavel out and come back tomorrow for amendments
as everyone appeared focused on Sec. 45.56.670(a).
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that the committee did get through the
sectional analysis at a high level and he was comfortable moving
on to amendments.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD disagreed that the committee went
through a sectional analysis at a high level, and then corrected
herself as she recalled the previous presentation.
MS. ANSELM answered that she had gone through many of the
sections during her PowerPoint presentation, but she did not go
through all of the sections.
CHAIR CLAMAN suggested to Representative Reinbold that if she
wanted a more detailed analysis of the sections to ask Ms.
Anselm to stop by her office.
[HB 170 was held over.]
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB170 ver J 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Sponsor Statement 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Sectional Analysis 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Repealers List 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 DCCED Whitepaper 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Supporting Document-Letter ANCSA Regional Association 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Supporting Document-Letter NASAA 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 HJUD Slide Presentation 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Additional Document-Enforcement Comparison Chart 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Fiscal Note DCCED-DBS 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |
| HB170 Fiscal Note DHSS-SDSA 4.7.17.pdf |
HJUD 4/7/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/11/2017 5:30:00 PM HJUD 4/12/2017 1:00:00 PM |
HB 170 |