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6912 HOUSE JUDICIARY

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ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RESEARCH AGENCY

Pouch Y. State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465 3091

December 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Representative-Elect Katie Hurley

FROM: Heidi Borson Paine ^{HBP}
Legislative Analyst

RE: Fair Campaign Practices Legislation
Research Request 85-054

You requested information on state and federal legislation designed to prevent slanderous political campaigns. You also indicated specific interest in California fair campaign practices legislation. This memorandum presents an overview of federal and state statutes, as well as case laws which involve fair campaign practices. The conclusion of this memorandum discusses alternatives for Alaska.

To respond to this request, I contacted several national organizations including the National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, Common Cause, and the American Bar Association. I also contacted the Federal Elections Commission and elections administrators in numerous states.

Federal Law

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) was the first major federal election reform law enacted since 1925. However, FECA regulation of campaign speech is limited and the law only addresses the issue of slander indirectly. Title 2, Section 441d of the United States Code requires anyone paying for a political statement in a newspaper, other publication or on any broadcasting station to state the name of the person, committee or organization paying for the communication and whether or not the candidate authorized the communication. According to Todd Johnson of the Federal Election Commission, there are no other federal laws concerning fair campaign practices.

Case Law

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to free political expression. The Fourteenth Amendment protects this right

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from abridgment by state law. Because of these constitutional guarantees, state laws regulating political campaigns, and especially campaign speech, are subject to close scrutiny by the courts. Over the past 20 years, much case law has been developed to protect First Amendment rights in state political campaigns. Two of the most important cases are New York Times v. Sullivan, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964), and Vanasco v. Schwartz, 410 F. Supp. 87 (1975).

In New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court established the "malice standard" by which the constitutionality of state laws regulating political campaign practices is judged. In its ruling, the court stated that:

The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice", that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not...¹

Furthermore, in explaining the New York Times' decision as it relates to campaign speech, the Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application in speech by candidates for public office."²

In Vanasco v. Schwartz, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a mandatory New York Fair Campaign Code because of its "chilling effect" on free speech. The New York Fair Campaign Code prohibited the misrepresentation of a candidate's qualifications, position, or party affiliation and outlawed any attack on a candidate based on race, sex, religious affiliation, or ethnic background. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that state statutes concerning deceptive campaign speech must adhere to the malice standard established in New York Times v. Sullivan.

State Law

According to Robert Peck of the American Bar Association, few states have laws directly regulating the content of political speech because of the possibility of infringing upon First Amendment rights of free speech. He points out that political speech is the most well protected

¹New York Times v. Sullivan, 84 S.Ct. at 710 (1964).

²Romig, Candice. "Fair Campaign Practices", State Legislative Report, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1983.

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type of speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Peck contends that candidates in most states rely on general statutes concerning libel and slander for protection.

However, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), twenty states have statutes which address the use of deceptive speech in campaigns. Over half of the laws prohibit false statements made knowingly which challenge a candidate's character. For example, according to Montana Statute 13.35.234, it is unlawful to make or publish false statements about a candidate's character or morality or to knowingly misrepresent a candidate's voting record or positions on public issues. According to Jack Lowe of the Montana Department of Elections, this is the first statute in Montana which addresses false statements. He contends that the statute is rarely used because of the constitutional questions involved.

Statutes in some states prohibit specific types of statements in campaign speech. For example, Minnesota statutes prohibit erroneous statements of party support. Ohio statutes also forbid false statements such as remarks about an opposing candidate's incumbency, voting record, education, criminal and mental confinement record, and education.

I found that most state statutes concerning campaign ethics focus on literature disclosure and campaign tactics. These statutes do not directly regulate the content of political speech, but may help to prevent slanderous or unfair campaigns. For example, twenty-three states have statutes which require all political advertisements to include the name of the sponsoring person or group. Seven other states, California, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia, require that an advertisement indicate whether it has been officially endorsed by a candidate.

Other state statutes which regulate campaign practices focus on political espionage, undue influence of voters, and campaign "dirty" tricks. For example, Montana bans all political advertisements on election day in an effort to prevent unfair tactics. New York law prohibits placing agents in campaign organizations, bribing an opponent's staff, and wire-tapping. Other states prohibit theft of campaign materials.

Because of the protection given campaign practices under the First Amendment, enforcing statutes which regulate campaign practices is difficult. In most states, violations of campaign practices statutes are considered misdemeanors and are punished by a fine, imprisonment or both. Some states including Alabama, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Wisconsin also provide that a person convicted of a campaign violation is ineligible for public office for a specified period of time. In these states, a convicted elected official must resign.

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Furthermore, California and Montana have included voluntary campaign ethics codes in their statutes. These codes address malicious campaign speech and other unfair political practices. Reportedly, when only one candidate in a race chooses to sign the agreement, the opponent's refusal often becomes a major campaign issue in these states.

California Law

In June of 1984, the California electorate narrowly adopted Proposition 20. This constitutional amendment provides that a person making libelous or slanderous statements against an opposing candidate shall resign the seat to which elected where judicially found that: 1) the libel or slander was a major contributing cause in the defeat of an opposing candidate; and 2) the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.³

As you requested, I have attached copies of California's voluntary code of campaign ethics, Proposition 20, and the two bills proposed in the 1983-1984 session of the California Legislature. Assembly Bill 331 would have added a pledge to the code of ethics requiring the release of campaign-related advertisements to opponents 48 hours before dissemination. Assembly Bill 406 would have required candidates to sign a fair campaign practices agreement to be eligible to receive public campaign funds generated through tax returns. Neither bill passed.

Alternatives for Alaska

Currently, political candidates in Alaska are protected against libelous and slanderous campaigns under AS 15.56.010 (3). This statute specifically prohibits the circulation of false information in a campaign. Knowingly circulating false information which could damage a candidate's reputation is a class A misdemeanor. Under AS 15.56.110, the election of a candidate to the State legislature or municipal office who knowingly committed a corrupt campaign practice such as circulating false information is voidable. Alaska Statutes also require paid advertisements to be so marked and require the identification of the party responsible for any campaign literature. In addition, AS 15.56.020-.035 prohibits undue influence on elections and interference with voting.

³A similar measure was introduced during the 1983 session of the Illinois Legislature, but it did not get out of committee. Instead of removal from office, the penalty for libelous or slanderous statements would have been a 30-day jail term or a \$500 fine or both.

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These statutes are designed to help prevent unfair campaign practices. Alaska could consider additional measures for reducing the incidence of slanderous political campaigns. For example, Alaska could establish a commission or give authority to an existing agency to investigate complaints of libelous campaign literature and slanderous campaign speech. Robert Peck of the American Bar Association suggested assigning this duty to the agency which enforces the financial reporting requirements for political campaigns in Alaska, the Alaska Public Offices Commission. Alaska could also adopt a voluntary campaign ethics code. However, it appears that any proposed legislation which regulates political speech must be carefully scrutinized so as not to conflict with the constitutional rights of free speech and press.

* * * * *

I hope the information presented in this memorandum is helpful. Please contact me again if you have any additional questions.

HBP

Attachments

12520.

ELECTIONS CODE

ELEC

Article J. Code of Fair Campaign Practices

12520. Subscription to code; form.

At the time an individual files his or her declaration of candidacy, nomination papers, or any other paper evidencing an intention to be a candidate for public office, the county clerk, shall give the individual a blank form of the Code of Fair Campaign Practices and a copy of the provisions of this chapter. The county clerk shall inform each candidate for public office that subscription to the code is voluntary.

In the case of a committee making an independent expenditure within the meaning of Section 12511, the Secretary of State shall provide a blank form and a copy of the provisions of this chapter to the individual filing, in accordance with Title 9 (commencing with Section 81000) of the Government Code, an initial campaign statement on behalf of the committee.

The text of the code shall read, as follows:

CODE OF FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES

There are basic principles of decency, honesty, and fair play which every candidate for public office in the State of California has a moral obligation to observe and uphold, in order that, after vigorously contested, but fairly conducted campaigns, our citizens may exercise their constitutional right to a free and untrammelled choice and the will of the people may be fully and clearly expressed on the issues.

THEREFORE:

(1) I SHALL CONDUCT my campaign openly and publicly, discussing the issues as I see them, presenting my record and policies with sincerity and frankness, and criticizing without fear or favor the record and policies of my opponents or political parties which merit such criticism.

(2) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT the use of character defamation, whispering campaigns, libel, slander, or scurrilous attacks on any candidate or his or her personal or family life.

(3) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT any appeal to negative prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national origin, physical health status, or age.

(4) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT any dishonest or unethical practice which tends to corrupt or undermine our American system of free elections, or which hampers or prevents the full and free expression of the will of the voters including acts intended to hinder or prevent any eligible person from registering to vote, enrolling to vote, or voting.

(5) I SHALL NOT coerce election help or campaign contributions for myself or for any other candidate from my employees.

(6) I SHALL IMMEDIATELY AND PUBLICLY REPUDIATE support deriving from any individual or group which resorts, on behalf of my candidacy or in opposition to that of my opponent, to the methods and tactics which I condemn. I shall accept responsibility to take firm action against any subordinate who violates any provision of this code or the laws governing elections.

(7) I SHALL DEFEND AND UPHOLD the right of every qualified American voter to full and equal participation in the electoral process.

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ELECTIONS CODE

12526.

I, the undersigned, candidate for election to public office in the State of California or treasurer or chairman of a committee making any independent expenditures, hereby voluntarily endorse, subscribe to, and solemnly pledge myself to conduct my campaign in accordance with the above principles and practices.

Date
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

Signature

12522. Supply of forms.

The Secretary of State shall print or cause to be printed, blank forms of the code. The Secretary of State shall supply the forms to the county clerks in quantities and at times requested by the clerks.
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

12523. Retention of forms; public inspection.

The county clerk shall accept, at all times prior to the election, all completed forms which are properly subscribed to by a candidate for public office and shall retain them for public inspection until 30 days after the election.
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

12524. Public record.

Every code subscribed to by a candidate for public office pursuant to this chapter is a public record open for public inspection.
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

12525. Voluntary.

In no event shall a candidate for public office be required to subscribe to or endorse the code.
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

12526. Operative date of chapter.

This chapter shall be operative only until January 1, 1989, and as of that date is repealed.
(Added by Stats. 1982, c. 855, §1.)

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ELEC

ELECTIONS CODE

Elected Officials. Disqualification for Libelous or Slanderos Campaign Statements

Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General

ELECTED OFFICIALS. DISQUALIFICATION FOR LIBELOUS OR SLANDEROUS CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Adds a section to the Constitution providing that no person who is found liable in a civil action for making libelous or slanderous statements against an opposing candidate during an election campaign shall retain the seat to which elected where it is judicially found that: (1) the libel or slander was a major contributing cause in the defeat of an opposing candidate and (2) the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or true. Contains other provisions. Summary of Legislative Analyst's estimate of net state and local government fiscal impact: Adoption of this measure would have no direct fiscal effect on the state or local governments. If, however, a successful candidate were disqualified from assuming or holding office as a result of the measure, local governments could incur additional costs if an election had to be held to fill the vacancy. These costs could be significant if the election did not coincide with a regularly scheduled election.

Final Vote Cast by the Legislature on ACA 74 (Proposition 20)

Assembly: Ayes 75	Senate: Ayes 29
Noes 0	Noes 5

Analysis by the Legislative Analyst

Background

The first amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the right of free speech. Article I of the State Constitution contains a similar provision. Neither Constitution, however, protects a person who makes libelous or slanderous statements. Libel and slander are broadly defined as untrue written or oral communications which have a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation, either generally or with respect to his or her occupation. Anyone so injured may file a lawsuit against the person alleged to have committed the libel or slander. Under certain circumstances, however, spoken and written communications are considered "privileged" and therefore exempt from civil liability. This is true of communications that occur in connection with legislative, judicial or other official proceedings.

