

ALASKA LEGISLATURE COMMITTEE FILES 1993-1994 8672

8049 HOUSE RESOURCES

314

APPENDIX A

TANK TIGHTNESS TESTING/SITE ASSESSMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM SUMMARY

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FA APPLICATION		FA AWARDED		FA ENCUMBERED		NOT ELIGIBLE	COMMENTS
			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Tongass Association	Westflight Bldg	2491	900.00		900.00					Complete
Totem Services	Totem Chevron	0234		2,400.00		1,724.21			675.79	Complete
Totem Svcs Inc	Totem Services	0234	900.00		900.00					Complete
Wainer, H Erling	Peters Creek Texaco	0025	1,200.00	3,200.00	1,200.00	3,200.00				Complete
Weber, Gary	Wasilla Chevron	1896	1,200.00	3,200.00	1,200.00	2,500.00			700.00	Complete
Wilbur, Joseph	Flight Safety AK	0448	275.00		275.00					Complete
Wilbur, Joseph	Flight Safety AK	0292	900.00		600.00				300.00	Complete
World Wide Movers	World Wide Movers	0381	300.00		300.00					Complete
Zarcone Bros Real Estat	Lynx Creek Tesoro	2570	600.00		600.00					Complete
AK Aerofuel Inc	AK Aerofuel Inc Tanks #1	1529	600.00					600.00		Received 3/9/92
AK Aerofuel Inc	AK Aerofuel Inc Tanks #3	1529	600.00					600.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Ketchikan	1340	215.00					215.00		Received 3/5/92
AK Airlines	Cargo Bldg-Sitka	1486	300.00					300.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Yakutat	1588	300.00					300.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Ketchikan	1340	551.50	1,600.00				551.50	1,600.00	Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Cargo Bldg-Juneau	1570	558.00	1,600.00				558.00	1,600.00	Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Kodiak	0332	600.00					600.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Kotzebue	1704	600.00					600.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Regional Hdqtrs - Anchorage	0813	900.00					900.00		Intents with Applications
AK Airlines	Nome	1709	900.00					900.00		Received 3/5/92
AK Airlines	Cargo Bldg-Fbks	1348	1,200.00					1,200.00		Intents with Applications
AK Terminals Inc	AK Terminals Inc	0940	825.00					825.00		Received 2/28/92
Anders, Ed	Chena Valley Develop	2738	600.00					600.00		Received 2/27/92
Anders, Ed	Valley Center Store	2736	600.00					600.00		Received 2/27/92
Anders, Ed	Anders Cache Store	2737	900.00					900.00		Received 2/27/92
ANICA	Bethel Power Products	2376	600.00					600.00		Intents with Applications
ARA Denali Park Hotels	Hotel Area	1554	600.00					600.00		Received 2/27/92
ARA Denali Park Hotels	Mt McKinley Village	0314	600.00					600.00		Received 2/27/92
Benco Inc	Big Wheel Tire	0868	900.00					900.00		Received 12/31/91
Black Bear Inc.	Black Bear Store	2548	900.00					900.00		Received 2/28/ 2
Bosch, G.	G & G Foodmart	2839	600.00					600.00		Intents with application
Bradford, Gary D.	Penn. Automotive	2649	600.00					600.00		Received 3/4/92
Bristol Bay Contractors I	Bristol Bay Contractors Inc	0702	300.00					300.00		Received 2/28/92
Brunquist, Norm	4618 Lk Spenard	1479	1,200.00					1,200.00		Received 12/31/91
Bush Pilots Air Svc	Bush Pilots Air Svc	0659	900.00	2,400.00				900.00	2,400.00	Intents with Applications
Campbell, A.	Spartan Service	2413	825.00					825.00		Intents with application
Carlson Enterprises	Carlson Enterprises	1504	600.00					600.00		Received 12/30/91
Central Pen Gen Hospit	Central Pen Gen Hospital	2385	600.00					600.00		Received 2/27/92
Chevron USA	2801 Boniface Pkwy	0059	465.00					465.00		Received 3/5/92

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OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FA APPLICATION		FA AWARDED		FA ENCUMBERED		NOT ELIGIBLE	COMMENTS
			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Chevron USA	415 Muldoon	0053	555.00				555.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	2200 W. Dimond	1961	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	11836 Old Glenn	1962	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	1465 W No. Lights Blvd	0007	925.00				925.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	1304 Airport Heights	0019	1,065.00				1,065.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	6470 Debarr Rd	0012	1,175.00				1,175.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	3608 Minnesota Dr	0047	1,175.00				1,175.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	303 W. Fireweed	1769	1,175.00				1,175.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	4417 Lake Otis Pkwy	0024	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	832 E. 6th Ave	0015	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	815 W. International Airport	0074	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	439 W Evergreen	0969	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	5210 Old Seward	1781	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA	11460 Old Seward	1784	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Chevron USA Inc	Lake Otis Chevron	0024		3,200.00				3,200.00		Received 3/4/92
Chugach Electric Assoc	Headquarters Facility	0726	382.50				382.50			Intents with application
City & Boro of Juneau	Harborview School	2070	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Capital School	2073	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	West Juneau Lift Station	2161	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Sitka St Pump Station	2162	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	S. Franklin Lift Station	2163	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Outer Dr Lift Station	2164	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Bartlett Hospital Lift Station	2166	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Auke Bay Fire Dept	2168	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Lemon Crk A Lift Station	2172	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Lawson Crk Lift Station	2173	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Gruening Park Lift Station	2174	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Valley Ct Lift Station	2175	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Downtown Fire Dept	2159	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Basin Rd Pump Hse	2160	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Glacier Fire Dept	2167	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Twin Lakes Lift Station	2165		800.00				800.00		Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Fleet Maintenance	2169		1,100.00				1,100.00		Received 12/31/91
City & Boro of Juneau	Juneau Airport Maintenance	2157		1,600.00				1,600.00		Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Busbarn	2171		1,923.66				1,923.66		Received 12/30/91
City & Boro of Juneau	Capital Transit Bus Barn	2171		2,400.00				2,400.00		Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Juneau	Eagle Crest Ski Area	1891		3,200.00				3,200.00		Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Green Lake Hydro Plant	2329	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	The Cove Sanitary Sewer Lift Station	2320	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications

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			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
City & Boro of Sitka	Halibut Pt Sanitary Sewer Lift Statio	2331	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Sandy Beach Sanitary Sewer Lift Sta	2332	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Indian River Sanitary Sewer Lift Sta	2333	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Thomsen Harbor Sanitary Sewer Lift	2334	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Lincoln&Lake St Sanitary Sewer Lift	2335	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Jamestown Bay Sanitary Sewer Lift	2336	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City & Boro of Sitka	Airport Maintenance	0464	900.00				900.00			Intents with Applications
City of Craig	Public Works	1708		334.47				334.47		Received 12/26/91
City of Delta Junction	Fire Station	0212	300.00				300.00			Received 2/3/92
City of Fairbanks	Fire Station #4	0347	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City of Fairbanks	Public Works Fac	0345	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
City of Fairbanks	Public Safety Bldg	0354	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
City of Fairbanks	Wastewater Treatment Plant	0379	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
City of Homer	Public Safety	2531					300.00			Intents with application
City of Hoonah	Hoonah Public Works	1743	597.26				597.26			Rec 3-18-92
City of Ketchikan	Public Works Warehouse	1182	600.00				600.00			Rec 4/23/92
City of Kodiak	St Herman Harbor	0126	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Kodiak Police Dept	0524	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Lower Reservoir Pump Station	2418	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Pillar Creek Pump Station	2419	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Wastewater Treatment Plant	2420	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Lift Station 4	2421	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Kodiak Public Works	0520	600.00				600.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	Kodiak Fire Dept	0528	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
City of Kodiak	St. Paul Harbor/Pier II	1082	1,500.00				1,200.00		300.00	Received 3/5/92
City of Nome	PW Building	2377	300.00	800.00			300.00	800.00		Intents with application
City of St Paul	City Power Plant	2394		3,200.00				3,200.00		Intents with application
Classen, Thomas J.	Hangar-Fbks Int'l Airport	2538	300.00	800.00			300.00	800.00		Intents with Applications
Columbus Distributing	Airport Texaco	1389	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Columbus Distributing	Soldotna Texaco	1391	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Dean, Robert	Pinnacle Mountain	2516	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Delta Airlines	Anch Int'l Airport	0208	900.00				900.00			Intents with application
Ebbert, Keith	Sunrise Inn	2270	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Ellis, W. T.	Duffy's Roadhouse	2497	600.00				600.00			Received 12/31/91
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopters Fairbanks	0223	600.00				600.00			Received 12/31/91
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopters Juneau	0477	900.00				900.00			Received 12/31/91
EV-JO Inc	Kenai Texaco	0523	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Evert's Air Fuel, Inc.	Evert's Air Fuel, Inc.	0425	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 2/18/92
Fickes, Lester&Dorothy	Riverview Quick Stop	1054	540.00				540.00			Intents with application

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			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Fishers Fuel Inc	Larrys Healy Service	0492	900.00				825.00		75.00	Received 3/9/92
Fishers Fuel Inc	Fisher's Fuel Mile 52 Parks	1114	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Fishers Fuel Inc	Palmer Tesoro	0870	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Fishers Fuel Inc	Mars Hilltop	0388	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Frontier Flying Service	Frontier Flying Service	0130	1,200.00	3,200.00			1,200.00	3,200.00		Intents with application
Frosty Fuel Co	Dutch Harbor	0991	300.00	800.00			300.00	800.00		Intents with Applications
Frosty Fuel Co.	Cold Bay	0993		800.00				800.00		Intents with Applications
Frosty Fuel Co.	Port Heiden	2547		1,600.00				1,600.00		Intents with Applications
Gamble, E.B.	Fritz Creek Gen Store	0245	600.00				600.00			Received 3/4/92
Garrett, Nelson	Garrett Tesoro	2527	600.00				600.00			Received 3-10-92
George, Spiro L. Sr.	George's Grocery	0800	600.00	1,600.00			600.00	1,600.00		Intents with Applications
Grammont, Willard	Willard's Auto Electric	2484	1,800.00	4,800.00			900.00	2,400.00	3,300.00	Intents with Applications
Harris Sand & Gravel	Harris Sand & Gravel	2544	600.00				600.00			Received 2/18/92
Hoover, Darlene	Services Unlimited	2437	600.00				600.00			Received 3/4/92
Hoover, Darlene	Hoover's Chevron	1039	900.00				900.00			Received 3/4/92
Hudson Air Svc& Sons In	Talkeetna State Airport	1223	300.00				300.00			Received 3/5/92
Icicle Seafoods Inc	Petersburg Fisheries	0508	300.00				300.00			Received 3/2/92
Icicle Seafoods Inc	Seward Fisheries	1680	600.00				600.00			Intents with application
Illies, Dennis	Valley Country Store #2	1987	550.00				550.00			Received 2/27/92
Illies, Dennis	Valley Country Store #1	1988	825.00				825.00			Received 2/27/92
Int'l Aviation Services	Int'l Aviation Services	0409	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
Int'l In-Flight Catering	Int'l In-Flight Catering	0449	300.00				300.00			Received 12/31/91
Island Union Services In	Union Tire & Brake	2379	1,100.00				1,100.00			Received 3/2/92
Jones, Troy	Big Su Lodge	2320	900.00	2,400.00			900.00	2,400.00		Received 12/30/91
Kasilof Riverview Lodge	Kasilof Riverview Lodge	0384	1,200.00	3,200.00			1,200.00	3,200.00		Intents with Applications
Kenai Airport Fuel Svc	Kenai Airport Fuel Svc	2187	1,200.00	2,621.50			1,200.00	2,621.50		Received 2/14/92
Ketchikan Air Service	Wrangell Air	0691	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Ketchikan Air Svc Inc.	Ketchikan Air Svc Inc.	1335	900.00				900.00			Received 2/24/92
Ketchum Air Svc	Ketchum Air Svc	1143	1,200.00	3,200.00			1,200.00	3,200.00		Intents with application
Kim, Ok Y	Kim's Oceanview Texaco	0762	735.00				735.00			Received 3/4/92
Korovin Corp	Olson's Texaco #2(854 E 36th)	2287	900.00				900.00			Received 12/31/91
Korovin Corp	Olson's Texaco #1(3607 Spenard)	2288	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 12/31/91
Laidlaw Transit	Soldotna	1254	825.00				825.00			Need notif & pd inv
Laidlaw Transit(Cunning)	Laidlaw Transit - Homer	1581	300.00				300.00			Need paid invoices
Lake Clark Air Inc	Lake Clark Air Inc	2426	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
Lake Hood Associates	Lake Hood Associates	2360	900.00				900.00			Intent with Application
LaPan, Richard	Anchor Point Tesoro	2550	900.00				900.00			Intents with Applications
Larry's Flying Service	Larry's Flying Service	0111	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Lk Hood Air Harbor	Lk Hood Air Harbor	1728	400.00				400.00			Intents with application

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			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Long Rifle Lodge Ltd	Long Rifle Lodge Ltd	1950	300.00	800.00			300.00	800.00		Intents with Applications
Lot Inc	Hatcher Pass Gateway Ctr	0123	600.00				600.00			Received 12/31/91
Macomber Corp	Macomber Corp	0446	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
Mapco Express	#5017 1773 College Rd(Fbks)	1333	850.86				850.86			Received 12/19/91
Mapco Express	#5020 2900 E Tudor(Anch)	2545	850.86				850.86			Received 12/19/91
Mapco Express	#5018 205 E 3rd(Fbks)	0966	900.00				900.00			Received 12/19/91
Mapco Express	#5022 2300 Cushman(Fbks)	2546	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 12/19/91
Marathon Fuel Corp	Seward Marina	0162	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/3/92
Maritime Helicopters	Maritime Helicopters	0864	300.00				300.00			Received 3/4/92
Mark Air Inc	4100 W Int'l Airport-Anch	0611	300.00				300.00			Received 12/30/91
Mark Air Inc	6441 So Air Park Dr	2718	300.00				300.00			Received 12/30/91
MarkAir Inc	Aniak Airport	1377	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
MarkAir Inc	Kodiak Airport	0092	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
MarkAir Inc (Magoffin)	MarkAir Aircraft Hanger	2371	300.00				300.00			Received 12/23/91
MarkAir, Inc	Cargo Terminal, Fbks	1110	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 12/23/91
MarkAir, Inc	Warehouse/vehicle Main(Fbk)	2751	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 12/23/91
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Plant Building	0535		786.00				786.00		Received 1/17/92
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Talkeetna C.O.	0419		800.00				800.00		Received 1/17/92
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Willow C.O.	0655		800.00				800.00		Received 1/17/92
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Palmer C.O.	1458		800.00				800.00		Received 1/17/92
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Eagle Rivar	0529		800.00				800.00		Received 1/17/92
Matanuska Tele Assoc	MTA Healy C.O.	1556		1,600.00				1,600.00		Received 1/17/92
McClain, R & Smith L.	Mentasta Lodge	1936	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
McMahan, Ronald S.	Ron's Service	1478	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
Missionary Aviation Rep	MARC Flight Center	0158	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
MOA Facility Maintenanc	Latimer Fire Station	1426	300.00	800.00			300.00	800.00		Received 2-7-92
MOA Solid Waste Svc	Central Transfer Station	1306	300.00				300.00			Intents with application
Mountain Corp	Mountain Market	2616		1,475.75				1,475.75		Received 12/26/91
Nenana Heating Svcs	A Frame Svcs	1623	900.00	2,400.00			900.00	2,400.00		Rec 3-27-92
Nickerson, Vicki	Goldstream General Store	1068	600.00	1,442.50			600.00	1,442.50		Received 12/31/91
Nistler Enterprises	Nistler Enterprises	0594	900.00				900.00			Received 12/31/91
Paxson Lodge Inc	Paxson Lodge Inc	1938	900.00				900.00			Intents with application
Petersburg Motors Inc	Petersburg Motors Inc	0206	900.00				900.00			Received 3/4/92
Prato, Marcel	Cascade Liquor	2508	980.67				900.00			Received 12/27/91
PTI Communication	Juneau-204 Main	0145	260.00				260.00			Intents with application
PTI Communication	Juneau-9229 Cessna	0143	300.00				300.00			Intents with application
Qwik Three Inc	Qwik Lube - Fbks	2474	900.00				900.00			Rec 4-7-92
Rabbage, Terence	Chinook Chevron Svc	0926	900.00				900.00			Received 3/2/92
Rain Proof Roofing, Inc	Rain Proof Roofing, Inc	0286	600.00				600.00			Need paid invoices & FA-1

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			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Reeve Aleutian Airways	Port Heiden	0528	300.00				300.00			Intents with Applications
Reeve Aleutian Airways	Anchorage	1593	900.00				900.00			Intents with Applications
Reliable Transfer Corp	Reliable Shop	0181	208.00				208.00			Intents with application
Rogers, Doris	Eagle Auto Service Center	2532	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Roofe, Marvin	Four Corner Store	1662	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Sadler, Anna L.	A.K. Chevron	2461	900.00				900.00			Intents with Applications
Sea Land Service Inc	Sea Land Freight Svc	0043	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Sears Roebuck & Co	Sears Roebuck & Co	1466	300.00	1,600.00			300.00	1,600.00		Intents with Applications
Second Ave Service	Second Ave Service	2341		996.80				996.80		Received 12/26/91
Stark Lewis Co.	Stark Lewis Co.	2647	360.00				180.00		180.00	Received 2/24/92
Stelling, John	Stelling Enterprises	2203		800.00				800.00		Received 12/11
Stephan's Tool Rental&	Stephan's Tool Rental&Sales Inc	0975	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
Stephens, Ron	Peter's Creek Svc	2587	1,200.00				900.00		300.00	Received 3/4/92
Strang, Gerald	Gakona Lodge	2357	900.00	2,400.00			900.00	2,400.00		Intents with Applications
Sunny Chevron Svc, Inc.	Sunny Chevron Svc, Inc.	0413	600.00				600.00			Intents with application
Tacks General Store	Tacks General Store	0793	900.00	2,400.00			900.00	2,400.00		Inten's with application
Taku Oil Sales	Woodsey's Union Service	0113	600.00				600.00			Received 3/4/92
Taku Oil Sales	Aurora Fuel Services	0282	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/4/92
Tanana Gas Co.	Tanana Gas Co.	2457	300.00				300.00			Intents with application
Tatsuda's Supermarket	Tatsuda's Supermarket Inc.	0424	900.00				900.00			Received 2/21/92
Tatsunda's Supermarket	Tatsunda's Ward Cove Market	0466	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Temasco Helicopters Inc	Temasco Helicopters-Vrangell	1775	300.00				300.00			Received 3/3/92
Temasco Helicopters Inc	Temasco Helicopters-Juneau	0270	600.00				600.00			Received 3/3/92
Temasco Helicopters Inc	Temasco Helicopters-Ketchikan	1768	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/3/92
Temasco Helicopters Inc	Temasco Fuel Svc-Ketchikan	2634		810.32				810.32		Received 3/3/92
Tesoro AK Petroleum	Huffman Tesoro #15	1984	515.00				515.00			Received 3/5/92
Tesoro AK Petroleum	Willner's Mini Mart	0112	600.00				600.00			Received 3/5/92
Tesoro AK Petroleum	Garrett's #1	1404	900.00				900.00			Received 3/5/92
Tesoro AK Petroleum	Alaska Mechanical	0125	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Tesoro AK Petroleum	Discount Truck Stop(Interior Fuels)	0084	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
The Hanger Group Inc.	Northshore Aviation	0005	1,200.00				1,200.00			Received 3/5/92
Thompson, Dean	AAA Plumbing & Heating	2602	600.00	1,600.00			600.00	1,600.00		Intents with Applications
Tundra Tours Inc	Tundra Tours Bus Co.-Fbks	1671	600.00				600.00			Received 12/31/91
Tundra Tours Inc.	Tundra Tours Bus Co - North Pole	1675	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Tundra Tours Inc.	Tundra Tours Bus Co - Wasilla	1051	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
Tundra Tours Inc.	Tundra Tours Bus Co - Palmer	0313	600.00				600.00			Intents with Applications
U-Haul Co of AK	Anch U-Haul Center	1201	600.00				600.00			Intents with application
Uyak Air Service Inc	Uyak Air Service	1034	300.00				300.00			Received 3/4/92
Wadsworth, Norma	Camper City Super Service	2530		3,200.00				3,200.00		Intents with Applications

APPENDIX A

TANK TIGHTNESS TESTING/SITE ASSESSMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM SUMMARY

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FA APPLICATION		FA AWARDED		FA ENCUMBERED		NOT ELIGIBLE	COMMENTS
			TTT	SA	TTT	SA	TTT	SA		
Warren, Stephen	C & W Repair	0316	877.00				877.00			Received 2/12/92
Wickwire, Thomas	Tanana Air Svc	1723		1,600.00				1,600.00		Intents with application
William T Heister Inc	Sandlake Service	0189	825.00				825.00			Received 12/31/91
Wilson, Mark&Delores	Wilson, Mark&Delores	2561	594.00				594.00			Received 2/21/92
Woods Air Fuel Inc	Woods Air Fuel Inc	1571	1,200.00				1,200.00			Intents with Applications
Wuerth, Julius&Juergen	Pacific Mitsubishi	2566		800.00				800.00		Received 2/24/92
Aero Tech Flight	Aero Tech Flight	2131	742.50						742.50	Work done prior to Sep-90
Benshoof, Lyman	Benshoof, Lyman	2402								No work done
Blackard, Joe&Mary	Bus Barn	0324	517.50						517.50	Work done prior to Sep-90
Chevron USA	2500 Seward Hwy	1778	175.00						175.00	Line test, not tank test
Chumley's Inc	Chumley's Inc	UNK							NE	Received 12/31/91
City of Homer	Public Library, 141 W Pioneer Ave	2522	300.00						300.00	Heating Oil Tank
City of Homer	Wastewater Treatment,3575 Heath S	2522	600.00						600.00	Over Max Limit/Facility
City of Houston	Volunteer Fire Dept	2733	600.00						600.00	Withdrew appl-other funding
Copper Basin Dist.	Tazlina Service	1949	600.00						600.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Fbks Daily News Minor	Fairbanks Daily News Minor	2188	600.00						600.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Fbks Motors, Inc.	Fairbanks Motors, Inc.	1483	400.00						400.00	Not an approved method
Gartz, Albert	OK Fuel Co.	1594	1,500.00						1,500.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Hammon, Fred	Soldotna Y Chevron	0518								Tanks out of use on 9/5/90
Hanauer, Ellen	Cushman Box Boy Grocery	1089		2,400.00					2,400.00	No proof of work or pymt
Homer Electric Assoc	HEA-Homer	1261	900.00						900.00	Received 11/1
Horrell Investments	Glennallen Chevron	2292	1,200.00						1,200.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Interior Fuels	Interior Fuels - Discount Trk	0084	1,200.00						1,200.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Interior Fuels	Interior Fuels - Heating Oil	0084	1,200.00						1,200.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Mapco Express	#5004 5159 Old Seward(Anch)	1500	850.86						850.86	Out of Compliance
Mapco Express	#5006 1501 E Dimond(Anch)	1505	850.86						850.86	Out of Compliance
Mapco Express	#5014 1900 Muldoon(Anch)	1517	850.86						850.86	Out of Compliance
Mapco Express	#5024 8803 Jewel Lk(Anch)	1521	850.86						850.86	Out of Compliance
Mapco Express	#5021 6010 Old Seward(Anch)	0727	1,134.48						1,134.48	Out of Compliance
Mapco Express	#5010 1500 E 5th(Anch)	1512	1,200.00						1,200.00	Out of Compliance
McMahan, R.S.	Ron's Service & Towing	1478	900.00						900.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Northwest Airlines	Northwest Airlines-Anchorage	UNK	225.00						225.00	Costs Prior to 9/90
Peters, Ken	Tudor Car Wash	2451	850.00						850.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Tesoro Ak Petroleum	Willner's Mini Mart	0112	600.00						600.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Tesoro Ak Petroleum	Garrett's New Seward	1404	900.00						900.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
Tesoro Ak Petroleum	Alaska Mechanical	0125	1,200.00						1,200.00	Work done prior to Sep-90
TOT			\$242,164	\$120,354	\$77,306	\$33,410	\$141,150	\$77,891	\$32,981	

Shaded Area = Reimbursement Paid

APPENDIX B

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 92 REQUESTS		GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN			C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Illies, Riley, Worrell	Stop N Shop-Emergenoy Grt	2315	109,460	12,163	109,460		X							X
Nixon, William	Anchorage Clean Sweep	1233	247,995	25,000	82,268		X	X		X			X	
Kelly, Bud	Kelly's Tire & Wheel	1460	949,600	25,000	68,967		X		X				X	X
Wilson, Don	Don Wilson	2529	100,000	11,111	Note 1									
Decker, Robert	University Car Care	2285	142,003	15,778	31,485				X				X	X
Cook, John	Sterling Tesoro	2286	33,165	3,685	47,827									X
Continental Baking Co.	Sunrise Bakery	0330	95,655	10,628	97,218		X		X	X			X	X
Miller, Dale	Alaska Chevron	0556	800,148	25,000	56,338								X	
John, Alec & Ruby	Tsesyu Tesoro	1224	18,828	2,092	22,661								X	X
Illies, Riley, Worrell	Wasilla Stop-N-Shop	2315	885,670	12,837	130,798		X		X				X	X
Cohen, David	Sheep Mtn. Lodge	2005	348,000	25,000	27,167				X				X	X
Weber, Gary	Wasilla Chevron	1896	18,315	2,035	22,760								X	X
Hanauer, Ellen	Cushman Box Boy Grocery	1089	35,500	2,500	35,500		X		X				X	
Alaskan Federal Credit Union	SJ Chapman Subdiv	2422	239,000	25,000	83,058		X	X	X					
Northstar Ventures	Seven - 11 #105	1983	98,700	10,900	49,500			X		X				X
Alaska Sightseeing, Inc	Alaska Sightseeing	1657	109,480	12,162	80,140		X	X		X				
Garrett, Nelson	Garrett's Tesoro	2527	225,000	25,000	54,014			X	X					X
K & L Distributors, Inc	K & L Distributors (Anchorage)	1503	15,523	1,725	35,959			X		X				X
Young, E.J.	Young Investment	0013	6,884	765	5,414		X	X		X				
Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.	Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.	1919	25,055	2,784	8,291		X	X		X				
Benward, Roy	Lot 2A Jeanie Subdiv	2582	2,005	223	1,871		X			X			X	
Byers, Andrea & William	A & B Tool & Equip Rental, Inc.	0105	947	105	861			X		X				X
Allinger, Leroy	Mt. McKinley Rental	2528	6,014	668	7,190			X		X				X
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner	Fairbanks Daily News-Miner	2188	29,579	3,287	19,268		X			X				
K & L Distributors, Inc	K & L Distributing (Fairbanks)	1958	16,200	1,800	9,278			X		X				X
McMahan, Ronald	Ron's Service & Towing	1478	6,903	767	Note 1									
Nixon, William	Anchorage Clean Sweep - Phase II	1233	113,000		99,968		X	X		X				
Kelly, Bud	Kelly's Tire & Wheel - Phase II	1460	301,130		265,908	25,000		X		X				X
Decker, Robert	University Car Care - Phase II	2285	195,290	9,222	318,148			X		X				X
Cook, John	Cook's Sterling Tesoro - Phase II	2286	428,685	21,315	60,332									X
Miller, Dale	Alaska Chevron - Phase II	556	635,642		Note 2									
Illies, Worrell & Riley	Stop N Shop - Phase II	2315	450,000		133,469			X		X				X
Cohen, David	Sheep Mtn. Lodge - Phase II	2005	250,000		235,188					X				
Weber, Gary	Wasilla Chevron - Phase II	1896	427,035	22,965	192,085			X		X				X
Hanauer, Ellen	South Cushman Box Boy - Phase II	1089	259,536	22,500	99,580					X			X	
Alaskan Federal Cr Union	SJ Chapman Subdiv - Phase II	2422	329,880		Note 1									
Tesoro Northstore	7-11 #105(1246 Noble-Fbks) - Phase II	1983	112,902	12,545	Note 1									
Ak Sightseeing Tours	Ak Sightseeing Tours - Phase II	1657	179,682	12,638	155,389		X	X		X				
Garrett, Nelson	Garrett's Tesoro - Phase II	2527	264,795		224,690			X		X				
K & L Distributors, Inc	K & L Distributors (Anchorage)-Phase II	1503	139,500	15,500	90,468					X				

APPENDIX B

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 92 REQUESTS		GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN			C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Samuel, A.M.	Moose Creek Gen Store-Emerg Grt	2199	112,050	12,450	2,808									X
Decker, Robert	University Car Care - Emergency Grant	2285	215,000	0	210,488		X							
TOTAL			\$8,780,125	\$387,350	\$3,155,806	\$25,000	15	18	8	22	0	12	21	
INELIGIBLE APPLICATIONS - FY 92			FY92 Application Requests											
Dawson, Leona	Wike's Service Station			no estimate	Ineligible									
Roderick, Paul	Former Service Station		81,000	9,000	Ineligible									
Wise, Dennis	Cornerstone Gas		162,000	18,000	Ineligible									
Russell, Darrell	Russell's Texaco			no estimate	Ineligible									

FY 92 Tank Cleanup Program Allocation	FY92	Grants/Loans	Allocation	Explanation - Activities Funded Codes
	Allocation	Processed	Balance	
Revised FY92 Allocation	4,137,873	3,180,806	957,067	C-Containment; CA-Corrective Action
Financial Assistance	4,058,453	3,180,806	877,647	CL-Closure; CU-Cleanup Activities
Contingency Balance	79,420		79,420	RA-Risk Assessment
				SA-Site Assessment; T-Testing

Note 1: Grant still under review. Need approved Corrective Action Plan before grant can be issued.

