

**ALASKA LEGISLATURE COMMITTEE FILES 1991-1992 8672**

**7048 HOUSE LABOR & COMMERCE**

Countervailing recommendations are also part of a statewide approach to insure that utility proposals are compatible with statewide overviews and objectives.

The three prototypical approaches to integrated resource planning are three points along a continuum. At one end (utility planning approach), planning consists of the state developing utility reporting requirements and reviewing utility reports for compliance with requirements. In this case, the utility regulatory commission is heavily dependent on the utility to do the planning. At the other end (statewide and countervailing approaches), planning consists of the commission developing plans or analyses against which utility plans are compared for consistency. This approach gives the public planning entity the greatest degree of independence in the planning process.

The State of Nevada, a leader in the development of integrated resource planning, has developed comprehensive statutes and rules which establish integrated planning. Additionally, Nevada has reviewed the statutes of other states implementing integrated planning and identified components important to the planning process as follows:<sup>28</sup>

- 1) **Planning Process Integration:** Integration involves two aspects; substance and procedure. Substantively, integration includes a forecast of future demand and a comprehensive analysis of demand and supply options available to meet or alter demand which are then unified to derive the "least-cost" resource plan. On a procedural level, regulators strive for integration of utility rate making and utility construction permit proceedings to ensure that the resource process actually takes hold and leads to long-term economic benefits to ratepayers and financial health for the utility.
- 2) **Sufficient Methodological Specification:** Specification of the methodology and models to be used by the utilities is necessary to insure: 1) use of state-of-the-art approaches; 2) consistency over time between plan filings by various utilities; and 3) the establishment of a systematic review process for interested parties and regulators. This methodological specification must not be so rigorous, however, as to thwart innovation by utility resource planning staffs.

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<sup>28</sup>Jon B. Wellinghoff and Cynthia K. Mitchell, "A Model for Statewide Integrated Resource Planning," Public Utilities Fortnightly, August 8, 1985, p. 20.

## ENERGY PLANNING

- 3) **Required Implementation:** Integrated planning is accompanied by action plans detailing the means by which utilities plan to acquire and implement resource options with cost-effectiveness being the key priority.
- 4) **Utility Responsibility for Plan Creation:** If the expertise and data for plan development originate within the utilities, utilities are likely to stand behind their plans and use them in a variety of internal and external decision making processes. By placing primary responsibility for creation and coordination of plan components within the individual utilities, successful plan implementation is more readily assured.
- 5) **Plan Enforcement:** Unless the regulatory process provides for an effective enforcement mechanism to ensure that utilities adequately conduct the planning process and follow through with the acquisition and implementation of resource options, the entire process becomes little more than a futile exercise. Regulatory integration of the planning process can greatly facilitate enforcement of the planning process.

### EXAMPLES OF INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING AT WORK

This section provides practical examples of integrated resource planning in the Pacific Northwest and Southern California. The Northwest Power Planning Council was developed following the very expensive Washington Public Power Supply System construction "mistakes" in the late 1970s. Southern California Edison is an excellent example of one utility's creative response to state legislation requiring utility planning. These examples were chosen because each emphasizes planning for uncertainty to maximize flexibility and minimize costs. Because of the volatility of Alaska's economy, this approach to planning is especially pertinent. In addition, the Pacific Northwest has considerable surplus electrical generating capacity--similar to conditions in many Alaska communities.

### Pacific Northwest Planning

The Northwest Power Planning Council is responsible for electrical energy planning for the Northwest Region (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana) as required by the Federal Northwest Power Act.<sup>29</sup> The council's planning strategies are particularly relevant to the Railbelt and some other areas of Alaska, because the Northwest, like the Railbelt, currently has a large surplus of power and future demand levels are uncertain. The council utilizes an integrated resources and risk minimization planning approach. All potential demand- and supply-side options are evaluated for their ability to provide an adequate and reliable supply of electrical energy at the lowest possible cost; most efficient options are added to the region's energy portfolio. Risk minimization is accomplished through the recognition of the shifting nature of energy demand projections and addressing this uncertainty by defining the probable boundaries of potential energy growth. To do this, the council develops high, medium-high, medium-low, and low electrical growth forecasts for twenty-year periods. These forecasts are continually monitored and updated on a two-year cycle.

The range of forecasts serves two important functions. First, it is an explicit statement that the future is uncertain and that the council does not base decisions on the traditional "most likely" forecast. Rather, the council evaluates the consequences of specific actions across a wide range of possible futures. Second, the forecast range represents the council's judgment on the potential futures for which the region should plan and invest.

The council attempts to maximize flexibility by identifying options with short lead times, small sizes, and/or low capital costs. Short lead times allow for greater adaptability to unforeseen changes in demand. Smaller plant sizes make it easier to match resources to loads. Options with lower capital costs tend to reduce risk because they reduce the amount of money that has to be committed to any one project. Conservation is considered a highly flexible option in the Pacific Northwest. The region has a large supply of potential conservation measures which cost much less than building generating capacity. Conservation also helps reduce uncertainty because more energy efficient building and end uses are more resistant to changes in energy prices and are therefore less likely to contribute to fluctuations in power demand or switching to other fuels.

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<sup>29</sup>Chapter 12H-Pacific Northwest Electric Planning and Conservation Act, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, December 5, 1980.

## ENERGY PLANNING

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The Pacific Northwest region also uses a resource options strategy to add flexibility to the scheduling of options that require a great deal of time from inception to completion. Under this strategy, an option moves through the time-consuming but relatively inexpensive siting, design, and licensing, after which it can be scheduled, placed on hold, constructed, or terminated, depending on the demand for electricity. The cost of developing resource options is typically very small compared to the costs associated with construction. Furthermore, options substantially reduce the lead time required for constructing generation capacity. By having a licensed or readily licensable power project effectively "on hold," the period over which electricity needs must be forecast can be reduced to the construction period, which is as little as half of the total time that is now needed. The objective of the effective options planning strategy is to move decisions involving the commitment of large sums of capital as close as possible to the anticipated time power will be needed. This significantly reduces the likelihood of beginning construction on a project that is not needed. The council has analyzed the value to the region of being able to option resources. It found that this two-stage decision making process could save the region \$700 million across the 20-year range of future load growths.

The council's planning process consists of three steps: 1) initial determination of resource needs; 2) selection of cost-effective supply- and demand-side options; and 3) selection of the final resource portfolio and action plan. The council's planning begins with an extensive analysis to determine the range of future electrical energy growth in the region over the next 20-year horizon, based on economic and demographic projections and the price of alternative fuels. Forecasts of future electricity prices are also a key factor in forecasting future electricity use. As previously described, the forecasts characterize the range of uncertainty by providing estimates of four growth patterns for electrical demand (high, medium-high, medium-low, and low).

In the second step, the council estimates the availability, reliability, and cost of both generating and conservation resources; cost analyses include environmental impacts or costs. To most accurately estimate the costs of potential resources, their use is simulated with the existing power system to determine the actual costs to the region. This analysis also determines the compatibility of each alternative with the existing power system. The council then analyzes the lowest cost combinations of all resources to meet the entire range of potential energy needs. Non-discretionary resources are first added into the portfolio. These are cost-effective resources whose timing cannot be scheduled or controlled by the power system. For example, the opportunity for energy savings in new residential and commercial buildings will occur when the buildings are built. In contrast, discretionary resources can be scheduled by the power system to produce energy when they are needed.

The council also identifies "lost opportunity resources." A lost opportunity resource is a potential electrical power generating or conservation option currently available to the region which, if not acquired or currently secured, will no longer be available and cost-effective. If a lost opportunity is not secured, it will have to be replaced in the future by a less cost-effective option. Conservation standards for energy efficient construction of new residential and commercial buildings are an example of a lost opportunity resource the Northwest Region is currently pursuing.

The final step in the planning process is the application of electricity costs (from the resource portfolio determined in step two) to the forecasting system. The resulting forecasts of energy needs are then used to fine tune the amount of options needed.

The council's planning strategy is based on a societal perspective. The objective of the council's plan is to minimize total system costs, whether these costs are borne by utilities--and thus reflected in electric rates--or by individuals, businesses and governments acting in their own self-interest. This approach does not necessarily result in the lowest electrical rates in the short term; but instead minimizes the long-term cost of serving all ratepayers in the region.

#### Southern California Edison

As at many other utilities, resource planning at Southern California Edison (SCE) had traditionally been dominated by a single load forecast which defined the resource requirements necessary to meet the load with an adequate safety margin. This process worked quite well during decades of steady growth and few surprises. As the business environment began to change, starting in the late 1960s, the process of load forecasting and resource planning became more complicated. The SCE's initial response to this new planning environment was to develop more sophisticated forecasting models and more extensive data bases. It took some time to realize that more sophisticated forecasting methods were not the problem's cure. Planning had become more complicated not because the forecasting models were inadequate, but because frequent surprise events made their underlying assumptions inappropriate. This observation led to SCE's new resource planning philosophy: planning for uncertainty.

## ENERGY PLANNING

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A review of SCE's resource plans since 1965 indicates that out of a total of 34,000 megawatts of "planned" resource additions, only 9,000 megawatts were actually built. In all cases, the cancellations took place with projects in early stages of conceptual planning or design. As a result, SCE did not incur any major engineering or construction costs in canceling these planned resources. Despite the fact that forecasts were, on average, twice as high as actual growth rates experienced, the separation of forecasting functions from planning functions--and consequent consideration of alternative scenarios and responses--allowed SCE to respond to "low" demand in time to come up with the "correct" plan of action. Learning from this experience, SCE changed the focus of their planning from predicting future events to responding efficiently to change.

The SCE analysis starts with an effort to identify how the future could unfold under a wide range of assumptions. Alternative economic conditions, growth rates, and regulatory, environmental, technological, social, political and business environments are considered. Future scenarios consisting of plausible combinations of these parameters, including many surprise events, are postulated and their potential impact on electrical service and customers are evaluated. Each scenario leads to a set of outcomes affecting economic growth, employment, income, housing, trade, financial services, industrial activity, and so on. Since demand for electrical services is a derived demand, SCE's growth rate is a function of these other variables.

In the early stages of SCE's analysis, it became clear that many alternative scenarios result in similar consequences relative to the need for new resources. That is, even though they were caused by different factors, their impact on SCE's resource requirements would be similar. This reinforced the importance of focusing on the consequence of scenarios as opposed to the events or scenarios themselves. Subsequently, the scenarios were grouped based on their consequences. In 1986, the outcome of this consolidation process was 12 sets of scenarios or consequences which encompassed a wide range of potential futures. These consequences formed the boundaries of a forecast range similar to the council's forecast range previously described.

Since there is no way of knowing which one, if any, of the scenarios will occur, SCE's resource planning process focuses on developing a flexible action plan which covers the entire set of possible outcomes. To achieve this objective, the resource plan consists of a number of strategic elements that can be rearranged in a variety of ways to accommodate any plausible scenario. Using these strategic "building blocks," SCE can accommodate a range of growth outcomes from four percent annual growth to one-half of one percent annual decline during the next ten-year period. The strategic elements in SCE's plan include:

Extended or Shortened Use of Oil and Gas Units--This offers a number of options that may be exercised in relatively short order depending on the need for capacity and the type of load. The useful life of many aging plants may be extended or plants may be mothballed as needed. In addition, units can be modified to meet base, intermediate, or peaking load requirements.

Transmission Network--The availability of excess capacity at other utilities allows SCE to use their existing and planned transmission network for purchases of economy energy. In recent years, this has saved SCE customers billions of dollars.

Qualifying Facility Resources--Power generated by independent entities and sold to SCE under PURPA-type contracts has grown in significance during the past several years. Qualifying facility (QF) projects are generally nonutility financed and have short development times. Managing QF development to conform to changing requirements through appropriate price signals provides an additional element of flexibility to SCE's resource planning process.

Energy Management--During decades of demand-driven, generation-focused planning, customer demand was considered as a "given" and supplies were planned to meet it no matter what the cost. The SCE is increasingly focusing its attention on managing and modifying its load with a variety of load management options. The SCE believes that the key to customer-side load management is time-of-use differentiated pricing and marketing strategies which provide sufficient incentives for customers to modify their consumption patterns.

New Resources--In addition to the above-mentioned options, SCE maintains a number of conventional and nonconventional new resources in its inventory. Many are modular in nature and can be brought on line in a relatively short period of time. These include all types of capacity: base load, intermediate, and peaking.

## ENERGY PLANNING

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The use of strategic elements to develop alternatives provides the basic ingredients of SCE's flexible integrated resource plan. The success of SCE's planning process is evident in its ability to respond to a wide range of possible growth scenarios in the future. The SCE's planning methods have been widely acclaimed and emulated by other utilities.

## CONCLUSION

In theory, integrated resource planning is a framework within which all reasonable options for meeting electrical power demand are considered to provide the most cost effective system. In practice, states and utilities are finding that IRP maximizes flexibility in addressing the uncertainties of future power needs in the late 1980s and beyond. Integrated resource planning is worthy of consideration in Alaska's energy future. Alaska's economy and its dependence on natural resource development and extraction makes the demand for electricity particularly subject to volatility. Therefore, an energy program that plans for uncertainty and maximizes flexibility is likely to provide maximum benefits to all consumers of electricity in Alaska.

In the following chapters, the history of energy planning in urban (Chapter Two) and rural (Chapter Three) Alaska is reviewed. Then, the current energy situation and programs are assessed from an IRP perspective and suggestions are offered for near-term efforts. The final chapter explores the implementation of IRP for future energy planning in Alaska.

**EPRI**

Electric Power  
Research Institute

Topics:  
Demand-side planning  
Demand-side management  
Planning  
Financial planning  
Least-cost planning  
Integrated value-based planning

EPRI EM-6133  
Project 2982-2  
Final Report  
December 1988


## Status of Least-Cost Planning in the United States

Prepared by  
Barakat, Howard & Chamberlin, Inc.  
Oakland, California

Electrical resource planners in nearly every state either use or are considering least-cost planning (LCP). At least 43 states have functioning LCP strategies or are considering, developing, or implementing a planning process that will ensure the most cost-effective mix of new generating facilities and demand-side management (DSM). In most of these states, regulatory commissions or legislative bodies lead the development of LCP procedures through mandate or through active encouragement of nascent utility LCP processes.

At least 17 states have functional LCP strategies (see Figure 1). Commissions in many of these states enforce least-cost planning through a variety of regulations and filing requirements, often using plant authorization or rate cases as the forum. Legislatures in at least 12 of these states have supported the process either by passing LCP laws or by giving authority to the commissions to establish and enforce regulations. Utilities in a few of these 17 states practice LCP without regulatory or legislative mandates.

**Figure 1**  
**NATIONWIDE STATUS OF LEAST-COST PLANNING**



An additional 8 states are beginning to implement LCP strategies through legislative, regulatory, or utility action. Regulatory planners are developing or actively considering LCP in 18 more states. Eleven of these 18 states are preparing LCP rules for regulatory or legislative review. The other 7 states are examining LCP through commission studies or legislative task forces. Seven states are not actively considering LCP.

## Seeing the Light on Energy

*Why would a utility company give away light bulbs?*

The state Public Utilities Commission recently guided California's four biggest private power companies back into energy conservation by letting them count as profits some of the power they saved.

But the law says the commission can't tell municipal utilities what to do, so it was obviously on its own initiative that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power decided to give away energy-saving light bulbs. Talk about seeing the light.

The goals are the same—reducing the need to build new generating plants. Four of the biggest private utilities expect to spend \$560 million over five years on conservation. That will save enough energy to eliminate the need for a new

300-megawatt power plant. DWP will spend \$80 million a year on its own programs, among them dispensing bulbs that use about one-fourth as much power as standard bulbs.

