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International rally backs nuclear test ban

ASSOCIATED PRESS

ALMA ATA, USSR - Activists from around the world came together yesterday to rally for a halt to all nuclear testing and to share sad stories of radiation damage in Soviet Kazakhstan.

"We're poisoning our air, we're poisoning our soil, we're poisoning our water," former bomb designer Ted Taylor told participants in the four-day conference. The US nuclear physicist said Americans and Soviets are more likely to be killed by the pollution from their own nuclear testing than by an enemy bomb.

Although superpower tensions are easing, the activists decided they have virtually no hope of persuading US, British and French leaders to

stop testing nuclear bombs soon. The United States detonated an underground bomb on Friday.

The activists are concentrating instead on President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, said Dr. Bernard Lown of Boston, an organizer of the conference and president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

The conference was highlighted by yesterday's festive, multinational rally and a political victory for the hosts, a Kazakh nuclear group called Nevada-Semipalatinsk, named after the US and Soviet test sites.

On Wednesday, Kazakhstan's Legislature voted unanimously to ask the Soviet government to halt all nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk, located in the northern steppes of

the Central Asian republic.

The American delegation to the conference, in contrast, was outraged to learn its government had set off another underground nuclear explosion in Nevada.

"I feel ashamed and angered," Lown said. "This makes no sense. Why are we conducting nuclear tests just a few days before the summit?"

Gorbachev is to meet President Bush in Washington this week, and the superpowers hope to complete an agreement to reduce long-range nuclear weapons by 30 percent to 50 percent.

The activists sent a telegram urging the leaders to halt nuclear testing. But no serious discussion of the issue is expected at the summit, Lown said, citing the Soviet foreign

minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

Conference leaders met with Shevardnadze on Tuesday in Moscow, where he restated the Soviet willingness to stop nuclear testing if the United States does.

Bush and Gorbachev are expected to sign protocols on verifying compliance with a 150-kiloton ceiling for nuclear tests. Although a pair of treaties setting the ceiling were signed in the early 1970s, they have never been ratified by the US Senate, and previous American administrations expressed doubt about Soviet compliance.

US policy, outlined by an American diplomat in Moscow, is that exploding nuclear bombs under the Nevada desert is necessary to test new weapons.

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette: Monday, July 2, 1985

UPHEAVAL IN THE EAST

Doctors push ban of N-tests

Five from district back from Russia

Star Tribune • Saturday/September 1/1980

Nuclear arms race is a long way from over

... START is acceptable only as a way to further the arms control process, to support Gorbachev and to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. A comprehensive test ban treaty will save money, slow proliferation and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war by limiting modernization of nuclear weapons.



Tuesday, September 18, 1990

Let's follow up on Soviet nuclear test ban

By John O. Pastore
Special to the American Statesman

Austin American-Statesman

SANTA FE SENTINEL - AUGUST 4, 1990

People-power can put an end to nuclear weapons testing

Breaking Pledge, U.S. to Defer Underground Nuclear Test Talks

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JULY 8, 1989

Soviets Cut Back Nuclear Testing As Hazards Become a Local Issue

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 7 — The Soviet Union has scaled back its nuclear testing program, possibly to ease concerns of Soviet citizens that the blasts are contaminating the environment, Bush Administration officials say.



The Jonesville Gazette / Friday, June 15, 1990 /
Nuclear test ban
Weapons tests are causing a drift closer to nuclear war.

Independence Day, 1990

\$600 million test site tab eyed

Las Vegas, Nevada

□ The money would go to cleaning land contaminated by testing in the 1950s and monitoring ground water.

Section 1 Chicago Tribune, Sunday, August 26, 1990

Nation/world

U.S. spending millions on plan to restart Pacific nuclear tests

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

ZURICH, SATURDAY-SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1990

Leakage Is Feared From French A-Tests

ARE THESE PEOPLE TALKING TO ONE ANOTHER?

*QUOTABLE QUOTES ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN*

Secretary of Energy James D. Watkins, Letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, April 1990, on a recent DOE study which indicated that the U.S. cannot consider any further limits on testing for 10 years:

"We have not identified any further limitations on nuclear testing... that would be in the U.S....interest" beyond those in the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Ambassador C. Paul Robinson, Chief U.S. negotiator at the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) in Geneva which has not met since 1982 when Reagan formally withdrew from the talks, on the same DOE study, June 14, 1990:

"I am not aware that DOE ever made such a statement. That is certainly not the administration's position."

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Letter to US CTB Coalition, March 30, 1990:

"...the United States is firmly opposed to the move to convert by amendment the Limited Test Ban Treaty into a comprehensive test ban."

Brent Scowcroft, Letter to House Armed Services Chairman Dante Fascell, February 20, 1990:

"After careful review by this Administration, the fundamental position of the United States on nuclear testing remains unchanged: nuclear testing is indispensable to the maintenance of the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years. As long as we depend on nuclear weapons for our security, some nuclear testing will be necessary."

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, May 1990:

"If you could exert as much pressure on President Bush as the Kazak people are putting on me, we could have a nuclear test ban."

October 20, 1990:

"The principal strategy of the U.S.S.R. in this matter has been actions that would lead to a complete end of nuclear testing. We have proved that those were indeed actions, and not words, by our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, which, for reasons beyond our control, did not develop into a complete and definitive cessation of such tests, and by our practices over the past year when we have not conducted a single nuclear test."

"It goes without saying that the Soviet Union's pledge to completely ban all nuclear testing at any time and for all times, if the U.S. does likewise, still stands."

French President Francois Mitterrand, May 19, 1989:

"If the United States of America and the Soviet Union give them up, and Great Britain too, we shall follow suit. I am prepared to stop nuclear testing immediately."

TABLE 51

NATIONAL DEFENSE ISSUE: NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS FOR BOTH
COUNTRIES TO STOP TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(Survey No. 11, Question 10a, Items)

Americans Talk
Security
National
Survey #11
Dec. 1988

	Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	Somewhat Dis- approve	Strongly Dis- approve	(Not Sure)
TOTAL	67%	18	6	6	3
<u>Party Identification</u>					
Republican	59%	20	9	10	2
Independent	73%	18	5	2	2
Democrat	74%	14	3	5	4
<u>Viewpoint</u>					
Conservative	64%	17	7	9	3
Liberal	75%	15	3	3	4
<u>Region</u>					
Northeast	74%	17	7	-	2
Midwest	70%	18	5	5	2
South	63%	21	6	8	2
West	61%	15	3	12	9
<u>Income</u>					
Under \$35,000	72%	16	3	6	3
Over \$35,000	66%	20	8	5	1
<u>Education</u>					
High school or less	71%	14	6	5	4
Some college	66%	24	4	6	-
Four year college	66%	27	4	3	-
Post graduate	59%	20	7	9	5
<u>Gender</u>					
Men	66%	19	6	7	2
Women	68%	17	6	5	4
<u>Age</u>					
18-29	77%	10	7	6	-
30-39	67%	24	6	3	-
40-49	65%	19	7	7	2
50-64	63%	21	2	11	3
65+	66%	13	8	3	10
<u>Gender/Age</u>					
Men, 18-39	71%	17	8	4	-
Men, 40+	62%	20	4	10	4
Women, 18-39	75%	18	4	3	-
Women, 40+	66%	16	7	5	6

Oppos.
85%

Banning Nuclear Tests – It's Bush's Move

By Philip G. Schrag

FORTY countries, including Egypt, India, Iran, and Iraq, have recently proposed an amendment to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. They want to turn it into a treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing. This initiative presents the Bush administration with a diplomatic challenge and a national security opportunity.

More than 100 countries have joined the treaty over its 26-year life. But nuclear weapons testing by the United States and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent by Britain, France, and China, continues at a vigorous pace underground.

Such testing has been vigorously criticized by most countries. In 1987, 128 countries voted for a United Nations resolution advocating the amendment that has just been formally proposed. Only the US, France, and Britain opposed the resolution.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty's amendment clause specifies

that a conference to consider amendments must be convened if requested by one-third of the parties. The US, Britain, and the USSR – the three countries that drafted the treaty – are responsible for convening such a conference. Those countries will each have only one vote at the conference, but under the treaty each of them can veto any amendments.

The 40 countries that have now called for an amendment conference are more than a third of the parties. These countries want an end to underground as well as atmospheric testing. What should the US do?

In large part, the answer to this question depends on whether the Bush administration thinks that continued testing is necessary, and, if so, for how long. Until 1981, every American president since Dwight Eisenhower had endorsed efforts to negotiate a comprehensive test ban agreement. Reagan administration officials reversed this longstanding policy, believing that nuclear weapons testing would be necessary indefinitely to develop new types of nuclear weapons and to make sure that the nuclear weapons already in the US stockpile will work. President Reagan also

canceled ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations. But President Bush may take a fresh look at this issue.

There is reason to think that a ban on nuclear testing at this time would enhance American national security. If the US and the USSR stop testing, it will be more difficult for hard-liners in third-

The least attractive policy would be US obstruction of this move toward a comprehensive test ban.

world states to argue that their countries needed to test nuclear weapons to acquire international prestige. A comprehensive ban would also help to stabilize the nuclear arms race by impairing the ability of either the US or the USSR to build new generations of nuclear weapons.

Concern about the reliability of stockpiled weapons could be eliminated by giving final proof tests to any types of weapons in the stockpile that have not yet been tested fully, and then freezing existing blueprints. New types

of nuclear missiles and bombs would have to be designed to incorporate existing designs.

The problem of verification, long a critical issue in negotiations, has largely been solved by technological advances in seismology.

President Bush could respond in four ways to the 40-nation initiative. Three of them are reasonable. The fourth possibility would be diplomatically isolating and would throw away an opportunity to contribute to nuclear nonproliferation.

First, the President could seize the initiative by reopening negotiations with the USSR toward a comprehensive test ban.

Second, if the President wants to move at a more modest pace toward an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty, he could explore with the USSR a gradual phase-out of nuclear weapon tests over several years.

Either of these approaches could lead to a treaty that would advance American interests, and either of them could convince the 40 nations that the superpowers are engaged in a serious effort to end nuclear weapons testing. As a result, the pressure to hold a large conference, in which the US

would have only limited influence, might abate.

Third, the US could endorse the 40-nation initiative, convene the conference promptly, and work within it to help frame a sound, effective amendment. For example, it could insist on suitable verification arrangements and a schedule for an end to testing which permitted final experiments with any weapons that have to be modified to remain reliable without further testing.

The least attractive policy would be American obstruction of this new international effort to move the world toward a comprehensive test ban.

This course would enable the USSR to continue to portray itself as more devoted than the US to arms control. It would also increase the likelihood that by the end of the century, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and other nations will test nuclear weapons and deploy the missiles and bombers that could eventually ensnarl the world in a nuclear war.

■ Philip G. Schrag is a professor of law at Georgetown University. From 1977 to 1981, he was the deputy general counsel of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Boston Globe

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1986

ELLEN GOODMAN

Halting nuclear tests

Bernard Lown hasn't much time to rest on his Nobel laurels. On this achingly beautiful morning, the cardiologist and winner of the Peace Prize is at his desk talking again, or talking still, about nuclear testing.

The co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War got involved in the arms-control, antinuclear, peace movement — whatever you want to call it — because of his concern about nuclear tests. In the early 1960s, he remembers, when superpowers were exploding nuclear bombs in the atmosphere, "We collected baby teeth, and proved that Strontium 90 entered the food chain."

Nuclear testing was driven underground, but despite a million Hiroshimas in the nuclear arsenal, it hasn't been stopped. In fact, last Monday, the day Lown was interviewed, was the last day in the moratorium the Russians have called and kept by themselves since July. If we go through with our own plans for an April 16 test, the Russians will resume testing and we will have lost yet another chance.

Since last summer, Gorbachev has taken the lead in proposals as well as propaganda. He halted Soviet testing and asked Americans to join in. He asked for 50 percent cuts in nuclear arsenals and a 15-year plan for eliminating nuclear weapons. Only last weekend he offered to meet to discuss ending tests.

The Reagan administration has countered all these proposals by speaking in a foreign tongue: nyet, nyet, nyet. We seem to have switched roles. As Paul Warnke, the former arms-control negotia-

tor, said, the Russians are offering us our own proposals for arms control and we can't "take yes for an answer."

It is as if the superpowers are in a relationship cursed with bad timing. One presses for a commitment and when the other finally comes around and says yes, the first dances away.

Lown knows something about that international role-reversal firsthand. After receiving the Peace Prize, he had a three-hour interview with Gorbachev, but he has yet to receive even an acknowledgement from the White House. On the larger scale, he says with deep frustration, "Every American president has supported test bans until Reagan."

The doctors have won a Nobel Prize, but the patient has not yet taken the first step to recovery: the comprehensive test ban. "If we ask what has driven the arms race, it is the ever greater sophistication of technology," Lown repeats. "If the qualitative change in weapons is what's made the age so unstable and insecure, then stopping the testing will slow the process."

The White House claims, in part, that we need tests to check the weapons we have now. "But testing is the starting gun for any arms race. We test for the weapons of the future. It is clear that Reagan prefers a defense *by* arms to a control *over* arms. The summit was the pacifier; "star wars" is the policy.

We have lived with the nuclear arms race for so long and with such a sense of helplessness that ordinary citizens have become nearly immune to the reality, and passive to the possibilities for

change. "Imagine yourself walking around your whole life with a revolver pointed at the back of your head," says Lown. "You would say, 'This guy has to be straitjacketed.'" If, however, you feel powerless, you might prefer to look straight ahead.

Today, when the Russians are talking our line, asking us to say

Testing is the starting gun for any arms race.

yes to our own test-ban proposals, we have to allow this atomic revolver into our peripheral vision. When the government won't agree to America's own proposals, we still have leverage.

In the Congress, there is a bill that would cut off funds for nuclear testing for six months, unless the Soviets tested. Before the Gorbachev moratorium, such a bill was considered a wild peacenik proposal. Not anymore.

Americans have another recourse that Soviet citizens do not. As Lown puts it, "The American people can shout to the rooftops."

I know no way to stop the April 16 blast, a blast that will be echoed in the Soviet Union. The chorus demanding an end to testing sounds to me like the ragtag pack of peace marchers wandering across Nevada, a voice in the wilderness. But I am reassured by this physician. Having watched the pot of public concern for decades, Lown says: "It's like boiling water. Nothing happens, nothing happens, nothing happens, and then finally there's steam."

Ellen Goodman is a Globe columnist.

Monitoring Nuke Tests

American scientists set up in the Soviet Union

Sounding an old theme, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on a visit to Britain last week, said the Soviet Union was preparing for a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit—but that no date could be set until Washington responded to Moscow's latest arms-control proposals. To dull any Soviet propaganda edge, the Reagan administration agreed to resume talks—broken off six years ago—about a total nuclear-test ban. But even as the U.S. delegation packed for Geneva, the administration was still bickering about the team's instructions. Hard-liners want to focus on charges that Moscow has violated SALT II and the ABM treaty; the State Department believes the United States should negotiate arms cuts, even while complaining about alleged Soviet violations.

Washington may also propose that both sides reduce underground nuclear testing. (The Soviets have had a unilateral moratorium in place for nearly a year.) The problem is how to verify Soviet compliance with a ban. In one concession, Moscow allowed a group of U.S. scientists to set up the first monitoring station within Soviet borders. Photographer Ted Spiegel, on assignment for NEWSWEEK, accompanied the U.S. team and filed this report.

The caravan threaded its way across a rough hillside inside the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, in an area that has long been closed to Americans. Six U.S. scientists joked with the half dozen Russian scientists who accompanied them. Some of the travelers wore pale-blue T-shirts reading "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Test Ban Verification Team." They came to a stop just 140 miles from Semipalatinsk, the Soviet Union's main nuclear-test site. The Russian and American workers assembled a wooden shack and placed an orange-banded seismometer inside. Output lines connected the instrument to a digital recorder. With that, the teams inaugurated the first of three sites that will allow U.S. scientists to detect any unannounced Soviet nuclear tests. "This is a breakthrough," said James Brune, a seismologist from the University of California at San Diego. "If the Russians weren't really serious about test-ban negotiations they wouldn't agree to putting in a lot of monitoring stations."

The Natural Resources Defense Council



TED SPIEGEL—BLACK STAR

On site: U.S. and Soviet teams calibrate a seismometer in Kazakhstan

(NRDC), a U.S. environmental group, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences worked out the seismograph agreement between themselves. But the private accord may push the superpowers one step closer to a total nuclear-test ban. Last May the NRDC negotiated a go-ahead to position seismic equipment in the Soviet Union. In return, the Americans have offered to help the Soviets establish similar monitoring sites around the U.S. nuclear testing ground at Yucca Flat, Nev.

Moscow doesn't really need those sites. The Kremlin has been able to find out about U.S. tests from the seismic data in American scientific journals, while U.S. scientists have had no access to comparable Soviet data. But Moscow clearly hopes to prod Washington into a test-ban accord.

In a makeshift lab, the U.S. scientists watched the first digital readouts on the tape. In unison, three seismometers recorded an earthquake 300 miles away. The tape gave the scientists the high-frequency waves they need to distinguish between natural earth tremors and those caused by nuclear explosions. "We're getting them!" shouted one gleeful scientist.

Bureaucratic mixups: The Soviets had told the Americans they could set up three sites right away, but bureaucratic mixups kept them from establishing more than one in the first 10 days of their visit. And Kremlin officials said the U.S. team might have to suspend monitoring during any Soviet test after Moscow's moratorium ends on Aug. 6. The other news was mixed, too. "Comrade Gorbachev sends his personal best wishes for [your] success," an official said. Both sides applauded. Then the official added,

"But no word yet about when we can get to our next monitoring site." Even three stations wouldn't enable U.S. scientists to keep track of all Soviet nuclear activities—and at least until they can, the odds are against a new test-ban accord.

Chernobyl's Goats

Almost three months after the accident at Chernobyl, the Soviet Politburo told the world last week what went wrong. Workers at the nuclear plant committed "gross breaches" of the rules: they ran experiments in "turbogenerator operations" without getting permission—and the tests themselves didn't follow safety guidelines. The bill to date: \$2.8 billion.