Under current law, libel or slander actions are given "special precedence" (that is, priority consideration) by the court system over other civil actions. The penalty levied against a person found to have made a libelous or slanderous statement is a monetary award, payable to the injured party.

Proposal

This measure adds to the State Constitution a provision that would prevent any successful candidate for the U.S.

Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, a state elective office or a local elective office in California from holding that office, if

- that person is found in a civil action to have made libelous or slanderous statement against an opposing candidate during the course of the election campaign
- the libelous or slanderous statement was a major contributing cause in the defeat of the opposing candidate, and
- the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.

The measure specifies that the vacancy in the public office shall occur only after the trial court decision has become final. Vacancies created as a result of this measure would be filled in the manner provided by existing law.

Fiscal Effect

Adoption of this measure would have no direct fiscal effect on the state or local governments.

If, however, a successful candidate were disqualified from assuming or holding office as a result of the measure, local governments could incur additional costs if an election had to be held to fill the vacancy. These costs could be significant if the election did not coincide with a regularly scheduled election.

Text of Proposed Law

This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional Amendment 74 (Statutes of 1982, Resolution Chapter 181) expressly amends the Constitution by adding a section thereto; therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are printed in *italic type* to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE VII

SEC. 10. (a) No person who is found liable in a civil action for making libelous or slanderous statements against an opposing candidate during the course of an election campaign for any federal, statewide, Board of Equalization, or legislative office or for any county, city and county, city, district, or any other local elective office shall retain the seat to which he or she is elected, where it is established that the libel or slander was a major contributing cause in the defeat of an opposing candidate.

A libelous or slanderous statement shall be deemed to have been made by a person within the meaning of this section if that person actually made the statement or if the person actually or constructively assented to, authorized, or ratified the statement.

"Federal office," as used in this section means the office of United States Senator and Member of the House of Representatives; and to the extent that the provisions of this section do not conflict with any provision of federal law, it is intended that candidates seeking the office of United States Senator or Member of the House of Representatives comply with this section.

(b) In order to determine whether libelous or slanderous statements were a major contributing cause in the defeat of an opposing candidate, the trier of fact shall make a separate, distinct finding on that issue. If the trier of fact finds that libel or slander was a major contributing cause in the defeat of an opposing candidate and that the libelous or slanderous statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or true, the person holding office shall be disqualified from or shall forfeit that office as provided in subdivision (d). The findings required by this section shall be in writing and shall be incorporated as part of the judgment.

(c) In a case where a person is disqualified from holding office or is required to forfeit an office under subdivisions (a) and (b), that disqualification or forfeiture shall create a vacancy in office, which vacancy shall be filled in the manner provided by law for the filling of a vacancy in that particular office.

(d) Once the judgment of liability is entered by the trial court and the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired, or all possibility of direct attack in the courts of this state has been finally exhausted, the person shall be disqualified from or shall forfeit the office involved in that election and shall have no authority to exercise the powers or perform the duties of the office.

(e) This section shall apply to libelous or slanderous statements made on or after the effective date of this section.

AMENDED IN SENATE SEPTEMBER 6, 1983

AMENDED IN SENATE AUGUST 26, 1983

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 4, 1983.

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 21, 1983

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—1983-84 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 311

Introduced by Assemblyman Connelly

January 19, 1983

An act to amend Section 12520 of, and to add Section 12521 to, the Elections Code, relating to elections; and making an appropriation therefor.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 311, as amended, Connelly. Elections: Code of Fair Campaign Practices.

Existing law provides for a voluntary subscription by candidates for state or local office to a Code of Fair Campaign Practices which contains specified pledges.

This bill would add a pledge to the code regarding the release of campaign-related advertisements to opponents 48 hours prior to dissemination, as specified.

This bill also specifies under which circumstances the code would apply and would require that the election official responsible for preparation of the ballot note on the sample and official ballots whether a candidate has signed the code, and would provide for penalties under specified circumstances.

This bill would impose a state-mandated local program by requiring local election officials to perform specified tasks.

The bill appropriates \$2,000 to reimburse local agencies and school districts for their costs.

This bill would provide that notwithstanding Section 2231.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, this act does not contain a repealer, as required by that section; therefore, the provisions of the act would remain in effect unless and until they are amended or repealed by a later enacted act.

Vote: $\frac{2}{3}$ majority. Appropriation: yes no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated local program: yes.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

1 SECTION 1. Section 12520 of the Elections Code is
2 amended to read:

3 12520. At the time an individual files his or her
4 declaration of candidacy, nomination papers, or any
5 other paper evidencing an intention to be a candidate for
6 public office, the clerk, shall give the individual a blank
7 form of the Code of Fair Campaign Practices and a copy
8 of the provisions of this chapter. The clerk shall inform
9 each candidate for public office that subscription to the
10 code is voluntary. Any candidate who has not properly
11 executed and delivered the code to the appropriate
12 election official in the county of the candidate's residence
13 within five days following the filing of nomination papers
14 in the case of a primary election or within five days
15 following the primary election in the case of the general
16 election shall be deemed to have refused to sign the code.

17 In the case of a committee making an independent
18 expenditure within the meaning of Section 12511, the
19 Secretary of State shall provide a blank form and a copy
20 of the provisions of this chapter to the individual filing, in
21 accordance with Title 9 (commencing with Section
22 81000) of the Government Code, an initial campaign
23 statement on behalf of the committee.

24 The text of the code shall read, as follows:

25 CODE OF FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES

26 There are basic principles of decency, honesty, and fair
27 play which every candidate for public office in the State
28 of California has a moral obligation to observe and
29 uphold, in order that, after vigorously contested, but
30

1 fairly conducted campaigns, our citizens may e
2 their constitutional right to a free and untram
3 choice and the will of the people may be fully and
4 expressed on the issues.

5 THEREFORE:

6 (1) I SHALL CONDUCT my campaign open
7 publicly, discussing the issues as I see them, pres
8 my record and policies with sincerity and frankne
9 criticizing without fear or favor the record and pol
10 my opponents or political parties which meri
11 criticism.

12 (2) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT the
13 character defamation, whispering campaigns,
14 slander, or scurrilous attacks on any candidate or
15 her personal or family life.

16 (3) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT any app
17 negative prejudice based on race, sex, religion, n
18 origin, physical health status, or age.

19 (4) I SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT any disho
20 unethical practice which tends to corrupt or unde
21 our American system of free elections, or which ha
22 or prevents the full and free expression of the will
23 voters including acts intended to hinder or preve
24 eligible person from registering to vote, enrolling t
25 or voting.

26 (5) I SHALL provide to my opponents, a
27 addresses they specify on their Code of Fair Can
28 Practices form, and for public inspection t
29 appropriate election official in the most populous c
30 in the district in which I am seeking election or
31 Secretary of State if I am a candidate for statewide
32 48 hours prior to dissemination by me or my con
33 committee, the text of any campaign advertisi
34 communication which refers to my opponent by na
35 innuendo.

36 (6) I SHALL NOT coerce election help or can
37 contributions for myself or for any other candidat
38 my employees.

39 (7) I SHALL IMMEDIATELY AND PUBLI
40 REPUDIATE support deriving from any individ

AMENDED IN SENATE AUGUST 10, 1983

AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 27, 1983

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 11, 1983

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 3, 1983

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—1983-84 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 406

Introduced by Assemblymen Davis, Chacon, Elder, Farr,
Harris, Hauser, Hayden, Katz, Klehs, Peace, and
Vasconcellos

(Coauthors: Senators Dills, Garamendi, Leroy Greene,
McCorquodale, Presley, Robbins, Torres, and Watson)

January 31, 1983

An act to amend Sections 32002 and 32004 of, and to add Sections 32001.5 and 32005 to, the Elections Code, relating to elections.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 406, as amended, Davis. Elections: public campaign financing.

Under existing law, the California Election Campaign Fund Act permits individuals to designate on the applicable tax return the payment of specified various amounts, in addition to their tax liability, to the California Election Campaign Fund. The act provides for the disbursement of the moneys in that fund to qualified political parties, as specified, and prescribes the procedures and allocation of those funds by those parties to candidates for state office at statewide general elections.

This bill would create a Fair Campaign Practices Agreement, as specified, and would require candidates to sign

only upon his or her determination that a majority of a committee composed as follows concurs in each such disbursement:

(1) Chair of that party.

(2) As to the majority party of the Assembly, its Speaker; or, as to each minority party of the Assembly, that party's Minority Leader.

(3) As to the majority party of the Senate, its President pro Tempore; or, as to each minority party of the Senate, that party's Minority Leader.

(b) As to any party unrepresented by both paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (a), its chair shall be the sole member of the committee provided for in subdivision (a).

(c) As to any party unrepresented by one, but not both, of the categories specified in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (a), the two members of that committee provided for by subdivision (a) shall choose a third member to serve for each calendar year.

(d) Any funds received by a committee's political party which are disbursed by the committee to candidates shall be disbursed only to candidates for state office in connection with a statewide general election who have signed the Fair Campaign Practices Agreement specified in subdivision (e).

However, this provision shall not apply to a candidate who signs the Fair Campaign Practices Agreement but is opposed by a candidate who declines to sign the Fair Campaign Practices Agreement.

(e) The text of the Fair Campaign Practices Agreement shall read as follows:

FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES AGREEMENT

I. Fair Campaign Pledge

I pledge to conduct my campaign for public office openly and fairly. I also will not use or permit the use of any campaign advertisement which falsifies the facts regarding my opponents. In addition I will publicly repudiate support deriving from any individual or group

1 who uses or permits the use of any campaign
2 advertisement which falsifies the facts regarding my
3 opponents.

II. Specific Agreements

4
5 I further agree to the following specific conditions:

6 (1) I will clearly identify myself (or my campaign
7 committees) as the sender of all my campaign
8 advertisements.

9
10 (2) During the campaign I agree to provide to my
11 opponent and to the newspapers of two newspapers of
12 the widest general circulation within the district which
13 newspapers were most recently used by the county clerk
14 in publishing notices pursuant to Section 6588 of the
15 Elections Code, the text of all campaign advertisements
16 which name or make either direct or indirect reference
17 to my opponent at least 24 hours before they are placed
18 in the mail and 48 hours before they are broadcast or
19 otherwise published.

III. Submission of Advertisements

20
21 I shall designate one individual and one delivery
22 address to receive campaign advertisements which name
23 or make either direct or indirect reference to my
24 candidacy within 24 hours following my certification as
25 the candidate of my party for the general election.

26 I agree to submit the text of any campaign
27 advertisement which names or makes either direct or
28 indirect reference to my opponent, to the individuals
29 designated by my opponent and to the newspapers
30 referred to above, at least 24 hours before the
31 advertisement is placed in the mail and 48 hours before
32 they are broadcast, or otherwise published.

33 In addition, I agree that the text of any campaign
34 advertisement which names or makes either direct or
35 indirect reference to my opponent, and which will be
36 received in the mail, broadcast, or otherwise delivered
37 during the last seven days of the campaign, will be
38 furnished to my opponent and to the newspapers
39 referred to above at least 48 hours before it is mailed
40

1 broadcast, or otherwise published.

2 I acknowledge that I am civilly liable for failure to
3 comply with the advance notice requirement of this
4 agreement.

