


ALASKA LEGISLATURE COMMITTEE FILES 2007-2008 SJUD 12540

**First Nations in  
Yukon and North BC**



White River

Kluane

Champagne & Aishihik

Kwanlin Dun

Ta'an Kwach'an

Whitehorse

Teslin

Kaska

Carcross/Tagish

Treaty 8

## First Nations Land Claim Agreement Status

- Yukon: (First Nation pop. of ~ 2,600 along AHPP)
  - All right of way First Nations have settled except Kaska and White River.
    - Kaska did not complete negotiations
    - White River completed negotiations but have not held a ratification vote
- BC: (First Nation pop. of ~ 5,800 along AHPP)
  - Kaska FN – AIP stage pursuant to the BC Treaty process.
  - Taku River Tlingit – AIP stage in BC Treaty process
  - Treaty 8 – signed in 1899

## TransCanada's Benefits to First Nations

- Benefits of the NPA for First Nations derive from:
  - Terms and Conditions (obligations which are attached to Foothills' Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity)
  - Undertakings from the project hearings
- Foothills is required to deliver significant benefits and minimize impacts of the project.
- Benefits are already secured.
- Government of Canada can impose penalties on Foothills should it fail to comply with Terms and Conditions of the NPA.

## TransCanada's Benefits to First Nations (cont'd)

- **NPA Benefits for all Northern Residents:**
  - Training and employment opportunities for construction and operations of the pipeline.
  - Northern business opportunities.
  - Opportunity for equity participation.
  - Natural gas supply to communities
    - Beaver Creek, Burwash Landing, Destruction Bay, Haines Junction, Whitehorse, Teslin, Upper Liard and Watson Lake (many are First Nation communities)
    - Foothills has an obligation to provide specified financial assistance for gas off-takes.
  - Zonal tolls
    - Lower tolls for Whitehorse or Ft. Nelson versus Alberta deliveries.

## TransCanada's Benefits to First Nations (cont'd)

- **NPA Specific Benefits for First Nations:**
  - Fair and competitive opportunity to participate in the supply of goods and services.
  - Representation on the Board of Directors for Foothills South Yukon.
    - 3 of 11 directors for First Nations/Women
  - Foothills must enhance First Nations participation in project employment, training, and entrepreneurial opportunities through detailed socio-economic plans.
  - Terms and Conditions require Foothills to establish and maintain a consultation process with First Nations.
  - Terms and Conditions or Undertakings (from hearings) establish protection for biophysical, socio-cultural, and socio-economic environment of the communities and traditional lands.
- The Umbrella Final Agreement and Yukon First Nation Final Agreements acknowledge and respect the validity of Foothills' pipeline easement.
  - Setting aside new lands for a Greenfield project would be a difficult and slow process.

## Summary

- **TransCanada holds critical assets for the project in Alaska and Canada**
  - **Alaska**
    - Conditional FERC Certificate
    - Clean Water Permits and Federal ROW
    - Pending State ROW
  - **Canada**
    - NPA Certificates
    - Canada / U.S. Treaty
    - Single-window regulatory agency
    - Yukon ROW
    - Specific benefits for First Nations and extensive history of consultation.



**The Palin-Parnell Administration presents**

# **AGIA**

**The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act**

**Senate Judiciary**

**4/4/2007**

# AGIA Overview



## **AGIA:**

- Is a **commercial vehicle** that creates a competitive playing field
- Provides a **pipeline sooner and on Alaska's terms**
- Is a **transparent process, with transparent inducements.**

# **Commercial Vehicle**

# **AGIA**

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- **AGIA is not a negotiation**
- **Successful bidding process requires AGIA's inducements**
  - **Inducements provide for a level playing field and all the players are in the game**
  - **Without inducements, no bidders**
  - **Without bidders, state has no ability to get a pipeline on its desired terms**

# Commercial Vehicle

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

## AGIA's inducements:

- Known, clearly quantified, and transparent
- Midstream inducement of \$500 million:
  - *reduces licensee's project development risks, especially an independent pipeline licensee*
- Upstream tax and royalty inducements:
  - *coupled to the licensed midstream project to make license more valuable, by*
    - Encouraging open season participation
    - Ensuring that state will stick with its licensed partner
- Requirement to obtain pipeline certificate reduces overall project risks, increases opportunity for success