More than 200 Soviet citizens are suffering from radiation sickness—30 are still in the hospital—and 28 people have died, the Politburo disclosed. About 385 square miles of land around the reactor are contaminated, and Soviet authorities are concerned about the nearby water basin. But they said the plant is now "under dependable control and is no cause for concern."

The Kremlin sacked four high-ranking officials, expelled the plant's former director from the Communist Party and "initiated criminal proceedings against persons guilty of the accident." The minister of power engineering was only rebuked because he'd been new at the post when the accident occurred. But the Politburo warned that he'd "be subject to a harsher punishment if he has failed to learn a lesson."

by HAROLD EVANS
Contributing Editor

THE HAZEBROOK FOLLY

On Thursday, February 5, unless President Reagan realizes what is happening, he will blow up his last best chance of leaving the world a safer place than he found it. This is more important than Iran. The President has talked of a world where nuclear weapons are "impotent and obsolete." Unfortunately, he has also been induced to make decisions that risk an acceleration of the arms race. He is about to do so again with an ill-timed explosion in the Nevada desert, code-named Hazebrook.

Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter all secured arms-control agreements—20 of them altogether. President Reagan has nothing to show. For this the Soviets are much at fault—they had no effective leadership for years—but it is too facile to blame everything on the Soviets. Doing that as a reflex can lead to actions against our own national-security interests, and that is what is happening with nuclear tests.

Since August, 1985, the Soviets have conducted not a single nuclear explosion. The U.S. has announced 20. Three times these last 18 months the Soviets have extended their moratorium and invited the U.S. to join as a prelude to negotiating the permanent, verifiable test-ban treaty that both sides repeatedly have pledged their efforts to achieve and that bipartisan leadership in Congress urges on the President. A test ban is crucial because it provides a foundation for progress on arms control, as President Kennedy said when he announced his moratorium on atmospheric testing—now a respected treaty.

On every occasion Reagan has been persuaded to say no to a test ban. One excuse has been followed by another. In 1985 it was said the Soviets had gotten ahead and the U.S. needed to catch up. Well, we did—and how!—with seven extra tests in 1985 and 13 announced in 1986. But, in fact, we were never behind. As was later admitted, there had been no change in the ratio of U.S. to Soviet tests. The U.S. is at least 200 ahead of the Soviets.

Next it was said that the Soviets had been cheating on the 150-kiloton underground limit agreed in 1974. Scientists suggested that the administration's calculation of the power of Soviet explosions was

based on a faulty calibration. So it was. In March, 1986, the CIA said it was changing its measure that had overestimated Soviet yields by 20 percent.

Then it was objected that there was no point in resuming talks on a test ban, because tests could not be detected and the Soviets would never agree to on-site monitoring. Well, they did. They invited American scientists to set up verification equipment, and it is operating on Soviet soil. Tougher provisions would be needed in a treaty, but even so the expert consensus is overwhelming that there is no technical difficulty in unmanned monitoring.

The truth is that it's not technology that stands in the way. It's part of a campaign against arms control in a divided administration. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's assistant, Richard L. Wagner, Jr., said it frankly: "Even if effectively verified, a comprehensive test ban would not be in the national-security interests of the U.S."

The underlying proposition here is that the U.S. can "win" an arms race.

That is an interstellar gamble; it is not one that the American people want to take, according to the polls, and it is not what the President himself says he

wants. The more the costly race proceeds, with both sides developing different systems, the more difficult the asymmetrical arithmetic of arms control, the more likely the chance of disaster.

Even on the narrow ground of weapons technology the proposition is dubious. A White House study says that through continued testing the Soviets could develop efficient miniature warheads that would allow them to exploit their heavy missiles. On the other hand, a test ban, as Senator Durenberger has said, would "stop menacing Soviet developments while preserving the technological edge the United States enjoys." Warhead designs for Trident D-5, MX and Midgetman have been tested.

Gorbachev has said that if the U.S. resumes testing, the Soviets will follow. We will be back on the competitive spiral of testing, building new weapons and testing again. Here's a chance for Reagan to regain an initiative. He should cancel Hazebrook and probe the Soviet offer. ■



S. J. RES. 287

(NOTE.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date, number, and reference of resolution.)

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Pell (for himself, Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Matsunaga, and Mr. Simon)

introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Requesting the President of the United States to negotiate agreements to achieve early prohibition of nuclear explosions.

Whereas the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain are committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;

Whereas the United States and Soviet Union anticipate early agreement upon verification protocols in the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the President expects, accordingly, to seek advice and consent to ratification of two treaties which were signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively;

Whereas in 1988, a quarter century after the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, states party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty formally proposed an amendment that would broaden its prohibition on testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water to include underground testing;

Whereas the formal request by more than one-third of the parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, as provided for in Article II of the treaty, now mandates the convening of a conference to consider such amendment;

Whereas the early prohibition of underground nuclear explosions would constrain the development and deployment of new generations of nuclear arms; reduce reliance upon nuclear arsenals, reinvigorate efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, and end further radioactive contamination of the environment;

Whereas the reliability of nuclear weapons of the United States as deterrents to nuclear war can be assured by means other than nuclear explosive testing;

Whereas recent advances in verification techniques and recent agreements and understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding in-country monitoring and on-site inspection have helped open the way to effective verification of a comprehensive ban: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, at the earliest possible date, the President of the United States should --

(1) proceed with his plan to conclude successfully the current phase of the Nuclear Testing Talks and request Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty;


(2) convey to the Soviet Union the desire of the United States to continue the bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks to identify and agree upon a definite timetable for the early achievement of a verifiable comprehensive test ban; and

(3) express to the states party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty the willingness of the United States to prepare for and pursue negotiations in good faith in the Test Ban Treaty Conference called to broaden the Limited Test Ban Treaty into a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

TEST BAN

January meeting keeps hope alive

By WILLIAM EPSTEIN



U.N. PHOTO 17722 MILTON GRANT

Voting to reconvene: only the United States and Britain voted against continuing the Partial Test Ban Treaty amendment process.

Overshadowed by the countdown to war in the Persian Gulf, a significant meeting convened from January 7 to 18 at U.N. headquarters in New York. The Nuclear Test Ban Amendment Conference was the culmination of six years' effort by nonaligned states to end the nuclear arms race by changing the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty to include a ban on all nuclear tests.

No one expected the two-week conference to produce a test ban. Instead, the real test was a vote on whether to continue the amendment work at a future date. That vote—74 to 2 to reconvene, with 19 abstentions—left the conference's two adamant opponents, the United States and Britain, in not-so-splendid isolation. Seven Western nations that were expected

to abstain voted instead to reconvene the conference.

The United States and Britain were reluctant participants in the conference. The movement begun in 1985 by six nonaligned states—Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia—under the leadership of Mexico's Nobel Peace laureate, Amb. Alfonso Garcia Robles, relied on the amendment provisions of the 1963 treaty. To the surprise of skeptics, the idea gained momentum in a series of General Assembly resolutions. By April 1989 more than one-third of the parties had joined the request for the amendment conference, making it mandatory for the three depositaries (states that negotiated the treaty)—the United States, Britain, and the Soviet

Union—to convene it. The Soviets supported the amendment proposal but U.S. and British officials announced that they would veto it. They described the conference as a waste of time and money.

One delegate called the U.S. and British insistence that the amendment process stop at the close of the two-week conference "a preposterous notion."

Although any vote on an actual amendment would have required the assent of all three depositaries, a vote to continue the proceedings at a later date did not. So, for the first time, the smaller powers succeeded in pressing their views to a vote in a conference dealing with the provisions of a disarmament treaty. The Western nuclear powers always prefer consensus to majority vote, as it gives them an effective veto. In fact, the United States and Britain have urged that all future multilateral efforts on a test ban be left to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where each of the 39 participants has a veto over procedure as well as substance. For 12 years the United States has refused to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the Conference on Disarmament or anywhere else.

The conference created a number of other firsts. It was the first time that all parties in a multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty were able to engage in actual negotiations on the treaty, and high participation—100 out of 117 parties—indicated the intensity of interest in a comprehensive test ban. By comparison, only 84 out of 141 parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty took part in that treaty's 1990 review. It also was the first time that the amendment procedure had been invoked under any disarmament treaty, and the first time that the non-nuclear states had proposed a detailed verification scheme and a sanctions regime to deter violations of a nuclear disarmament treaty. Some supporters of the amendment process expressed the hope that the new developments in this conference would set precedents for future disarmament efforts.

The conference decided that further work was needed on verification and sanctions, and authorized Conference President Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister, to undertake consultations to achieve "progress on those issues" and to reconvene the confer-

ence "at an appropriate time."

The nonaligned states first tried to set a September 1993 deadline for reconvening the conference, and to create an intersessional working group to deal with verification and sanctions. The conference clearly would have adopted the proposal embodying these demands, but the 10 sponsors (the original six conference sponsors plus the Philippines, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania) decided to modify the proposal to gain wider support. As a result, seven Western parties joined in the vote to continue the conference. These included three NATO members—Denmark, Iceland, and Norway—as well as Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Sweden. Mexico's Amb. Miguel Marin Bosch, a leader of the amendment move, called the vote "an important breakthrough" in a previously solid Western front. In private, delegates from several other Western nations who had abstained expressed their unhappiness with the stubborn refusal of the United States and Britain to begin any negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.

The seven new supporters apparently see the amendment conference as a way to increase pressure on these two nuclear powers to negotiate a total ban, most likely in the Conference on Disarmament. Cooperation between the two conferences could speed the achievement of a new treaty.

The Gulf war had very little impact on the conference except to keep it out of the news. But a number of representatives who believe that a comprehensive ban is essential to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons mentioned that such a treaty would prevent Iraq and other would-be nuclear powers from acquiring an arsenal of sophisticated nuclear weapons.

Some delegates suggested in private that U.S. preoccupation with the war has hardened its opposition to a comprehensive test ban. They hope that after the war, and with further progress on strategic nuclear arms control, the administration and Congress will review the U.S. position. Resolutions supporting the amendment were introduced in both houses of Congress in January—partly because of the impressive activity of 123 nongovernmental organizations participating in the conference.

The *New York Times*, which previ-

ously opposed a comprehensive test ban, scolded the administration for its intransigence, saying U.S. delegate Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes "gratuitously offended states that want a total test ban" when she told the conference. "Consideration of testing limitations is a serious undertaking that should be conducted in a serious manner." The January 27 editorial continued: "For the U.S. to insist on testing undermines nuclear arms control and sends the wrong message to potential nuclear powers: 'Do as I say and not as I do.'"

The future work of the amendment conference is now largely up to President Alatas, a supporter of the amendment from its inception. If, as expected, he pursues his mandate as vigorously as he sought consensus at the conference, a comprehensive ban may well be achieved before 1995, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is up for renewal.

The NPT renewal gives the non-nuclear states considerable leverage on the United States and Britain. If the latter continue to withhold their cooperation, the non-nuclear states may try to extend the NPT for only a year or two pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, or amend the NPT to specify that a comprehensive ban be concluded by a certain date. Another option is to take the two countries to the World Court. If there is a confrontation on these issues, or if the United States refuses to attend or pay its share of the costs of the next session of the amendment conference, as it has threatened, the NPT could be doomed.

The amendment conference proved a partial success. Conference sponsors feel they have raised the comprehensive test ban once again to a top place on the international arms control agenda. They consider the continuation of the conference a victory. And they believe that with the perseverance of the conference president and activist non-nuclear states, including the seven new Western supporters, the conference could be a turning point in the long struggle to ban nuclear testing and achieve real nuclear disarmament. ■

William Epstein, senior fellow at the U.N. Institute for Training and Research, represented the U.N. secretary-general at negotiations leading to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy

Charles L. Glaser

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue.

"Glaser's analysis of the impact of strategic defenses and the perplexities of managing a transition to a defense-dominant world remains the most thorough and sensible that has yet appeared in print."

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The First Step: Halt Nuclear Weapons Testing

Defense Monitor in Brief

- U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreements have not prevented rapid growth in the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads.
- Current U.S.-Soviet talks give the erroneous impression that deep reductions in nuclear weapons are about to occur.
- The U.S. and the Soviet Union continue to test and build new, more destructive nuclear weapons.
- Since 1945 the U.S. has conducted 932 nuclear test explosions and the Soviet Union has conducted 638. Neither country needs to continue nuclear test explosions to maintain a secure retaliatory force.
- The flight testing of new ballistic missiles will lead to the development of new, super-accurate, first strike weapons.
- The U.S. could verify with high confidence Soviet compliance with a ban on nuclear test explosions and ballistic missile flight tests.

In 1969 the United States and the Soviet Union began conducting strategic arms negotiations on a regular basis. Since then the total number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear warheads on long-range missiles and bombers has more than quadrupled, from about 5,550 to about 24,000.

It is far from clear that a new arms reduction agreement will be completed any time soon. The strategic arms reduction talks (START) have been going on since 1982 and have not yet produced an agreement. Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's influential National Security Adviser, has been critical of the prospective agreement that might be produced by these talks. Further, many major obstacles remain, in-

cluding a fundamental disagreement over Star Wars and many thorny problems regarding verification.

Even if a START treaty is signed and ratified, it would still leave the United States and the Soviet Union with far more nuclear weapons than they need for secure retaliatory forces. Finally, if past U.S.-Soviet agreements on long-range nuclear weapons are any indication, a START treaty would not prevent either country from developing new nuclear weapons.

A New Approach

It is time for a new approach. With the recent improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, President Bush has an historic opportunity to genuinely

Seventeen Years of Service to the Nation

slow and reverse the nuclear arms competition with the Soviet Union. This could be accomplished through a combination of sensible restraint and bilateral arms limitation agreements that prevent the development of new, more dangerous nuclear weapons.

Past and current arms negotiations have focused almost exclusively on numerical limits for **existing nuclear delivery vehicles** and have neglected limits on the development of **new nuclear warheads and new missiles** to carry those warheads. Both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to develop more destructive nuclear warheads and more accurate ballistic missiles.

The combination of new, more destructive nuclear warheads and new, more accurate ballistic missiles could be used to create weapon systems particularly well-suited for a first strike. Such weapons would compel both the United States and the Soviet Union to put their nuclear forces on a hair trigger during a crisis. In short, to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union need to stop developing deadly new weapons. The way to accomplish this is through the cessation of nuclear test explosions and ballistic missile flight testing.

A BAN ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Today the United States has about 13,000 nuclear warheads deployed on long-range missiles and bombers. The Soviet Union has about 11,000. Since 1945 the United States has conducted 932 nuclear test explosions and the Soviet Union has conducted 638. Clearly, both nations have more than enough reliable nuclear warheads to maintain strong retaliatory forces.

Nuclear Test Explosions Since 1945

U.S.	932*
U.S.S.R.	638
France	172
U.K.	41*
China	34
India	1

Total:	1,798

* includes 20 joint U.K./U.S. tests.

Source: DOE, CDI, NRDC.
Chart prepared by Center for Defense Information.

A nuclear test ban would help stop the development of dangerous new nuclear warheads. By refraining jointly from nuclear explosions testing, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would be able to ascertain whether new nuclear warheads actually work as designed. Without the opportunity to test, scientists would have little incentive to design new nuclear warheads because they would not have confidence in the reliability of these warheads

and there would be no point in putting them in new nuclear weapon systems.

Benefits of Ending Tests

A test ban would prevent both the U.S. and the Soviet Union from developing "earth penetrating" nuclear warheads which burrow deep into the ground before exploding. The United States is currently designing these warheads to destroy underground targets in the Soviet Union such as ICBM silos and command bunkers.

The continued U.S. pursuit of the capability to destroy such targets is both ironic and troubling. The U.S. has identified the Soviet SS-18 missile as the most dangerous Soviet nuclear weapon precisely because it has the accuracy and the destructive power to destroy U.S. ICBM silos and command and control facilities. Certainly U.S. and Soviet missiles armed with new earth penetrating warheads would be even more effective against ICBM silos and command and control facilities than today's SS-18 missile.

The development and deployment of earth penetrating warheads could only raise fears on both sides of disarming strikes by the other. During times of tension, political and military officials, confronted by numerous, highly accurate missiles armed with earth penetrating warheads, might believe that they were in a "use 'em or lose 'em" situation. The pressure would grow to try to beat the other side to the punch by launching nuclear weapons first, before they could be destroyed in a surprise attack. Thus the deployment of earth penetrating warheads might have the perverse effect of provoking officials to initiate the use of nuclear weapons during a crisis.

According to a Pentagon spokesman, the U.S. could develop a new earth penetrating warhead in "about five years." In fact, the U.S. has already conducted a significant amount of research on this type of warhead, having started the development of an earth penetrating warhead for the Pershing II intermediate-range missile in 1979, before canceling the program in 1980.

If both sides continue nuclear testing the Soviet Union will likely follow

the U.S. lead and develop its own earth penetrating warhead. Such a weapon would bring the Soviets closer to having the theoretical capability to carry out a disarming first strike against the United States. Its development would make both countries less secure.

Compact Warheads

A test ban on nuclear explosions would also benefit U.S. security by making it extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to develop more compact and efficient nuclear warheads that weigh less and have more explosive power than existing warheads. The United States currently enjoys a large advantage in this area. Its ballistic missiles carry warheads with far greater "yield to weight" ratios than those on Soviet ballistic missiles. If both sides continue to set off nuclear test explosions, it is likely that the Soviet Union will be able to close that gap.

A 1984 report prepared by the Reagan Administration noted that if the Soviets continue nuclear testing, "they could develop efficient miniature warheads with high yield to weight and yield to volume ratios. Such developments would allow the Soviets to exploit fully the fractionation possibilities of their ICBMs." In other words, with the development of lighter warheads, the Soviet Union could take advantage of the large payload capacity of its existing ICBMs and quickly double or even triple the number of warheads on those missiles without adding a single new missile to its arsenal. A ban on all nuclear explosions would work to foreclose this possibility.

X-Ray Lasers

In addition to preventing the development of new nuclear warheads, a ban on all nuclear explosions would prevent the development of nuclear-driven directed energy weapons (NDEWs), including X-ray lasers, hypervelocity pellets, and optical frequency lasers. The most advanced of these potential new weapons is apparently the X-ray laser. The United States is currently conducting research on the X-ray laser under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. For the X-ray laser to work as part of a Star Wars

"shield," the X-ray energy would have to be generated by a nuclear explosion in outer space. That energy would be focused and directed against Soviet ballistic missiles in space.