5
6 Signature _____ Signature _____

7 Date _____ Date _____

8
9 (f) For purposes of the Fair Campaign Practices
10 Agreement "campaign advertisement" means a
11 communication authorized by a candidate or a
12 candidate's controlled committee, as defined in Section
13 82016 of the Government Code, for the purpose of
14 advocating the election or defeat of a qualified candidate
15 through any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine,
16 outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, or any other
17 type of general, public, political advertising, including,
18 but not limited to, recorded telephone messages and
19 printed materials which are publicly distributed.

20 SEC. 5. Section 32005 is added to the Elections Code,
21 to read:

22 32005. Any person who after signing the Fair
23 Campaign Practices Agreement fails to provide
24 campaign advertisements as required by the agreement
25 shall be liable in a civil action brought by the Attorney
26 General or by a person residing within the jurisdiction of
27 the candidate in question for an amount of ten thousand
28 dollars (\$10,000) or three times the amount of the cost of
29 the campaign advertisement, whichever is greater.

30 SEC. 6. In the event that the Franchise Tax Board
31 redesigns the tax form so that space is available to print
32 the statement, "The state assures that no political
33 contribution collected by the Franchise Tax Board for
34 disbursement to official political parties will be
35 contributed or transferred to any candidate who has
36 failed to sign the Fair Campaign Practices Agreement"
37 on the tax form, the statement shall also be printed on the
38 tax form.

**THE FOLLOWING PAGES MAY
NOT FILM LEGIBLY BECAUSE OF
THE POOR QUALITY OF THE ORIGINAL**

ATTACHMENT B

STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REGULATE NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING

OVERVIEW. Negative campaign advertising attracted unprecedented attention in 1988 as President Bush's successful campaign ads attacked the credibility of opponent Michael Dukakis. Local and state politicians continued to stage controversial campaigns in 1989, spending millions of dollars on negative ads in races for governors' seats in Virginia and New Jersey and mayors' offices in New York and Cleveland. While negative campaign advertising is not a new phenomenon, the way political consultants assess negative ads has changed. Many candidates--previously cautioned that nasty ads could result in backlash votes against them--are now counseled that negative ads command more viewer attention and switch more votes than positive ads.

And while the true merits of negative campaign advertising are arguable, there is an inarguable political reality now faced by candidates for public office: negative ads are a fact of political life. Despite complaints from some voters and legislators that "attack" ads demean the electoral process and deter voters from participating, legal scholars warn that the constitutional issues raised when regulating the free speech of candidates are difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. Even so, state legislative efforts to regulate negative campaign ads continue.

SURVEY RESULTS. The following summary and table show the results of a 50-state telephone survey conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures in December 1989. The individuals contacted in each state were those working in state departments, agencies or commissions charged with enforcing election and campaign laws. Contacts were asked the following with regard to their states: (1) is there a fair campaign practices code, voluntary or mandatory, that applies to candidates for state office?; (2) does this code provide sanctions for violations?; (3) are there other statutory provisions that affect negative ads (other than disclaimer or disclosure provisions)?; (4) have there been any court challenges to these provisions?; and (5) have there been any legislative proposals to regulate negative campaign ads since 1985 (responses to this question are not necessarily exhaustive). Names and telephone numbers of contacts providing information are listed on the table.

Fair Campaign Practices Codes: Seven state legislatures have endorsed or adopted a fair campaign practices code (CA, IL, MT, NY, WA, WV, WY). These codes are generally signed by candidates on a voluntary basis. Code provisions typically include a clause similar to that found in Washington's code, vowing to "not participate" in "personal vilification, defamation, and other attacks on any opposing candidate or party" (WAC Sec. 390-32). The Connecticut General Assembly enacted a voluntary code in 1974, but repealed the code in 1978.

Laws Prohibiting False Campaign Statements: Laws in twenty-one states (AK, CA, CO, FL, IN, LA, MA, MI, MN, MS, MT, NV, NC, ND, OH, OR, TN, UT, WA, WV, WI) prohibit false campaign statements. In Michigan and Nevada, these prohibitions apply specifically to false incumbency designations; in California, misrepresentation of party support is the type of false statement prohibited. Seven state prohibitions (in AK, CO, IN, MN, ND, OR, TN) apply only to written false statements. Most states punish violations as misdemeanors. Nebraska's campaign falsity statute, enacted in 1978, was repealed in 1986.

Court Challenges: Key provisions of New York's Fair Campaign Code were struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad in *Vanasco v. Schwartz*, 401 F. Supp. 87, aff'd 423 U.S. 1041 (1975). The *Vanasco* ruling, which has become the leading opinion on campaign falsity statutes, held that any state regulation of campaign speech must be premised on the "actual malice" standard applicable to public figures according to *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 251 (1964). Similarly, Nebraska's campaign falsity statute (NRS Sec. 49-14,132) was ruled "constitutionally invalid as overbroad" by the Nebraska Supreme Court and was repealed in 1986. See, *Fowler v. Nebraska Accountability Commission*, 330 N.W.2d 136 (1983). Ohio's current prohibition against false statements was ruled unconstitutional by a federal district court in 1987 (*Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission*, 670 F.Supp. 1368 (1987)); that ruling is now on appeal. A successful 1989 challenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana's false statement prohibition is also on appeal. See *State v. Burgess*, 543 S.2d 1332 (1989).

Legislative Proposals Since 1985: While some survey contacts report increasing bipartisan legislative interest in regulating negative campaign ads, others say such efforts in their states would be met with solid opposition. States where recent legislative proposals in this area have received bipartisan support include Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. 1990 proposals in Florida and New Jersey would require that a candidate's own voice and/or photograph be used in campaign ads that make reference to an opposing candidate.

STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REGULATE NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING

	Fair Campaign Practices Code	Sanc-tions for Code Violation	Laws Prohibiting False Campaign Statements	Court Challenges	Legislative Proposals Since 1965	Contact	Notes	
AL	No	No	No			Vicki Balogh Secretary of State's Office 205/281-7210		AL
AK	No		Al. Stat. Sec. 15-56-010 prohibits false campaign statements/misd (a)(b)		'90 (Rep. Finkelstein, HB 319; pending) '83 (failed); '88 (failed)	Linda Edgeworth Division of Elections 907/485-4611	Finkelstein's bill would make voluntary oath available to candidates	AK
AZ	No		No			Secretary of State's Office 602/547-8083		AZ
AR	No		No			Ginger Bailey Secretary of State's Office 501/682-5070		AR
CA	Cal. Elec. Code Sec 12500 (c)	No	Cal. Elec. Code Sec. 11707 prohibits misrepresentation of party support			Jon Rothman Fair Pol. Practices Cman. 916/372-5660		CA
CO	No		CRS Sec. 1-13-109 prohibits false campaign statements/misd. (b)(d)			Vikki Lindsey Secretary of State's Office 303/894-2211		CO
CT	No (Vol. code in effect 74 to 78)		No		'89 (Rep. K'ner, HB 5580; failed) '87 (Interim study)	Ron Gregory, State Elections Enforcement Cman. 203/566-7108	Code discontinued because of issues raised in Vanasco case (see NY)	CT
DE	No		No			Virginie Lane, State Elections Cman's Office 302/736-4277		DE
FL	No		Fl. Stat. Ch. 104 271 (1987) prohibits false campaign statements/civil penalty (d)		'90 (Rep. Rush, Orrau, HB1165) '90 (Rep. Bonson, HB2109)	Wayne Maloney, House Cman. on Ethics & Elections 904/488-5116	HB 1665 would require use of "attacking candidate's" photo, voice in ads	FL
GA	No		No			Harriet Bell, State Ethics Commission 404/493-5785		GA
HI	No		No			State Ethics Commission 808/548-6401		HI
ID	No		No			Marilyn Johnson Secretary of State's Office 208/334-2300		ID
IL	P.A. 86-873 (c)	No	No			Mark Kloeber, State Board of Elections 217/782-4141		IL

- a) Applies to statements that are defamatory
- b) Applies to written false statements (unless otherwise noted, false statement prohibitions apply to both oral and written statements)
- c) Code is voluntary
- d) Applies to false statements with design or effect of influencing votes on candidates or ballot questions

	Fair Campaign Practices Code	Sanc-Uons for Code Violation	Laws Prohibiting False Campaign Statements	Court Challenges	Legislative Proposals Since 1985	Contact	Notes
N	No		Ind. Code Sec. 3-14-3-22 prohibits false campaign statements/felony (a)(b)(d)(e)			Laura Molloy State Election Board 317/232-3939	
A	No		No		'89 (Sen. Granstall, SF 523 prohibiting false campaign statements; failed)	Janet Wilson Leg. Service Bureau 515/261-6471	Interim study conducted in 1988
S	No		No			Rebecca Bossmeyer Secretary of State's Office 913/296-3488	
Y	No		No			Raymond Wallace Registry of Election Finance 502/584-2226	
A	No		LRS Title 18, Sec. 463 prohibits false campaign statements/misd. (d)	'89 challenge on const. grounds (on appeal)		Marie McGrory, Ethics Administration Program 604/765-2308	See, State v. Burgess, 543 S. 2d 1332 (1989)
AE	No		No		'90 (Rep. Atayo; pending)	Marilyn Canavan Cmsn. on Gov'l Ethics & Elec. 207/280-4178	Ethics Cmsn reports increased interest in regulating negative ads
AD	No		No			Rebecca Bahinec State Adm Bd of Elec Laws 301/974-3711	
LA	No		Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 56, Sec. 42 prohibits false statements/misd. (d)			Diane Meibaum State Ethics Commission 617/727-0060	Ethics Cmsn has issued advisory on fair campaigning
MI	No		Mich. Comp Laws Sec. 16B.944 prohibits false incumbency designations			Marcia Peck Bureau of Elections 517/373-8358	
IN	No		MN Ch. 311B.05 prohibits distribution of false campaign material/gross misd. (b)(d)		'88 (resulting in Ch. 311B.05)	Jeff Sigurdson Secretary of State's Office 612/296-2805	Ch. 311B.05 also prohibits defamatory letters to the editor/misd. (d)
IS	No		Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 23-15-875 prohibits false charges against "integrity" of candidate/misd.			Reese Partridge Secretary of State's Office 601/369-1350	
IO	No		No		'87 (Sen. McCarthy; failed)	Gayle Thomas Secretary of State's Office 314/751-3719	
IT	MCA Sec. 13-35-302 (c)	No	MCA Sec. 13-35-234 prohibits false campaign statements/misd. (a)(f)			Karen Crawford Secretary of State's Office 408/444-2942	

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- Applies to statements that are defamatory
- Applies to written false statements (unless otherwise noted, false statement prohibitions apply to both oral and written statements)
- Code is voluntary
- Applies to false statements with design or effect of influencing votes on candidates or ballot questions
- All false statement prohibitions listed, with exception of LA, apply to persons making statements that they know to be false or should be reasonably expected to know are false
- Court can deprive accused candidate of nomination or election

