

**ALASKA LEGISLATURE COMMITTEE FILES 1991-1992 8672**  
**7671 SENATE RESOURCES**

which longlines for sablefish and halibut in the southeast Alaska and East Yakutat districts moves yet further west as the season advances and continues longlining in the West Yakutat, Kodiak, and southwest districts (J. Gharrett, personal communication). The smaller vessels, that is those less than 30 feet in length, rarely fish outside southeast Alaska.

### Fishermen

(Southeast)

Langdon and Miller's survey of fishermen found that crew size on vessels in Area 2C varied with the rural or urban nature of the community in which the fishermen resided. For urban communities, from which the larger vessels fished, crew size including captain averaged 3.6 persons in 1982, while for rural communities crew size averaged 3.0 persons. If crew sizes remained equivalent to those in 1982, it is estimated that 4,768 fishermen fished commercially for halibut in 1990 in Area 2C.

A similar disparity between urban and rural residence was found in kinship and crew patterns; Langdon and Miller found that rural crews were more likely to be formed with kinfolks than those fishing from urban communities. It should be noted here that crews from Native villages tend to be larger, and with greater involvement of kin, because of the cultural basis of fishing as a family economic activity and the cultural pattern of initiating young people into traditional occupations. Since the family is the "economic firm" in subsistence activities (a "domestic mode of production"), transfer of this pattern of activity to the commercial fishery is appropriate both culturally and economically in the mixed economy of rural communities.

The fishermen of southeast Alaska participate in a number of commercial fisheries. Langdon and Miller's data showed that halibut fishermen fished for a mean of 2.62 species, with a median of 2.48 species, during the fishing year. A 45-year old non-Native fisherman, self-described as a "seiner," from Angoon reported his seasonal round of fishing in 1990 as follows: "January: bait; February: crab; March: sac roe [herring], brown crab, and get ready for black cod; April, May: black cod (2 weeks here, 6 weeks off Seward coast); June: halibut (hits third opening), get ready for seining; July, August: seining; September: one day black cod, halibut, and usually fall dogs [salmon]" (Martha Betts, 1991). According to Betts (1991), the pattern described by the seiner above is atypical; he fishes for crab and black cod "outside" the islands of the Alexander Archipelago while most seiners do not. Angoon and Kake fishermen, mostly Tlinget, seine for salmon, hand-troll for salmon (during seine closures) using skiffs, and long-line for halibut using seine boats. Some fishermen also use their boats as halibut tenders for other fishermen fishing from skiffs. Langdon and Miller (1983) reported that only 7.9 percent of the fishermen interviewed in Area 2C fished in just one fishery, while 42.9 percent fished in two directed fisheries, typically halibut and salmon. One-fifth of the fishermen in Langdon and Miller's sample fished for four or more species during the course of the year.

The demography of fishermen varies with residence in rural or urban communities. The mean age of all fishermen surveyed by Langdon and Miller in 1982 was 38.8 years, with a median of 34.6 years. Fishermen from urban communities were younger, however, with an average age of 37 years compared to the mean age of 44 years in rural communities. Urban fishermen had completed more years of formal education than those from rural communities in Langdon and Miller's sample; 13.1 years of schooling compared to 10.1 years. Both of these indicators suggest that life in urban communities offers more opportunities for training and employment.

Income from the fishery varies considerably. For the communities with a mixed cash-subsistence economy, the halibut fishery is very important. A 50-year old Tlinget hand troller from Angoon, reporting on his 1990 season, said that "Angoon just wants to make living, not be huge highliners... one quarter of total income from fishery is from halibut. It's an important fishery. There are three

(1 metric ton = 2205 lbs.)

Table 1.1 Sablefish landings (mt) off Alaska by fishery and area from 1960 to 1990.

YEAR	GULF OF ALASKA				BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS				ALL AREAS			
	DOMESTIC	JOINT VENTURE	FOREIGN	TOTAL GOA	DOMESTIC	JOINT VENTURE	FOREIGN	TOTAL BS/AI	DOMESTIC	JOINT VENTURE	FOREIGN	TOTAL ALL AREAS
1960	1,925	0	217	2,142	0	0	1,861	1,861	1,925	0	2,078	4,003
1961	866	0	31	897	0	0	15,627	15,627	866	0	15,658	16,524
1962	684	0	47	731	0	0	25,989	25,989	684	0	26,036	26,720
1963	881	0	1,928	2,809	0	0	14,370	14,370	881	0	16,298	17,179
1964	1,172	0	1,285	2,457	0	0	5,086	5,086	1,172	0	6,371	7,543
1965	1,047	0	2,411	3,458	0	0	6,077	6,087	1,047	0	8,498	9,545
1966	1,067	0	4,112	5,179	0	0	10,846	10,846	1,067	0	14,958	16,025
1967	966	0	5,197	6,163	0	0	13,350	13,350	946	0	18,547	19,493
1968	161	0	14,887	15,048	0	0	16,047	16,047	161	0	30,929	31,090
1969	301	0	19,075	19,376	0	0	17,682	17,682	301	0	36,757	37,058
1970	578	0	24,565	25,143	0	0	12,985	12,985	578	0	37,550	38,128
1971	387	0	25,243	25,630	0	0	17,942	17,942	387	0	43,185	43,572
1972	1,086	0	36,417	37,503	0	0	16,089	16,089	1,086	0	52,506	53,592
1973	1,245	0	27,441	28,686	0	0	8,759	8,759	1,245	0	36,200	37,445
1974	1,111	0	27,224	28,335	0	0	6,735	6,735	1,111	0	33,959	35,070
1975	1,557	0	24,538	26,095	0	0	4,513	4,513	1,557	0	29,051	30,608
1976	1,151	0	26,587	27,738	0	0	4,582	4,582	1,151	0	31,169	32,320
1977	1,179	0	15,961	17,140	2	0	4,613	4,615	1,181	0	20,574	21,755
1978	1,738	0	7,128	8,866	0	0	2,073	2,013	1,738	0	9,141	10,879
1979	3,447	18	6,885	10,350	0	0	2,158	2,158	3,447	18	9,043	12,508
1980	2,384	20	6,138	8,542	5	39	2,437	2,481	2,389	57	8,575	11,023
1981	1,940	<0.5	7,976	9,916	2	180	2,955	3,137	1,942	180	10,931	13,053
1982	2,910	1	5,646	8,557	176	124	3,839	4,139	3,085	125	9,484	12,694
1983	3,761	275	4,966	9,002	90	114	3,178	3,382	3,852	389	8,144	12,385
1984	8,075	528	1,107	10,510	1,055	348	1,923	3,326	9,930	876	3,029	13,835
1985	11,366	226	38	11,630	3,375	110	312	3,797	14,741	335	351	15,427
1986	21,684	246	1	21,931	6,013	430	109	6,552	22,770	675	110	23,555
1987	26,349	180	0	26,529	7,785	123	33	7,941	34,136	304	33	34,473
1988	30,972	37	0	31,009	6,575	14	0	6,589	37,565	51	0	37,616
1989	29,850	0	0	29,850	4,496	3	0	4,499	34,346	3	0	34,349
1990	27,331	0	0	27,331	4,462	0	0	4,462	31,821	0	0	31,821

Source: Data for 1960-1980 from Bakkala, Richard G. (editor) et al., 1988. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-139; Condition of Groundfish Resources of the Eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Region in 1987; and Major, Richard L. and Thomas K. Wilderbuhr (editors), 1988. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-149: Condition of Groundfish Resources of Gulf of Alaska Region as Assessed in 1987. Data from 1981-1989 from PacFIN source reports; March 29, 1991.

Note: Discrepancies between actual sums of component figures and totals are due to rounding.

# Southeast Halibut Vessel participation

**Table 1a** Number of halibut vessel owners by state of residence from 1984-1990 for one of the vessel class options, and number of quota share (QS) recipients by the same regions for four quota share apportionment rules.

## IPHC REGULATORY AREA 2C

Vessel Class	YEAR							Number of QS Recipients based on Apportionment Rule #			
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1	2	3	4
% < 35 feet	55	50	48	47	50	48	45	52	54	57	57
% 36-60 feet	44	48	50	52	49	51	54	46	44	41	41
% 61-90 feet	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2
% > 90 feet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Freezer/LL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
≤ 35 feet All	703	573	641	688	829	758	673	1,296	1,682	2,122	2,122
Alaska	1.8 606	2.6 519	2.8 597	3.0 639	2.7 793	2.1 723	2.2 627	1,210	1,540	1,885	1,885
Other States	15	7	12	21	14	14	13	24	42	53	53
Unknown	82	47	32	28	22	21	33	62	100	174	174
% Alaska	86	91	93	93	96	95	93	93	92	89	89
36-60 feet All	555	553	674	764	821	805	799	1,146	1,366	1,527	1,527
Alaska	7.9 459	13.1 465	12.1 560	11.1 650	11.1 733	11.6 722	10.0 711	979	1,122	1,245	1,245
Other States	58	64	93	89	73	66	69	129	188	221	221
Unknown	28	24	21	25	15	17	29	38	56	61	61
% Alaska	85	81	83	85	89	90	88	85	82	82	82
61-90 feet All	13	19	20	18	21	25	14	37	47	62	62
Alaska	15.2 10	36.3 15	22.7 14	3 13	13.5 13	11.5 16	16.8 11	22	27	38	38
Other States	2	4	6	4	8	7	1	12	17	20	20
Unknown	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	3	3	4	4
% Alaska	77	79	70	72	62	64	79	59	57	61	61
> 90 feet All	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Alaska	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Other States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Alaska	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	100	100	100
Freezer/LL All	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaska	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Alaska	1271 0	1145 0	1335 0	1470 0	1671 0	1588 0	1486 0	0	0	0	0

3%

Total lbs in 1000's caught: 5,198 9,203 10,608 10,712 11,373 9,505 9,649  
 Quota: 11,500 9,500 8,000

Penciled in numbers represent average catch / vessel for each class size by year (for Alaska residents) in 1000's of lbs

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Table 1b

Catch of Pacific halibut off Alaska, in thousands of pounds (net weight), by state of owner residence, during 1984 through 1990 for one of the vessel class options, and calculated amount of IFQ within each vessel class according to each of the four apportionment rates.

lbs

IPHC REGULATORY AREA 2C

Vessel Class	YEAR							Amount of IFQs based on Apportionment Rule #			
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1	2	3	4
% < 35 feet	21	17	18	20	20	17	16	19	19	19	18
% 36-60 feet	76	75	78	77	78	80	83	78	78	79	78
% 61-90 feet	2	8	4	3	2	3	1	3	3	2	4
% > 90 feet	0	0	0	*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Freezer/LL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
< 35 feet All	1,242	1,566	1,907	2,104	2,266	1,628	1,509	1,428	1,388	1,391	1,357
Alaska	1,091	1,386	1,707	1,959	2,177	1,563	1,403	1,351	1,301	1,293	1,263
Other States	55	85	110	96	58	38	38	30	40	41	40
Unknown	97	95	84	49	30	27	67	47	47	57	54
% Alaska	88	89	90	93	96	96	93	95	94	93	93
36-60 feet All	4,404	6,943	8,276	8,230	8,883	7,636	8,000	5,769	5,797	5,838	5,767
Alaska	3,748	6,098	6,981	7,216	8,177	6,958	7,062	5,046	5,015	5,078	5,035
Other States	492 <sup>1</sup>	676	1,129	853	577	535	689 <sup>1</sup>	537	595	600	577
Unknown	164 <sup>1</sup>	169	167	160 <sup>1</sup>	129	143 <sup>1</sup>	249 <sup>1</sup>	185 <sup>1</sup>	187 <sup>1</sup>	161	155
% Alaska	87	88	84	88	92	91	89	88	87	87	87
61-90 feet All	152	694	430	378 <sup>1</sup>	224	241	185	203	215	171	276
Alaska	152	545	319	302 <sup>1</sup>	173	184	185	156	163 <sup>1</sup>	118 <sup>1</sup>	178 <sup>1</sup>
Other States	*	149	111	44	51	57	*	47	52	38	71
Unknown	*	0	0	*	0	*	*	*	*	16	26
% Alaska	60	79	74	78	77	72	81	71	68	68	64
> 90 feet All	0	0	0	*	0	0	0	0	*	*	*
Alaska	0	0	0	*	0	0	0	0	*	*	*
Other States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Alaska	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	100	100	100
Freezer/LL All	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaska	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Alaska	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

90

\* indicates data not shown due to confidentiality restrictions.