The Soviet Union has also reportedly expressed interest in developing an X-ray laser. In 1985 the CIA stated that in Soviet publications on X-ray lasers "the use of nuclear explosions has been proposed as a method for creating conditions for X-ray lasers."

If both the United States and the Soviet Union continue nuclear testing, both sides could eventually develop X-ray lasers with significant military applications. It is unlikely, however, that an X-ray laser could be used effectively to shoot down ballistic missiles in a nuclear war. The booster rockets of future ballistic missiles could burn out so quickly that the missiles would dispense their warheads while still in the atmosphere. This would render X-ray lasers ineffective because X-rays are not able to penetrate the earth's atmosphere.

Although X-ray lasers would certainly be ineffective against ballistic missiles, they could be used very effectively in another manner. Space-based X-ray lasers, which could strike at the speed of light, would be particularly well-suited to destroy satellites in high orbit (higher than 5,000 kilometers). The U.S. is extremely dependent on these satellites for communications and early warning of missile attack. Soviet X-ray lasers would have the capability to destroy U.S. satellites in high orbits (a capability the Soviet Union does not have now). Preventing the development of Soviet X-ray lasers would therefore definitely be in the interests of the United States.

Genie Still in the Bottle

Today the U.S. is not even close to having an operational X-ray laser or any other nuclear-driven directed energy weapon (NDEW). In a 1988 report the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the U.S. X-ray laser is many years away from fruition. In a 1987 study the American Physical Society (APS), the most prestigious organization of American physicists, concluded that "even in the best of circumstances, a decade or more of

A Comprehensive Test Ban in 1963 Would Have Prevented Many of Today's Nuclear Weapons

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, prohibiting nuclear testing in outer space, underwater, and in the atmosphere. The treaty, however, permitted nuclear testing to be conducted underground. This continued nuclear testing allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to develop smaller, more efficient nuclear warheads, enabling them to develop Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and cruise missiles. **Since 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union have developed, tested and built the following long-range MIRVed missiles and cruise missiles:**

United States

ICBMs: Minuteman III; MX.
SLBMs: Poseidon C-3; Trident C-4.
Cruise Missiles: Tomahawk SLCM; ALCM.

ALCM: Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM: Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

Source: Department of Defense, CDI.
Chart prepared by Center for Defense Information.

Soviet Union

SS-17; SS-18; SS-19; SS-24.
SS-N-18; SS-N-20; SS-N-23.
SS-N-21 SLCM; AS-15 ALCM.

intensive research would be required" before an informed decision could be made "about the potential effectiveness and survivability of directed energy weapon systems."

There are no indications that the Soviet Union is any closer to developing NDEWs than is the United States. In a 1987 report the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the U.S. and Soviet were equal in directed energy weapon technology. In 1986 the CIA told Congress that it "does not believe that the Soviet Union can deploy nuclear-driven directed-energy weapons without conducting additional explosive tests." Since 1986 the Soviet Union has conducted only 42 nuclear explosions. That is certainly too small a number to develop NDEWs. According to weapons designers at Los Alamos National Laboratory, between 100 and 200 nuclear explosions might be needed to develop such third generation nuclear weapons. Therefore a ban on all nuclear tests would likely preclude both sides from developing NDEWs.

Verification of a Test Ban

There is a large amount of evidence which suggests that the U.S. can confidently verify Soviet compliance with a nuclear test ban. Certainly the U.S. has the capability to verify the compliance

with at least a low threshold test ban which would prohibit all but the smallest nuclear explosions.

Today there is a consensus within the scientific community that a U.S. network of high-performance seismic stations positioned just outside the borders of the Soviet Union can detect all Soviet nuclear explosions in hard rock with yields above 1 kiloton (the equivalent explosive power of 1,000 tons of TNT). This consensus is reflected in an authoritative report issued in 1988 by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). OTA, a non-partisan analytical arm of Congress, concluded that with a dozen or so seismic arrays along Soviet borders the U.S. "can detect and identify underground nuclear explosions with yields below one kiloton if no attempt is made to evade the monitoring network."

This OTA assessment applies solely to the verification capability of a network of seismic arrays outside the Soviet Union. It does not reflect the broader verification capabilities of non-seismic means of verification and cooperative measures. If an external network is supplemented with seismic monitoring stations inside Soviet territory, reconnaissance and eavesdropping satellites, on-site inspections and data exchanges, many experts believe that the U.S. could confidently verify a complete ban on

nuclear testing even if attempts were made to evade the monitoring network.

Numerous Tests Needed

To create a reliable new nuclear warhead the Soviets would have to conduct a series of nuclear explosions, not just one or two. The U.S. usually conducts at least six tests for each new basic weapons design. The development of much more advanced directed-energy weapons and other "third generation" nuclear weapons could require several hundred tests. It would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to evade detection of an entire series of tests.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union would have a strong disincentive to cheat because it would be perceived by the international community as an untrustworthy and duplicitous negotiating partner if it were caught. The potentially high political costs of violating the treaty would far outweigh the marginal military benefits. Above all, the Soviets know that if they were caught cheating the U.S. would then resume testing.

Monitoring in U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union has recently demonstrated its willingness to allow the U.S. to install seismic stations in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has already permitted private American scientists, under the auspices of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), to set up five seismic monitoring stations in the Soviet Union.

On September 14, 1988, U.S. government officials were present at the Soviet test site to monitor a Soviet nuclear explosion. The Joint Verification Experiment (JVE), which also included Soviet observation of a U.S. test in Nevada, was intended to improve U.S. and Soviet capabilities for estimating the magnitude of each other's nuclear explosions. To this end the Soviet government allowed the U.S. offi-

cial to set up their own equipment at the test site to measure the size of the explosion. The JVE provides another example of Soviet willingness to allow highly intrusive on-site inspections in order to verify agreements on nuclear testing.

Soviet Compliance

In building its case against limits on nuclear testing the Reagan Administration accused the Soviet Union of "likely" violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), an agreement signed in 1974 which limits the yield of nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons. In 1987, however, the directors of the nation's two nuclear weapons labs testified before Congress that there is no clear-cut evidence that the Soviets have violated the TTBT. In 1988 the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) concluded that, based on the available data, Soviet nuclear testing has been "consistent" with the TTBT limit. Therefore, **the Reagan Administration's charge of Soviet cheating is not supported by the facts.**

On the contrary, it was clearly a politically motivated effort to cloud the debate, confuse Congress and the American public, and justify continued U.S. nuclear testing to build new weapons.

Stockpile Reliability

A test ban would not render existing U.S. nuclear weapons unreliable. The U.S. can insure the reliability of its nuclear stockpile through non-nuclear testing. In 1985 eight renowned nuclear weapon experts, including Norris Bradbury, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratories, told Congress:

"Continued nuclear testing is not necessary in order to insure the reliability of the nuclear weapons in our stockpile. The best way to confirm reliability is to disassemble sample weapons

and to subject the components to non-nuclear tests."

They added that, in the past, problems with nuclear weapons have been discovered and fixed without nuclear testing:

"Weapons can also be detonated without their nuclear components in order to insure that the complete assembly operates correctly. Nonexplosive tests are also available for determining whether the nuclear components have deteriorated during storage. If aging problems are found in some components, these components can be replaced with newly fabricated ones, using the original design specifications. In the past these techniques have identified a number of reliability problems. In no case was the discovery of a reliability problem dependent on a nuclear test and in no case would it have been necessary to conduct a nuclear test to remedy the problem."

A test ban would not prevent the U.S. from replacing old nuclear weapons in the stockpile because existing nuclear warhead designs can be remanufactured. In 1986 Admiral Sylvester Foley, then Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs, told Congress that "the remanufacture of existing, well tested warheads is possible." In a 1987 study, Ray Kidder, a senior scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, stated, "the nuclear weapons in the present U.S. stockpile are sufficiently robust to allow reliable replication, if necessary...It is concluded that the necessary materials and expertise required for the remanufacture of the existing stockpile can and will be available, and that remanufacture can be successfully accomplished."

Only a small fraction of U.S. nuclear tests are conducted for the purpose of maintaining stockpile reliability. According to the Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. conducted only 6 to 8 nuclear tests between 1970 and 1985 to "correct defects in stockpiled weapons." That is less than three percent of all the tests conducted during that period. Such a small number of tests cannot establish statistically meaningful measures of the reliability of the thousands of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. Furthermore, since

Soviet Unilateral Testing Moratorium

The Soviet Union began a unilateral nuclear testing moratorium on August 6, 1985 and refrained from testing until February 26, 1987. During that 19 month period, the United States, which refused to join in the moratorium, conducted a total of 26 nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is again prepared to stop nuclear testing any time that the United States stops testing.

such a small fraction of the tests are conducted for this purpose, it is obvious that DOE, which runs the U.S. nuclear testing program, does not consider such tests to be very significant.

Over a long period of time after the implementation of a test ban there would likely be a subtle but significant decrease in confidence in overall reliability in the nuclear stockpile. This would erode the very high degree of confidence required for a nation contemplating a "first strike" in which nuclear weapons would have to perform with tremendous precision.

A disarming first strike would require the sudden and swift destruction of the other side's nuclear forces, including its ICBMs, submarines in port, and bombers on the ground. Today's ICBMs are either in silos that have been reinforced with steel and concrete or are mobile. In either case their destruction requires attacking nuclear warheads to detonate very close to the ICBMs with great explosive power. Submarines and bombers, of course, are mobile and must be destroyed before they can escape attack.

Retaliating against cities and industrial facilities is a far easier task since these targets are not hardened to withstand nuclear blasts and do not move. Therefore, the lesser degree of confidence required for effective retaliation would not be significantly affected by a nuclear test ban.

A FLIGHT TEST BAN

Following a nuclear test ban the U.S. and the Soviet Union could agree to ban or limit flight testing of new ballistic missiles. Once the development of new nuclear warheads is stopped, the political climate will be more conducive to the signing of an agreement to stop the development of new ballistic missiles.

Precedents

There are several precedents for new U.S.-Soviet arms agreements to restrict flight testing: the ABM treaty prohibits testing of ABM interceptor missiles on mobile launchers; SALT II prohibited testing of more than one new type of ICBM; and the

INF treaty bans flight testing of land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

The U.S. has proposed flight testing limits in past and present negotiations on strategic arms. The U.S. first proposed flight testing limits to the Soviet Union in January 1958 when President Eisenhower wrote to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin proposing a halt to the testing of missiles in outer space. As part of its initial SALT II proposal the Carter Administration proposed a limit on the number of ICBM and SLBM flight tests permitted per year. In the START negotiations the U.S. is currently proposing a ban on the flight testing of all heavy ballistic missiles.

A FLIGHT TEST BAN IS NOT A NEW IDEA

"A ban on the testing of long-range missiles, if put into effect within six months, might prevent the development of a Soviet operational ICBM capability... it might prove to be in our interest to propose such a ban."

John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
May 2, 1958

Congress has also passed legislation limiting flight testing. It prohibited the flight testing of U.S. anti-satellite weapons against objects in space from FY86 through FY88. This prohibition was contingent on the Soviets continuing to refrain from such tests (the Soviets have not conducted any antisatellite tests since 1982). In 1988 Congress approved legislation, also based on Soviet reciprocity, prohibiting the U.S. from conducting ballistic missile flight tests with lower-than-normal trajectories that reduce warning time (the bill containing this legislation was vetoed by then President Reagan).

Benefits

A ban on ballistic missile flight testing would reduce fears that the other side is developing the ability to carry out a disarming first strike. It would accomplish this by making it difficult to develop new missiles with pinpoint accuracy and shorter flight times and by reducing

confidence in the reliability of existing missiles to destroy the other side's retaliatory forces. Leaders contemplating a first strike would be less likely to make a decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis because they would not be confident that their weapons would perform with the precision required to prevent the other side from retaliating in a devastating fashion.

Effect on Soviet Missiles

A flight test ban would make it extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to develop new ICBMs with enough accuracy to destroy hardened underground military facilities such as ICBM silos and command and control installations. According to former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, the Soviets' two newest ICBMs, the SS-24 and the SS-25, lack the accuracy to destroy hardened targets. In September 1988 he told Congress, "the SS-24 and SS-25 are presently suited most appropriately to soft and medium hard targets--rather than hard targets--due to lower accuracies and reliability." A flight test ban would impede Soviet efforts to improve the accuracy of the SS-24 and the SS-25 to the point where they have the capability to destroy hard targets. The only long-range missile the Soviet Union has today with apparent hard target capability is the SS-18 and the Soviets have agreed to cut the number of these missiles in half as part of a START treaty.

A flight test ban could also prevent the Soviet Union from developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with sufficient accuracy to destroy very hard U.S. targets. In return the United States would probably have to limit the deployment of the new Trident II SLBM which has already been tested and will have "silo busting" accuracy. The Trident II is scheduled to become initially operational in December 1989.

Preventing the Soviets from developing "hard target kill" SLBMs is particularly important because of the short flight times of SLBMs. Because Soviet SLBMs could be launched close to U.S. borders, they could hit their targets in under 15 minutes. The development of Soviet hard target kill SLBMs would therefore allow the Soviet Union to target

U.S. ICBMs and bombers simultaneously in a surprise attack. This is a capability the Soviets do not have today. As mentioned above, the only weapon that the Soviets have today that has the accuracy and destructive power to destroy U.S. silos is the SS-18 ICBM. The SS-18's flight time to the United States, however, would be about 30 minutes. This would allow more than enough time for U.S. bombers to receive early warning of an attack and get off the ground before the SS-18's warheads landed. Therefore, only a new hard target kill Soviet SLBM could potentially threaten both U.S. bombers and ICBMs simultaneously.

A flight test ban would not only make it difficult for the Soviet Union to increase the accuracy of its existing ICBMs and SLBMs, it would virtually prevent the Soviets from developing new ballistic missiles with first strike accuracy.

Benefits of a Missile Flight Test Ban

"On balance the danger from continued testing clearly outweighs the benefit. Missile tests are good things...when they lead to better and more reliable U.S. missiles. But when they lead to quicker, more lethal, and more reliable Soviet missiles, tests are not good things.

"[It is not enough to ask] what American missile reliability can do for us. We must ask what Soviet missile reliability can do to us. Perfect reliability means a perfectly reliable Soviet first strike against our silos and bombers. Suppose both sides had perfectly reliable, perfectly accurate, and very quick weapons. If the Soviets fired first, their reliable weapons would turn our reliable weapons to ashes...The idea of deterrence through bilateral weapon unreliability runs counter to everyday experience, and takes some getting used to. It's valid nevertheless."

William Colby
Former Director of the CIA
November 14, 1987

Arms Reductions and Missile Accuracy

It is widely assumed that nuclear war plans call for two warheads per hardened target. For example, it is

assumed that in a first strike, the Soviet Union would use 2,000 warheads against 1,000 U.S. ICBM silos. If a START treaty is concluded, it might result in the U.S. retaining a smaller number of silos than it has today but it would not impede the Soviet Union from developing more accurate ballistic missiles.

If the Soviets were to develop a missile with such accuracy that they could confidently allocate only one warhead per silo, and the U.S. reduced the number of its silos to comply with the provisions of a START treaty, then the treaty might actually have the unintended effect of making a disarming Soviet first strike more, not less, plausible. A flight test ban would benefit the U.S. by preventing the development of Soviet missiles with accuracy sufficient to destroy silos with only one warhead.

Benefits of a Partial Ban

Given the predictably strong political opposition in the Pentagon to a total flight test ban, it may be difficult to achieve such an agreement soon. In the near term, however, certain mutually beneficial, partial restrictions on flight testing could be achieved. These restrictions could provide the foundation for a total flight test ban in the future.

Specific flight testing restrictions could prevent the development of many dangerous new technologies. For example, such limits could prevent both nations from developing missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) that could home in on their targets with pinpoint precision. Test restrictions could also prevent the development of SLBMs with lower-than-normal trajectories that could reach targets faster and reduce warning time. Finally, a ban on the flight testing of all MIRVed missiles could lower confidence in the reliability of existing MIRVed missiles and encourage a move toward single-warhead missiles.

MARVs

A ban on the flight testing of precision guided maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs) would serve the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

MARVs, unlike today's nuclear warheads, would be able to change their course as they streak down toward their targets. A MARV, after being released from the "bus" of its ballistic missile and traveling through space, would reenter the atmosphere and, using advanced sensor technology, home in on its target with extremely high accuracy.

Tests of the first U.S. long-range homing MARVs could begin in the early-to-mid 1990s. There is no evidence that the Soviets have begun testing MARVs but it has been reported that they are expected to do so in the next few years. Therefore, the implementation of a MARV flight test ban would prevent the development of this dangerous new technology on both sides.

Depressed Trajectory

A ban of the flight testing of SLBMs with "depressed trajectories" would also ease fears of a disarming surprise attack. A missile in a depressed trajectory takes a lower-than-normal flight path. As a result, such missiles arrive at their targets much faster than those taking a normal flight path. This means that missiles launched in a depressed trajectory from Soviet submarines stationed 1,000 nautical miles off the U.S. coast could arrive at bomber airfields in five minutes rather than in 13 minutes cutting warning time by more than half. Therefore, U.S. bombers, which even with early warning require at least 6 to 8 minutes to get safely airborne, might not be able to take off before the Soviet missiles arrived. Depressed trajectory SLBMs could also pose a threat to command and control facilities and mobile ICBMs.

Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has extensively tested ballistic missiles in a depressed trajectory. Last year the U.S. Navy told Congress that a ban on depressed trajectory SLBMs would be "a non-intrusive limitation...acceptable for U.S. strategic system flight tests." While it appears that the U.S. Navy has no intention of testing SLBMs in a depressed trajectory, the House Armed Services Committee reported in 1988 that "there are some indications of Soviet plans" to conduct such missile tests.

Now is the time to nip depressed trajectory testing in the bud. Depressed trajectory missiles make no sense for a retaliatory strike: they have shorter range and require more fuel than missiles with normal flight paths. Depressed trajectory SLBMs, however, would be well suited for a surprise attack. By cutting early warning time in half, the aggressor could carry out a surprise attack and potentially undercut the other side's ability to retaliate effectively. A ban on all depressed trajectory flight testing would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

MIRVs

It would make sense to ban all further MIRV flight testing. MIRVs, by providing a single ballistic missile with the capability to destroy numerous land-based retaliatory missiles, make a disarming first strike more plausible. Therefore, the extensive deployment of MIRVed missiles could put U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces on a hair-trigger during a crisis, increasing pressure on leaders to launch a preemptive strike.