Fair Campaign Practices Code	Sanctions for Code Violation	Laws Prohibiting False Campaign Statements	Court Challenges	Legislative Proposals Since 1983	Contact	Notes
NE	No	Prohibition of false statements (NRS Sec. 49-14.132) repealed in 1986	1983 case ruled false statement law was unconstitutional		Frank Daley, Accountability & Disclosure Commission 402/471-2522	See, Fowler v. NE Accountability Cmn., 330 N.W. 2d 136 (1983)
NV	No	NRS Sec. 294A.057, .058 prohibit false incumbency designations			Robert Elliot Secretary of State's Office 702/885-5203	Legislative proposals expected during '91 session
NH	No	No			William Gardner Secretary of State's Office 603/271-3242	
NJ	No	No		'90 (Assem. Franch. A-3356 pending) '90 (Sen. Pusso; pending)	Fred Herriman Election Law Enforcement Cmn. 609/292-8700	A-3098 would require use of candidate's photo, voice in ads referencing other candidates
NM	No	No			Chris Boyle Secretary of State's Office 505/827-3600	
NY	Elec. 3-106, Code Sec. 6201.1, 6201.2	No	1975 ruling struck down code as unconstitutional (code revised accordingly)	'88 (failed) '90 (pending)	John Ciampoli Board of Elections 518/474-8387	See, Vanasco v. Schwartz 401 F.Supp. 87, aff'd 423 U.S. 1041 (1975)
NC	No	N.C. Gen. Stat Sec 163-274(b) prohibits false statements/misd. (d)			Johnnie McLean State Board of Elections 919/733-7218	
ND	No	ND Cent. Code Sec. 16.1-10-04 prohibits false statements/misd. (b)			Ben Meier Secretary of State 702/224-2800	Sec. 16.1-10-04 applies only to political ads, news releases
OH	No	ORC Sec. 3599.081 prohibits false statements/misd. (overturned by fed. ct. 1987) (d)	1987 court ruling now under appeal		David Clouston Ohio Elections Commission 514/456-2585	See, Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Cmn, 670 F. Supp 1368 (1987)
OK	No	No			Marilyn Hughes Council on Camp. Compliance & Ethical Stds. 405/521-2391	
OR	No	ORS Sec 260.532 prohibits false campaign statements/civil penalty (b)(c)(f)			Jack Graham Secretary of State's Office 503/378-4144	
PA	No	No		'88 (failed) '89 (failed) '90 (pending)	John Contino State Ethics Commission 717/763-1610	
RI	No	No			Jan Armstrong State Board of Elections 401/277-2345	

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- (a) Applies to statements that are defamatory
- (b) Applies to written false statements (unless otherwise noted, false statement prohibitions apply to both oral and written statements)
- (c) Code is voluntary
- (d) Applies to false statements with design or effect of influencing votes on candidates or ballot questions
- (e) All false statement prohibitions listed, with exception of LA, apply to persons making statements that they know to be false or should be reasonably expected to know are false
- (f) Court can deprive accused candidates of nomination or election

56 § 41A

ELECTIONS

Cross References

Nomination of candidates, generally, see c. 53, § 1 et seq.

Posters, cards or handbills, posting and distribution near entrance to polling place prohibited, penalty, see c. 54, § 35.

Library References

Elections ⇐317.

C.J.S. Elections §§ 329, 356.

§ 42. False statements relating to candidates or questions submitted to voters

No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made or published, any false statement in relation to any candidate for nomination or election to public office, which is designed or tends to aid or to injure or defeat such candidate.

No person shall publish or cause to be published in any letter, circular, advertisement, poster or in any other writing any false statement in relation to any question submitted to the voters, which statement is designed to affect the vote on said question.

Whoever knowingly violates any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.

Added by St.1946, c. 537, § 11. Amended by St.1964, c. 147, § 2.

Historical Note

St.1964, c. 147, § 2, approved March 9, 1964, inserted the second paragraph.

Prior Laws:

St.1922, c. 209, §§ 1, 3.

St.1928, c. 101.

G.L.1932 (Ter.Ed.) c. 55, § 34A; c. 56, § 64A.

Cross References

Nomination of candidates, generally, see c. 53 § 1 et seq.

Law Review Commentaries

Avoidance of an election or referendum when the electorate has been misled. (1957) 70 Harvard L.Rev. 1077.

Law of the land; torts of the tongue. Wm. Arch. McLean (1900) 12 Green Bag 523.

Library References

Elections ⇐318, 332.

C.J.S. Elections §§ 331, 353.

to the improper discharge of his campaign duties or to obtain information about the candidate or his campaign organization.

(B) No person, during the course of any campaign for nomination or election to public office or office of a political party, by means of campaign materials, including sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or television or in a newspaper or periodical, a public speech, press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly and with intent to affect the outcome of such campaign do any of the following:

(1) Use the title of an office not currently held by a candidate in a manner that implies that the candidate does currently hold that office or use the term "re-elect" when the candidate has never been elected at a primary, general, or special election to the office for which he is a candidate;

(2) Make a false statement concerning the formal schooling or training completed or attempted by a candidate; a degree, diploma, certificate, scholarship, grant, award, prize, or honor received, earned, or held by a candidate; or the period of time during which a candidate attended any school, college, community technical school, or institution;

(3) Make a false statement concerning the professional, occupational, or vocational licenses held by a candidate, or concerning any position the candidate held for which he received a salary or wages;

(4) Make a false statement that a candidate or public official has been indicted or convicted of a theft offense, extortion, or other crime involving financial corruption or moral turpitude;

(5) Make a statement that a candidate has been indicted for any crime or has been the subject of a finding by the Ohio elections commission without disclosing the outcome of any legal proceedings resulting from the indictment or finding;

(6) Make a false statement that a candidate or official has a record of treatment or confinement for mental disorder;

(7) Make a false statement that a candidate or official has been subjected to military discipline for criminal misconduct or dishonorably discharged from the armed services;

(8) Falsely identify the source of a statement, issue statements under the name of another person without authorization, or falsely state the endorsement of or opposition to a candidate by a person or publication;

(9) Make a false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or public official;

(10) Post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a false statement, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, concerning a candidate that is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.

As used in this section, "voting record" means the recorded "yes" or "no" vote on a bill, ordinance, resolution, motion, amendment, or confirmation.

(C) Before any prosecution may commence, a complaint shall be presented to the Ohio elections commission by an affidavit of any person, made on personal knowledge and subject to the penalties for perjury, setting forth any violation of division (A) or (B) of this section. The commission shall proceed to investigate the charges made in the affidavit, and shall, whenever possible, complete the investigation of all matters before an election. The commission or a member of the commission may administer oaths, and the

commission may issue and enforce subpoenas with regard to an investigation under this section in the same manner as provided in division (C) of section 3517.15 of the Revised Code. The commission shall issue copies of its findings to the committees or persons involved in its investigation.

(D)(1) If the commission finds that division (A) or (B) of this section has been violated, it shall do only one of the following:

(a) Impose a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars;

(b) Forthwith transmit a copy of its findings and the evidence to the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate county.

(2) Notwithstanding any provision of Chapters 1901., 1905., 1907., and 2931. of the Revised Code, the common pleas court has exclusive original jurisdiction over prosecutions under this section.

(3) Any person adversely affected by the action of the commission under division (D)(1)(a) of this section may appeal from such action in accordance with section 119.12 of the Revised Code.

(E) If the commission finds upon the preponderance of the evidence that the violation is a continuing one, or if it has reason to believe that recurrence of the violation is imminent, it may issue an order to cease and desist. The commission or the person who filed the affidavit, or the treasurer of the campaign committee of any candidate who filed an affidavit may bring an action for an injunction against any person violating or attempting to violate the order. Any person adversely affected by a cease and desist order of the commission may appeal as provided in section 119.12 of the Revised Code. No appeal, however, shall stay enforcement of a cease and desist order. In an action for injunction to enforce any final order of the commission brought pursuant to this section, the findings of the commission, after hearing, are prima-facie evidence of the facts found.

(F) In any action before the commission, if the allegations of the person who filed the affidavit are not proved, and the commission seeks neither civil nor criminal relief in court, the commission may find that the complaint is frivolous and order the complainant to pay costs. If so, the person filing the complaint may be required to pay such costs of the commission as would be assessed for the same service in a civil action before the court of common pleas. Such costs paid to the commission shall be deposited in the general revenue fund of the state. The commission shall provide each person under investigation, by mail or in person, prior to each meeting of the commission at which the person's presence is requested, a notice for the hearing, and shall supply to each person under investigation, prior to the person's first appearance before the commission, a statement of the legal rights and obligations of those under investigation by the commission.

(G) Whoever violates division (A) or (B) of this section is guilty of unfair campaign practices, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

HISTORY: 1986 H 555, eff. 2-26-86

1984 H 722; 1980 S 251; 1977 H 1; 1976 H 804

PRACTICE AND STUDY AIDS

Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Statutory Charges
Baldwin's Ohio School Law, Text 5.03(A)

government, and any county, city, district or other municipal corporation or public corporation organized for a public purpose, including a cooperative body formed between municipal or public corporations. [Formerly 260.231; 1973 c.43 §27a; 1979 c.190 §372, 1979 c.318 §35a; 1983 c.71 §9, 1983 c.392 §1; 1985 c.365 §39, 1985 c.408 §62; 1987 c.718 §3]

260.440 [Amended by 1971 c.644 §6, repealed by 1971 c.749 §62]

260.442 [Formerly 260.250, 1973 c.744 §28; 1979 c.190 §353; renumbered 260.625]

260.450 [Repealed by 1957 c.644 §28]

260.452 [Formerly 260.420; 1973 c.744 §29; repealed by c.190 §431]

260.460 [Repealed by 1957 c.644 §28]

260.462 [Formerly 260.270; 1973 c.744 §30; 1979 c.190 §386; renumbered 260.655]

260.470 [Amended by 1957 c.644 §9; 1971 c.749 §34; renumbered 260.365]

260.472 [Formerly 260.280; 1973 c.744 §31; 1979 c.190 §370; renumbered 260.415]

260.480 [Amended by 1957 c.644 §11; repealed by 1971 c.749 §62]

260.482 [Formerly 260.310; 1973 c.744 §32; 1977 c.678 §3; 1979 c.190 §364; renumbered 260.635]

260.490 [Amended by 1959 c.644 §12; repealed by 1971 c.749 §82]

260.492 [Formerly 260.320; 1973 c.744 §33; repealed by 1970 c.190 §431]

260.500 [Amended by 1957 c.644 §13; 1971 c.749 §56; renumbered 260.552]

260.502 [Formerly 260.335; repealed by 1973 c.744 §48]

260.510 [Amended by 1957 c.644 §14; repealed by 1971 c.749 §82]

260.512 [Formerly 260.340; 1973 c.744 §34; 1979 c.190 §380; renumbered 260.605]

260.520 [Amended by 1957 c.644 §15; 1971 c.749 §35; renumbered 260.375]

260.522 Identification of source of political publication. (1) Except as provided in this section, no person shall cause to be printed, posted, broadcast, mailed, circulated or otherwise published, any written matter, photograph or broadcast relating to any election or to any candidate or measure at any election, unless it states the name and address of the person responsible for the publication, including a statement that the publication was authorized by the person.

(2) A radio broadcast which complies with the requirements of the Federal Communications Act and regulations under it is not required to state the address of the person responsible for the broadcast if the person responsible for the broadcast is a candidate or political committee.

(3) The prohibition under subsection (1) of this section does not apply to:

(a) Any sign relating to a candidate if the candidate or the principal campaign committee of the candidate is responsible for the

sign and the sign displays the name of the candidate; or

(b) Any written matter relating to a measure at any election prepared under the direction of the governing body of the city, county or district that referred the measure if the written matter is impartial, neither supports nor opposes passage of the measure and contains the name and address of the city, county or district.

(4) Any written matter or broadcast which has been previously published shall have the publisher and date of publication clearly identified when it is referred to in a publication listed under subsection (1) of this section.