Not entirely by coincidence, the Natural Resources Defense Council, which helped write the PUC's conservation formula, helped the department find an Oregon consultant to help with its bulb deal.

DWP crews will start calling the utility's 1.3 million customers shortly after the first of the year to promote the program. They plan to give between four and eight bulbs to each household, and even show up at houses and apartments to screw the bulbs in. The brightest bulb is 100

watts, which burns on only 27 watts of power. DWP says the bulbs will go in sockets that are used the most, not in closets and basements.

Promoting these bulbs has taken off in recent years. Southern California Edison Co. will soon give away its millionth low-energy bulb to low-income customers.

But there is a catch. Utilities probably cannot give bulbs away indefinitely, and even though the energy-savers last up to 10 times longer than standard bulbs, the initial cost runs between \$8 and \$10.

Retailers so far hesitate to stock bulbs costing that much more than others. Stores are the next hurdle, says NRDC. Based on its record so far, it will find a way.

# Utilities Rush to Profit From Selling Less

By DAVID STIPP

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Perhaps the most radical recent change on America's energy horizon started not in the Middle East but in Rhode Island.

Last December, regulators there were the first to give profit incentives to utilities for investing in energy conservation. Regulators in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York and California recently adopted similar rules, and those in several other states are expected to follow soon.

The new rules foster a strange logic: Utilities now can boost earnings by paying customers not to buy their main product.

The companies once simply built power plants to make megawatts and money. Now they're rushing to invest in the "negawatt" business: handing out or helping customers buy high efficiency light bulbs, air conditioners and electric motors, and sharing in the savings by charging higher rates.

That has sparked the economic equivalent of war on electricity waste. Utility investment in negawatts "has gone ballistic in the past 18 months, from a million-dollar business to a billion-dollar one," says Thomas Feller, an energy analyst at Cambridge Energy Research Associates in Cambridge, Mass. In the Northeast, where dire power shortages were foretold a few years ago, some utilities now project "flattening demand [for power] or a downturn in demand," largely due to conservation.

The change is being fostered by some odd couples. Utilities and environmental groups—after years of tangling over nuclear power, acid rain and other issues—have teamed up to push through the new rate rules. This blossoming "collaborative"—a utility industry buzzword—has become "very significant to utilities and to national energy policy," says John Bryson, chief executive of SCEcorp, parent of Southern California Edison Co.

The breakthrough alliance was formed by the Conservation Law Foundation, a Boston environmental group, and New England Electric System, Westboro, Mass., which serves customers in three New England states. They jointly drafted the first of the new rate rules and ushered them through state regulatory channels.


Meanwhile, California's version of the incentives was being formulated by the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group, that state's utilities and some other organizations. The NRDC also recently joined with Pacific Gas & Electric Co., San Francisco, to push the federal Energy Department to make conservation the cornerstone of its forthcoming national energy strategy.

"There's been a major philosophical and cultural shift toward conservation" among utilities, says Douglas Foy, execu-

## The Power of Conservation


### Energy-Saving Technologies

Replacing existing devices with more efficient ones could cut U.S. electricity consumption over time by 31.3%, according to a utility group. Here are the group's estimates of which areas the savings would come from:



### Meeting Demand With Efficiency

Pacific Gas & Electric, the nation's largest utility, expects conservation programs to meet three-quarters of its new demand for electricity by 2000. How its electricity savings will grow along with rising demand to offset the need for power plants:



tive director of the Conservation Law Foundation.

Regulators "for a long time have been telling utilities to go forth and spend money on conservation. [but the companies] weren't responding aggressively" before the incentives, says Susan Tierney, a Massachusetts utility commissioner. The problem, says John W. Rowe, New England Electric's chief executive, "was that we didn't see how we could afford to spend much money on something that both added costs and lowered revenues." Utilities traditionally have been allowed to charge customers for the costs of conservation programs. But that didn't offset the lost revenues from the programs, he adds, so "there was no way we could make money on them. The rat has to smell the cheese."

The cheese that regulators are beginning to offer utilities is a return on energy-saving outlays that is roughly equivalent to the returns they've traditionally made by investing in power plants. This year, New England Electric will spend \$66 million on conservation, says Lawrence J. Reilly, the utility's director of rates.

The program will save customers an estimated \$154 million; stringent monitoring overseen by regulators will verify the savings. The utility expects to get back its \$66 million of costs plus a \$7.4 million profit incentive awarded under the new rules.

Overall, the rules "have turned conservation from being the most controversial expenditure I have to deal with to being the most profitable investment I make," says Mr. Rowe.

The California Energy Commission, which sets state energy policy, recently projected that such programs and other ef-

ficiency measures will meet three-fourths of the state's increased demand for electricity between now and 2001. PG&E alone says it expects to spend up to \$2 billion on conservation programs over the next 10 years. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York recently announced plans to spend \$4.1 billion on conservation by 2005. New England utilities are committed to spending \$1 billion to \$2 billion on "collaborative" conservation programs between 1990 and 1994, according to the Conservation Law Foundation. That will displace the need for at least several new power plants, at one-half to two-thirds of the cost of building them.

The programs—and the incentives behind them—are popular with environmentalists because they will lower power-plant emissions that contribute to acid rain, urban smog and suspected global warming. Utilities, for example, contribute about 35% of U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide, the main "greenhouse" gas, says Armond Cohen, an energy expert at the Conservation Law Foundation. As energy demand grows world-wide, he adds, conservation precedents set now by U.S. utilities "will be copied elsewhere and leveraged into enormous future benefits." Even Sweden, known for its energy-efficient ways, recently sent officials to New England to study its conservation programs.

# Backgrounder

March 1990

## Big Savings From Small Sources

How Conservation  
Measures Up

Bonville  
POWER ADMINISTRATION



**Payback on the Conservation Investment**  
**BPA Conservation Spending and Savings as of Sept. 30, 1989**  
 Includes Budget Obligations and Contractual Commitments

Activity	Purpose	Savings (megawatts)	Cost to BPA (\$ millions)	Life-cycle cost/kWh to BPA (1988 \$)
<b>Direct-Savings Programs</b>				
<b>RESIDENTIAL SECTOR</b>				
Residential Weatherization	Install weatherization measures in existing electrically heated homes.	87 MW	\$393	2.7c/kWh
Residential Hot Water	Wrap electric water heaters in homes.	37 MW	\$ 34	2.6c/kWh
<b>COMMERCIAL SECTOR</b>				
Street and Area Lighting	Convert to lighting systems that are more energy efficient.	16 MW	\$ 49	2.3c/kWh
<b>INDUSTRIAL SECTOR</b>				
Conservation/Modernization	Modernize aluminum smelters to increase their energy efficiency.	95 MW	\$ 46	0.6c/kWh
Energy Savings Plan	Make energy efficiency improvements in manufacturing processes.	3 MW	\$ 3	0.4c/kWh
<b>AGRICULTURAL SECTOR</b>				
Irrigated Agriculture	Convert to lower-pressure sprinkler systems.	3 MW	\$ 2	0.4c/kWh
	<b>Total — Evaluated Programs, measured</b>	<b>241 MW</b>	<b>\$527</b>	<b>1.8c/kWh avg.</b>
	<b>Total — Unevaluated Programs, estimated</b>	<b>50 MW*</b>	<b>\$ 75</b>	<b>3.0c/kWh est.</b>
	<b>Total — All Direct-Savings Programs</b>	<b>291 MW</b>	<b>\$602</b>	<b>2.0c/kWh</b>

**Codes and Standards Support**

Improve energy-efficiency of new buildings and appliances. Includes savings by 2010 from actions taken through Sept. 30, 1989, in code adoption, through Super Good Cents, Blue Clue, and related programs.

100-400 MW	\$129	N/A
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**Technical Support Activities**

Develop regional infrastructure energy conservation; improve conservation technology; develop techniques to measure program savings. Includes program evaluation, research, state and local government support.

N/A	\$139	N/A
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**Total Conservation Investment**      \*\* \$870 million

\* 41 MW and \$66 million are in the commercial sector; 9 MW and \$9 million are industrial.

HB

135

(7)  
Date Referred: February 12, 1991

FURTHER REFERRALS:

Resources  
Finance

Date of Committee Action: 3/31/92

The LABOR AND COMMERCE Committee considered:

HB 135

HOUSE BILL NO. 135

PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT

"An Act enacting and entering into the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

be replaced with CSHB 135 (L+C) [ ] the same title

[ ] a new title

[ ] have attached amendments(s)

[ ] do pass

[ ] do not pass

[ ] no recommendations

individual recommendations

[ ] additional referral to the \_\_\_\_\_ Committee

ADOPTS: \_\_\_\_\_ letter of Intent

ATTACHES NEW FISCAL NOTE(S): (Dept) \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVES PREVIOUS: (Dept/Date) \_\_\_\_\_

fiscal impact DEC

[ ] fiscal note(s) \_\_\_\_\_

[ ] zero fiscal note \_\_\_\_\_

[ ] zero fiscal note(s) \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNING DO PASS:

SIGNING OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

	Check appropriate column:	Do Not Pass	No Rec	Amend
	David Doyley		✓	
	Leon Matar		✓	
	Kevin P. Parnell		✓	
	Kevin L. Gaylor		X	
	Greg S. ...	X		

Chairman's Signature

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA  
1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Bill No. HB135

Revision Date: March 19 Department Affected: Environmental Conservation  
 Title: Pacific Ocean Resources Compact BRU: Environmental Quality  
 Component: Environmental Quality Projects  
 Sponsor: Navarre, Grussendorf, Ellis, etc. COMPONENT SERIAL  
 Requestor: \_\_\_\_\_ NUMBER 1016

Expenditures/Revenues: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97
PERSONAL SERVICES	56.7	56.7	56.7	56.7	56.7	56.7
TRAVEL	40	40	40	40	40	40
CONTRACTUAL	441.5	441.5	441.5	441.5	441.5	441.5
SUPPLIES	9	9	9	9	9	9
EQUIPMENT	9	9	9	9	9	9
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
<b>TOTAL OPERATING</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>
<b>CAPITAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>REVENUE</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

FUNDING: (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

GENERAL FUND	556.2	556.2	556.2	556.2	556.2	556.2
FEDERAL FUND						
OTHER						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>	<b>556.2</b>

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME	1	1	1	1	1	1
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

Estimate of current year impact: No current fiscal year impact.

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary.)

See attached

Prepared By: Lynn Kent  
 Division: Environmental Quality

Phone: 465-2630  
 Date: 3/19/91

Approved by Commissioner: *Ann A. Jensen*  
 Agency: Department of Environmental Conservation

Date: 3/27/91

Distribution (by preparer): Legislative Finance, Legislative Sponsor, Requestor, OMB, & Impacted Agency (ies).

depending on the funding formula and the extent of the compact's mandate.

General funds are shown as the funding source. The Oil and Hazardous Substance Release Response Fund could be considered as a back-up source if a determination was made that this use is consistent with the purposes of the fund.

Personal Services

1 Environmental Specialist III	56.7
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Travel

Estimated for staff and three appointed representatives to attend meetings of the compact	40.0
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Contractual

Includes Alaska's estimated contribution to support the compact and five staff positions	441.5
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Supplies

	9.0
--	-----

Equipment

	9.0
--	-----

Total	<hr/> 556.2
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STATE OF ALASKA  
House of Representatives  
District 27

Representative Cliff Davidson  
Chairman  
House Resources Committee



Box V, Juneau, AK 99811  
(907) 465-2487  
Box 746, Kodiak, AK 99615  
(907) 486-8250

TO: Representative Dave Finkelstein, Chairman  
House Labor and Commerce Committee

FROM: Representative Cliff Davidson 

DATE: 31 March, 1992

SUBJECT: House Bill 135

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact legislation was simultaneously introduced in Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon and California in February 1991. The intent of the legislation is to provide a coordinated and continual effort to: 1) prevent spills of substances dangerous to the environment and the fisheries of the Pacific Ocean, and 2) provide a uniform set of standards for matters such as contingency planning and financial responsibility.

Upon introduction, the compact legislation in each of the states was identical. Since that time, various modifications have been made. It is a legal requirement that before Congress can act on a compact, essentially identical legislation must pass through each state legislature. Only after consistent legislation has passed in the various states and Congress has approved the compact does the legal authority exist for the compact to operate. For those reasons, I am today offering a proposed committee substitute that is identical to the current Senate version. At the present time, this version better conforms to the legislation currently under discussion in the other coastal states.

Thank you for this hearing on House Bill 135.

7-LS0700D✓  
Dierdorff  
3/31/92

CS FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 135 ( )  
IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  
SEVENTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

BY

Offered:  
Referred:

Sponsor(s): REPRESENTATIVES DAVIDSON, Navarre, Grussendorf, Ellis, Brown, Gruenberg, Kubina,  
Finkelstein, Koponen, Moyer

A BILL

FOR AN ACT ENTITLED

1 "An Act enacting and entering into the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact."

2 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

3 \* Section 1. AS 46 is amended by adding a new chapter to read:

4 CHAPTER 47. PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT.

5 Sec. 46.47.010. COMPACT ENACTED AND ENTERED INTO. (a) The Pacific Ocean  
6 Resources Compact as set out in AS 46.47.020 is enacted into law and entered into on behalf of  
7 the state. This compact shall take effect after two or more of the states of California, Hawaii,  
8 Oregon, or Washington ratify the compact in substantially the same form as set out in  
9 AS 46.47.020 and consent is granted by the Congress as required by section 10, Article I, of the  
10 Constitution of the United States.

11 (b) In addition to the states named in (a) of this section, the Province of British Columbia  
12 may become an associate party to the compact, without voting power. Upon request of the  
13 Province of British Columbia and approval of the Congress, the Province of British Columbia  
14 may become a full party to the compact with the same rights and powers as the party states.



1 its territorial sea and responsibility for management of many marine resources and ocean uses;  
2 each party has unique natural resource, social, economic, and political conditions for which local  
3 management by the individual party is the most appropriate;

4 (5) the parties now do not have an effective means to address mutual concerns  
5 related to transport of oil and hazardous substances in waters within and beyond the party's  
6 jurisdiction that may jeopardize ocean resources and uses important to one or more coastal  
7 parties;

8 (6) the 1983 Presidential Proclamation of the 200-mile United States Exclusive  
9 Economic Zone has created the opportunity for all coastal states to more fully exercise and assert  
10 their responsibilities pertaining to the protection, conservation, and development of ocean  
11 resources under United States jurisdiction;

12 (7) citizens of the Pacific states and the Province of British Columbia are  
13 increasingly concerned with the environmental integrity of the ocean and protection of all ocean  
14 resources;

15 (8) recent studies conducted in the wake of major accidental releases of oil or  
16 hazardous substances have concluded that the existing system of response to spills fails to  
17 provide adequate protection to ocean resources in the following ways:

- 18 (A) inadequate personnel training and qualifications;  
19 (B) weaknesses in vessel design and integrity;  
20 (C) insufficient traffic management;  
21 (D) gaps in regulatory oversight;  
22 (E) incomplete cost recovery by the states or provinces; and  
23 (F) a lack of information about the marine and coastal environments;

24 (9) a spill or discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from an ocean-going vessel  
25 has the potential of causing major regional effects.