# **A Project on the State's Terms**

# **AGIA**

**The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act**

- **State's "must haves" focus on the future:**
  - **A competitive and vibrant oil and gas industry**
  - **Jobs and careers, not only from the pipeline itself, but also from a vibrant support industry**
  - **Gas for Alaskans**

# **A Project on the State's Terms**



## **The state "must haves"**

- **Minimum 70/30 debt/equity ratio ensures reasonable base tariffs**
- **Expansion requirements ensure explorer's gas can access the pipeline**
- **Rolled-in rates ensure all parties have an economic incentive to explore for gas**

# **Transparent Public policy**



- **AGIA creates a competitive process, not a negotiated process**
- **Bids commented upon by the public**
- **Winner chosen by the Commissioners**
- **Legislative review and approval**
- **Value of AGIA's inducements are up-front and transparent**

# Summary

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- AGIA levels the playing field.
- AGIA is a commercial vehicle that provides a pipeline sooner on Alaska's terms, in a transparent manner.

# **Increasing Predictability for Producers**



## **Constitution of Alaska**

### **Article 9 - Finance and Taxation**

#### **§ 1. Taxing Power**

**The power of taxation shall never be surrendered. This power shall not be suspended or contracted away, except as provided in this article.**

# Increasing Predictability for Producers



## Constitution of Alaska

### Article 9 - § 4. Exemptions

The real and personal property of the State or its political subdivisions shall be exempt from taxation .... [P]roperty used exclusively for non-profit religious, charitable, cemetery, or educational purposes, ... shall be exempt from taxation. Other exemptions of like or different kind may be granted by general law. All valid existing exemptions shall be retained until otherwise provided by law.

**The Palin-Parnell Administration presents**

# **AGIA**

**The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act**

**Economics of AGIA's role in the previous  
presentation to Senate Judiciary Committee  
4/16/2007**

# Summary of economics of AGIA rolled-in rate provisions

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- AGIA rolled-in rates promote competition, exploration and development. Contrast: if the FERC's lower-48 policy were used it is unlikely that the last Bcf of in-fill compression will occur, and very unlikely that looping will occur.
- Rolled-in rates are in the state's interest given uncertainty of where expansion gas will come.
- The objective evidence indicates that rolled-in rates cost Producers only modestly, are mostly off-set by State's \$500M contribution, and ***are unlikely to affect their investment decisions.***


- **Base Case: 4.5 Bcf/day**
- **1<sup>st</sup> Expansion: 1 Bcf, infill compression**
- **2<sup>nd</sup> Expansion: 1 Bcf, infill compression**
- **3<sup>rd</sup> Expansion: 1 Bcf, looping**

Note: Volumes here reported at pipe inlet

# Effects of AGIA vs. FERC-L48 Rate Policy



- AGIA policy; Initial, 1st and 2nd Expansion Shippers' Rates
- ▨ Lower-48 FERC policy, 1st Expansion (2018) Shippers' Rates
- Lower-48 FERC policy, 2nd Expansion Shippers' Rates (2021)
- ▨ Lower-48 FERC policy, 3rd Expansion Shippers' Rates (2023)




tax freeze

# Effects of AGIA vs. FERC-L48 Rate Policy (cont.)



- AGIA policy, Initial, 1st and 2nd Shippers' Rates
- ▨ AGIA policy, 3rd Expansion Shippers' Rates (2023)
- ▩ Lower-48 FERC policy, 3rd Expansion Shippers' Rates (2023)



- We don't know from where gas for a given expansions will come – state lands (12.5% royalty + PPT), federal lands (1/2 fed. royalty + PPT), or the OCS (0% royalty, no PPT).
- Given such uncertainty the state is clearly better off with AGIA's rolled-in rate provisions.