(5) "Address" for purposes of this section means the address of a residence, office, headquarters or similar location where the person may be conveniently located. If the person is a political committee, the address shall be the address of the political committee included in the statement of organization under ORS 260.042. [Formerly 260.360; 1973 c.483 §1; 1973 c.744 §35; 1975 c.683 §13; 1979 c.190 §373; 1981 c.234 §17; 1983 c.71 §11; 1985 c.306 §63; 1989 c.403 §28; 1989 c.1054 §13]

260.530 [Repealed by 1957 c.644 §28]

260.532 False publication relating to candidate or measure. (1) No person shall cause to be written, printed, published, posted, communicated or circulated, any letter, circular, bill, placard, poster, photograph or other publication, or cause any advertisement to be placed in a publication, or singly or with others pay for any advertisement, with knowledge or with reckless disregard that the letter, circular, bill, placard, poster, photograph, publication or advertisement contains a false statement of material fact relating to any candidate, political committee or measure.

(2) A candidate who knows of and consents to a publication or advertisement prohibited by this section with knowledge or with reckless disregard that it contains a false statement of material fact, violates this section regardless of whether the candidate has participated directly in the publication or advertisement.

(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a candidate knows of and consents to any publication or advertisement prohibited by this section caused by a political committee over which the candidate exercises any direction and control.

(4) Any candidate or political committee aggrieved by a violation of this section shall have a right of action against the person alleged to have committed the violation. The aggrieved party may file the action in the circuit court for any county in this state in

which a defendant resides or can be found or, if the defendant is a nonresident of this state, in the circuit court for any county in which the publication occurred. To prevail in such an action, the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant violated subsection (1) of this section.

(5) A plaintiff who prevails in an action provided by subsection (4) of this section may recover compensatory damages for all injury suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the false statement of material fact. Proof of entitlement to compensatory damages must be by a preponderance of evidence. Any prevailing party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal.

(6) A political committee has standing to bring an action provided by subsection (4) of this section as plaintiff in its own name, if its purpose as evidenced by its preelection activities, solicitations and publications has been injured by the violation and if it has fully complied with the provisions of this chapter. In an action brought by a political committee as provided by subsection (4) of this section, the plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for all injury to the purpose of the committee by reason of the false statement of material fact. A political committee may not be sued as defendant in such an action. A recovery made by a political committee which prevails in an action under this section shall be distributed pro rata among the persons making contributions to the committee.

(7) If a judgment is rendered in an action under this section against a defendant who has been nominated to public office or elected to a public office other than state Senator or state Representative, and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the false statement was deliberately made or caused to be made by the defendant, the finder of fact shall determine whether the false statement reversed the outcome of the election. If the finder of fact finds by clear and convincing evidence that the false statement reversed the outcome of the election, the defendant shall be deprived of the nomination or election and the nomination or office shall be declared vacant.

(8) An action under this section must be filed not later than the 30th day after the election relating to which a publication or advertisement in violation of this section was made. Proceedings on a complaint filed under this section shall have precedence over all other business on the docket. The courts shall proceed in a manner which will insure that:

(a) Final judgment on a complaint which relates to a primary or nominating election

is rendered before the 30th day before the general election; and

(b) Final judgment on a complaint which relates to an election to an office is rendered before the term of that office begins.

(9) The remedy provided by this section is the exclusive remedy for a violation of this section. [Formerly 260.340; 1973 c.744 §30; 1975 c.643 §14; 1979 c.190 §374; 1979 c.667 §2; 1981 c.807 §43; 1983 c.756 §1; 1983 c.804 §63a]

260.340 [1987 c.644 §10; 1971 c.749 §27; renumbered 260.325]

260.542 Use of term "reelect." No person shall use the term "reelect" in any material, statement or publication supporting the election of a candidate unless the candidate:

(1) Was elected to the identical office with the same position number, if any, in the most recent election to fill that office;

(2) Was elected from the same district from which the candidate is seeking election or, if district boundaries have been changed since the previous election, if the majority of the population in the district from which the candidate is seeking election was in the district from which the candidate was previously elected; and

(3) Is serving and has served continuously in that office from the beginning of the term to which the candidate was elected. [Formerly 260.405; 1973 c.744 §37; 1979 c.190 §375]

260.545 Use of candidate name in way implying candidate is incumbent. No person shall use the name of a candidate in a way that implies that the candidate is the incumbent in office in any material, statement or publication supporting the election of a candidate unless the candidate is qualified to use the term "reelect" under ORS 260.542 or the candidate:

(1) Was appointed to the identical office with the same position number, if any, after the most recent election to fill that office;

(2) Was appointed from the same district from which the candidate is seeking election, or if district boundaries have been changed since the previous election, if the majority of the population in the district from which the candidate is seeking election was in the district from which the candidate was appointed; and

(3) Is serving and has served continuously in that office since the date of appointment. [1987 c.826 §2]

260.552 [Formerly 260.500; 1973 c.744 §38; repealed by 1979 c.190 §431]

260.555 Prohibitions relating to circulation, filing or certification of initiative, referendum or recall petition. (1) No person attempting to obtain signatures on, or

Historical and Statutory Notes

Sunset Act application: See Reviser's Note following § 42.17.350.

42.17.439. Certification of reports

Every report and statement required to be filed under this chapter shall identify the person preparing it, and shall be certified as complete and correct, both by the person preparing it and by the person on whose behalf it is filed.

Enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 1, § 43, eff. Jan. 1, 1973 (Initiative Measure No. 276, § 43).

Historical and Statutory Notes

Sunset Act application: See Reviser's Note following § 42.17.350.

42.17.440. Statements and reports public records

All statements and reports filed under this chapter shall be public records of the agency where they are filed, and shall be available for public inspection and copying during normal business hours at the expense of the person requesting copies, provided that the charge for such copies shall not exceed actual cost to the agency.

Enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 1, § 44, eff. Jan. 1, 1973 (Initiative Measure No. 276, § 44).

Library References

Records 14.

C.J.S. Records § 35 et seq.

42.17.450. Duty to preserve statements and reports

Persons with whom statements or reports or copies of statements or reports are required to be filed under this chapter shall preserve them for not less than six years. The commission, however, shall preserve such statements or reports for not less than ten years.

Enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 1, § 45, eff. Jan. 1, 1973 (Initiative Measure No. 276, § 45).

Historical and Statutory Notes

Sunset Act application: See Reviser's Note following § 42.17.350.

Library References

Records 13.

C.J.S. Records §§ 34, 40.

POLITICAL ADVERTISING

42.17.505. Definitions

The definitions set forth in this section apply throughout RCW 42.17.510 through 42.17.540.

(1) "Actual malice" means to act with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.

(2) "Sponsor" means the candidate, political committee, or person paying for the advertisement. If a person acts as an agent for another or is reimbursed by another for the payment, the original source of the payment is the sponsor.

(3) "Incumbent" means a person who is in present possession of an elected office.

Enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 199, § 1.

42.17.510. Identification of sponsor—Exemptions

(1) All written political advertising, whether relating to candidates or ballot propositions, shall include the sponsor's name and address. All radio and television political advertising, whether relating to candidates or ballot propositions, shall include the sponsor's name. The use of an assumed name shall be unlawful. The party with which a candidate files shall be clearly identified in political advertising for partisan office.

(2) Political yard signs are exempt from the requirement of subsection (1) of this section that the name and address of the sponsor of political advertising be listed on the advertising. In addition, the public disclosure commission shall, by rule, exempt from the identification requirements of subsection (1) of this section forms of political advertising such as campaign buttons, balloons, pens, pencils, sky-writing, inscriptions, and other forms of advertising where identification is impractical.

(3) For the purposes of this section, "yard sign" means any outdoor sign with dimensions no greater than eight feet by four feet.

Enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 216, § 1.

Cross References

Advertising rates for political candidates, see § 65.16.095.

ments, see *Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee*, 1989, 109 S.Ct. 1018, 108 L.Ed.2d 271.

United States Supreme Court

Freedom of speech and association, ban on political party primary endorse-

42.17.520. Picture of candidate

At least one picture of the candidate used in any political advertising shall have been taken within the last five years and shall be no smaller than the largest picture of the same candidate used in the same advertisement.

Enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 216, § 2.

42.17.530. False political advertising

(1) It is a violation of this chapter for a person to sponsor with actual malice:

(a) Political advertising that contains a false statement of material fact;

(b) Political advertising that falsely represents that a candidate is the incumbent for the office sought when in fact the candidate is not the incumbent;

(c) Political advertising that makes either directly or indirectly, a false claim stating or implying the support or endorsement of any person or organization when in fact the candidate does not have such support or endorsement.

(2) Any violation of this section shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 216, § 8. Amended by Laws 1988, ch. 199, § 2.

42.17.540. Responsibility for compliance

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the responsibility for compliance with RCW 42.17.510 through 42.17.530 shall rest with the sponsor of the political advertising and not with the broadcasting station or other medium.

HB

43

Alaska State Legislature

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




REPRESENTATIVE FRAN ULMER

MEMORANDUM

March 27, 1991

TO: Rep. Dave Donley, Chair
House Judiciary Committee

FROM: Rep. Fran Ulmer 

RE: HB 43, relating to child support arrearages

I would like to request a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee for HB 43, relating to child support arrearages. This bill requires that when past due child support is collected for families who have been receiving public assistance, those arrearages will be paid first to the family, and secondly to the state for reimbursement of the public assistance. Although this bill is a technical change to the way in which the state handles payment of child support arrearages, it will help families remain financially independent. This legislation was recommended by the Family Support Task Force and is supported by the Alaska Children's Commission, the Alaska Family Support Group and by Alaska Dads and Moms.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Alaska State Legislature

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



REPRESENTATIVE FRAN ULMER

MEMORANDUM

April 10, 1991

TO: Rep. Dave Donley, Chair
House Judiciary Committee

FROM: Rep. Fran Ulmer

RE: HB 43, relating to child support arrearages

I would like to request a hearing for HB 43, relating to child support arrearages, before the House Judiciary Committee at the committee's earliest convenience. This bill has wide support among both custodial and non-custodial parent organizations, the Alaska Children's Commission, as well as the administration. I urge you to bring this before the Judiciary Committee for review.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

District 4B — Juneau
P.O. Box V • Juneau, Alaska 99811-3100 • (907) 465-4947



Alaska State Legislature

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




REPRESENTATIVE FRAN ULMER

MEMORANDUM

April 21, 1991

TO: Rep. Dave Donley, Chair
House Judiciary Committee

FROM: Rep. Fran Ulmer 

RE: HB 43, relating to child support arrearages

One of the responsibilities of the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Revenue is to collect past due child support. When a custodial parent applies for public assistance, he or she must assign the rights to uncollected, past due support to the state for reimbursement of the assistance received. When the delinquent child support is collected, the state is reimbursed first for the assistance paid to the family. After the state is fully repaid, the balance of the past-due child support is paid to the family. [Note: Although the state is reimbursed for arrearages first, that reimbursement does not affect payment of current monthly child support to the family.]

The effect of HB 43 is to reverse this order of payment regarding arrearages. Under the bill, past-due child support will be paid first to the family and secondly to the state for reimbursement of assistance received by the family. The purpose of this change is to make this "family-first" priority a clear policy of the state and to ensure that child support is received when it is most needed. Under the current order of payment, families sometimes wait years for their share of past-due child support. In some cases, the children are grown and on their own by the time the delinquent payments are received--long after they were most needed by the family. HB 43 ensures that families will receive payments first.

There are several changes I would like to suggest the committee make to HB 43. I have recently learned of a case pending in the State of Washington whose outcome may have significant bearing on Alaska's child support arrearage collection system (*Jensen v Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services*). That case attempts to rectify in Washington certain inequities which occur in Alaska's arrearage collection system as well.