26 (b) Therefore, the purpose of this compact is to

27 (1) assist in the promotion of interstate commerce by providing uniform regulation  
28 of the transportation of oil or hazardous substances within the compact zone;

29 (2) provide a legal mechanism to regulate certain ocean activities within the  
30 United States Exclusive Economic Zone that the parties cannot now individually regulate;

31 (3) enhance regional sovereignty over issues of critical importance;

- 1 (4) direct federal agencies to act in the best interest of the region;
- 2 (5) foster regional cooperation and pooling of resources to reduce costs and  
3 increase effective use of scarce resources;
- 4 (6) enhance the oversight and supervision of activities of concern to the parties;
- 5 (7) address issues of mutual concern to the Pacific states and the Province of  
6 British Columbia and enhance the parties' influence over activities of concern that are not now  
7 addressed through existing compacts, including
- 8 (A) spill prevention;
- 9 (B) transportation of oil and other hazardous substances;
- 10 (C) spill response planning; and
- 11 (D) environmental monitoring and research;
- 12 (8) foster cooperation and coordination among the parties in order to increase the  
13 effectiveness of the individual party's ocean laws and programs;
- 14 (9) provide technical assistance to parties for ocean activities covered by this  
15 compact;
- 16 (10) provide for formal participation by the Province of British Columbia with  
17 the compact to more fully address issues of regional concern;
- 18 (11) ensure that the citizens of the region have opportunities to participate in  
19 discussions and deliberations of regional ocean resources issues;
- 20 (12) establish an innovative system under which the parties can represent their  
21 shared interests within the compact zone, including
- 22 (A) the maintenance and protection of common ocean resources; and
- 23 (B) vessel transportation of oil and other hazardous substances;
- 24 (13) establish uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment for  
25 vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances within the compact zone and to provide  
26 oversight for the implementation of these standards and regulations by federal agencies, states  
27 or provinces, and private industry;
- 28 (14) promote more coordinated management of ocean resources that are of mutual  
29 concern;
- 30 (15) provide a forum for the regional coordination of the individual parties' plans  
31 for the management and protection of those areas of the Pacific Ocean and adjacent waters over

1 which the compacting parties jointly or separately now have or may acquire jurisdiction.

2 ARTICLE II  
3 DEFINITIONS

4 In this compact,

5 (1) "compact" means the representative body created by Article IV of this  
6 compact;

7 (2) "compact zone" means the portion of the oceans bordering the parties within  
8 the 200-mile exclusive economic zone;

9 (3) "hazardous substance" means an element or compound that, when it enters in  
10 or on the water, presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare or  
11 the environment, including fish, animals, vegetation, or a part of the natural habitat in which they  
12 are found; "hazardous substance" includes a substance designated under 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(2)(A),  
13 an element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated under 42 U.S.C. 9602, a  
14 hazardous waste having characteristics identified under or listed under 42 U.S.C. 6921, a toxic  
15 pollutant listed under 33 U.S.C. 1317(a), and an imminently hazardous chemical substance or  
16 mixture with respect to which the administrator of the United States Environmental Protection  
17 Agency has taken action under 15 U.S.C. 2606;

18 (4) "navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the  
19 territorial sea;

20 (5) "oil" means crude petroleum oil or any other hydrocarbon, regardless of  
21 gravity, that is produced at the well in liquid form by ordinary production methods, and any  
22 petroleum products or petrochemicals of any kind and in any form whether crude, refined, or a  
23 petroleum byproduct, including petroleum, fuel oil, gasoline, lubricating oils, oily sludge, oily  
24 refuse, or mixed with other wastes, liquefied natural gas, or propane;

25 (6) "party" means a state or province that ratifies this compact as provided in  
26 Article III of this compact;

27 (7) "representative" means an individual appointed as provided in Article IV of  
28 this compact to represent a party;

29 (8) "vessel" means a watercraft or other artificial contrivance that is constructed  
30 or adapted to carry, or that carries oil or hazardous substance in bulk as cargo or cargo residue,  
31 and that

- 1 (A) operates on the navigable waters of the compact zone; or  
2 (B) transfers oil or hazardous substance in a place subject to the  
3 jurisdiction of the United States.

## ARTICLE III

## OPERATIVE DATES

4  
5  
6 (a) Except as provided in (b) of this article, this compact shall become effective when  
7 this state and one or more of the states of California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington ratify the  
8 compact and the consent of the Congress is or has been granted as required by section 10,  
9 Article I, of the Constitution of the United States.

10 (b) This agreement shall become operative as to the Province of British Columbia as a  
11 full party upon request of the Province of British Columbia and approval of the Congress.

## ARTICLE IV

## PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT

12  
13  
14 (a) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is created and shall have its offices within the  
15 territorial limits of one of the parties, shall carry out its duties and functions in accordance with  
16 this compact, shall continue in force and effect in accordance with this compact, and, except as  
17 specifically provided in this compact, may not be considered an agency or instrumentality of the  
18 United States for the purpose of any federal law. Each party participating in this compact shall  
19 appoint three persons, subject to the applicable laws of the appointing party, to undertake the  
20 functions and duties of representatives of the compact. This compact shall be invested with the  
21 powers and duties set out in this compact.

22 (b) The term of each representative shall be four years. A representative shall hold office  
23 until a successor is appointed and qualified but the successor's term shall expire four years from  
24 the legal date of expiration of the term of the predecessor. Vacancies occurring in the office of  
25 a representative for any reason or cause shall be filled for the unexpired term by the party  
26 represented by the vacancy. A party may remove the representative for that party in accordance  
27 with the statutes of the party concerned. Each representative may delegate to a deputy the power  
28 to be present and participate, including voting as the representative or substitute, at any meeting  
29 of or hearing by or other proceeding of the compact.

30 (c) The compact shall invite the Secretary of the United States Department of  
31 Transportation, the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the

1 Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or their designees to  
2 participate as nonvoting members of the compact.

3 ARTICLE V

4 PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT AUTHORITY

5 (a) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is authorized to

6 (1) facilitate the prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills through the  
7 establishment of uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment for vessels  
8 transporting oil and hazardous substances to the extent that the parties and the federal government  
9 have authority within the compact zone;

10 (2) ensure a coordinated network of oil and hazardous substance spill response  
11 plans and programs of the parties, federal agencies, and private organizations;

12 (3) by regulation, establish the requirements for submission of and approval by  
13 the compact of a contingency plan by any vessel transporting oil or hazardous substance in the  
14 compact zone; the requirements must be at least as stringent as the requirements for spill  
15 response plans under sec. 4202 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380); a plan developed  
16 in accordance with the regulations adopted by the compact and approved by the compact shall  
17 satisfy the requirements of sec. 4202 of the Oil Pollution Act and any requirements of an  
18 individual party for submitting a vessel contingency or spill response plan; in establishing  
19 regulations under this paragraph, the compact shall work closely with officials of the parties to  
20 assure that the vessel contingency plans required under this compact are at least as  
21 comprehensive as similar plans required by the parties and to integrate, to the fullest extent  
22 possible, any requirements for vessel contingency plans in effect at the time the compact initiates  
23 its requirements under this paragraph;

24 (4) establish and maintain an informational clearinghouse related to spill response,  
25 including a directory of personnel, equipment, technical expertise, organizations, and other  
26 resources available to assist as part of a regional oil or hazardous substance spill response;

27 (5) provide a forum for discussion and recommendation to resolve conflicts  
28 among member parties or the federal government regarding various ocean resources programs  
29 that have been or may be established by each party;

30 (6) provide opportunities for public participation in compact activities by holding  
31 meetings of the compact in various locations within the territorial limits of the parties, providing

- 1 opportunities for public comment at meetings and developing a public outreach program;
- 2 (7) designate state or provincial agency officials to act on behalf of the compact  
3 as liaisons with federal agencies;
- 4 (8) identify the regional data needs related to ocean resources and recommend a  
5 method for compiling the data in a format that can be shared by all parties;
- 6 (9) consult with and advise any pertinent party or federal agency with regard to  
7 problems connected with ocean resources management and recommend the adoption of any rules  
8 or regulations the compact considers advisable that are within the jurisdiction of the agency;
- 9 (10) establish sanctions and a schedule of civil penalties for violations of the rules  
10 or regulations of the compact and impose those sanctions or civil penalties in accordance with  
11 5 U.S.C. 551 - 559 and 701 - 706.
- 12 (11) request the United States Coast Guard to enforce or assist in the enforcement  
13 of any regulations adopted by the compact related to the prevention of and response to oil or  
14 hazardous substance spills in the compact zone.
- 15 (b) In addition to the authority granted under (a) of this article, the compact may
- 16 (1) accept grants and gifts;
- 17 (2) enter into contracts for whose performance the compact shall be solely  
18 responsible in order to support its operations;
- 19 (3) conduct and prepare, independently or in cooperation with others, studies,  
20 investigations, research, and programs relating to the purposes of this compact;
- 21 (4) conduct public hearings on matters pertaining to the purposes of this compact;
- 22 (5) issue subpoenas;
- 23 (6) in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 551 - 559 and 701 - 706,  
24 enforce the rules and regulations adopted by the compact to carry out the authority of the  
25 compact as set out in this article;
- 26 (7) appoint technical and advisory committees for the purpose of advising the  
27 compact on regional ocean resources issues, data needs and format, and other purposes related  
28 to the compact's activities; a technical or advisory committee appointed by the compact is not  
29 subject to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, as amended);
- 30 (8) allow a variance from the provisions of this compact or rules or regulations  
31 adopted by the compact under this article; a variance must be based on a showing by the person

1 or entity seeking the variance that the activity allowed under the variance will have no regional  
2 effect and that the variance is economically necessary; under no circumstances may a variance  
3 result in the regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substance according to standards  
4 less stringent than standards imposed under federal law.

5 (c) The compact shall adopt all regulations necessary to carry out its duties and exercise  
6 its authority under this article. The compact shall adopt the regulations in accordance with the  
7 provisions of 5 U.S.C. 500 - 559.

## 8 ARTICLE VI

### 9 PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT ORGANIZATION

10 The compact shall select a chair and a vice-chair. After the initial chair and vice-chair  
11 are selected, the compact shall establish a rotation for the selection of the chair and vice-chair  
12 so the office rotates through the parties to the compact. The compact shall appoint and at its  
13 pleasure remove or discharge such officers and employees as may be required to carry the  
14 provisions of this compact into effect and shall fix and determine their duties, qualifications, and  
15 compensation. The compact shall adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its business.  
16 It may establish and maintain one or more offices for the transaction of its business and may  
17 meet at any time or place within the territorial limits of the signatory parties but must meet at  
18 least once a year.

## 19 ARTICLE VII

### 20 VOTING AND QUORUM

21 (a) A majority of the representatives shall constitute a quorum.

22 (b) Each party shall be entitled to one vote. An action or decision of the compact may  
23 not be approved unless the action or decision receives a majority of the votes of the parties.

## 24 ARTICLE VIII

### 25 SUPPORT AGENCIES

26 The compact may contract for the staff support necessary to carry out the purposes of this  
27 compact or request appropriate agencies of the signatory parties to act as the research agencies  
28 of the compact.

## 29 ARTICLE IX

### 30 PARTIES' POWERS UNDER COMPACT

31 Except as specifically provided in Article V of this compact, nothing in this compact may

1 be construed to limit the powers of a party or to repeal or prevent the enactment of legislation  
2 or the enforcement of a requirement imposing additional conditions and restrictions to conserve  
3 ocean resources.

4 ARTICLE X

5 ABSENCE

6 Continued absence of representation or of a compact representative from a party shall be  
7 brought to the attention of the appointing authority of the party not represented.

8 ARTICLE XI

9 FUNDING

10 (a) Each party shall contribute to the support of the compact according to the party's  
11 relative proportion of the total of the parties' gross state products, but each party shall contribute  
12 at least 10 percent of the total annual budget for the compact and may not be required to  
13 contribute more than 50 percent of the total annual budget for the compact.

14 (b) The annual contribution of each party shall be figured to the nearest \$100.

15 (c) The compact shall prepare an annual budget which shall be approved by vote of the  
16 compact. After approval, the proposed budget shall be presented to the chief executive and the  
17 legislative body of each party.

18 (d) Each party shall be responsible for the expenses of its own representatives.

19 ARTICLE XII

20 WITHDRAWAL FROM COMPACT

21 This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each party until renounced  
22 by it. Renunciation of this compact must be preceded by sending six months' notice in writing  
23 of intention to withdraw from the compact to the other parties to the compact.

24 Sec. 46.47.030. REPRESENTATIVES. The three representatives of the state to the  
25 Pacific Ocean Resources Compact shall be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation  
26 by the legislature.

1991 Regular Legislative Session  
FISCAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION  
Prepared by the Legislative Fiscal Office

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MEASURE NUMBER: SB 500  
STATUS: C-Engrossed  
SUBJECT: Ratifies Pacific Ocean Resources Compact.  
GOVERNMENT UNIT AFFECTED: Department of Land Conservation and  
Development, Legislative Assembly  
PREPARED BY: Ken Rocco  
REVIEWED BY: Ann Glaze, John Lattimer  
DATE: 6/26/91

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	<u>1991-92</u>	<u>1993-94</u>
<b>EFFECT ON EXPENDITURES:</b>		
Emergency Board	General Fund	\$ 25,000
Legislative Assembly		Indeterminate

GOVERNOR'S BUDGET: Measure is not included in Governor's budget.

**COMMENTS:**

The measure, as amended, provides ratification of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact by the Legislative Assembly. The compact is designed to coordinate protection of marine and coastal resources by the States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. The amended measure provides for a General Fund appropriation to the Emergency Board of \$25,000 to carry out the provisions of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact. The appropriation reflects the amount anticipated for the initial costs of maintaining involvement with the compact while the ratification process occurs in other states.

Each ratifying state is to appoint two persons to act as representatives to the compact. As amended, one member of the Senate and one member of the House are to be appointed to represent Oregon. The fiscal impact on the Legislative Assembly depends on several unknowns such as the date of ratification and the number and location of meetings. Funds are allocated to the Legislative Assembly for committees and membership on organizations. The ability of this activity to be funded from these resources depends on the total amount budgeted and on the priorities set by the leadership in allocating the available funds.

Expenditures could increase in subsequent biennia depending on the number of states that ratify the compact and the scope of the compact's activity. Preliminary estimates of the Department of Land Conservation and Development's Ocean Resources Program indicate that a staff of at least three professional level positions would be required for full implementation. Total

*Page 2 of 2*

compact expenditures for personal services, travel and office expenses, administrative costs, and capital outlay expenditures could range between \$500,000 and \$750,000 per biennium. Assuming all five states ratify the compact and share expenses on some pro rata basis, Oregon's share could range between \$100,000 and \$150,000 per biennium.

State agencies with responsibilities for marine and coastal resources could encounter additional work due to the compact, but the increase is expected to be minimal.

LEGISLATIVE REVENUE OFFICE

REVENUE IMPACT ANALYSIS

BILL # SB500C

DATE 6-26-91

LEGISLATIVE REVENUE OFFICE HAS DETERMINED  
LEGISLATION HAS NO IMPACT ON STATE OR LOCAL  
AS ANALYZED BY THIS OFFICE

*J.C.S.C.*

STATE OF ALASKA  
THE LEGISLATURE

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY

M E M O R A N D U M

March 2, 1990

SUBJECT: Interstate compacts  
(Work Order No. 6-2304)

TO: Representative Cliff Davidson

FROM: John B. Gaguine <sup>JBG</sup>  
Legislative Counsel

You have asked a number of questions regarding interstate compacts. A couple of these questions are answered in the materials you sent over. Legal Research Report No. 9.2 for the Oil Spill Commission, "Potential Utility of an Interstate Compact as a Vehicle for Oil Spill Prevention and Response," explains well what an interstate compact is, and under what authority the states may initiate them. I will try to address some of the questions that are not covered by those materials.