<sup>1</sup> Includes landings from adjacent vessel class(es) and/or residencies.

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Table 2.4a--continued

Vessel owner participation  
Southeast/E. Yakutat blackcod fishery

SEO/EY**	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Rules			
								1	2	3	4
% < 60'	77.8%	79.2%	89.7%	91.1%	91.5%	93.0%	94.5%	88.4%	89.1%	88.7%	93.0%
% > 60'	22.2%	20.8%	10.3%	8.9%	8.5%	7.0%	5.5%	11.6%	10.9%	11.3%	7.0%
< 60'											
All	98	95	217	316	354	361	311	633	573	689	541
Alaska	2468	12580	171	254	295	302	267	497	453	542	441
Other states	30	15	46	62	59	59	49	136	120	147	100
% Alaska	69.4%	84.2%	78.8%	80.4%	83.3%	83.7%	84.2%	78.5%	79.1%	78.7%	81.5%
> 60'											
All	28	25	25	31	33	27	18	83	70	88	41
Alaska	31510	31513	34115	35221	32222	34317	36211	39	35	39	26
Other states	18	12	10	10	11	10	7	44	35	49	15
% Alaska	35.7%	52.0%	60.0%	67.7%	66.7%	63.0%	61.1%	47.0%	50.0%	44.3%	63.4%

Total lbs caught in pot. 3382 1978 3765 3587 6265 5463 6116

SEO/EY\*\* = Southeast outside/East Yakutat 6180 5680 5680

Quota -

Total participants - 126 120 242 347 389 388 329

Percented in figures represent average catch/vessel in metric tons for each class size by year (for Alaskan residents)

Table 2.5a-continued


~~1215~~ pounds in metric tons  
S.E./E. Yakutat blackcod fishery

SEO/EY**	1984	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
% < 60'	68.5%	60.3%	78.3%	84.6%	83.6%	86.0%	90.7%
% > 60'	31.5%	39.7%	21.7%	15.4%	16.4%	14.0%	9.3%
< 60'							
All	2318	1193	2948	4725	5236	4697	5545
Alaska	1594	1000	2202	4019	4117	3814	4427
Other states	724	193	746	706	1119	883	1118
% Alaska	68.8%	83.8%	74.7%	85.1%	78.6%	81.2%	79.8%
> 60'							
All	1064	785	817	862	1029	766	571
Alaska	345	410	512	743	731	584	400
Other states	719	375	305	119	298	182	171
% Alaska	32.4%	52.2%	62.7%	86.2%	71.0%	76.2%	70.1%


SEO/EY\*\* = Southeast outside/East Yakutat

9.13

Figure 4.2 Estimated number and percentage of vessel owners by the ratio of IFQs to average landings for QS apportionment rules 3 and 4.



Rule 3: Best 5 of 7 years for 1984-90 (closest to approved option)




Rule 4: Best 6 of 7 years for 1984-90


Note: The average landings for each owner is for the number of years fished from 1984-90.

Halibut

Figure 4.4 Estimated number and percentage of vessel owners by the ratio of IFQs to 1990 landings for QS apportionment rules 3 and 4.



Rule 3: Best 5 of 7 years for 1984-90 (closest to approved option)



Rule 4: Best 6 of 7 years for 1984-90

Note: Only owners with 1990 landings are included.

*Halibut*

**Table 3.21** Number of vessel owners participating in the halibut fishery off Alaska, by vessel class and the number of years fished during 1984-1990.

Participation by:	Number of Years Fished							Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
All Owners	4,054	1,748	1,117	828	637	444	507	9,335
% of Total Owners	43%	19%	12%	9%	7%	5%	5%	100%
Owners of Vessels ≤ 35'	2,877	1,076	597	380	253	162	127	5,472
% of Vessels ≤ 35'	53%	20%	11%	7%	5%	3%	2%	100%
% of Total Owners	31%	12%	6%	4%	3%	2%	1%	59%
Owners of Vessels 36-60'	958	564	457	401	347	251	343	3,321
% of Vessels 36-60'	29%	17%	14%	12%	10%	8%	10%	100%
% of Total Owners	10%	6%	5%	4%	4%	3%	4%	36%
Owners of Vessels ≤ 60'	3,835	1,640	1,054	781	600	413	470	8,793
% of Vessels ≤ 60'	44%	19%	12%	9%	7%	5%	5%	100%
% of Total Owners	41%	18%	11%	8%	6%	4%	5%	94%
Owners of Vessels > 60'	219	108	63	47	37	31	37	542
% of Vessels > 60'	40%	20%	12%	9%	7%	6%	7%	100%
% of Total Owners	2%	1%	1%	1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	6%
Owners of Vessels 61-90'	185	88	53	38	32	28	33	457
% of Vessels 61-90'	40%	19%	12%	8%	7%	6%	7%	100%
% of Total Owners	2%	1%	1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	5%
Owners of Vessels > 90'	34	20	10	9	5	3	4	85
% of Vessels > 90'	40%	24%	12%	11%	6%	4%	5%	100%
% of Total Owners	<1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	<1%	1%
Owners of Freezer Vessels	1	5	3	0	0	0	0	9
% of Freezer Vessels	11%	56%	33%	-	-	-	-	100%
% of Total Owners	<1%	<1%	<1%	-	-	-	-	<1%

# Halibut - IFQ Recipients

**Table 4.2** Number of halibut vessel owners during 1984 through 1990 and calculated number of quota share (QS) recipients according to each of four quota share apportionment rules, by vessel class and region of owner residence.

*rule #1 = correct # of recipients*

Vessel Class Set	YEAR							Number of QS Recipients by Apportionment Rule			
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1	2	3	4
All	3149	2538	3082	3597	3770	3464	4024	6118	7702	9335	9335
Alaska	2518	2118	2593	3050	3361	3010	3410	5240	6475	7711	7711
Other States	201	163	230	290	265	266	316	452	577	658	658
Unknown	430	257	259	257	144	188	298	426	650	966	966
% Alaska	80	83	84	85	89	87	85	86	84	83	83
% < 35 ft	66.0	59.7	55.3	54.3	49.5	46.3	44.8	51.2	54.6	58.6	58.6
% 36-60 ft	30.7	36.1	39.4	40.4	45.0	47.9	48.8	42.5	39.2	35.6	35.6
% ≤ 60 ft	96.6	95.8	94.7	94.7	94.5	94.2	93.5	93.7	93.8	94.2	94.2
% > 60 ft	3.6	4.6	5.5	5.5	5.9	6.1	6.8	6.3	6.2	5.8	5.8
% 61-90 ft	3.4	4.1	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.7	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.9
% > 90 ft	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9
C/B	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.9	99.9
F/L	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
<b>&lt;35 ft</b> All	2077	1516	1705	1954	1865	1604	1801	3131	4206	5472	5472
Alaska	1634	1260	1457	1709	1741	1462	1595	2819	3675	4618	4618
Other States	53	31	35	60	37	38	48	68	94	120	120
Unknown	390	225	213	185	87	104	158	244	436	734	734
% Alaska	79	83	85	87	93	91	89	90	87	84	84
<b>36-60 ft</b> All	966	915	1215	1454	1696	1658	1963	2600	3019	3321	3321
Alaska	817	784	1020	1213	1485	1420	1655	2174	2491	2736	2736
Other States	118	107	158	180	167	170	195	279	353	398	398
Unknown	31	24	37	61	44	68	113	147	175	187	187
% Alaska	85	86	84	83	86	86	84	84	83	82	82

TABLE 2.2.1 Distribution of Vessel Owners by Vessel Size Class and the Number of Years Fished

*Sable fish IFQ Recipients*

Vessel categories associated with Alternative 2.1

Number of Years Fished	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
<b>ALL OWNERS</b>	680	267	196	126	116	80	51	1,496
% of total	45%	18%	13%	8%	8%	4%	3%	100%
<b>Owners of Vessels &lt;50'</b>	420	162	114	68	75	31	23	893
% of vessels <50'	47%	18%	13%	8%	8%	3%	3%	100%
% of total	28%	11%	8%	5%	5%	2%	2%	60%
<b>Owners of Vessels 50-100'</b>	177	92	79	55	37	27	28	495
% of vessels 50-100'	36%	19%	16%	11%	7%	5%	6%	100%
% of total	12%	6%	5%	4%	2%	2%	2%	33%
<b>Owners of Vessels &gt;100'</b>	24	12	3	3	4	2	0	48
% of vessels >100'	50%	25%	6%	6%	8%	4%	0%	100%
% of total	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%

Vessel categories associated with Alternative 2.2


*- most similar to method chosen by Council*

Number of Years Fished	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
<b>ALL OWNERS</b>	680	267	196	126	116	60	51	1,496
% of total	45%	18%	13%	8%	8%	4%	3%	100%
<b>Owners of Vessels &lt;50'</b>	420	162	114	68	75	31	23	893
% of vessels <50'	47%	18%	13%	8%	8%	3%	3%	100%
% of total	28%	11%	8%	5%	5%	2%	2%	60%
<b>Owners of Vessels 50-75'</b>	131	62	89	43	33	24	24	386
% of vessels 50-75'	34%	16%	18%	11%	9%	6%	6%	100%
% of total	9%	4%	5%	3%	2%	2%	2%	26%
<b>Owners of Vessels &gt;75'</b>	55	28	9	11	8	5	2	114
% of vessels >75'	48%	23%	8%	10%	5%	4%	2%	100%
% of total	4%	2%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	8%
<b>Owners of Freezer/Longliners</b>	16	16	4	4	2	0	2	44
% of freezer/longliners	36%	36%	9%	9%	5%	0%	5%	100%
% of total	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%

Continued --

Sablefish

Figure 2.5.2 Ratio of IFQ Pounds to Average Landings



*closest to approved option*

**Notes:** Rule 2A: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use all 6 years (84-89).  
Rule 2B: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use best 5 of 6 years (84-89).  
Rule 2C: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use best 4 of 6 years (84-89).  
Ratios of less than 1 indicate owner will receive a smaller amount of IFQ lbs. than his average landings over the years in which he participated.  
With few exceptions the individuals that fished only one year are included in the first cluster. Those who fished two years are in the second cluster, etc.

range of the number of vessels that are consistent with the characteristics of the fishing trips that are expected to occur for each vessel class and area, the number of vessel and fishermen is indeterminate.

The cost model estimates of the total number of vessel operating days and the total number of fisherman days are 27,769 to 37,135 and 109,147 to 144,948, respectively, with partial adjustment to an IFQ program compared to 68,138 vessel operating days and 265,328 fisherman days without an IFQ program (Table 4.1). If each vessel is fully employed in the halibut fishery, there would be 147 to 192 halibut vessels and 584 to 756 halibut fishermen. However, if on average, each vessel spends only 50 days per year in the halibut fishery, there would be 588 to 768 halibut vessels and 2,336 to 3,072 halibut fishermen. These are in comparison to estimates of 3,769 vessels and 14,721 fishermen without an IFQ program.

#### 4.1.12 Effects of an IFQ Program on Harvesting Costs due to a Redistribution of Effort and Catch to More Profitable Fishing Operations

An IFQ program will decrease harvesting costs by providing each fishing operation with substantially more flexibility in determining how and when to harvest halibut. An IFQ program will also decrease harvesting costs by redistribution fishing effort from high to low cost fishing operations. It has been estimated that this redistribution would have reduced total harvesting cost in 1990, by approximately \$9.8 to \$12.7 million in total (Table 4.1). This is about \$0.20 to \$ 0.26 per pound of halibut. Combined with the cost saving due to increased flexibility, the model's estimate of the total harvesting cost saving with an IFQ program is \$45.8 to \$52.8 million, excluding the bait and gear loss savings included elsewhere.

#### 4.1.13 Effects of an IFQ Program on Harvesting Activity due to a Redistribution of Effort and Catch to More Profitable Fishing Operations

With one exception, the cost model estimates that the 61-90 foot vessel class is the lowest cost vessel class in each area. The exception is that in Area 2C, with a 50% reduction in catch per fishing day, the 36-60 foot vessel class has the lowest cost per pound of halibut landings.