### Case A: "State gas first"

1<sup>st</sup> bcf from state lands  
2<sup>nd</sup> bcf from NPR-A  
3<sup>rd</sup> bcf from OCS

### Case B: "State gas second"

1<sup>st</sup> bcf from NPR-A  
2<sup>nd</sup> bcf from state lands  
3<sup>rd</sup> bcf from OCS

### Case C: "State gas last"

1<sup>st</sup> bcf from OCS  
2<sup>nd</sup> bcf from NPR-A  
3<sup>rd</sup> bcf from state lands

**State Revenue, AGIA Rates:  
All Expansions Occur**



- Without rolled-in rates it is **very unlikely** all expansions would occur. But if they did:  
 $[AGIA \text{ revenue}] - [L48 \text{ FERC revenue}] =$

	<b>State NPV<sub>5</sub> difference, \$2007 (billion)</b>			
	<u>Case A</u>	<u>Case B</u>	<u>Case C</u>	<u>Expected</u>
	State gas first	State gas 2nd	State gas last	<u>Value</u>
\$3.50	(0.91)	(0.79)	0.15	(0.52)
\$5.50	(0.75)	(0.58)	0.25	(0.36)
\$7.00	(0.71)	(0.52)	0.05	(0.39)

AGIA Revenue, AGIA Rates:  
No Looping

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- Without rolled-in rates it is **very likely** the last expansion won't occur. If it doesn't:  
 $[AGIA \text{ revenue}] - [L48 \text{ FERC revenue}] =$

	State NPV <sub>5</sub> difference, \$2007 (billion)			
	<u>Case A</u>	<u>Case B</u>	<u>Case C</u>	<u>Expected</u>
	State gas first	State gas 2nd	State gas last	<u>Value</u>
\$3.50	(1.13)	(1.05)	0.85	(0.44)
\$5.50	(0.74)	(0.65)	3.30	0.64
\$7.00	(0.56)	(0.46)	5.00	1.33

Revenue, AGIA Rates:  
 No Looping, No Full in-fill



The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- Without rolled-in rates it is *likely neither 2<sup>nd</sup> nor 3<sup>rd</sup>* expansion occur. If they don't:  
 [AGIA revenue] – [L48 FERC revenue] =

	State NPV <sub>5</sub> difference, \$2007 (billion)			
	<u>Case A</u>	<u>Case B</u>	<u>Case C</u>	<u>Expected</u>
	State gas first	State gas 2nd	State gas last	<u>Value</u>
\$3.50	1.71	1.67	2.18	1.85
\$5.50	5.63	5.57	6.28	5.83
\$7.00	8.51	8.45	9.27	8.75

**State Revenue, AGIA Rates:  
AGIA rates state's best bet**

**AGIA**

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- Even given the **bad** assumption of equal chance for each expansion path (e.g. odds of looping unaffected by rate treatment), AGIA maximizes expected state returns.

	<b>Expected Value State NPV<sub>5</sub> difference, \$2007 (billions)</b>			
	<b>All Three Exp.</b>	<b>1st Two Exp.</b>	<b>Only 1st Exp.</b>	<b>Avg of Cases</b>
\$3.50	(0.52)	(0.44)	1.85	0.30
\$5.50	(0.36)	0.64	5.83	2.03
\$7.00	(0.39)	1.33	8.75	3.23

# Worst Case Producer Effects of AGIA Rates


# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- The following shows Producer upstream investment measures given the three expansions under the “worst case” of no producer gas in any of the expansions.


	<b>NPV</b>	<b>IRR</b>	<b>P/I</b>	<b>NPV per BOE</b>	<b>% Δ NPV</b>	<b>Δ IRR</b>	<b>% Δ P/I</b>
\$3.50	3.8	29.5%	3.0	\$0.46	-7.0%	-0.22%	-4.8%
\$5.50	11.7	62.8%	7.3	\$1.41	-3.3%	-0.10%	-2.9%
\$7.00	17.4	79.0%	10.3	\$2.10	-2.3%	-0.13%	-2.1%

Frequency Distribution Producer Upstream NPV<sub>10</sub>




Note: Results differ from previously reported estimates due to recalibration of \$2004 to \$2006 price paths.

## Frequency Distribution Producer Upstream IRR



Note: Results differ from previously reported estimates due to recalibration of \$2004 to \$2006 price paths.

## Frequency Distribution Producer UpStream Profitability Ratio



Note: Results differ from previously reported estimates due to recalibration of \$2004 to \$2006 price paths.