Note 2: Grant processed in the amount of \$259,128. Funds will be encumbered as soon as signed by grantee.

Shaded Area = Grant Offer Signed and Funds Encumbered

APPENDIX C

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 92 REQUESTS		GRANTS ISSUED		NOTES
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	UPGRADE	CLOSURE	
Agni, Steve	Carr Gottstein			15,600			FA-3
AK USA Federal Credit Union	Big Lake	2308		4,842			NE
AK USA Federal Credit Union	Lamplight Chevron	2307		39,825			NE
Alaskan Federal Credit Union	SJ Chapman Subdivision	2422		57,000		6,635	
Alaska Sightseeing Tours, Inc.	Alaska Sightseeing Tours, Inc.	1657		14,854		14,532	
Anchorage Chrysler Center	Anchorage Chrysler Center	0161		1,323			FA-3,5
Asako Corporation Ltd.	Alaska Sportsman's Lodge	2284		14,998		14,911	
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Laidlaw Transit	0324		11,811			NE
Byers, William	A & B Tool & Equipment Rental	0105		19,585		13,838	
City of Palmer	Public Works Shop	0652		9,626		6,425	
City of Palmer	Public Works Shop/Airport Facility	0692		9,626		9,680	
City of Unalaska	Dept of Public Works-Valley Rd.	0089	16,372	4,538			NE
Cline's Texaco	Cline's Texaco	0031	18,300		8,490		
Cohen, David	Sheep Mountain Lodge	2005	27,600	8,700			
Copper Valley Electric Ass'n.	CVEA - Glennallen	0290		2,614		2,326	
Cooper, Stephen	3712 University Ave. Fbx	2525		3,854		2,042	
Courtney's Tudor Service	Courtney's Tudor Service	2375	51,000	9,000			
Dam, William E.	Government Hill Texaco	2524	60,000				
Deacon, Jacqueline	Sister's Construction			32,822			FA-3
Decker, Robert	University Car Care	2285	40,285	19,715			
Denali Fuel Company	Denali Fuel Company	0537		59,145		14,174	
Dennison, K.M.	Lake Hood, Space #603	0323		1,200			NE
Dunham, Leverne C.	Pigs for Pets			30,240			
Fairbanks Daily News Miner	Fairbanks Daily News Miner	2188	16,584	2,280	15,864	2,290	
Fairbanks Motors, Inc.	Fairbanks Motors, Inc.	1483		1,680			
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Baler/Landfill	0941		22,316		22,316	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Big Dipper Ice Rink	1260		19,178		5,772	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Chena Lakes Recreation Area	1248		9,106		3,300	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Hunter Elementary	2629		9,106		9,106	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Hutchison Career Center	2213		9,106		9,106	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Lathrop High School	2212		9,106		9,106	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	North Pole High School	2589		9,106		9,106	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	North Pole Middle School	2630		9,106		9,106	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	North Pole Transfer Station	2631		11,708		11,708	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Old Sewage Plant	2206		11,708		11,708	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Steese Volunteer Fire Depart	2436		13,800		7,082	
Fairbanks North Star Borough	Westcott Pool	1253		9,106		3,360	
Fennimore, Ron	Fennimore Service Center	0386	3,165		422		
Gana - A' Yoo	Fbks Int'l Airport	2045		12,000			NE

APPENDIX C

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 92 REQUESTS		GRANTS ISSUED		NOTES
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	UPGRADE	CLOSURE	
Garrett, Nelson	Garrett's Tesoro	2527	39,600		60,000		
Golden Valley Electric Assoc	Golden Valley Electric Assoc	0128		5,152			
Grasto, Gena & Jeanette	Valley View Center	0249		12,611		8,411	
Greer Tank, Inc.	Greer Tank, Inc.	1188	14,635	7,190		7,629	
Haines Light & Power Co.	Haines Light & Power, Co., Inc.	0360		1,451		1,451	
Haxby, John	239 E. Int'l. Airport Road	1922		5,280		5,800	
Head, Henry P.	H.P. Head, Lake Spennard #113	1689		210			NE
Hiddleston, George & Mary	c/o John Starke	0792		10,620		11,577	
Higgins, Charles	Charles Higgins Company	2127		5,534		5,534	
Hilles, Riley & Worrell	Wasilla Stop 'n' Shop	2315	60,000				
John, Alec & Ruby	Tsuyvu Service Station	1224	3,576	8,160	3,884	6,480	
K & L Distributors, Inc.	K & L Distributors, Fbx.	1958		12,000			FA-3
K & L Distributors, Inc.	K & L Distributors, Inc. Anch.	1503		9,408		3,264	
Kardatzke, Mike	Aviation Insurance of Alaska, Inc.	1694		5,751		5,580	
Kurani, Inc.	Kurani, Inc., Pizza Hut 210 Center Ct.	1218		2,805		2,313	
Lynden Transport, Inc.	Lynden Transport, Inc.	0216		8,335			NE
Markley, Jack & Viola	1208 Gambell	2274		13,601			
Matteson, Barry	House of Harley	2608		6,841		6,268	
McBride, Mike	McBride's Flight Operations	1711	5,031	3,101		3,002	
McManan, Ronald S.	Ron's Service and Towing	1478	1,645	2,926		4,024	
Miller, Dale	Alaska Chevron	0556	29,603	1,320	Issued Grant under FY93 Program		
Moose Creek General Store	Moose Creek General Store	2199	59,092	8,922	60,000		
MOA-Solid Waste Services	Central Transfer Station	1306		13,227	60,000		
MOA-Solid Waste Services	Anchorage Regional Landfill	2086		13,227	43,939		
Nenana Heating Services, Inc.	Nenana Heating Services, Inc.	1626	770				Withdrew
Perkins, James & Barbara	Clear H-2-O	1666		7,725		5,792	
Petroleum Sales	Petroleum Sales	0201		20,370		22,407	
R & M Consultants	R & M Consultants	0249		10,876		7,750	
Rain Proof Roofing	Rain Proof Roofing	0286		5,340		5,038	
Robbins, Mary L.(No-Par Inc)	The Village Store	0219	36,600	23,400	Grant was declined		
Roderick, Paul	Anchor Point Texaco	2432	60,000				NE
Schwanke, Roland	Sterling Chevron	0642				13,304	
Second Ave. Service, Inc.	Second Avenue Service, Inc.	2341	35,444	10,800	35,444	10,800	
Skagway Fuels-Gordon, Alvin	Skagway Fuels	0991		884		884	
Soldotna Y Chevron	Soldotna Y Chevron	0518	7,414				NE
Summit Lake Lodge	Summit Lake Lodge	1935	10,667	5,893		4,734	
Sunrise Distributor, Inc.	Sunrise Distributor, Inc.	2293		3,926		3,428	
Superior Car Wash Systems	Alaska Auto Import Specialties	2576		10,543		10,161	
Superior Car Wash Systems	Wasilla Car Wash	1283	11,876			11,745	

APPENDIX C

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 92 REQUESTS		GRANTS ISSUED		NOTES
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	UPGRADE	CLOSURE	
T. C. T. Communication	T.C.T. Communications	2271		4,990		4,914	
Tamsco Helicopters	Tamsco Helicopters-Ketchikan	1768	41,678		44,572		
Trail Ridge Air	Trail Ridge Air	0896	7,500	6,513		4,368	
Tundra Copters	Tundra Copters	1681		2,256		2,256	
United Lumber Co., Inc.	Soldona	0761		6,000		6,000	
United Lumber Co., Inc.	Anchorage	1030		47,909		5,100	
Valley Service Center, Inc.	Valley Chevron	0455	57,600	2,400	60,000		
Vrem, Kelly L.	Birchwood Airport Lot 1 Bk 200		30,000	30,000			NE
Wadsworth, Norma	Camper City Super Service	2530	60,000		54,600	5,400	
Wise, Dennis	Astoria Limited/Cornerstone Gas	0066		60,000			NE
TOTALS			\$806,037	\$946,785	\$447,015	\$393,057	

FY 92 Tank Upgrade & Closure Program Allocation	FY 92 Allocation	Grants Processed	Allocation Balance
Revised FY 92 Allocation	1,213,093	840,072	373,021
Financial Assistance	1,168,621	840,072	328,549
Contingency	44,472		44,472

NOTES:

- FA-3 = Should Apply for Tank Cleanup Program
- FA-5 = Should Apply for Reimbursement Program
- NE = Not Eligible for Financial Assistance Under This Program

Shaded Area = Grant Offer Signed and Funds Encumbered

APPENDIX D

REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	UPGRADE & CLOSURE	CLEANUP	TOTAL REQUEST
Air Van Lines(Arrow Moving & Storage)	Arrow Moving & Storage (209 Post)	1349	\$3,978	\$12,631	\$16,609
Air Van Lines, Inc.(Bethco Consltd)	Anch Moving Svc (135 Post Rd)	795	\$3,974	\$9,553	\$13,527
Air Van Lines, Inc.(Sumiko Grp)	Air Van Lines (2216 Post)	1351	\$8,394	\$4,401	\$12,795
AK USA Federal Credit Union	Big Lake Marina	2308/2011	\$4,271	\$30,231	\$34,502
AK USA Federal Credit Union	Lamplight Chevron (Kenai)	2307		\$20,253	\$20,253
Alascom, Inc	12 Sites	12 Sites	\$200,000		\$200,000 *
Alaska Airlines	Petersburg	1354	\$9,767	\$7,054	\$16,821
Alaska Sales & Service	Geo Ctr	1919	\$28,689		\$28,689
Allinger, Leroy	Mt. McKinley Rentals	2528		\$24,779	\$24,779
Alyeska Pipeline Service	Van Horn Facility/Pump Sta #2 & #12	3 Sites			Withdrew Requests
Anchorage Chrysler Center	Anchorage Chrysler Center	NE			Not Eligible
Arctic Slope/Ocean Holdings	APC Fabrication Yard		\$4,862		\$4,862
Benward, Roy	Roy E. Benward	2582		\$4,734	\$4,734
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Bus Barn(Laidlaw Transit)	324	\$5,120		\$5,120
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Office/Shop (Mat Su Inc)	570	\$4,695		\$4,695
Brannon, Ernest W. & Donna	Burkeshore Marina	498		\$8,276	\$8,276
Butler Aviation	Anchorage Fueling & Service Co Plant #4	1270	\$836	\$130,392	\$131,228
Carr Gottstein, Inc.	6441 C St (J.B. Gottstein & Co.)	830		\$25,340	\$25,340
Central Plumbing & Heating, Inc.	Central Plumbing & Heating, Inc.	2290	\$6,556		\$6,556
City of Fairbanks	10 Sites	10 Sites	\$29,358		\$29,358
Cohen, David	Sheep Mt Lodge	2005		\$2,199	\$2,199
Continental Baking Co.	Sunrise Bakery	330	\$14,200	\$79,622	\$93,822
Continental Motor Co	4940 Old Seward	52	\$25,345	\$9,048	\$34,393
Continental Motor Co	6239 McKay	647	\$2,236		\$2,236
Continental Motor Co	6255 McKay	2201	\$5,138	\$1,835	\$6,973
Cook, John	Sterling Tesoro	2286		\$29,658	\$29,658
Copper Valley Electric	Valdez & Glennallen	290/294	\$4,356		\$4,356
Culhane Brothers	Culhane Brothers	1725		\$200,000	\$200,000 *
Denali Fuel Co	Consolidated Freightways 801 1st Ave	305	\$3,035	\$48,055	\$51,090
Eastwind, Inc	Old Crowley Shop	397	\$12,999	\$78,800	\$91,799
Enstar Natural Gas Co.	Beaver Creek	1648	\$2,492	\$12,881	\$15,373
Enstar Natural Gas Co.	Kenai Operations	1637	\$825		\$825

APPENDIX D

REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	UPGRADE & CLOSURE	CLEANUP	TOTAL REQUEST
Fairbanks Daily News Miner	Fairbanks Daily News Miner	2188	\$19,098		\$19,098
FDIC/St of AK Teachers Retiremt	Seair Ak Airlines	1179		\$36,127	\$36,127
Fennimore, Ron	Fennimore Service Ctr (#21 Front St)	386	\$7,023		\$7,023
Gana A'Yoo Ltd	Fbks Int'l Airport	2045		\$9,527	\$9,527
Garrett, Nelson	Garrett's Tesoro	2527		\$37,517	\$37,517
GO Invest dba B&B Tool	B&B Tool Supply, Inc.	1914		\$22,238	\$22,238
Golden Valley Electric	Uslbelli Spur Rd	128	\$3,361		\$3,361
Head, H.P.	Lake Spenard #113	1689			Not Eligible
Healy Roadhouse, Inc.	Healy Roadhouse Inc.	404	\$2,505		\$2,505
Hess, Jerry	Katmai Oil & Gas			\$6,818	\$6,818
Illies, Dennis	Valley Country Store	1988	\$1,848		\$1,848
John, Alec & Ruby	Tsesyu Service Station	1224	\$33,121		\$33,121
K&L Distributors, Inc.	K&L Distributors - Fairbanks	1958		\$7,850	\$7,850
K&L Distributors, Inc.	K&L Distributors - Anchorage	1503		\$79,934	\$79,934
Kenai Peninsula Borough	Homer Maintenance Shop	1831	\$674	\$14,308	\$14,982
Kenai Peninsula Borough	School Warehouse	1880	\$22,633		\$22,633
Lefever, Darrel	Topper's 4th & Ingra	1920			Not eligible
Lvnden Transport	3001 Peger Rd, Fbks	216	\$8,335		\$8,335
Mapco Express, Inc.	15 Sites	15 Sites		\$200,000	\$200,000 *
Mark Air Inc	Mark Air - 1400 W. Int'l Airport Rd	611	\$14,887		\$14,887
Matanuska Electric	3 Facilities	3 Sites	\$49,316	\$35,670	\$84,986
MPH Trust (Transpacific Resources)	Loomis Armored	394	\$1,120	\$15,603	\$16,723
Municipality of Anchorage	Landfill & Central Transfer Station	2086/1306	\$4,050		\$4,050
Nenana Heating Service	A Frame Services	1623		\$2,025	\$2,025
Ninilchik Native Association	Clam Gulch Service Station	1592		\$14,804	\$14,804
Nixon, William	Anchorage Clean Sweep	1233	\$17,850		\$17,850
Northstore Ventures	7-Eleven 28 Facilities	28 Sites	\$112,000	\$88,000	\$200,000 *
Nye Frontier Ford	Nye Frontier Ford	2313	\$49,911		\$49,911
Our Lady of Compassion Care Ctr	Our Lady of Compassion Care Ctr	1691	\$15,891		\$15,891
Parker Drilling Co.	Parker Drilling Co.	40	\$50,993		\$50,993
Petro Products Co. Inc.	Renner's Gas & Save #5	1421	\$79,254	\$30,870	\$110,124
Phillips Petroleum	Phillips Kenai Plant	610		\$6,392	\$6,392

APPENDIX D

REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM FOR FY 92

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	UPGRADE & CLOSURE	CLEANUP	TOTAL REQUEST
Pink Elephant Stores, Inc.	Pink Elephant Stores, Inc.	1452	\$650		\$650
R&M Consultants	R&M Consultants	NE			Not Eligible
Roderick, Paul	Anchor Pt Texaco	2432		\$200,000	\$200,000 *
Rol-Don's Inc	Sterling Chevron	642		\$119,582	\$119,582
Russell, Darrell		NE			Not Eligible
Sister's Construction	Sister's Construction	NE			Not Eligible
Skagway Fuels	8th Ave & AK St	981		\$27,000	\$27,000
Stoner, Vern	Goldpanner Service, inc.	1339		\$5,716	\$5,716
Suburban Propane Gas Co.	Suburban Propane Gas Co.	963	\$3,587		\$3,587
Temsco Helicopters	Juneau	270	\$31,412		\$31,412
Temsco Helicopters	Wrangel	1775	\$2,365		\$2,365
Temsco Helicopters	Ketchikan	1768	\$33,455		\$33,455
Transpacific Resources, Inc.	USPS Annex - 3719 Arctic Blvd	2051	\$7,299	\$18,649	\$25,948
Troy Air, Inc	Ak Airlines Anchorage Int'l Airport		\$20,425	\$32,121	\$52,546
Tundra Tours, Inc.	Industrial Ave/Badger Rd	1671/1675	\$7,786	\$10,412	\$18,198
U.S. Small Business Admin	Den Tech (Rent a Wreck 1313 Laona)	2004		\$19,796	\$19,796
United Lumber Co.	Millwork Plant 160 W. 68th	1030	\$47,910		\$47,910
United Utilities	Manley Electric	70		\$8,134	\$8,134
Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.	Usibelli Healy Creek Facility	267		\$11,079	\$11,079
Vangas, Inc.	Petrolane - 2550 Cushman, Fbks	519	\$45,114		\$45,114
Waldec Enterprises, Inc.	Eastside Anch Auto Svc	320	\$7,082	\$67,225	\$74,307
Waldron Corp.	Waldron Corp.	668	\$23,929		\$23,929
Westours, Inc	Gray Line of Ak - Skagway	308	\$168,000	\$32,000	\$200,000 *
Wilson, Donald	Spenard Property	2529		\$29,036	\$29,036
Wortham, William & Carol	College Service Station		\$1,866	\$10,961	\$12,827
Young, E.J.	Young Investments	13		\$21,935	\$21,935
Young, John & Jacques	Dimond Chevron	2444	\$6,729	\$42,210	\$48,939
Matanuska Electric Assoc	Matanuska Electric Assoc	2425	\$11,200	\$35,670	\$46,870
TOTALS	158		\$1,341,850	\$2,046,587	\$3,388,437

*Maximum allowable per statute

APPENDIX E

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL				C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Murray, Kenneth	Lucky Sourdough	2784	40,446	4,494	44,940	1	Note 1									
Heflinger, Carl	Northside Grocery & Gas	0204	383,380	25,000	408,380	2										
Samuel, A.M.	Emergency - Moose Creek Ga	2199	112,050	12,450	124,500	3	220,090		X	X	X	X			X	
Davidson-Fowler Partnership	US Travel System	2742	187,200	20,800	208,000	4	Note 1									
Wortham, William C	College Ctr Svc Station	2745	46,886	5,209	52,095	5	Note 1									
Valley Service Ctr, Inc	Valley Chevron	0455	89,594	9,955	99,549	6	89,500					X				
Continental Motor Co.	4940 Old Seward	0052	173,093	19,233	192,326	7										
Lefever, Darrel	3rd&Ingra,4th&Ingra(Anch)	2747	416,253	25,000	441,253	8										
Renner, Terry	Renner's Gas & Save #3	2327	383,709	25,000	408,709	9										
CDE Co.	The Office Place 116 Minnie St	2746	14,706	1,634	16,340	10										
Gavrilovich, Louie	Lake Air Complex	2450	64,783	7,198	71,981	11										
Sig Wold Storage&Transfer	Sig Wold Storage&Transfer	1589				12	Note 1									
Courtney, Estate of	Courtney's Tudor Service	2375	32,400	3,600	36,000	13										
Petro Products	Renner's Gas N Save	1421	74,520	8,280	82,800	13.5										
Harnmon, Fred	Soldotna Y Chevron	0518	94,761	10,529	105,290	14										
Hutchison, Harry	Hutchison Chevron	1462	28,912	3,212	32,124	15										
Arnoldy, Marty	Summit Lk Lodge - Moose Pa	0818	279,563	25,000	304,563	16										
Bettles Lodge Inc	Bettles Lodge Inc	1535	23,789	2,643	26,432	17										
Schwanke, Roland	Sterling Chevron	0642	65,835	7,315	73,150	18										
Mammoth of Alaska, Inc	Mammoth of Alaska, Inc	1698	310,000	25,000	335,000	19										
Denali Fuel Co.	Equipment Sales, Inc	0537	76,862	8,540	85,402	20										
Bigfoot Auto Svc, Inc	Bigfoot Auto Svc-Haines	1235	18,409	2,045	20,454	20.5										
Kess, Jerry B.	Former Katmai Oil & Gas	2545	45,900	5,100	51,000	21										
Renner, Darrel	Renner's Chevron Full Service	2324	70,200	7,800	78,000	21.5										
JD&S Rentals	Kodiak Rental Center	0639	42,641	4,738	47,379	22										
Empire Airlines Inc.	Empire Airlines Inc.	2615	11,758	1,307	13,065	23										
Hull, Ron	Former H&H Tesoro	2701	198,171	22,019	220,190	24										
Korovin Corp	Olson Gas Service #2	2287	375,000	25,000	400,000	25										
Columbus Distributing Co.	Soldotna Texaco	1391	237,325	25,000	262,325	26										
Wright Air Service	Wright Air Service	0563	14,261	1,584	15,845	27										
Ak Sales & Service	National Car Rental	1255	12,068	1,341	13,409	28										
Gana A Yoo Ltd	Fbks Int'l Airport Bk 101 Lt 1	2045	83,597	9,289	92,886	29										
City of Unalaska	Unalaska Dept of Public Wks	0089	58,725	6,525	65,250	30										
Anch Baptist Temple Inc	Anch Baptist Temple Inc	1145	16,089	1,788	17,877	31										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5002 Mile 7.5 Old Seward(An	1498	377,656	25,000	402,656	32										
World Wide Movers	World Wide Movers	1890	408,000	25,000	433,000	33										
Lovejoy, Dortha	Bailey's Rent-All	0329	975,000	25,000	1,000,000	34										
Bailey, Frederick	Bailey's Rental	2703	20,012	2,223	22,235	35										
Mountain Corp	Mountain Market	2616	49,254	5,473	54,727	35.5										
Craig, Robert	Craig's Anchor Pt Garage	0228	122,316	13,590	135,906	37										
Campbell, David	Campbell & Sons Fuel	0741	722,749	25,000	747,749	37.5										