With the redistribution of all effort and catch to the low cost vessel class in each area, it is estimated that there would have been 13,961 to 18,468 fishing vessel operating days and 72,842 to 96,977 fisherman days compared to 27,769 to 37,135 vessel days and 109,147 to 144,948 fisherman days with the partial adjustment to an IFQ program or compared to 68,138 vessel days and 265,328 fisherman days without an IFQ program.

As noted above, a range of numbers of vessels or fishermen could be associated with these estimates of vessel and fisherman days. If each vessel is fully employed in the halibut fishery, there would be 72 to 94 halibut vessels and 376 to 494 halibut fishermen. However, if on average, each vessel spends only 50 days per year in the halibut fishery instead of 200 days, there would be 288 to 376 halibut vessels and 1,504 to 1,976 halibut fishermen. These are in comparison to estimates of 3,796 vessels and 14,721 fishermen without an IFQ program. The redistribution of catch and effort to the most profitable vessel class for each area reduces the required numbers of vessel and fisherman days because landings per vessel day or fisherman day are higher for the most profitable vessel class than for most other vessel classes.

1990 levels

There are two reasons why the model may under estimate the effect of an IFQ program on employment opportunities in the halibut fishery. First, no adjustment is made in the number of crew members for a vessel class. Currently, there may be additional crewmen, who are only justified by

The following discussion of issues, costs and benefits of possible adoption of an IFQ program are based on a qualitative assessment of social impacts. As noted previously, it has not been possible to conduct a social impact study and this assessment is based on a survey of available literature.

### 5.3.1 Assessment of impacts

The discussion of impacts is organized by issue so that the reader can refer to the discussion of economic impacts in Sections 4.1 and 7.

#### 5.3.1.1 Provision of a harvest share

- a. The allocation of a QS to an individual is the allocation of a fishing privilege and not the allocation of a piece of real property. Further, the yearly poundage represented by the ratio of the QS to the TAC will fluctuate as the stock biomass changes. Currently, the biomass appears to be decreasing and thus the annual poundage of the IFQ will also decrease until the stock recovers and TAC is increased.
- b. The Council proposes to allocate QS and IFQ to vessel owners and qualified bareboat charterers who landed halibut in designated years. In so doing the Council will recognize the capital investment and risk taken by these individuals and/or companies. Crew and hired skippers have also invested time and labor as co-venturers paid through the vessel share system, but these investments are not recognized in the allocation of harvest shares proposed.
- c. Since the IFQ is proportionate to historic catches, and these have been declining over time (see Table 5.1), an individual vessel owner will not see any immediate increase in catches and will forgo the opportunity of "striking it rich" through fishing skill or luck, for the opportunity to expand fishing operations through the purchase of additional QS or IFQs. However, the vessel owner is assured of the opportunity to take the full poundage of an IFQ during the season, and not be subject to the need to take unnecessary risks in bad weather or in fishing practices in order to maximize harvests during an opening. Further, mechanical or other vessel problems can be resolved without missing the opportunity to fish for halibut, as was the case with, for example, engine failure at the beginning of an opening. A significant social and cultural impact of the introduction of an IFQ program is the switch from a "hunting and fishing" culture to a "farming" culture. For many the attraction and satisfactions of fishing as a life-style will fade with the introduction of quotas and the lessening of feelings of competitiveness and independence.
- d. The initial allocation of QS and IFQs will fix the maximum social parameters of the fishery. Access to the fishery, unless the Council and Secretary change the IFQ program through an FMP amendment, will be by purchase or lease of QS and IFQ or through inheritance in years after implementation of the program. Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 288 to 376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976 fishermen. This economically efficient fleet would be similar in numbers to that operating in the halibut fishery in 1978 (Langdon and Miller, 1984b), but with increased fishing power due to improved technologies. Since much of the rural Alaskan fishery operates within a mixed cash-subsistence economy, with different criteria of efficiency, availability of QS and IFQs to the present operators of the fleet of skiffs and medium-sized vessels will permit continuance of traditional fishing, but will not encourage economic growth in rural communities.

not true. according to AK. Comm. Fish. Entry Comm. 5-48 in 1978 1274 halibut permits were fished. (which is equivalent to 4000-5000 fishermen)

As noted above, this analysis is based upon a study of the literature related to the halibut fishery. The most recent survey of halibut fishermen, carried out in 1982 by Langdon and Miller, showed that 7 percent of the fishermen were residents of Washington State; 37.5 percent lived in Southeast Alaska (including Yakutat); 3.2 percent lived in Prince William Sound communities; 35.6 percent resided in Cook Inlet communities; 11.1 lived on Kodiak Island, and 3 percent in the Lower Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Of the Alaskan fishermen, 72 percent lived in urban communities.

The crews are typically paid on a crew-share/boat-share basis. This pattern of payment extends back to the early days of the halibut fishery. The Deep Sea Fishermen's Union (DSFU) founded in 1912, has represented the Puget Sound fishermen in negotiations about pay and conditions with the Fishing Vessel Owner's Association (FVOA) since 1914. This is the only example of organized labor-owner agreements in the fishery.

### 5.2.3 Relative economic importance of the halibut fishery

The literature survey has not provided sufficient specific information to assess the economic importance of the halibut fishery to communities. In general, there are few employment opportunities other than commercial fishing available to residents of rural Alaskan communities described in Section 5.1. In consequence, any change in the allocation of harvest rights to a fishery will have impacts on rural Alaskan fishermen and their communities. The commercial fishing industries of Kodiak, Seward and Sitka will be impacted by an allocation scheme, but it is difficult to predict from the literature survey what that impact will be; much will depend on developments in the halibut marketing and processing sector. The communities of the Upper Cook Inlet/Kenai Peninsula and Seattle have diversified urban economies, and changes in the allocation of halibut harvests will have little or no effect on the social and cultural systems of these urban areas. Seattle may benefit from an allocation scheme since it, and other Northwest ports, may regain landings lost to Alaskan ports. Other Pacific Northwest communities in Washington and Oregon will have some social impacts from an allocation program, but these will be relatively minor and will primarily affect vessel owners resident in those communities.

### 5.3 Analysis of the Alternatives

Two alternatives are being considered for the future management of the halibut fishery. Alternative 1 is the existing status quo in the fishery; that is, the fishery would continue as an open access fishery with harvest controlled through area-specific seasonal quotas. The fishery would continue as described in Section 5.1 above; increasing numbers of vessels and gear, leading to ever-shorter seasons and decreasing catch per unit of effort. The problems and issues related to continuation of the status quo fishery have been identified and listed in Section 4.0 above.

The second alternative under consideration by the Council is the introduction of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program for halibut fishery in the waters off Alaska. The Council is considering three variants of an IFQ program. However, all would allocate quota shares (QS) in the fishery to participants proportionate to their historical fishing records. After the total allowable catch (TAC) for a given fishing year has been specified, IFQs would be set. The IFQ would be the poundage equivalent of the proportionate ratio of QS to the TAC. Thus the amount available for harvest under an IFQ would vary each year with the size of the TAC. IFQs would be transferable under all variants of the program. In two variants of the program, portions of the TAC would be set aside for community development.

It is important to note that there are many rural Alaska coastal communities that rely heavily on halibut for subsistence purposes. These communities also rely, to some extent, on halibut for income in a commercial sense. Chapter 5 of this document provides a detailed description of these communities and their reliance on the halibut resource.

#### 4.1.18 Effects of an IFQ Program on the Economic Stability of the Halibut Fishery and Fishing Communities

On a year to year basis, industry members have no firm idea of whether or not they will be able to secure sufficient product. This is the case in terms of both short and long-term planning. In areas with only a few very short openings, if a vessel breaks down, a fisherman might miss all or a substantial portion of the season. Likewise, increased fishing effort does not allow processors to plan for consistent or orderly processing. The short-term discontinuities make planning difficult. Long-term plans can be made but, unlike some other industries, participants are not guaranteed access to halibut. Several towns in southeast Alaska, especially Petersburg, traditionally had longline fleets. These fleets now are partially diversified into other fisheries as a result of short halibut and sablefish seasons. Likewise, with an increase in the number of halibut vessels and stable or decreasing stocks, fishermen who had relied on halibut have had to turn to other fisheries in order to maintain their income. In some instances, increased effort or decreased stocks will cause fishermen to leave the fishery or the occupation. As fishermen switch fisheries or occupations their living standards may suffer. This is especially true in communities which offer few alternatives to fishing. In these communities, especially along the Alaskan coast, communities could experience reduced income and population.

The data presented in Table 3.20 demonstrates the volatility of participation in the halibut fishery. Of the 9,335 different vessel owners who participated between 1984 and 1990, 43% have done so for only one year while only 5% have participated all seven years.

The implementation of an IFQ program would result in significant changes in the halibut fishery. Initially, these changes would increase uncertainty and decrease stability. However, once the adjustments are made, IFQs would decrease uncertainty and increase the ability of fishermen and processors to plan their participation in the halibut fishery. By reducing the level of overcapitalization, an IFQ program will also tend to dampen the fluctuations in income and employment associated with changes in quotas and landings.

#### 4.1.19 Effects of an IFQ Program on Other Fisheries

By relieving pressure on the halibut fishery, a halibut IFQ program would tend to increase participation in other fisheries for two reasons. One reason is that participation in the other fisheries would probably increase as fishermen attempt to create a record of participation in the expectation that IFQs would eventually be used in those fisheries. The increased participation in the other fisheries would impose costs on fishermen who are already participating in those fisheries.

Another reason is that those who chose not to participate in the halibut fishery might be more likely to participate in the other fisheries. However, this redirected effort would likely be minimal due to the fact that most halibut fishery participants are already participating in other fisheries. The halibut season openings in the major halibut landing areas are only two days long currently and most fishermen are engaged in other fisheries during the rest of the year. Those that cease to fish halibut would be freeing up only a very limited amount of fishing time to direct at other fisheries. Additionally, most of the boats that fish halibut are small vessels under 50 feet in length whose

i.e.:  
fishermen  
dropout

opportunities to participate in other fisheries are very limited. This is particularly true of the vessels that would most likely not find it viable to continue in the halibut fishery; i.e., those that receive QS which amounts to substantially less than their average past landings.

There are other factors involved which may tend to increase pressure on other fisheries under a halibut IFQ program. If longline fishermen in other directed fisheries, such as Pacific cod and rockfish, are able to retain their halibut bycatch with IFQs, then their directed fishery for the other species may be more economically viable than before when they had to discard incidentally caught halibut. The marginal costs of harvesting halibut as bycatch are much lower than in a directed fishery situation. The attractiveness of this situation may induce additional participation in these fisheries as fishermen grasp an opportunity at a more economically efficient operation. In the recently instituted Canadian Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) program this situation apparently has occurred with respect to rockfish. Additional effort has been exerted in the directed longline fishery for rockfish, resulting in the total allowable catch of this species to be taken in a much shorter period of time than has previously been experienced (Zyblut, personal communication). Actually, there is a two-fold reason that the TAC was taken quicker this year than usual. Fishermen in the IVQ halibut fishery are now retaining the incidentally caught rockfish that were previously discarded in the fast-paced, open access fishery for halibut. These retained rockfish are now being reported and counted against the TAC.

A similar situation could likely occur in the Southeast Area off Alaska under a halibut IFQ system. Additional effort could be exerted against rockfish stocks, assuming an ability to retain incidentally caught halibut. Without the derby style "race for fish", unreported (and discarded) bycatch of rockfish in the directed halibut fishery would likely be reduced and these species would now be landed and the landings counted against the TAC. These combined factors would likely increase the possibility that the TAC for these rockfish species would be reached earlier than traditionally occurs. On the positive side, the IFQ program would result in much better accounting of the actual mortality of these species. The demersal shelf rockfish complex has a low TAC of 425 mt (1991) and mortality of this species in the directed halibut fishery is currently unknown. The IFQ system would likely result in fisheries managers having a more accurate understanding of demersal shelf rockfish stocks.

#### 4.1.20 Effects of an IFQ Program on Groundfish Discards in the Halibut Fishery

When there is a premium on the rate of harvest, the costs of taking the time to retain bycatch are higher. As a result, the bycatch of rockfish and other groundfish that might otherwise be retained is discarded in the current open access fishery. The mortality rate for the discarded rockfish is almost 100%, but much lower for other species. An IFQ program is expected to decrease the premium on the rate of harvest and to increase the amount of bycatch that is retained by halibut fishermen.