A MIRV flight test ban would reduce confidence in the reliability of existing MIRVs over time and thus would discourage a decision to attempt a surprise attack. If accompanied by an arms reduction agreement, such as a START treaty, a MIRV flight test ban would also give both countries an incentive to reduce the number of MIRVed missiles and put more emphasis on less threatening single-warhead missiles.

Soviet Interest in a Flight Test Ban

In September 1987 a congressional delegation led by Congressman Tom Downey (D-NY) visited the Soviet Union and inspected a Soviet radar installation near the city of Krasnoyarsk. During this visit members of the delegation discussed a flight test ban, among other proposals, with Soviet arms control specialists. Upon its return the delegation reported to Congress that "all [of these proposals] at-

tracted substantial positive interest from the Soviet side."

There are additional indications that the Soviets may be interested in limits on missile flight testing. In the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets reportedly said they might consider a ban on depressed trajectory missiles if the agreement included limits on how close ballistic missile submarines could come to each other's borders. In 1987, Soviet scientists released a report calling attention to the "danger" of MARVs. They asserted that the development of MARVs "could foster...illusions with regard to the feasibility of waging a 'limited' nuclear war."

Verification of a Flight Test Ban

The U.S. could verify Soviet compliance with either a total or partial ban on ballistic missile flight testing. The Senate hearings on the INF treaty made this clear. After hearing witnesses from the intelligence community, the Defense Department, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Select Intelligence committee reported that if the Soviets violated the INF treaty by flight testing the missiles covered under the treaty, the violation would be "readily detectable." Certainly it would be easier to verify a flight test ban on even larger strategic missiles being tested at much greater ranges, fully observable by a network of U.S. satellites and radars.

Discouraging Evasion

One way of trying to circumvent flight test ban limits would be through clandestine testing of ballistic missile components in permitted space program launches. Although such tests might provide information about certain components of ballistic missiles, it would not be the same as testing the missile as a complete, integrated system. In addition, there are ways to make circumvention of a flight test ban more difficult. The U.S. and the Soviet Union could: 1) define differences in trajectories between strategic missiles and space launches; 2) require space launches to use different types of booster rock-

ets than those used for strategic missiles; 3) announce all space launches in advance; 4) confine all launches to established areas; and 5) explain the nature and purpose of each launch. These measures would make it extremely difficult to cheat on an agreement limiting ballistic missile flight testing.

A FLIGHT TEST BAN CAN BE VERIFIED

"The probability that the U.S. would detect a single Soviet flight test is certainly higher than 90 percent, given the variety of means the U.S. has to detect these tests. At least 20 tests are required to determine with confidence the accuracy of a new missile. Therefore, even if the U.S. can be confident that it can detect the test of a Soviet ballistic missile only 90 percent of the time, its chances of not detecting one of the 20 Soviet tests is only one in 100 billion billion. In short, a treaty banning ballistic-missile testing altogether could be confidently verified."

Dr. Kosta Tsipis
Director of MIT's Program in Science and Technology for International Security
March 1985

TAKING THE INITIATIVE

It took two and a half years to negotiate the SALT I Interim agreement, seven more years to negotiate the unratified SALT II treaty, and over six years (so far) to negotiate the prospective START treaty. Not one of these three is now in force and even if they were, they would not prevent either side from developing new nuclear weapons systems. Clearly, these negotiations have not resulted in effective constraints on the nuclear arms competition.

It is time for the United States to take the initiative. The first essential step is a U.S. decision to stop nuclear testing. The Soviets are already on record as stating that they will stop testing as soon as the United States does. A U.S. initiative would demonstrate that the United States is genuinely ready to start a process to halt 40 years of nuclear arms competition.

Conclusions

- The development of new, more destructive U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons could be slowed and ultimately stopped through a series of initiatives by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- A U.S. decision to stop all nuclear test explosions would be quickly followed by a similar cessation in the U.S.S.R.
- A ban on all nuclear test explosions would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war.
- A ban on U.S. and U.S.S.R. flight tests of ballistic missiles would stop the development of dangerous, new first strike missiles in both countries.

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SANE/ALASKA

**Working For Peace, Justice
and Global Security**

An affiliate of SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for Global Security

(1,000+ members)

What is SANE/Alaska?

SANE/Alaska is a non-profit activist/educational organization formed in 1982 under the name Citizens Against Nuclear War. In 1987, SANE/Alaska affiliated with SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for Global Security, the largest peace and disarmament group in the nation, with over 180,000 members. SANE/Alaska has over 1,000 paid members from Barrow to Ketchikan.

In 1982, SANE/Alaska successfully sponsored Nuclear Weapons Freeze initiatives in Anchorage and Juneau. In August 1986, Alaskan voters approved our ballot initiative making the promotion of a mutual and verifiable Nuclear Weapons Freeze the official policy of the state. The initiative was endorsed by Gov. Walter Hickel, Gov. Bill Sheffield, Gov. Steve Cowper, Mayor Tony Knowles, Sen. Arliss Sturgulewski and Dick Randolph.

SANE/Alaska's mission is to help organize Alaskans into a citizens movement to reverse the arms race, abolish nuclear weapons and construct a world of peace, justice and respect for the environment.

A major goal of SANE/Alaska is to secure a "peace dividend" targeted for human needs, new infrastructure development and environmental protection. SANE/Alaska also educates and lobbies for federal legislation to assist local communities with the post-Cold-War transition from a military dependent economy to a peace economy.

In addition to public education projects on peace, SANE/Alaska has actively supported resolutions in the Alaska State Legislature promoting the negotiation of a mutual and verifiable nuclear-free arctic treaty between Arctic nations. Since March 1987, SANE/Alaska has worked to prevent air shipments of deadly bomb-grade Japanese plutonium through Alaskan airspace, a serious threat to the state's people and environment.

The group has also supported legislation in the Alaska State Legislature to ban the sale of irradiated food in Alaska until peer-reviewed scientific research proves that the process is safe (food irradiation is already illegal in three states and several countries). SANE's latest special project involves researching Alaska's Permanent Fund stock holdings to establish a socially responsible investment policy.

SANE/Alaska has an office in Anchorage and employs a full-time director, occasional project coordinators and student interns year round. For more information about SANE/Alaska or to get involved, call 272-0621.

SANE/FREEZE Gulf War Actions: What You Can Do

1) Write letters to the editor and call in to talk shows. It's not too late to stop the fighting and to save lives. We demand an immediate cease-fire, a negotiated resolution that prevents further out-breaks and lays the groundwork for real peace in the region, and the convening of an international peace conference to resolve all conflicts in the region. We are expressing support for the troops by calling for an end to the fighting. "Stop fighting, start talking." The war will end in some kind of negotiation sooner or later. Let us save lives by making it sooner.

2) Organize demonstrations. Have people bring candles, American flags and flowers to erect a shrine to those killed. This will be a time for both mourning and protest. Encourage the participation of religious and labor leaders as well as elected officials. Arrange for the ringing of church bells.

3) Encourage continued negotiations toward a swift, peaceful settlement now that war has begun. Ask your Congressperson what he or is doing to end the war now.

4) This conflict could cost up to three billion dollars per day (*Washington Post*, 1-15-91), money we cannot afford to waste. Demand that the cost of the war start coming out of the Pentagon budget.

5) Keep the phone lines busy. The White House comment line is (202) 456-1111, and the State Department Public Affairs line is (202) 647-6575.

6) Consider civil disobedience at home offices of members of your Congressional delegation who voted for the authorization of the use of force.

7) Support our troops by donating blood to SANE/Alaska's Gulf Blood Drive. In Anchorage, call the Blood Bank of Alaska, 563-3110 to set up an appointment. Let us know you donated.

SANE/FREEZE Calls for CTB at U.N.

(Note: What follows is the January 9 testimony of Cora Weiss, the International Representative of SANE/FREEZE before the Amendment Conference for a Comprehensive Test Ban at the United Nations in New York City.)

My name is Cora Weiss. I am the International Representative of SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for Global Security. We are an organization of 130,000 members with 241 affiliates in 40 of the United States. Our national office is in Washington, DC and we have an International Office in New York City which maintains working relations with colleague organizations all around the world and as an NGO with the United Nations.

SANE/FREEZE is the largest peace and justice organization in the U.S. It is our history and commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons that brings us before you today. SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, was founded to prevent nuclear testing in the 50s. The Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze emerged in the 80s calling for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons. In 1961, SANE worked with women's organizations in building public pressure for the treaty to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

It is appropriate therefore that today I am also representing women for Meaningful Summits, a network of women's organizations and individuals dedicated to the elimination of nuclear weapons, reversing the arms race, and helping governments understand the need to have women in decision making positions whenever the fate of the earth is on the table.

Mr. President, with your permission, I should like to address my own government as well as all the others assembled here.

I would like to tell you that there is no public support in our country for nuclear testing. SANE/FREEZE members have marched in the Nevada desert and have been arrested to bring the horrors of testing to public attention.

As we sit here today the world sits on the edge of its chair frightened about the consequences of the most rapid deployment of military force since the Vietnam War in the Middle East. One of the reasons offered by our administration in an attempt to justify this outrageous military build-up is to eliminate the military and nuclear capability of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

A test ban is a first and major step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and until nuclear weapons are eliminated every dictator, every Saddam Hussein will want one. Thus, we must make it impossible for other nations to try to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

As long as work proceeds on nuclear weapons anywhere in the world such weapons will spread like a cancer and thus must be excised.

Weapons of mass destruction are not compatible with the "new world order" that President Bush would like us to support. According to series of United Nations resolutions and highly respected international lawyers the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity. Thus the use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international law. And we know that the concept of international law is being increasingly invoked in Washington.

I would like to speak mother to mother, parent to parent. In 1961, two of our children were infants. They were just losing their baby teeth. A research doctor at Washington University in St. Louis, MO was testing babies teeth for the presence of Strontium 90 the deadly cancer-making component of nuclear weapons. At that time the Soviet Union and the United States were testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and the radiation fallout was polluting the grass that cows ate. Mothers were feeding the babies milk laced with this deadly element. That's all that we needed to know. Thousands of American mothers organized to protest nuclear testing and when President Kennedy signed the treaty he recognized (continued on page 13)

(CTB - continued from page 12)

the persuasive role that the women played in educating and activating public opinion. Pushing nuclear testing underground may have put it out of sight, but lethal fallout continues to pollute the earth and the water supply. You might want to take a trip "downwind" of the nuclear test sites in this country so that you can meet the widows and widowers, the victims of thyroid cancer, the victims of leukemia, breast cancer and cancer of the prostate in abnormal numbers.

Evidence is available of the accidental venting of underground tests in Nevada since 1961 which have released as much deadly activity into the atmosphere as did the Chernobyl accident which is thought to have accounted for 10 percent of all previous radiation releases.

Andrei Sakharov, a hero of the American people, worried about the biological effects of Soviet H-bomb tests calculated that as many as 1 million persons will die worldwide for every 50,000 kilotons of radioactivity released. Sakharov's formula implies that the deaths of 14 million persons can be associated with an estimated 700,000 kilotons of radioactivity that have been released since 1945 from testing and accidents such as Chernobyl. The damage to health alone would be reason enough to support a comprehensive test ban.

We believe that the majority of you sitting here today and during these two weeks of conference agree that the time to end nuclear testing is now. It is to Mrs. Hoinkes, the head of the U.S. delegation, and as an American, I would like to include Mr. Kenyon of the United Kingdom, that we must address our remarks. If you agree that nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won then why, pray tell, do you insist on having more nuclear weapons and more sophisticated nuclear weapons? If you didn't want more, you would agree to stop testing.

If you are afraid that nuclear weapons may soon be in the hands of more states, now known as non-nuclear states, then how do you explain the contradiction in opposing the ban on all testing which would stop the spread and future development of such weapons. How will we teach our children to be consistent if our governments are so dangerously inconsistent? All over the world people are questioning the decay of moral values. If governments don't behave morally, surely their citizens cannot be expected to behave morally.

What unites all of us in this room, no matter the flag of our nation, is our susceptibility to deadly diseases from the leakage of nuclear testing whether it is in the South Pacific, in the Soviet arctic or the American West. We could all be lying side by side in a hospital and our political differences would not protect us from lying side by side in a cemetery.

The members of SANE/FREEZE and of Women for Meaningful Summits whom I represent today also ask that you make every effort to establish a continuing mechanism to work out the details of a Comprehensive Test Ban. We believe that such a working committee might be a special sub-committee of the Con-

ference of Disarmament and that all 118 states should support such a mechanism. That will be the only way to guarantee that by 1995, or sooner, the world will rejoice at the announcement that nuclear testing has ended once and for all.

Mrs. Hoinkes, your administration cannot look the public in the eye and ignore our opinion. You, as a woman, as a mother, as an intellectual, should not let yourself be used in such a deadly political act. We count on you to represent public opinion. Tell President Bush and Secretary Baker to support an end to all nuclear testing.

In the year 2020 your kids will be your age. What kind of world will you pass on to them? Spend 20 minutes a month protecting your children's future.

Have more good intentions than free time? Every month we'll find you the best 20-minute action you can take at home to urge policy-makers to cut military waste and meet crucial environmental and human needs. We'll send you our monthly action recommendation on a postcard with all the information you need. And every six months we'll send you a brief report on the results of the actions you take.

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TWO SIDES OF PATRIOTISM



JIM LAVRAKAS / ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS

Christopher Toal, a patriot against war: "I saw the real need for an activist, loyal opposition movement in this state."



JIM LAVRAKAS / ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS

Larry Burgess, a patriot against Iraq: "We're not supporting the war necessarily, but if it takes a war to get rid of a tyrant, then that's what we have to do."

Gulf between demonstrators

Local organizers say timing, not patriotism, puts them at odds

By LARRY CAMPBELL P.A-6
Daily News reporter

Larry Burgess doesn't like war. No one really does, he thinks. But he's always felt that "freedom isn't free. There's a price to pay."

Christopher Toal doesn't like war, either. He thinks there are such things as just wars, but the current battle in the Persian Gulf isn't it — especially when you see kids going hungry and we spend billions on the B-2 bomber. You've got to ask, "What's wrong with this picture?"

Burgess is one of the organizers of the Alaska Support Rally. Saturday, his group pulled together 400 or so people at Delaney Park Strip to show support for American troops in the gulf.

Toal is executive director of SANE/Alaska, the local affiliate of a nationwide peace organization. His group says it also supports the troops, but has shown it through peace demonstrations since the air war began more than a month ago.

Both men say they want the military men and women to come home swiftly and safely. But as the United States began sending troops overseas late last year, battle lines formed on the home front, too. Both Burgess and Toal swear allegiance to the flag, and they're willing to acknowledge each other's patriotism. But they admit they don't really understand each other.

Burgess is 52, married, with children. He's a project coordinator for Chugach Electric Association. He's an Air Force veteran, having done engineering work from 1956 to 1960.

He said Saturday's support rally helps send images to men and women overseas that they need to see from home. War is a necessary evil, but those forced to fight shouldn't feel alone.

"We're not supporting the war necessarily," he said. "But if it takes a war to get rid of a tyrant, then that's what we have to do. I would love to say, 'Let's stop.' But people like Saddam, who says he idolized Hitler, people like that are ruthless. They have to be stopped."

Toal is 38, single and devotes his

"If we could just get past the name-calling. They're not warmongers and we're not flag burners. If we could agree on that, we'd get a long way."

— Christopher Toal

time nowadays to leading the SANE/Alaska cause. When he was younger, Toal was a welder and mined coal in Colorado. He was passed over in the draft lottery in the early 1970s, when the war in Vietnam was still raging.

Toal's travels around the country have taken him through America's biggest cities, now decaying with poverty. He says those visions never made sense to him, and became his examples of military spending taking priority over social policy.

He came to Alaska and earned a psychology degree from University of Alaska Anchorage in the mid-1980s. That was when the activist bug really bit him.

"A class called 'Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Policy' really opened my eyes to national security issues," Toal said. "I saw the real need for an activist, loyal opposition movement in this state."

Like a crusader, Toal attacks President Bush, his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, and a decade of Republican foreign policy that included aligning America with leaders like Saddam Hussein of Iraq. At speaking engagements or rallies, Toal is like a champion debater, armed with scores of statistics and a recall of diplomatic history.

"I do my homework," he said. "You can't make your point if you don't know what you're talking about."

For Burgess, it comes down to trusting news reports and world leaders.

"Deep down, in my heart, if what I read and hear is true, I do not

approve of what Saddam is doing," Burgess said. "And it's not just Bush in this thing. If it was, I might even question what's going on. But the U.N. coalition is in this. They can't all be wrong."

Toal agrees Saddam should be stopped, but he also thinks the policy-makers can be wrong. Economic sanctions could have starved Saddam out of Kuwait, he says, but perhaps not in time to keep the issue out of the next presidential election.

Burgess doesn't deny that politics may be playing more than a fair part in policy decision-making, "but even if it is all political, Saddam still has to be stopped."

Now that America is in the gulf, he says, the fight should be finished before troops are pulled out. Toal instead points to last week's Soviet peace proposals, and believes a successful cease-fire agreement could end war while an acceptable settlement is negotiated.

But one of the deepest divisions between the two men is the question of timing — is now really the time to debate any of this, while troops are in harm's way?

These two avowed patriots don't agree. Burgess says scenes from home of anti-war demonstrations hurt troop morale. The demonstrators, he believes, should instead be thanking God for the people who died in past battles to protect the right to protest.

Toal, however, believes the troops can understand that his side supports them even as it opposes the policies that put them in the gulf. His group backs a congressional measure called the Persian Gulf Bill of Rights, which would provide \$2 billion of economic aid to service members and their families and a \$10,000 bonus for returning reservists.

But such details haven't been discussed between the two sides in the weeks of demonstrations. Instead, the two groups hold their own rallies, always four blocks apart.

"If we could just get past the name-calling," Toal said. "They're not warmongers and we're not flag burners. If we could agree on that, we'd get a long way."