APPENDIX E

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL				C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Kenai Airport Fuel Svc Inc	Kenai Airport Fuel Service Inc	2187	40,241	4,471	44,712	38										
Rountree, Richard	Aero Services	1960	10,602	1,178	11,780	39										
Omni Enterprises, Inc.	DeHart's Store	0107	102,458	11,384	113,842	40										
Nenana Heating Svcs	A-Frame Services	1623	49,500	5,500	55,000	41										
Central Plumbing&Heating	Central Plumbing&Heating	2290				42										
Ak Farmers Co-op, Inc	Mile 267.5 Richardson Hwy	1076	48,600	5,400	54,000	43										
AMP Industries	AMP Warehouse	2798	14,897	1,655	16,552	44										
Cordova Outboard Shop	Cordova Outboard Shop	1737	36,260	4,029	40,289	45										
AK Sales & Service	1300 E 5th	1952	65,431	7,270	72,701	46										
Sunny Chevron Service Inc.	Sunny Chevron Service Inc.	6413				47										
Rainproof Roofing	Rainproof Roofing	0286	18,233	2,026	20,259	48										
Petro Products	Petro 1	1418	53,530	5,948	59,478	48.5										
Nickerson, Vicki	Goldstream General Store	1068	\$8,456	\$939	9,395	49										
AK Sales & Service, Inc.	Truck Center-1345 E. 8th Ave	1959	7,233	804	8,037	51										
Anch Baptist Temple Inc	ABT Preschool & Bus shop	1144	18,000	2,000	20,000	52										
GO Investments	B&B Tool Supply	1914	37,992	4,221	42,213	53										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5008 717 E. No. Lights(Anch)	0050	354,417	25,000	379,417	54										
Chuck Higgins Co.	Princess Tours Bus Maint	2127	39,016	4,335	43,351	55										
Denali Fuel Co.	Hartzell Road	0542	42,008	4,667	46,675	57										
Transpacific Resources	USPS-Arctic Carrier Annex	2051	113,371	12,597	125,968	58										
Mindoro Partners	775 E 100th Ave Anchorage	2541				59										
Estate of Wm G Knight	Rampart Property	1121	139,212	15,468	154,680	60										
Continental Motor Co.	6239 MacKay St	0647	18,938	2,104	21,042	61										
Stephens, Ronald	Peters Creek Chevron	2587	15,577	1,730	17,307	62										
Dentech	Dentech 1313 Laona Circle	2004	4,981	554	5,535	63										
MPH Trust% Hodge&Lekisch	Loomis Armored Inc	0394	10,082	1,120	11,202	64										
Sister's Construction	Sister's Construction	2644	49,472	5,497	54,969	65										
Yukon Equipment Co., Inc	Yukon Equip Co.	UNK	20,519	2,280	22,799	66										
SEND International	SEND Int'l Glennallen	1913	10,800	1,200	12,000	67										
A & M Investments	Continental Motor Co.	2201	10,761	1,196	11,957	68										
Hermon Bros Costr Co.	Hermon Brothers Equip Yard	0787	22,725	2,525	25,250	69										
United Lumber	United Lumber	1030	64,215	7,135	71,350	71										
Ak Cleaners(Harris&Marten's)	Alaska Cleaners	0821	19,863	2,207	22,070	72										
Marley, Wiliam&Judy	The Roost	0359	15,143	1,682	16,825	73										
City of Craig	Public Works	1708	7,315	813	8,128	74										
Butler, Roger	R & J Enterprises	2423	21,488	2,387	23,875	75										
Alaska Mechanical, Inc.	Alaska Mechanical, Inc.	0186	34,186	3,799	37,985	76										
MarkAir Inc	6311 S Air Park Pl Anchorage	2717	180,000	20,000	200,000	77										
City of Homer	Public Works	2522	12,526	1,392	13,918	78										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5018 205 E Third(Fbks)	0966	158,206	17,578	175,784	79										
Unocal Corp	#5057 4351 Int'l Airpt-Anch	0023	57,870	6,430	64,300	80										

APPENDIX E

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL				C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Unocal Corp	#4854 2730 Spenard-Anch	0014	77,220	8,580	85,800	81										
Texaco Refining& Mktg	Sand Lake Texaco	0912	975,000	25,000	1,000,000	82										
Unocal Corp	#4581 636 C St-Anch	0006	117,900	13,100	131,000	83										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5015 S/E Minn/No Lts(Anch)	1519	49,964	5,551	55,515	84										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5022 2300 Cushman(Fbks)	2546	356,262	25,000	381,262	85										
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopters-Fbks	0223	420,715	25,000	445,715	86										
Tesoro Ak Petroleum Co	North Rd Kenai Tesoro	1138	68,400	7,600	76,000	87										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5017 1773 College(Fbks)	1333	211,582	23,509	235,091	88										
Tesoro	Former 7-11 #104(550 3rdFbk	1098	134,100	14,900	149,000	89										
War's Cove Packing	WCP Kenai	1459	62,403	6,934	69,337	90										
Unocal Corp	#4652 1441 C St-Anch	0011	116,235	12,915	129,150	91										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5003 2730 Spenard(Anch)	0014	263,739	25,000	288,739	92										
Fbks North Star Borough	Westcott Pool	1253	32,804	3,645	36,449	93										
Tesoro(Interior Fuels)	Interior Fuels	0084	99,697	11,077	110,774	94										
Anch Fueling&Service Co	AFSC Plant No.4	1270	443,139	25,000	468,139	95										
Tesoro(R. Cosgrave)	7-11 #111(3679 College-Fbks)	1112	545,250	25,000	570,250	96										
Homer Electric Assoc	3977 Lake St, Homer	1261	48,187	5,354	53,541	97										
Anderson Trucking Svc	Anderson Trucking Service, In	2008	38,652	4,295	42,947	98										
Alaska West Express	Alaska West Express	1524	4,267	474	4,741	99										
Alaska Airlines	Ak Airlines Term-Wrangell	1359	41,355	4,595	45,950	100										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5007 5497 E No Lights(Anch)	1510	297,146	25,000	322,146	101										
City of Palmer	Equipment Yard	0652	354,945	25,000	379,945	102										
Alascom Inc.	Tok	0209	16,452	1,828	18,280	103										
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopters-Juneau	0477	438,879	25,000	463,879	104										
Green Alaska, Inc.	Green Construction Co.	0387	178,830	19,870	198,700	105										
Int'l In-Flight Catering Co.	Int'l In-Flight Catering Co.	0449	75,361	8,373	83,734	106										
Laidlaw Transit(FDIC)	Laidlaw Transit, Eagle River	0093	135,253	15,028	150,281	107										
MOA ATU	600 Telephone Ave	1355	227,391	25,000	252,391	108										
Usibelli Coal Mine Inc.	Lignite Creek	0264	301,958	25,000	326,958	109										
MOA Facility Maintenance	4th & Post Maintenance	1411	210,024	23,336	233,360	110										
Tesoro Northstore	7-11 #65 (Wasilla)	1981	37,800	4,200	42,000	111										
Usibelli Coal Mine Inc.	Healy Creek	0267	975,000	25,000	1,000,000	112										
Texaco Refining& Mktg	Boniface Texaco	0878	186,197	20,689	206,886	113										
Laidlaw Transit	Laidlaw Transit, Soldotna	1254	195,444	21,716	217,160	114										
Tesoro(Carr Gottstein)	Tesoro Huffman Carwash	1984	7,095	788	7,883	115										
City&Borough of Juneau	PW Utilities Div	1177	5,850	650	6,500	116										
Alascom Inc.	Glennallen	0333	17,005	1,890	18,895	117										
City of Fairbanks	Public Safety Bldg	0354	16,389	1,821	18,210	118										
Temasco Helicopters Inc	Temasco-Ketchikan	1768	19,229	2,137	21,366	119										
MOA Facility Maintenance	Klatt Maintenance	1415	121,368	13,486	134,854	120										
City&Borough of Juneau	Parks & Recreation	2158	8,231	914	9,145	121										

APPENDIX E

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL				C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
City&Borough of Juneau	Juneau Airport	2157				122										
City&Borough of Juneau	Eaglecrest Ski Area	1891	8,059	895	8,954	123										
40 Mile Air	Tanacross Hanger	0242				IC										
Alascom Inc.	Talkeetna Bartlett	1139	18,046	2,005	20,051	IC										
Alascom Inc.	Pedro Dome	1674	14,587	1,621	16,208	IC										
Alyeska Seafoods, Inc	Alyeska Seafoods, Inc	1170				IC										
Anchorage Chrysler	Anchorage Chrysler Center	0161				IC										
Arctic Slope Regional Corp	Executone, Inc-Fbks	2729	49,006	5,445	54,451	IC										
B-J's Services, Inc	B-J's Services, Inc	2463				IC										
Bradford, Gary	Peninsula Automotive	2649				IC										
Bratrud, Robert	3002 Spenard, Anchorage	2800	7,894	877	8,771	IC										
Carr-Gottstein Inc	J B. Gottstein Warehouse	0830				IC										
CEM Leasing	Gate 28 W Ramp,Fbks Airpt	0201	12,699	1,411	14,110	IC										
City of Seward	Public Works Shop	1491	166,320	18,480	184,800	IC										
City of Soldotna	City Maintenance Garage	1215				IC										
Foster, Corrine	Cache Creek Chevron	0328				IC										
Halliburton Co.	Halliburton Geophysical Svcs	1886				IC										
Jones, Troy	Big Su Lodge	2320	90,000	10,000	100,000	IC										
Korovin Corp	Olson Gas Service #1	2288	225,000	25,000	250,000	IC										
Lynden Transport	Lynden Transport-Fbks	0216	31,038	3,449	34,487	IC										
Matanuska Telephone Assoc	Palmer Plant	0535				IC										
Matanuska Telephone Assoc	Healy Facility	1556				IC										
MOA AWWU	Pump Station #2	1288	93,420	10,380	103,800	IC										
MOA AWWU	Pump Station #12	1292	381,000	25,000	406,000	IC										
Ninilchik Native Assoc	Ididastop, Clam Gulch	1592	11,610	1,290	12,900	IC										
Nistler Enterprises	Nistler Enterprises	0594	69,300	7,700	77,000	IC										
Petro Star Fuel, Inc	Sourdough Fuel-Beaver Bri St	0090	247,951	25,000	272,951	IC										
Petro Star Fuel, Inc.	Sourdough Fuel	1926				IC										
Pietrok, Michael	Chickaloon General Store	1934				IC										
Sourdough Properties, Inc.	Sourdough Properties, Inc.	0881				IC										
Spenard Builders Supply	SBS 4412 Lois Dr	1526	22,500	2,500	25,000	IC										
Stelling, John D	Stelling Enterprises	2203				IC										
Tesoro Ak Petroleum Co	Former Eagle River Auto Parts	0798	61,159	6,795	67,954	IC										
Tesoro(Laurence Intl)	7-11 #59 (12870 Old Seward)	0784	12,419	1,380	13,799	IC										
Tesoro(Petro Products)	Petro #1	1418	18,258	2,029	20,287	IC										
Tundra Tours	Tundra Tours	UNK				IC										
Wise, Dennis	Cornerstone Gas	0066	460,000	25,000	485,000	IC										
Wise, Dennis	Former 5 Star Auto	UNK	360,000	25,000	385,000	IC										
Powell, Fran	AK State Troopers Bldg	0476				NE										
AK Railroad Corp	Various Sites	UNK	407,582	25,000	432,582	NE										
Alascom Inc.	Sitka	0114	27,675	3,075	30,750	NE										

APPENDIX E

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	GRANTS ENCUMBER	LOANS ISSUED	ACTIVITIES FUNDED							
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL				C	CA	CL	CU	RA	SA	T	
Alascom Inc.	Tolsona	0322	14,589	1,621	16,210	NE										
Alascom Inc.	Sawmill	0367	18,189	2,021	20,210	NE										
Alascom Inc.	Eagle River Earth Station	1155	15,944	1,771	17,715	NE										
Brunquist, Norm	4618 Lk Spenard	1479				NE										
Chumley's Inc	Chumley's Inc	0915				NE										
Darby, Ted	Space 424, Lake Hood	2445				NE										
Falcon Properties	Gate 28 West Ramp Fbks Airpt	0022	2,899	322	3,221	NE										
IWW Partnership	700 I street	2142	6,962	774	7,736	NE										
Ketchum Air Service, Inc	Ketchum Air Service Lk Hood	1143	165,150	18,350	183,500	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5021 6010 Old Seward(Anch	0727	632,632	25,000	657,632	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5009 1209 Gambel(Anch)	0756	153,361	17,040	170,401	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5001 1405 Bragaw(Anch)	1496	235,973	25,000	260,973	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5004 5159 Old Seward(Anch	1500	220,685	24,520	245,205	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5006 1501 E Dimond(Anch)	1505	226,855	25,000	251,855	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5010 1500 E 5th(Anch)	1512	277,493	25,000	302,493	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5012 150 W Tudor(Anch)	1513	198,915	22,105	221,050	NE										
Mapco Express Inc.	#5014 1900 Muldoon(Anch)	1517	208,618	23,180	231,798	NE										
Myers, Carole	Aerotwin(Merrill Field)	2404	8,957	995	9,952	NE										
Plunkett, James	Former Willow Cache Realty	2735				NE										
Prato, Marcel	Cascade Liquor	2508	10,598	1,178	11,776	NE										
Tyonek Native Corp	Native Village-Timber Camp	UNK	49,050	5,450	54,500	NE										
TOTAL FY 93 APPLICATIONS	185		\$21,967,138	\$1,693,349	\$23,560,487		\$309,590									

RANK = Applications are listed in numerical order from highest score to lowest score, i.e. Rank "a" received highest score and Rank "123" received lowest score.
RANK "IC" = The information submitted with the application was insufficient to rank the application.
RANK "NE" = The application was determined to be ineligible for Financial Assistance.

Note 1 = A grant offer has been issued and funds will be encumbered as soon as grantee signs the grant offer.

Shaded Area = Grant Offer Signed and Funds Encumbered

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
Hill, Stephen	Aniak Transportation Svc	2754	14,400	5,133	19,533	1	10/1/91	Note 1	
Horrell Investments	Tazlina Trading	1949				1	11/7/91	38,934	14,427
Horrell Investments	Glennallen Chem	2292	26,249		26,249	1	11/7/91	37,689	22,311
Orville D. Arno'd Estate	Butte Quick Shop	2626		6,000	6,000	1	11/15/91	Note 1	
Stelling, John D.	Stelling Enterprises	2203	13,033	1,545	14,578	1	12/11/91	15,049	2,377
Nenana Heating Services	A-Frame Services	1623	44,400	15,600	60,000	1	12/20/91	60,000	
Miller, Dale	Alaska Chevron	0556	30,923		30,923	1	12/23/91	60,000	
Warren, Stephen	C & W Repair	0363	21,630	2,580	24,210	1	12/26/91		
Totem Services Inc.	Totem Services Inc	0234	51,600	8,400	60,000	1	12/27/91	60,000	
Marley, William & Judy	The Root	0359	6,713	867	7,580	1	12/30/91		
Campbell, David	Campbell & Sons Fuel	0741	41,000	19,000	60,000	1	12/30/91	60,000	
Bigfoot Auto Svc., Inc	Bigfoot Auto Svc	1235	45,600	14,400	60,000	1	12/30/91	48,089	4,159
Battles Lodge, Inc	Battles Lodge, Inc	1535	60,000		60,000	1	12/30/91	50,941	9,059
Paxson Lodge, Inc	Paxson Lodge	1938	36,000	24,000	60,000	1	12/30/91	40,200	19,800
Omni Enterprises	DeHart's Store	0107				1	12/31/91	60,000	
Missionary Aviation Repair Co.	MARC Flight Center (tank #1)	0158	21,317	17,838	39,155	1	12/31/91	37,035	14,015
Tack, Stephen & Cyndie	Tack's General Store	0793	19,500	16,947	36,447	1	12/31/91		
Nickerson, Vicki	Goldstream Gen Store	1068	3,618		3,618	1	12/31/91	Note 1	
Cordova Outboard, Inc	Cordova Outboard Shop	1737	42,466	6,032	48,498	1	12/31/91	46,664	7,124
Pietruk, Michael	Chickaloon General Store	1934	20,865		20,865	1	12/31/91	Note 1	
Kenai Airport Fuel Svc Inc	Kenai Airport Fuel Svc Inc	2187	39,600	20,400	60,000	1	12/31/91	60,000	
Alaska AeroFuel Inc	FAI Gate #38	1529	39,600	20,400	60,000	1	12/31/91		
Warning Lites of Alaska Inc	Warning Lites of Alaska Inc	1735	22,244	4,820	27,064	1	12/31/91	20,335	6,139
Wilson, Mark & Dolores	Hamilton's Place	2561	34,597	12,334	46,931	1	12/31/91		
Cook, John	Cook's Corner Sterling Tesoro	2286	57,402		57,402	1	2/14/92	60,000	
Fapadrew Inc	Fisherman's Bend	0605	53,646	6,354	60,000	1	3/4/92	53,646	6,354
Kim, Ok Y	Kim's Oceanview Texaco	0762	55,800	4,200	60,000	1	3/4/92	45,500	14,500
Ebbert, Keith	Sunrise Inn	2270	41,771	16,242	58,013	1	3/27/92	Note 1	
Thurmond, Wm & Rochelle	Thurmond's Automotive	UNK	60,000		60,000	1	4/1/92		
William T Heisler Corp	Sand Lake Service 7211 Jewel Lk	0189	48,000	12,000	60,000	2	12/31/91		
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopter-Juneau	0477	60,000		60,000	2.5	12/31/91		
MOA- ATU	Anch Telephone Utility	1355	60,000		60,000	3	10/31/91		
Temco Helicopters	Temco - Petersburg	1763	51,592	5,920	57,512	3	12/23/91		
Texaco Refining & Marketing	Boniface Texaco	0878	60,000		60,000	3	12/24/91		
Providence Hospital	Providence Hospital	1947	15,618	5,452	21,070	3	12/30/91		
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopter-Fbks	0223	52,200	7,800	60,000	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Talkeotna PSB # 111	0278	10,415	7,563	17,978	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Fishook Public Safety Bldg # 41	0281	4,651	3,955	8,606	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Meadow Lakes PSB # 71	0287	2,865	7,420	10,285	3	12/31/91		
Kodiak Electric Assoc, Inc	Kodiak Electric Assoc, Inc	0606				3	12/31/91		
Fairbanks U-Drive, Inc	Hertz Rent A Car	0806	18,920	10,383	29,303	3	12/31/91		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopters-Valdez	1080	45,600	14,400	60,000	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Butte Public Safety Bldg #21	1290	8,291	4,715	13,006	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Sutton Public Safety Bldg #11	1300	7,963	5,620	13,583	3	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Cottonwood Public Sfty Bldg #65	1812	11,291	7,299	18,590	3	12/31/91		
MOA- AWWU	AWWU-Operations Facility	1945		22,500	22,500	3	12/31/91		
Hoover, Karl & Darlene	Services Unlimited	2437	32,400		32,400	3	3/27/92		
Providence Hospital	Medical Office Bldg	1946	52,748	7,252	60,000	3	3/31/92		
JH&M Investments	Anchorage Nissan	2470	14,277	5,640	19,917	3	4/1/92		
Sea-Land Freight Services	Sea-Land Services - Anchorage	0043	26,956	3,987	30,943	4	12/27/91		
Prato, Marcel	Cascade Liquor	2508	38,854		38,854	5	12/27/91		
Bratrud, R(c/o Marston Prop)	3002 Spenard Road	2800		7,844	7,844	6	9/17/91		
Hammon, Fred	Soldotna Y Chevron	0518		19,029	19,029	6	9/27/91		
CDE Co.	The Office Place(Fbks)	2746		1,455	1,455	6	10/3/91		
Charlie's Sport Shop	Charlie's Sport Shop	1777		5,727	5,727	6	10/14/91		
AK Childrens Services	Jesse Lee Home	2802		7,789	7,789	6	10/16/91		
A & W Services	2425 Merrill Field Dr (Anch)	2426		5,204	5,204	6	10/28/91		
Northern Air Cargo	NAC-3488 W. Int'l Airport	1472		3,593	3,593	6	11/1/91		
AK Sales & Service	National Car Rental	1255		18,012	18,012	6	11/13/91		
AK Sales & Service, Inc.	Truck Ctr-1345 E 8th Ave	1959		25,640	25,640	6	11/18/91		
Butler, Roger & Judy	R & J Enterprises	2423		7,297	7,297	6	11/18/91		
AK Sales & Service, Inc.	1300 E. 5th	1952		33,995	33,995	6	12/2/91		
Stanger, Joseph	Eyak Air - Willow Airport	0662		1,632	1,632	6	12/11/91		
Paratex Pied Piper	Paratex Pied Piper	1925		15,383	15,383	6	12/11/91		
Dancing Eagles Corp	12512 Old Glenn Hwy	0180		18,000	18,000	6	12/12/91		
40-Mile Air Ltd.	Tanacross Hanger	0242		4,920	4,920	6	12/17/91		
Arnoldy, Marty	Summit Lake Lodge-Moose Pass	0818		17,572	17,572	6	12/17/91		
Gavrilovich, Louie	Lake Air Complex	2450		14,797	14,797	6	12/17/91		
Coulter, Maurice	Parks Highway Truck Stop	1206		10,709	10,709	6	12/18/91		
Commercial Contractors, Inc.	Allen & Petersen Co.	0266		13,800	13,800	6	12/20/91		
Alaska Cleaners	AK Cleaners, 610 W. Fireweed	0821		40,506	40,506	6	12/20/91		
AK Farmers Co-op	Mile 267.5 Richardson Hwy	1076		9,250	9,250	6	12/20/91		
Kobuk Inc.	Kobuk Inc	1173		15,052	15,052	6	12/20/91		
Frederick, Richard	Sportsmen's Paradise	2314		6,243	6,243	6	12/20/91		
Hellinger, Carl	Northside Grocery & Gas	0204		2,128	2,128	6	12/23/91		
City of North Pole	North Pole Police Station	0352		4,500	4,500	6	12/23/91		
Hermon Bros Constr Co.	Hermon Bros Constr Shop	0787		17,380	17,380	6	12/23/91		
Smyth Moving(Payle,James)	Smyth Moving Service, Inc.	1445		6,559	6,559	6	12/23/91		
Allwine, Steven/Tollefson,Karla	Mendenhall Auto Ctr	2146		12,193	12,193	6	12/23/91		
Sky Harbor Prop Owners	Sky Harbor Airstrip	0142		5,037	5,037	6	12/24/91		
Four Aces	Four Aces	0172		7,200	7,200	6	12/24/91		
Sig Wold Storage & Transfer	Sig Wold Storage & Transfer	1589		7,004	7,004	6	12/24/91		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
AMP Industries Inc.	AMP Warehouse	2798		3,840	3,840	6	12/24/91		
Brannon, Ernest & Donna	Burkeshore Marina	0498		4,555	4,555	6	12/26/91		
City of Craig	Public Works	1708				6	12/26/91		
Peter Pan Seafoods	Dillingham Cold Storage	1915		4,618	4,618	6	12/26/91		
Lovejoy, Dorthea	Bailey's Rent-All	0329	9,996	24,104	34,100	6	12/27/91		
Denali Fuel Co.	Hartzell Road	0542		2,018	2,018	6	12/27/91		
Birchwood Camp of AkMisConf	Birchwood Methodist Camp	2460		4,942	4,942	6	12/27/91		
City of Homer	Public Works	2522				6	12/27/91		
Empire Airlines	Empire Airlines	2615		3,504	3,504	6	12/27/91		
Dan's Aircraft Repair	Dan's Aircraft Repair	2826		9,420	9,420	6	12/27/91		
Fox General Store, Inc	Fox General Store, Inc	0049	60,000		60,000	6	12/30/91		
Ak Industrial Hardware	Ak Industrial Hardware	0178		18,000	18,000	6	12/30/91		
Alaska Mechanical	Alaska Mechanical	0186				6	12/30/91		
Lynden Transport, Inc.	Lynden Transport - Fbks	0216		5,141	5,141	6	12/30/91		
America Rents	America Rents	0240		2,142	2,142	6	12/30/91		
McLane & Associates	McLane & Associates	0307	1,152	2,382	3,534	6	12/30/91		
Powell, Fran	Ak State Troopers Bldg-Kodiak	0476		3,780	3,780	6	12/30/91		
Abbott, Rohn D.	Shannon & Wilson-Fbks	0609		846	846	6	12/30/91		
Floyd & Sons, Inc	Thrifty Car Rental-Anchorage	0825		5,625	5,625	6	12/30/91		
Rabbage, Terrance	Chinook Chevron Svc	0926				6	12/30/91		
North Star Aviation Inc	Willow Airport	1327		5,400	5,400	6	12/30/91		
SEND International of AK	SEND Hanger - Gulkana	1913		5,532	5,532	6	12/30/91		
Estate of Don C Chandler	Chandler Plumbing & Heating	2384		1,815	1,815	6	12/30/91		
Estate of Don C Chandler	Acme Elect Bldg	2384		6,118	6,118	6	12/30/91		
Myers, Carole	Aerotwin(Merrill Field)	2404		5,971	5,971	6	12/30/91		
Johnston, William N. Jr	B.J.'s Gas & Grocery	2715		9,600	9,600	6	12/30/91		
Yukon Trading Post	Yukon Trading Post	1119		7,771	7,771	6	12/30/91		
Woodard Construction Co	Woodard Construction Co	0147		3,606	3,606	6	12/31/91		
Greer Tank & Welding Inc	Greer Tank & Welding Inc	0154	24,307	10,860	35,167	6	12/31/91		
Branham Adventures	Branham Adventures	0207	4,740	1,530	6,270	6	12/31/91		
Juneau Ready-Mix Inc.	Juneau Ready-Mix Inc.	0317		6,300	6,300	6	12/31/91		
City of Fairbanks	MUS Telecommunications	0376		3,002	3,002	6	12/31/91		
McBirney, Derrall&Winona	CJM Construction Inc	0420		3,237	3,237	6	12/31/91		
Rent-A-Can Toilet Co. Inc	Rent-A-Can Toilet Co. Inc	0462		2,490	2,490	6	12/31/91		
Young's Partnership	Young's Chevron	0599	52,800	7,200	60,000	6	12/31/91		
MarkAir Inc	4100 w Int'l Airport Anchorage	0611		23,387	23,387	6	12/31/91		
DOWL, Inc	DOWL Engrs/Ak Testlab	0747		9,364	9,364	6	12/31/91		
Enterprise Co.	SKW Constructors, Inc	0805		5,569	5,569	6	12/31/91		
Chris Berg, Inc	Chris Berg, Inc	0607		13,948	13,948	6	12/31/91		
Kenai Air Ak, Inc	Kenai Air Ak, Inc	0985		21,420	21,420	6	12/31/91		
Estate of Wm G Knight	Moosehorn Property	1124		12,190	12,190	6	12/31/91		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
Anch Baptist Temple, Inc	ABT Preschool & Bus Shop	1144		2,795	2,795	6	12/31/91		
Anch Baptist Temple, Inc	Anch Baptist Temple, Inc	1145		6,686	6,686	6	12/31/91		
Douglas Trucking, Inc	Douglas Trucking, Inc	1266		3,360	3,360	6	12/31/91		
Ketchikan Air Service	Ketchikan Air Service	1335	25,200	34,800	60,000	6	12/31/91		
AK Helicopters, Inc	AK Helicopters, Inc	1345		19,874	19,874	6	12/31/91		
MarkAir Inc	Bethel Passenger & Cargo Term	1392		1,516	1,516	6	12/31/91		
Haltness, Erik	Johnson Sand & Gravel	1393		6,606	6,606	6	12/31/91		
Hutchison, Harry	Hutchison Chevron	1462		14,474	14,474	6	12/31/91		
Brunquist, Norm	Brunquist, Norm	1479		5,223	5,223	6	12/31/91		
Rodeheaver, Sallie	Hortz Car & Truck Rental-Kodiak	1520	8,142	2,550	10,692	6	12/31/91		
JD & S Rentals	Kodiak Auto Center	1645		9,033	9,033	6	12/31/91		
Kenai Natives Assoc	Wildwood Village	1686		10,560	10,560	6	12/31/91		
Lake Hood Air Harbor Inc	Lake Hood Air Harbor Inc	1728		6,603	6,603	6	12/31/91		
World Wide Movers	World Wide Movers - Anchorage	1890		9,300	9,300	6	12/31/91		
Kirn, Il Soo	Speedy Auto Glass	2191		60,000	60,000	6	12/31/91		
Renner, Darrel	Renner's Chevron Full Svc	2324		60,000	60,000	6	12/31/91		
Renner, Terry	Renner's Gas&Save #1	2325		60,000	60,000	6	12/31/91		
MarkAir Inc	Bethel Aircraft Maintenance	2370		7,018	7,018	6	12/31/91		
Seven W dba Hilltop	Seven W dba Hilltop	2442		5,726	5,726	6	12/31/91		
Peters, Kingston	Tudor Car Wash	2451		24,000	24,000	6	12/31/91		
Peninsula Plumbing&Heating	Peninsula Plumbing&Heating	2453		2,340	2,340	6	12/31/91		
Fbks Street Investor's	Fbks St Investor's Commercial Building	2485		5,550	5,550	6	12/31/91		
Mindcro Partners	775 E 100th Ave	2541		3,900	3,900	6	12/31/91		
Gills, Ray	Lake Spenard	2558		3,720	3,720	6	12/31/91		
Grate Land Auto	Grate Land Auto	2560				6	12/31/91		
Budiona Inc	Budiona Inc	2567		6,015	6,015	6	12/31/91		
Lowell-Maher Co.	1885 Marica, Fairbanks	2652		4,200	4,200	6	12/31/91		
Trcy Air Inc	Troy Air Inc	2662		60,000	60,000	6	12/31/91		
Bailey, Frederick	Bailey's Rental	2703				6	12/31/91		
MarkAir Inc	6311 S Air Park Pl Anchorage	2717		41,070	41,070	6	12/31/91		
Plunkett, James	Former Willow Cache Realty	2735		10,800	10,800	6	12/31/91		
Chris Berg Inc	Chris Berg Inc - Fbks	2741		3,194	3,194	6	12/31/91		
Apling, Floyd	Plaschem Supply & Consulting	2806		1,710	1,710	6	12/31/91		
Hull, Ronald	Former H&H Tesoro	2701		1,993	1,993	6			
IWW Partnership	700 I Street	2142		21,094	21,094	6	1/15/92		
Eames, Mike	St. Elias Auto Center	0536		1,566	1,566	6	1/16/92		
AK Electric Light&Power Co.	AK Electric Light&Power Co.(Juneau)	0812		840	840	6	2/10/92		
City of Ketchikan	Fire Station II	2106		3,060	3,060	6	2/18/92		
Reliable Transfer Corp	Reliable Shop	0181		2126	2,126	6	2/19/92		
Haines Home Bldg Supply	Haines Home Bldg Supply	2656		1,452	1,452	6	2/26/92		
AK Oil Sales Inc.	Kenai Chevron Station	1605		4,526	4,526	6	2/27/92		