There is no statute governing the negotiation of interstate compacts. Since, as discussed in Legal Research Report No. 9.2, a compact requires the passage of identical legislation by the legislatures of several states, negotiations among the states are a prerequisite to a compact. One would expect those negotiations to be carried out by executive branch officials most conversant with the subject matter, which in the area of oil transport would seem to be DEC officials. However, I do not see any constitutional separation-of-powers problems with the legislature initiating compact negotiations, participating in them or even carrying them out without executive branch participation, since the compact is essentially a legislative function.

As discussed in Legal Research Report No. 9.2, a successful compact would have to be approved by the legislatures of the states involved and then, if involving a matter that would ordinarily be preempted by the federal government (as would be the case in regulation of oil transport, where the U.S.

Supreme Court in 1977 invalidated Washington laws as pre-empted by federal legislation), would have to be approved by Congress. Legal Research Report No. 9.2 notes that in some cases negotiation of the compact and approval by the state legislatures and Congress has taken up to eight years.

Compacts involving foreign countries are far rarer than interstate compacts; none of the compacts to which Alaska is a party (listed below) involve any foreign nations. However, the provision of the U.S. constitution that allows interstate compacts also authorizes compacts "with a foreign power", if Congress consents. I do not know whether Canadian law would allow British Columbia to enter into a compact, or whether Canada would have to be a party, although section 16 of the Constitution Act of British Columbia suggests that the province could not enter into a compact with an American state. It seems likely, though, that the U.S. State Department would not look favorably on an agreement between Alaska and Canada on oil transportation rather than a treaty between the United States and Canada on the subject, and that the State Department might well oppose Congressional approval of an Alaska-Canada agreement.

You have also asked what the procedure is for initiating an interstate compact in Oregon, Washington and California. I assume that it is the same as in Alaska, since none of those states has any statutes on the adoption of interstate compacts (not even California, which has statutes on every subject imaginable). Washington does have a statute appointing a commission to negotiate a compact on the apportionment of the waters of the Columbia River basin, but nothing on compacts in general.

Alaska is a participant in a large number of interstate compacts (according to Legal Research Report No. 9.2, seventeen). These cover such diverse areas as fisheries (the Pacific Marine Fisheries Compact, AS 16.45.020), corrections (the Interstate Correction Compact, AS 33.36.020), higher education (the Western Regional Higher Education Compact, AS 14.44.015), and nuclear energy (the Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, AS 41.98.110, and the Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management, AS 46.-45.010). In the environmental area, AS 46.04.100 authorizes the governor to execute compacts with other states or countries on oil pollution control, and AS 46.09.050 authorizes the governor to execute compacts on hazardous substance release control. However, no formal compacts on either of these subjects appear in the Alaska statutes.

Representative Cliff Davidson  
Page 3  
March 2, 1990

Finally, you have asked about language in Section 309(b) of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 that gives the consent of Congress to two or more coastal states to enter into compacts on coastal zone planning, policies and programs. I do not think that this language would be applicable to a compact between Alaska and the other Pacific coast states on oil transportation. The legislative history behind this section suggests strongly that it was meant to allow compacts between neighboring states sharing a similar coastline, such as (to use an example given in the history) Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. See 1976 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 1794-95. Since Alaska's coastline is many hundreds of miles away from the coastline of the nearest state, I do not think that Section 309(b) could apply to Alaska.

If I may be of further assistance, please advise.

JBG:pl  
WKP2/119

## PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT

### Multi-State Compacts

A compact is a multi-state agreement consented to by Congress, through which states form a governing body pertaining to issues of regional concern.<sup>1</sup> Multi-state compacts have been used to address problems such as air pollution, land use planning, and water allocation. The one consistent theme of all multi-state compacts is the presence of a regulatory problem which transcends state boundaries. In the case of the proposed Pacific Ocean Resources Compact, the states of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington (and potentially British Columbia as a non-voting member) would join in a multi-state compact for the purpose of the regulation of shipments of oil and hazardous substances which impact the region. The Compact does not address resource management or allocation, or the regulation of fisheries.

In structure, compacts are formal agreements enacted by statute in the legislatures of the separate states--the wording of each state's statute is essentially the same. Once ratified by each state and approved by Congress, the compact cannot be altered, repealed, revoked or ignored by a member state. Because it is approved by Congress, the compact is a federal rather than state law as it relates to legal, Constitutional objectives. As a result of Congressional approval which bestows federal authority, a multi-state compact, by definition, does not interfere with interstate commerce. Therefore, the multi-state compact agency can address resource problems with regulations that compact members could not do as individual states.<sup>2</sup>

The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact as currently proposed will have three members from each of the states of Alaska, California,

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<sup>1</sup>Much of the information contained in this overview summarizes, Harry Bader, "Potential Utility of and Interstate Compact as a Vehicle for Oil Spill Prevention and Response," and Alison Rieser, "Federal Pre-Emption Considerations for State Oil Spill Prevention and Response Arrangements," in Alaska Oil Spill Commission, SPILL, The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, Appendix M, State of Alaska, February 1990.

<sup>2</sup>For example, many of the regulations Alaska enacted in 1976 concerning oil tanker safety standards, the coastal protection fund, and tanker searches that were prohibited in Chevron v. Hammond in 1979, or removed from statute after Ray v. Atlantic, could theoretically have been permitted had they been enacted by a compact to which Alaska was a member.

Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. Fiscal support of the compact agency is in proportion to each state's portion of the total gross states' product with no state paying more than 50 percent or less than ten percent of the agency's annual budget. Selection and compensation of each state's members is the discretion of the states.

#### Benefits to Alaska of Joining the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

Alaska can benefit in numerous ways from joining the Pacific compact. The primary benefit is enhanced state sovereignty over issues of critical importance to the state such as the prevention of oil and hazardous waste spills, transportation of oil and hazardous wastes, oil spill contingency planning, and environmental monitoring and research. By forming a multi-state compact approved by Congress, regulatory authority that was previously the exclusive domain of the federal government is transferred to the compact agency. Of particular relevance to the Pacific compact is the jurisdiction over the ocean waters from the state's three-mile limit to the 200-mile limit. Regional spill response and prevention contingency planning would be extended into this 200-mile zone. The compact agency will have the authority to regulate activities related to oil and hazardous substances within this zone.<sup>3</sup>

Of particular concern to Alaska is the compact's ability to influence or regulate aspects of oil tanker transportation such as tanker design, tug escorts, safety equipment, and crew size and training. Undoubtedly, the multi-state compact will have greater authority than the individual states currently have. To the extent that the compact regulates regional North Slope tanker traffic, the compact would not conflict with the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act which sets tanker safety standards to avoid international conflicts. However, this regulatory authority would be contingent upon North Slope tanker traffic continuing to be confined to the compact region as a result of the export ban. Certain aspects of tanker standards such as double hulls, is likely to receive legal challenge as a result of questions remaining from Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company and Chevron v. Hammond.

In addition to establishing uniform vessel safety standards, the compact will have the authority to coordinate the oil and hazardous substance spill response plans and programs of the states, federal agencies and private organizations. The compact also establishes requirements for the submission and approval of contingency plans

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<sup>3</sup>In the early 1980s, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game completed a study on the potential effectiveness of multi-state compacts and concluded that they offer little benefit. Since that time, however, the lawsuit Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific Northwest Power and Conservation Council 786 F.2d. 1359 (1986), explicitly established the authority of multi-state compacts.

for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances in the compact zone. These requirements must be at least as stringent as those required under the federal Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990.

Alaska's sphere of influence would also be significantly increased because Alaska would comprise one-fifth of the voting power within the compact agency with each party having one vote. In contrast, Alaska holds less than one half percent of voting power in Congress.

In general, industry has expressed support for the uniform set of standards that would result from the Compact. For example, only one vessel contingency plan would be required to operate in the region. Similar legislation has been introduced in the states of California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington.

G. Fay  
2/1/91



July 25, 1991

BILL BRADBURY  
Senate Majority Leader  
OREGON STATE SENATE  
SALEM, OREGON  
97310-1347

Rep. Cliff Davidson  
Alaska Hse of Representatives  
State Capitol, P.O.B. V  
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Cliff:

The Interstate Ocean Compact bill has been passed by both houses of the Oregon Legislature and was signed into law by Oregon Governor Barbara Roberts.

The die is now cast, and if an ocean compact is going to exist to increase the Eastern Pacific Rim prevention of oil spills, other state legislatures must enact similar legislation in their states.

I have enclosed a copy of Senate Bill 500 (the Ocean Compact bill) in its final form. I am very hopeful that at least two other states will be able to enact similar legislation during their next legislative session.

Once three states have enacted comparable legislation, we can approach the federal government and ask Congress to ratify our compact. My goal would be to have the compact up and running by January of 1993. I am very hopeful we can get compact legislation through your legislature early in the 1992 session.

As you know, creation of a compact does not require passage of identical legislation in each member state, but the courts have ruled that each member state must pass legislation granting the compact identifiably comparable powers for it to actually be a compact under federal law.

I would strongly suggest that each state use the legislation adopted by Oregon as their starting point and determine whether any amendments are necessary to achieve passage.

I look forward to seeing many of you at the Western Legislative Conference annual meeting in Cheyenne, Wyoming this September, or at the Pacific Fishery Legislative Task Force in Alaska.

Hoping for successful enactment of this compact.

My Best,

Bill Bradbury  
State Senator



**C-Engrossed  
Senate Bill 500**

Ordered by the House June 26  
Including Senate Amendments dated April 25 and June 14 and House  
Amendments dated June 26

Sponsored by Senator BRADBURY; Senators BRENNEMAN, COHEN, GOLD, KITZHABER, SPRINGER, Representatives JOSI, RIJKEN, SCHROEDER, TAYLOR, WHITTY

**SUMMARY**

The following summary is not prepared by the sponsors of the measure and is not a part of the body thereof subject to consideration by the Legislative Assembly. It is an editor's brief statement of the essential features of the measure.

**Ratifies Pacific Ocean Resources Compact. Appropriates money to Emergency Board for contribution to compact. Requires one member of Senate be appointed by President of Senate and one member of House of Representatives be appointed by Speaker of House to act as representatives on compact.**

**Declares emergency, effective July 1, 1991.**

**A BILL FOR AN ACT**

1  
2 Relating to Pacific Ocean Resources Compact; appropriating money; and declaring an emergency.

3 **Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:**

4 **SECTION 1.** (1) The Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon hereby ratifies the Pacific  
5 Ocean Resources Compact as set forth in section 2 of this Act. This compact shall take effect after  
6 two or more of the States of Alaska, California, Hawaii or Washington ratify the compact and con-  
7 sent is granted by Congress as required by section 10, Article I of the Constitution of the United  
8 States.

9 (2) In addition to the States of Alaska, California, Hawaii and Washington, the Province of  
10 British Columbia may become an associate party to the compact, without voting power. Upon re-  
11 quest of the Province of British Columbia and approval of Congress, the Province of British  
12 Columbia may become a full party to this compact with the same rights and powers as the party  
13 states.

14 **SECTION 2.** The provisions of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact are as follows:  
15

---

**ARTICLE I**

**Findings and Purpose**

16  
17  
18 A. The parties recognize:

19 (1) The States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington and the Province of British  
20 Columbia have a common interest in the protection of marine and coastal resources. This common  
21 interest results from:

22 (a) The fluid, dynamic ocean currents and atmospheric winds that carry pollutants beyond one  
23 party's coastal area to another.

24 (b) The migratory nature of many important living marine resources that depend upon the ma-  
25 rine habitat of various parties for different parts of their lifecycle.

26 (c) The economic reliance of each party upon renewable resources of the ocean.

**NOTE:** Matter in bold face in an amended section is new; matter [italic and bracketed] is existing law to be omitted.

1 (d) The use of the ocean for transport of oil and other hazardous substances between ports in  
2 the various parties and other nations.

3 (e) A regional interest in providing a stable environment for those communities dependent upon  
4 ocean resources and ocean trade for a livelihood.

5 (2) Some marine resource activities, such as fisheries, are currently highly managed with regard  
6 for their regional or transboundary nature through existing state programs, regional fisheries  
7 councils, interstate compacts and international treaties. Because there are existing formal mech-  
8 anisms for interstate cooperation and coordination for these marine resource activities, this compact  
9 is not intended to encompass these activities or to grant to the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact  
10 authority to regulate resource allocation or management as it may pertain to the use and con-  
11 sumption of marine resources.

12 (3) A formal interstate agreement does not exist to address and resolve issues of mutual concern  
13 or to coordinate individual programs of the parties that affect regional interests in the areas of:

14 (a) Prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills;

15 (b) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances;

16 (c) Oil and hazardous substance spill response planning;

17 (d) Environmental monitoring and research; and

18 (e) Ocean resource management.

19 (4) Each party has jurisdiction over the submerged and submersible lands within its territorial  
20 sea and responsibility for management of many marine resources and ocean uses. Each party has  
21 unique natural resource, social, economic and political conditions for which local management by  
22 the individual party is the most appropriate.

23 (5) Parties now do not have an effective means to address mutual concerns related to transport  
24 of oil and hazardous substances in waters within and beyond the party's jurisdiction that may  
25 jeopardize ocean resources and uses important to one or more coastal parties.

26 (6) The 1983 Presidential Proclamation of the 200-mile United States Exclusive Economic Zone  
27 has created the opportunity for all coastal states to more fully exercise and assert their responsi-  
28 bilities pertaining to the protection, conservation and development of ocean resources under United  
29 States jurisdiction.

30 (7) Citizens of the Pacific states and the Province of British Columbia are increasingly con-  
31 cerned with the environmental integrity of the ocean and protection of all ocean resources.

32 (8) Recent studies conducted in the wake of major accidental releases of oil or hazardous sub-  
33 stances have concluded that the existing system of response to spills could be improved in the fol-  
34 lowing ways to provide better protection of ocean resources:

35 (a) Enhanced personnel training and qualifications;

36 (b) Improved vessel design and integrity;

37 (c) Better mechanisms for cost recovery by the states or the province;

38 (d) Improved coordination in regulatory oversight;

39 (e) Enhanced traffic management; and

40 (f) An improved information base dealing with marine and coastal environments.

41 (9) A spill or discharge of oil or hazardous substance from an ocean-going vessel has the po-  
42 tential of causing major regional impacts.

43 B. Therefore, the purposes of this compact shall be:

44 (1) To assist in the promotion of interstate commerce by encouraging uniform regulation of the

1 transportation of oil or hazardous substance within the compact zone.

2 (2) To provide a legal mechanism to regulate certain ocean activities within the United States  
3 Exclusive Economic Zone.

4 (3) To enhance regional coordination of issues of critical importance.

5 (4) To work with federal agencies to advance the best interest of the region.

6 (5) To foster regional cooperation and pooling of resources to reduce costs and increase effective  
7 use of scarce resources.

8 (6) To monitor activities of concern to the parties.

9 (7) To address issues of mutual concern to the Pacific states and the Province of British  
10 Columbia and enhance the parties' influence over activities of concern that are not now addressed  
11 through existing compacts, including:

12 (a) Spill prevention;

13 (b) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances;

14 (c) Spill response planning;

15 (d) Environmental monitoring and research; and

16 (e) Ocean resource management.

17 (8) To foster cooperation and coordination among the parties in order to increase the effective-  
18 ness of the individual party's ocean laws and programs.

19 (9) To provide technical assistance to parties for ocean activities covered by this compact.

20 (10) To provide for formal participation by the Province of British Columbia with the compact  
21 to more fully address issues of regional concern.

22 (11) To insure that the citizens of the region have opportunities to participate in discussions and  
23 deliberations of regional ocean resources issues.