STATE OF ALASKA

Passed (58.4%)

8-26-86

THE BILL TO BE INITIATED

BY INITIATIVE

A BILL

FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
NUCLEAR FREEZE AS THE POLICY OF THE STATE."

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

SECTION 1. DECLARATION OF POLICY. IT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE OF
ALASKA:

- (1) TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE GREATEST CHALLENGE FACING THE EARTH IS TO
PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN;
- (2) TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IS DANGEROUSLY
INCREASING THE RISK OF A HOLOCAUST THAT WOULD BE HUMANITY'S FINAL
WAR;
- (3) TO PROMOTE A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE BILATERAL NUCLEAR FREEZE
FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WARHEAD, MISSILES, AND OTHER
DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO
REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

SECTION 2. IMPLEMENTATION. (A) THE GOVERNOR SHALL CONDUCT THE AFFAIRS
OF STATE AND CARRY OUT STATE PROGRAMS IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS POLICY.

(B) THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR SHALL DELIVER
COPIES OF THIS ACT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. THIS INITIATIVE SHALL BE EFFECTIVE WHEN
ENACTED ACCORDING TO LAW.

SAFETY NO BARRIER TO TEST BAN

By RAY E. KIDDER

**Older, less safe weapons are being retired or retrofitted—
and nearly all of the most important weapon safety
improvements can be made without nuclear testing.**

This brief report was prepared in response to a letter of July 17, 1990, by the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, requesting an assessment of the safety of U.S. nuclear warheads with particular attention to the extent to which additional nuclear explosive tests might be needed to further improve their safety. Chairman Fascell's letter contained five questions concerning this issue that I have attempted to answer as follows:

Are our nuclear weapons safe?

The safety record of our nuclear weapons has been remarkably good. The nuclear safety record of our nuclear weapons has been perfect. In the 45-year history of nuclear weapons there has never been an accident which produced any nuclear yield. There have been only two accidents in which the [conventional] high explosive (HE) contained in the nuclear warhead detonated: the 1966 accident in Palomares, Spain, and the 1968 accident in Thule, Greenland, both involving B-52 aircraft. These detonations would probably not have occurred if the warheads had contained insensitive high explosive (IHE) instead of conventional HE, and could not have occurred had it been the practice not to allow nuclear weapons to be airborne in peacetime.

As you know, questions have recently been raised concerning the safety of three of our artillery-fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs): the W48, W79, and W82. These projectiles do not entirely satisfy existing requirements for nuclear safety. They can be rendered safe by means of a retrofit that does not necessitate further nuclear tests. In the meanwhile, it is my understanding that they have been rendered safe by other effective means. In the longer term, given the reunification of Germany and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, it seems likely that our overseas AFAPs can be returned to the United States and placed in storage.

Questions have also been raised concerning the safety of the SRAM-A

[short-range attack missile], with the result that it has been removed from alert aircraft pending a safety review. It is intended that the SRAM-A warhead (W69) be replaced with the SRAM-II warhead (W89) currently under development, a modern warhead that employs IHE and enjoys special fire-resistant features. I believe that the perceived safety problem with the W69 could, if deemed necessary, be fixed by retrofit without requiring a nuclear test. An alternative to retrofit would be to keep the SRAM-A off of Strategic Air Command alert aircraft and out of harm's way until it can be replaced and retired.

There has been some criticism of the fact that the W88 warhead for the Trident II D5 missile does not employ IHE. It is clear that the safety of the D5 missile would be improved if the W88 warheads were replaced with warheads employing IHE. Safety tests that have been conducted to date suggest that while such improvement is not without merit, it is not necessary to meet current safety requirements.


More than half of the nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile were designed 20 years ago or more, and do

not have some of the important electrical, nuclear, and plutonium-dispersal safety features of modern weapons. This is not to say that they are unsafe, but clearly their safety is not up to modern standards. The majority of these old-timers are due for retirement without replacement. Of those that will be replaced, the majority will be replaced by modern warheads already in stockpile. Those remaining will be replaced with weapons currently under development, these latter requiring only a modest number of nuclear tests before being ready for production.

The safety of the existing stockpile needs improvement. But with an appropriate schedule of retirement, retrofit, and replacement of older weapons with the more modern weapons currently in stockpile or under development, the safety of the U.S. stockpile will be well assured; particularly so if the transport of nuclear weapons by air in peacetime is prohibited.

Do we need to increase the number of nuclear tests we conduct to ensure the safety of our nuclear arsenal? Or, do we need to increase the number of nuclear tests we conduct only for the relevant programs in question?

Ray E. Kidder is a nuclear weapons physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in Livermore, California. Views expressed are the author's alone.



U.S. AIR FORCE

The SRAM-A, shown here being loaded on a bomber during a training exercise, has been withdrawn from active service because it does not use insensitive non-nuclear explosives.

No significant increase, beyond the modest number of nuclear tests required by weapons currently under development, is needed to ensure the safety of our nuclear arsenal.

With respect to those nuclear weapon systems whose safety has been recently called into question, effective corrective measures can be or have been taken that do not require any significant increase in nuclear tests. The AFAPs are now one-point safe. (The condition known as "nuclear one-point safety" is satisfied if, given that detonation of the warhead's HE has taken place at any one point, there is less than one chance in a million of obtaining a nuclear yield exceeding that equivalent to four pounds of HE.) SRAM-A will presumably be replaced by SRAM II. Should a decision be made to replace the W88 warheads in the D5 missile, which does not seem likely at this time, a replacement could be made that would require no more than one or two additional nuclear tests. A further decision to replace the third-stage propellant in the D5 missile

with a less hazardous, non-detonatable variety would require missile tests, but no nuclear tests.

Are there ways to deal with the warhead safety question other than through nuclear testing?

There are a number of ways. Improvements can be made in the conditions and operating procedures associated with the storage, transport, and deployment of the weapons. For example, the transportation of nuclear weapons by air could be prohibited in peacetime, as well as their deployment aboard alert aircraft that are in close proximity to operating runways. Aircraft carrying nuclear weapons present the greatest risk of a serious nuclear accident because an airplane crash will subject the nuclear warheads to both violent impact and intense heat of burning missile propellant and jet fuel. Should U.S. land-based nuclear weapons be withdrawn from all overseas bases not directly accessible by sea, air transport of these weapons would not be needed.

Should we add insensitive high explosives to all our nuclear weapons? If so, why?

It has been modern practice to employ IHE in all nuclear bombs and missiles that are deployed aboard aircraft because of the possibility of severe impact and fire stated above. It has not been the practice to employ IHE in the warheads of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), one reason being the less hazardous, more benign environment they enjoy. These practices are supported by the accident record. There have been several aircraft accidents in which fire and impact have led to some dispersal of plutonium, an extremely hazardous radioactive material. There have been no accidents with SLBMs that have resulted in plutonium dispersal of which I am aware. The current exemption of SLBM warheads from the requirement to use IHE carries with it, however, an obligation to observe correspondingly more stringent precautions in the handling, loading, and

deployment of these warheads.

None of the many types of nuclear weapons that entered the stockpile prior to 1979 are equipped with IHE. However, with the exception of three ICBM types (Minuteman II and two types of Minuteman IIIs) and one SLBM type (Trident I C4), all of these older weapons will be either retired, or replaced with modern weapons equipped with IHE. This program of retirement and replacement will accomplish the result of adding IHE to all our nuclear weapons (with three exceptions noted) in the normal course of events. No additional nuclear tests will be needed beyond the modest number required by weapons currently under development.

A means of improving nuclear weapon safety that does not involve the use of IHE and does not require nuclear tests is to upgrade the arming, fuzing, and firing components of our older nuclear warheads to meet modern requirements of electrical safety. These components are sufficiently external to the nuclear package that changes in them can be made without influencing the nuclear performance of the warhead, so that nuclear explosive tests are not needed.

The pace at which the safety of the stockpile is brought up to modern standards could be increased by accelerating the retirement of those weapons that are not planned to be replaced, and by increasing the electrical and nuclear safety of those weapons scheduled for replacement by means of retrofits that would require few if any nuclear tests. During the interval of time before replacement or retirement, an effective means of assuring the nuclear safety of these older weapons would be to equip them with mechanical safing. Such means can assure safety with respect to detonation at a single point (one-point safety) or at any number of points (multi-point safety), and have been in successful use for more than 20 years.

What advantages are there to reconfiguring our nuclear testing program so that instead of matching specific warheads to specific delivery vehicles, we make our warheads more interchangeable with our delivery vehicles? How costly is this? Would the need to conduct nuclear tests be reduced if we reconfigured our nuclear testing program in this way?



Atomic artillery shells, about the size of this conventional Copperhead projectile, may be unsafe. But they will surely be withdrawn from Europe where they have been deployed.

Existing nuclear warheads can be repackaged and incorporated into new delivery vehicles for which they were not originally designed, provided that they will not be required to cope with unacceptably more-stressing conditions in their stockpile-to-target sequence. In this sense, they are already interchangeable. The W84 and W85 warheads that have been salvaged from the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II, eliminated by the recent treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles, are examples of warheads with modern safety features that could be repackaged for use in other weapon systems. The same would be true of many other types of weapons in the current stockpile.

In addition to repackaging existing warheads for use in new delivery vehicles, it is possible to retrofit existing warheads, or to modify warheads in development, for use in existing delivery vehicles other than those for which the warheads were originally designed. An example of the latter possibility would be to modify the SRAM II W89 warheads so that they could replace the W88 warheads now deployed in the Trident II D5 missile. The D5 would then enjoy the advanced safety features of the W89 warhead without requiring significant alteration itself.

Repackaging or retrofitting an existing warhead for a new application eliminates the costs associated with designing, engineering, developing, and testing a new warhead. Depending on the circumstances, production costs may also be reduced. Repackaging or retrofitting therefore can reduce both the cost and the number of nuclear tests that are needed to field a new weapon system capability.

The constraints imposed by restriction to an existing warhead, as opposed to the greater flexibility afforded by a new warhead, are the price one must pay for these savings in cost and reductions in nuclear tests. The cost-benefit comparison will of course be strongly influenced by the difficult-to-quantify benefits of a reduction in nuclear testing.

To conclude, the safety of the existing stockpile of nuclear weapons needs improvement. But with an appropriate schedule of retirement, retrofit, and replacement of older weapons with more modern weapons currently in stockpile or under development, the safety of the U.S. stockpile will be well assured. No significant increase beyond the modest number of nuclear tests required by weapons currently under development is needed to accomplish this result.

The safety of nuclear warheads could be still further improved by utilizing the concept of "separable components" in which the warhead's plutonium and HE are physically separated from each other until the warhead is to be armed. Such a design would virtually eliminate the possibility of plutonium dispersal and would also ensure nuclear safety. Implementation of these safety benefits, however, would be a major and protracted undertaking requiring a very large number of nuclear tests. The cost-benefit aspect of such an undertaking is questionable in view of both the performance penalties that would be paid and its strongly adverse implications for nuclear arms control.

A recurrent theme of this assessment has been the improvement in the safety of our nuclear weapons that would result if their transport by air or their deployment aboard aircraft in close proximity to operating runways were prohibited in peacetime. Given the relaxation in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe that such safety measures deserve serious consideration. ■



Council For A Livable World

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Comprehensive Test Ban

In 1982 the Reagan Administration formally announced that it would not reopen Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty negotiations which were started in the Carter Administration. In August 1985 the Soviet Union initiated a unilateral, self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and called upon the United States to also stop testing and resume CTB negotiations. To date the Reagan Administration has refused to do so, asserting that a CTB is not in the best interest of the United States. Since the Soviets have stopped testing, the United States has conducted at least eleven underground tests, seven in 1985 and four this year. Fifteen tests are expected in 1986. Both houses of Congress have overwhelmingly passed identical resolutions urging the Reagan Administration to resume CTB negotiations. A ban on all nuclear weapons testing by the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as by other nuclear and non-nuclear countries, had been a national security objective of every American president since Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Negotiations for a CTB treaty between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain began in 1977. They reached tentative agreement on all substantive points during the first two years, but a final push to conclude a treaty was postponed until after the SALT II Treaty debate. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the suspension of the SALT II ratification process, prospects for agreement diminished. In November 1980 the Soviets were advised that the prospects for the next session were uncertain and that they would be notified by the new Administration if they were to continue. This was never done.

To date, three treaties have been negotiated with the Soviet Union that place restrictions on nuclear testing but do not ban testing outright: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963

The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain had by the end of 1958 conducted over 250 tests in the atmosphere. Rising public opposition to continued testing resulted in a moratorium on nuclear tests by the three countries, which lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. In 1960 President Eisenhower advised the USSR that the United States could not continue to observe the moratorium. In 1961 France conducted an atmospheric test that caused the Soviets themselves to resume testing. However, the United States did not resume immediately.



Thereafter both superpowers resumed nuclear testing at a rapid pace. President Kennedy, after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and under intense domestic and international pressure, opened negotiations with Moscow and London. These negotiations quickly produced the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which has been ratified by the Senate. The treaty continues to prohibit nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Underground nuclear tests, however, are not restricted. While the treaty sharply reduced nuclear fallout and set several useful precedents for future arms control agreements, its effect on the rate of testing or qualitative advances in nuclear weaponry has been minimal. In fact, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the time, insisted on an aggressive underground testing program as a condition of their support for the partial test ban.

The 1963 treaty fell short of a comprehensive test ban because of unresolved questions regarding the number of inspections needed for verifying compliance and the desire to conclude a treaty quickly. To date, 123 countries have signed the treaty. France and China still refuse to sign and China reserves the right to test above ground. The United States has conducted approximately 817 tests since 1945; and the Soviet Union, around 603.

THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES

In 1974 Soviet leader Brezhnev proposed to President Nixon that the United States and USSR stop all nuclear testing. Anticipating opposition from Congress and the weapons laboratories, President Nixon countered with a proposal to limit all explosions to no more than 150 kilotons (over ten times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb). This agreement became the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, but included a proviso committing the parties to negotiate a limit on peaceful nuclear explosions. The treaty which followed, signed in May 1976 by President Ford and Brezhnev, restricted the yield in tests of so-called peaceful nuclear devices to no more than 150 kilotons. The USSR thought peaceful nuclear explosions useful for civil engineering.

These two treaties set important precedents for future arms control efforts. Both contain provisions for the exchange of information to facilitate verification including the establishment of periodic consultations to discuss uncertain events. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty contains provisions for on-site inspections whenever several simultaneous explosions add up to more than 150 kilotons (which some projects might require).

Although signed by presidents Nixon and Ford, neither treaty has been ratified. At present both treaties are in the hands of the Reagan Administration. They cannot be ratified unless the Administration formally submits them to the United States Senate. Meanwhile, both parties have advised each other that they will comply with their provisions and are doing so. If ratified, the exchange of verification information will take place.

STATUS OF CTB NEGOTIATIONS

President Carter began negotiations with the USSR and Britain on a CTB Treaty shortly after he took office in 1977. After two years most of the difficult technical and verification issues had been resolved, and 90 percent of the treaty had been written. Herbert York, the chief test ban negotiator, said "Any time after late 1979, the treaty could have been finished in six months of fairly hard work providing all of the three capitals involved had told their negotiators to get the lead out. None of them were doing that at the time."

Key points of agreement, many representing significant Soviet concessions, included 1) Soviet and U.S. agreement to place a network of satellite-monitored seismic stations in each country to gather verification data from tests; 2) provisions for the use of on-site inspections to investigate suspicious events; 3) an international exchange of seismic and other testing data; 4) Soviet agreement to a moratorium on their peaceful nuclear explosives program (the United States had long ago abandoned its program for lack of effectiveness); 5) Soviet acceptance of a treaty that did not necessarily include France and China; 6) Soviet acceptance of a treaty with a limited duration; 7) Soviet acceptance of a multilateral treaty which could include all other countries.

The Carter Administration initially proposed a treaty of indefinite duration but subsequently requested a three-year treaty to gain the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nuclear weapons laboratories, and other opponents to a permanent test ban. The laboratories openly worked against any agreement and the departments of Defense and Energy continued to be obstructive. On the Soviet side, President Brezhnev used considerable political capital to overcome opposition from the Soviet military, according to Soviet observers in this country. Consequently, if negotiations reopen, much old ground may have to be gone over again.

ADVANTAGES OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

1. An end to nuclear weapons testing would significantly slow down U.S. and USSR modernization of nuclear weapons whose deployment would greatly increase the likelihood of nuclear war. New concepts in warhead design focus on developing weapons suitable for "nuclear war fighting." Most of this new generation of weapons is designed to carry out "controlled" and "limited" strikes against the enemy's military forces and command centers or to intercept incoming missiles. Given the nature of these tasks, the weapons will only be credible if their owners have a very high degree of confidence in their ability to perform as intended. If a test ban were concluded, neither side could achieve the level of confidence in new weapons that only actual testing can guarantee and consequently would have much less incentive to produce them. Government scientists have recently predicted a large rise in the number of nuclear explosions required for advanced, third-generation weapons systems, primarily related to the strategic defense initiative, Star Wars. Perfecting just one of the new designs could require 100 to 200 explosions, compared to about six usually required.

2. A CTB treaty could help contain nuclear proliferation. Under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, the non nuclear weapons states agreed to yield their rights to nuclear weapons provided the superpowers pledged to pursue nuclear arms control, including a CTB. Citing the continued unwillingness of the superpowers to live up to their arms control obligations, some nations have threatened to withdraw from the treaty, while others have refused to join. The third review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty took place in September 1985. The conferees sent a strongly worded message to the superpowers to resume negotiations on a CTB treaty.

A multilateral CTB treaty would be a powerful non proliferation measure in its own right. While a country could still build a nuclear device, it would have limited value without testing. In fact, some countries like India and Pakistan which are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and whose nuclear programs are a grave cause for concern have expressed support for a treaty which applies equally to nuclear and non nuclear powers.

3. A CTB treaty would halt harmful radiation leaks, protecting lives and the environment. Although underground testing has proven far less dangerous than testing in the atmosphere, accidental ventings continue at the Nevada Test Site, where there has been testing underground since 1963. Some radioactive debris has drifted across Nevada and Utah, harming people and livestock. Throughout the 32-year history of Nevada nuclear testing, test officials have failed to properly notify the public and state health departments of testing activity and of radiation dangers associated with it. The USSR has also had leaks of radioactive material. In addition, the tests produce substantial nuclear wastes whose disposal is a major problem. Finally, harmful radioactive material is left in the ground after each test.