This will provide two types of benefits. It will increase the exvessel value of total catch because more will be retained. It will also result in less uncertainty concerning total fishing mortality for the species taken as bycatch in the halibut fishery.

Because rockfish typically have been discarded, it is not known what the rockfish bycatch rate has been in the halibut fishery. If a bycatch rate of 10% is assumed, as was done for the Canadian halibut fishery, approximately 7.0 million pounds of rockfish were taken in the Alaska halibut fishery in 1990. Using the average 1990 exvessel price of rockfish of \$0.24 (\$/lb round weight) for all gear or \$0.41 for longline gear, the potential exvessel value of the rockfish bycatch in the halibut fishery was from \$1.7 million to \$2.9 million.

## Effects Of NPFMC IFQ Plan On Coastal Communities

01/06/92

### Fleet Characteristics

In general, the fishing fleets of the coastal communities of Southeast, and certainly Sitka, are diversified, well-stratified small (less than 60') boat fleets that provide a living to many people. Stratified here means that there are vessels of all sizes included in the make-up of the fleets with the highest concentrations in the 35-50' range. Diversification refers to the fact that most fishermen depend on more than one fishery to provide the income needed to keep their business afloat. "Langdon and Miller (1983) reported that only 7.9% of the fishermen interviewed in Area 2C (Southeast) fished in just one fishery, while 42.9% fished in two directed fisheries, typically halibut and salmon. One-fifth of the fishermen in Langdon and Miller's sample fished for four or more species during the course of the year" (Council's Analysis, p. 8). Diversification has increased through the 1980s.

We believe that these characteristics are vital to the economic well being of the fleet and the communities they help support. Diversification helps stabilize income (and boat values) as it mitigates the effects of annual fluctuations within the different fisheries due to market conditions, stock conditions, etc. This year, for example, the low price of salmon would have been much more devastating locally had it not been for the fact that most salmon fishermen in Southeast participate in other fisheries. Well balanced stratification ensures an entry level in the fisheries, economic mobility, and a wide base of participation (jobs). "In the late 1970s and early 1980s, halibut was the second most important fishery in the Southeast region in terms of employment, ranking just behind salmon" (p. 7). This importance has not diminished through the 1980s. We believe that stratification and continued opportunities for diversification are critical to the well being of the coastal communities.

There are some key phrases you frequently hear repeated to justify the measure being proposed by the NPFMC in their approved Sablefish and Halibut Fixed Gear IFQ management plan. One that Clem Tillion is fond of is "too many boats chasing too few fish". Another is "overburdened with participants". The implication is that the pie is being cut into such small pieces that nobody really gets enough for sustenance. Figures from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (p. 1 and 2) show that yearly average gross earnings for participants in the halibut fishery fluctuates with price but, if you average out the most recent six years reported (1984-1989) and compare that with the previous seven years (1977-1983), (even if you eliminate 1980 - a very poor year), you can see an increase of over 30% in gross earnings, from \$20,289 to \$30,983. Yearly average pounds landed shows the same trend. In the black cod fishery, the figures are much more dramatic (p. 3 and 4). The increase is in the order of 250%. It is worth noting here that the black cod fishery has only recently become a domestic fishery. Until 1977 and creation of the 200 mile limit, it was primarily a foreign fishery which phased out over the next seven years. There had been minimal involvement in the fishery by domestic fleets until 1984 from which point domestic participation has increased to fill the void. In light of the above information and the perspective offered by Table 1a (p. 10) and 2.4a (p. 12) of the fisheries in Southeast, we find no evidence of plummeting catch rates and/or income but rather indications of economically viable fisheries that have provided many with a reliable source of at least part of their fishing income.

#### Impact of Initial Allocation

To be eligible for an allocation of quota share one must have landed halibut or black cod in one of the years 1988, 1989, or 1990. Quota shares are to be calculated based on one's average of their best 5 of 7 years (1984-1990) for halibut and the best 5 of 6 years (1985-1990) for black cod. An individual's average is then converted to a percentage of all qualifying pounds and one's quota share is represented by that percentage. One of the ironies of this method of allocation is that it tends to reward those most responsible for the "over-capitalization" so often cited as one

of the major problems associated with open access. According to Council figures there will be approximately 6,118 initial halibut IFQ recipients (compared to 4,059 permits fished in 1990) and 1,081 black cod IFQ recipients (compared to 670 permits fished in 1990).

Because of the method chosen for determining initial allocation of IFQs, quota share recipients with the least number of years as vessel owners with halibut and/or black cod landings (regardless of their overall history of participation in the fisheries) are put at a distinct, in some cases severe, disadvantage as to continuing and upgrading in the fishery.

Why would anyone sell? According to figures from the NPFMC analysis, over 40% of initial recipients in both the black cod and halibut fisheries will receive no more than 20% of their average landings and an additional 26% will receive less than 40% of their average (fig. 4.2, rule 3, p. 4-48 and fig. 2.5.2, p. 2-56 from the Council Analysis). Some of these recipients will be persons no longer active in the fishery or only casual participants. This is significant though as it creates a certain number of quota shares that will most likely be up for sale immediately;. It also impacts the initial allocations of those still active in the fishery. Fig. 4.4, rule 3, (p. 4-50) gives an indication of the impact of initial allocation to 1990 halibut participants. It shows that 28% of QS recipients will receive less than 21% of their 1990 landings and another 20% will receive less than 41% of their 1990 landings. Thus, about half of all halibut QS recipients will receive less than half of their 1990 landings and about 67% will receive less than half their average. Only about 28% of halibut QS recipients will receive better than 80% of their 1990 landings and less than 5% will receive 80% or better of their 5 year average. How many businesses will be able to survive that kind of impact to a significant block of their income? Without the ability to buy more quota shares, the impetuous to sell will be great. To quote the NPFMC analysis, "Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 288-376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976

fishermen (p. 5-48, for halibut fishery). This is in contrast to 4,059 vessels and 14,721 fishermen in the 1990 halibut fishery (NPFMC figures).

There will be tremendous competition for quota shares as they come on the market and that those able to pay the most will by and large be those vessel owners more favored by the initial allocation and with the more capitalized vessels. This effectively eliminates an entry level to all but the wealthy and assures further consolidation as fishermen retire and/or cash out of the fishery. There is not sufficient data in the Council Analysis to know exactly how initial allocation will impact Sitka (see p. 5-47, 5.2.3) but, if Sitka falls anywhere close to the averages, the impact to many vessel owners could be severe enough in the short term to see immediate fall-out and in the long run a steady decline in vessel participation (and boat values) as consolidation continues. In addition to this, there will be an immediate reduction of crew members, probably on an average of at least one per boat that remains in the fisheries, then 1-3 more as vessels drop out.

#### Protection Against Extreme Consolidation?

There is but one provision in the sablefish and halibut management plan (copy attached) approved by the NPFM Council that limits consolidation (fleet reduction) and that is the ownership and use caps for quota shares. The plan specifies that no individual or person (corporation, partnership, etc.) may own or utilize more than 1% of the combined Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands quota for sablefish and 0.5% for halibut and the same for any of the combined areas 2C; 3A and 3B; or 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E, and that, in areas 2C (Southeast), no more than 1% of the black cod or halibut quota shares or IFQs. Taken to the limit, this represents 100 vessels in the halibut and black cod fisheries in Southeast, as compared to 1990 levels of 1,486 and 329 respectively - a 93% reduction of participation in halibut and 69% reduction in black cod. In 1990, 278 Sitkans held halibut permits and 114 held black cod permits, with an average of 3.6 persons per boat (NPFMC figures).

The provisions that some like to call "protection to the coastal communities" are that quota shares or IFQs initially allocated "for any vessel category or any management area may not be transferred to other vessel category or any other management area" (Sec. C-3-iv of plan). The vessel categories are as follows: halibut - 1) freezer/longliner, 2) catcher boats, a) vessels less than or equal to 35', b) vessels more than 35 feet but less than or equal to 60', c) vessels more than 60'; sablefish is the same but without the less than 35' class break. Upon inspection, it is hard to find any protection from these provisions. For this to be significant, you would have to assume that boats in the two smallest size classes would be capable of harvesting much less than 1% of the quota. In area 2C, 1% amounts to (at 1990 quotas) 80,000 pounds of halibut and 125,244 pounds of black cod. There is no shortage of vessels in the less than or equal to 60' class capable of this level of annual harvest. As for the less than or equal to 35' class which applies only to halibut, look at Table 1b (p. 11). You will find that vessels in this size class took, on an average of the years 1984-1990, 18.4% of the annual quota for halibut in area 2C. At 1990 levels, that represents 1,472,000 pounds. If, for argument sake, you assume that initial allocation keeps this percentage (which it probably will not) and that it is only practical for a vessel in this class to harvest at most 1/2 to 1/3 of the 1% limit in Southeast (40,000-26,666 pounds), you are still talking about only 36-55 vessels in comparison to 673 vessels in 1990. Where is the protection against extreme consolidation?

The other measures of "protection" offered are that the owner of the IFQs must, in most cases, be aboard the vessel fishing the quota shares and that quota shares can only be sold or transferred to a U.S. citizen who is a "bona fide fixed gear crew member". (This is also ironically the "recognition" given to fishermen whose participation in these fisheries has been primarily as crew members.) A bona fide fixed gear crew member is "any person that has acquired commercial fish harvesting time at sea (i.e. fish harvesting crew) that is equal to 5 months of any commercial fish harvesting activity. Additionally, any individual who receives an initial allocation of QS will be considered a bona fide crew member" (Sec. 1-1 of plan). This is an effort to keep quota shares from

becoming owned and controlled by corporate interests. (The corporations being allocated QS are current fishing operations.) Though this may slow the process of consolidation down, what is the difference in the long run to the economic well being of the small boat fleet and the coastal communities if the rights to harvest in all the federally managed waters off the coast of Alaska are controlled by a few hundred very wealthy vessel owners or a handful of corporations, as is the case in New Zealand? It should be added that according to the Magnuson Act (Sec. 304-97-453, 99-659a, b, and c), the Secretary of Commerce has ultimate control over the final version of this plan and it is without a doubt that there will be heavy lobbying in Washington; D.C. to have as much of the "restrictive language" (i.e. 1% cap, vessel size classes, bona fide crewman provision, etc.) as possible removed.

#### IFQ VERSUS LIMITED ENTRY

This is not just another limited entry system. "Fishermen and managers should be aware individual quotas are not simply an alternative licensing system. The transition to IQs is a fundamental change that converts to private property that which has been a public or common property resource" (from A Commission of Inquiry into 'Licensing and Related Policies of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada), p. 36).

In the limited entry system instituted in the State of Alaska, the first thing that is done is to set a maximum number of permits to be issued based on the highest number of participants in any single year of the four most recent previous years. That number of permits is then issued. Eligibility is dependent on deliveries in a set base period. Permit recipients are then determined from those eligible through a point system whose criterion include, but not limited to, past participation as captain and/or crew, investment in fishery (ownership of vessel and gear), availability of alternative occupation, and income dependence (fishing versus non-fishing). The State is now just beginning the second stage of the limited entry process which is to set an optimum number (which could be either higher or lower than the maximum number) of vessels for each

limited fishery. The criterion for finding this number are being worked on now but must, according to the limited entry enactment law, reflect a reasonable balance of conservation concerns; an economically healthy and reasonable fishery; and hardship to fishermen.

The only thing this IFQ plan and the State limited entry system have in common is that eligibility is dependent on a set base period. There are no similarities beyond that point. State limited entry permit recipients are determined on a variety of criterion and then given equal access; this IFQ allocation is determined solely on poundage delivered. State limited entry gives only access to harvest; IFQs give absolute control over a certain percentage of the quota. State limited entry protects fleet participation; this IFQ plan is designed to reduce fleet participation through quota share consolidation. One of the glaring omissions of this plan is the lack of any parameters for optimum fleet size and an attempt to achieve that with as little disruption as possible.