24 (12) To establish an innovative system under which the parties can represent their shared in-  
25 terests within the compact zone, including:

26 (a) The maintenance and protection of common ocean resources; and

27 (b) The vessel transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.

28 (13) To recommend uniform safety standards for routes, crews and equipment for vessels trans-  
29 porting oil and hazardous substances within the compact zone and monitor the implementation of  
30 these standards and regulations by federal agencies, states or provinces and private industry.

31 (14) To promote more coordinated management of ocean resources that are of mutual concern.

32 (15) To provide a forum for the regional coordination of the individual parties' plans for the  
33 management and protection of those areas of the Pacific Ocean and adjacent waters over which the  
34 compacting parties jointly or separately now have or may acquire jurisdiction.

35 **ARTICLE II**

36 **Definitions**

37 As used in this compact:

38 (1) "Compact" means the representative body created by Article IV of this compact.

39 (2) "Compact zone" means the portion of the oceans bordering the parties within the 200-mile  
40 exclusive economic zone.

41 (3) "Hazardous substance" or "hazardous substances" means any element or compound that,  
42 when it enters in or upon the water, presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public  
43 health or welfare or the environment, including but not limited to fish, animals, vegetation or any  
44 part of the natural habitat in which they are found. "Hazardous substance" includes but is not lim-

1 ited to a substance designated under 33 U.S.C. §1321 (b)(2)(A), any element, compound, mixture,  
2 solution or substance designated under 42 U.S.C. §9602, any hazardous waste having characteristics  
3 identified under or listed under 42 U.S.C. § 6921, any toxic pollutant listed under 33 U.S.C. §1317  
4 (a) and any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Admin-  
5 istrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency has taken action under 15 U.S.C. §  
6 2606.

7 (4) "Navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the territorial sea.

8 (5) "Oil" means crude petroleum oil and any other hydrocarbons regardless of gravity, which  
9 are produced at the well in liquid form by ordinary production methods, and any petroleum products  
10 or petrochemicals of any kind and in any form whether crude, refined or a petroleum by-product,  
11 including petroleum, fuel oil, gasoline, lubricating oils, oily sludge, oily refuse or mixed with other  
12 wastes, liquefied natural gas or propane.

13 (6) "Party" means a state or province that ratifies this compact as provided in Article III of this  
14 compact.

15 (7) "Representative" means an individual appointed as provided in Article IV of this compact to  
16 represent a party to the compact.

17 (8) "Vessel" means a watercraft or other artificial contrivance that is constructed or adapted  
18 to carry, or that carries oil or hazardous substance in bulk as cargo or cargo residue, and that:

19 (a) Operates on the navigable waters of the compact zone; or

20 (b) Transfers oil or hazardous substance in a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United  
21 States.

### 22 ARTICLE III

#### 23 Operative Dates

24 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this Article, this compact shall become effective when  
25 two or more of the States of Alaska, California, Hawaii or Washington ratify the compact and the  
26 consent of Congress is or has been granted as required by section 10, Article I of the Constitution  
27 of the United States.

28 (2) This agreement shall become operative as to the Province of British Columbia as a full party  
29 upon request of the Province of British Columbia and approval of the Congress.

### 30 ARTICLE IV

#### 31 Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

32 (1) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is created and shall have its offices within the terri-  
33 torial limits of one of the parties, shall carry out its duties and functions in accordance with this  
34 compact, shall continue in force and effect in accordance with this compact, and, except as specif-  
35 ically provided in this compact, shall not be considered an agency or instrumentality of the United  
36 States for the purpose of any federal law. Each party participating in this compact shall appoint two  
37 persons, subject to the applicable laws of the appointing party, to undertake the functions and duties  
38 of representatives of the compact. This compact shall be invested with the powers and duties set  
39 forth in this compact.

40 (2) The term of each representative shall be four years. A representative shall hold office until  
41 a successor is appointed and qualified but the successor's term shall expire four years from legal  
42 date of expiration of the term of the predecessor. Vacancies occurring in the office of a represen-  
43 tative for any reason or cause shall be filled for the unexpired term by the party represented by the  
44 vacancy. Any party may remove the representative for that party in accordance with the statutes

1 of the party concerned. Each representative may delegate to a deputy the power to be present and  
2 participate, including voting as the representative or substitute, at any meeting of or hearing by or  
3 other proceeding of the compact.

4 (3) The compact shall invite the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the United  
5 States Environmental Protection Agency and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmo-  
6 spheric Administration or their designees to participate as nonvoting members of the compact.

7 **ARTICLE V**

8 **Pacific Ocean Resources Compact Authority**

9 (1) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is authorized to:

10 (a) Facilitate the prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills by:

11 (A) Serving as a West Coast Spill Prevention Advisory Committee to the United States Coast  
12 Guard. As such, the compact shall advise the United States Coast Guard on matters pertaining to  
13 spill prevention within the compact zone and also shall advise the United States Coast Guard on  
14 other matters within the compact's authority as set forth in this compact.

15 (B) Participating as an interested person in any rulemaking proceeding by the United States  
16 Coast Guard related to the establishment of safety standards for routes, crews and equipment for  
17 vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances. The United States Coast Guard shall adopt the  
18 recommendations of the compact, unless the United States Coast Guard makes a finding, as part of  
19 the rulemaking process, that the adoption of such recommendations would not further the prevention  
20 of oil and hazardous substance spills.

21 (C) As an interested person, requesting the United States Coast Guard to initiate rulemaking for  
22 the establishment or amendment of safety standards for routes, crews and equipment for vessels  
23 transporting oil and hazardous substances. The United States Coast Guard shall initiate rulemaking  
24 as requested by the compact, unless the United States Coast Guard makes a finding that the initi-  
25 ation of such rulemaking would not further the prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills.

26 (D) Making recommendations to other appropriate state, federal and regional entities regarding  
27 uniform safety standards for routes, crews and equipment for vessels transporting oil and hazardous  
28 substances in the compact zone.

29 (b) Insure a coordinated network of oil and hazardous substance spill response plans and pro-  
30 grams of the parties, federal agencies and private organizations.

31 (c) By regulation, establish the requirements for submission of and approval by the compact of  
32 a contingency plan by any vessel transporting oil or hazardous substance in the compact zone. Such  
33 requirements shall be consistent with the requirements for response plans under section 4202 of the  
34 Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380). A plan developed in accordance with the regulations adopted  
35 by the compact and approved by the compact shall satisfy the requirements of section 4202 of the  
36 Oil Pollution Act and shall supersede any requirements of an individual party for submitting a vessel  
37 contingency or spill response plan. However, all plans approved by parties to this compact before  
38 the operative date of the compact shall remain in full force and effect until a contingency plan is  
39 approved by the compact pursuant to this paragraph. In establishing regulations under this para-  
40 graph, the compact shall work closely with officials of the parties to assure that the vessel contin-  
41 gency plans required under this compact include all subject areas included by the member parties,  
42 in the standards for vessel contingency plans of the parties, in aggregate, before the adoption of the  
43 compact.

44 (d) Establish and maintain an informational clearinghouse related to spill response, including a

1 directory of personnel, equipment, technical expertise, organizations and other resources available  
2 to assist as part of a regional oil or hazardous substance spill response.

3 (e) Provide a forum for discussion and recommendation to resolve conflicts among member par-  
4 ties or the federal government regarding various ocean resources programs that have been or may  
5 be established by each party.

6 (f) Provide opportunities for public participation in compact activities by holding meetings of the  
7 compact in various locations within the territorial limits of the parties, providing opportunities for  
8 public comment at meetings and developing a public outreach program.

9 (g) Designate state or provincial agency officials to act on behalf of the compact as liaisons with  
10 federal agencies.

11 (h) Identify the regional data needs related to ocean resources and recommend a method for  
12 compiling the data in a format that can be shared by all parties.

13 (i) Consult with and advise any pertinent party or federal agency with regard to problems con-  
14 nected with ocean resources management and recommend the adoption of any rules or regulations  
15 the compact considers advisable that are within the jurisdiction of the agency.

16 (j) Establish sanctions and a schedule of civil penalties for violations of the rules or regulations  
17 of the compact and impose such sanctions or civil penalties in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§551 to  
18 559 and §§701 to 706.

19 (k) Request the United States Coast Guard to enforce or assist in the enforcement of any regu-  
20 lations adopted by the compact including but not limited to regulations related to the submission  
21 of a contingency plan or financial assurance requirements in the compact zone.

22 (L) Establish a schedule of reasonable fees to be assessed for the review of a contingency plan  
23 submitted under paragraph (c) of this subsection. The fees shall be sufficient to recover the costs  
24 of reviewing the plans and conducting any related inspections. The fees may be assessed in incre-  
25 ments up to the maximum amount.

26 (2) In addition to the authority granted under paragraph (1) of this Article, the compact may:

27 (a) Accept grants and gifts.

28 (b) Enter into contracts for whose performance the compact shall be solely responsible in order  
29 to support its operations.

30 (c) Conduct and prepare, independently or in cooperation with others, studies, investigations,  
31 research and programs relating to the purposes of this compact.

32 (d) Conduct public hearings on matters pertaining to the purposes of this compact.

33 (e) Establish a standardized cost recovery formula for damages to other resources based on the  
34 amount of oil or hazardous substance spilled.

35 (f) Enter into an agreement with the United States Coast Guard under which the compact will  
36 administer compliance with the requirements for demonstrating financial responsibility under sec-  
37 tion 1016 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in an amount established by the compact. Such proof of  
38 financial responsibility, if established by the compact, shall satisfy and supersede the requirement  
39 of any individual party for demonstrating financial responsibility. However, all financial responsi-  
40 bility requirements established by the parties to this compact before the compact establishes an  
41 amount under this paragraph shall remain in full force and effect until the compact establishes a  
42 requirement and enters into an agreement with the United States Coast Guard under this paragraph.  
43 In establishing the amount of financial responsibility under this paragraph, the compact shall work  
44 with officials of each party to assure that such requirements are sufficient to satisfy the require-

1 ments of the parties, in aggregate.

2 (g) In accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§551 to 559 and §§701-706, enforce the rules  
3 and regulations adopted by the compact to carry out the authority of the compact as set forth in  
4 this Article.

5 (h) Appoint technical and advisory committees for the purpose of advising the compact on re-  
6 gional ocean resources issues, data needs and format and other purposes related to the compact's  
7 activities. A technical or advisory committee appointed by the compact shall not be subject to the  
8 provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, as amended).

9 (i) Allow a variance from the provisions of this compact or rules or regulations adopted by the  
10 compact pursuant to this Article. A variance shall be based on a showing by the person or entity  
11 seeking the variance that the activity allowed under the variance will have no regional impact and  
12 that the variance is economically necessary. Under no circumstances may a variance result in the  
13 regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substance according to standards less stringent  
14 than standards imposed under federal law.

15 (3) The compact shall adopt all regulations necessary to carry out its duties and exercise its  
16 authority under this Article. The compact shall adopt such regulations in accordance with the pro-  
17 visions of 5 U.S.C. §§500 to 559.

18 **ARTICLE VI**

19 **Pacific Ocean Resources Compact Organization**

20 The compact shall select a chairperson and a vice chairperson. After the initial chairperson and  
21 vice chairperson are selected, the compact shall establish a rotation for the selection of the chair-  
22 person and vice chairperson so the office rotates through the parties to the compact. The compact  
23 shall appoint and at its pleasure remove or discharge such officers and employees as may be re-  
24 quired to carry the provisions of this compact into effect and shall fix and determine their duties,  
25 qualifications and compensation. The compact shall adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of  
26 its business. It may establish and maintain one or more offices for the transaction of its business  
27 and may meet at any time or place within the territorial limits of the signatory parties but must  
28 meet at least once a year.

29 **ARTICLE VII**

30 **Voting and Quorum**

31 (1) A majority of the representatives shall constitute a quorum.

32 (2) Each representative shall be entitled to one vote. No action or decision of the compact shall  
33 be approved unless the action or decision receives a majority of the votes of the representatives,  
34 including at least one affirmative vote from each party.

35 **ARTICLE VIII**

36 **Support Agencies**

37 The compact may contract for the staff support necessary to carry out the purposes of this  
38 compact or request appropriate agencies of the signatory parties to act as the research agencies of  
39 the compact.

40 **ARTICLE IX**

41 **Parties' Powers Under Compact**

42 Except as specifically provided in Article V of this compact, nothing in this compact shall be  
43 construed to limit the powers of any party or to repeal or prevent the enactment of any legislation  
44 or the enforcement of any requirement imposing additional conditions and restrictions to conserve

1 ocean resources.

2 **ARTICLE X**

3 Absence

4 Continued absence of representation or of any compact representative from any party shall be  
5 brought to the attention of the appointing authority of the party not represented.

6 **ARTICLE XI**

7 Funding

8 (1) Each party shall contribute to the support of the compact.

9 (2) The annual contribution of each party shall be figured to the nearest \$100.

10 (3) The compact shall prepare an annual budget which shall be approved by vote of the compact.  
11 After approval, the proposed budget shall be presented to the chief executive and legislative body  
12 of the signatory parties.

13 (4) Each party shall be responsible for the expenses of its own representatives.

14 **ARTICLE XII**

15 Withdrawal from Compact

16 This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each party until renounced by it.  
17 Renunciation of this compact must be preceded by sending six months' notice in writing of intention  
18 to withdraw from the compact to the other parties to the compact.

19  
20 **SECTION 3.** One member of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate and one  
21 member of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives  
22 shall act as the representatives of the State of Oregon on the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact in  
23 accordance with the powers and duties set forth in the compact.

24 **SECTION 4.** (1) In addition to and not in lieu of any other appropriation, there is appropriated  
25 to the Emergency Board, for the biennium beginning July 1, 1991, out of the General Fund, the sum  
26 of \$25,000 which may be allocated by the Emergency Board only for the purpose of funding the costs  
27 of contributing to the support of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact activities, once the compact  
28 becomes operational.

29 (2) If all of the moneys referred to in subsection (1) of this section are not allocated by the  
30 Emergency Board prior to December 1, 1992, such moneys on that date become available for any  
31 other purpose for which the Emergency Board lawfully may allocate funds.

32 **SECTION 5.** This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,  
33 health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect July 1, 1991.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA PETROLEUM RESOURCE ORGANIZATION  
540 Water Street Suite 202  
Ketchikan, Alaska 99801

03/19/91

Statement concerning the proposed adoption of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact by SB 102 & HB 135

The Southeast Alaska Petroleum Resource Organization, SEAPRO, is a recently formed cooperative organization representing several oil transporters, oil terminals, and bulk oil users who do business in the Southeast Alaska region. Our area of operation is from Dixon Entrance to Yakutat, and our headquarters office is located in Ketchikan. The purpose of the organization is to enhance the regional industry's ability to respond to oil spills which may occur in this area, especially any spill which may be greater than the capacity of any one member to control and clean up. Currently SEAPRO operates as an information network between member companies, other regional companies, government agencies, and other pollution response organizations. One of the goals of this network is to be able to provide a rapid and comprehensive means of communication between industry and government which will allow more efficient planning for pollution prevention and response, plus acquire appropriate pollution response resources as rapidly and efficiently as possible in the event that they are needed.

Over the past couple of days we have been reviewing the proposed Pacific Ocean Resource Compact in light of it's potential impact on pollution prevention and response within our area of concern, which includes the adjacent waters of British Columbia. It is the opinion of SEAPRO management that this Compact offers some potential benefits in advancing pollution prevention and response, but that it also contains several technical deficiencies and omissions which should be corrected in advance of adoption.