4. A CTB treaty may be the easiest agreement to achieve as a prelude to a comprehensive freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A CTB treaty would accomplish the first step of a Freeze by halting nuclear weapons tests. Successful negotiation of a CTB treaty would also help create a higher level of trust between the superpowers, which in turn would strengthen arms control initiatives such as the Freeze.

5. A CTB treaty would save billions of dollars. The United States and other nuclear countries spend millions of dollars each year testing nuclear weapons, as much as \$60 million per test. Even more significant would be the billions of dollars saved by not testing future untested weapons systems now in research and development, such as Reagan's destabilizing Star Wars program.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON TEST LIMITATION TREATIES

The Administration announced in July 1982 that it had decided to abandon negotiations on a CTB Treaty until verification measures for the unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties can be "strengthened." In February 1983 the Administration made a formal proposal to the Soviet Union that talks on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty be reopened to include direct on-site monitoring of all tests expected to exceed 75 kilotons. The Administration says it cannot confidently determine whether the Soviets are complying with the treaties as they are now written. It maintains, on highly disputed evidence, that Soviet tests may have exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold on 14 occasions since the treaties were signed. There is reliable evidence both here and abroad that this is not the case.

The Administration's announced position is disingenuous. First, the verification tasks and monitoring systems for a comprehensive test ban are very different from those involved in monitoring a 150 kiloton threshold test ban. And in fact, it is much easier to detect violation of a total ban than to discriminate among explosions with a force of about 150 kilotons.

Second, once the treaties are ratified, the Soviet Union would provide geophysical and test site data that would greatly facilitate precise measurement of their tests. Moreover, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations believed that the treaties as written could be adequately verified; any Soviet cheating that could possibly go undetected would make no militarily significant difference.

Third, and most significant, the primary factor behind the Administration's decision appears to be the desire to continue testing of new warheads, perhaps even over the 150 kiloton threshold. Eugene Rostow, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, admitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 1982 that he had "run into a profound stone wall" in the form of "whole phalanxes and battalions" of government officials who believe that "given the uncertainties of the nuclear situation and the need for new weapons and modernization, we are going to need testing, and perhaps even testing above the 150 kiloton level, for a long time to come." Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense, asserted March 24, 1986 on the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" that "even if a test ban were verifiable, it's not in our interest to stop making the improvements that we're making that are leading to a safer and more reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons."

VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Over the years, verification of compliance has been the greatest obstacle to successful conclusion of a test ban. However, advances in seismology as well as negotiated provisions for verification make a CTB sufficiently verifiable. The Administration's preoccupation with verification has motivated many scientists to elaborate upon their argument that a CTB is verifiable. The problem is not in detecting explosions, but rather distinguishing nuclear explosions from earthquakes.

Lynn Sykes, head of the earthquake studies group at Columbia University, and Jack Everndon, program manager of the U.S. Geological Survey's National Center for Earthquake Research, among others, argue that this distinction can be accurately made with networks of seismic monitoring stations, such as those agreed to during CTB negotiations. They point out that only 0.5 percent of all earthquakes occur within the USSR and are close enough to the surface to be potentially confused with explosions. Furthermore, there are clearly observable differences between the seismic signals of earthquakes and nuclear explosions, down to a one-or-two kiloton yield, regardless of the environment. Nuclear explosions under that level are not useful or practical.

The conclusion is that the unresolved issues over verification are political rather than technical. No treaty can ever be 100 percent verifiable. As Admiral Bobby Inman, former director of the CIA, said, "If you insist on absolute certainty you'll never have an arms control process."

THE NEED FOR PROOF TESTING

Opponents of a CTB have argued the need for continued proof testing, or testing by actually firing existing nuclear weapons, to confirm the continued reliability of stockpiles. This, however, is not necessary to check the reliability of most of our weapons systems and in fact is one of the least used methods. Moreover, there would be no prohibition on testing non nuclear components of our weapons, and it is those that are most susceptible to degradation. Finally, if nations had less confidence in the reliability of their nuclear weapons, they would be less likely to use them.

CONGRESS AND THE TEST BAN

There has been substantial support in Congress for resuming CTB negotiations. In the spring of 1984 the Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation calling upon President Reagan to resume CTB talks. On June 20, 1984, by a vote of 77 to 22, the Senate approved the Kennedy (D-MA)-Mathias (R-MD) amendment to the fiscal year 1985 Defense Authorization bill expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should resume negotiations on a CTB Treaty as well as submit the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties to the Senate for ratification. On February 26, 1986, the House overwhelmingly passed House Joint Resolution 3, identical to that passed in the Senate in 1984, by a vote of 268 to 148. House and Senate leaders are now considering legislation to cut off funds for nuclear weapons testing as long as the Soviets refrain from testing.

FOR FURTHER READING

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
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NUCLEAR TESTING



DER JACOB TASA (TIME) DMI

Engine of the Arms Race

"The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would be an important step toward reduction of international tensions and would open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of disarmament."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 13, 1959

More than a quarter century and 1,000 nuclear explosions after Eisenhower publicly opposed it, nuclear weapons testing still fuels the arms race. Both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and

the Non-Proliferation Treaty legally commit the US and USSR to negotiate an end to testing. There are well over 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world, yet the US continues to test new warheads, and the USSR started testing again in February 1987, after a unilateral ban that lasted 19 months. Why do the superpowers continue? Many reasons are advanced, but the main purpose of testing is to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons.

This dangerous pattern must be stopped. A verifiable treaty to end all nuclear testing could be concluded in a short time. All that's lacking is the necessary political determination on the part of our leaders—and we citizens hold the key to creating that determination.

WHY WE MUST CONCLUDE A TEST BAN

An end to nuclear tests "would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas," said President Kennedy. "It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war."¹ His words carry even more truth today, with much larger and more threatening nuclear stockpiles on each side. Here are the main advantages of enacting a test ban:

◆ A test ban would break the momentum of the arms race and increase national security.

The Administration argues the opposite: that continued testing ensures our security. Testing has produced many new, more "advanced" US weapons, such as the MX and Trident II missiles. But it has also allowed the Soviets to modernize their weapons, which can hardly increase our security.

The top military goal of this Administration since taking office has been to regain the ability to "prevail" in any nuclear

conflict. Of course, America could only "win" a nuclear war by knocking out Soviet forces in a surprise attack, which requires weapons that are highly accurate, fast, and invulnerable. It also requires the willingness to strike first with nuclear weapons, which has been central to every Pentagon war plan since the first atom bomb was exploded in 1945.² Many entirely new weapons systems have been created since then, and more elaborate war games in which to "use" them, but the basic idea has endured with frightening constancy for four decades: maintain a superior nuclear force so that the US can threaten the rest of the world at the first sign of conflict.

New technological developments are what drive the arms race, and these "advances" require testing. Theodore B. Taylor, a former deputy director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, estimates that four million new types of weapons are conceptual possibilities. Even if only a small proportion of these turn out to be practical for development, that's a lot of new weapons types. "Nuclear weapons technology is potentially extremely open-ended," he concludes.³ The newest weapons concepts, including the x-ray laser, other directed-energy beams, and electromagnetic-pulse bombs, may necessitate hundreds of test explosions, according to Robert W. Selden, director of theoretical physics at Los Alamos National Lab.⁴ Although US technology is superior in these areas, the Soviets are conducting research on new warheads, too. A test ban would prevent both sides from making progress on these new weapons. Allowing the development of deadlier and deadlier weapons is in no country's best interest.

◆ A test ban is verifiable.

For many years, concern over verifying a CTB had some validity; now that the world's seismologists assert with near-unanimity that all but the tiniest tests can be detected and measured, the Reagan Administration has been forced to create other reasons for its insistence on continuing tests. "I'm opposed to a test ban even if it were verifiable," admitted then assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle in 1986, who has had enormous influence on nuclear policy since 1981.⁵

The United States has the technology to detect underground nuclear explosions anywhere in the Soviet Union. Soviet tests are already monitored by a global network of seismic stations managed by several Western nations. The seismometers can distinguish earthquake vibrations from those caused by nuclear tests. Two preeminent geophysicists concluded in 1982 that seismic monitoring can detect any militarily useful tests. Now even the chief of verification programs at the Livermore National Lab concedes, "You can define a verification scheme that can give you confidence that there aren't any tests above one kiloton."⁶ Satellites enhance this verification ability by monitoring the Soviet land mass with infrared and x-ray sensors. They also observe movement of personnel and equipment that precede nuclear tests.

The Soviet government recently demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with verification measures by allowing US scientists to operate seismic monitoring equipment near their main test site at Semipalatinsk, in a project of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a nonprofit environmental research organization. During the last round of CTB talks in the late 1970s, the USSR agreed to allow US tamperproof seismic monitors within their boundaries. General Secretary Gor-

TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS: A QUICK HISTORY

The United States and the Soviet Union have both claimed to seek a comprehensive test ban (CTB) since the late 1950s. Although a CTB agreement—a complete ban on all nuclear tests in any location—has not been reached, the intervening years have produced several concrete advances.

1963: "Yesterday, a shaft of light cut into the darkness," President Kennedy announced after signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.¹ A popular outcry against atmospheric testing compelled negotiation of the treaty; the justified fear of radioactive fallout superseded even Cold War paranoia. But the treaty merely moved tests underground, allowing the arms race to continue its deadly spiral.


1974: The US and USSR again set aside the ultimate goal of a CTB for a compromise—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty—that limited each test to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons (a measure of a bomb's explosive force). The US never ratified the treaty, but both superpowers have observed it. This has curbed the development of new weapons only minimally, if at all.

1980: President Carter broke off test ban negotiations because of political pressure following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the SALT II controversy, and the upcoming 1980 elections. But during the treaty discussions important obstacles had been surmounted, including Soviet agreement to on-site inspection.

"We could have concluded a CTB treaty in 1978 but for the lack of political will on the part of the US."

Paul C. Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1977-78;
chief negotiator during CTB negotiations²

NUCLEAR TESTS SINCE 1945 Through December 31, 1997



* 20 tests joint US-UK (all UK underground tests).

bacher has repeated Soviet willingness to accept these verification measures as well as on-site inspection. The obstacles to a test ban are not technical—they're political.

◆ A test ban would help stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed by most countries, commits the signatory nonnuclear states to forego developing nuclear weapons. (Conspicuously absent from the list of signatories are all the nations suspected of secretly building nuclear bombs: Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa.) In exchange, the nuclear powers pledged to negotiate "a cessation of the arms race at an early date" and "a treaty on general and complete disarmament."⁹ Enacting a test ban would demonstrate that the nuclear powers are serious about these commitments and would remove some of the nonnuclear states' incentive to develop these weapons. By ignoring our pledge we guarantee that eventually many more countries will have nuclear bombs, some of them potentially hostile to the U.S.

◆ A test ban would benefit public health and the environment.

Moving tests underground has greatly reduced the radioactive contamination of our air, water, and soil — but not eliminated it. Both US and Soviet tests have vented radiation into the atmosphere. The federal government admits that 42 underground tests have vented; fallout from one such test in Nevada was detected in Minnesota and Canada.¹⁰ Only now are some of the diseases caused by extensive exposure to

radiation coming to light, as case upon case of cancer and genetic defects appear among nuclear weapons workers and their families.

◆ A test ban would save taxpayers' money.

The testing program has a direct cost of about \$700 million a year; research and production of nuclear warheads cause an additional drain on the federal budget.¹¹ If the US had concluded a CTB in 1978, several strategic weapons programs would not have been developed, including the Trident II missiles and submarines, the MX and Midgetman missiles, and SDI research. Together such programs have drained away more than a hundred billion dollars that could have been spent to improve the quality of life or to lower the massive national debt.

◆ A test ban would not affect the reliability or safety of the nuclear arsenal.

The Pentagon argues that we need to test weapons to make sure they work and, conversely, that they won't go off accidentally. In fact, fewer than 5% of all tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site are to prove the bombs work, and even those are unnecessary, according to Hans Bethe, Paul Warnke, and six other weapons experts who wrote to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1985. That letter declared that "the best way to confirm reliability is to disassemble sample weapons and to subject the components to non-nuclear tests."¹² In any case, uncertainty in both nations that the bombs will work is an advantage to preventing nuclear war, since it would encourage hesitation in using them.

Nuclear testing is no longer used to improve safeguards against accidental or unauthorized detonation of nuclear bombs. The safeguards consist of elaborate security procedures and non-nuclear elements of the weapons.

THERE WILL NEVER BE AN END TO THE ARMS RACE. . . UNLESS WE END IT.

The Soviet Union unilaterally halted its nuclear testing in August 1985. It repeatedly asked the United States to join its moratorium and negotiate a permanent end to these tests. After the US reiterated its refusal and continued an intensive program of 26 tests over the next 19 months, the Soviets finally resumed testing in February 1987.

The House of Representatives perceived the wiser course and, in 1986 and 1987, responded to pressure from people around the country just like you and voted to cut off funding for nuclear weapons tests. The Senate, however, didn't follow suit. In 1989, a CTB bill has a good chance of passing in both houses of Congress—but only if you make your opinion known.

Citizen action makes all the difference. The ABM Treaty was ratified in 1972 after intense lobbying from voters; it has effectively prevented a missile-defense race. Congress enacted a mutual US-Soviet ban on anti-satellite tests in 1984, despite Administration opposition. This law has prevented the Soviet Union from developing weapons that could disable the satellites the US relies on for warning of attack.

And leaders of the test ban issue in Congress have stated repeatedly that it is the courage of individuals that forces them to take legislative action. Many thousands of people have lobbied their representatives in Congress and helped educate the public on the issue. Since August 1985 over 12,000 people have demonstrated their opposition to testing at the Nevada Test Site and over 3,000 of them have been arrested for engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience.¹⁴

Tell your elected representatives to cut off all funds for testing. Recent advances in weapons development make finishing the job begun over two decades ago an immediate imperative. We must shut down the engine that powers the arms race: nuclear testing.



One minute after an underground blast at Nevada Test Site, the surface begins to crater.

Footnotes

1. Address to the nation, 26 July 1963.
2. Telephone interview, 26 March 1987.
3. American University Commencement Address, 10 June 1963.
4. Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, *To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans* (South End Press, 1987).
5. Theodore B. Taylor, "Endless Generations of Nuclear Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1985.
6. William J. Broad, "U.S. Researchers Foresee Big Rise in Nuclear Tests," *New York Times*, April 21, 1986.
7. Quoted in Neil Joeck and Herbert F. York, "Countdown on the Comprehensive Test Ban" (U. Cal. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and the Ploughshares Fund, 1986).
8. Milo D. Nordyke, in Fred Hiatt, "The Livermore Lab's Nuclear Test Detectives" (*Washington Post*, June 11, 1986).
9. Article VI, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
10. "Low-level Radiation Effects on Health" (House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 1979).
11. Robert S. Norris, Thomas B. Cochran, and William M. Arkin, "Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Papers: Known U.S. Nuclear Tests" (Natural Resources Defense Council, 1986).
12. Letter to Rep. Dante Fascell from Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury, Richard Garwin, Spurgeon M. Keeney, Wolfgang Panofsky, George Rathjens, Herbert Seoville, and Paul Warnke; May 14, 1985.
13. Hugh DeWitt, "Nuclear Labs' Job Is Done" (*Los Angeles Times*, July 11, 1982).
14. Tabulation by American Peace Test.

SANE/FREEZE

711 G St. SE
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 546-7100

SANE / ALASKA
3605 Arctic Blvd., #1717
Anchorage, Alaska 99503

SANE/FREEZE is a nonprofit peace organization dedicated to nuclear disarmament, nonintervention, and reduced military spending. We are the largest national peace organization, with over 180,000 members. Our work includes national lobbying, local organizing, and public education.

- Please send me _____ copies of this brochure @ 25¢ each, \$18/100, \$73/500 (including postage).
- I would like to join SANE/FREEZE and support its work for nuclear disarmament. I enclose my membership contribution of \$25 (\$10 for students and those of low income).

RUSH: Need by (date) _____, bill me with shipment

NAME _____

STREET _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

SJR

24

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. SJR-24

Revision Date: _____ Department Affected: Legislature

Title: Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Act. BRU: _____

Sponsor: Kerttula Component: _____

Requestor: Senate State Affairs COMPONENT SERIAL NO.

--	--	--	--

Expenditures/Revenues: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0					

CAPITAL	0					
---------	---	--	--	--	--	--

REVENUE	0					
---------	---	--	--	--	--	--

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	0					

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: none

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

Prepared By: Senate State Affairs Phone: x4522

Division: Alaska State Legislature Date: 4/3/91

Approved by Senator _____ Chairman, Sen. State Affairs

Agency: Alaska State Senate Date: 4/3/91

Distribution (by preparer): Legislative Finance, Legislative Sponsor, Requestor, OMB, & Impacted Agency(ies).

SJR

41

FISCAL NOTE

**STATE OF ALASKA
1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION**

BILL NO. _____

Revision Date: _____

Department Affected: Commerce & Econ. Dev.

Title: Senate Joint Resolution No. 41

BRU: Alaska Amateur Sports Authority

Component: _____

Sponsor: Senators Pearce, Sturgulewski, Collins

Requestor: _____

COMPONENT SERIAL NO.

--	--	--	--

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
REVENUE FUND RESOURCE:	0	0	0	0	0	0

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER FUND SOURCE:						
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: _____

ANALYSIS (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

Prepared By: Steve Busch, Executive Director Phone: 258-9580

Division: Alaska Amateur Sports Authority Date: 1/31/92

Approved by Commissioner: Glenn A. Olds *for [Signature] Ant Comm.*

Agency: Department of Commerce & Economic Development Date: 2-3-92

Distribution (by preparer): Leg. Fin., Legislative Sponsor, Requestor, OMB/DBR, Gov. Legis. Ofc., and Impacted Agency(ies).