### Conclusion

There is an endless variety in IFQ management schemes currently in effect. Many were imposed on fisheries already under a limited entry program, a much different scenario than using an IFQ system as a limited entry scheme. Some are freely transferrable, some are attached to vessels, some are non-transferrable, some are leasable, many are not. The formulas for determining quota share vary greatly, few rely solely on historic landings, some are all equal. Most, with New Zealand and Iceland being the main exceptions, have been applied to fisheries involving at most a few hundred participants (some less than 100) and more localized areas. Nothing of this magnitude has yet been implemented. Though there are benefits to individuals granted IFQs (which managers and beneficiaries are quick to applaud) high-grading and black marketing remain a problem in nearly all QS fisheries and some have seen radical quota reductions or even closure because of crashing stocks. It is also clear that, where allowed, consolidation is the rule and where uncontrolled, it is extreme. New Zealand is a good example of this. "Economists of the New Zealand Fishing Industry Board suggest that the

top 5-7 firms control between 70% to 85% of the quota (by weight)" (from Council Analysis, p. 1-22). (For more information on this, see "Quota Quagmire" attached.) Maybe the real test of the benefit of this plan will be how disruptive it will prove to be to the economic structure of the fishing fleets; how many people in the long run will be displaced or suffer extreme hardship. We believe this plan will lead to the fishing equivalent of agribusiness and the exclusion of the coastal communities from the fisheries.

There is no doubt that with the "derbies", fishermen take increased risk, that over-capitalization is encouraged, and that the grounds are overcrowded - all of which are the major causes of the problems associated with the fisheries (bi-catch, lost gear, etc.). These problems need to be addressed. Increased participation needs to be addressed, especially in light of falling quotas. But, the Council has chosen not to use the management tools set forth in the Magnuson Act (see Sec. 303 97-453, 99-659, 101-627) to address these problems. Many plans have been submitted to the Council which could go far to alleviate the problems associated with derbies but the Council has chosen instead to support a plan which amounts to economic allocation. This is totally unjustified and threatens to rip apart the complex economic fabric of the small boat fleets and radically reshape the fishery. Some will say this is only speculation and not the intent of the Council. If this is not the Council's intent, where is the language defining intent and preventing this from becoming reality? The Council's own analysis shows it is a distinct possibility.

prepared by Donna Donohue  
747-6467  
Bx 2993  
Sitka Ak 99835

The following coastal communities have all passed resolutions requesting analysis of the economic impact of this plan on the affected communities. The Council voted to approve the plan with <sup>out</sup> the analysis sought by the coastal communities and required by the Magnuson Act.

Anchorage

City of Seward

City of Homer

Whittier

Valdez

Kenai Borough

Cordova

Kodiak City and Borough

Soldotna

Alaska State Chamber of Commerce

South West Municipal Conference

Alaska Municipal League

Sand Point

Bristol Bay Borough

Unalaska

Ounalashka Corporation (Native Corporation Unalaska)

Sitka

April 16, 1992

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I believe the following questions should be brought up in opposition to the proposed I.F.Q. system.

Why has the "Economic Analysis on Coastal Alaska Communities" NOT been addressed in the March 27, 1992 "Supplemental Analysis" issued by N.P.M.F.C.? It was specifically requested by every city council to be impacted in Alaska.

Why did the N.P.M.F.C. amass a book of data, some of which was not previously made available, using three months to do so and gave the hard working layman one week to digest and comment on it?

The composition of the analysis that was supplied is deceiving. If you dig the pertinent statistics out of it and place them on a graph it is easy to see that boats 60' and above, though fewer in number and most of which will not deliver in Alaska, will be guaranteed a major portion of quota shares. The boats under 60', their crews and communities will be drastically impacted.

Many Alaskan communities are made up of and service fishing related enterprises. No resource has ever been attacked on the free enterprise scale.

Most of us Alaska resident fishermen cannot combat political attack on our livelihood. Many of us also believe the N.P.M.F.C. is not acting in a non-bias manner or with any consideration for Alaska's people except for two of the members. What is the motivation of the remainder?

Why is the Seattle Longliners Union given credit for a multitude of support votes and the State of Alaska only credited for one vote against?

We need help to stop the eminent destruction of our coastal communities. It is no secret that our stocks have declined since the factory trawl fleet increased.

Why are corporation able to lobby and sway government into taking positions detrimental to the working fisherman's right to work?

There should be legitimate concern for how our towns and people will be affected by this before it is done to us.

Please consider this a very small portion of opposition that exists.

Sincerely, *Harvey R Jones*  
*Box 7286*  
*Nikishka, Alaska*  
*99635*

March 24, 1992

Dear Sir

I wish to express to you my support of HJR 61 and SJR 38, which is before you regarding the individual fishing quota program for halibut and sablefish. You must understand and be aware that there are many Alaskans all over this state who are opposed to this plan, with just a few people, in a few areas in favor of it. This plan, if put into place, will mean much economic hardship for Alaskan fisherman and coastal communities.

In view of the declining state revenues from the oil industry, our state government leaders should be doing all that is possible to increase the economic benefits from the fishing industry. The IFQ program as proposed by the NPFMC is completely unfair to the vast majority of Alaskan fisherman.

A quota system, or trip limit system would be welcomed by Alaskan fisherman, but only if all Alaskan halibut and sablefish commercial fisherman are allowed to participate in the fishery.

Please help us in any way you can to stop the individual fishing quota program as proposed by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council. Thank you

Sincerely,  
Joseph C. Wierzbicki

# BIO ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

NORMAN STADEM  
ECONOMIST

1826 E. 26th Ave.  
Anchorage, AK 99508  
(907) 272-0908

April 16, 1992

Honorable Walter J. Hickel, Governor  
Office of the Governor  
State of Alaska  
Third Floor, State Capitol  
P.O. Box 110001  
Juneau, AK 99811-0001

Dear Governor Hickel:

## IFQs -- AN UNNECESSARY ENCROACHMENT ON FREE ENTERPRISE

The Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) management of sablefish and halibut is a shortsighted solution to extremely complex fishery management problems.

The key to "rationalizing" open access resources is to assign property rights and responsibilities to them. In the first instance, IFQ management program fails to completely "privatize" the fishery; secondly, it is redundant because other major issues can be resolved within the open access framework. These include weather related safety problems and year round supply of "fresh" fish.

Supporters claim that IFQs will deliver benefits similar to those achieved from privatizing farmland, timberland, oil wells, etc. But comparing the property rights vested in IFQs to those vested in land ownership is like comparing apples to oranges. In the first instance, IFQs will not privatize the fishery -- the fisheries will still remain "open access." IFQs will only privatize the right to leave the dock, to go on to the ocean and to harvest a given quota of fish. This is no different than licensing an airplane or a truck to haul freight -- the government issues annual licenses to haul freight. Once on the ocean, the "race for fish" will still dictate behavior.

The analogy of a "chain saw massacre" in the Chugach National Forest, used by Mr. Dean Adams in the April

5th issue of the Anchorage Times, is excellent. Paraphrased, the open access logging season opens and each logger is compelled to race to cut as many trees as possible (rule of capture) during the short season. This "race to cut trees" problem is easily eliminated in the forest by selling stumpage rights to parcels of timber. Each logger can then husband her/his own parcel and manage the harvest of her/his trees. If there are better trees on the neighbors' parcels, s/he can't just go and cut and take them. Property rights are clearly defined and readily enforceable -- each logger knows which trees belong to her/him and where her/his boundaries are.

If the IFQ concept were applied, however, each logger would be given a stumpage quota. Those who qualified for a quota could cut trees anywhere in the forest. Clearly, the incentive would be to race in and cut the best trees before other loggers get them (rule of capture is still operating). In this way the logger maximizes the market value of her/his limited quota.

Property rights to parcels of land work quite well because it gives the individual certain rights to use, and to enforce these rights to use, a specific location (location rights). IFQs do not give usage rights to location. Thus, we see that the attempt to privatize ocean fisheries, using a reasonably successful land-based model, fails. The IFQs do nothing to encourage husbandry of the resource. They will not eliminate the "rush for fish" that is associated with "open access." In fact IFQs encourage "high grading" in order to maximize value of ones quota.

So, we are left with a contrived and experimental application of property rights, the impact of which are unknown. We can show how private ownership of land has benefited society, but how will this hybrid work?

Two of the most often quoted reasons for imposing IFQ management is to improve safety and to make fresh halibut and sablefish available to consumers year round.

But the open access system can be structured to achieve these two objectives. A magnetized plastic "credit

card" accounting system (proposed for the IFQ program) would allow total flexibility under open access. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) or the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) would define the seasons in terms of two parameters. First, the individual fishers would be given a period and/or a quota. Then the time period in which the individual would be required to fish her/his period/quota is specified. For example, let's say a 24 hour halibut period could be fished any time from April 1 to June 30. The individual could then fish when the weather and the market conditions were deemed suitable. Check-in and check-out procedures would have to be specified.

The fish stocks are protected and managed by the NPFMC and the IPHC using the best scientific information available. Therefore, IFQs are not necessary for conservation purposes.

The safety issue is resolved because fishers will not feel compelled to fish in hazardous weather. "Fresh" fish will be more prevalent on the market year round. In addition, small boats will be able to achieve parity with the larger boats. Such an open access plan would avoid all the inequities of initial allocations which bias the IFQ plan against small boats; especially those that have suffered weather related set backs during the critical qualifying years.

The legacy of IFQ management will be to have given away Alaska's birthright to these ocean resources. Most Alaskans will not be able to buy quota shares (QS). (Please refer to page 3 of my February 6, 1992, paper for more detail.) Only operators with large initial QSs will be able to buy them by averaging the cost. The Division of Investment, Section A, permit loan is limited to 80% of the lesser of appraised value, or cost, up to a maximum of \$300,000. At \$10 a pound of QS, this will buy around 37,500 round weight pounds of quota. Just the down payment will be \$75,000, hardly pocket change to most coastal villagers. The debt service on \$300,000 at 10% over 15 years is \$39,500, annually. At \$1.60 per pound dressed weight, assuming 75% recovery, the total revenue from a 37,500 pound quota is \$45,000. This leaves the fisher with \$5,600 to pay all her/his other expenses including 30% crew

April 16, 1992


shares of \$13,500. Clearly, negative profit is an impossible situation.

We all would like to be handed a retirement package such as this. Many "high liners" will receive quota shares worth millions of dollars. This is what folks dream of when they go to Las Vegas. But, it is unconscionable that the State of Alaska should be a party to such a program, especially when it stands to deprive future Alaskans of economic opportunities.

Unless the Alaskan members of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council vote to rescind their December 1991 action, next week, Alaskans will be preempted from this "backyard" resource. Please urge them to do so.

The existing management program must be upgraded, but the IFQ program is not the answer for Alaska.

Sincerely yours,



Norman Stadem  
Economist

Copy to:

Senator

Adams  
Collins  
Cotten  
Duncan  
Eliason  
Fischer  
Frank  
Halford  
Hoffman  
Jones  
Kerttula  
Menard  
Pearce  
Pourchot  
Rodey  
Shultz  
Sturgulewski

IFQs -- UNNECESSARY

April 16, 1992

Uehling  
Zharoff  
Representative  
Baker  
Barnes  
Brown  
Bruckman  
Carney  
Choquette  
Davidson  
Davis  
Davis  
Donley  
Ellis  
Finkelstein  
Gruenberg  
Grussendorf  
Hanley  
Hudson  
Jacko  
Kubina  
Larson  
Mackie  
Martin  
Navarre  
Parnell  
Phillips  
Phillips  
Taylor  
Ulmer  
Zawacki



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Fisheries  
 committee name  
 committee on Sen. Res # 38, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Maria Rapone  
 Testifier  
FV / Rosy Alice  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address  
747-3722  
 Phone No.

10/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate  
Resource & Fisheries  
committee name

committee on

Sen Res # 30

dated

1-29-92

As a native of <sup>bill/subject</sup> Alaska I've been advised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.Q. proposal, the years chosen were those when I was ~~just~~ just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed:

Robin A. Lee

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

415 Monastroy St. Apt. X.

Address

747-3722 (message)

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptomise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and halibut.

I am opposed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no guarantee that individuals ~~involved~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~proposal~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea~~ ~~such~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch. I am against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource.

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK  
Address  
747 8902  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate Resource Fisheries  
committee name

committee on

Senate Res 38  
bill/subject

dated

1/29/92

I'm opposed to IFQ's. I've been part of the black cod + Halibut Fisheries since the middle ~~of the~~ 1970s. The IFQ plan will eliminate me from the fishery as well as the majority of people ~~and~~ who have taken risks and worked hard as crew members more than 1/2 my income is directly related to these fisheries. I am a boat owner making payments - will not survive with IFQ. I support SENATE Res 38.