APPENDIX F

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OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
AK Oil Sales Inc.	Steves Chevron	1607		4,233	4,233	6	2/27/92		
Waldec Enterprises	Eastside Service Station	0320				6	2/28/92		
Bradley Sky Ranch Inc	Bradley Sky Ranch Inc	0197		7,200	7,200	6	3/4/92		
Cunningham, John T	Homer School Bus Terminal	1581		4,680	4,680	6	3/5/92		
Alaska Pacific University	Alaska Pacific University	2706		6,480	6,480	6	3/5/92		
City of Cordova	Cordova Harbor Wasteoil Site	1757		12,000	12,000	6	3/6/92		
Favco Inc.	Favco Inc.	2322		4,347	4,347	6	3/25/92		
City of Fairbanks	Public Safety Bldg	0354		13,723	13,723	6	3/27/92		
City of Fairbanks	Fire Station #4	0347		2,376	2,376	6	3/31/92		
Doyle, Patrick	Big Dipper Car Wash	2307		18,120	18,120	6	4/1/92		
Grammont, Willard	Willard's Auto Electric	2484		13,480	13,480	6	4/1/92		
Homer Electric Assoc	HEA-Seldovia	1249		2,326	2,326	7	9/30/91		
Homer Electric Assoc	HEA-Kenai	0231		34,406	34,406	7	11/1/91		
Homer Electric Assoc	HEA-Homer	1261		14,958	14,958	7	11/1/91		
MOA-Merrill Field Airport	Aircraft Apron	0296		8,100	8,100	7	11/13/91		
MOA-Merrill Field Airport	Snow Equipment Bldg	1310		6,270	6,270	7	11/13/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	New Transit Maintenance	0585		15,111	15,111	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Public Health Facility	1312		10,230	10,230	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Fire Station #1	1347		17,100	17,100	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Northwood St Maintenance	1409		19,050	19,050	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	4th & Post St Maintenance	1411		22,017	22,017	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Muldoon St Maintenance	1417		23,997	23,997	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Latimer Fire Station	1426		15,777	15,777	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Girdwood Fire Station	1429		16,257	16,257	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Fire Maintenance	1436		7,680	7,680	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Fire Station #11	1439		16,602	16,602	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Fire Station #10	1444		7,680	7,680	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Old Transit Maintenance	1448		50,517	50,517	7	12/18/91		
MOA Facility Maintenance	Cemetery	2304		8,406	8,406	7	12/18/91		
Fbks North Star Borough	FNSB Transit Garage	2209		11,850	11,850	7	12/23/91		
Anch Fueling & Service Co.	AFSC Plant #4	1270		57,240	57,240	7	12/26/91		
Laidlaw Transit (FDIC)	Laidlaw Transit-Eagle River	0093		17,151	17,151	7	12/27/91		
Laidlaw Transit	Laidlaw Transit-Soldotna	1254		29,913	29,913	7	12/27/91		
Sourdough Properties, Inc	Sourdough Express	0881		11,405	11,405	7	12/30/91		
Alascom Inc	Yakutat	0213		9,938	9,938	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Wasilla PSB #61	0262		2,071	2,071	7	12/31/91		
Usibelli Coal Mine Inc	Lignite Creek	0264		19,531	19,531	7	12/31/91		
Usibelli Coal Mine Inc	Healy Creek	0267		42,522	42,522	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Lakes Public Safety Bldg #51	0277		3,799	3,799	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Big Lake Public Safety Bldg #81	0285		3,448	3,448	7	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Windy Point	0312		4,831	4,831	7	12/31/91		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
Alascom Inc	Tern Lake	0319		5,756	5,756	7	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Neklasson Lake	0364	30,774	15,733	46,507	7	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Cordova Earth Station	0487		9,038	9,038	7	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Bird Point	0549		4,335	4,335	7	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Ketchikan Toll Ctr	1017		9,038	9,038	7	12/31/91		
Cunashka Corp	Tony's Service Center	1271		15,000	15,000	7	12/31/91		
MOA- AWWU	AWWU-Headquarters Facility	1281		31,248	31,248	7	12/31/91		
MOA- AWWU	Pt Woronzof	1284		24,900	24,900	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Lakes Public Safety Bldg #52	1304		3,243	3,243	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	MSB Maintenance Facility	1317		4,397	4,397	7	12/31/91		
ERA Aviation Inc	ERA Helicopter Tours-Anch	1480		36,542	36,542	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Willow Public Safety Bldg# 121	1813		5,436	5,436	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Animal Control Shelter	1815		2,310	2,310	7	12/31/91		
Alaska USA Federal Cr Union	777 Juneau ST, Anchorage	1970		12,548	12,548	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	MSB School District Maint Yard	2348		7,994	7,994	7	12/31/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	MSB School District Auto Shop	2349		7,077	7,077	7	12/31/91		
Anderson Trucking Svc Inc	K&W Trucking (Fbks)	2832		14,135	14,135	7	12/31/91		
Alaska West Express	Alaska West Express	1524		2,037	2,037	7	1/3/92		
Royd, Roger	One Stop Grocery	2266	1,668		1,668	8	12/11/91		
Wainer, H Erling	Peters Creek Texaco	0025	8,630		8,630	8	12/31/91		
Scott, John H.	Scotty's Chevron	2716	22,180		22,180	8	12/31/91		
Air Tek Inc	Air Tek Inc	2478		8,541	8,541	IC	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Talkeetna/Bartlett	1139		20,664	20,664	IC	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Pedro Dome	1674		8,897	8,897	IC	12/31/91		
Alaska Pacific Transport	Alaska Pacific Transport	1245		7,500	7,500	IC	12/31/91		
Alyeska Seafoods, Inc	Alyeska Seafoods, Inc	1170				IC	12/31/91		
Arctic Slope Regional Corp	Executone Inc.	2729				IC	12/30/91		
B-J's Services, Inc	B-J's Services	2463				IC	12/30/91		
Bradford, Gary	Peninsula Automotive	2649				IC	12/30/91		
Brady's Floor Covering, Inc.	Brady's Floor Covering, Inc.	0992		5,400	5,400	IC	12/30/91		
C.R. Lewis Co., Inc.	C.R. Lewis Co., Inc.	1432		30,000	30,000	IC	12/30/91		
Carboy, Philip	Gold Hill	0440				IC	12/31/91		
CEM Leasing Inc	Gas n Go	1473	48,000	12,000	60,000	IC	12/27/91		
CEM Leasing Inc	Plaza Gas	2518	46,800	13,200	60,000	IC	12/27/91		
CEM Leasing Inc	Hub Gas	2519	48,000	12,000	60,000	IC	12/27/91		
City of Fairbanks	Public Works Facility	0345	23,497		23,497	IC	4/1/92		
City of Kenai	Kenai Public Safety Bldg	0526	1,980	12,600	14,580	IC	12/31/91		
City of Kenai	Kenai Municipal Airport	0532	1,980	6,000	7,980	IC	12/31/91		
City of Seward	Public Works Shop	1491		17,647	17,647	IC	12/23/91		
City of Soldotna	Central Emergency Services	1211		8,098	8,098	IC	12/20/91		
City of Soldotna	City Shop	1215		8,098	8,098	IC	12/20/91		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
City of Soldotna	WasteWater Treatment Fac	2829		8,093	8,098	IC	12/20/91		
Classon, Thomas	Hangar - Fbks Int'l Airport	2538		3,300	3,300	IC	3/31/92		
Crabb's Corner	Crabb's Corner	0341		7,085	7,085	IC	12/27/91		
Denali National Park Hotel	MtMcKinley Village Hotel	0314				IC	12/31/91		
Lanall National Park Hotel	Hotel Area	1554				IC	12/31/91		
Earth Movers of Fbks, Inc	Earth Movers of Fbks, Inc.	0631	12,420		12,420	IC	10/14/91		
Ev-Jo Inc	Columbus Dist Co., Inc	2085		6,555	6,555	IC	12/31/91		
Falcon Properties	Gate 28 West Ramp Fbks Airpt	0022		6,509	6,509	IC	12/31/91		
Foster, Corine	Cache Creek Chevron	0328				IC	12/31/91		
Generator Venture-KAKM	Goose Bay Tower	1050	19,500		19,500	IC	12/31/91		
George, Spiro	George's Grocery	0800	22,200		22,200	IC	3/3/92		
Grant, Hugh N.	Gas 'n Go	2269				IC	12/31/91		
Harri Plumbing & Heating Inc	Ak Laundry & Cleaners Inc	0512		2,400	2,400	IC	12/31/91		
Harvey, Kieth W.	Kieth Harvey	0644		2,940	2,940	IC	4/1/92		
Herrick, James	Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua	0493		15,600	15,600	IC	12/31/91		
Hudson Air Svc & Sons Inc	Hudson Air Service & Sons Inc	1223				IC	12/31/91		
Int'l Aviation Service, Inc	Int'l Aviation Service, Inc	0409		3,175	3,175	IC	12/30/91		
Ivey, Rose Mary	Chitna Fuel & Grocery	2744				IC	12/31/91		
Jones, Troy C.	Big Su Service	2320	30,000	30,000	60,000	IC	12/30/91		
Ketchum Air Service, Inc	Ketchum Air Service, Inc	1143		12,900	12,900	IC	12/31/91		
Lower Kuskokwim Schl Dist	Nelson Island Area HS	2643		60,000	60,000	IC	12/27/91		
M&M Constructors	M&M Constructors	1058				IC	12/31/91		
Mapco Express Inc.	#5005 491 E Parks Hwy(Wasilla)	2372	49,200	10,800	60,000	IC	12/30/91		
Matanuska Telephone Assoc	Palmer Plant	0535		15,000	15,000	IC	1/7/92		
Matanuska Telephone Assoc	Healy Facility	1556		12,000	12,000	IC	1/7/92		
McMahan, Ronald	Ron's Service	1478	52,800	7,200	60,000	IC	12/31/91		
Nistler Enterprises	Nistler Enterprises	0594	30,000	30,000	60,000	IC	12/31/91		
Northern Energy	Northern Energy	0284	13,357	3,881	17,238	IC	12/31/91		
OMB Realty Inc	OMB Realty Inc	UNK		36,000	36,000	IC	12/31/91		
Petersburg Motors Inc	Petersburg Motors Inc	0206	8,070		8,070	IC	12/30/91		
Petro Star Fuel	Sourdough Fuel	1926		13,597	13,597	IC	12/24/91		
Petro Star Fuel Inc	Sourdough Fuel Inc	0090	60,000		60,000	IC	12/31/91		
Renner's Gas & Save	Renner's Gas & Save	2327		5,964	5,964	IC	9/17/91		
Renner, Terry	Renner's Gas&Save #2	2326		60,000	60,000	IC	12/31/91		
Rountree, Richard	Aero Services	1960				IC	11/18/91		
Russell, Darrell	Russell's Texaco	0962	48,000	12,000	60,000	IC	12/27/91		
Rust's Flying Service, Inc.	Rust's Flying Service, Inc.	1368				IC	12/30/91		
Spnard Builders Supply	SBS 4412 Lois Dr.	1526				IC	12/31/91		
StarFlite Inc.	StarFlite Inc.	2446		37,200	37,200	IC	12/31/91		
Stephens, Ronald	Peters Creek Chevron	2587	42,699	15,060	57,759	IC	12/31/91		
Sunny Chevron Service, Inc.	Sunny Chevron Service, Inc.	0413				IC	1/30/92		

APPENDIX F

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE PROGRAM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PRIORITY RANKING FOR FY 93

OWNER/OPERATOR	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 93 REQUESTS			RANK	DATE RECEIVED	GRANTS ENCUMBER	
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			UPGRADE	CLOSURE
Thompson, Billy E.	Thompson's Gas Service	1172	60,000		60,000	IC	12/26/91		
Tundra Tours, Inc.	Tundra Tours, Inc.	UNK				IC	12/31/91		
Utopia Inc	Quinnat Landing Hotel	2367				IC	12/27/91		
Vend Alaska	Vend Alaska	0686		4,800	4,800	IC	12/31/91		
Wilbur, Joseph	Flight Safety AK	0448				IC	12/31/91		
Wrangell Fisheries	Wrangell Fisheries	2520				IC	3/4/92		
Wrightway Auto Carriers, Inc	101 W. Whitney Rd	2646		19,923	19,923	IC	12/30/91		
Alascom Inc	Sitka	0114		8,794	8,794	NE	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Juneau Toll Ctr	0227	29,794	16,511	46,305	NE	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Sawmill	0367	29,314	13,801	43,115	NE	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Nikishka	1024		6,093	6,093	NE	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Eagle River Earth Station	1155	26,400	14,294	40,694	NE	12/31/91		
Alascom Inc	Haines	2018		7,674	7,674	NE	12/31/91		
Alaska Railroad Corp	14 Sites	Various		60,893	60,893	NE	12/31/91		
Anchorage Chrysler Center	2601 E 5th Ave	01E1				NE	10/21/91		
Central Plumbing & Heating	Central Plumbing & Heating	2290		20,381	20,381	NE	12/19/91		
Copper Center Lodge	Copper Center Lodge	UNK				NE	12/31/91		
Darby, Ted	Space 424 Lake Hood	2445				NE	10/11/91		
Gamble, Edward	Fritz Creek General Store	0245		6,000	6,000	NE	12/31/91		
Geri, Warren	Hangar-Merrill Field	2601		2,520	2,520	NE	12/31/91		
Halliburton Co.	Halliburton Geophysical Svcs	1886		19,928	19,928	NE	10/22/91		
Int'l In-Flight Catering	Int'l In-Flight Catering	0449	5,870		5,870	NE	12/31/91		
JD&S Rentals	Kodiak Auto Ctr #2	1643		5,841	5,841	NE	12/31/91		
Kenley, Fred	Lake Hood Slip 601	2395				NE	12/31/91		
Mapco Express Inc.	#5021 6010 old Seward (Anch)	0727	49,200	10,800	60,000	NE	12/30/91		
Mapco Express Inc.	#5001 1405 S. Bragaw (Anch)	1496	49,200	10,800	60,000	NE	12/30/91		
Mapco Express Inc.	#5006 1501 E Dimond (Anch)	1505	49,200	10,800	60,000	NE	12/30/91		
Mapco Express Inc.	#5024 8803 Jewel Lk (Anch)	1521	49,200	10,800	60,000	NE	12/30/91		
Matanuska-Susitna Borough	Big Lake Elementary	UNK		5,203	5,203	NE	12/31/91		
Second Avenue Service	Second Avenue Service, Inc	2341		16,338	16,338	NE	12/26/91		
TOTAL FY 93 APPLICATIONS	399		\$2,699,223	\$3,162,315	\$5,861,538			\$854,082	\$120,265

RANK 1 is the highest score, 2 the second highest, 3 the third highest, etc. (Several facilities may be in the same rank.)

RANK "IC" = The information submitted with the application was insufficient to rank the application. See "Information Required" column for list of missing items.

RANK "NE" = The application was determined to be ineligible for the Financial Assistance Program.

Note 1 = A grant offer has been issued and funds will be encumbered as soon as grantee signs the grant offer.

Shaded Area = Grant Offer Signed and Funds Encumbered

APPENDIX G

TANK CLEANUP PROGRAM REQUESTS FOR FY 94

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 94 REQUESTS			DATE RECEIVED	COMMENTS	FACILITY LOCATION
			GRANT	LOAN	TOTAL			
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Heated Bus Barn-Moose Creek	1070	76,791	8,532	85,323	12/31/92		Moose Creek
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Shop & Office-Anchorage	0570	130,264	14,474	144,738	12/31/92		Anchorage
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Heated Bus Barn-Fbks	1066	130,126	14,458	144,584	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Blackard, Joe & Mary	Bus Barn-Anchorage	0324	130,063	14,451	144,514	12/31/92		Anchorage
C. R. Lewis Co. Inc	C. R. Lewis Co. Inc	1432	106,200	11,800	118,000	12/30/92		Anchorage
City & Borough of Sitka	City Garage	0525	7,432	826	8,258	12/31/92		Sitka
City of Cordova	Small Boat Harbor	1757	36,180	4,020	40,200	12/30/92		Cordova
Eichner & Eichner	2480 Tongass	2645	12,700	1,410	14,110	12/29/92		Ketchikan
Global Finance & Investment Co.	Chena Pump Plaza	1094	33,858	3,762	37,620	12/23/92		Fairbanks
Goldpanner Service Inc.	Goldpanner Service Inc.	1339	10,913	1,213	12,126	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Haxby, John	Call Earl Inc	1922	20,072	2,230	22,302	11/20/92		Anchorage
Horrell Investments	Glennallen Chevron	2292	113,070	12,563	125,633	12/10/92		Glennallen
Juneau Ready Mix	Juneau Ready Mix	0317	2,730	303	3,033	12/31/92		Juneau
Kenai Air Alaska	Kenai Air Alaska	0985	48,127	5,347	53,474	12/31/92		Kenai
Mark Air	Hangar/Cargo Facility	1110	462,479	25,000	487,479	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Mark Air	Vehicle Maintenance/Warehouse	2751	417,039	25,000	442,039	12/31/92		Fairbanks
MB Contracting Co.	MB Contracting Co.	0635	14,260	1,584	15,844	12/18/92		Anchorage
Peninsula Ford Inc.	Peninsula Ford Inc.	2613	23,830	2,648	26,478	10/21/92		Soldotna
PERS & FDIC	Kenai Supply, 3061 Peger Rd	UNK	137,700	15,300	153,000	12/30/92		Fairbanks
Renner, Terry	Renner's Gas & Save #2	2326	242,873	25,000	267,873	12/31/92		Anchorage
Shaw, Bert	2605 E. 5th	2176	22,500	2,500	25,000	12/29/92		Anchorage
Smithson, Charles E.	Circle S Groc. Texaco	1714				12/14/92	No Cost Estimates	Chugiak
Sourdough Fuel	Sourdough Beaver Brook	0090	311,709	25,000	336,709	12/31/92		North Pole
Suburban Propane, Quantum Che	Petrolane Gas Service	0519	92,991	10,332	103,323	12/30/92		Fairbanks
Temsco Helicopters Inc.	Juneau Airport	0270	6,904	767	7,671	12/30/92		Juneau
Totem Services Inc.	Totem Chevron	0234	147,510	16,390	163,900	12/31/92		Fairbanks
TRS & FDIC	Searmotive, 5301 Lk Shore Dr	1179	66,246	7,361	73,607	12/31/92		Anchorage
Wuerth, Julius & Juergen	European Motors	2565	37,265	4,141	41,405	12/29/92		Anchorage
Wuerth, Julius & Juergen	Pacific Mitsubishi	2566	37,265	4,141	41,405	12/29/92		Anchorage
Young's Partnership	Young's Chevron	0599				12/28/92	No Cost Estimates	Tok
TOTAL FY 94 APPLICATIONS	30		\$2,879,096	\$260,552	\$3,139,648			

APPENDIX H

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE REQUESTS FOR FY 94

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 94 REQUESTS			DATE RECEIVED	COMMENTS	FACILITY LOCATION
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			
Alaska Dial a Car Inc	Payless Car Rental-Anchorage	1909				12/31/92	Closure-No cost estimates	Anchorage
Alaska Dial a Car Inc	Payless Car Rental-Fbks	UNK				12/31/92	Closure-No cost estimates	Fairbanks
Alaska Dial a Car Inc	Alaska Dial a Car Inc	UNK				12/31/92	Closure-No cost estimates	Fairbanks
Alaska Frontier Resort	Iliamna Lake Resort	2431	12,495	16,040	28,535	12/31/92		Iliamna
ARA Denali Park Hotels	McKinley Village	0314		9,450	9,450	12/14/92		Denali Park
Bishop, Thomas	Nuggot Aviation	0375	42,649		42,649	12/1/92		Palmer
Burt, Marilyn	Awesome Auto Inc.	2340				12/30/92	No Cost Estimates	Palmer
C.R. Lewis Company Inc.	C.R. Lewis Company Inc.	1432		8,428	8,428	12/15/92		Anchorage
CCEK Halverson Properties	Precision Grind	UNK		43,015	43,015	12/31/92		Anchorage
CEM Leasing	Hilltop Truck Stop	2442	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Chamberlain, Cleo	Eagle Air	0353		3,750	3,750	10/16/92		Gulkana
Chena Goldstream Fire & Rescue	3210 Murphy Dome	1183		8,222	8,222	12/23/92		Fairbanks
Chena Goldstream Fire & Rescue	716 Chena Ridge Road	1181		8,222	8,222	12/23/92		Fairbanks
City & Borough of Sitka	Crescent Harbor	0082		3,359	3,359	12/31/92		Sitka
City & Borough of Sitka	Fire Dept	2337		1,740	1,740	12/31/92		Sitka
Eagle Alrmotive	Gulkana Airport	0353		3,765	3,765	11/23/92		Glennallen
Eero Volkswagen	Eero Volkswagen	2503		10,941	10,941	11/3/92		Anchorage
Eichner & Eichner	2450 Tongass	2645		5,750	5,750	12/29/92		Ketchikan
Eldridge, Chet	AK Mechanical Fuel Service	0125	29,128	30,872	60,000	12/31/92		Delta Junction
Ellis, W.T.	Duffy's Roadhouse	2497	6,000	3,300	9,300	12/31/92		Slana
Fickes, Lester & Dorothy	Riverview Quick Stop	1054	1,042		1,042	6/22/92		North Pole
Fisher's Fuel Inc.	Larry's Healy Service	0492	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Healy Fork
Fisher's Fuel Inc.	Fisher's Fuel Inc.	1114	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Big Lake
Fisher, Robert B.	Big Lake Rent-All	1123	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Big Lake
Fisher, Robert B.	Mars Hill Top	0388	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Cutton
Fisher, Robert B.	Palmer Tesoro	0870	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		Palmer
Fox General Store Inc.	Fox General Store Inc.	0049	60,000		60,000	12/31/92	FY93 Applied for just Closure	Fairbanks
Gerik Inc.	Ride 'N Shine	2186	41,100	18,900	60,000	12/31/92		Anchorage
Helms, Orville R.	1524 Stacia St	2427		1,118	1,118	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Hildre, Harvey & Loretta	Porta Shop	1703	3,814	3,343	7,157	12/31/92		Juneau
Hoover, Carl & Darlene	Hoover's Chevron	UNK	60,000		60,000	8/17/92		Skagway
Hudson Air Service	Village Airstrip-Talkeetna	2549		1,375	1,375	12/31/92		Talkeetna
Lerude, Robert	Central Motor Inn	2506				12/31/92		Central
Loop Services Inc	Noble Street Texaco	0962	45,386	14,614	60,000	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Lot Inc.	Hatcher Pass Gateway Center	0123	34,710	8,940	43,650	12/30/92		Palmer
Maritime Helicopters, Inc.	Maritime Helicopters, Inc.	0864	33,525	19,500	53,025	12/7/92		Homer
Mark Air	Hangar/Cargo-Fbks	1110	55,831	4,169	60,000	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Mark Air	Vehicle Maint/Warehouse-Fbks	2751	21,177	38,823	60,000	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Miller, Ralph D.	Tanana Trading Post	2559	51,660	8,340	60,000	12/31/92		Delta Junction
Nordstrom Inc.	Nordstrom Inc.	2779		7,569	7,569	12/18/92		Fairbanks

APPENDIX H

TANK UPGRADE AND CLOSURE REQUESTS FOR FY 94

OWNER NAME	FACILITY NAME	FAC ID#	FY 94 REQUESTS			DATE RECEIVED	COMMENTS	FACILITY LOCATION
			UPGRADE	CLOSURE	TOTAL			
Pacific Alaska Fuel Services	Kotzebue Airport	1225	48,096	11,904	60,000	12/30/92		Kotzebue
Roote, Marvin & Mary Lou	4 Corner's Store	1662	44,957	15,043	60,000	12/31/92		Wasilla
Seawell, William	Tryph's Lodge	2573		7,800	7,800	4/4/92		Saicha
Shaw, Bert	2605 E. 5th	2176		6,197	6,197	12/29/92		Anchorage
Smithson, Charles E.	Circlo S Groc. Texaco	1714				12/14/92	No Cost Estimate	Chugiak
Sourdough Fuel	Sourdough Beaverbrook Station	0090	60,000		60,000	12/31/92		North Pole
Spornak Airways	Spornak Airways	1065	1,967		1,967	12/31/92		Anchorage
Temsco Helicopters Inc	Juneau Airport	0270		5,360	5,360	12/30/92		Juneau
Temsco Helicopters Inc	Ketchikan	1768		3,186	3,186	12/30/92		Ketchikan
Turner, Betty J.	Cork's Pit Stop	0215		13,420	13,420	12/30/92		North Pole
Weaver, Patrick & Joanne	Curry's Corner	0210	44,642	15,358	60,000	12/31/92		Fairbanks
Weber, Gary	Wasilla Chevron	1896	38,160	21,840	60,000	12/30/92		Wasilla
Wizard Wash	Wizard Wash	2551		8,505	8,505	12/31/92		Anchorage
Wuerth, Julius & Juergen	Pacific Mitsubishi	2566		475	475	12/29/92		Anchorage
TOTAL FY 93 APPLICATIONS	72		\$1,096,814	\$392,158	\$1,488,972			



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
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Underground Storage Tanks Financial Assistance Program
3601 C Street, Suite 398
Anchorage, Alaska 99503

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The *Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill

Final Report, State of Alaska Response



Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

June 1993

The *Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill

Final Report, State of Alaska Response

prepared by Ernest Piper

Anchorage, Alaska

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation



June 1993 • Walter J. Hickel, Governor • John A. Sandor, Commissioner

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Foreward

The publication of this report comes approximately four and one-half years after the grounding of the Exxon-Valdez on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and the consequent spill of eleven million gallons of North Slope crude oil into one of America's most valued and beautiful natural environments. A primary purpose of the report is to glean all the lessons we can from that experience and record them for the future so that we do not forget.