Briefly, in Alaska and Washington, when a parent assigns rights to child support arrearages to the state as reimbursement for AFDC payments, the state then holds that parent liable for the full amount of the assistance provided. Assume, for example, a family receives public

District 4B — Juneau

P.O. Box V • Juneau, Alaska 99811-3100 • (907) 465-4947



Recycled Paper

assistance benefits in the amount of \$10,000 and the state collects all the child support due during that period of time, which is \$3,000. The family terminates from public assistance and an additional \$4000 worth of support accrues. The family then goes on public assistance for a second time. The state will use the "gap period of arrears" of \$4000 to reimburse unpaid AFDC benefits from either the first or second welfare period. (See attached chart.)

This practice creates a grave inequity between those families receiving assistance who have outstanding child-support arrears, and those families who have no child-support arrearages to be collected. No other AFDC recipient is required to repay the assistance provided. Federal law is silent on this issue; federal regulations are contradictory. If the legal challenge in Washington is upheld, Alaska will have solid grounds for redressing this inequity. Counsel from the Legal Affairs Agency advises me, however, that we may well have litigation on this issue regardless of how we choose to handle it.

I **strongly recommend** that we amend HB 43 to indicate the Legislature's intention that AFDC payments shall be reimbursed from child support arrearages up to the total amount of child support ordered for those months in which the family received assistance, or the total amount of the assistance provided during that period, **whichever is lesser**. I also suggest we add the proviso "to the extent allowed by federal law" to address prospectively the failure of the Washington litigants to overturn this practice in Washington. I have prepared a committee substitute which incorporates these changes for your review.

Passage of HB 43 will require additional personnel in the Child Support Enforcement Division to calculate the amounts of child support owed to both the family (the "obligee") and to the state. Clients tend to go on and off of public assistance over a period of months and years; each time a client returns to the public assistance rolls, the debts to the state and the family must be recalculated.

In addition, payment of "families first" will result in a loss of revenue to the state in the amount of approximately \$2,400.0. This loss will require an additional appropriation to the AFDC program (\$1,961.0) and to the Child Support Enforcement program (\$462.5). Although these numbers appear large, the loss is only temporary; the funds eventually may be recovered by the state.

HB 43 was recommended by the Family Support Task Force and is supported by the Alaska Family Support Group, Alaska Dads and Moms, and the Alaska Commission on Children and Youth.

HB 43, Child Support Arrearages

Sample Case

	Child Support Owed	AFDC Paid
Period 1: [on AFDC]	\$3000	\$10,000
Period 2: [off AFDC]	\$4000	0
Period 3: [on AFDC]	\$1500	\$5000
Total	\$8500	\$15,000

Under current law: State will retain all child support arrearages from periods #1,2 and 3 (\$8500) as reimbursement for AFDC benefits.

Family would receive no arrearages.

Under CSHB 43: State would retain child support arrearages only from periods #1 and #3 (\$4500) as reimbursement for AFDC benefits.

Family would receive \$4000 in arrearages before state retained \$4500 for AFDC reimbursement.

CSHB 43, CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES

Sectional Analysis

Section 1. (d) Provides that past-due child support payments collected by the state shall be paid **first** to the custodial parent (the "obligee") and **secondly** to the state for reimbursement of public assistance paid to the family. This reverses the current order of payment.

(e) To the extent permitted by federal law, after the past-due child support owed to the family has been paid, the state may retain past-due child support payments equal to the total amount of child support owed during the period in which the family received AFDC benefits, or the total amount of assistance paid, whichever is lesser.

(f) The state shall pay past-due child support recovered through off-set of the obligor's federal tax refund **first** to the state for unreimbursed assistance and **secondly** to the family, as required by federal regulation.

HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT

(7)
Date Referred: January 21, 1991

FURTHER REFERRALS:

Judiciary
Finance

Date of Committee Action: 3-26-91

The HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES Committee considered:

HB 43

HOUSE BILL NO. 43

CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES

"An Act relating to the distribution of child support arrearages collected by the child support enforcement agency."

RECOMMENDATIONS: [] the same title
be replaced with _____ [] a new title

[] have attached amendments(s)

[] do pass

[] do not pass

[] no recommendations

[] individual recommendations

[] additional referral to the _____ Committee

ADOPTS: _____ letter of Intent

ATTACHES NEW FISCAL NOTE(S): (Dept)

APPROVES PREVIOUS: (Dept/Date)

[] fiscal impact D.O.R.








[] fiscal note(s) _____


[] zero fiscal note _____

[] zero fiscal note(s) _____

SIGNING DO PASS: (LINCOLN)

SIGNING OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

	Check appropriate column:	Do Not	No Rec	Amend
		Pass		
				
 (CARNEY)				
 (GONZALES)				
 (DAVIS)				
 (DAVIS)	 (HANLEY)		X	
	 Miller		X	


CO-Chairman's Signature

HB 43, CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES

Sectional Analysis

Section 1. (d) Provides that past-due child support payments collected by the state shall be paid **first** to the custodial parent (the "obligee") and **secondly** to the state for reimbursement of public assistance paid to the family. This reverses the current order of payment.

(e) After the past-due child support owed to the family has been paid, the state may retain past-due child support payments equal to the total amount of unreimbursed assistance.

(f) The state shall pay past-due child support recovered through off-set of the obligor's federal tax refund **first** to the state for unreimbursed assistance and **secondly** to the family, as required by federal regulation.

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

WALTER J. HICKEL, GOVERNOR

P.O. BOX 5
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-0400
PHONE: (907) 465-2300
TELEFAX: (907) 465-2389

February 25, 1991

Mr. Steve Strube
P.O. Box 521155
Big Lake, AK 99652

Dear Mr. Strube:

In the chaos of moving into this job I apparently overlooked a memo from Governor Hickel dated January 8, 1991 advising me of the formation of an advisory team for the Department of Revenue.


Apparently this appointment was also not communicated to at least some of you, since my telephone calls to several people on the list resulted in their expression of surprise at the appointment.

Regardless, you have been assigned to the advisory team for the Department of Revenue and I welcome the opportunity to receive your input and expertise.

Since 75 % of the team resides in the Anchorage/MatSu area I have asked Jim Magowan to serve as Chairman. He will coordinate a meeting in the near future. After you have had the chance to identify issues on which you wish to counsel the Department of Revenue, he will schedule a meeting with me.

Your positive input and solutions to perceived problems of the Department of Revenue will be welcomed.

Very truly yours,


Lee E. Fisher
Commissioner

LEF:mll

cc: Lt. Governor Jack Coghill
James Rockwell, Special Assistant
to the Governor

MARCH 23, 1991



REP. LINCOLN, CO-CHAIR
HOUSE H.E.S.S. COMMITTEE
PO BOX V

JUNEAU, AK 99811

RE: HB 43

DEAR REP. LINCOLN AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS,

PASSAGE OF THIS BILL WILL PUT ABOUT
TWO MILLION DOLLARS INTO THE HANDS
OF CUSTODIAL FAMILIES, AND CHILDREN,
THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE EARNED BY
GOVERNMENT TO REIMBURSE ACCRUED
AFDC DEBTS.

THE ALASKA FAMILY SUPPORT GROUP, INC.
STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS BILL BECAUSE
WE BELIEVE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PAID
BEFORE GOVERNMENT.

ATTACHMENT 1 B 2 SHOWS THESE ISSUES ARE
RECOMMENDATIONS # 35 ~~#~~ 36 OF THE
FAMILY SUPPORT TASK FORCE LAST SESSION.

SINCERELY,

Steven P. Stuber, President

P.S. PLEASE DI

P.O. Box 521155

AK Fam. Support Grp Stmt

bx (907) 892-7760

HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT

(7) Date Referred: March 27, 1991 FURTHER REFERRALS: Finance

Date of Committee Action: 4-29-91

The JUDICIARY Committee considered: HB 43

HOUSE BILL NO. 43 CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES

"An Act relating to the distribution of child support arrearages collected by the child support enforcement agency."

RECOMMENDATIONS:
 be replaced with CS HB 43 (Juo) the same title a new title
 have attached amendments(s)
 do pass
 do not pass
 no recommendations
 individual recommendations
 additional referral to the _____ Committee

ADOPTS: _____ letter of Intent

ATTACHES NEW FISCAL NOTE(s): (Dept) APPROVES PREVIOUS: (Dept/Date)
 fiscal impact Revenue _____ fiscal note(s) _____
 zero fiscal note _____ zero fiscal note(s) _____

SIGNING DO PASS	DP	OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS	DNP	NR	AM
		Larry Montan		✓	
Ally Kumbay	✓	Mark Stanley		X	
Ally Elliot	✓	Kevin Paul Palmer		✓	
		David Dowley		X	

David Dowley
 CHAIRMAN'S SIGNATURE

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. CSHB43 (JUD)

Revision Date: April 26, 1991
Title: Act relating to distribution of child support arrearages collected by the CSEA
Sponsor: Representative Ulmer
Requestor: House Judiciary

Department Affected: Department of Revenue
BRU: Social Services
Component: Child Support Enforcement

COMPONENT SERIAL NO. | 1 | 1 | 1 |

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97
PERSONAL SERVICES	466.4	525.6	549.2	615.1	642.8	716.7
TRAVEL	0	0	0	0	0	0
CONTRACTUAL	36.7	38.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
SUPPLIES	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPMENT	38.5	13.4	0	14.8	0	16.3
LANDS & STRUCTURES	0	0	0	0	0	0
GRANTS, CLAIMS	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISCELLANEOUS	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OPERATING	541.6	577.0	589.2	669.9	682.8	773.0
CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
REVENUE	(716.8)	(1608.9)	(1725.8)	(1771.6)	(1742.2)	(1742.2)

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND	184.2	196.2	200.3	227.8	232.2	262.8
FEDERAL FUNDS	357.4	380.8	388.9	442.1	450.6	510.2
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	541.6	577.0	589.2	669.9	682.8	773.0

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME	11	12	12	13	13	14
PART-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0
TEMPORARY	0	0	0	0	0	0

Estimate of current year impact: 0

ANALYSIS: See attached analysis.

Prepared By: Ardith Lynch *Ardith Lynch* Phone: 263-6277
Division: Child Support Enforcement Division Date: April 26, 1991

Approved by Commissioner: Lee E. Fisher *Lee E. Fisher*
Agency: Department of Revenue Date: 4/29/91

Distribution (by preparer): Legislative Finance, Legislative Sponsor, Requestor, OMB, & Impacted Agency(ies).

ANALYSIS FOR FISCAL NOTE
HB 43
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
PAGE 2 OF 3

This legislation reverses the current order of collection of child support arrearages in those cases where child support was unpaid before, during, and after a custodial relative's receipt of AFDC grants. These cases create two debts. Current policy is to collect the State's debt first. * This means that money owed to the State of Alaska from assigned support due (but unpaid) during a child's period of receipt of AFDC benefits, and other cost recoveries, is collected by CSED before it collects any unpaid support that accrues after a custodial relative leaves the AFDC rolls.

By reversing the priority of debt collected, paying any excess over current support due to the family for post-AFDC unpaid support before paying the State for assigned (AFDC) unpaid support, the State relinquishes (in the first year) \$1,961,000 in collections and \$462,500 in prepaid Federal Incentives that are remitted to the General Fund to help pay the State's AFDC General Fund match and finance the child support program.