Signed:

Thomas D. Wiley FBI SOWRAY  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

231 KATHLAN M-25 SITKA, AK, 99835  
Address

Address

747-5570

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the \_\_\_\_\_

committee name

committee on SENATE RES. 38 dated 1/27/91  
bill/subject

I AM OPPOSED TO THE IFQ  
PLAN AS PRESENTED BY THE  
NORTH PACIFIC MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.  
THE IMPACT ON THE COASTAL  
COMMUNITIES OF ALASKA HAS NOT  
BEEN ADEQUATELY ASSESSED.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Testifier

PL. SEQUOIA

Representing (Optional)

BOX 6384 SITKA AK.

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the LABOR, COMMERCE & RESOURCES  
committee name

committee on HOUSE BILL HJR 61, dated JANUARY 28, 1992  
bill/subject

I favor House Bill HJR # 61. Too many unknowns if IFQ should ever be imposed on the small fisherman. IFQ is designed to eventually eliminate the small timer and the village and would be a bonanza for the larger vessels. It appears to <sup>be</sup> a scheme to hurt Alaskan fisherman.

Signed: Mark Jacobs Jr  
Testifier

Litka Ooster, Gwich'in & Nuiya tribes  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 625 Litka Alaska 99835  
Address

(907) 747-8168  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

SENATE

Please enter into the record my testimony to the RESOURCES, FISHERIES  
committee name

committee on SENATE RESOLUTION # 38, dated JANUARY 28, 1992.  
bill/subject

I FAVOR THIS RESOLUTION IN THAT IF IFQ IS EVER IMPOSED  
ON OUR FISHERMAN, THE SMALL FISHERMAN AND MOSTLY VILLAGERS WILL  
BE SEVERLY IMPACTED AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATED. THIS IFQ  
IS DESIGNED TO HELP ONLY THE LARGER VESSELS, THERE ARE TOO  
MANY UNKNOWNNS IF IFQ BECOMES LAW.

Signed: Mark Jacobe Jr  
Testifier

Litka Oberster of Allegut of Haida tribes  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 625 Sitka, Alaska 99835  
Address

(907) 747-8168  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 68 / IFQ management dated 1-24-92  
 bill/subject

Dear Senator Jones,

I very strongly support SJR 68. I am without doubt that the approved IFQ plan passed by the NPFAC will be disastrous to the coastal communities, and a tragedy to all of Alaska. I am enclosing a copy of some information I put together for the Sitka Chamber of Commerce, along with the documentation for the analysis.

In addition I will say the more I read about & investigate quota share schemes around the

Signed: Donna Bernhoe  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 2993

Address  
Sitka AK 99835

Phone No.

2/17/92

Senator Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee

Dear Senators,

I was quite disturbed when I heard that my participation and that of many other voters in your recent teleconference on IFQ's was going to be a waste of our time and effort. If it is known to you that one of the committee members has killed the resolution by political manipulation, why put us through a charade as if you desire our opinions and information? I speak of the Seward Downtown Merchant's Association meeting of 2/14/92 at which Mr. Clem Tillion, the Fish Czar, stated that Senator Dick Eliason has the resolution Dead no matter what action you take. Even if some would wish to abandon the constitution, I ask that you assume what responsibility you can, and I reiterate my position below.

IFQ's " give to an individual the right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, converting common property to private property." A system that converts a public resource to private property does not fall within the definition of limited entry for the State of Alaska, i.e. limited access to a public resource.

The Alaska Constitution Article VIII section 15 reads "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State". The only exception is the amendment passed in 1972 creating limited entry - but IFQ's are not limited entry under the definitions of the State of Alaska. The proponents of IFQ's are not working on a constitutional amendment to allow ITQ's to be legal, they just ignore the law. The Attorney General's Office on January 15, 1992 wrote "...if an IFQ proposal is made which would violate the "open access" clauses of the state constitution we will recommend against its adoption." There can be no doubt that the IFQ proposal violates open access since that is the exact purpose for which it has been proposed.

X I call on you to honor your oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the State of Alaska and oppose any effort to impose this unconstitutional system on the citizens of Alaska.

*Paul K. Seaton*

Paul K. Seaton  
HC-67 Box 1253  
Anchor Point, AK 99556  
907 235-6342

X PS. I think it quite important that the wording preventing any State money, agencies or property be prevented from being used to implement or enforce ITQ's be retained in the final resolution.

# **CORRECTION**

**THIS DOCUMENT  
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED  
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource  
 committee name  
 committee on SR 68 / IFQ management dated 1-24-92  
 bill/subject

Dear Senator Jones,

I very strongly support SR 68. I am without doubt that the approved IFQ plan passed by the NPFMC will be disastrous to the coastal communities, and a tragedy to all of Alaska. I am enclosing a copy of some information I put together for the Sitka Chamber of Commerce, along with the documentation for the analysis.

In addition I will say the more I read about & investigate quota share schemes around the

Signed: Donna Benohoe  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 2993

Address  
Sitka AK 99835

Phone No.

World I become increasingly convinced that IFQ's are a very dangerous management tool. Privatization to this degree is extremely attractive to big money interests and plans too easily manipulated to be protective of the ~~interests of~~ <sup>interests of</sup> the citizens. I find this contrary to the spirit of the Alaska State Constitution & the Magnuson Act.

2/17/92

Senator Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee

Dear Senators.

I was quite disturbed when I heard that my participation and that of many other voters in your recent teleconference on IFQ's was going to be a waste of our time and effort. If it is known to you that one of the committee members has killed the resolution by political manipulation, why put us through a charade as if you desire our opinions and information? I speak of the Seward Downtown Merchant's Association meeting of 2/14/92 at which Mr. Clem Tillion, the Fish Czar, stated that Senator Dick Eliason has the resolution Dead no matter what action you take. Even if some would wish to abandon the constitution, I ask that you assume what responsibility you can, and I reiterate my position below.

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X I call on you to honor your oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the State of Alaska and oppose any effort to impose this unconstitutional system on the citizens of Alaska.

*Paul K. Seaton*

Paul K. Seaton  
HC-67 Box 1253  
Anchor Point, AK 99556  
907 235-6342

X PS. I think it quite important that the wording preventing any State money, agencies or property be prevented from being used to implement or enforce ITQ's be retained in the final resolution.

This was sent to Gov. Hickel as  
well as the NPFMC, Murkowski,  
Stevens etc.

2/21/92

Dear Governor Hickel

I wish to inform you that I oppose an Individual Fish Quota management system.

I support House Joint Resolution 61 and Senate Joint Resolution 38, and participated in the state-wide hearings on those two resolutions. The testimony was overwhelmingly IN FAVOR of these resolutions.

As an Alaskan resident, I ask you to utilize your position, as a representative of the people, to derail the attempts of Clem Tillion--the "chief instigator" behind the IFQ plan. Clem Tillion is an unpopular choice for a fisheries consultant, and in fact, espouses controversial and negative theories for fishermen. You are being misled and not given adequate information concerning this issue, by Mr. Tillion. I predict, as do others, that if the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council does NOT rescind its decision to go forward with IFQ's, YOU, Governor Hickel, will be held responsible--because you appointed Mr. Tillion.

IFQ's are not supported by the majority of Alaskan fishermen. They ARE supported by a small percentage of Seattle vessel owners and a handful of traditional Alaskan longliners---these people are a small fraction of the total fleet who will gain permanent access to a public resource. A resource that should belong to ALL Alaskan fishermen.

I encourage you to take note of the mounting opposition to IFQ's in the coastal communities. Fishermen are a major force in Alaskan politics and deserve your attention in this matter.

Mr. Tillion has not provided the "full story" to you, Mr. Hickel, if you believe that IFQ's are the ONLY solution. Enclosed, are some statistics, which you will find most enlightening.

Sincerely,

Chris and Lacey Berns  
Alaskans for Responsible Resource Management  
Box 26  
Kodiak, Alaska 99615

HALIBUT IFQ RECIPIENT STATISTICS

The following was tabulated by Linda Kozak and was based on preliminary tables provided by the staff of the NPFMC. The numbers are all for the preferred option which the Council adopted at the December, 1991 meeting. Percentages are rounded off.

Alaskan vessels who qualify for quota:	5,240	86%
Non-Alaskans and unknowns:	<u>876</u>	14%
Total vessels who qualify:	6,118	

\*\*\*\*\*

Alaskan vessels under 35':	2,819	54%
Alaskan vessels 36'-60':	<u>2,174</u>	41%
All Alaskan vessels 0 - 60':	4,993	95%
Alaskan vessels over 61':	247	5%
Total Alaskan vessels who qualify:	5,240	

*878 = non Alaskans*

\*\*\*\*\*

The following information is taken from the tables provided by the NPFMC staff and is preliminary. All extrapolations are utilizing the 1992 Alaska halibut quota. This number is not quite correct, as CDQs are not factored in.

1992 Alaska Halibut Quota:	42,000,000 pounds
Total Alaska share of quota:	30,240,000 pounds
<u>Average</u> Alaskan quota initially allocated:	5,771 pounds
Total Non-Alaskan share of quota:	11,760,000 pounds
<u>Average</u> Non-Alaskan allocation:	13,425 pounds

*2500  
AK's Fished  
84,700  
will not  
qualify at all  
for quota*

NOTE: The average allocation for non-Alaskans is more than double what the average Alaskan will get.

\*\*\*\*\*

The following information is taken from tables provided by the NPFMC staff and is preliminary. It is for both Alaskan and non-Alaskan owners. There is no breakdown of Alaskans vs. non-Alaskans for the following statistics.

2,003 (32.7%) of total recipients will get quota under 500#  
 2,645 (43.2%) of total recipients will get quota under 1,000#  
~~5,208~~ (82.7%) of total recipients will get quota under 10,000#.

*5058*

Utilizing the basic assumption that Alaskans represent the majority of the recipients of small amounts of quota, the following information is helpful:

Total Recipients under 500#:	98% Alaskan = 1,963
Total Recipients under 1,000#:	95% Alaskan = 2,513
Total Recipients under 10,000#:	90% Alaskan = 4,552 <i>10% non-</i>

NOTE: Remember that these are assumed numbers and the actual numbers are not available in the tables.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on 51238, dated 2-21-92  
 bill/subject

See attached sheet

Signed: Michael Reif Michael Reif  
 Testifier  
Listening C. Bd. Sitka Assembly / Speaking  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 2346, Sitka AK 99835  
 Address  
907-747-6005  
 Phone No.

February 21, 1992

My name is Mike Reif a member of the City & Borough of Sitka Assembly

Organizations that represent a broad cross section of this community have serious concerns about this IFQ plan. This concern is evident by the following passing resolutions demanding a socio economic study: The City and Borough of Sitka Assembly, The Sitka Chamber of Commerce, and The Alaska Native Brotherhood of Sitka

Now I speak to you as an individual. I am against this IFQ plan and support SJR38.

The issue in front of us is fishing harvest rights. The question is for whom and in what form. In answering that question we must remember that whatever we do for black cod and halibut, will probably set the precedent for all the other fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. A renewable multi billion dollar resource in an area twice the size of the state of Alaska. It is not difficult to determine why politically an IFQ was developed for black cod and halibut first and not pollock.

The founding fathers of this country had in front of them the issue of rights for a new nation. The solution that they found was based on principals that have served this nation well generation after generation. We have a single right - fishing harvest right - let be certain that we base that right on principals that will serve future generations well and not just solve today's problems.

What is the principal this IFQ plan is based on? It is based on the privatization of the harvest rights of public resource to eventually a few with no direct benefit to the public owners. Eventually according to NPFMC own study where we had 10 fishermen we will have 1 - a 90% fleet reduction. Future generation to enter these fisheries must capitalize it is estimated at 4 times the ex vessel fish price. Money has a cost! Lets say the annual harvest in the EEZ is 1B then the IFQ's will be worth approximately 4B. Today's fishermen are given 4 billion and tomorrow's generation must pay 4B just for the right to fish. Money has a cost! That cost will be paid by future fishermen to their banker and foreign and domestic investors. At 10% interest that amounts to 400M in debt serves annually.