Alaska State Legislature

3111 C Street, Suite 150
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
(907) 561-2038



During Session:
P.O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-4993

Senator Drue Pearce
District G

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Patrick Rodey, Chair
Senator Jim Duncan, Vice-Chair
Senator Paul A. Fischer
Senator Pat Pourchot
Senator Rick Uehling
Senate State Affairs Committee

FROM: Senator Drue Pearce *dp*

DATE: February 6, 1992

RE: SJR 41, relating to the use of Alaskan facilities for year-round training for national and international sports teams.

The Alaska Legislature created the Alaska Amateur Sports Authority to promote and develop amateur sports, including training facilities.

Pursuant to that charge, the Authority is developing the Alaska Sports Training and Education Center in conjunction with the Eagle Glacier Nordic Training Center, Kincaid Park, Hatcher Pass facilities, Alaska Pacific University, and the University of Alaska. The Eagle Glacier Nordic Training Center in Girdwood and Kincaid Park in Anchorage are world class training and recreational facilities.

The purpose of this Resolution is to formally invite state, national and international sports teams to Alaska to make use of its year-round training and educational opportunities and to encourage both public and private entities to help attract sports teams to Alaska for training and competition.

The state would receive both economic and social benefits from hosting team training and national and international sports competitions.

DP:jw

SPONSOR STATEMENT

Alaska State Legislature

3111 C Street, Suite 150
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
(907) 561-2038




During Session:
P.O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-4993

Senator Drue Pearce
District G

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Patrick Rodey, Chair
Senate State Affairs Committee

FROM: Senator Drue Pearce 

DATE: January 31, 1992

RE: SJR 41, relating to the use of Alaskan facilities for year-round training for national and international sports teams.

Please consider scheduling SJR 41 for a hearing as soon as possible.

The Alaska Legislature created the Alaska Amateur Sports Authority to promote and develop amateur sports, including training facilities. Pursuant to that charge, the Authority is developing the Alaska Sports Training and Education Center in conjunction with the Eagle Glacier Nordic Training Center, Kincaid Park, Hatcher Pass facilities, Alaska Pacific University, and the University of Alaska. The Eagle Glacier Nordic Training Center in Girdwood and Kincaid Park in Anchorage are world class training and recreational facilities.

The purpose of this Resolution is to formally invite state, national and international sports teams to Alaska to make use of its year-round training and educational opportunities and to encourage both public and private entities to help attract sports teams to Alaska for training and competition.

The state would receive both economic and social benefits from hosting team training and national and international sports competitions.

Thank you.

DP:jw
enclosure

HEARING REQUEST

POSITION PAPER

Department of Commerce
& Economic Development


Senate Joint Resolution No. 41

SJR 41 relates to the use of Alaskan sports facilities for year-round training and education by national and international sports teams.

SJR 41 specifically invites national and international winter sports governing bodies to Alaska which would provide positive social and health effects on Alaskan residents as well as provide economic benefits by hosting training events and ultimately more national and international competitions

The concept of a year-round Alaska Sports Training and Education Center is part of the department's overall strategic plan.

The department supports the resolution's invitation.



Glenn A. Olds, Commissioner

Date:

2-3-92

SJR

42

Alaska State Legislature

Senate

Office of The Majority Leader

Official Business

Rick Halford
P.O. Box V
State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811
Phone (907) 465-4258

P.O. Box 190
Chugiak, Alaska 99067
Phone (907) 276-4999

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Pat Rodey, Chairman
Senate State Affairs Committee

FROM: Senator Rick Halford *Rick*

DATE: February 7, 1992

SUBJECT: Sponsor Statement -- SJR 42
Supporting the continuation of at least the current level of
U.S. military presence at Fort Richardson, Alaska.

The military presence in Alaska represents a vital and essential part of Alaska, especially in the Anchorage/Eagle River area by the existence of Fort Richardson.

Our armed forces have long played a major role in the growth and development of Alaska since its purchase from Russia in 1867. Nearly 14,000 soldiers, their families and retired personnel currently reside in the Anchorage area. Additionally, thousands of civilians earn their living through businesses supported by the bases.

Fort Richardson is located in one of the most strategic locations in the United States. Personnel stationed there can quickly and easily be deployed throughout Europe and Asia. With the reduction of military bases in the Pacific Rim, Fort Richardson's importance is greatly increased.

Recently President Bush has promised to cut defense spending by \$50 billion over the next few years. It is imperative the remaining defense spending be allocated to bases where it will be most effective to our nation's defense program. Clearly from an economic and military standpoint, Fort Richardson is one of those places.

SPONSOR STATEMENT



**PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
6TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)
& U.S. ARMY GARRISON-ALASKA
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505**

**arctic light
FAX**

FAX: 384-2060

Voice: 384-2019/2072

SUBJECT: Ft. Richardson Demographics DATE: 5 Feb 92
TO: Jerry Burnett, Rep. Randy Phillips Office OFFICE: _____
FAX NO: 465-2778 VOICE: 465-4949

Confirm Yes No Will Call

Number of Pages: 2 Including cover sheet

MESSAGE FROM: Doris Thomas OFFICE: Media Relations

MESSAGE:

Attached is a copy of the FY92 Command Information Card for the 6th Infantry Division (Light), which gives statistical data on Fort Richardson (FRA), Wainwright and Greely (FWA and FGA, respectively). I hope it will meet your needs.

Information about where our soldiers live is not on the card, so I've summarized that information below:*

Soldiers living on post: 3130
Soldiers living off post: 1180**
Family members on post: 3980
Family members off post: 1490

*Numbers are rounded to the nearest 10

** About 140 of those are single or are unaccompanied married soldiers

These numbers will not agree precisely with the command information card, due to differences in the way soldiers are counted by our Housing office and by our military manpower analysts. You may wish to get more information from the State Dept. of Labor (J. Greg Williams, demographer, or Terry Elder in Research and Analysis)

Let me know if I can provide any more information, or if you need a copy of the "Impact of Military Spending on the Economy of Alaska." We have some extra copies.

FT. RICH INFO,

STATISTICAL DATA

30-Sep-91

	FRA	FWA	F8A	OTHER	TOTAL
SIZE (THOUSANDS OF ACRES)					
Training Acres	52	916	662	3	1643
	47	878	629	3	1557
REAL PROPERTY (MILLIONS SQ. FT.)	3.1	7.3	1.5		16.9
MILITARY AUTHORIZED	4201	5198	437		9836
6th ID (L)	3011	3402			6413
Echelons Above Division (EAD)	532	1030	33		1595
Garrison	391	301	180		872
Tenants	267	465	224		956
FAMILY MEMBERS (ACTIVE DUTY)	5464	6419	724		12607
ARMY RETIREES	1200	500	90	460	2250
Family Members	1560	650	117	598	2925
DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (ACTUAL)	1195	719	286		2200
Garrison	826	419	157		1402
DA Tenants	85	121	51		257
NAF	222	115	57		394
Commissary	62	64	21		147
OTHER CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES	369	628	79		1076
AAFES	216	339	46		601
BLM		160			160
Contractors	153	129	33		315
SCHOOLS ON POST	3	4	1		8
Student Enrollment	1090	934	328		2352
FAMILY QUARTERS (UNITS)	1757	1627	337		3721
Officer	204	218	58		480
Enlisted	1553	1299	279		3131
BOI HOUSING (UNITS)		550			550
Officer		116			116
Enlisted		434			434
FY 91 ECONOMIC IMPACT (\$ MILLIONS)					\$525.8
FAYROLL					
Military Active Duty	\$116.7	\$115.2	\$8.8		\$240.7
Army Reserve	0.5	0.3			0.8
DA Civilian Garrison	40.7	21.2	7.4		69.3
DA Civilian Tenants	2.6	3.5	2.5		8.6
NAF	4.0	1.9	0.6		6.5
Commissary	2.3	2.4	0.8		5.5
AAFES	3.1	6.0	0.7		9.8
OTHER EXPENDITURES					
NAF Procurement	2.1	1.0	0.4		3.5
Supplies & Equipment	27.7	27.7	6.6		62.0
Other Operational Costs	40.1	49.2	13.2		102.5
Military Construction	2.7	13.5	.4		16.6

Prepared by the Programming & Cost Analysis Branch, DPM
 AUIOVON J17-384-2272
 Commercial 907-384-2153

CORRECTION

**THIS DOCUMENT
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**

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Prepared by the Programming & Cost Analysis Branch, DR&I
AUIOVON 317-384-2272
Commercial 907-304-2153



Anchorage - Star of the North
Chamber of Commerce

February 6, 1992

To: House Special Committee on Military & Veteran Affairs
From: The Anchorage Chamber of Commerce
Re: HJR 63

The Anchorage Chamber of Commerce strongly supports HJR 63. The Military represents a vital sector of the Anchorage and Statewide economy. Fort Richardson personnel contribute to the quality of life in Anchorage as well as the economy.

The Anchorage Chamber of Commerce has adopted as one of its Federal priorities: Support of Alaska's Congressional delegation as needed to keep Alaska Military facilities open and at current or greater levels of personnel.

Alaska serves as a strategic military position and Fort Richardson is a key to military operations in Alaska. The Chamber supports and urges passage of HJR 63 as currently written.

Post-It™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671		# of pages	1
To	Larry Burnett	From	Carol & Cyman
Co.	Paul & Phillips	Co.	A.C.C.
Dept.	Office - House	Phone #	272-2401
Fax #	465-2778	Fax #	272-4117

ANC. CHAMBER STATEMENT

437 E Street, Suite 300, Anchorage, Alaska 99501-2365 Phone: (907) 272-2401 Fax: (907) 272-4117

FEB - 6 - 92 THU 11:29 ANCH CHAMBR COMMERCE P. 01

Founded 1915

CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 42 (STATE AFFAIRS)

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

SEVENTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

BY THE SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Offered:

Referred:

Sponsor(s): SENATORS HALFORD, Cotten, Pourchot

A RESOLUTION

**1 Supporting the continuation of at least the current level of U.S. military presence at Fort
2 Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska.**

3 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

**4 WHEREAS changing world conditions and relationships have lead to pressure on the Congress
5 and the President to reduce defense spending; and**

**6 WHEREAS reductions in defense spending would probably result in some cuts in personnel
7 stationed at bases around the country because a very significant portion of defense spending is related
8 to personnel costs; and**

**9 WHEREAS the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have been reviewing the need for a continued
10 presence of the present complement of military personnel at Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force
11 Base in Alaska; and**

**12 WHEREAS changing world conditions and relationships have lead the U.S. Army and U.S. Air
13 Force to reduce their presence in the Philippines, South Korea, and the other areas; and**

**14 WHEREAS, although military reductions have occurred in Europe and the Far East, Alaska's
15 strategic importance should continue to grow in order to defend the interests of the United States in the
16 Arctic and the Pacific Rim regions; and**

1 **WHEREAS** in 1990, the military services in Alaska stood as the third largest industry in the
2 state, accounting for 16 percent of the state's labor force and 13 percent of the state's payroll with
3 expenditures on behalf of the military services in Alaska having an estimated \$2,700,000,000 effect on
4 Alaska's economy; and

5 **WHEREAS** Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base represent the largest concentration
6 of military personnel in Alaska; and

7 **WHEREAS** the military personnel at Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base and their
8 families contribute significantly to the state's economy and their presence is vital to the social fabric of
9 the Anchorage area;

10 **BE IT RESOLVED** that the Alaska State Legislature urges the President, the Congress, the U.S.
11 Army, and the U.S. Air Force to maintain at least the current level of military presence at Fort
12 Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska.

13 **COPIES** of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable George Bush, President of the United
14 States; the Honorable Dan Quayle, Vice-President of the United States and President of the U.S. Senate;
15 the Honorable Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Robert C. Byrd, President Pro
16 Tempore of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the U.S. House of
17 Representatives; Michael P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army; Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air
18 Force; General Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff; General Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force Chief of
19 Staff; the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable
20 Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. SJR 42

Revision Date: _____ Department Affected: Dept. Mil. & Vets Aff.
 Title: Supporting Force Levels at Ft. Richardson BRU: _____
 Sponsor: Halford, Cotten Component: _____
 Requestor: _____ COMPONENT SERIAL NO.

--	--	--	--

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0

CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---

REVENUE FUND SOURCE:	0	0	0	0	0	0
-----------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER FUND SOURCE:						
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: _____

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

Prepared By: State Affairs Committee (Senate) Phone: 465-3793
 Division: Alaska State Legislature Date: 2-7-92
 Approved by Senator Pat Rodey *Pat Rodey*
 Agency: Chair, State Affairs Committee Date: 2-7-92

SJR

43

7-LS1912D
Lauterbach
2/21/92

CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 43 (STATE AFFAIRS)

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

SEVENTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

BY THE SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**Offered:
Referred:**

Sponsor(s): SENATORS STURGULEWSKI, Pearce, Collins, Uehling

A RESOLUTION

**1 Urging the Congress to amend the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 to allow savings in
2 military spending to be spent for domestic needs as well as for budget deficit reduction.**

3 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

**4 WHEREAS the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 enacted by the Congress established three
5 separate categories for federal spending; and**

**6 WHEREAS these categories of defense, domestic, and international spending have spending
7 limits set within each category and transfer of funds between categories is prohibited; and**

**8 WHEREAS any savings in military spending can be directed only toward budget deficit
9 reduction and may not be reprogrammed for domestic spending; and**

**10 WHEREAS Alaska, like the other 49 states, faces pressing social and economic needs ranging
11 from health care and day care to transportation and public safety; and**

**12 WHEREAS state and local government responsibility for providing human services and paying
13 for the renewal of infrastructure has increased over the past decade while federal aid to states and
14 communities has dropped from 29.4 percent to 16 percent of their budgets; and**

**15 WHEREAS the number of Americans living below the poverty line has increased to 33,000,000
16 according to 1990 census figures and many families even above the poverty line are facing very difficult**

1 economic circumstances that affect the health and education of their children and the well-being and
2 productivity of their adult members; and

3 **WHEREAS** the fiscal constraints faced across the country retard efforts to preserve our families,
4 develop jobs, clean up our environment, and repair and expand our infrastructure; and

5 **WHEREAS** President Bush proposed a 10-year reduction of 22 percent in the military budget
6 even before the breakup of the USSR; and

7 **WHEREAS** the potential domestic effect of even a small savings in military spending is truly
8 significant as evidenced by the fact that the \$865,000,000 cost of just one B-1 bomber exceeds the cost
9 of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 49 out of the 50 states in the nation; and

10 **WHEREAS** a "peace dividend" would make a real difference in whether our families can be
11 strong and healthy and whether our nation will be economically competitive, environmentally
12 responsible, and socially compassionate;

13 **BE IT RESOLVED** that the Alaska State Legislature urges the Congress and the President, for
14 the sake of present families, future generations of children, and the continued greatness of our nation,
15 to

16 (1) reach a new budget agreement that would allow savings in military spending to be
17 used to meet the nation's enormous social and economic needs; and

18 (2) develop mechanisms to provide for the timely and orderly conversion of our economy
19 from an emphasis on the military to one that is civilian oriented.

20 **COPIES** of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable George Bush, President of the United
21 States; the Honorable Dan Quayle, Vice-President of the United States and President of the U.S. Senate;
22 the Honorable Robert C. Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Thomas S.
23 Foley, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the
24 Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
25 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

PROPOSED

CS SJR 43 (STA)

ADD: (line 3) (page 1)

WHEREAS, A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE
REMAINS A HIGH PRIORITY, ALTHOUGH
THE COST OF MAINTAINING A STRONG
NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS BEEN REDUCED
SIGNIFICANTLY, AND

CHANGE: (line 6, page 2)

"the breaking of" to "CHANGES IN"

DELETE: (lines 18 + 19)

ok with Orless

TO: SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RE: Swift adoption of SJR 43, forthwith
Date: 2/21/92
Fr: James E. Fisher, 630 Harris St., Juneau, AK

I urge swift adoption of SJR 43, entitled: "Urging a reduction in federal military spending and an increase in federal nonmilitary domestic spending".

This type of declaration appears imperative, if one will only recall the steady drumbeat of such statements as:

-- ...this is a very dangerous world...

-- ...the US must keep up its guard against nuclear proliferation...

--... the US should be ready to help in trouble spots across the world, i.e., the Yugoslavian situation...

These counsels appear obsolete at the least and most self serving at the most. Following such reasoning the US might continue to spend on military apparatus, supported by reckless Federal deficit financing that absorbs financial resources critically needed for this country to maintain -- and regain -- its place the economic firmament of world markets.

Here in Alaska we should avoid much, if any, effect from the restructuring of U.S. military deployment. See attached clipping from the Anchorage Daily News of January 29th, 1992.

SJR 43 is a "get with it" plea of a type which should be emphasized, as so frequently is required for the obvious, by repetition over and over and over.

For the momentum so helpful to Legislative declarations, I suggest the members of this Committee add their names as co-sponsors.

(SJR43CIV.292)

Alaska State Legislature



SENATOR
ARLISS STURGULEWSKI

311 C STREET, SUITE 550
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99503
(907) 561-7615

While in Juneau
P.O. BOX V
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811
(907) 465-3818

Senate

MEMORANDUM

10 February 1992

TO: Senator Pat Rodey
Chairman, Senate State Affairs Committee

FROM: Senator Arliss Sturgulewski

Thank you for scheduling SJR 43 for a hearing before the Senate State Affairs Committee. This resolution calls for using current reductions in federal defense spending to be allocated toward domestic spending.

Women Legislators Lobby members in Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina & Vermont introduced similar legislation into their respective legislatures on February 3rd.

I look forward to your favorable consideration of this resolution.

Federal Spending Priorities ***Time to Put Our Money Where the People Are***

ITEM: *In FY 1991 a record number of states suffered severe budget shortfalls.* For much of the fiscal year states had to resort to slashing program spending, furloughing employees, and raising taxes and fees in an attempt to eliminate these shortfalls. Still, at the end of the fiscal year, the National Conference of State Legislatures recounted that 31 states plus Puerto Rico and DC reported potential deficits — some as high as 15% of their original budgets.

ITEM: *The federal deficit is growing.* This past July the administration revised its deficit projections for fiscal year 1992 (which began October 1), predicting that the deficit will reach \$34 billion — \$67.4 billion higher than the President's original projection last February. The Congressional Budget Office reports that the deficit may be even worse — \$362 billion.