#### BENEFITS

1. The adoption of the Compact, especially if British Columbia is included, should improve overall pollution prevention and response efficiency. All of the Pacific coastal jurisdictions are in the process of adopting rules, regulations, and procedures which are intended to enhance pollution prevention and response. Unfortunately, each jurisdiction seems to be creating different approaches to solving the same problems. The multiplicity and duplication caused by this circumstance has forced industry to expend time, energy, and resources, sometimes at cross purposes, in attempts to divine means of compliance with the anticipated desires of each separate jurisdiction.

(1. Continued) Establishing a single set of rules to govern the entire region will allow industry to focus it's efforts and expenditures in those areas which are mutually determined to be of greatest benefit toward pollution prevention and response.

2. Adoption of the Compact should improve the expertise of each individual jurisdiction. Currently, each individual state or province is limited in it's pollution specific expertise by it's own internal capability to acquire and maintain such expertise. Additionally, the expertise acquired by any particular jurisdiction is generally limited to the specific concerns of the agencies within that region. This handicap greatly limits the broader professional knowledge which is necessary to keep abreast of technological trends or developments which tend to antiquate specific regulations as well as prevention and response planning and methods. The Compact could act to centralize available expertise and distribute information tailored to the specific need of any particular jurisdiction, thereby increasing the access to expertise for all of the jurisdictions without necessarily having to maintain such expertise "in house".

3. Adoption of the Compact should force the federal government to improve the level of professionalism within their regulatory agencies. Enforcement of the Compact requirements will fall on the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has been charged with enforcing pollution prevention and vessel safety regulations for decades. Unfortunately, due to a number of complex personnel policies and conditions within the Coast Guard, the level of professional competence at the inspection and enforcement level has deteriorated over the past several years. This condition has caused resentment of, and decreased cooperation with, Coast Guard inspectors by many in industry. Requiring the Coast Guard to enforce the provisions adopted by the Compact will allow the several jurisdictions direct oversight over the Coast Guard's professional performance. This may well force the leadership of the Coast Guard to adopt policies and procedures which will improve the level of professional competence of their inspectors and administrators, thereby increasing industries willingness to cooperate with those personnel. The end result would be an improvement in the overall material condition of merchant vessels and waterfront facilities.

#### TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES

1. There seems to be a growing trend by legislators to be overly specific in technical terms when creating new law. We view this as a serious mistake. For example, under Article II Definitions (5), you end the definition of "oil" with the words "liquified natural gas, or propane". While propane is a petroleum product, (liquified petroleum gas), it is only one of a series of such products.

(1. Continued) By adopting such precise language you specifically omit other similar petroleum gasses such as butane, propylene, and butylene which are capable of liquefaction by pressurization only, while specifying LNG, (methane), which is not capable of liquefaction unless refrigerated to extreme temperatures. Aside from the fact that none of these gasses, especially LNG, pose any serious environmental threat if spilled, and aside from the fact that technology to contain these products if spilled does not exist, the attempted specificity makes the law appear silly in the eyes of professionals, and creates serious problems of compliance and enforcement.

2. Article II Definitions (8) gives a definition for "vessel" which appears to be legally insufficient. It appears that an attempt to specify tank vessels is being made, but falls short of doing so. It also points to three additional characters, "bulk", "cargo" and "residue", which are key to the definition of a vessel, yet these three characters are not defined. All three of these characters have specific definitions under 33 CFR, 46 CFR, and 49 CFR. It would be interesting to know which definition this law envisions. Also, since you are dealing with interstate commerce, possibly international commerce, it would be nice if the definition of "vessel" were a little more in compliance with that which is specified in 1 USC.

3. Article II Definitions (8) (B) ends with the words "in a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Since this Compact could possibly include an international jurisdiction, possibly that wording should be changed to "in a place subject to the jurisdiction of the Compact."

4. Unfortunately, we have not had sufficient time to thoroughly analyze the proposed legislation in conjunction with the referenced laws, but we tend to believe that the general concept is acceptable if specific technical details of the regulations promulgated under the referenced laws are directly incorporated by the Compact.

#### OMISSIONS

The most serious omission of this proposed Compact is that it patently ignores existing and future threats to the environment. As is traditional after all oil spills which achieve notoriety, the public, (media), clamors for action and politicians pass laws to prevent a repetition of similar incidents. The problem is that usually such actions are directed at closing the barn door through which the horse has already bolted. The legislation drawn usually envisions a specific incident, but it's impacts will be felt in places unimagined.

This certainly has been the case with all of the environmental legislation passed by Alaska since the EXXON VALDEZ, and it appears to be the case here. As is clear from attempting to define a "vessel" within this legislation, everybody seems to have put their blinders on and are focusing on "tank vessels". Specifically tank vessels carrying crude oil. While tank vessels carrying crude oil will always pose a threat to the environment, they are not the sole threat. Unfortunately, the entire state of Alaska seems to be oblivious to the fact that there are other vessels plying our waters which also threaten the environment, as well as the health and safety of large numbers of people.

Every year for the past ten years, there have been significant casualties involving foreign flag cruise ships either in Alaskan waters, enroute to Alaska, or just departing Alaska. Of these, the fire and sinking of the PRINZENDAM, and the grounding and sinking of the SUN DANCER resulted in significant pollution. Fortunately, the first happened well out to sea, while the other occurred in Canada. But several others such as the DAPHNE and NORTH STAR have resulted in moderate pollution of Alaskan waters.

Many of these ships carry large quantities of heavy fuel oil which looks and acts much like crude oil. These ships proceed into some of the most sensitive habitats in our state, through difficult navigational areas, with the added pressure of keeping precise time schedules. None of these ships have contingency plans, none have adequate pollution response or control equipment, none have adequately trained spill response personnel, and all are capable of protecting themselves from legal claims arising from a ship casualty. Of course none of us will be all that concerned with environmental protection when one of these ships goes to the bottom hazarding the lives of 800 visitors to our state, but oil pollution will be a by-product of such a tragedy. You are courting disaster by not recognizing this threat and planning accordingly.

In addition to cruise ships, a significant number of foreign flag freight ships call at locations large and small throughout the state. Again, these vessels carry large quantities of heavy fuel, and they have a history of causing pollution incidents, although not as frequently as cruise ships. The most serious pollution incident in Southeast Alaska's history was caused by such a ship sinking in Dixon Entrance, and a couple of freight trampers have caused environmental damage in the Aleutians over the past couple of years.

Finally, the rapidly increasing size and number of "uninspected" fishing vessels bearing the U.S. flag working Alaskan waters also pose a serious threat. Recently one such vessel sank in Tongass Narrows in front of the oil terminals in Ketchikan, causing the largest oil spill in that community in many years. Because these vessels have had the political ability to prevent themselves from falling under Coast Guard inspection, they usually fall far below the material condition, damage control capability, and manning standards of even the foreign flag cruise ships. Again these ships pose a substantial threat to the environment, not to mention the threat to the health and safety of their crews and innocent by-standers, yet the threat they pose is being ignored.

Another omission, or more correctly a mis-classification, which will lead to serious deficiencies in pollution prevention and preparedness planning has already been encodified in HB 567 which was passed last year, and has been the cause of furious regulatory activity so far this year. This is the professionally unacceptable mistake of dividing oils into the categories of crude oil and non-crude oil for the purpose of assigning pollution regulation applicability. The use of the wording crude and non-crude was an apparent attempt by the legislature to recognize that certain non-persistent oils common to the Alaskan transportation system pose a lesser threat to the environment than does "Alaskan" crude oils. This division then was established to allow for a lesser degree of financial responsibility and even prevention and preparedness measures.

Those of us in the oil pollution business divide oils by there tendency to pose threats to the environment. The terms persistent and non-persistent are the classifications normally use to determine the gross environmental threat of a product. We tend to think of crude oil as persistent, however, there are numerous examples of crude oils which exhibit characteristics similar to gasoline or case head oils. We also tend to think of non-crude oils as non-persistent. But Number 6 oil, Bunker C, and Asphalt are all examples of non-crude oils which are highly persistent when spilled into the marine environment. In the first case, there is little concern because we do not experience very light crude oils in the Alaskan transportation system. In the second case, however, there is very real cause for concern, because we experience all three of the products mentioned with relative frequency in Alaska.

In our view, the threat to the environment posed by a spill of 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil or asphalt is roughly similar to a 100,000 gallon spill of "Alaskan" crude oil.


If you judge the threat to the environment by the relative persistence of the product, you can see how foolish it is for the state to treat oils of relatively equal persistence as a lesser threat than "Alaskan" crude oil. Yet this is exactly the situation created by the wording of HB 587. This is another example of trying to be over technical in writing law when you have little professional knowledge of the subject at hand.

Our reason for mentioning this last item is to illustrate the almost impossible regulatory compliance climate which is being developed by the State of Alaska. While Alaska has lead the pack in creating an impossible compliance climate, it is not alone. All of the other jurisdictions considering the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact are working toward equally impossible regulations.

It is our hope that by placing the authority for further development of pollution prevention and response regulations under a single jurisdiction, we will be able to then work with that jurisdiction to achieve a more rational and professional approach to controlling the threat posed by the transportation of oils and hazardous materials than is currently possible.

It is also our hope that in the event this Compact is not established in the very near future, that the Alaska State Legislature will revisit the legislation passed in the wake of the EXXON VALDEZ, assess the damage which those laws and subsequent regulations are doing to Alaskan businesses, and make adjustments which improve the regulatory compliance capabilities of our businesses without compromising environmental protection.

Our organization stands ready to assist you in any way possible to achieve the goals stated above.

  
R. H. Hill  
Manager

# Samson Tug & Barge Company, Inc.

Phone (907) 747-8559 • Fax(907) 747-5370 • P.O. Box 559 • Sitka, Alaska 99835

Senator Sam Cotten  
Alaska State Legislature  
P.O. Box V  
State Capitol  
Juneau, AK. 99811

March 14, 1991

Dear Senator Cotten:

We were aware of a compact being worked on by the Pacific Coast states and the Province of British Columbia, however information was somewhat scarce. We are very appreciative of having been brought up to speed on the status of the compact and of Senate Bill No. 102. We have reviewed SB 102 and find both agreements and disagreements with the bill.

This bill, as with HB 567 of 1990, fails to recognize the largest potential for a major oil spill in Alaska or members of the compact. Certainly the Exxon Valdez made an impression, but historically how many tankships have had major spills in the last 12 years? How many large freight vessels and foreign flag passenger vessels have had major spills? A review of U.S. Coast Guard records will show a very real list. In Southeast Alaska and the nearby Canadian waters in recent years - the Lee Wang Zin, the Sundancer, the North Star, just to name a few who have grounded and spilled oil into the water. No, they are not carrying crude oil, but they all carry and use heavy bunker oil (persistent). Some of the old and the majority of the new foreign flag passenger vessels carry in the neighborhood of 1,000,000 gallons of this heavy oil. During the summer they transit throughout Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Seward, and into Anchorage. They do not have onboard any major oil response equipment.

Scenario: At 0200 on a summer morning the foreign flag passenger vessel Rotterdam grounds on a charted pinnacle in the vicinity of the entrance to Glacier Bay, Alaska. Two fuel tank compartments have been holed and heavy bunker oil is leaking. Weather is Southeasterly winds 30 kts with gust to 40; tide is flooding. There are 1200 passengers onboard and the vessel has a 15 degree list.

With this scenario, we have search and rescue - 1800 persons (passengers and crew) in jeopardy, a grounded vessel that may or may not be salvageable, oil in the water and the potential for a lot more oil. They have no C-Plans, no response equipment, no trained personnel to respond, and minimum liability insurance for clean-up. This oil will be around for a long time and the impact will be tremendous and so will the public outrage. Why aren't these vessels required to comply will be the question?

Other oceangoing freight vessels, including fish processors, visit ports year round from Ketchikan to Dutch Harbor and the Pribilofs. These vessels meet the minimum federal pollution prevention regulations but carry very little oil response equipment onboard. If one of these vessels grounded, there would be little to no containment of heavy oil by the spiller.


The above noted vessels need to be added to the definitions under Article II and they need to be regulated, as they are the biggest threat to the waters of Alaska and the members of the compact. ADEC appears unwilling to acknowledge these vessels as potential threats, but the compact should, because they are threats.

As noted in your cover letter, we agree an exemption should be made for tank barges transporting non-crude petroleum products to communities. We recommend that instead of deadweight tonnage that vessel exemption be based on the barge capacity. We would recommend tank barges transporting non-persistent oils (gasoline, kerosene, diesel) of not more than 50,000 barrels be exempted. Tank barges are presently under inspection and monitored by the U.S. Coast Guard for safety, manning, and pollution prevention. They carry onboard pollution containment equipment, personnel are licensed/documented, and personnel are trained in oil spill response.

We agree with the uniformity of standards, as we transport not only petroleum products but deck cargo as well to and from Southcentral, Western, and Southeast Alaska. Requiring only one spill C-Plan for petroleum products for the Pacific region would be ideal. There are some standards that would be disadvantageous to industry and we have a disagreement with. Establishing routes that may exclude transit at night or dictate where a class of vessel must navigate; inspection standards for uninspected vessels; manning of vessels. The intent of establishing some of these standards is well meaning however industry must be included in any finalization of compact regulations. Research and studies should be done utilizing all data available and support agencies (Article VIII) should not be agencies of signatory parties. Parties outside the compact should be employed to do the research, as state agencies tend to be partial to the state government and its needs, rather than the needs of the overall people, including industry.


These are the immediate concerns of SB 102 that we have. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call upon us.

Sincerely,

  
ALBERT M. SNELLING  
Safety Officer

cc: Senator Eliason

**PMISA**



December 20, 1991

TO: G. Kraatz  
K. Oxley  
J. Maslen  
A. Stephens  
D. McCormack  
C. Halen  
G. McMahan

FROM: Leo Brien 

SUBJECT: Pacific Compact Legislation - Alaska

During the Pacific Conference, I had an opportunity to meet with Senator Sam Cotten, Alaska (President of the Senate) and discuss the Pacific Compact. As you may be aware, he is carrying this legislation in Alaska. I expressed my concerns with the Compact concept, but could not specifically address his bill as I have never had an opportunity to review it. I assumed, however, that it is similar if not identical to Oregon and California.

He recognized some of my concerns and gave me the impression that he is willing to consider amendments to accommodate these concerns. I also had the impression that this issue is not a "life or death" issue for him and he does not appear to be emotionally attached to the concept.

Since I initiated this dialogue, I thought it would be beneficial to follow up with a letter, a copy of which is attached. You will note that most of the concerns I outlined were taken directly from my March 15, 1991 letter to Assemblyman Hauser. Since we all agreed with the text of that letter, I felt it was appropriate to advise Senator Cotten of those concerns.

Please advise of questions/comments.

cc: W. Lawrence  
R. Ray

LRB:rc

**PIISA**



December 20, 1991

Senator Sam Cotten  
P. O. Box 770296  
Eagle River, AK 99577

Dear Senator ~~Cotten~~: *Sam*

During the Pacific Conference we had a brief opportunity to discuss the Pacific Compact legislation. While I have not had an opportunity to review the specific legislation you have introduced in Alaska, I thought it would be helpful if I outlined some of the concerns PMSA noted with respect to similar (I believe) legislation (AB393-Hauser) introduced in California.

The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact, as it is entitled in California, goes well beyond traditional compacts by extending the geographic scope of state jurisdiction.