This IFQ is bad social policy! It is a good thing we did not allow the oil companies to IFQ or privatize Prudhoe Bay. It is a good thing we did not allow the timber companies to IFQ or privatize our National Forest.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated? The principal are two

1. All the public owners are allowed access if they so desire with rational management.

2. If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few all the public owners should receive a direct benefit.

Alaskans better than most people should understand that principal.

The harvest rights to the public oil in Prudhoe Bay has benefited all owners of the resource and only a few entities harvest that resource.

Do not give the public multi billion dollars renewable harvest rights in an area twice the size the state of Alaska to eventually a few - the future Exxon of the the fishing grounds. Governor Hickle talks about the owner state owned by all Alaskans, and not the give away State owned eventually by a few large entities.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR 38, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

I Am For This. MEASURE AGAINST  
I.F.Q.'S. THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO  
MANAGE THESE FISHERIES FOR ALL  
FISHERMEN, INSTEAD OF A CHOSEN FEW.  
THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE I.F.Q. PROGRAM  
HAS LED TO THE COUNCIL IGNORING ANY  
OTHER TYPES OF MANAGEMENT. I FEEL THE  
IDEA OF ACTUALLY DIVIDING UP A NATURAL RESOURCE  
AND AWARDED THAT RESOURCE TO FISHERMEN  
WHO HAVE LOBBIED LONG AND HARD TO GET IT  
AWARDED ONLY TO THEM IS NOT A FAIR OR  
EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO OUR PROBLEMS  
THANKS,

Signed: Ernie Matteson

Testifier

E.G. MATTESON, Daughters Fish Co.

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6089 Sitka 99835

Address

747-4803

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on SSR 38, dated FEB. 19, 1992  
 bill/subject

I oppose IFQ implementation at this time because I do not believe that an adequate socio/economic study has been made. Moreover, I believe that an independent ~~socio/economic~~ company be contracted to do a socio/economic study. NOT NMFS who is ~~not~~ biased!

Signed: Susan Jeffrey Susan Jeffrey  
 Testifier

Myself  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 3363, Kodiak Alaska  
 Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the SENATE  
RESOURCES  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 38, dated 2/19/92  
 bill/subject

I SUPPORT SJR 38. I BELIEVE  
 THE <sup>STATE</sup> ADMINISTRATIVE COST OF TRACKING  
 FISH FOR TAX PURPOSES WILL HELP CRIPPLE  
 THE STATES ECONOMY FOR FISHERIES.

Signed: JOHN SEVIER  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 1933- Kodiak 99615  
 Address  
486 4886  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38-, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

I support sjr 38  
for REASONS to NUMEROUS  
to LIST

Signed: Chris Berns  
Testifier Chris Berns

Representing (Optional)  
Box 26

Address  
486-5291

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

SENATE  
RESOURCES

committee name

committee on

SJR 30

, dated

2-19-92

bill/subject

- WE SUPPORT SJR 30.
- WE OPPOSE HALIBUT & SABLEFISH  
IFQ'S:

Signed:

Jeffrey R. Stephan JEFFREY R. STEPHAN  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

UNITED FISHERMEN'S MARKETING ASSOCIATION,

INC.

Address

BOX 1035, KODIAK AK 99015

Phone No.

907-486-3453



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 38, dated 2/19/92  
 bill/subject

I support SJR 38 because I believe whether or not IFQ's are good or bad in concept, IFQ's in the context of the plan approved by the NPFMC in December spells economic disaster to many fishermen & the communities they live in. I am submitting along with this a summary of some of the points that are central to this issue. What is needed is a plan that has as its intent & clearly stated goal a ~~the~~ way to address the

Signed: Aurora Wanhoe

Testifier

myself & all concerned with continued access to the resource by citizens of the Coastal Communities.

Representing (Optional)

Box 2993

Address

Sitka AK 99835 (907) 747-6467

Phone No.

problems in these fisheries (which is the focus of any management plan) that assures continued access to the resource to the general citizenry, and a continued wide base of participation by fishermen in the coastal communities. NOT a plan that is designed to see fleet reductions, and encourages dramatic reductions, toward the ultimate end of an "economically efficient fishery" (that is - the fewest number of boats <sup>needed</sup> to harvest the resource, as opposed to many people making a living from the resource.)

problems in these fisheries (which is the focus of any management plan) that assures continued access to the resource to the general citizenry, and a <sup>continued</sup> wide base of participation by fishermen in the coastal communities. NOT a plan that is designed to see fleet reductions, and encourages dramatic reductions, toward the ultimate end of an "economically efficient fishery" (that is - the fewest number of boats <sup>needed</sup> to harvest the resource, as opposed to many people making a living from the resource.)

There is NOT a resource crisis. According to IPHC and NMFS biologists the halibut and blackcod stocks are in a healthy state. The declines being experienced are part of the natural cycles of the stocks. Halibut remains well above equilibrium levels. Blackcod is coming down from the all time highs of the mid '80's. *There are indications from 1991 halibut stock assessments that the decline may be decreasing.*

Figures from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission indicate the longline fisheries are economically healthy and viable. The years 1985-89 show a significant increase in fishermen's average annual gross earnings and pounds landed in both fisheries from the years 1980-84.

Ownership and use caps <sup>for</sup> the blackcod fishery are 1% of the total combined quota for the Gulf of Alaska/Bering Sea; for halibut .5% of the combined quota. This translates to 100-200 boats respectively, as compared to 1990 levels of 670 blackcod vessels and 4059 halibut vessels, a reduction of 85% in blackcod and 95% reduction in halibut participation. In 1990 there were 14,721 fishermen; this number is expected to be reduced to 1500-2000.

*(poundage)*  
For halibut, Alaskans will receive 72% of the quota; they represent 86% of initial recipients. Though these percentages seem to favor Alaskans, remember that the majority of Alaskans are receiving very small shares. The average Alaskan share is less than 1/2 the average non-Alaskan share. The significance of this will be seen as shares begin to change hands. "Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 238-376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976 fishermen" (Halibut EIS, p.5-48) Who will be in the best position to buy up "unprofitable" quota? Generally those more favored by initial allocation. For blackcod the outlook is even more ominous. 51% of the quota will go to non-Alaskan fishermen who represent only 28% of initial recipients.

This plan does NOT solve the bicatch problem. IFQs are not required by vessels to cover their bicatch in other fisheries. The Council has eliminated the halibut bicatch cap for non-directed fisheries for the first two years of implementation. There is no bicatch cap for rockfish or greycod and retention is required. It is reasonable to predict that this will eliminate the directed rockfish fishery.

This IFQ plan is NOT a conservation measure. It is an attempt to "rationalize" the fisheries that amounts to economic allocation.

*Donna Donohoe*

3



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Committee Senate  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

The issue in front of us is fishing harvest rights. This IFQ will probably set the precedent for all the fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. A renewable multi-billion \$ resource in an area twice the size of the state of Alaska.

The Founding Fathers of this country had in front of them the issue of rights for a new nation. The solution that they found was based on principals that have served this nation generation after generation. We have a single right - "Fishing Harvest Right" - lets be certain that our fishing harvest rights are based on principals that will serve future generations of Alaskans well.

What is the principal this IFQ Plan based on? It is based on the privatization of harvest rights of a public resource to a few with no direct benefit to the public owners. Eventually according to NPFMC where we had 10 fisherman we will have 1 - a 90% fleet reduction

That is bad social policy; another public resource managed under that principal is the mining law of 1872. That law allows large entities (foreign & domestic) to harvest public minerals with no direct benefit to the public owners. The principals of this IFQ will not serve us well over the generations

Signed: Michael Reif (Cover)  
Testifier

Listening in Assembly City of Sitka Writing as  
Representing (Optional) Individual

PO Box 2346, Sitka, AK  
Address

907-747-6005  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate  
Resource Fisheries

committee name

committee on

SR 38

dated

1-29-92

bill/subject

I am a Sitka resident and newcomer to the sablefish and halibut fisheries. I am opposed to the current IFQ proposal for the following reasons:

1) The divvying up of such a major resource into the hands of a few individuals I feel will have a very detrimental effect on the economies and lifestyles of the Coastal Communities of Alaska these fisheries support.

2) These individuals who, under the current proposal, would receive the lion's share of the resource, are rather arbitrarily chosen - they happened to be vessel owners in the qualifying years. Many fishermen who did not happen to fish their own vessels in those years actually have participated in the fisheries for as long as, or longer than, these vessel owners, yet receive no ~~portion~~ portion of the quotas.

~~I~~ I strongly support conservative long term management of the resource itself, but do not feel the current IFQ plan is an acceptable way to achieve this.

Signed:

Testifier

Laurie Mastrella

Representing (Optional)

POB 6407 Sitka AK

Address

Phone No.

# **CORRECTION**

**THIS DOCUMENT  
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED  
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Committee Senate  
committee name  
committee on SJR 38, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

The issue in front of us is fishing harvest rights. This IFQ will probably set the precedent for all the fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. A renewable multi-billion \$ resource in an area twice the size of the state of Alaska.

The Founding Fathers of this country had in front of them the issue of rights for a new nation. The solution that they found was based on principals that have served this nation generation after generation. We have a single right - "Fishing Harvest Right" - Lets be certain that our fishing harvest rights are based on principals that will serve future generations of Alaskans well.

What is the principal this IFQ Plan based on? It is based on the privatization of harvest rights of a public resource to a few with no direct benefit to the public owners. Eventually according to NPFMC where we had 10 fisherman we will have 1 - a 90% fleet reduction.

That is bad social policy; another public resource managed under that principal is the mining law of 1872. That law allows large entities (foreign & domestic) to harvest public minerals with no direct benefit to the public owners. The principals of this IFQ will not serve us well over the generations.

Signed: Michael Reif (over)

Testifier

Listening in Assembly City of Sitka Writing as  
Representing (Optional) Sitka Included

PO Box 2346, Sitka, AK  
Address

907-747-6005  
Phone No.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated?

The principal are 2.

1) All the public owners are allowed access if they so desire with rational management

OR  
2) If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few, all the public owners should receive a direct benefit.

Alaskans better than most people should understand that principal. The harvest rights to the public oil in Prudhoe Bay has benefited all the owners of that resource; only a few entities harvest that oil.

Do not give the public multi-billion ~~\$~~ dollar renewable harvest rights in an area twice the size of the State of Alaska to a few. Governor Hickel talks about the owner state (owned by all Alaskan residence) and not the give away state owned by a few larger entities.

Thank you  
Mike Ref



# Alaska State Legislature

Senate  
Resource Fisheries

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

committee name

committee on

<sup>SJR</sup>  
SR 38

dated

1-29-92

bill/subject

I am a Sitka resident and newcomer to the sablefish and halibut fisheries. I am opposed to the current IFQ proposal for the following reasons:

1) The divvying up of such a major resource into the hands of a few individuals I feel will have a very detrimental effect on the economies and lifestyles of the Coastal Communities of Alaska these fisheries support.

2) These individuals who, under the current proposal, would receive the lion's share of the resource, are rather arbitrarily chosen - they happened to be vessel owners in the qualifying years. Many fishermen who did not happen to fish their own vessels in those years actually have participated in the fisheries for as long as, or longer than, these vessel owners, yet receive no ~~portion~~ portion of the quotas.

~~I~~ I strongly support conservative long term management of the resource itself, but do not feel the current IFQ plan is an acceptable way to achieve this.

Signed:

Testifier

Laurie Mastrella

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6407 Sitka AK

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature



Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate  
Resources, Fisheries  
committee name

committee on Senate Resolution 38, dated  
bill/subject

1-29-92

I am in favor of Resolution 38. I am Retired from Civil Service. I work as a deck hand on Commercial fishing Boats. I also Hand trace and Halibut fish pulling Halibut gear by hand. Fishing supplements my income. Also Native People would depend more on State Government handouts if they are no longer able to fish Halibut if the IFQ Pass. Alaskans are losing their Right to fish Commercially. It's begining to be an out of state fishery.

Signed:

Pete J. Karras  
Testifier

Pete J. Karras

Self  
Representing (Optional)

Address

936 Stogunton Sitcha AK

Phone No.