ITEM: *The rate of poverty in the United States is increasing.* This fall, the Census Bureau released statistics for 1990. The report showed that the poverty rate rose to 13.5% last year from 12.8% in 1989. According to the Census report, 33.6 million people were living below the poverty level in 1990. Given the current state of the economy, we can expect that number to continue to increase.

ITEM: *Despite the dramatic end of the Cold War and the death of communism, military spending remains high — \$291 billion in FY 1992.* Although President Bush announced modest unilateral reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the administration is determined to continue funding big ticket items such as the B-2 stealth bomber and Star Wars, and has cautioned that the proposed reductions will not bring about a peace dividend.

Q: Does the federal budget affect WLL members?

A: Absolutely. WLL members know the pain of having to cut needed services for their constituents in order to balance their state budgets. The national recession accounts for some of the states' fiscal woes, but so does the fact that fully fifty cents of every federal tax dollar goes to the costs of the military and paying for past wars. During the past decade, state and local government responsibility for providing human service and paying for infrastructure has increased, along with federal mandates to do so. But during that same time, federal aid has dropped from 29.4% to 16.% of state and local budgets.

Q: How can WLL members help reorder federal spending priorities?

A: Let Congress know that you support changing budget laws in order to further reduce military spending and reallocate those funds to critical domestic programs in your state or district.

Q: Are there budget laws standing in the way of making the "peace dividend" a reality?

A: Yes. In the fall of 1990, budget experts and members of Congress returned from the budget summit with a new budget agreement designed to control a runaway federal deficit and limit most types of federal spending. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) established three separate categories for discretionary spending — one for defense, one for domestic and one for international. Spending "ceilings" were set for each category and "walls" were erected between them to prohibit transfer of money from one to another, thus silencing popular calls to turn swords into plowshares. Under the BEA, any money cut from the military budget goes directly to deficit reduction — it may not be reprogrammed for domestic or international uses. Furthermore, any spending above the caps triggers an across the board cut within that category. Finally, the BEA institutes a pay-as-you-go philosophy to discourage deficit spending. In FY 1994 and 1995 the walls between the categories will disappear and one overall spending cap will be set for all discretionary programs (defense, domestic and international).

Q: Has the Budget Enforcement Act worked?

A: By several counts — No. The world has changed dramatically since the BEA was enacted. Not only has the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union as we knew it disintegrated, but growing domestic problems such as unemployment, homelessness and environmental deterioration demand a re-examination of resources dedicated to domestic needs. In 1992 it makes no sense to prohibit a transfer of funds from military to domestic programs, particularly when the cost of one B-2 bomber, \$865 million, exceeds AFDC costs in 49 out of 50 states. The BEA was also created to control the deficit. However, the deficit continues to grow. Recent projections show that over the five year period of the budget agreement the deficit will exceed earlier projections by at least \$328 billion.

Congressional support for removing the walls of the BEA is growing. Over the past months a number of initiatives to cut military spending in order to free up resources for deficit reduction and domestic needs were introduced in both the House and Senate. Although the efforts failed to gain the needed majority, they did spark Congressional debate on the budget agreement. House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) said, "If world conditions continue to change dramatically, it's legitimate for us to review the budget agreement, as I'm sure it's being done in the administration."

Q: Why is it important for WLL members to act NOW to change federal spending priorities?

A: Despite administration plans for gradual reductions in military spending, recent studies show that unless deeper reductions in military spending are begun this year, domestic programs will suffer additional funding cuts in the mid 1990's.

Robert Reischauer, director of the Congressional Budget Office, recently testified that without significant cuts in the military budget over the next few years, we would face one of two undesirable scenarios by FY 1995. Either domestic discretionary funds would have to be cut by \$21 billion from current levels, or dramatic and economically dislocating cuts would be needed in military production programs. Because there is no orderly way to reduce military spending enough in 1994 and 1995 without additionally cutting non-defense programs, deeper cuts must be made in the military budget next year, FY 1993.

According to analysts, these cuts can be made safely. The current military budget of about \$300 billion, as well as Administration plans for a 22% reduction in military spending over 10 years, were determined prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. respected organizations such as the Brookings Institution believe that the military budget could be reduced to about one half of current spending over that period of time.

It is important to remember that reordering federal spending priorities need not mean a greater federal deficit. As long as overall spending remains within the limits set by the BEA, it is possible to decrease military spending and increase domestic spending with little or no effect on the federal deficit.

SPECIAL WLL ACTION

On *February 3rd*, the President is scheduled to release his budget proposal for the next fiscal year. We expect that he will announce modest reductions in military spending. WLL members know the economic reality in their states and districts. WLL members know that larger cuts in the military budget are needed in order to address the critical needs of constituents at home.

Join WLL's Georgia delegation in sending a unified message to Congress and the administration. On February 3rd, the same day that President Bush releases his proposed spending plan, WLL members in Georgia will introduce a resolution proposing alternative spending priorities. Their sample resolution is enclosed.

We encourage you to focus on the particular needs of your area, whether they be health care, economic conversion, homelessness, or environmental clean up. It is time to address the economic needs of this nation and put our money where the people are.



Official Business

Alaska State Legislature

FEB 01 1992

NEWS RELEASE

P.O. Box V
State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Feb. 3, 1992

Contact: Caren Robinson
465-3875

ALASKA WOMEN LEGISLATORS SEEK REPEAL OF U.S. BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT

JUNEAU--In an unprecedented bi-partisan display of unity, today eight Alaska women legislators are joining other women lawmakers from around the country in urging Congress to scrap the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). The BEA sets spending ceilings for defense, domestic and international programs. It also prohibits the transfer of military funds to domestic or international programs.

Joint resolutions are being introduced today in both the House and Senate by Rep. Bettye Davis, D-Anchorage; Sen. Arliss Stugulewski, R-Anchorage; Rep. Fran Ulmer, D-Juneau; Sen. Virginia Collins, R-Anchorage; Rep. Kay Brown, D-Anchorage; Rep. Georgiana Lincoln, R-Rampart; Sen. Drue Pearce, R-Anchorage; and Rep. Betty Bruckman, D-Anchorage. The resolutions call for a reduction in federal military spending and an increase in federal nonmilitary domestic spending.

"The American defense budget can be substantially reduced without risking national security," said Rep. Bettye Davis, chair of the Legislative Children's Caucus. "It's time to reorder our national priorities; we need to direct more money toward educating children and promoting healthy and stable families. Due to the end of the Cold War we can't afford an out-of-control military budget at the expense of our national well-being."

Despite modest unilateral reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, military spending for fiscal year 1992 is \$291 billion. Fifty cents of every federal tax dollar goes to the military and paying for past wars. One B-2 stealth bomber costs \$865,000,000, which exceeds the cost of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 49 out of the 50 states in the union.

-MORE-

"Due to the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, the world is an infinitely safer place," said Sen. Arliss Sturgulewski, chair of the Senate Health and Social Services Committee. "Huge needs exist in our economy. More of our kids need a lifelong start in increased accessibility to Headstart programs. Too many of our rural community health clinics don't have access to the most basic of life's needs, safe water. That's simply unacceptable! For America to be strong and competitive, we need to transfer military resources to programs that meet human needs."

According to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, if the U.S. reduces its forces in Europe, ends funding for chemical and biological weapons, cuts the CIA budget, and reduces its nuclear arsenal, there will be an additional \$98 billion to spend on domestic programs. Specifically, jobs, housing, health and nutrition, education, community development, environmental protection, prenatal care and child care are all areas that would benefit from a military reduction.

The joint resolutions introduced today request that Congress and President Bush do the following:

- reduce military spending to a level that is more appropriate to a post-Cold War world situation;
- reach a new budget agreement that would allow savings in military spending to be used to meet the nation's enormous social economic needs; and
- develop mechanisms to provide for the timely and orderly conversion of our economy from an emphasis on the military to one that is civilian oriented.

Women state legislators from Hawaii to New England are introducing resolutions similar to the ones offered in Alaska. The effort is spearheaded by the Women Legislators' Lobby, a national lobbying organization committed to the adequate funding of human needs, promoting peace, preserving the environment, and encouraging a healthy economy. For more information regarding the Women Legislators' Lobby call (617) 643-6740.

FISCAL NOTE

**STATE OF ALASKA
1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION**

BILL NO. SJR-43

Revision Date: _____ Department Affected: NA
 Title: Urging reduced federal military spending/increase domestic spending
 BRU: _____ Component: _____
 Sponsor: Sturqulewski
 Requestor: State Affairs Committee COMPONENT SERIAL NO.

--	--	--	--

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0					
CAPITAL						

REVENUE FUND SOURCE:						
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FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)


GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER FUND SOURCE:						
TOTAL	0					

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: None

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

Prepared By: Max Gifford Phone: x4522
 Division: Committee Assistant - State Affairs Date: Feb. 10, 1992
 Approved by Senator Pat Rodey 
 Agency: Chair, Senate State Affairs Date: Feb. 10, 1992

SJR

51

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
1992 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. SJR-51

Revision Date: _____ Department Affected: NA
Title: Honoring General Colin L. Powell BRU: _____

Sponsor: State Affairs Component: _____
Requestor: Senator Rodey COMPONENT SERIAL NO.

--	--	--	--

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	Ø					

CAPITAL	Ø					
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REVENUE						
FUND SOURCE:						

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
FUND SOURCE:						
TOTAL	Ø					

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: Ø

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

Prepared By: Senate State Affairs Committee Phone: 465-4522
Division: Alaska State Legislature Date: March 2, 1992
Approved by Senator PAT RODEY, Chair *Pat Rodey*
Agency: Senate State Affairs Committee Date: 3/2/92

News....

from Senator Pat Rodey

March 11, 1992

General Powell Welcomed to Alaska

The State Senate today unanimously approved a resolution welcoming General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Alaska when he visits next month.

Senator Pat Rodey, Chairman of the Senate State Affairs Committee, and sponsor of the resolution, SJR-51, noted that this is only the second time in history that the nation's top military commander has visited Alaska.

"It's an honor to have General Powell visit Alaska," said Rodey. "Too often the politicians in Washington, D.C. tend to dismiss or ignore Alaska. It's been our nation's military leaders that have long recognized Alaska's strategic importance to our national defense program."

Senator Rodey said that General Powell will visit the state in mid April, having accepted an invitation to address the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce. In addition, tentative plans call for General Powell to visit major military installations in Fairbanks and Anchorage.

- end -

Further Information: Senator Pat Rodey, 465-3793

3/9/92

AMENDMENT

OFFERED IN THE SENATE

BY SENATOR POURCHOT

TO: CSSJR 51 (STA)

Page 1, line 13

Delete, after "the":

FRATERNAL AND

Page 2, line 3

Delete:

SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN

Insert:

personnel

Pat —
Note from
Tim Benintendi.

Senator Pourchot:

re: SJR-51 General Colin Powell

Thank you for filling in for Senator Rodey on the Floor this morning.

Senator Rodey would appreciate it if you would note that too often Alaska is ignored or shunted aside by the politicians in Washington, D.C.,it's only when our strategic defensive position in the global scheme of things comes into play that we seem to gain in importance and that's been largely due to the nation's military high command.

This is only the second time in history that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has personally visited Alaska. It's a great honor to have General Powell here - and it is a clear indication from our military leaders as to the importance they attach to Alaska in our national defense program.

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

COLIN LUTHER POWELL, General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 5 April 1937, New York, New York

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 33

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC 20318-0001, since October 1989

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Infantry School, Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
The National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

City University of New York - BS Degree - Geology
George Washington University - MBA Degree - Business Administration

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jun 58	Oct 58	Student, Infantry Officer Basic Course, later Ranger Course, and later Airborne Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Oct 58	May 59	Platoon Leader, Company B, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 48th Infantry, United States Army Europe
May 59	Jul 59	Assistant Adjutant, Combat Command B, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe
Aug 59	Oct 60	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Company D, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 48th Infantry, United States Army Europe
Dec 60	Oct 61	Liaison Officer, later Executive Officer, Company A, 1st Battle Group, 4th Infantry, 2d Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, Massachusetts
Oct 61	Feb 62	Commander, Company A, 1st Battle Group, 4th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, Massachusetts
Feb 62	Sep 62	S-1 (Personnel), 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, Massachusetts
Oct 62	Nov 62	Student, United States Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Dec 62	Jan 63	Self Defense Corps Training Center Advisor, 2d Infantry Division, I Corps, Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
Jan 63	Nov 63	Senior Battalion Advisor, Unit Advisory Branch, later Assistant G-3 (Operations) Advisor, 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Viet Nam, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

COLIN LUTHER POWELL, General

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Nov 63	Jun 64	Test Officer, United States Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, Georgia
Aug 64	May 65	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
May 65	Feb 66	Test Officer, Supporting Weapons Test Division, United States Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, Georgia
Feb 66	Jun 67	Instructor/Author, Operations Committee, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Aug 67	Jun 68	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 68	Sep 68	Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, United States Army Vietnam
Sep 68	Jul 69	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), later Deputy G-3 (Operations), Americal Division, United States Army Vietnam
Sep 69	Jul 71	Student, The George Washington University, Washington, DC
Jul 71	Jun 72	Operations Research Analyst, Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Sep 72	Aug 73	White House Fellow, Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Washington, DC
Sep 73	Sep 74	Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea
Sep 74	Jul 75	Operations Research Systems Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Requirements and Analysis), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC
Aug 75	Apr 76	Student, National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC
Apr 76	Jul 77	Commander, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jul 77	Dec 78	Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Jan 79	Jun 81	Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Jun 81	Aug 82	Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Aug 82	Jun 83	Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 83	Jun 86	Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Jun 86	Dec 86	Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe,
Jan 87	Dec 87	Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, DC
Dec 87	Jan 89	Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, DC
Apr 89	Sep 89	Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

COLIN LUTHER POWELL, General

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
ZUT	9 Jun 58	30 Jun 58
1LT	30 Dec 59	30 Jun 61
CPT	2 Jun 62	30 Jun 65
MAJ	24 May 66	30 Jun 72
LTC	9 Jul 70	30 Jun 79
COL	1 Feb 76	
BG	1 Jun 79	22 Jan 82
MG		1 Aug 83
LTC	1 Jul 86	
GEN	4 Apr 89	

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Soldier's Medal
Bronze Star Medal
Purple Heart
Air Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Expert Infantryman Badge
Combat Infantryman Badge
Parachutist Badge
Pathfinder Badge
Ranger Tab
Presidential Service Badge
Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION ROTC

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
White House Fellow, Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Washington, DC	Sep 72-Aug 73	Lieutenant Colonel
Operations Research Systems Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Requirements and Analysis), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC	Sep 74-Jul 75	Lieutenant Colonel

COLIN LUTHER POWELL, General

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	Jul 77-Dec 78	Colonel
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	Jan 79-Jun 81	Brigadier General
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	Jul 83-Jun 86	Major General
Deputy Assistant, later Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, DC	Jan 87-Jan 89	Lieutenant General
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Oct 89-Present	General

HB

40

DIVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES

**LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY
STATE OF ALASKA**

P.O. Box Y, Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-3867 or 465-2450
FAX (907) 465-2029

Deliveries to: 240 Main Street
Court Plaza, Room 500
Mail Stop 3101

MEMORANDUM

April 16, 1991

SUBJECT: Sectional analysis of CSHB 40 (Jud)

TO: Representative Betty Bruckman
Attn: Anne Ziesmer-Hays

FROM: John B. Gaguine *JBG*
Legislative Counsel

You have requested a sectional analysis of the above described bill.

As a preliminary matter, note that a sectional analysis or summary of a bill should not be considered an authoritative interpretation of the bill and the bill itself is the best statement of its contents. If you would like an interpretation of the bill as it may apply to a particular set of circumstances, please advise.

This single-section bill expands the criminal offense of campaign misconduct in the first degree (AS 15.56.010), a class A misdemeanor, to include the writing and circulating of information that a person knows is false and that relates to the reputation for honesty and integrity, qualifications, or background and experience of a candidate for office (including the person circulating the information). Current law only covers such false information when it would seriously provoke or damage the reputation of another person. The bill also provides that the criminal penalties of AS 15.56.010 apply to information printed in a paid statement in the official state election pamphlet, as well as to information in a letter, circular, bill, placard, poster, or newspaper, radio or television advertisement.

JBG:lmb:pl
91-124.lmb

Sectional Analysis

§ 15.55.250

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The lieutenant
AS 15.50.010

practices

SLA 1980.

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§ 15.56.010

ELECTIONS

§ 15.56.010

Sec. 15.56.010. Campaign misconduct in the first degree. (a) A person commits the crime of campaign misconduct in the first degree if the person

(1) knowingly circulates or has written, printed or circulated a letter, circular, or publication relating to an election, to a candidate at an election, or an election proposition or question without the name and address of the author appearing on its face;

(2) knowingly prints or publishes an advertisement, billboard, placard, poster, handbill, paid-for television or radio announcement or other communication intended to influence the election of a candidate or outcome of a ballot proposition or question without the words "paid for by" followed by the name and address of the candidate, group or individual paying for the advertising or communication and, if a candidate or group, with the name of the campaign chairman; or

(3) knowingly writes or prints and circulates, or has written, printed and circulated, a letter, circular, bill, placard, poster or advertisement in a newspaper, on radio or television

(A) containing false factual information relating to a candidate for an election;

(B) which the person knows to be false; and

(C) which would provoke a reasonable person under the circumstances to a breach of the peace or damages the candidate's reputation for honesty, integrity, or the candidate's qualifications to serve if elected to office.

(b) Violation of this section is a corrupt practice.

(c) Campaign misconduct in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor. (§ 205 ch 100 SLA 1980)

Revisor's notes. — Enacted as AS 15.56.011. Renumbered in 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality. — See *Tally v. California*, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960) holding a Los Angeles mu-

nicipal ordinance, similar to this section, void on its face.

Collateral references. — Validity and construction of state statute prohibiting anonymous political advertising. 4 ALR4th 741.

Criticism or disparagement of character, competence, or conduct of candidate for office as defamation. 37 ALR4th 1088.

Photograph, defamation by. 52 ALR4th 488.

Class or group defamation as actionable by individual member. 52 ALR4th 618.

Sufficiency of identification of allegedly defamed party. 54 ALR4th 746.

Defamation by statement made in jest. 57 ALR4th 520.

False light invasion of privacy — neutral or laudatory depiction of subject. 59 ALR4th 502.