However, child support collections and timely support payments to the family will increase if CSED receives prompt notification when an obligor becomes employed. Increased State revenues from collection of assigned support will result. Currently, CSED's match with records of the Department of Labor, Employment Security Division, serves as the primary means for identifying a delinquent parent's employer. By the time CSED receives the data, four to six months have elapsed. This time lag allows many obligors to delay enforcement of their child support, and permits obligors who work in seasonal employment to avoid payment of their child support. The employer reporting provisions of HB 43 will allow CSED to require companies who employ a large number of obligors to report new hires to CSED. Fewer than 100 companies employed 20 or more obligors in CSED's caseload during the last three years. Prompt notification to CSED will increase the agency's ability to collect support when the obligor parent is employed and earning regular wages.

This fiscal note reflects the lost revenues to the State from the change in arrearage payment priority, which are partially offset by revenues from increased child support collections based on employer reporting. Collection has been expanding at a rate between 12% and 15% a year. This fiscal note adjusts the rate of revenue loss accordingly in the four following fiscal

* When a support collection is made by CSED, Ongoing Support - the support obligation that is due in the current month - is always paid to custodial parents who are not receiving AFDC, before any arrearage payment is made.

ANALYSIS FOR FISCAL NOTE
HB 43
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
PAGE 3 OF 3

years from FY92, and holds incentive losses constant. These revenues are reflected in future-year budgets as Program Receipts; their loss will require additional appropriations in the AFDC program and the Child Support Enforcement program.

The legislation will require increased operational staffing at CSED. To pay arrearages to the family first, CSED must greatly accelerate the rate at which subrogated debt calculations are completed. Presently, payments exceeding the current support due can be retained to the State until the accumulated amount nears the amount of the estimated subrogated debt. The legislation will necessitate a sub-debt calculation as soon as a child leaves the AFDC rolls, and each time the child leaves, in order to guarantee the correct distribution of debt between the State and the custodial relative. (A given child can go on and off the AFDC rolls, and can change custodial relationships, many times. Each of these movements, for each child, must be tracked before a correct sub-debt can be calculated.) CSED presently has one accounting technician assigned to calculate sub-debts; approximately 45 sub-debts can be researched and accurately completed each month. The number of sub-debts that will be required to be completed each month in FY 92 under the proposed legislation is 250. The Division has already automated the sub-debt process to the maximum degree possible. Additional staff will be essential to implementing the change. This fiscal note reflects the cost of additional accounting technicians who will be assigned full-time to sub-debt research and calculation: three in FY 92, increasing to four in FY 93 and FY 94, five in FY 95 and FY 96, and six in FY 97, to meet the estimated increase in CSED's caseload involving past public assistance payments. Each position in FY 92 will cost \$36,100, with associated equipment costs for computer terminals, telephones, and furniture for one person in FY 92 at \$12,800. Increases in equipment costs in the years after FY 92 are projected to increase at a rate of 5%.

The bill will also require additional personnel to enter reports from employers and issue appropriate withholding orders to collect child support. However, revenues from increased collections will exceed the personal services costs. (CSED receives 66% federal funding, in addition to federal incentive payments.) These positions will collect an additional three million dollars in child support in 1992. To minimize costs, these additional staff will utilize existing equipment in swing-shift arrangements. This fiscal note reflects five child support enforcement officers and three clerk positions, with a 3.75% shift differential. Increases in Personal Services costs in the outlying years beyond FY92 are projected at a conservative rate of 4.5 percent. In addition, the change in the debt priority will require CSED to forgo immediate collection of additional miscellaneous cost recoveries amounting to \$36,700 in FY 92 for expenditures such as blood-testing.

**THE FOLLOWING PAGES MAY
NOT FILM LEGIBLY BECAUSE OF
THE POOR QUALITY OF THE ORIGINAL**

Pay Family Arrearages First If AFDC Fully Funded

RECOMMENDATION 35:

TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND PROVIDED THAT THE LEGISLATURE APPROPRIATES ADEQUATE FUNDS, CEED SHOULD DISTRIBUTE AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF THE CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO PAYMENT OF ARREARAGES IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

- (1) First, to the obligee, who is not receiving public assistance, support arrearages accrued after the obligee stopped receiving public assistance;
- (2) Second, to the State for unreimbursed public assistance; and
- (3) Third, to the obligee, support arrearages which accrued before the obligee received public assistance, and which exceed the amount of public assistance paid to the family.

RECOMMENDATION 36:

THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD APPROPRIATE FUNDS TO MAKE UP THE ESTIMATED \$1.6 MILLION SHORTFALL CAUSED BY RECOMMENDATION 35.

Issue

How should child support arrearages collected by the Child Support Enforcement Division in cases involving former AFDC recipients be distributed by the State?

PSA Requirement

Section 122 of the Family Support Act requires that states distribute child support payments and arrearages they collect within time limits to be set forth in federal regulations.

Rationale

On August 4, the federal government issued final regulations establishing the time limits for distribution of child support payments and arrearages, as required under Section 122 of the Family Support Act. Those regulations indicate that the states have discretion to distribute a portion of child support arrearages to the family before satisfying state liens for prior AFDC payments. Before the new regulations were issued, it did not appear that the states had this discretion.

House Judiciary Committee

APRIL 30, 1991

Dear Members:

Please review the final Draft of
CSHB 43 (JUD) which was reported out
of committee yesterday, so Final
Action can be approved at today's
Hearing.

Thank you.

[Handwritten signature]
H-30-1

**CS FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 43 (JUDICIARY)
IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SEVENTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION**

BY THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

**Offered:
Referred:**

Sponsor(s): REPRESENTATIVES ULMER, Brown, Carney, B.Davis

A BILL

FOR AN ACT ENTITLED

1 "An Act relating to distribution of child support collected by the child support enforcement
2 agency; requiring certain employers to provide information to the agency; requiring the
3 Department of Health and Social Services to give notice of assignments to recipients of
4 aid to families with dependent children; and providing for an effective date."

5 **BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

6 * Section 1. AS 25.27.075 is repealed and reenacted to read:

7 Sec. 25.27.075. EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION. (a) Upon notice by the agency and
8 except as provided in (b) of this section, an employer doing business in the state shall report to
9 the agency the

10 (1) hiring of a person who resides or works in this state to whom the employer
11 anticipates paying earnings; and

12 (2) rehiring or return to work of an employee who was laid off, furloughed,
13 separated, granted a leave without pay, or terminated from employment.

14 (b) An employer is not required to report the hiring of a person who the employer

1 anticipates

2 (1) will be employed for less than one month's duration; or

3 (2) will be employed sporadically so that the employee will be paid for less than
4 350 hours during a continuous six-month period.

5 (c) An employer required to report under (a) of this section may make the report by
6 mailing the employee's copy of the W-4 form or by other means authorized by the agency that
7 will result in timely reporting.

8 (d) An employer required to report under (a) of this section shall submit reports within
9 seven days of hiring, rehiring, or return to work of an employee. The report must contain

10 (1) the employee's name, address, social security number, and date of birth; and

11 (2) the employer's name, address, and employment security reference number or
12 unified business identifier number.

13 (e) The agency shall retain the information received under (a) - (d) of this section for a
14 particular employee only if the agency is responsible for establishing, enforcing, or collecting a
15 support obligation of the employee. If the employee does not owe a support obligation, the
16 agency may not create a record regarding the employee, and the information contained in the
17 notice shall be promptly destroyed.

18 (f) An employer of the obligor or a labor union of which an obligor is a member shall
19 provide to the agency information requested regarding the obligor's employment, wages or salary,
20 and location. The information required under this subsection is in addition to the information
21 required under (a) of this section, if any.

22 (g) In addition to civil liability under AS 25.27.260, if applicable, or any other law, an
23 employer of an obligor or a labor union of which an obligor is a member that knowingly violates
24 this section is liable for a civil penalty of not more than \$1,000.

25 * Sec. 2. AS 25.27.130 is amended by adding new subsections to read:

26 (d) Except as provided in (f) of this section, if the obligee is not receiving assistance
27 under AS 47.25.310 - 47.25.420 at the time the state recovers money in an action under this
28 section, the recovery of any amount for which the obligor is liable shall be distributed to the
29 obligee for support payments that have become due and unpaid since the termination of
30 assistance under AS 47.25.310 - 47.25.420 under a support order in favor of the obligee.

31 (e) After payment to the obligee under (d) of this section, the state may retain an amount

1 not to exceed the total unreimbursed assistance paid on behalf of the obligee under
2 AS 47.25.310 - 47.25.420.

3 (f) Notwithstanding (d) of this section, the state shall, if required under federal law or
4 regulations, distribute amounts recovered through offset of the obligor's federal tax refund as past
5 due support with first distribution to the state for unpaid support assigned to the state under
6 AS 47.25.345.

7 * Sec. 3. AS 47.25.340 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

8 (b) During the application process, the department shall give to the applicant written
9 notice of the assignment of support rights that will be considered to have occurred under
10 AS 47.25.345. The notice must

11 (1) be plainly written;

12 (2) include a statement that informs the applicant that the assignment under
13 AS 47.25.345 includes an assignment of support rights that may have accrued during any time
14 that the family was not receiving assistance and that, under the assignment, the state may retain
15 support that it collects on behalf of the applicant to reimburse the state for assistance received
16 by the applicant during previous periods of assistance, if any.

17 * Sec. 4. This Act takes effect January 1, 1992.

CSHB 43, CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES

Sectional Analysis

Section 1. States the legislature's intent that the Child Support Enforcement Agency shall use the full latitude available under applicable federal laws and regulations to return as much money as possible to the family first when it collects child support payments in order for the family to remain self-supporting.

Section 2. (d) Provides that past-due child support payments collected by the state shall be paid **first** to the custodial parent (the "obligee") and **secondly** to the state for reimbursement of public assistance paid to the family. This reverses the current order of payment. In addition, it requires that public assistance payments shall be reimbursed up to the maximum amount of the child support collected during the period of assistance, or the amount of the assistance paid, **whichever is lesser.**

(e) The state shall pay past-due child support recovered through off-set of the obligor's federal tax refund **first** to the state for unreimbursed assistance and **secondly** to the family, as required by federal regulation.

Section 3. (a) Requires the Child Support Enforcement Agency to amend the state plan to reflect the payment priorities of Section 2 of the bill.

(b) Requires the Child Support Enforcement Agency to report to the legislature if a provision of this bill, or a state plan amendment to implement the bill is disapproved by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement.

RECEIVED APR 29 1991

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

WALTER J. HICKEL, GOVERNOR

FAIRBANKS FIELD OFFICE
675 7TH AVENUE, STATION G
FAIRBANKS, ALASKA 99701
PHONE (907) 451-2830
FAX (907) 451-2959

April 25, 1991

Representative Dave Donley, Chairman
House Judiciary Committee
State Legislature
P.O. Box V
Juneau, AK 99811

Re: HB 43

Dear Representative Donley:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) on House Bill 43. Several additional questions arose at the April 22 hearing, which I will attempt to answer in this letter.

Mandatory wage withholding: Since 1985, orders enforced by CSED have been subject to income withholding when unpaid child support (arrears) equal one month's support obligation. The federal Family Support Act of 1988 requires immediate income withholding on orders issued or modified after October 31, 1990, which are enforced by the agency, even if support payments are not in arrears. The federal law further requires immediate income withholding on all orders issued after January 1, 1994, even if they are not enforced by CSED. Section 101(c) of the Family Support Act (copy attached) requires a study of the administrative feasibility, cost implications, and other effects of requiring immediate income withholding on all child support awards, to be completed by October 1991. The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement reports that the study is scheduled to begin this summer.