747-3978



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the S. RES.  
committee name

committee on S.J.R. 38, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

I am against S.F.R.  
Because should put a lot of small  
Boats out of work  
and a lot of deck hands out to.  
That's what we don't need right  
now. I oppose S.F. 2.

Signed: Gene Whitson  
Testifier

opposing IED Management System  
Representing (Optional)

Box 1818  
Address

SITKA AK  
Phone No. 747-3342



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

<sup>Senate</sup>  
RESOURCE Fisheries  
committee name

committee on

SENATE Res 38, dated  
bill/subject

1/27/92

NINE years deckhanding BLACKCOD + HALIBUT

I will miss this season and now HAVE A TAX PROBLEM AS A RESULT. I'll TAKE MEY lumps.

I WORKED FOR A SHARE (ONE SHOULDER'S WORTH)

There HAS to BE A COMPROMISE:

NO IFQ

Unless deckhands get in IFQ the percent relation to crew share off gross stock from those years and got proof of TAXES PAID on crew SHARES

Signed:

Scott Saline SCOTT SALINE  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

Bx 3183 Sidka

Address

747 5570

Phone No.

To: Senate Resources, FSM  
on Senate Joint Resolution No. 39

As a commercial fisherman, owner-operator, who has also crewed, from Sitka, Alaska I wish to comment on the I.F.Q. (Individual Fisheries Quota) management scheme recently passed by the N.P.F.M.C. (North Pacific Fisheries Management Council). I am in opposition I.F.Q.'s for the following reasons:

**Job loss and job displacement** - There will be significantly less need for as many crew members. A boat which carries a 6-person crew might be able to do the job with a 3-person crew. A boat like mine which needs 3 persons on board to harvest halibut would only need 2 or I can possibly do the work myself. To maximize profits, Quota holders would certainly use less crew members.

**Seafood processing workers** - Since there would be a minimal amount of delivery ports, the remaining ports would lose employment. Seattle would also receive much more product which would take jobs away from established Alaskan ports leaving job loss and job displacement in its wake.

**Quota availability and centralization of quota** - My ability to purchase Quota share will be very limited because of the exceeding high (potential) cost of quota shares. I'd be competing against fisherman with funds made from selling their quota poundage who would have considerable backing from banks and other sources.

**Crew member and new-comers** who would like to purchase Quota shares would also be at a great disadvantage. The price per pound will likely be highly inflated.

**Centralization of Quota shares** is sure to happen. Fisherman who want to maximize their Quota are only limited by percentage of quota held. I believe by creative leasing or other angles Quota will be centralized in the years to come. With monopoly of the resource a probability.

This centralization will certainly harm Alaskan's, especially in small towns and villages. Their buying power is generally no match against established fisherman who would have funds on hand from harvesting their I.F.Q. and many will have financial backing also.

Stressing my points again - crew members, new-comers, fisherman with limited buying power, villagers and others who live on a lower and or different monetary system or scale, will find it very difficult to obtain I.F.Q.'s. This will lead to centralization and probable monopolies.

I.F.Q.'s are not the only alternative available!! Therefore, I'm asking the Secretary of Commerce to reverse the decision by the N.P.F.M.C. on this historic and detrimental management scheme.

As my representative I ask you to support the many individuals and communities in opposition to I.F.Q.'s.

Sincerely,

John Murray  
F/V Dorothy  
P.O. Box 6031  
Sitka, AK 99835

372



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resources, Fisheries  
committee name

committee on SENATE Resolution 38, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

SITKA ALASKA NATIVE BROTHER HOOD  
SUPPORTS SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 38,

THE I.F.Q. SYSTEM WILL LOCK LITTLE  
BOATS AND HAND LINE BOATS TO A VERY SMALL  
QUOTA. LITTLE BOATS WILL NOT BE ABLE  
TO ADVANCE TO LARGER BOATS UNDER THE  
SMALL QUOTA THEY WILL BE LOCKED INTO  
UNDER THE I.F.Q. SYSTEM

THE LARGER BOATS FROM LOWER 48 STATES  
WILL TAKE OVER THE FISHERIES UNDER I.F.Q.  
MANAGEMENT, LIKE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SEINE  
AND TROLL FISHERIES. ONLY LARGE LIMIT BOATS NOW  
DOING THE SEINING AND TROLLING IN ALASKA FROM  
LOWER 48, NO MORE SMALL BOATS LEFT IN ALASKA.

*Herman Kitka*

Signed: HERMAN KITKA SR

Testifier

SITKA ALASKA NATIVE BROTHER HOOD

Representing (Optional)

109 METLAKATLA S SITKA AK. 99835

Address

(907) 747-8119

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resources  
committee name

committee on SSR 38, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

I am for SSR 38 & Against the IFA presented by the WPFMC.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated  
The Principal are 2.

1) All the public owner are allowed access if they so desire with rational management

or

2) If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few all the public owners should receive a direct benefit like the oil from Prudhoe Bay to Alaska.

This IFA is a giveaway to a few with no direct benefit to the public owners  
This is bad social policy

Signed:

[Signature]  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

PO Box 2346, Sitka, AK 99835

Address

7476005

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38, dated 1-29-1992.  
bill/subject

I am for STR38, because basically I feel it is wrong to give a public resource to a few individuals.

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately cause extreme consolidation, this in turn would eliminate the income base to many small fishermen.

This in turn would cause financial hardship on them and many coastal communities.

Moreover it would be virtually impossible for the average newcomer to get into fishing.

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman - E/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114 H. HPR. SITKA, AK. 99835  
Address

747-7452  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Recessed Fisheries  
 committee name  
 committee on Sen. Res # 38, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Marla Rapone  
 Testifier

FV / Rosy Alice  
 Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address

747-3722  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource  
committee name

Committee on HJR 61, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

I am for HJR 61 - because basically I feel  
it is wrong to give a Public Resource to a  
few individuals

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately  
cause extreme consolidation, this in turn  
would eliminate the income base to many  
small fishermen.

This in turn will cause financial hardship  
to them and many coastal communities  
moreover it would be virtually impossible  
for the average Newcomer to get into fishing.

Also it will pose problems in legality and  
then too it will open the door for  
bribe-marketing

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisher & Sons F/V Marden  
Representing (Optional)

3114 H. H. P. R. Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

247-7452  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptomise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and Halibut.

I am opposed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no guarantee that individuals ~~is~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~the~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea fish~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch I AM against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK

Address

747 8902

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource & Fisheries committee name

committee on Sen Res # 30, dated 1-29-92

As a native of <sup>bill/subject</sup> Alaska I've been raised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.Q. proposal, the years chosen were those when I was ~~just~~ just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota, (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed: Robin A. Lee  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
415 Monastory St. Apt. X.  
Address

747-3722 (message)  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource  
committee name

committee on HJR 61, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

I am for HJR 61 - because basically I feel  
it is wrong to give a Public Resource to a  
few individuals

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately  
cause extreme consolidation, this in turn  
would eliminate the income base to many  
small fishermen.

This in turn will cause financial hardship  
to them and many coastal communities  
moreover it would be virtually impossible  
for the average Newcomer to get into fishing.

Also it will pose problems in legality and  
then too it will open the door for  
black-marketing

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman F/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114th H.P.R. Sitka, AK 99935  
Address

217-7452  
Phone No.

10/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Fisheries  
 committee name  
 committee on Seafood #38, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Marie Rapone  
 Testifier

FV/Rosy Alice  
 Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address

747-3702  
 Phone No.

16/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38, dated 1-29-1992  
bill/subject

I am for STR38, because basically I feel it is wrong to give a public resource to a few individuals.

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately cause extreme consolidation, this in turn would eliminate the income base to many small fishermen.

This in turn would cause financial hardship on them and many coastal communities.

Moreover it would be virtually impossible for the average newcomer to get into fishing.

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman - F/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114th HPR. Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

747-7452  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

*J.F.G. and unfair to most fishermen.  
Too much gear is on the ground by some boats.  
Why not limit the amount of gear a boat can have  
on board, regardless of size of boat & make a boat  
bring in the gear that he goes out with.*

Signed: John A. Smith  
Testifier

"FV Melody's"  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 2462 Sitka AK. 99835  
Address

1-907-747-6975  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated Jan 29, 1992  
bill/subject

I am opposing IFQ's. IFQ's will hurt me & my family. I do support some kind of management program like limited entry with non transferable permits. With non transferable permits the NPFMC could eventually obtain over time a manageable number of permits. IFQ's will take many jobs from crew members

Signed: Kevin S. Mulligan Kevin Mulligan  
Testifier

F/V Sylvia  
Representing (Optional)

#1 Breathless Inc.  
Address

907-568-2246  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptom ise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and halibut.

I am oppossed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no gutantee that individuals ~~involved~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~the~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea~~ ~~fish~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch I AM against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK  
Address  
747 8902  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource & Fisheries committee name

committee on Sen Res # 30, dated 1-29-92

As a native of Alaska <sup>bill/subject</sup> I've been raised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.O proposal, the years chosen were those when I was ~~just~~ just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota, (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed: Robin A. Lee  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
415 Monastery St. Apt. X.  
Address  
747-3722 (message)  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Fisheries committee name

committee on Senate Res 34 , dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

Let IT be known that I am opposed to the I.F.Q. Plan. I was crewmember during the time that most of the people who will benefit from I.F.Q.'s had smaller vessels such as my self now. They were ~~not~~ allowed to venture into these fisheries to become aggressive and prosperous members of this community. Why should I be denied the right of this? Because ~~it~~ IT took me years just as IT did these people as an aggressive ~~fisherman~~ fisherman to move onward to my own vessel. Remember when they were making there way me and many others were there right working for our share of the fish also.

Signed: Charlie J Bower

Testifier Charlie BOWER

F/O Esther

Representing (Optional)

P.O. 6407

Address

MESSAGE - 747-6662

Phone No.

1.31.92

I am opposed to the proposed IFQ system. I do not believe IFQ's are not the solution to the problems in the Halibut and Sablefish fisheries.

Limiting fishermen to a certain number of pounds is limiting his ability to make a living. Gear restrictions are a better method of control. By limiting fisher's gear to 20 skates for boats under 60 feet and to 40 skates for boat over 60 feet, the fishermen are able to catch more fish but aren't using so much gear that they can't get it all back.

Another thing to look at is how much money gets back into the economy from 1 large catcher compared to several small boats. The majority of large boats return to Seattle with their fish or the money from the sale of their fish. The proceeds from several small boats is returned to the economy of the state.

Another way to do this would be limited entry. Seeing how well the salmon limited entry program has worked, should tell us that method could work for Halibut and Sablefish also. Our ability to make a living is not limited, but the amount of gear fished would be limited and as a result so much gear would not be left on the grounds.

over

I feel we are over ridden by far too many government agencies and regulations. The state should be in charge of waters to 200 miles.

If Jim to diversify, as Clem Tillion told us we must do, last year during Bristol Bay strike, Drift Gillnet salmon to other fisheries, I cannot be limited to my present 1970 under 35' boat. I must be allowed to upgrade to a newer, larger boat.

I've been fishing Halibut since I purchased my boat and Cook Inlet drift permit in 1983. Prior to 1983 I worked as a boat puller in Cook Inlet.

My whole life is invested in fishing. Jim not going to give up without a fight.

Jim St. Peter  
 Jim St. Peter  
 47356 DIACHRIM LANE  
 PO Box 1458  
 Kenai AK 99611



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
committee name

committee on SJR 38 - IFQ'S, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

The Kodiak Chamber of Commerce supports SJR 38  
 In opposition to any Individual Fishery Quota plan.  
 We urge the Legislature to Adopt this Resolution  
 AND Bring pressure to Bear on the North Pacific  
 Fishery Management Council AND the National Marine  
 Fisheries Service to complete an in Depth Socio-Economic  
 Impact Study Prior to this plan moving any Further  
 in the Council process. Additionally, we urge  
 the Council AND NMFS to complete an in depth study  
 on the cost of Implementation AND enforcement of  
 this IFQ proposal. ~~BE~~ UNTIL these studies are  
 completed we urge the Council to HOLD in ABEYANCE  
 any further action on the IFQ proposals.  
 PLEASE PASS in the AFFIRMATIVE SJR 38

Signed: WAYNE A. STEVENS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Testifier

KODIAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Representing (Optional)

BOX 1485 KODIAK AK 99615

Address

486-5557

Phone No.