This raises a number of issues:

- \* The U.S. Congress, Alaska, California and Washington state enacted comprehensive oil spill prevention legislation in 1990 and 1991. Each provides a high degree of protection for the marine environment. Much of the regulatory proceedings necessary to implement the provisions of this legislation is still being completed. It seems premature to consider additional regulation until we have had an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the legislation so recently enacted.
- \* The proposed compact appears to violate the constitutional principals that reserve admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal government.
- \* The Alaska legislature enacted, I believe, very comprehensive legislation that dramatically increased the State's authority over the shipping and handling of oil. Is Alaska prepared to

**PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING ASSOCIATION**

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relinquish some of this new authority to an intermediate bureaucracy not directly accountable to the Alaskan electorate?

\* Industry, and ultimately, the consumer, is already providing significant funding for federal and state oil spill prevention laws. As additional unspecified funding is required for this interstate compact, it is unrealistic and unfair to expect industry and consumers to pay yet another assessment. Will general funds be available for this proposal? Given the deficit situation facing many states, the availability of general funds appears highly doubtful.

\* The power to enact and enforce regulations governing activities off the coasts has inherent foreign policy implications, and there is a constitutional limit on the extent to which Congress may authorize a state to exercise that power. The delineation of that federal limit has been the subject of international debate and that controversy would likely be intensified if authority out to 200 miles were granted to states through the creation of this compact.

PMSA does support the concept of uniformity of maritime law and regulation throughout the United States. The U. S. Coast Guard currently provides that uniformity, as they alone have the authority over such subjects as vessel design, navigation and manning requirements. Our industry is international in scope, and we therefore believe a single agency approach is absolutely critical.

The compact language, as prepared by California (and enacted by Oregon) moves well away from this concept by creating a regulatory body with the authority to impose an unnecessary additional layer of regulations. PMSA cannot support the regulatory provisions encompassed by this legislative language. On the other hand, PMSA does recognize the value of interstate communication and cooperation in addressing oil spill prevention, planning and response. We are supportive of increased coordination among states on such issues.

Senator Cotten  
Page 3

Accordingly, we believe Compact legislation should be strictly advisory in nature, emphasizing interstate cooperation and eliminating regulatory authority/requirements which go well beyond the long standing bounds on states' authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.

Some of the concerns I have raised may not be applicable to your legislation. I did, however, want you to be aware of our concerns with the California Compact legislation.

I would be happy to discuss this issue with you at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,



Leo Brien  
President  
Pacific Merchant Shipping Association

*Thoug the attached article may also be of interest.*

LRB:rc

Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution) and CRISTAL (Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution) — met at the end of October in Norway and agreed to extend these agreements for two years to February 20, 1994. These agreements are voluntary commitments to pay cleanup and compensation costs promptly to spill victims.

TOVALOP, whose member companies represent 97% of the world's total tank-vessel tonnage, makes available a maximum of \$70 million for any one incident. CRISTAL, comprised of about 750 oil companies, raises that figure to \$135 million. According to a spokesman for the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, members chose to revisit the issue in no more than two years because of these "uncertain times given the new Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) and the debate over the protocols."

The protocols that he referred to are 1984 International Maritime Organization (IMO) protocols to the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage. At a recent diplomatic conference in London, participants asked the IMO to adopt new protocols in place of the 1984 protocols, which have been ratified by only two of the eight countries needed for enactment (OPA 90 discouraged any hope of the US ratifying these protocols). The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Assembly recommended that the

IMO reduce the number of countries required to adopt the protocols to make it easier for the protocols to go into effect. The assembly had earlier rejected a suggestion that the liability limits be raised to \$283 million (currently the limit is \$80 million; the 1984 protocols would have raised the limit to \$191 million).

### Five States Discuss the Need for Cooperation in the Gulf of Mexico

Kicking off the Clean Gulf '91 conference in Austin, Texas, on October 29, representatives from the five Gulf states — Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida — began talks on drawing up a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to "pool their resources" regarding oil spill preparedness and response. They discussed the need for a "good communications network," which would include sharing data and coordinating training, research, contingency planning, and other requirements to avoid unnecessary duplication. In discussing what form this cooperation should take, the representatives ruled out a formal compact, since such an agreement would require congressional approval. And, as was evident on the West Coast, where a similar compact gained little support, it would be faced with too many obstacles (see "Outlook for Western States' Compact Looks Bleak," *OSLR*, June 1991). Representatives instead voiced their support for an MOU and possibly a task force that could meet on a regular basis.

**Hotline:** On October 29, the US Senate consented to the ratification of two IMO treaties: the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation, 1990; and the international Convention on Salvage, 1989 (see *OSLR*, August 1991) . . . The US Coast Guard (USCG) has received more than 120 comments on the advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning vessel response plans, but one USCG officer reviewing the comments said that they were not as specific as the USCG had hoped (see *OSLR*, October 1991) . . . Around the first of October, Washington State Governor Booth Gardner appointed Barbara Herman as the new administrator of the state's Marine Safety Office. Herman was formerly the chief litigator for the state of Alaska in the Exxon Valdez case . . . For more information on any article in this issue, contact the Oil Spill Hotline: (617) 641-5110 or 648-8700; Fax: (617) 648-8707.

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LEGAL RESEARCH REPORT

No. 9.2

"POTENTIAL UTILITY OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACT  
AS A VEHICLE FOR OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE"

Submitted: December 1989  
Principal Investigator: Harry Bader

The contents of this report are presented in draft form subject to amendment and supplementation, intended for the use of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission, and may not be quoted or used in any manner without the permission of the Legal Research Team.

## FINAL

### I. PROSPECTUS

Federal Courts, in the past decade, have breathed renewed vitality into compact clause theory. This judicial activity, coupled with recent creative applications of the compact clause by Congress to mounting regional problems, offers the state of Alaska a wide range of options which permits conduct otherwise prohibited within the stream of interstate commerce.

Through compact, the state can achieve enhanced sovereignty via regulations which have the force of federal law and exert a controlling influence over federal agency conduct. Compacts also permit the pooling of resources generating the synergistic effect of creating a sum greater than its parts. Compacts also can be designed to increase responsiveness to local needs.

This paper addresses the utility of compacting as a means for protecting natural resources, notably the abundant fishery, through enhanced regulation of oil transshipment in Pacific waters and terrestrial pipelines, terminal operations, and production areas. The application of compact concepts in this analysis is, therefore, directed toward resource protection, not resource allocation. Thus, the involved states should find little opportunity for internal conflict within the compact structure.

## II. INTRODUCTION

Alaska has assumed a premiere role as nation's steward by virtue of the incalculable natural resource wealth within her borders. Whether those resources are unscathed wilderness, alluring placer deposits, the oil which drives industry, or the remarkable yet still not entirely understood anadromous fish, these resources are Alaskan from whom the future of a nation is fashioned. Due to the importance of these resources to all American, Alaska has often been forced to accept resource policies not of her own choosing. It is incumbent upon this state to protect its sovereignty by demonstrating a willingness and an ability to ensure the protection and wise use of resources vital to both Alaska and the rest of the country. Pursuant to this end, leaders in the state must apply proven mechanisms in innovative ways which will enable the state to emblazon her own vision to her own future.

The interstate compact is a potentially valuable instrument for ensuring Alaska's rightful place as chief architect of resources planning management. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter championed in a 1925 Yale Law Review article, "Conservation of natural resources is thus making a major demand on American statesmanship. An exploration of the possibilities of the compact idea furnishes a partial answer to one of the most intricate and comprehensive of all American problems." Indeed, the federal judiciary recently heralded the compact as an "...innovative system of cooperative federalism..." in which states can substantively participate in natural resource decision making. Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific Northwest Power and Conservation Council 786 F.2d. 1359 (1986).

There are basically two types of compacts which can take on any one or part of three forms. The traditional compact is the multi-state agreement. A newer type, pioneered under the Delaware River Compact is a multi-state/federal

organization. The forms of compact may be a self-sustaining service compact such as the New York Port Authority, which operates the New York City commercial port, or the nonregulatory cooperative management agreement such as the Atlantic States Fisheries Commission, 56 Stat.267(1942), or a regulatory compact with substantive teeth such as the Northwest Power Planning Council, 16 USC 839. An effective compact among the Pacific states and provinces for the regulation of oil shipments would most effectively be an amalgamation of the regulatory and management forms.

Alaska is no stranger to the compact. Indeed the state is currently a partner in seventeen compact organizations, such as the Pacific States Fisheries Compact and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact. All of these compacts, however, predate the judicial pronouncements which brought forth the new principles enabling compacts to serve as dispensers of federal law; therefore, our state's current agreements lack the ability to be an effective forum for enforcing Alaska's appropriate role in resource management.

### III. PROSPECTS

#### WHAT IS A COMPACT?

A compact is a multi-state agreement, (or multi-state/federal agreement) consented to by Congress, whereby states may coalesce to form an authoritative body governing issues of regional concern. They have been employed to solve problems of air pollution, land use planning, water allocation, and a myriad of other applications. The one consistent theme, always, is the presence of a regulatory problem with transcends state boundaries.

The constitutional basis for compacts is found in article, I, section 10 clause 3, which holds that "... no state shall, without the Consent of Congress...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another state or with a foreign power." Through this simple clause, the Constitution recognizes the inherent sovereign power of

states to form agreements aimed at regional problem solving. Because a compact is essentially a contract between states, the basic tenets of contract law have traditionally been applied to compact relationships. Pursuant to these agreements, the Supreme Court has confirmed that states have the ability to delegate their political powers to, and to devise financing for, the activities contemplated by compacts. *Dyerv. Sims* 341 US 22 (1951).

Because Congressional consent transforms compact provisions into federal law, compacts can authorize state conduct which would otherwise be constitutionally invalid. *Cuyler v. Adams* 449 US 433 (1981) and *Intake Water Company v. Yellowstone River Compact* 590 F.Supp. 293 (1983).

In structure, compacts are formal documents made between the states in an identifiable text. This document is enacted by statute in the legislatures of the separate states. The wording of these statutes must be essentially the same for each state. Once ratified by the requisite states and approved by Congress, the compact cannot be altered, repealed, revoked or ignored by a member state. Disputes arising under compacts are taken to the federal courts, not state courts, for final interpretation. Unlike reciprocal agreements, the statutes ratifying compacts are conditioned upon conduct by the members. *Seattle Builders* at 1372.

#### WHAT ARE THE POWERS OF A COMPACT?

Because a compact is approved by congress, the compact is federal, not state, law for consideration of Constitutional objections. *Cuyler* at 438. Therefore, a compact cannot, by definition, be a state law impermissibly interfering with interstate commerce or federal supremacy interests, nor do traditional pre-emption problems apply. This transformation occurs because Congress, in approving the agreement, exercises its legislative power that the compact threatens to encroach upon, and declares the compact to be consistent with Congress's supreme power in that area. *Intake Water Company* at 297. Therefore the compact agency may

address resource problems with regulations that compacting members could not do as individual states. For example, many of the Alaska state regulations (SB 406) concerning oil tanker regulation, risk avoidance charges, the coastal protection fund, and tanker searches, prohibited by federal district judge Fitzgerald in *Chevron v. Hammond*. in 1979, or dropped by the state after *Ray v. Atlantic Rishfield* could, theoretically have been permitted to stand had they been enacted by a compact to which Alaska was a member. Likewise Alaska, through authority delegated by the compact commission, could exert regulatory controls over the North Slope productin areas, the pipeline, terminal operations and off-shore production, even in areas otherwise pre-empted.

Not only may compacting states enter the realm usually reserved for the federal government, compact agencies may even exert a controlling influence over federal agencies when Congress has given a clear and unambiguous mandate to that end in the consent legislation. *Seattle Master Builders at 1364*. Currently, two compacts are now operating which possess and wield this impressive authority. One is the Northwest Power Council (16 USC 839) and the other is the Columbia River Gorge Commission (16 USC 544). The more powerful multi-state compact is the Northwest Power Council. Charged with the duty to develop and implement an energy and conservation plan for the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, the Council is also empowered to oversee the operations of the federal Bonnaville Power Administration, at least to the extent necessary as to ensure federal compliance with the compact's plan. Oversight authority is manifested through several provisions within the consent legislation. The Council may review the actions of BPA to determine whether BPA is consistent with the compact's goals and regulations. The Council may notify BPA if the Council deems federal conduct inappropriate in light of the plan's provisions. In such cases, the BPA may to continue with proposals or activity unless a formal written

justifiability, subject to all the structures of administrative procedure law, is proffered by the federal agency.

#### POLICY BENEFITS OF A COMPACT ORGANIZATION

Several benefits accrue from the structural organization and inherent powers of a compact. Chief among these benefits is enhanced state sovereignty over issues of critical importance to the state. Contrary to the intuitive belief that compacts truncate state power through binding agreements, the compact is a latch key which opens a door into an entirely new sphere of influence otherwise inaccessible to states. Oklahoma's governor, Johnson Murrasy, understood this attribute while advocating Red River Compact. Murray believed a compact "...an effective block against federal encroachment on state sovereignty...and an inspiration to many who are tired of federal intervention in every field imaginable." Reviewing the sad history of Coast Guard supervision over tanker and crew safety monitoring, federal supervision may not only be a benign nuisance, but incompetent and dangerous as well.

Compacts can also prevent federal agencies from acting cavalierly toward state interests. The Northwest Power Council was designed to prevent this problem. Recently, Alaska has again felt the brunt of federal insensitivity to state regulatory organs. In another natural resource field, wildlife management, the National Park Service violated the spirit of cooperative game management, enunciated after ANILCA, by unilaterally ending the land and shoot wolf hunting in National Preserve lands without first consulting the state Game Board last year. Whether one opposes or advocates wolf hunting, this lesson of federal condescension towards Alaska's state authorities bodes ill for hopes of amicable federal agency cooperation in oil activity regulation.

In addition to allowing states to travel waters normally reserved as a federal province, a compact necessarily increases an individual state's

representational power within a given context. Alaska, for example, is only a voice of 3 within a din of 535 legislators in the federal Congress. Whereas in a Pacific states compact, Alaska could compose fully 25% of the decision making body as one of four equal partners.

Equally important is a compact's role in increasing regulatory responsiveness to community needs and values. This sensitivity to the local population is achieved because of the great accountability with a compact organization. Citizens can have direct access to the compact representatives appointed by their governor, much like contacting their state legislator, rather than having to deal with the labyrinth channels of a faceless bureaucracy. Due to the traditional tie between compact representatives and a governor, there is a closer link with the electoral process than would be under a bureaucratic regulatory regime. Because of this responsiveness, compact decisions would be expected to be more narrowly tailored to the specific needs of the region, and therefore more effective and efficient than generalized federal policy decisions. Sensitivity to local needs is a mandate in the wake of the Exxon Valdez, yet as Attorney General Doug Baily has pointed out, there is now a fear that the Trustee Council, established under federal law after the spill, may be frustrating the interests of the local communities in Prince William Sound.

The responsiveness of an interstate compact also outshines the effectiveness of the judiciary in most circumstances. The judicial instrument is simply too sporadic and static to deal with the dynamics of the continuously adjusting environment of regional resources management.

Enhanced oversight is another benefit. A good industry record for 12 years in Prince William sound led to complacency in enforcement of safety standards and preparedness which led to unsafe conditions and an inability to respond to the Exxon Valdez tragedy. If a particular state or agency is lulled into an ineffective

enforcement role, the interests and agents of other states could stimulate additional oversight. Compacts increase the number of watch dogs by increasing the number of participant within the regulatory and enforcement scheme.

Likewise, compacts pool the resources (personnel, equipment, financing, expertise, etc.) of member states, enabling activity impossible for any one state to accomplish on its own.