Alaskans are a proud people — a people who are dead serious about our role as stewards of the rare and rich ecosystems that make up Alaska. We work, live and play in close association with nature. We have a deep awareness of the necessity to prosper in nature and also to conserve it for a later day and a coming generation. For us, that later day is the reality of next week as well as the next century, and the coming generation is made up of our children. The environment is not an abstract concept to Alaskans.

Therefore, when the tanker went aground on March 24, 1989, all Alaskans felt the shock, profoundly, then rolled up their sleeves and went to work. This report is written from the point of view of Alaska's state government, especially the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and other agencies that faced the formidable task of responding to the spill and protecting Alaskans and their natural resources. But also evident and important to report is that Alaskans of all types, ages and occupations pitched in and did their part. So, one of the lessons learned is that people who are closest to the disaster — in nearby towns and villages, on the fishing grounds, in the local governments and schools — make up one of the most valuable sources of immediate information, local knowledge, and, importantly, motivation to do the spill response and cleanup job right.

It is also important to recognize other Americans and people of foreign nations. Immediately after the spill, and during the whole first year of response and cleanup, the Alaska Governor's Office and other state agencies received thousands of letters and calls from other states and countries. We still receive inquiries on the spill's after-effects and restoration of the environment. This heartfelt outpouring of concern dramatized the significance of Alaska as a planet-wide symbol of majestic natural environment, wildlife, and the last frontier. Our sincere thanks go out to all of those who cared, and along with our thanks, an assurance that we also care.

The writer of the report, Ernie Piper, is uniquely qualified to put the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in historical perspective. When the spill occurred he was serving as Special Assistant to Governor Steve Cowper, specializing in resource issues relating to local governments; earlier, he was a policy analyst in the division of strategic planning and chief speech writer and researcher for Governor Bill Sheffield. Mr. Piper had been following oil development issues for a number of years, was knowledgeable about the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the Valdez terminal, and was personally acquainted with many of the key DEC staffers who became members of the spill response team.

In the first two seasons of the spill response, Mr. Piper was the liaison to local governments in the spill-affected area, and one of the Governor's primary strategists and coordinators working with DEC's technical managers and Commissioner Dennis Kelso. Beginning in October of 1990, Ernie Piper became the State's On Scene Coordinator, managing Alaska's state agency and community response programs. He continued in that capacity with the election of Walter Hickel as Governor in December of 1990 and represented the State of Alaska during the final two years of spill response and cleanup. He is therefore a most appropriate author to summarize and analyze Alaska's response to the largest oil spill ever to occur in our state.

This report is intended to focus on the lessons the state learned from America's largest tanker spill. Representatives of state and federal agencies, citizens who live in

the towns and villages near oil development and transportation routes, regulators of oil and gas production in our state, and businesspersons in exploration, production or transportation of oil and gas — all have a responsibility to examine the lessons we gained at a costly price.

I believe one of the most vital lessons is that prevention is the key to the problem of oil spills, and DEC has rededicated itself to the principle that it is much easier, more cost-effective, and environmentally safer to prevent spills than to clean them up. A second essential lesson is the importance of building partnerships among the communities, government agencies, and private enterprises to keep prevention standards high and to stand ready to respond if the need ever arises again. A third lesson is that people and communities as well as natural resources are impacted by oil spills and must be a part of the restoration process. Fortunately, the federal and state governments' litigation against Exxon was resolved in 1992 with a billion-dollar settlement — the largest dollar settlement of its type in United States history. This agreement enabled the restoration process to move forward.

We've made some great strides in these endeavors, as Ernie reports here in the final chapters of this history. Restoration is well underway, but much remains to be done. We need to keep the commitment strong, to keep the communication lines open, to maintain cooperation at all levels so that the resources, people and communities impacted by the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill are restored and that future spills are prevented.

John A. Sandor, Commissioner
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
September, 1993

Table of Contents

Foreward	i
Acknowledgments	v
Maps	
Alaska Map — Oil Spill Location	vi
Spread of Oil from the <i>Exxon Valdez</i>	vii
Prince William Sound and Tanker Grounding Location	viii
Introduction	1
Oil in Alaska	1
Notes, Introduction	7
Chapter 1: The Oil Spill Response Organization	9
1.1 Who's in charge here?	10
Federal regulatory structure	10
State structure and lead agency	10
The "responsible party"	11
The government's role — and options	11
1.2 The <i>Exxon Valdez</i> oil spill	12
1.3 State government organization	20
DEC duties and management structure	21
Alaska Departments of Fish and Game and Natural Resources	24
The Office of the Governor	27
1.4 The joint response	28
The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee	30
The Technical Advisory Group	33
1.5 Summary	43
Notes, Chapter 1	43
Chapter 2: Technology	49
2.1 On the water	51
Boom	51
Skimmers	53
Burning	56
Dispersants	56
2.2 Shoreline cleanup	61
Hot water and high pressure	63
Solvents and chemical cleaners	69
Mechanical treatment	72
Bioremediation	73
Notes, Chapter 2	83
Chapter 3: Cleanup, 1989-92	89
3.1 The <i>Exxon Valdez</i>	91
3.2 The emergency order	92
3.3 The Battle of Sawmill Bay ..	94
3.4 Cleanup operations	96

Commercial fishing	99
Subsistence	106
The invasion	114
Miles of beach	119
3.5 Transition, 1989-90	127
The "walk-a-thon," winter surveys, and evaluation of conditions	128
Local response	131
Newport Beach	133
FASST and SSAT surveys	136
3.6 1990 Cleanup	139
3.7 The state response plan	143
3.8 Cleanup, 1991-92	144
Notes, Chapter 3	147
Chapter 4: Legal, Regulatory and Administrative Changes	155
4.1 State legislation	155
Oil and Hazardous Substances Release Response Fund	156
Contingency plans and response standards	160
Liability, penalties, fines	161
Access, enforcement, and oversight	162
4.2 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990	163
Notes, Chapter 4	165
Chapter 5: Restoration	167
5.1 Restoration structure and funding	172
Organization	173
Public Advisory Group	175
5.2 Restoration timetable	175
5.3 Restoration activities	176
Summary of injury	176
Damage to other resources and services	179
5.4 Criteria and restoration options	180
Notes, Chapter 5	183

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Acknowledgments

The idea of preparing some kind of final report on the spill response came up early in 1989, but as the response got longer, finality seemed ever more distant. Many people in state government helped make it happen — finally — but a few were truly instrumental and I would like to note their involvement here.

At the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Joe Ferguson refused to let anyone forget that there should be a report, and he kept the idea alive every step of the way. Marti Early was extraordinarily patient while waiting for my revisions, even while juggling the layout and graphics. Ward Lane provided invaluable computer services. David Bruce showed great resourcefulness and tenacity when it came to handling those critical and innumerable administrative details, like contracts and budgeting. Larry Dietrick and Steve Provant provided substantial technical insight and got me back on course at a number of points in this report. L.J. Evans loaned me files (against her better judgment), slogged through the footnotes, and edited much of the text. Support from Mark Brodersen at the Restoration Office was also very much appreciated. Commissioner John Sandor continued his pattern of professionalism in dealing with the *Exxon Valdez* project as a whole; he actively supported independent writing and research for this report.

Other special contributions from sister agencies included those from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game's Mark Kuwada, a careful writer and thoughtful public servant; Jim Fall of the Division of Subsistence, on whose research and writing much of the subsistence section of chapter three depended; Jim Frechione, Judy Bittner, and my many colleagues at the Division of Parks and the Department of Natural Resources. Many thanks to all those other state employees who took the time to write down their experiences and opinions in the record. The Oil Spill Public Information Center from the *Exxon Valdez* Trustee Council provided important access to documents and research assistance.


A special acknowledgment and thanks go to former Governor Steve Cowper, former DEC commissioner and good friend Dennis Kelson, and former DEC manager Gary Hayden, all of whom showed the greatest confidence and trust by bringing me into the spill response management at various points and in various ways. They showed tremendous leadership during a tough time, and provided critical access and explanation to me. And I offer special thanks to Commander Ed Page of the U.S. Coast Guard, who didn't agree with me all that much, but who is a good friend, an honest critic, and an outstanding officer.

I also wish to acknowledge the assistance of The Oil Spill Public Information Center, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, the U.S. Coast Guard, and a great number of individuals with state and federal agencies involved with the spill response.

Most of all, I wish to thank the people of the oil spill region, whose thoughts, efforts, emotions, and experience flow strongly and deeply below the surface of this brief government report. Someday, I hope, you will all tell your stories with the same strength, energy and passion you put into this noble fight to protect your communities and our environment.


Ernest Piper
Eagle River, Alaska
June 5, 1993

Alaska Map – Oil Spill Location




Spread of Oil from the Exxon Valdez Spill

March 24, 1989 to June 20, 1989



Prince William Sound and Tanker Grounding Location




Introduction

The facts of the grounding of the T/V *Exxon Valdez* on March 24, 1989, have been fairly well documented in the official record of government and the unofficial record of journalism, video documentary, television fiction and popular non-fiction.

The tanker ran aground shortly after midnight on a well-charted, well-marked reef about 25 miles from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminal at Valdez. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the accident was due to a combination of bad seamanship, bad judgment, bad management and bad luck. The Alaska Oil Spill Commission expanded the blame in its 1990 findings, concluding that industry was poorly prepared, government had not pushed hard enough and consistently enough as regulators, and the public and political leadership had grown complacent before the disaster.

The tanker lost about 11 million gallons of North Slope crude oil from its tanks. The state and federal governments agree that the on-the-water response by industry was slow and inadequate. Equipment was unavailable, performed poorly, or was simply not up to the task of responding effectively to a spill of that magnitude. Cleanup on all or part of nearly 1,300 miles of Alaska shoreline continued from 1989 through June 1992.

This report does not attempt to recreate the accident or redistribute the blame already spread at the feet of various parties. It does not purport to tell every story from every aspect of the spill, nor is it intended to duplicate or compete with a longer, more extensively researched, federally mandated report prepared by the U.S. Coast Guard. This is an account of the actions taken by the Alaska state government, especially the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, during the three years of spill response and cleanup. It is tangent to many other stories — from Alaska Native villages, from the federal government, from the



The *Exxon Valdez* and a lightering vessel after the grounding.

Photo by U. S. Coast Guard

commercial fishing fleets of the area, for example — and it attempts to explain the state government's interaction with those parties. It is beyond the scope of the project and the ability of this author to tell all those stories.

It is arranged by issue, rather than by chronology. A brief overview of the content and organization may help the reader at the outset.

Oil in Alaska

Oil had been flowing through Alaska's modern history long before the tanks of the *Exxon Valdez* ripped open and poured 11 million gallons of grief into Prince William Sound in March of 1989. The social and economic history of the young state has been alternately steered and altered by oil development since the discovery and development of the Kenai and Cook Inlet oil and gas fields in the 1950s and '60s.

The idea of a place called Alaska — from far Southeast to the Arctic and west deep into the North Pacific — is an invention of mapmakers, European governments, and the mind of America. Through the middle of the 20th century, this vast area was made up of regions that were defined by language, geography, culture, economics and politics. Native cultures were very distinct from each other; the arrival of Europeans and Americans did not change this pattern much. Alaska's cities tended to grow up around specific economic interests — Anchorage and the Alaska Railroad; Nome, Fairbanks and Juneau around gold mines or districts. Through the 1950s, the only area of the territory where Americans had developed a more or less integrated economy was the Southeast panhandle. Political life of the territory was centered there as well.

Even after the war and during the subsequent boom in military construction around Anchorage and Fairbanks, the areas outside of Southeast were, economically speaking, really only appendages of various federal government programs and operations: the Alaska Railroad, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Army Signal

Corps, the regular Army and Air Force. The retail and service industries (especially construction) were directly and firmly tied to the federal presence. Mining and fishing were seasonal, and any year-round economic activity was limited because of that.

Southeast, of course, had its own federal economic dependencies and seasonal fluctuations, but its fishing and logging industries provided the base for communities that were more like permanent, year-round towns of the Pacific Northwest, and less like the work-camp outposts of Southcentral and the so-called "westward" area of Alaska — i.e., everything west of the Panhandle.


Oil and gas development on the Kenai Peninsula and in the Cook Inlet changed this balance significantly. Throughout the 20th century there had been bursts of mining activity in Alaska: gold in the Interior, copper at Kennecott, coal at various locations. There had even been some limited drilling for oil early in the century near the natural seeps at Katalla, to the east and south of Cordova. But the discovery and development of the Swanson River oil field near Kenai, and subsequent development of gas and oil fields on- and offshore, sparked the first serious, non-government economic activity in Alaska outside of Southeast since World War II.

After statehood, in 1959, oil development also bailed the young state government out of early financial trouble. In 1962 the new, three-year-old State of Alaska had been depending for support largely on transition funds from Washington, D.C. It was not clear where the state would get the funds it needed to provide even basic state services; the

population base and gross economic product were simply not large enough to produce significant revenue through usual methods of taxation.

Then, in 1963, the state Department of Natural Resources offered Cook Inlet offshore tracts for oil and gas leasing. The state expected to receive a modest amount in bids, perhaps \$15 million; instead, the high bidders put up nearly three times that amount. The high bids were a minor windfall and solved a short-term fiscal crisis.

The emphasis is on "short-term," however. In 1964, the largest earthquake in North American history turned southcentral Alaska upside down, causing massive geological



Workers at an oil drilling rig.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

change, and presenting Alaska with the daunting and expensive prospect of rebuilding virtually all its public infrastructure. Congress eventually authorized more than \$350 million in disaster relief, loans, construction funding, and other programs to Alaska.

Ironically, the event that literally tore much of the state apart set the stage for the next major flurry of economic activity in Alaska. The federal infusion of cash was massive — almost a billion dollars at 1990 values — and it was spread around in varying ways: \$51 million to rebuild schools and other public buildings, \$25 million in urban renewal projects, \$5 million in 23 highway reconstruction projects, and \$92 million in disaster and small business loans. The federal government also purchased or otherwise financed more than \$15 million in bonds that the state had already issued, or planned to issue, to finance previously planned public construction projects.¹ Obviously, much of that wealth and many of the jobs wound up going to Outside² concerns. But it is safe to say that in raw economic terms, disaster reconstruction money carried many state government programs, allowed the government to redistribute its own money to other needs, and helped the state generate income from taxation it might not have normally raised.

But like military construction or statehood transition funds, this federally sponsored economic shot in the arm would not sustain state programs and the private economy for very long. "Something else" would have to come along.

The "something else" came along in 1967, when Atlantic Richfield, again, made its first major oil strikes at Prudhoe Bay. This would lead to more than \$900 million (about \$1.5-\$1.8 billion in 1990 dollars) in state lease sale revenues in 1969, authorization and construction of the pipeline in the 1970s, and waves of population and economic growth in the 1980s.

But while the actual effects and benefits of North Slope oil discoveries couldn't be foretold exactly in 1967, it was no accident that the State of Alaska would be a major participant in whatever occurred.

The fear that Alaska would be broke (or nearly so) without federal help was one of the minor themes running through the debate about statehood for Alaska during the 1950s.

Opponents of statehood suggested that Alaska would become little more than a drain on federal resources; proponents of statehood countered that the territory could never achieve real economic growth while under management by "absentee" owners in Washington. Often these arguments were smokescreens for other larger (frequently unspoken) political or economic concerns, but the prospect of a cash-poor state of Alaska was real enough that at statehood, Alaska's land grant was unlike that given to any other Western state. The realization that Alaska would have to support itself from its natural resources and lands was the driving force for this new federal policy.

Alaska not only received the right to select 104 million acres from the public domain, but the state could make its selections in large blocks. Other Western states had usually been granted the right to pick (or to have chosen for them) small blocks of land within larger federal holdings; Alaska, on the other hand, could put together hundreds or thousands of acres in a contiguous block. Instead of choosing a small parcel for a small and particular purpose (eventual sale as a homesite, for example), Alaska could choose massive parcels for large-scale purposes (lease as a mineral development, for example). Alaska also, unlike other states, received title to tideland and submerged lands up to three miles offshore.

This seemingly arcane bit of land management strategy set the stage for a new way of managing public lands in America. Other states had used land disposals as a way to finance government projects. But generally that involved the outright sale of public domain parcels for homes or farms, with the money generated being earmarked to finance the schools (or other public needs) demanded by families moving to the new homes and farms. Ultimate disposal of public domain lands was not just a consequence of this type of policy, it was the goal.

That would not be the case in Alaska. Land in most of Alaska — without roads, without suitable agricultural or grazing conditions — was, in modern economic terms,

worth little on its own. The resources on and under the land held potentially more value over time — much more value, in fact, than could be realized by a one-time sale that sent the resources and the land into private hands.

This led to a land selection strategy by the state government that concentrated on finding resource-rich lands that could be leased for development, with the state receiving royalties based on production over time. And this, in turn, led the new state planners directly to the North Slope of Alaska. There would be no farms or New England town sites on the tundra, but there might be lucrative resource development — particularly oil development.

Everyone — from local villagers to the U.S. Defense Department to the oil industry to the new state managers — everyone knew that there was oil, in some amount, under the North Slope. There were numerous natural seeps, and even as far back as the 1920s there was a fair amount of technical geological data suggesting large reservoirs of oil. A massive area in the central and western Arctic had been designated a national strategic petroleum reserve three decades before Alaska became a state.

Alaska's land selections would be to the east, in and around Prudhoe Bay, the Sagavanirktok River, Oliktok — essentially, almost everything in between the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska to the west and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the east.

The 1968 announcement of a large discovery at Prudhoe Bay by Atlantic Richfield confirmed what many people had suspected all along: The North Slope reserves were potentially huge, perhaps 10 billion recoverable barrels, the largest find ever in North

America. In June of 1969, the core of what later became a larger consortium of oil companies operating at Prudhoe Bay applied for federal permits to build a pipeline from the North Slope. That fall, Alaska's fourth Prudhoe Bay oil and gas lease sale brought in more than \$900 million in high bids to the state. This represented more than seven times the state's budget at the time.

The pipeline was still a long way off. At the federal level, the Nixon Administration supported the project and took several administrative actions to ease the path of the right of way permit. In Alaska, Governor Bill Egan's administration also supported the project.

However, there was substantial opposition to such a project outside Alaska, and some within the state as well. The U.S. Congress moved carefully on various pieces of pipeline legislation. Several lands and right of way issues

wound up in federal court. The passage of the landmark National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 raised other, more complicated issues. Alaska Natives pointed out that their historical claims to much of Alaska had not been resolved through the treaties and laws that had dealt with Native American land claims in the Lower 48; they wanted some control, compensation — or both — regarding pipeline construction. A tangle of claims, lawsuits, statutes and proposals from Congress and the state legislature, oil industry negotiations and plans, proposals for Alaskan or Canadian routes — all these combined to form a tightly-woven barrier to construction of the pipeline.

That barrier was unraveled by a combination of events, politics, settlements, and laws: Native claims were settled in the landmark Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act;



The Trans-Alaska oil pipeline.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

Congress exempted much of the pipeline construction and planning from some of the major federal environmental requirements; Alaska negotiated taxation and some regulatory issues directly with the industry; the all-Alaska route was selected. On July 17, 1973, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act was approved in the U.S. Senate by a single vote — that of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, who used his constitutional power to break a 50-50 tie.



Terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Valdez, Alaska.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

Construction started in 1974 and lasted until 1977. On June 20, 1977, the first barrels of oil flooded the pipeline and started downstream to Valdez.

Ultimately, the pipeline project offered its support among Alaska's elected leaders and much of the relatively small population (about 300,000 at the time) because oil development held the promise of jobs, increased prosperity, and revenue to support programs and facilities that could raise the state's standard of living.

At the national level, the pipeline was supposed to lessen the nation's dependence on foreign oil. The control of world oil markets — and pricing — by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was beginning to squeeze oil-dependent industrial economies in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Here at home, the nation was beginning a decade-long economic slump, exacerbated in part by OPEC's embargoes and the cartel's ability to raise the price of oil to unheard-of levels. An Alaska pipeline was supposed to help protect or strengthen the U.S. economy to some degree. It was also considered in many respects a national security issue — an issue so strong, in fact, that the Congress exempted the pipeline project from many of the emerging environmental requirements in federal law. The first OPEC embargo against the United States had come for political reasons, not market reasons: America's support of Israel in its wars with neighboring Arab states cost the nation its access to Middle East oil.

The promises of Alaska North Slope oil and the pipeline have largely come true. Alaska oil did not solve all the state's problems, but oil revenues, state spending, and associated activity certainly did help raise Alaska's standard of living. Alaskans wisely decided in 1976 to put aside at least a quarter of all oil income in a

constitutionally protected savings account; the Alaska Permanent Fund in 1992 contains about \$14 billion, and holds the promise of stable government support for programs after the oil runs out. The state has used its oil revenue to improve water and sewer systems, pay for construction and operation of public schools even in the smallest communities, protect and improve its fisheries, build senior citizen centers and community halls, upgrade other public services and amenities — all while its citizens enjoy the lowest rates of overall taxation anywhere in America.

Right now, for good or for ill, Alaska's economy and government are substantially dependent on the revenue generated by oil development at Prudhoe Bay. And at the national level, Alaska oil is critical to America's energy supply, at least at current levels

of consumption. Unfortunately, Alaska oil did not cause America to kick its foreign oil habit; imports as a total percentage of U.S. consumption have continued to rise. However, Alaska oil makes up nearly a quarter of all oil produced in the United States, and the products refined from North Slope crude oil fuel — literally — the automobiles and the giant economy of California and much of the American West: The bulk of the West Coast refining capacity is filled by oil that travels down the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to Valdez. Many geologists believe there are other untapped oil fields in the Alaska Arctic.

Without Alaska oil, the American economy would not look exactly the same. That is why, in part, there is continuing interest and debate about where, when, how — and if — there will more oil exploration and development in Alaska. Many people have argued that Alaska's valuable oil has come at a dear price to America, not only by changes in the land, but by stalling or allowing America to avoid dealing with long-term questions about conservation and use of alternative fuels. Others contend Alaska oil has helped keep the U.S. economy strong, and that the nation should continue its search for oil in Alaska's frontier areas.

Yet regardless how one feels about Alaska oil development, people from all sides of the debate felt together the shock and anger and initial despair when the news came on March 24, 1989, that a supertanker had run hard aground in Prince William Sound. While the promises of North Slope oil development had come true, so had the major threat.

This is where this report picks up the story. The subsequent sections are arranged as follows:

- 1.0 The Oil Spill Response Organization — This section explains how the standard institutions functioned within the spill response, but more important, how separate and unique institutions emerged. It looks at how decisions were made, primarily at the state level, but also how state interests and decisions conflicted with, overlapped, or were harmonized with the decisions of other entities involved in the response.
- 2.0 Technology — This section looks at how oil spill response technology worked on the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill. Perhaps of more general interest is the discussion of how public and private institutions viewed certain technologies, and how they made the decisions to use (or not use) certain types of technology.
- 3.0 Shoreline Cleanup, 1989-92 — This section is a somewhat sequential look at the shoreline cleanup, which began after the relatively brief on-the-water response phase. It touches on some of the issues from previous sections — institutional interaction, technology assessment, etc. — but applies the analyses of the previous sections to specific incidents and periods. This, I hope, puts the previous discussions into context.
- 4.0 Legal, Regulatory and Administrative Changes — This section is a brief overview of state and federal law and regulation changes made since the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill.
- 5.0 Restoration — This section begins with a description of how and why the State of Alaska addressed the principal legal issues raised by the spill. It touches on two early, failed attempts to settle various aspects of the cases, as well as the final civil and criminal settlements of October 1991. It then explains the basic approaches to restoration anticipated by the state and federal government in the early stages (winter, 1992-93) of the restoration process.

Readers wishing more detailed, but relatively brief descriptions of the events leading up to the grounding, the regulatory history of the Alyeska Pipeline Service

Company terminal at Valdez, the first six weeks of the oil spill response, and a complete review of restoration efforts can start with several governments reviews or summaries including: National Transportation Safety Board; the Alaska Oil Spill Commission reports, especially the background sections; the National Response Team report to the President in May 1989; and all the restoration reports to date.

Notes, Introduction

¹Ernest Gruening, *The State of Alaska* (Random House [revised edition] 1968), p. 531.