# Summary

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

- AGIA rolled-in rates promote competition, exploration and development.
- Given uncertainties, AGIA's rolled-in rates are clearly in the state's monetary interest.
- The objective evidence indicates that AGIA's rolled-in provisions cost the Producers only modestly and ***are unlikely to affect their initial investment decisions.***

**The Palin-Parnell Administration presents**

# **AGIA**

**The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act**


**Presentation to Senate Judiciary  
4/11/2007**

# oil production tax

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

### Effective Production Tax Rate- Oil




# Q3. FT contracts: nominal dollar size of obligation



The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

The total financial commitment for the producers would be around \$3.4 billion per year, increasing to approximately \$4 billion per year for a 20% cost overrun. A producer with one-third of shipping capacity would make a financial commitment of between \$1.1 and \$1.33 billion per year.




# Q3. FT contracts (cont.): tariff in context of revenues

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

Revenues declines as known reserves decline; we assume no new discoveries.



## **Analysis of Producer Returns, Investment Attractiveness, and Fiscal Certainty**

Response to questions  
4-5, 9-11, 16

# How to measure investment attractiveness?

- NPV = “net present value”
  - The current value of future profits
- IRR = “internal rate of return”
  - The discount rate that makes  $NPV = 0$
- P/I = “profitability index”
  - $\frac{\text{[present value of cash inflows]}}{\text{[present value of outflows]}}$
- NPV/Boe = “NPV per barrel oil equivalent”
  - Measure of how much cash flow is generated from reserves

# Producer Upstream Returns

Base case cost = \$20.5B



	NPV	IRR	P/I	NPV per BOE
<b>\$3.50</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>\$0.49</b>
<b>\$4.00</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>39.7%</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>\$0.74</b>
<b>\$4.50</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>48.7%</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>\$0.98</b>
<b>\$5.00</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>56.3%</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>\$1.22</b>
<b>\$5.50</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>62.9%</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>\$1.46</b>
<b>\$6.00</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>68.9%</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>\$1.70</b>
<b>\$6.50</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>74.2%</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>\$1.93</b>
<b>\$7.00</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>79.2%</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>\$2.15</b>
<b>\$7.50</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>83.9%</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>\$2.37</b>
<b>\$8.00</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>90.4%</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>\$2.57</b>
<b>\$8.50</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>95.6%</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>\$2.76</b>

# Producer Upstream Returns

50% cost overrun = \$30.1B

# AGIA

The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

	NPV	IRR	P/I	NPV per BOE
\$3.50	1.2	13.8%	1.5	\$0.14
\$4.00	3.2	20.9%	2.2	\$0.39
\$4.50	5.2	28.0%	3.0	\$0.63
\$5.00	7.2	35.0%	3.8	\$0.87
\$5.50	9.2	41.4%	4.6	\$1.12
\$6.00	11.2	47.2%	5.4	\$1.35
\$6.50	13.1	52.4%	6.1	\$1.59
\$7.00	15.1	57.2%	6.9	\$1.82
\$7.50	16.9	61.9%	7.6	\$2.05
\$8.00	18.8	67.8%	8.3	\$2.27
\$8.50	20.5	72.7%	9.0	\$2.47


# Producers' returns as both shippers + pipeline owners

# AGIA


The Alaska Gasline Inducement Act

	NPV	IRR	P/I	NPV per BOE
\$3.50	3.0	12.6%	1.3	\$0.37
\$4.00	5.0	14.0%	1.4	\$0.60
\$4.50	6.9	15.4%	1.6	\$0.83
\$5.00	8.7	16.7%	1.7	\$1.06
\$5.50	10.6	17.9%	1.9	\$1.28
\$6.00	12.4	19.0%	2.0	\$1.50
\$6.50	14.2	20.1%	2.2	\$1.72
\$7.00	16.0	21.1%	2.3	\$1.93
\$7.50	17.7	22.1%	2.5	\$2.14
\$8.00	19.3	23.0%	2.6	\$2.33
\$8.50	20.8	23.9%	2.7	\$2.51

**Frequency Distribution of Producer NPV<sub>10</sub>**




## Frequency Distribution of Producer IRR




# Relative likelihood

### Frequency Distribution of Producer Profitability Ratio



**Internal Rate of Return (IRR)  
(\$35 and \$25 oil and 6/1 oil/gas ratio)**



Project comparison data from EconOne presentation to LB&A Committee, 6/14/06. EconOne data 13  
assumes 100% Producer pipeline ownership; upstream return data assumes 0% pipeline ownership.