Compacts provide a unified and cohesive agency through which decision making is streamlined and coordinated. Such a management scheme would have enhanced oil spill recovery efforts this past March. The Skinner-Reilly Report, prepared by the National Response Team for President Bush, found that the various contingency plans for Prince William Sound did not refer to each other or establish a workable response command hierarchy. This situation resulted in confusion and delay during the critical first days of the response in the Exxon oil spills, exacerbating the devastating environmental consequences.

Another benefit of compacting as a means of dealing with regional problems is its role in reducing peripheral interests. In the compacting process, states negotiate directly with each other about issues which immediately affect them. This operational milieu excludes centrifugal forces beyond the region which may otherwise intervene if the controls were to take place on a national level.

Finally, compacts foster synchronization of state efforts in controlling regional problems. If states pursue their own independent regulatory program, Balkanization and duplication can undermine effective controls. More importantly, in the absence of a compact, the vigilance of one state may be thwarted by the inaction or lax administration of adjoining state.

#### HOW IS A COMPACT FORMED?

...questions of joining or not joining an interstate compact, or creating one, renewing or not renewing it, of appropriating money for its support, of sanctioning

and implementing activities, are uniquely the responsibilities of the states and their people, and it is the state and their people which should have an intense concern for what they may be gaining, losing, delegating or benefiting through the path of interstate compacts ...

M. Ridgeway

Interstate Compacts: A Federal Question

1971

There is no form or pattern for a proper compact, the process of its genesis if free from restriction aside from the Congressional consent criterion. Thus, states are arbiters of their own destiny. With over a hundred compacts now in existence, compacts of the future have a rich history to learn from in constructing agreements to meet the needs of emerging regional problems. The primary obstacle to effective use of compacts as regulatory device is the time period traditionally involved in bringing a compact to fruition. Often times, the period from initial negotiations to federal consent, has consumed more than eight years. Glacial slowness need not be the rule, and the avoidance of some common pitfalls can serve to greatly reduce delay.

One contemporary practice which has shortened the time frame for compact formation has been the shift away from formal compact negotiation commissions to extra-legal organizations composed of various state officials who share a common desire to rectify a particular problem. A most effective start is for each state's negotiating team to draft its own provisions for inclusion in an agreement to serve as a basis for negotiation.

Because Congressional consent to begin negotiations is not mandated by the Constitution, a compacting team ought not to seek this protracted strategy before beginning substantive consultations. Many feel that having prior Congressional

approval for negotiating enables Congress to guide the states and contributes significantly to eventual federal ratification chances. However, this advantage can typically be gained with the inclusion of a nonvoting federal official in the negotiating team.

Crucial to success has been the involvement of local leaders from potentially affected communities and interest groups. This does not mean allocating formal positions to such groups, but it does require the creation of a standardized mechanism of communication and meaningful participation. This approach not only expands the information horizon contributing to better compacts, but serves a legitimization function, thereby reducing potentially disorientating opposition from within state. Rarely will Congress give its stamp of approval to a compact perceived as eviscerated internally by intra-state strife.

The experience of the Red river compact found that the early establishment of both legal and technical advisory committees for information gathering and processing was helpful in facilitating the negotiating process. The Red River example also demonstrated the need to guard against information gathering becoming an end unto itself, stymieing progress.

Once the compact document has been drafted, each state must pass enabling legislation conditioned upon the consent of the other involved states. Each statute will require reciprocal action to be effective. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. V. Federal Reserve Board 86 LEd.2d. 112 (1985). Each statute must be virtually identical in form and wording. After approval by the appropriate governors, the compact is subject to federal consent.

Congressional approval is not required of all interstate agreements. Only those arrangements which are "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States" require consent under

the Constitution. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land 706 F2d. 1312, 1316 and Cuyler at 448. an agreement intended to regulate oil shipments on land and water within the Pacific states will most certainly encroach upon the federal province, and therefore must receive consent under the compact clause.

It is this encroachment which serves as the vehicle through which compact provisions become federal law. When Congress approves a compact, Congress exercises the legislative power that the compact threatens to encroach upon, and declares that the compact is consistent with Congress's supreme power in that area. Intake Water Co. at 297.

After congress has bestowed its consent, tradition holds the President reserves a right to participate in the approval process, though presidential involvement probably could be avoided through a concurrent resolution serving as Congress's consent mechanism.

Congress has a duty to ensure that compacts do not proceed to impermissibly infringe upon critical federal interests not contemplated in the consent resolution. Therefore, Congress retains the power to alter, amend, or repeal a compact. Cuyler at 439-440. Also, Congress may enact subsequent legislation which is expressly inconsistent with an interstate compact to which it had previously given its consent.

The extent of federal power to intervene in the internal affairs of an approved compact is the subject of much debate. While the courts have sidestepped this constitutional issue, dicta provides insight to the judiciary's hesitancy to permit wholesale federal intrusion into compact operations. "We have no way of knowing what ramification would result from a holding that congress has the implied constitutional power to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to an interstate compact. Certainly, in view of the number and variety of

compacts in effect today, such a holding would stir up an air of uncertainty in those areas of our national life presently affected by the existence of these compacts. No doubt the suspicion of even potential impertinency would be damaging to the very concept of interstate compacts." Tobin v. United States 306 F.2d 270 at 273 (1962).

#### WHAT ELEMENTS ARE NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMPACT DOCUMENT?

After the Clean Air act, a flurry of compacting activity erupted in the attempt to control regional air pollution. to assist congress in sifting through the flood of compact proposals, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare created a set of Guidelines denoting key indicators of competent compact drafting. The indicators were expected to reveal which documents showed the highest potential for achieving their stated goals. See: Air Pollution, 1968 Hearings on Air Pollution Compacts, S2350, S.J. Res. 95 Before the Subcommittee on Air Pollution, 90th Congress, 2nd sess. 3 (1968). Combined with subsequent Compact debates, a beacon can be constructed which provides safe passage for would be compact drafters. An enumerated discussion of important draft criteria, based upon the foregoing, follows.

1. Any agency establishes by the compact should have broad standard-setting monitoring, and enforcement powers.

A compact document must articulate the mission and duties for which it is created and demonstrate the means by which these goals will be realized. The document should demonstrate that the mechanisms specified as tools for compact operation will both be effective in achieving the goals as well as being the best possible option available.

The multistate agreement needs to also explain what type of administrative agency will effectuate its purposes. Two basic options are available. Each party

state may use its own agencies if they appear to be fully equipped to carry out compact policy, or if the complexity of the arrangement necessitates, a special interstate agency may be created. The compact should be able to delegate authority, but it should not be required to refrain from taking enforcement action until other entities have had an opportunity to do so. In order to coordinate its activities with the federal government, the compact ought to be authorized to designate liaisons to work and communicate with federal agencies involved with the same regional problems.

In order to attain its true potential, the compact document must contain a provision ensuring that federal activities and projects will be coordinated to the fullest extent possible with the policies of the compact.

Finally, in order to retain the flexibility demanded in the field of resource protection, a host of housekeeping provisions must be contained within the documents. The organization should have the power to conduct investigations, make studies, hold hearings, prepare findings, adopt rules and regulations, carry out enforcement actions (including litigation), and the ability to enter into contracts.

## 2. Each state must have equal representation

It is well settled that compacting states possess equal voting power, despite economic, population, and geographic disparities. Allocating several voting representatives to each state allows a greater range of expertise to be present on the authoritative body, as well as minimizing the potential of special interest capture of a particular state or representative. Another important provision concerning representation involves the ability of states to render their representative accountable and sensitive to their constituency. The accountability dilemma is a real quandary because interstate compacts transcend state lines and political units, thereby circumventing the accustomed channels and structures of

responsibility in the American political system. The apparent freedom that compacts enjoy from their home legislatures must be circumscribed to prevent administrative tyranny without emasculating the agency, rendering it unfit for achieving its mission.

3. Enforcement and business actions by the compact should not require unanimous consent.

Business and enforcement actions should not require unanimity on the part of the decision making board; however, a simple majority is just as undesirable due to the lack of protection it affords minority interests. Thus, a common trend is the 3/4 majority requirement. The requirement concerns the total number of voting representatives, not three-quarters of member states, permitting state delegations to split on a particular vote.

4. The compact must be able to demonstrate financial integrity.

Financial integrity incorporates the needs to be able to receive and dispense funds. It is imperative for a compact to be able to obtain financing beyond simple allocations by member states.

5. The federal government ought to have an avenue to participate in a nonvoting fashion.

6. A valid regionalist justification must be presented.

Compacts are intended to provide a solution for a problem of regional character which defies both federal and state oriented approaches. Congress must see that a set of unique forces (economic, social, ecological, or geographic) frustrates conventional contrivances. Regional interests, regional wisdom, and regional pride must serve as the foundation from which the most effective devices will spawn. It is imperative that the uniqueness of the region be clearly defended when proposing a compact, or the federal judiciary has left no doubt that differing

conditions in different geographic areas may provide a reasonable basis for different legislative treatment.

7. Miscellaneous

A host of other conditions require treatment in a compact document. Of particular importance will be the dedication of drafters in articulating clear definitions and intent for the articles of the compact. Because it is the federal court system which is the final arbitrator in compact disputes and interpretation, care must be taken to ensure that alternative constructions of compact articles do not wreak violence upon the purposes envisioned by the agreement's framers.

No clearer example exists of the consequences to Alaska due to curt misinterpreting of state intent than the Ninth circuit's inquiry into Alaska's definition of "rural" under the subsistence provisions found in ANILCA. Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska 860 F.2d. 312,316 (1988). In that case the court paid no special attention to the uniqueness of Alaska's remote bush regions, and held that what constituted rural in Iowa would serve as an appropriate definition for rural in Alaska. This decision, which devastated Alaska's state subsistence provisions in 1988, was a result due in part to the state's failure to adequately explain the rationale employed in reaching this particular definition. The lesson of this case ought not to be lost on compact designers attempting to protect resources under the unique conditions faced in the Pacific Rim Region.

#### **IV POLICY APPLICATIONS FOR RESOURCE PROTECTION**

This section attempts to portray the spectrum of possibilities available under compact theory for regulation the oil industry, federal agencies, and state government, in order to protect the natural resources for which the Pacific Rim is famed. This is by no means an exhaustive analysis, rather, its intent is merely

informative and designed to reveal the changes that can be reaped, both minor and radical, under the case law offer by Cuvler and its progeny.

Establishment of the uniqueness of this region, justifying compact treatment should not be difficult. The presence of an extensive aboriginal population extremely dependent upon the anadromous fishery for subsistence and cultural survival, coupled with the large non-native subsistence population in Alaska, would alone justify special action. But there are other ties that bond these states as well. Economically, the fishing industry in Alaska, Washington, and Oregon are entirely dependent upon the harvest in Alaska coastal waters. Indeed, these are the most important fishing grounds in the nation and the continent. Sea Grant has estimated that over 70% of the Seattle based industry derives its fish from Alaska. Oregon's fishing industry is similarly dependent. This condition creates the economic bonds definitive for regionalism. Also, the unspoiled coastlines of the Pacific Coast, from the glaciated wilderness fiords of Alaska to the wild shores of Washington's Olympic Peninsula down to Oregon's protected ocean beaches and California's Big Sur, reveal a unique ecological treasure preserved for the world. Travelling past these environmentally sensitive shores, tankers carry one-fifth of the country's crude oil consumption. Cumulatively, these factors form a regional portrait, separate from the broad stroke of the federal brush.

Canadian provinces, as well as states, may share in interstate compacts, serving as full participating members. This is currently the case in the Northeast Forest Fire Protection Compact, in which Quebec and New Brunswick are members. A regional compact could envision British Columbia and the Yukon Territory as potential members as well as the Pacific states.

when assessing these policy applications, bear in mind that some would require express federal consent acknowledging subtle changes to the scope of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the Clean Water Act. Finally, it is prudent

to note that the Alaska legislature has already invited the application of compact to the task of oil pollution control through AS Section 47.04.100 (1984), authorizing the Governor to pursue compacting in order to achieve the purposes of oil pollution protection. The basis of a compact may be premised upon the very effective Pacific Oil and Ports Group created in 1975 by Dennis Dooley of the Alaska Oil Tanker Task Force under the direction of Walt Parker. The group involved Alaska, California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, and promulgated a set of Tanker standards.

After the Exxon Valdez debacle, a host of federal, state, and independent entities conducted investigations and studies to determine what went wrong in Prince William Sound. Interestingly through the morass of accusations and finger pointing, several common themes surface with striking consistency. These findings can be organized into four general categories which shed light on a set of corrective recommendations.

#### Findings:

##### 1. Contingency Planning

The sheer multitude of plans and agencies involved in oil recovery stymied effective response because of a fundamental failure to unify under a coordinated command hierarchy. Organizational responsibilities were unclear, decision making wallowed as a "team concept" broke down into adversarial relationships.

##### 2. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard routinely approved reductions in the number of sailors required on oil tankers, as well as reducing the level of experience for tanker operations. Pilotage standards for Prince William Sound were lowered to meet nationwide general standards. It appears that Coast Guard decision making is driven by industry initiative, rather than agency fact finding. Finally, the Coast

Guard failed to carry through its promises to develop radar installations and stricter tanker design standards.

### 3. Department of Environmental Conservation

The agency lacks the financial and personnel resources to effectively evaluate industry response capabilities and preparedness. In part, this is due to other priorities which DEC has responsibility towards. However, DEC apparently failed to enforce violations and deviations it detected with Alyeska operations.

### 4. Industry

The oil companies ignored recommendations to improve spill prevention and response. Alyeska, the company, cancelled contract with a company to maintain dedicated response teams in 1981, and disbanded its own teams in 1984.

Equipment inventories were allowed to fall below what was adequate to deal with even moderate sized spills.

### 5. Interior Pipeline Maintenance and spill Prevention

Over the past 12 years, more than 1.5 million gallons of hot crude oil have boiled across fragile tundra and fouled miles on Interior streams. Innovations in leak detection and response technology have not been adopted by Alyeska. DEC has not pursued inspection of strategic spill equipment caches. A litany of spill examples bodes ill for the lands traversed by the pipeline. Past terrestrial spills have been surprisingly large, due in part to the company's reliance on visual or olfactory detection of leaks. The 650,000 gallons that poured out at Steel Creek and the 240,000 gallons that polluted 30 miles of the Atigun Valley were all detected by human inspection, rather than electronic or mechanical means. Pipe check valves and bends have all been the source of major spills totalling 1000,000's of gallons. Aging equipment and corrosion offer new sources for concern and need immediate regulation and monitoring. A spill on the Yukon or

Tazlina and their many tributaries could devastate the subsistence fishery upon which tens of thousands of rural Alaskans and an ancient culture depend.

#### Recommendations

1. Adoption of response equipment inventory system, which also monitors equipment readiness and maintenance.
2. Development of a comprehensive contingency plan incorporating all effected parties to stimulate a streamlined coordinated command structure
3. Creation of a single mission enforcement unit.
4. Move oil spill responsibility from the industry. An independent dedicated response team permanently stationed to respond to spills, both terrestrial and marine, is essential.
5. Establish an entity with oversight authority concerning Coast Guard standard setting.
6. Invoke technology forcing provisions which mandate the application of spill prevention and recovery innovations when they become available.
7. Adopt strict crew size and qualification standards.
8. Adopt an emergency requisitioning authority capable of mobilizing equipment, personnel, and logistical services
9. Develop a pre-authorization procedure for streamlined decision-making under exigent circumstances for burning and dispersant use.
10. Implement on-site and on-tanker surprise inspection authority vested in the appropriate state regulatory agency.

#### COMPACT APPLICATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Comprehensive Monitoring and Water Protection Interstate Authority