²"Outside" may refer to anywhere that is not Alaska, but is used here to refer to the rest of the United States.

Chapter 1: The Oil Spill Response Organization

Oil spills occur with surprising frequency in the United States. In 1989 alone, the year the *Exxon Valdez* ran aground, the U.S. Coast Guard logged about 8,000 spills, small and large, in the marine waters of the U.S. Most are relatively small (the average is around a hundred or two hundred gallons). The State of Alaska deals with a variety of spills on water and land, as well. In 1991, for example, the state responded to more than 40 spills of more than 1,000 gallons.

Usually these spills involve leaking tanks and fuel lines, improperly stored product, mishaps in transferring product from one area to another, and other events and mistakes outside the public's general field of vision.

When the pollution is so massive, and the potential effects so critical and threatening, the public and virtually all its institutions find themselves right in the middle of what had been formerly a distant and specialized activity.

Oil spill response on this level is largely a technical and regulatory exercise. The people who appear at the site are generally confined to those in government regulatory agencies and the dozens of pollution control and cleanup contractors who operate in a given area. They speak the same regulatory and scientific language and understand the rules, the hierarchy, and the procedures involved in pollution control. It is, in short, much like any other technical trade: The only people who usually show up at a building site are carpenters, electricians, concrete finishers, building inspectors, and so on. One would not expect a member of the general public to know much more about building codes and rafter framing techniques than he or she knows about oil spill regulations, or the optimal speed for towing containment boom.

But when the pollution is so massive, and the potential effects so critical and threatening, the public and virtually all its institutions find themselves right in the middle of what had been formerly a distant and specialized activity. When they go to the people in charge of this activity to look for answers and reports, the public is given information that has been only partially translated, at best. It is similar to what happens when a speaker of high-school-level French tries to participate in a conversation with



Oily subsurface residue from the *Exxon Valdez* found on Eleanor Island, Prince William Sound.

Photo by Patrick Endres

two native speakers chattering in colloquial terms: The listener picks up a sentence here, a few ideas there, but generally he misses much of it and winds up being a little confused.

In many cases, particularly on the level of a response such as the *Exxon Valdez* operations, the fog of the technical and regulatory details can influence strongly the way the public, the media, and the government itself view the response.

1.1 Who's in charge here?

"The National Oil and Hazardous Substance Response System is a difficult and complicated system which blurs the lines of responsibility and is confusing to many observers," wrote one of the U.S. Coast Guard's chief public information specialists in 1991. The way to counter the confusion, he advised, is to immediately establish an identifiable leader, set attainable goals, and communicate them realistically to the public. The most likely identifiable leader candidate in a large spill is the federal on-scene coordinator, he concluded.¹

This is not necessarily what happened in the first few hours and days of the spill. Exxon emerged, partly by choice, as the focus of questioning and the principal source of information. The company staged the briefings, supplied the lead spokesman, and held court front and center for the media. While state and federal officials were present and available, Exxon chose to assume the point position in public. This may have been consistent with the established spill response structure, but it also may have sent a confusing message to a public and a media corps used to dealing with government officials during such a crisis.

Federal regulatory structure

Federal law divides authority for pollution containment and cleanup between the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Coast Guard deals with spills in marine waters (including the Great Lakes), and the EPA deals with oil and hazardous substance spills on inland waters and on land. This is why the EPA was the lead federal agency at the Love Canal and Times Beach chemical cleanups, and the Coast Guard was the lead agency on the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill. Each EPA- or Coast Guard-led cleanup has a federal on-scene coordinator.

Three basic federal documents govern pollution control (oil or chemical spills, essentially) on land and water.

The Clean Water Act of 1973, the sweeping legislation that was designed to both clean up polluted waters and prevent further pollution in years ahead, is the root of the program. The law mandated a national strategy for pollution control and led to the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Response System, guided principally by the National Contingency Plan.² The National Contingency Plan, in turn, established a series of regional authorities to oversee operations in areas such as the Gulf of Mexico, Puget Sound, and other principal zones of marine traffic.

More localized planning and oversight organizations can be formed, but all work in descending order under the umbrella of the federal laws and plans mentioned above.

State structure and lead agency

The National Contingency Plan sets the nation's policy for pollution control and response. States may use the federal program alone, or they may add special provisions or regulations on top of it. Simply explained, a state may enact stricter pollution controls than the federal government, but it cannot enact weaker regulations than those

established by Washington, D.C. This strategy, used in many kinds of unrelated federal-state programs, is designed to allow states to tailor regulation to local or state needs.

The state's pollution control laws designate the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) as the lead agency for pollution control within our borders and waters. DEC works with both the Coast Guard and the EPA. In the event of a spill, DEC appoints a state on-scene coordinator to manage state operations, work with federal agencies, and integrate the needs of other state and local agencies in state and federal activities.

DEC is the state's chief representative on the Alaska Regional Response Team, a management and policy oversight group established under the National Contingency Plan. All major policy decisions, and many technical decisions regarding spill response must be considered by the Regional Response Team first. The Regional Response Team is a mix of state and federal agencies that steers response activities and, in some cases, approves or rejects spill response methods. It also coordinates the variety of federal, state, and local contingency plans for spill response in Alaska. During an actual response, the on-scene coordinator has the authority to make the final decision about what actions to implement.

Technically, in all cases, the government is "in charge." In practice, however, on-scene coordination — rather than on-scene command by the government — is a mix of oversight and negotiation and common sense.

The "responsible party"

One of the principal jobs of state and federal regulators in a spill is the need to identify the person, group, or company is responsible for the spill. Federal and state laws allow the agencies to spend public money on pollution cleanup, but the government is supposed to get that money back. And getting paid back is not just an option: The state law governing how DEC spends its response fund requires the agency to recover its costs whenever possible.

Usually, that means finding the party responsible for the spill and making arrangements not only to pay for the cleanup (along with any applicable fines or penalties), but to arrange the cleanup itself. Under ideal circumstances, an agency finds the responsible party, and the responsible party finds a contractor, arranges the logistics, and pays the bills.

The government's role — and options

The first thing the lay person notices about this structure is that there seems to be a great deal of coordinating going on at the government level, but not a lot of ordering.

Under what might be called the "responsible party" system, both federal and state agencies oversee the cleanup activities and coordinate other agency concerns and requirements in the program. In the case of a small oil field spill of drilling muds or chemicals, the government tells the responsible party to clean up the mess, setting whatever conditions state or federal law require (fish habitat, wildlife protection, public health issues, etc.). The responsible party then hires a contractor, writes a proposed cleanup plan, and submits it to the federal and state on-scene coordinators for approval. If the plan receives the government stamp of approval, the cleanup proceeds. Appropriate government regulators check up on the progress of the cleanup to make sure it meets the requirements of the plan. When the job is done to the governments' satisfaction, the spiller is released and monitoring begins, if necessary.³

If the spiller is doing a poor job, or not following the plan, or otherwise refusing to do what the government requires, the on-scene coordinator has the option of taking over the cleanup. In that case, the government — state or federal — would take over the business of hiring and directing a contractor to do the work. A basic rule of thumb in making that kind of a judgment is whether the government is likely to be able to do the job better or faster than the responsible party.

Both federal and state pollution control strategies are a mix of government and

private efforts. They try to keep the polluter involved in the cleanup. Ideally, this allows the cleanup to get going quickly and to proceed efficiently. It also allows the government to concentrate efforts on strong oversight of pollution problems and abatement, without being sidetracked by financial or administrative headaches of the cleanup.

Technically, in all cases, the government is "in charge," since ultimately the government has authority to take over a cleanup (or, more frequently, to threaten take-over) if the public's goals for the cleanup aren't met.

In practice, however, on-scene coordination — rather than on-scene command by the government — is a mix of oversight and negotiation and common sense. The goal of a cleanup is not to punish a spiller or maximize the government's opportunity to collect fines in court. The goal is to protect the public, the public's resources, and to clean up the mess. Frequently, the fastest, most efficient, and least expensive method is to work with the responsible party.


1.2 The Exxon Valdez oil spill

It was not long after the *Exxon Valdez* hit the rocks that the public became confused about who was running the response, and why the command and decision-making structure was the way it was.

For matters of both perception and fact, the public expressed little confidence in the spill response structure that was emerging in Alaska. To the public's eye, Exxon was leading and the government was somewhere in the background. Considering the threat to the environment and the local economy, to many people it seemed odd that a private company was running what was, in many respects, a public safety program with broad public policy implications.

Exxon was not a government agency, therefore not responsible to the public; the Coast Guard was the coordinator of the effort, but Exxon managers, not the Coast Guard, told workers where to go and what to do; the state DEC, adopting its usual role as an oversight agency and coordinator for state policies and requirements, couldn't tell the Coast Guard what to do. The federal on-scene coordinator, a vice admiral and, to the public, a military leader, complained in frustration that he was a "coordinator, not a commander."⁴

To someone who knew and understood the national spill response system, the



The disabled tanker Exxon Valdez hours after the grounding

Photo by Don Lawn

structure made some kind of sense. The response was hardly running smoothly, but the principal officials understood the relationships in spill response and were working within the existing system.

To the public, however, the consistent and troubling question was either, "Who's in charge?", or "Why is Exxon in charge? They spilled the oil in the first place."

The answer — correct under the federal law and the general spill response strategy — was what U.S. Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner told USA Today in July 1989. Asked if the Coast Guard ought to be in charge — meaning in command — Skinner replied, "They should be in an overall supervisory responsibility [sic]. Where there is an industry player who has the funds, resources, and the response team ready, I do not believe we should supplant that with the Coast Guard."⁵

In some respects, this "in charge" issue was not as big a problem as some people perceived it to be. The real problem was that there simply were not sufficient resources available in the area to deal with a spill of that size. Regardless of how the chain of command took shape, if there was nothing to command it didn't really matter.

Yet as the size and the complexity of the disaster grew, upper-level policy makers for all three parties became more directly involved in the decision-making. Alaska Governor Steve Cowper, DEC Commissioner Dennis Kelso, the Alaska Oil Spill Commission, leaders of fishing groups and local governments, members of Congress — all concluded that at a certain point, the national response system, with its blurry lines of responsibility, was not the only way to handle this multidimensional response operation.⁶

While there were a number of institutional procedures unique to the *Exxon Valdez* spill response, the parties generally attempted to operate the response on the model set up in the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Response System, the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and DEC's Alaska statewide contingency plan.⁷ Coast Guard historians, however, concluded in a recent memo to DEC that "the NCP model got 'lost' in the process. The President became involved, the military was used in a manner and extent never envisioned by the NCP, cabinet-level officers were involved, and new structures such as the ISCC [Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee] were established by the FOSC [federal on-scene coordinator]."⁸

Under these plans, the Coast Guard has the basic responsibility for managing or coordinating spill response in Alaska's coastal waters. The state on-scene coordinator works as an advisor to the federal on-scene coordinator. The state's designated role is to make sure federal authorities know what state resources are available and what state or local needs must be considered or complied with. Both the state and federal coordinators are supposed to make sure that the responsible party is carrying out whatever contingency plan is in place at the time. In March of 1989, everyone was working off the contingency plan negotiated and developed between the state and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.⁹

The plan had been developed between 1984-87. It spelled out how fast Alyeska was to respond to various spill scenarios, including a potential 200,000 barrel spill. On March 24-25, Alyeska's response did not take shape the way the plan dictated it should. A barge was out-of-service; equipment was buried under several feet of snow; skimmers and other on-the-water response equipment was anywhere from 6-18 hours behind the response schedule in the plan.

Yet despite the slow and inadequate response on the water immediately after the grounding, organizationally, the spill response structure took shape the way it was designed. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was the designated responder; the Coast Guard assumed its role as chief federal coordinator; DEC took the necessary steps to oversee the response, especially as it affected specific state and local interests.

Alyeska, however, quickly dropped into the background as Exxon assumed complete control as the responsible party. Exxon said this hand-off was consistent with the agreements among Alyeska's parent companies, of which Exxon is one. However, Exxon did not make clear its intentions to follow through with the Alyeska contingency plan.

To someone who knew and understood the national spill response system, the structure made some kind of sense. The response was hardly running smoothly, but the principal officials understood the relationships in spill response and were working within the existing system.

Under the Prince William Sound Contingency Plan, approved by the DEC, Alyeska was supposed to coordinate and execute the industry response; indeed, that is exactly what Alyeska had done two months earlier during the Thompson Pass spill near the Alyeska terminal. This arrangement insures that when a spill happens, the state and the designated responder know with whom each is supposed to communicate. Exxon's take-over injected a whole new group of managers who, it turned out, were unfamiliar with the contingency plan and unfamiliar with their counterparts from the State of Alaska.

The system was designed so that the state could use the provisions of the contingency plan to help determine if the responder was successfully carrying out the multitude of recovery and habitat protection tasks that had been figured out in advance.

The owner companies' unilateral decision to make the hand-off of responsibility for spill response from Alyeska to Exxon the second day threw several years of planning and expectations to the wind.

The hand-off by Alyeska to Exxon left the state in a difficult position. Exxon's officials said they had their own plan, and did not necessarily intend to use the Alyeska plan the state had approved. Exxon never provided the state with a copy of its plan. According to a federal government report to the President¹⁰, the Exxon Shipping Company Headquarters Casualty Response Plan listed the company's internal structure for managing a marine spill, "but it is not specific to any location." And more important, the Exxon plan had never been reviewed or approved by state or federal officials, or the public at risk from a spill. In other words, the years of planning, negotiation, and public review that had gone into the thick Prince William Sound Contingency Plan were suddenly rendered meaningless. The hand-off left the responders with no commonly accepted plan for action.

It also left the public on the short end of the deal it had made with oil producers. The public agreed to the construction of the Alyeska facility on the premise that Alyeska would provide the best protection possible from damage caused by oil spills. The government-approved contingency plan was designed to show the public specific details about what protection they could expect for their public resources.

At the time of the grounding, the Alyeska contingency plan had detailed discussions about its command structure, which included an oil spill response coordinator designed to be the industry counterpart to the federal and state on-scene coordinators. The plan listed more than 130 sensitive habitat sites that would form the basis for any protective booming or other defensive measures. The plan set target times for initial response under different scenarios. It had lists of officials responsible for various aspects of response.

The point of the plan was that in an emergency, everyone ought to be working from the same, familiar set of instructions and plans. And further, if Alyeska was having trouble following the plan or even refusing to do so, the state would have the ability to objectively gauge the Alyeska effort, and the legal basis for triggering a state take-over or requesting federalization of a spill. The owner companies' unilateral decision to make the hand-off from Alyeska to Exxon the second day threw several years of planning and expectations to the wind.

As a matter of public regulation of the private Alyeska terminal, the industry position was troubling to state officials. Under state law, Alyeska cannot operate the terminal without an oil spill contingency plan reviewed and approved by the state. The "c-plan" was one of the ways that the public could hold the industry accountable for protecting public resources in the Sound. Regardless of who conducted a response for Alyeska — whether it was a contractor or another owner company — the state expected to use the Alyeska contingency plan as a mechanism to insure accountability. The "hand-off," which Exxon and Alyeska said was their plan all along, actually opened up a dangerous loophole in the government's ability to hold the oil companies to their plans and promises.

Perhaps more important than the legal and regulatory issues raised by the hand-off were the expectations of the public. In this case, at least initially, the "public" was defined primarily by the area residents, and the commercial fishing fleet based in Cordova. These people had participated in the development of the Alyeska contin-

The plan had never explicitly stated that dispersants would be the first-line defense. Now, right in the midst of an emergency, the fishing fleet and local residents were being told to accept a major change in the game plan.

agency plan, to some degree or another, through formal and informal meetings, hearings, and comments. They assumed they would be dealing with Alyeska, and the Alyeska plan. When the change came, they were confused and instantly skeptical; to the fishing families of Cordova, the sudden change in command and plan — and the confusion it caused — seemed almost intentional.

And when Exxon's chief executive officer Frank Iarossi stood up in Valdez on Friday, March 24, and announced that Exxon intended to fight the spill with dispersants as a first-line defense, the fishing vessel owners and local residents felt that the industry was changing the response rules without consulting the people and the industry most at risk from the spill. This, coupled with the fact that Alyeska had already failed to carry out its designated duties according to the plan's time and equipment requirements, led many to question whether the plan had been just a convenient fiction. Dispersants were potentially dangerous and extremely controversial, and the plan had never explicitly stated that dispersants would be the first-line defense. Now, right in the midst of an emergency, the fishing fleet and local residents were being told to accept a major change in the game plan — a controversial change even if there had been no emergency.

Under questioning from state and federal attorneys in 1992,¹¹ Exxon's Iarossi said the company always intended to take over response to a major tanker spill; and further, that dispersant use was the cornerstone of initial response plans for such a spill. Yet Iarossi was not sure what the approval process was for dispersants. At the time of the spill, he did not know that the state had pre-approved dispersant use in some areas, required special permission in others, and excluded a third zone. He did not know that under certain circumstances both Exxon and the federal on-scene coordinator needed

concurrence from the Alaska Regional Response Team. He had not read the Alyeska contingency plan. He did not know that the State of Alaska had regulatory oversight, and he did not understand why a DEC official was accompanying the Coast Guard and Exxon on the overflights that would assess the effectiveness of dispersants. In short, he knew less about the prearranged plans and requirements than many of the fishermen and government officials he would tell on March 24 — as if it were common knowledge — that dispersants were the first line of defense.

Much of the disagreement, animosity, and confusion about the decisions to use dispersants can be traced directly to Iarossi's general ignorance of the pre-approved spill response plans in Alaska, the authorities held by specific government agencies, and the role and the interest of the local fishing fleet.

"Well, we were led to believe that we needed a permit from the Coast Guard both to use dispersant and to burn," Iarossi stated during his deposition.¹² "And then what the Coast Guard did with it is a

mystery to us. But they apparently needed the concurrence from some committee. And it got even more confusing, because depending on where the oil was, they either did or they didn't. And it's not clear to me to this day [Aug. 5, 1992] what the Coast Guard had authority to and not do."



"When Exxon entered the picture in the first days of the spill, they did not follow the Alyeska plan, and later said they followed their own. Whatever plan they were following, if any, it was not a state-approved plan," said DEC Commissioner Dennis Kelso. Photo by Rob Schaeffer

In earlier statements to movie-makers and authors,¹³ Larossi has portrayed the dispersant discussions of the first few days as an exercise in indecision and fear by the governments and the public. Yet the governments were doing exactly what they had agreed to do weeks, and in some cases, years before; Larossi's perceptions are largely based on the fact that Exxon had a preferred strategy — a controversial, potentially dangerous one — and it had failed to consult with the government and the public about it. What Exxon wanted — full authority to do what the company felt most important — simply was not part of the plan. And when the public was confronted with the matter-of-fact statement that Exxon planned to rely on dispersants, and that it intended to carry out its own plan, the first question from the public to both governments was: Hey, who's in charge here?

Exxon would later claim that the hand-off concept was well understood between Exxon and Alyeska, and that Exxon was proceeding in those early days according to a long-standing company plan. However, Exxon's "plan" was actually a general compendium of available equipment and contractors, and a series of management strategies that applied to setting up command centers and assigning personnel *within Exxon itself*. This plan was not site-specific, nor did it address certain types of spills or specific scenarios.¹⁴ Exxon had, in 1982, notified DEC that the company may take over response to major tanker spills under certain conditions.¹⁵ However, regardless of Exxon's intentions, such a hand-off could not happen under the provisions of the government-approved contingency plan. The Alyeska plan of 1987 states explicitly, "Alyeska will maintain full responsibility and control in the event of an oil spill unless a government agency specifically notifies Alyeska they have assumed responsibility and control."¹⁶

In testimony before a Congressional committee in 1989 after the spill, DEC commissioner Dennis Kelso summarized the state's position regarding implementation of the Alyeska contingency plan.

"Recently, both Exxon and Alyeska have asserted that the state-approved contingency plan was somehow not really a set of requirements. Under Alaska statutes, it is unquestionably a binding document. Our law states that the company must have a state-approved plan in place as a condition of operating the terminal at Valdez. Failure to do what the plan says is a violation of state law.

"When Exxon entered the picture in the first days of the spill, they did not follow the Alyeska plan, and later said they followed their own. Whatever plan they were following, if any, it was not a state-approved plan."¹⁷

Exxon's unilateral detour from existing plans fostered skepticism, confusion and anger among the very people Exxon needed most at the time. True, it raised serious regulatory and legal questions for the government's responders who, as part of their jobs, are supposed to collect evidence as well as respond to the emergency. The public interest, in the case of a major oil spill, is not limited to simply responding to the oil on the water. The public interest includes protection of the people's ability to enforce liability requirements on the spiller.

But more important, as a matter of emergency response, any confusion about who should be doing what raised the possibility of a confused and ineffective response. When oil is on the water, there is no time to debate the fine points about whose plan is actually the real one. As a practical matter, the "hand-off" left state regulators with a moving target. It also left the public — especially the area's residents who depended on the commercial and subsistence resources — unclear about who would make good on the promises of protection detailed in the contingency plan. This loophole in the contingency planning process would not be closed off until 1992¹⁸, but in the context of the 1989 response to the *Exxon Valdez*, the immediate alteration of existing strategy was just the first in a series of precedents that raised questions about the state's ability to enforce its environmental standards.

Within a few days, a group of higher-level authorities began meeting to iron out principal differences among parties and to coordinate their plans. Exxon sent its spill response manager, Frank Larossi, who met with DEC commissioner Dennis Kelso and Rear Admiral Edward Nelson, the commander of the 17th Coast Guard District.

This arrangement was the first tangible evidence that this spill response would be more of a compound public policy operation than a straightforward technical exercise. The federal and state governments gradually took various organizational actions that reflected the magnitude and breadth of the response.

On April 6, the Coast Guard formally elevated all its decisions when it relieved the captain of the port of his duties as on-scene coordinator and installed Rear Admiral Nelson as federal on-scene coordinator. From this point forward, the Coast Guard maintained a flag officer as its on-scene coordinator. In addition, President George Bush charged the Coast Guard's commandant, Admiral Paul Yost, to maintain "personal oversight" of the response, further beefing up the upper-level command structure. As part of the same set of actions, the President also authorized the Department of Defense to provide whatever resources the Coast Guard needed.¹⁹

While this significantly elevated decision-making within the federal government and expanded the capabilities for providing federal support for the response, it was not actual "federalization" of the spill. The largest and most expansive spill response action in the nation's history would remain, essentially, under the team management concept described in the National Contingency Plan. This arrangement had both significant strengths and significant weaknesses.

The Coast Guard's official position on federalization was that the spiller, Exxon, was doing about as well as one could reasonably expect given the problem and the conditions. Federal officials informed the President in May, "The [federal on-scene coordinator] deemed it inappropriate to 'federalize' the incident as long as Exxon continued to cooperate with the federal OSC, fund the entire operation, and perform satisfactorily."²⁰

To state officials, the situation was not quite so simply assessed. The hand-off by Alyeska to Exxon, Exxon's subsequent refusal to use the Alyeska contingency plan — and the federal government's tacit acceptance of this — left state officials uneasy. Spill response strategy and priorities that had been carefully worked out with Alyeska in previous years were no longer in place, and a new organization was starting somewhat from scratch. Under this scenario, the state would be forced to negotiate with federal and Exxon officials on defensive measures and response priorities, with no guarantee of performance. In fact, given the shortage of manpower and equipment relative to the size of the spill, federal priorities were likely to make first claim on limited resources.

Further, and more important, the state recognized early on that the event was not just a massive pollution control exercise, but that there were massive economic and social

problems compounding the response. The kinds of upheaval and displacement caused by the spill and the response were more like those in a natural disaster, and therefore required broader government intervention and aid. Yet, as Governor Steve Cowper later recalled, there was a "substantial question" in the mind of state officials about how to increase government involvement, and whether federal takeover was the best strategy.²¹

On March 26, Governor Cowper declared a state emergency, which officially made available the emergency management expertise of the state Division of Emergency Services. It also allowed the state's responders to use equipment, manpower, and aircraft of the Alaska National Guard. On March 27, the Governor asked the President to declare a national emergency, specifically requesting that an emergency services



On April 5, 1989, frustrated by what he perceived to be Exxon's inability to deliver equipment to the spill area, Cowper called U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Nelson and asked the federal government to take full authority for the spill. However, the federal government did not want to federalize the spill.

Photo by Rob Schoeffler

Essentially, the state, the Coast Guard and Exxon agreed on a management system that provided for more federal involvement and direction, but allowed Exxon to write the checks. It was not a perfect arrangement, but it appeared better than the alternatives available at the time.

coordinator be appointed to work with state and local governments. His goal was to bring more federal resources to the spill and increase the influence of the federal government over Exxon's actions. However, his first inclination was to avoid actual federalization of the spill. "The original plan — which was Cowper's decision — was to try having Exxon, DEC and the Coast Guard to reach 'the appropriate decisions' on a consensus basis," according to Alaska Oil Spill Commission records.²² So, at least at first, the Governor was willing to give the established management strategy a try.

On April 5, frustrated by what he perceived to be Exxon's inability to deliver equipment to the spill area, Cowper called Rear Admiral Nelson and asked the federal government to take full authority for the spill. Cowper was also influenced by consistent reports from state personnel in the field that many of Exxon's statements about equipment working in the field were either misleading or incorrect, such as reports that equated skimmers "deployed" with skimmers actually recovering oil. Cowper felt that in the interest of effectiveness and accountability, the federal government needed to step in. However, the federal government did not want to federalize the spill.²³ Instead, on April 6-7, the federal government took steps to elevate spill response to a higher level within the Coast Guard, and the President announced his decision to allow greater Department of Defense involvement.

The state decided not to push the issue of federalization. Admiral Yost, the Coast Guard Commandant, assured the state that a joint response effort would work and that the federal government would make its decisions "in concert and in consonance" with the state and its regulations.²⁴ In addition, Cowper, Kelso, and the Governor's staff reluctantly agreed that yet another changeover in management — this time from Exxon to the government — could cause delays and confusion. And finally, Exxon's procurement and financial management appeared more efficient than the governments', even under emergency conditions. Essentially, the state, the Coast Guard and Exxon agreed on a management system that provided for more federal involvement and direction, but allowed Exxon to write the checks. It was not a perfect arrangement, but it appeared better than the alternatives available at the time.

Despite the problems this would cause for all parties, in various ways at various times, there were practical reasons for taking this approach. For one thing, Exxon had accepted responsibility for the spill on the second day and already had begun purchasing and transporting equipment, hiring vessels, and putting other contractors in the field. By keeping Exxon involved under the team management idea, the governments were by-passing a chance for tighter authority in exchange for the prospect of putting more resources in the field with a minimum of delays.

Despite the decision to pursue a team management approach, all three entities would guard their legal and operational prerogatives. It was unrealistic to assume that any one of the three would be willing to yield control of its most important interests to the basic response organization, since even at the start policy questions were woven into response issues. To deal with the mix between policy and technical issues, the three parties formed a high-level steering committee, which ostensibly would meet to iron out major policy disputes or agree to basic strategies.

There was a good deal of overlap between the high-level policy group and what might be termed the "basic" response organization headed by the federal and state on-scene coordinators. When first formed, the steering committee included Exxon's Frank Jarossi, DEC's Kelso, and the Coast Guard's Nelson. But when the job of federal on-scene coordinator was bumped up to a flag officer, the federal on-scene coordinator became part of the steering committee, and for most practical purposes, a deputy federal on-scene coordinator assumed the day-to-day technical burden. So, the protocol "equivalency" was generally maintained.

Occasionally, a decision by one or the other governments would be bumped up even higher, to the level of Governor Cowper or Commandant Yost. Governor Cowper maintained a consistent interest in the details of the response, but he left most strategic decisions to Kelso (or in some cases, other members of the Cabinet). The Governor spent most of his oil spill time on issues such as making sure commercial fishing

interests had access to restitution, or that communities could get necessary relief from state funds or resources. He was also consulted when DEC and the Cordova fishing community proposed to conduct independent cleanup, a move that some attorneys suggested could limit Exxon's liability for damages. Cowper quickly approved the action.

All in all, it was more of an *ad hoc* command-level structure than one that could be neatly drawn with boxes on an organizational chart.

This left the Coast Guard completely "in charge" of the effort, but misperceptions about the "in charge" issue would persist throughout the first summer, triggering confusion and frustration among the people of the spill region. It would also come up again in a series of bitter and sometimes acrimonious clashes in 1990 over state and federal jurisdiction.

Regardless of Vice Admiral Robbins' firm declaration, "[t]here can only be one boss and I have that responsibility,"²⁵ his authority and his actual command ability were something less than that of an admiral moving cruisers and destroyers during a naval battle. Exxon still controlled nearly all of the equipment, and Exxon supervisors, not Coast Guard officers, directed actual actions on the "battlefield."

"Exxon is in charge of things now," reported DEC's contractor from the field on April 26. "[DEC manager] assures me we are still under contract to ADEC, but for the most part, Exxon is giving me directions as to where to direct skimmers." He later referred to Exxon's control of operations as a "military takeover," and noted that by the end of April he had little control over dispatch and deployment of response vessels in his sector.²⁶

These observations would be mirrored by field notes, meeting minutes, and other events throughout the spill, but especially during the first year. The Coast Guard was, indeed, "in charge" of the response, but the "in charge" of a military operation and the "in charge" under the National Contingency Plan were very different.

For state monitors attempting to make sure that Exxon and its contractors did the job according to government and public requirements, the blurry lines of authority caused constant friction and confusion in the field. Exxon's contractors, from the shoreline cleanup company to the geologists hired by the company to work on surveys, naturally put the orders of the people who were paying them over the requests or orders of state monitors. The government, whether Coast Guard or state, was not in command of the response.²⁷

The problem for the public was more confusing and in many ways, more acute. Members of the public found themselves directed to Exxon, not the government, when they requested information or some solution to a problem. In Cordova, for example, the spill response drained adults from the usual patterns of home and work, and after a while the town simply ran out of child care. The only licensed child care facility was swamped — first, because more parents were working more uneven schedules, and the demand for child care was up, and second, because there weren't enough child care workers. This was not just a matter of demand; it was also a matter of wages. Like many other small businesses throughout the spill area, the child care center could not pay wages high enough to compete with the \$16.69 an hour available for shoreline workers.

The people of Cordova perceived this as a problem needing government intervention of some kind. The government was running a shoreline cleanup, and the shoreline cleanup was not the usual government public works project. It was, rather, a high-stakes environmental battle designed to protect the economic base of the region and the social system around it. This was about people's lives and families and towns — and naturally, the people wanted their public institutions to respond appropriately.

But Coast Guard commanders, however well-intentioned, are not equipped to deal with complex social problems — like meeting child care emergencies, or mental health problems, and so on. The Coast Guard admiral "in charge" of the response could not issue some order or tap some fund to mobilize an agency to help the Cordova child care facility.²⁸

The obvious problems caused by the blurred lines of authority and control led to numerous calls for changes in national response strategy. "The spiller should not be in charge of a major spill," the Alaska Oil Spill Commission concluded flatly in 1990.

The Coast Guard's authority under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) is largely confined to the basics of pollution control (after all, the NCP's full name is the National Oil and Hazardous Substances *Pollution* Contingency Plan). And while the NCP charges the federal government with the task of protecting the public health and welfare in the event of a spill, health and welfare issues are not the Coast Guard's institutional strength. Essentially, the Coast Guard was acting as a pollution control agency, not an agency responsible for Exxon's actions outside of the pollution control operation, and not an agency responsible for solving social and economic problems far outside the chain of causation.

Eventually, the Cordova child care facility's managers found themselves negotiating with Exxon to find a solution to the child care crisis. Like vessel owners, local governments, and many other Alaskans who found themselves in a similar situation over the next few years, they found this arrangement curious and troubling: curious, because social problems caused by natural disasters are not the usual responsibility of private industry, and troubling, because there was no way for these members of the public to enforce accountability. Exxon certainly stretched outside the usual realm of private industry involvement in solving social problems. However, a private corporation is not the same thing as a public institution. In dealing with a public institution, citizens have some leverage through the democratic process of politics and elections; when dealing with Exxon, they had no leverage beyond their own negotiating skills.

It is questionable whether "federalizing" the spill under the laws at the time would have solved all the problems. However, it certainly would have given the state and the Alaska public a more precise and stationary target for negotiation on both the mechanics of pollution control and the solutions to social and economic upheaval caused by the spill and the response.

The obvious problems caused by the blurred lines of authority and control led to numerous calls for changes in national response strategy, from private citizens to Governor Cowper, from the Alaska Oil Spill Commission to the U.S. Congress.

"The spiller should not be in charge of a major spill," the Alaska Oil Spill Commission concluded flatly in 1990. "A spiller should be obligated to respond with all the resources it can summon, but government should command that response."²⁹

The idea that "the spiller should not be in charge" of such a complex public action led directly to provisions in the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that would give command authority to the government under circumstances similar to those during the *Exxon Valdez* disaster.³⁰ However, the federal government's role in directing the *Exxon Valdez* response remained essentially the same from start to finish.

1.3 State government organization³¹

It was foolish to believe that the Exxon Valdez was just another issue for state government, but Governor Cowper felt it was important not to let the issue eat the government altogether.

The Cowper Administration adapted to the internal management challenges of the oil spill in a variety of ways. The front-line agencies such as the Alaska departments of Environmental Conservation, Natural Resources (DNR), and Fish and Game (ADF&G) all created special oil spill divisions or task forces, with separate staff and budgets. Other agencies, such as the Alaska Department of Labor, which oversaw worker health and safety on the shorelines, added additional temporary workers as needed. The Alaska Department of Law hired private law firms and devoted some in-house staff to oil matters exclusively. The Office of the Governor included an Oil Spill Coordination Office, and the Governor often consulted with an informal oil spill "mini-cabinet."

However, the basic management premise was that state government is designed, institutionally, to deal with concurrent problems, issues, and crises — some foreseen, some not. It was foolish to believe that the *Exxon Valdez* was just another issue for state government, but Governor Cowper felt it was important not to let the issue eat the government altogether. Commissioners were to retain their usual discretion to manage their divisions; department staff retained their usual permitting and management authority. The oil spill coordinator in the Governor's office had no special authority to

direct commissioners or manage agency affairs.

Publicly, DEC was the front-line agency. And although the public nature of the response often put DEC technical staff in front of news media that demanded more than mere technical information, the department's managers protected technical staff from political or policy disputes. Whenever possible, appointed officials, such as the commissioner or a Governor's office representative assigned to the spill, would comment on policy developments or provide the public response to positions or charges made by outside parties. This was done partly to protect the professional integrity of technical staff and ease their working relationships with the Coast Guard and Exxon; relationships were strained enough as it was. But the separation of church and state, so to speak, was also designed to simply let DEC's people do their work with as few distractions as possible — they had enough to do as it was.

DEC duties and management structure

In terms of sheer volume, DEC had more to deal with, from the standpoint of personnel and resource allocation, than its sibling agencies. At the time of the spill, DEC had 296 employees overall. Within a few days, more than 30 regular staff were in Valdez, with dozens more handling various support and administrative tasks at DEC offices around the state. And of course, when someone was pulled off a task unrelated to the oil spill, someone had to cover, which meant yet another task lost staff attention temporarily.

"I could see right away we were going to burn our people out," recalled DEC's first on-scene coordinator, Bill Lamoreux. "We did well because we had everyone in the department working on it 20 hours a day."³²

Obviously, that couldn't last.

Under normal circumstances, it would not be unusual for DEC to rotate full-time, permanent employees from scheduled tasks to spill response. At the start, that's what the department did with responders, including the state on-scene coordinator. However, as the shoreline cleanup plans started to come together, the exercise was becoming an undertaking of unprecedented proportions. In June, DEC appointed a former Alaskan and EPA official, Steve Provant, to the full-time job of state on-scene coordinator.³³ The department also designated the *Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill Response Center as a separate entity within the department. It remained separate, with a full-time coordinator position staffed from outside the department, until being merged with the department's Pipeline Corridor Regional Office in spring 1992.

By the final spring of shoreline cleanup in 1992, the Oil Spill Response Center had a staff of 12 doing a mix of shoreline monitoring, project close-out, and legal documentation. But just three years before, the operation was among the largest in state government.


In early May 1989, DEC received authorization to hire temporary employees to fill out its ranks on the oil spill. In raw numbers, more than 150 people were assigned to the oil spill alone during the peak of the response in the summer of 1989, and that number does not take into account an additional 50-60 who worked occasionally or

ADEC staffing statistics for spill response, summer of 1989

Temporary staff	150 persons plus part-time
Shoreline monitoring staff	60 persons
Overseers for oily solid waste handling	6-10 persons
Seafood inspection	12 inspectors
Payroll billings	nearly \$6 million

part-time on the project.

The spill response center was based in Valdez, and maintained regional offices in Seward, Homer, and Kodiak. These offices included field monitors, field managers, and clerical support. They also included computer mapping experts and technicians, a



Quarters for the thousands of spill response workers at remote sites included arrangements such as these trailers atop barges.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

DEC was responsible for making sure other departments did their accounting on time and correctly, as well, so that the state could recover its costs from Exxon. DEC was the principal source of cash flow for state oil spill response for nearly the entire three years.

group assigned to monitor the storage and disposal of solid oily waste, a small group to work as agency staff or liaisons on dozens of state and federal scientific monitoring programs, a special public information team, and an entire section devoted to finding housing, handling payroll and procurement, and paying bills and billing Exxon.

Some of the department's tasks were intuitively obvious, such as carrying out its specified regulatory duty to oversee cleanup operations. As the Exxon shoreline presence grew to several thousand workers and vessel-based support crews,³⁴ DEC had to expand its shoreline monitoring capabilities. On May

1, there were eight staff assigned to shoreline monitoring; six weeks later, staffing was up to 40, and by August it peaked at 60. These were the people who lived on the crew vessels and walked the beaches, noting whether the work was going as it should and reporting on conditions. Again, this group was a mix of DEC veterans and new, temporary hires. The department (as well as ADF&G and DNR) attempted throughout the spill to maintain continuity in staff assignments, especially on the shorelines.

And with anywhere from 2,500 to 3,000 people living and working on vessels and in remote sites,³⁵ DEC had to maintain staff to inspect the sanitation systems, cooking and food storage facilities, and drinking water systems for the work crews. The department reviewed almost 150 plans and conducted more than 120 site inspections during the summer of 1989.

The handling, storage, and transportation of roughly 30,000 tons of oily solid waste generated by the cleanup required the full-time attention of 6-10 workers in 1989, and an additional dozen full-time seafood inspectors stepped up oversight of tenders, processing plants, and product throughout the spill zone.³⁶ A significant problem was presented by the hundreds of fishing vessels that were working on oil spill response. Many of these vessels left the oil spill navy to work fisheries that were open. DEC required that any vessel making the switch from oil to fish had to undergo hull, gear, and hold inspection; the department conducted 280 such inspections in 1989.

DEC's Exxon Valdez employees dropped to 80 at the end of 1990, 30 during the 1991 cleanup season, and 20 during the summer of 1992 (including several who worked full- or part-time on restoration). Throughout the response, there was an effort to rotate permanent, full-time employees through the ranks, and most of the top technical managers were longtime department employees.

Employees were scattered around the spill area, on vessels, shorelines, and in field offices. Much of the communication among workers and supervisors was by hand-held VHF radio, facsimile machines (even aboard vessels), radio telephone, and regular land communication. Paperwork demands increased, rather than decreased, with the emergency, in part because of extensive documentation requirements for purchases and payroll, and the need to keep track of oil spill expenses separate from general

department activities.

The demands of the project, the conditions, the communication systems and the general atmosphere of urgency all combined to cause a variety of management problems. Normal scheduling was difficult; overtime costs were high; financial tracking and property control had gaps.

Administrative staff were constantly struggling to keep up with billings and documentation, since the state was sending invoices to Exxon for reimbursement of state expenses. Payroll alone accounted for nearly \$6 million in 1989 billings, and almost \$14 million through June 1992.³⁷ Payroll staff not only had to insure that the wage claims were precisely documented, but they also audited the original payroll requests to make sure overtime, leave time, health benefits, etc. were correct.³⁸

DEC was responsible for making sure other departments did their accounting on time and correctly, as well, so that the state could recover its costs from Exxon. DEC wound up with this task because it was the principal source of cash flow for state oil spill response for nearly the entire three years. At first, state agencies responding to the spill paid their workers and purchased supplies from state general fund revenues in the usual agency budget. Then, responding to the growing cash-flow crisis, the state Legislature in late April made a special appropriation of \$20 million to the state's Oil and Hazardous Substances Release Response Fund (known in government vernacular as the "470 Fund" because of the number of a legislative bill modifying the fund several years before). DEC used the "470 Fund" as its source for cash flow, as did other agencies,³⁹ then sought reimbursement from Exxon. This was the basic financial arrangement throughout the spill.⁴⁰ It didn't always work smoothly, as both DEC and other departments often had large backlogs of billings for Exxon. Gaps in documentation, or delays due to the crush of the original billings, often slowed the reimbursement system down. Exxon also sent back billings from time to time, requesting more complete documentation or questioning some items. Some billings the company simply

refused to reimburse. For example, if a passenger manifests for any DEC overflight included a single member of the news media, Exxon would reject the billing.⁴¹

The state received just under \$80 million from Exxon in reimbursements based on state billings during the three years of the response. An additional \$27 million in unbilled expenses were repaid to the state treasury out of the \$1 billion state-federal claims settlement with Exxon, and at this writing (spring, 1993) roughly \$30 million in additional reimbursement is outstanding.

DEC made a number of internal changes to deal with the special demands of the spill response. The department's actions showed how the agency could be flexible, but it also pointed out some things that DEC was not and is not.

For example, there was a strong and insistent public demand for development and testing of oil spill

response products. DEC did organize a task force in its Treatment Technology section within the oil spill response center to evaluate many of the proposals that came in. However, this effort did not extend too much beyond evaluation of proposals, or



Response personnel review of part of the 30,000 tons of oily solid waste generated by the cleanup in 1989.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

determining whether the scientific information submitted to the department looked as if it were done to accepted scientific standards. DEC was not designed as a research and development agency, even in what might be called "peacetime." The state government does not have an agency that serves this type of function.⁴²

There was also a demand, primarily from within the state-federal-Exxon response organization, for the state to provide basic scientific advice or consultation. Again, DEC did not necessarily have those scientific resources in its organization. DEC is a technical agency, as opposed to a scientific agency. This may seem like a semantic subtlety, but it really is quite important. DEC oversees waste management systems, hazardous site cleanups, air quality, drinking water and sanitation, and so on. This is a job primarily performed by engineers, or specialists with varied scientific or technical training. The department had a lot of professional engineers, but few, if any people with advanced degrees in microbiology. DEC's oil spill office waxed and waned on its commitment of people and resources to science or other research. Ultimately, the state's spill managers decided that its resources and personnel were stretched thinly enough without trying to launch a major new enterprise outside the traditional realm of agency operations and expertise.

The state-federal-Exxon oil spill structure brought together a number of people to work on a given problem, or set of problems, but the technicians didn't always bring the same set of tools to the table. Metaphorically speaking, one might come to the table prepared to discuss the best way to drive a nail, only to discover that the rest of group only had wrenches, and didn't think nails were particularly effective fasteners in the first place. This occasionally led to breakdowns in communication and sharp differences of opinion among the response agencies.⁴³

Alaska Departments of Fish and Game and Natural Resources

The Alaska Department of Fish and Game had a smaller, less visible continuing presence than the DEC, but its involvement came at a number of critical levels, and its influence on the response was the most profound, in many ways.

Officially, the department's response organization was split between the Division of Habitat and what later became the Division of Oil Spill Impact Assessment and Restoration (OSIAR).

The OSIAR division was the initial recipient of \$10.8 million in 1989⁴⁴ to begin independent assessment of the damage caused by the spill. Fish and Game had received some earlier funding for damage assessment study when it appeared that the federal government, the state, and Exxon would conduct damage assessment jointly, with primary funding from Exxon. This arrangement fell apart quickly as litigation loomed larger. The governments and Exxon chose to pursue independent courses of damage assessment.⁴⁵



Dead, oiled ducks mark the high tide line at Puale Bay on the Alaska Peninsula in May of 1989. Photo courtesy of the Exxon Valdez Restoration Office

From the standpoint of response management, the damage assessment program rarely emerged. The governments intended to use the study results to prosecute their natural resource damage claims against Exxon, and therefore data from the studies were held confidential. Access to damage assessment data was extremely restricted, although the state on-scene coordinator was able to receive occasional briefings if he felt damage assessment might aid in making a specific response decision. However, it appeared that despite limited circulation of biological damage assessment to DEC, Fish and Game response personnel had regular access and could provide information to other state responders.⁴⁶

Interaction between federal responders and damage assessment personnel was even less frequent, if it occurred at all. The federal on-scene coordinator in both 1990 and 1991 said many times, in public and private, that not only did he not have any damage assessment information, but furthermore, he did not *want* any.

So, despite the heavy investment in Fish and Game's damage assessment, and its status as the sole, detailed government program to figure out how the oil spill might have affected natural resources, it was virtually invisible to the public and barely visible to the response organizations.

Fish and Game's public point of contact during the response was primarily the Division of Habitat. Fish and Game biologists played a central role in setting the priorities and schedules for cleanup, particularly in 1989.⁴⁷ They also conducted specific monitoring of conditions at anadromous streams throughout the spill, and served as the state's cleanup monitors (often in DEC's stead) at anadromous streams.

Other Fish and Game divisions were the focus of some of the response's most difficult issues, such as the widespread commercial fishing closures of 1989, and the effect of the spill and response on subsistence foods and harvest patterns. However, on most issues, at most times, Fish and Game dealt with the principal state and federal response agencies through the habitat division.

Fish and Game faced the same problems as DEC when it came to committing staff to the oil spill effort.

At the outset, many of the staff dispatched to the oil spill were mid- and upper-level managers. The oil spill was the biggest thing on everyone's plate, but it was open-ended, and the government — at all levels — simply could not put everything else on hold all around the state while key people dealt with oil spill issues in Valdez, Cordova, Homer, Seward and Kodiak. Key managers had to go back to managing the rest of the state's programs. Similarly, as the project geared up, it was obvious that it was going to take a long time and a lot of people; Fish and Game, like DEC, simply could not pull away its permanent staff from all projects for an unlimited period of time.

During the first two or three months, permanent staff originally detailed to the oil spill were "called home." New people were rotated in. This solved one problem and created another — a problem that nearly every organization involved in the spill had to deal with at one time or another.

The new problem was that the new people were coming to a fast-paced and highly charged project. The learning curve was steep and the time was short. The "rotation" problem was slowing down and confusing the response, as new people asked old questions that had been discussed, debated, and resolved before they arrived.

As noted above, DEC undertook a massive temporary hiring program. However, most of the DEC field jobs were basic monitoring positions; they required some technical background, but essentially people had to be able to observe and report, as opposed to interpret and recommend.⁴⁸

Fish and Game would also attempt to solve its staffing problems by hiring temporary employees intended to work solely on the oil spill for the life of the project. However, Fish and Game's role was more immediately technical, which made its staffing problem more difficult to solve. While the department needed some entry-level workers (fisheries technicians), it really needed experienced fisheries biologists who could speak with authority within the growing number of resource assessment teams

Despite the heavy investment in Fish and Game's damage assessment, and its status as the sole, detailed government program to figure out how the oil spill might have affected natural resources, it was virtually invisible to the public and barely visible to the response organizations.

DNR monitors either augmented DEC's presence on the shoreline or served as a region's front-line cleanup representative.

and technical advisory organization

As the Fish and Game's lead representative on the project explained later, "The state's administrative procedures are designed to provide an objective evaluation process for selecting applicants; they are not designed to facilitate hiring itself."⁴⁹ The state's hiring system puts an emphasis on giving every applicant an even break; it does not necessarily give supervisors the ability to hire the best qualified applicant in the shortest amount of time.

The state system does allow an agency to make an emergency hire (and the oil spill unquestionably qualified as an emergency), but the rules say an emergency hire is good for only 30 days⁵⁰, after which time the agency must go back and hire off the certified state list of qualified applicants.⁵¹

Fish and Game had an additional problem: The oil spill created a bull market for biologists as agencies, Exxon, and consultants scrambled to add people to collect samples, undertake studies, and provide expert advice. The same people on Fish and Game's registers were being simultaneously recruited by consultants (many on contract to Exxon), who had more flexibility when it came to negotiating pay and other terms with an employee. It was, at first, difficult to get a commitment from some of these people until they had examined and exhausted other options.

Fish and Game got around these problems, in many cases, by calling former department staff out of retirement. These retirees were frequently biologists with two or more decades of experience in Alaska (one was a former commercial fisheries division director), which provided them with considerable authority. They also knew the state management system and general department policies and procedures, which made it easier to integrate them into the operation. Fish and Game would hire these people on an emergency basis, then, during the next 30 days, get them back on the registers, where they could be legally hired beyond the 30-day emergency limit.

The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) formed a special section within its Division of Land and Water Management (now the Division of Lands) to coordinate with DEC on land uses and cleanup priorities, but the division primarily reassigned permanent staff. In addition, much of the department's presence came from the Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation, the custodian of a dozen small state park sites in Prince William Sound, the wild and largely unknown Shuyak State Park at the north end of the Kodiak archipelago, and the Kachemak Bay Wilderness State Park, which abuts the Kenai Fjords National Park on the Kenai Peninsula. DNR monitors either augmented DEC's presence on the shoreline or served as a region's front-line cleanup representative. The difference was largely dependent on personalities and land ownership patterns in a given area; in both the Homer and Kodiak cleanup zones, the primary state interests outside of anadromous streams were the state parks. The rangers there served as primary state representatives on regional advisory committees, or worked interchangeably with DEC staff.

The parks division also had one of the least visible — for a reason — roles in cleanup planning. The division's archeologists were in charge of making sure that cleanup activity did not disrupt or destroy archeological sites, and that workers did not take artifacts. They worked directly with their federal government counterparts on a special cultural resources committee, and did not usually interact with DEC, except during budget discussions.

DNR and Fish and Game components of the spill response were the largest outside of DEC throughout the response. Other agencies, such as the Alaska departments of Labor, Administration, and Community and Regional Affairs, would enter the management structure at various points, but generally it was to provide a specific service to the organization, not to claim a separate authority. Funding was for specific and recognizable purposes, easy to track, and in relatively small amounts.⁵² Some additional personnel were hired on a temporary basis, but most agency staffing outside of DEC was handled in-house.

The Office of the Governor

Governor's Office of Oil Spill Coordination duties

- Head state's participation in National Transportation Safety Board proceedings
 - Oversee how state agencies dealt with spill-related issues
 - Manage the \$35 million special appropriation by the Legislature to the Office of the Governor
 - Troubleshooting
 - Serve as Governor's point of contact with Exxon management for business matters
-

The state had a number of projects or responsibilities that were not DEC's job. DEC (and other agencies) had a general responsibility to collect and properly handle information, samples, and other items that could be used in litigation, but the department was not responsible for implementing legal strategy. DEC commissioner Kelso said the state's legal team maintained its distance from DEC and did not ask it to take any specific actions, other than to document events and handle its oil samples in ways that would meet legal standards for submission as evidence in court.⁵³

Governor Cowper felt that the oil spill presented several tasks that did not fall neatly into the operational plans of any of the state agencies, and that the executive office should coordinate them. However, he did not want a new level of authority inserted between his commissioners and him.

In early May, the Division of Emergency Services, in the Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, suggested that it serve as the government's overall coordination arm for executive branch oil spill matters. Cowper did not think that appropriate. Instead, on June 1, he appointed Dr. Robert LeResche, director of the Alaska Energy Authority and a former DNR commissioner, to the job of managing everything that didn't fall under regular agency operations.

LeResche's Office of Oil Spill Coordination had two sets of tasks, one that was sharply defined and one that was more free-form.

LeResche became the project manager for the state's participation in National Transportation Safety Board proceedings on the grounding of the *Exxon Valdez*.

LeResche and his immediate staff, working with the attorney general, prepared the state's basic finding of fact about why the accident happened. He was the state's chief representative on the panel that conducted hearings in Anchorage that summer.

LeResche was also responsible for looking at how state agencies were dealing with spill-related issues, from internal management policies to field cooperation and data collection. His staff was to make sure that the state's management actions and response strategies were consistent with each other. This ranged from making suggestions about how departments handled overtime, to what kind of computer software they used to collect information about the spill. Normally, there is no pressing need to make every agency do everything exactly the same way; management or computer procedures that are efficient in the revenue department may be completely wrong for the fish and game department, and so on.

But in the case of the oil spill, it was important that data was collected and presented in a uniform manner. The state was billing Exxon for all its spill-related expenses, and it was important that fish and game's payroll or purchasing information looked the same as the information from the labor department; discrepancies could lead to delays or rejections of reimbursements. Also, maps and field notebooks and photos, all of which might be used in some aspect of legal proceedings, had to be treated and handled the same throughout the government; inconsistencies or discrepancies could cause confusion, or cause some information to be thrown out. And finally, of course, it was important to make sure that departments weren't duplicating each other's efforts. While certain clusters of agencies — the resource agencies, for example — are in frequent contact with each other on a routine basis, rarely do so many state agencies wind up working on the same project at the same time; at least 13 of the 16 state departments were involved in some way on the spill response.

LeResche was also the manager of the \$35 million special appropriation made by the Legislature to the Office of the Governor. This amount of money was far beyond the Governor's usual budget, and more than many agencies spend in a given year. Governor Cowper wanted to make sure the money was distributed efficiently and accounted for properly.

The second set of responsibilities was less well-defined, falling into a category that could best be described as general trouble-shooting. LeResche took over day-to-day management of Governor's Office personnel who had been in the field since early in

the spill. These people were supposed to stay somewhat in the background, serving as part observer and part safety valve, helping to break administrative logjams or handling questions that could slow down or distract regular agency personnel. For example, a fish biologist in a field office really wasn't equipped — either in terms of authority or resources — to handle complaints about the child care center funding, or the need for an extra state trooper to deal with trouble among all the transient workers in town. The Governor's office representatives were not in Valdez, Cordova, Homer, Seward and Kodiak to manage the spill operations; they were there to serve as community liaisons and work with the local governments.

LeResche's last major job was to serve as the Governor's point of contact with Exxon management for business matters, as opposed to technical response issues. LeResche worked with Exxon on reimbursement for state expenses. He also helped negotiate some of the preliminary payments by Exxon to Alaska commercial fishermen whose fisheries were shut down because of the oil.

LeResche's office did not coordinate all aspects of the response for the executive branch. Its focus was more on administrative, legal, and fiscal matters, while actual response policy and technical coordination was left to DEC. Agency staff outside of DEC were not always satisfied with DEC's ability or efforts to coordinate response policy for the government as a whole. Fish and Game, in particular, felt that DEC would lapse into a pattern of tending its own institutional needs first, sometimes taking technical positions that were directly contrary to Fish and Game's.⁵⁴ Some of these disputes might be considered garden-variety intramural arguments, although others were serious enough to suggest that in a catastrophic spill, the state might consider some modifications to its basic management procedures.

1.4 The joint response

The government was in charge of making sure Exxon conducted the cleanup properly. But there was not just one government, of course: Federal, state, and even some local government entities had various authorities over cleanup activities, land use, or resources.

Essentially, Exxon would come up with a proposed cleanup plan, which would be distributed to affected agencies and landowners for review and comment. The state and federal on-scene coordinators would confer and alter the plan, based on the comments, then authorize Exxon to proceed.

The authority was not always drawn clearly and sharply in the law. The federal and state governments in Alaska have a long-running legal battle over who owns the land underneath rivers and lakes. A series of court decisions has solved a few pieces of the issue, but the matter of who owns the tidelands has not been hashed out. Lawyers from the state and federal governments, working in the context of the *Exxon Valdez* spill, agreed not to argue about this particular issue when it came to pursuing and collecting money from damage claims from Exxon. Thinking practically, they realized that a squabble over tidelands ownership could not only hurt damage cost recovery, but it could certainly slow down disbursement of whatever was collected; the submerged lands cases usually take years of litigation to resolve.

When it came to sorting out authority over cleanup, there was an equally practical reason for putting aside issues of who held ultimate control of which decisions. A joint response, directed by the Coast Guard with high-level assistance from DEC, made more sense. DEC and other state agencies retained their regular statutory authorities — Exxon still needed approval from Fish and Game to work around salmon streams, or from Natural Resources to operate on state lands, or from DEC to burn logs, for example — but basic cleanup orders would be harmonized in a single work order to Exxon from the federal on-scene coordinator. In mid-April, DEC commissioner Kelso met with Coast Guard commandant Yost, who assured the state that Coast Guard decisions would be "in concert and in consonance" with state requests and requirements. In theory, all state agencies funneled their requirements through the state on-scene coordinator, and all federal agencies put theirs through the federal on-scene coordinator.⁵⁵ The two coordinators would then work out a common set of priorities.

The legal issue lurking behind this practical agreement concerned "pre-emption" of state law by the federal government. In very broad terms, a state may impose stricter (or simply different) environmental cleanup requirements than those of the federal government, as long as the state rules do not conflict with the federal ones. So theoretically, on the shorelines, the state could hold a crew on a work site to do more work, even if the federal monitor was satisfied.

But wait: If the federal manager decided to move anyway, he might be able to argue that the pressing need for basic federal cleanup at another site might be jeopardized if the crew stayed to do the state-ordered work. A court might agree. Again, in very broad terms, the state probably did not have the authority to unilaterally divert resources from the federal-directed cleanup to a state-directed work order.

Ultimately, the state had the authority to require Exxon to conduct cleanup to state requirements, but when resources were limited or the timetable tight, federal authority to conduct its cleanup probably superseded the state authority.

While the lines of authority in the cleanup issue might have been in better focus than those in the submerged lands issue, they were still not always crisply or boldly drawn. In the real world of the cleanup, on the beaches, the state and federal monitors were in constant negotiation and consultation about how much Exxon ought to do at a particular site at a particular time.

However, in April of 1989, the emergency was bigger than the jurisdictional questions. On April 20, Vice Admiral Clyde Robbins, the Coast Guard's Pacific Region commander who had taken over as federal on-scene coordinator,

announced a spill management structure that would remain largely intact for the duration of the spill response.

Essentially, Exxon would come up with a proposed cleanup plan, which would be distributed to affected agencies and landowners for review and comment. The state and federal on-scene coordinators would confer and alter the plan, based on the comments, then authorize Exxon to proceed. When Exxon had implemented the plan, the state and federal coordinators would assess whether the work was done properly, or whether it needed to be modified. This flow pattern was the same whether the issue was a general, area-wide work plan or a site-specific cleanup order.⁵⁶

The state had several primary concerns. First, the state made sure that all its affected agencies maintained their respective permitting authority. Alaska was agreeing to let the Coast Guard coordinate the massive response, but the state was not giving away its statutory right to review and approve activities on state lands, to regulate air and waste disposal, or to protect fisheries habitat.

If Exxon wanted to burn debris, DEC maintained its authority to review the burn plan and make sure that it met state air quality standards, and that Exxon applied for



Coast Guard on-scene coordinator Rear Admiral Dave E. Ciancaglini speaks to the public and panel, while DEC Commissioner Kelso listens, during an oil spill operations meeting in Anchorage.

Photo courtesy of Oil Spill Information Center

and received the proper permit. If Exxon were to work in or around a salmon spawning area, the Fish and Game department maintained its authority to permit and monitor the activity. If Exxon were to work on state-owned lands, Natural Resources retained the right to issue a land use permit.

The permitting authority was the clearest and most effective way for the state to control cleanup activity, and it wound up playing an important role.

The response would be extremely disruptive to the local environment. With the state retaining permitting authorities, the Alaska public had a way to insure that the "fallout" from cleanup activities was acceptable to Alaskans in the area. All the state permits were subject to public comment and review, and in some cases, the preferred course of action by Exxon or the federal government was unacceptable to local residents.⁵⁷ The permitting process gave citizens access to important decisions affecting the public lands and resources.

The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee

A second point of entry into the process for the public was the Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee (ISCC), formed by order of Vice Admiral Robbins on April 20. Robbins gave formal standing to an ad hoc group of agencies and citizen groups that had come together to help Exxon and the governments plan shoreline cleanup operations. The elevation of the group to advisory status to the federal on-scene coordinator was a departure from normal procedures; usually, the federal on-scene coordinator depends on the scientific support coordinator (currently the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA) to advise him on the resource considerations and impacts of cleanup.

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The ISCC consisted of state and federal resource agencies, plus representatives from established commercial fishing organizations, the regional Native corporation, and a private conservation organization. Each region (Prince William Sound, Kodiak, Homer and Seward) had an ISCC, and specific membership varied depending on principal land ownership patterns and resource interests. The National Park Service, for example, had a primary federal role in the Kodiak, Seward, and Homer ISCCs because of the Kenai Fjords National Park, and the Katmai National Park and Preserve on the Alaska Peninsula. The U.S. Forest Service had a greater federal role on the Prince William Sound ISCC because much of the land adjoining the Sound is in Chugach National Forest. In all cases, the three state resources agencies — DEC, Fish and Game, and Natural Resources — held seats on the ISCCs.

These groups reviewed Exxon cleanup plans and government strategies, established priorities for cleanup, commented on what techniques they preferred, and evaluated the results of cleanup. They made specific recommendations to the federal on-scene coordinator about work orders, determined appropriate buffer zones and the timing of work to protect wildlife, and noted specific resources uses at certain areas, such as tourism or recreation. In addition, archeologists from the governments and Alaska Native organizations made recommendations about delicate cleanup of important archeological sites.

Within the ISCC, federal and state authorities for resource management were not too difficult to sort out or synthesize. While specific responsibilities varied — the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manages eagles and migratory birds, NOAA manages marine mammals, and Alaska Fish and Game manages salmon and other commercial fish species — the wildlife managers had generally similar concerns and goals. They were able to agree on critical dates for cleanup deadlines (early to mid-May for seal pupping habitat, early to mid-July for Prince William Sound salmon species, for example) and wildlife protection buffers (several hundred yards around eagle nests, up to three miles for some marine mammal haul-outs) and their priorities generally did not compete with each other's. The regional flavor of the ISCCs also meant that federal or state agencies played lesser or greater roles based on a regional consensus about who had

the greatest problems presented by the oil spill. The Seward group, for example, had strong leadership from the local national park superintendent, while in Kodiak the managers of the national wildlife refuge and the state commercial fisheries managers set much of the governments' agenda.

Exxon and the ISCC members formed what became known as the Resource Assessment Teams, or RATs,⁵⁸ that spent much of the first several months doing the field work to find out what areas were affected, how badly they were oiled, and how well work crews were doing their jobs. Again, like the ISCC, the assessment teams had basic public and resource agency representation depending on who was available, who owned the uplands, and which kinds of wildlife habitats were being surveyed. Exxon added consultants from various disciplines to the mix, and assessment team and ISCC members tended to coalesce around specific disciplines — fisheries biology, geomorphology, archeology, etc. — rather than agency or institutional interests. Certain agencies had nominal "lead" designations — NOAA as the group's chair, DEC as the lead state agency — but in actual deliberations, the "lead" was frequently determined by consensus, based on the specific issue or site under review. The structure and activities of the ISCC were, as a result, practically fluid and basically democratic.

The members of ISCC viewed their organization like this:

"The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee was:

- A participatory, interdisciplinary, interagency resource that included Exxon for planning input on decisions affecting shoreline cleanup;
- A forum for ecological, cultural, and social resource identification;
- A forum for setting resource and work priorities;
- An on-scene planning body;
- A public component of the planning [and] decision-making process;
- A primary advisor to the federal on-scene coordinator;
- A consensus-building group;
- A focus for Prince William Sound shoreline cleanup."⁵⁹

Vice Admiral Robbins gave formal standing to an ad hoc group of agencies and citizen groups that had come together to help Exxon and the governments plan shoreline cleanup operations. Each region (Prince William Sound, Kodiak, Homer and Seward) had an Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee.

This is not to imply that the ISCC deliberations, and the relationships among agencies, were a consistent exercise in peace, love, and understanding.

One of the basic problems that took some time to overcome was the fact that many of the people sitting on the ISCC were unfamiliar with the national oil spill response structure, the role of the Regional Response Team and the federal on-scene coordinator, role of state and other federal agencies, etc. The blurry lines of authority that confused the general public occasionally confused ISCC members.

The paper cited above refers somewhat obliquely to other problems with the ISCC structure. It notes that "differing agencies had differing expectations" about cleanup planning and approaches, which is a polite way of saying that some things that concerned some agencies were viewed by others as lower priority, at best, or unimportant or uninformed, at worst. Some of the NOAA personnel assigned to spill management and strategy were openly hostile to state agency suggestions and condescending in dealing with Alaska officials. NOAA's principal field representative went so far as to publicly accuse the state of being "vindictive" in its cleanup recommendations, and questioned whether Alaska was trying to punish Exxon through the cleanup.⁶⁰ This attitude did not set the tone for positive discussions and "consensus-building."

The paper also notes a "lack of clarity" on the issue of who actually spoke for his or her agency or government as a whole, and mentions a problem with "maintaining continuity" of agency representatives on the committee. The "lack of clarity" issue was a big one, especially in the view of the Coast Guard coordinators and the federal on-scene coordinator himself. Vice Admiral Robbins frequently expressed frustration at hearing from several state agencies on a single issue, rather than hearing a synthesized State of Alaska position. In addition, some agencies (including the Coast Guard) rotated representatives in and out of areas and jobs; in other cases, weather and staff shortages would require that new agency people stand in for those who spent most of

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their time with a given committee or assessment group. A new agency staffer, hearing the details of an issue for the first time, might not arrive at the same position as his or her predecessor who was negotiating an agreement or providing one of the building blocks of consensus on a given issue.

The ISCC system also moved slowly for a variety of reasons. Information did not always move quickly from the field, to the ISCC, through the federal on-scene coordinator and back to the field.

"Coordination with the Resource Assessment Team (RAT) is not what we had hoped it would be," DEC's contractor reported at the end of May. "By the time feedback gets back to the proper channels to the Inter Agency Shoreline people, most of the issues are moot."⁶¹

The meetings were long (often several hours) and frequently were held twice a day. Like any committee with a number of members, there was a great deal of discussion. The meetings were also open to the public, which added another level of discussion and explanation. Agency staff on the committee were working 14 to 16 hours a day;⁶² regardless of whether this was a management problem or a simple lack of manpower to deal with a massive number of tasks, the result was that people were tired, not eating properly, and patience frequently ran thin.

Even considering the problems, the ISCC was an innovative departure from established response planning practices. State of Alaska officials liked the ISCC, and so did the members of the public who attended the meetings. The ISCC had a structure that was familiar to government managers and the public at-large. The public's business was being done largely in public, and government agencies with various resource management authorities were hashing out their differences and finding common solutions within the confines of understandable procedures for state and federal government coordination.

Yet the ISCC system didn't last past the first summer of cleanup. In February 1990, at a mid-winter meeting among the response organizations in Newport Beach, California, Exxon proposed a number of structural changes, including some modifications to the way in which information flowed through resource agencies and the public to the Coast Guard.

The ISCC and its support structure (specifically, the resource assessment teams) were the focus of a developing struggle for influence and control over both cleanup policies and their implementation in the field. Two major blocs began to form: the first included Exxon and the Coast Guard, along with NOAA, and to some degree, the U.S. Forest Service; the second included state agencies and public interest groups and local governments.

The state-public bloc in the fall of 1989 proposed that the ISCC's policies and procedures be updated based on 1989 field experience, and advocated that the ISCC's role be clarified and strengthened. State agencies, such as Fish and Game, felt that the ISCC had served as a powerful counterbalance to the federal government and Exxon, and that the ISCC had helped insure that Alaska's interests were best blended with federal goals.

The federal-Exxon bloc did not always share the state-local position. "NOAA, along with the Coast Guard and the U.S. Forest Service, frequently supported Exxon's efforts to dictate policies and procedures," Fish and Game's ISCC representative reported in his summary of the department's involvement in 1989-90.⁶³ State representatives felt that the ISCC provided a forum in which debate among equals could produce acceptable compromises for all.

"There were times when total agreement on priority or treatment methods could not be reached. In those cases when they could not reach a consensus, the final vote was decided by a simple majority. More often than not, some kind of compromise was worked out," one of DEC's technical representatives reported.⁶⁴

The ISCC would not survive the winter.

The Technical Advisory Group

The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was not originally intended to eliminate the role of the ISCC or their institutional cousins, the Multi-Agency Committees (MACs)⁶⁵. The stated goals for the creation of the TAG were to streamline the decision-making process and focus cleanup recommendations on technical questions, as opposed to policy issues. It probably accomplished one of the goals — streamlining decision-making — but it never was able to fully separate policy considerations from technical points, and it never truly harmonized the principal goals for cleanup.

The TAG was created in February 1990 in Newport Beach, California, where federal, state and Exxon officials met to discuss the principal technical issues facing responders in the coming summer. The two days of meetings dealt with the distribution of oil on shorelines, the chemical composition of the weathered oil, and the use of

fertilizers to enhance natural degradation. The group also discussed plans for the spring survey, and how the information from the survey would translate into work orders on the shorelines.

This is where the TAG emerged, although at the time it did not seem as if an entirely new decision-making body was being born. The "cooperative" approach to technical decision-making did not seem to exclude an ISCC review. It did, however, alter the way in which the parties would survey shorelines.

In the fall and early winter of 1989, DEC and other state agency monitors walked literally every mile of affected shoreline, noting oiling distribution and characteristics. The state survey paid special attention to locating and describing oil that had been buried, or been driven, below the beach surface. Exxon proposed that the spring survey be done jointly among state, federal, and

Exxon representatives, so that data collected would be in a similar format, and evaluations of conditions would be conducted at the same places at the same times.

There were really two slightly different sets of information on which cleanup decisions were based. The first was an assessment of the resources at risk, and the priority uses of the shorelines; the second was an assessment of what cleanup technique worked the best on a given problem. In 1989, both of these sets passed through the ISCC. The resource assessment teams collected one set, and Exxon's shoreline cleanup assessment teams collected the other. The ISCC looked at both and came up with a recommendation for cleanup to the federal on-scene coordinator.

The Newport Beach proposals for 1990 operations were different. Resource assessment was still an integral part of the decision, but, presumably, that assessment would



The general public and the press were free to attend the Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee meetings. The Technical Advisory Group, however, held meetings closed to the public by the order of the federal on-scene coordinator. The TAG was created in early 1990 and eventually replaced the ISCCs.

Photo courtesy of the Oil Spill Public Information Center

Fish and Game and Natural Resources did not like the fact that they did not have the same access to the decision-making table with the TAG. DEC would, theoretically, serve as Fish and Game's conduit to the federal on-scene coordinator.

not change from year to year; a shoreline segment close to a spawning stream or a nesting area or a subsistence use area had the same attributes in 1990 as in 1989. The change would come in the distribution and composition of the oil stranded on (or under) the shoreline. Therefore, the principal point of discussion for 1990 would be strictly technical, i.e., What are the oiling conditions and what is the best way to treat them?

And rather than have each agency collect its own technical information, the proposal was to collect it together and work from the same set of observations for each shoreline.

State on-scene coordinator Steve Provant and the DEC staff at the meeting viewed this arrangement as an improvement over the previous year.⁶⁶ The joint survey meant that DEC would be there on the shoreline, shoulder to shoulder with both the federal government and Exxon, giving the state more influence over what information went into the reports and how it was described. The ensuing technical discussion would also give the state a more direct line to the federal on-scene coordinator on technical matters. It was, actually, a more active and direct role for DEC than its usual monitoring-oversight responsibilities in a federally directed response.

Members of the ISCC, including other state agencies, would not view this arrangement in quite so positive a light. The ISCC had met in October of 1989 to work out its suggested improvements for 1990. The group planned to rewrite the shoreline cleanup manual it had produced earlier that year, adopt policies on bioremediation and other chemical cleansers, and otherwise tighten the loose bolts on the whole operation. The ISCC assumed that it would retain — or actually enhance — its authority as the principal forum for the government and the public to hash out the details and primary recommendations to guide the response.

But when the group met again on December 1, 1989, something had changed. The Coast Guard questioned the need for rewriting the shoreline manual, and NOAA, Exxon and the U.S. Forest Service agreed. These agencies took the position that the shoreline manual was an "historical document," rather than an active set of policy and technical guidelines in need of refinement.⁶⁷ When the group met in February, after the Newport Beach workshop, they were told of the TAG, although both Exxon and

NOAA staff assured the ISCC that they still had a role to play. That role, however, was never defined clearly enough for many ISCC members, and it was certainly not the active role the group had played in reviewing operations and making recommendations during the 1989 season.

The state agencies — Fish and Game and Natural Resources — did not like the fact that they did not have the same access to the decision-making table with the TAG. Whether by fact or by perception, DEC was assuming a much more pronounced role as the state's lead agency. DEC would, theoretically, serve as Fish and Game's conduit to the federal on-scene coordinator.

The public, defined primarily as local governments, commercial fishing, and conservation organizations, felt most left out. While they



Cordova fishing boat protesting spill response policies at a demonstration in September, 1989.

Photo by Rob Schaeffer

Where once the major cleanup recommendations were hashed out in public, they now were debated behind closed doors; where the chief advisory group had once been dominated by a diverse group of government agencies and the public, it now was administered by the spiller.

were free to provide comment either directly to the federal on-scene coordinator or through the state on-scene coordinator, they were no longer at the negotiating and discussion table as they were in the ISCC.

The issue of public access would flare up several times during the spring and early summer of 1990. The ISCC meetings were not conducted as open town meetings, but the general public and the press were free to attend. The TAG, however, was closed by the order of the federal on-scene coordinator, Rear Admiral D.E. Ciancaglini. Rear Admiral Ciancaglini said the TAG was a technical group in which scientists and technical experts had to be free to speak frankly and think out loud, and the admiral did not feel a public forum was conducive to such a discussion. When the new state on-scene coordinator, Randy Bayliss,⁶⁸ pressed the issue, Rear Admiral Ciancaglini said open meetings laws did not apply to the TAG, and he steadfastly refused to allow public access.

The TAG differed from the ISCC in another important way: Exxon was now the director of the chief advisory group to the federal on-scene coordinator. In the ISCC, Exxon was a kind of adjunct member, a technical advisor to the government and public agencies making the recommendations about the response. But in the TAG, Exxon was installed as administrator by the federal on-scene coordinator. The company's field managers now coordinated a small advisory group consisting of DEC, NOAA, the Coast Guard, and Exxon. Where once the major cleanup recommendations were hashed out in public, they now were debated behind closed doors. Where the chief advisory group had once been dominated by a diverse group of government agencies and the public, it now was administered by the spiller. An advisory group that was developing a multidisciplinary approach to cleanup decisions was replaced by small group looking only at "technical" issues.

The lack of public access and the narrowing of state agency involvement were not necessarily fatal flaws to the process. The decision-making process had indeed been streamlined, and the reduction in participants had the potential to cut down on the number of hours people spent tied up in meetings. Using the Coast Guard and DEC as the choke point for respective federal and state policies reduced confusion and had the potential for forcing each government to come to single, clearly defined positions on issues. And the idea that the advisors would make only "technical" judgments left the policy calls, in theory, to the upper-level policy-makers in both the state and federal governments.

Yet what may have been a well-intentioned effort to cut down on bureaucratic wrangling, streamline decision-making, and climb for the high ground of technical objectivity turned out to be less than a success in the view of the state agencies and the public.

The basic tension in the TAG was the result of two differing points of view about why, where, and how oil pollution should be treated on the Alaska shorelines. The federal position, shared largely by Exxon, was formed by NOAA and implemented by the Coast Guard. The state had a different point of view than its three partners in the TAG. Theoretically, this should not have caused a problem. However, as we will see later, the TAG's structure and its fundamental premise made it difficult to reconcile the two positions. But first, a look at the essential differences in the state and federal positions is useful.

a) State and federal responders did not agree on several key technical points.

NOAA argued that oil should be left in place absent a "compelling reason"⁶⁹ to remove it. The assumptions behind this reasoning were that the oil had weathered to a point where it presented little harm, if any, to humans or wildlife,⁷⁰ and that disruption of shorelines was unacceptable or ill-advised in most cases. NOAA argued that shorelines disrupted by mechanical treatment would not only cause harm to intertidal creatures, but they would also be destabilized and exposed to unacceptable levels of erosion. A third assumption was that natural weathering and degradation was proceeding fairly rapidly, even at sites with buried oil.

State officials believed that the NOAA assumptions probably held at certain sites and under certain conditions, but the data supporting those assumptions were neither extensive nor overwhelmingly persuasive. Investigation through 1990 and into 1991 would challenge some of the NOAA assumptions, and support the state's arguments that cleanup could proceed at more extensive and more aggressive levels.

State fish and game biologists were concerned that even low levels of weathered hydrocarbons could alter the development of salmon in the early stages of life. In a study that was partly associated with damage assessment, ADF&G researchers noticed that a significant number of salmon emerging from the eggs in oiled streams developed abnormally. The research led state fisheries biologists to doubt

the assumption that weathered oil posed little or no threat to the fish.

An associated study looked at whether mature fish of several species were showing evidence that they were continuing to be exposed to unnatural levels of hydrocarbons. The study's preliminary results suggested that fish in the oiled zone were, indeed, subject to some continuing exposure.⁷¹ An additional damage assessment study (to which NOAA's responders did not have access) was also beginning to suggest that leaving oil in place was not as benign as once believed. By 1991, the researchers were strongly convinced that oil was not weathering very quickly at certain kinds of sites — under mussel beds, in particular — based on samples of mussel flesh, shells, and the sediment under the beds. Researchers suspected that there was a link between the oiled mussel beds and continuing mortality and nesting abnormalities among several different species of bird and mammals in the spill zone. The link, they hypothesized, was because mussel beds like those they sampled are a primary or secondary food source for many animals.⁷²

Essential differences in the state and federal positions in the Technical Advisory Group

a) State and federal responders did not agree on several key technical points.

- NOAA argued that oil should be left in place absent a "compelling reason" to remove it.
- State officials argued that cleanup could proceed at more extensive and more aggressive levels.

b) The state and the federal-Exxon officials viewed the issue of "more harm than good" in fundamentally different ways.

- The state's definition of harm was very broad, because the state's resource management responsibilities and its social and economic interests were more diverse and more acute than those of either the federal government or Exxon.
- The federal government frequently took the position that active cleanup efforts were not necessary because the oiling was largely non-toxic and resource uses were not significantly disrupted by the presence of the oil.

c) Despite its name, the TAG was not just a "technical" advisory group; it was actually an arbiter of public policy and regulatory issues.

- The TAG was understood and explained by both the federal government and Exxon as a group of technical experts reaching consensus on what was the best treatment for a given shoreline.
- The state was concerned that the TAG was, in a piecemeal fashion, establishing overall State of Alaska policies on subjects wholly within the State of Alaska's authority.

State response officials also did not accept the blanket assumptions that subsurface oil would weather well, or that efforts to remove the subsurface oil would seriously affect the geomorphological stability of most beaches. Again, as various people continued their investigation of oiled sites, the original NOAA assumptions got weaker. Experts from both NOAA, and Exxon's chief consultant on geomorphology, began to conclude that many of the area's beaches were more active (and