Unpaid child support: CSED is currently enforcing almost 19,000 cases with child support orders. Less than 3,500 of these cases are current on their child support payments. Approximately 16,000 cases have an arrearage balance which totals \$203 million. Unpaid child support orders enforced by CSED as of March 31, 1991, break down as follows:


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Cases with arrears	16,000
Amount of Arrears:	TOTAL \$203,000,000
AFDC (7000 cases)	\$ 96,000,000
Non-AFDC (9000 cases)	\$107,000,000

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Representative Dave Donley, Chairman
Re: HB 43
April 25, 1991
Page 2 of 2

CSED appreciates the committee's concern regarding the nonpayment of child support. HB 43 recognizes the importance of support payments to children each and every month. CSED pays the current month's support to non-AFDC custodial parents whenever support is collected. The priority of arrearage payment becomes an issue only when support was not paid before, during, and after a public assistance grant. If support is paid in full each and every month, there will be no unpaid child support arrears to collect or distribute, and children will receive the benefit of timely support payments.

Very truly yours,


Ardith Lynch
Deputy Director
CSED

Attachments: as stated

FN:1115002

TITLE IV—RELATED AFDC AMENDMENTS

- Sec. 401. Benefits for two-parent families.
 Sec. 402. Changes in earned income disregards.
 Sec. 403. Households headed by minor parents.
 Sec. 404. Periodic reevaluation of need and payment standards.
 Sec. 405. CBO study on implementation of national minimum payment standard.
 Sec. 406. Study of new national approaches to welfare benefits for low-income families with children.

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- Sec. 501. Family support demonstration projects.
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 Sec. 505. Demonstration projects to expand the number of job opportunities available to certain low-income individuals.
 Sec. 506. Demonstration projects to provide counseling and services to high-risk teenagers.
 Sec. 507. Eighteen-month extension of Minnesota prepaid medicaid demonstration project.

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- Sec. 601. Inclusion of American Samoa as a State under title IV.
 Sec. 602. Increase in amount available for payment to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.
 Sec. 603. Assistant Secretary for Family Support.
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- Sec. 701. Temporary extension of provisions relating to collection of nontax debts owed to Federal agencies.
 Sec. 702. Limitation on use of reimbursement arrangements to avoid 2-percent floor.
 Sec. 703. Modifications to dependent care credit and exclusion for dependent care assistance.
 Sec. 704. Taxpayer identification number required for dependents who have attained age 2.

TITLE I—CHILD SUPPORT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY

Subtitle A—Child Support

SEC. 101. IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 466(b)(3) of the Social Security Act is amended to read as follows:

“(3)(A) The wages of an absent parent shall be subject to such withholding, regardless of whether support payments by such parent are in arrears, in the case of a support order being enforced under this part that is issued or modified on or after the first day of the 25th month beginning after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, on the effective date of the order; except that such wages shall not be subject to such withholding under this subparagraph in any case where (i) one of the parties demonstrates, and the court (or administrative process) finds,

that there is good cause not to require immediate income withholding, or (ii) a written agreement is reached between both parties which provides for an alternative arrangement.

“(B) The wages of an absent parent shall become subject to such withholding, in the case of wages not subject to withholding under subparagraph (A), on the date on which the payments which the absent parent has failed to make under a support order are at least equal to the support payable for one month or, if earlier, and without regard to whether there is an arrearage, the earliest of—

“(i) the date as of which the absent parent requests that such withholding begin,

“(ii) the date as of which the custodial parent requests that such withholding begin, if the State determines, in accordance with such procedures and standards as it may establish, that the request should be approved, or

“(iii) such earlier date as the State may select.”

(b) APPLICATION TO ALL CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS.—Section 466(a)(8) of such Act is amended—

(1) by inserting “(A)” before “Procedures”;

(2) by striking “which are issued or modified in the State” and inserting in lieu thereof “not described in subparagraph (B)”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) Procedures under which all child support orders which are initially issued in the State on or after January 1, 1994, and are not being enforced under this part will include the following requirements:

“(i) The wages of an absent parent shall be subject to withholding, regardless of whether support payments by such parent are in arrears, on the effective date of the order; except that such wages shall not be subject to withholding under this clause in any case where (I) one of the parties demonstrates, and the court (or administrative process) finds, that there is good cause not to require immediate income withholding, or (II) a written agreement is reached between both parties which provides for an alternative arrangement.

“(ii) The requirements of subsection (b)(1) (which shall apply in the case of each absent parent against whom a support order is or has been issued or modified in the State, without regard to whether the order is being enforced under the State plan).

“(iii) The requirements of paragraphs (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10) of subsection (b), where applicable.

“(iv) Withholding from income of amounts payable as support must be carried out in full compliance with all procedural due process requirements of the State.”

(c) STUDY ON MAKING IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING MANDATORY IN ALL CASES.—The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall conduct a study of the administrative feasibility, cost implications, and other effects of requiring immediate income withholding with respect to all child support awards in a State and shall report on the results of such study not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

42 USC 666.

Effective date.

Reports.
42 USC 666 note.

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

WALTER J. HICKEL, GOVERNOR

P.O. BOX 5
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-0400
PHONE: (907) 465-2300
TELEFAX: (907) 465-2389

February 25, 1991

Mr. Steve Strube
P.O. Box 521155
Big Lake, AK 99652

Dear Mr. Strube:

In the chaos of moving into this job I apparently overlooked a memo from Governor Hickel dated January 8, 1991 advising me of the formation of an advisory team for the Department of Revenue.


Apparently this appointment was also not communicated to at least some of you, since my telephone calls to several people on the list resulted in their expression of surprise at the appointment.

Regardless, you have been assigned to the advisory team for the Department of Revenue and I welcome the opportunity to receive your input and expertise.

Since 75 % of the team resides in the Anchorage/MatSu area I have asked Jim Magowan to serve as Chairman. He will coordinate a meeting in the near future. After you have had the chance to identify issues on which you wish to counsel the Department of Revenue, he will schedule a meeting with me.

Your positive input and solutions to perceived problems of the Department of Revenue will be welcomed.

Very truly yours,


Lee E. Fisher
Commissioner

LEF:m11

cc: Lt. Governor Jack Coghill
James Rockwell, Special Assistant
to the Governor

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
1991 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. HB 43

Revision Date: 3/20/91
Title: An act relating to distribution of child support arrearages collected by the CSEA
Sponsor: Representative Ulmer
Requestor: House HESS

Department Affected: Department of Revenue
BRU: Child Support Enforcement Division
Component: _____

COMPONENT SERIAL NO. | | |

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97
PERSONAL SERVICES	108.3	151.4	158.2	206.5	215.8	270.5
TRAVEL	0	0	0	0	0	0
CONTRACTUAL	36.7	38.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
SUPPLIES	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPMENT	38.5	13.4	0	14.8	0	16.3
LANDS & STRUCTURES	0	0	0	0	0	0
GRANTS, CLAIMS	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISCELLANEOUS	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OPERATING	183.5	202.8	198.2	261.3	255.8	326.8
CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
REVENUE	(2423.5)	(2717.7)	(2967.7)	(3162.5)	(3300.0)	(3300.0)

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND	62.4	68.9	67.4	88.8	87.0	111.1
FEDERAL FUNDS	121.1	133.9	130.8	172.5	168.8	215.7
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	183.5	202.8	198.2	261.3	255.8	326.8

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME	3	4	4	5	5	6
PART-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0
TEMPORARY	0	0	0	0	0	0

Estimate of current year impact: _____

ANALYSIS: Attach a separate page for analysis.

Prepared By: Ardith Lynch
Division: Child Support Enforcement Division

Phone: 263-6277
Date: March 20, 1991

Approved by Commissioner: Lee E. Fisher
Agency: Department of Revenue

Date: 3-22-91

Distribution (by preparer): Legislative Finance, Legislative Sponsor, Requestor, OMB, & Impacted Agencies).

ANALYSIS FOR FISCAL NOTE
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
PAGE 2 OF 3

This legislation requires a fundamental change in State revenue policy. It reverses the current order of collection of child support arrearages in those cases where child support was unpaid before, during, and after a custodial relative's receipt of AFDC grants. These cases create two debts. Current policy is to collect the State's debt first.* This means that money owed to the State of Alaska from assigned support due (but unpaid) during a child's period of receipt of AFDC benefits, and other cost recoveries, is collected by CSED before it collects any unpaid support that accrues after a custodial relative leaves the AFDC rolls.

By reversing the priority of debt collected, paying any excess over current support due to the family for post-AFDC unpaid support before paying the State for assigned (AFDC) unpaid support, the State relinquishes (in the first year) \$1,961,000 in collections and \$462,500 in prepaid Federal Incentives that are remitted to the General Fund to help pay the State's AFDC General Fund match and finance the child support program. Collection has been expanding at a rate between 12% and 15% a year in this subset of cases (3,116 post-AFDC cases out of 18,131 total AFDC cases). This fiscal note adjusts the rate of revenue loss accordingly in the three following fiscal years from FY92, and holds Incentive losses constant. These revenues are reflected in future-year budgets as Program Receipts; their loss will require additional appropriations in the AFDC program (\$1,961,000) and the Child Support Enforcement program (\$462,500) in the first year.

In addition to revenue losses, the legislation will require increased operational staffing at CSED to greatly accelerate the rate at which subrogated debt calculations must be completed. Presently, payments exceeding the current support due can be retained to the State until the accumulated amount nears the amount of the estimated subrogated debt. The legislation will necessitate a sub-debt calculation as soon as a child leaves the AFDC rolls, and each time the child leaves, in order to guarantee the correct distribution of debt between the State and the custodial relative. (A given child can go on and off the AFDC rolls, and can change custodial relationships, many times. Each of these movements, for

* When a support collection is made by CSED, Ongoing Support- the support obligation that is due in the current month- is always paid to custodial parents who are not receiving AFDC, before any arrearage payment is made.

ANALYSIS FOR FISCAL NOTE
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
PAGE 3 OF 3

each child, must be tracked before a correct sub-debt can be calculated.) CSED presently has one accounting technician assigned to calculate sub-debts; approximately 45 sub-debts can be researched and accurately completed each month. The number of sub-debts that will be required to be completed each month in FY 92 under the proposed legislation is 250. The Division has already automated the sub-debt process to the maximum degree possible. Additional staff will be essential to implementing the change. Without them, the changes cannot be implemented. This fiscal note reflects the cost of additional accounting technicians who will be assigned full-time to sub-debt research and calculations: three in FY 92, increasing to four in FY 93 and FY 94, five in FY 95 and FY 96, and six in FY 97, to meet the estimated increase in CSED's caseload involving past public assistance payments. Each position in FY 92 will cost \$36,100, with associated equipment costs for computer terminals, telephones, and furniture for one person in FY 92 at \$12,800. In addition, the change in the debt priority will require CSED to forgo immediate collection of additional miscellaneous cost recoveries amounting to \$36,700 in FY 92 for expenditures such as blood-testing.

Increases in Personal Services costs in the outlying years beyond FY92 are projected at a conservative rate of 4.5 percent, and then are held constant based on turnover assumptions. Increases in equipment costs in the years after FY 92 are projected to increase at a rate of 5%.

FN: WPPADMIN-214

AAL:akj

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

WALTER J. HICKEL, GOVERNOR

FAIRBANKS FIELD OFFICE
675 7TH AVENUE, STATION G
FAIRBANKS, ALASKA 99701
PHONE (907) 451-2830
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April 25, 1991

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
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Ardith Lynch
Deputy Director
CSED

Attachments: as stated

FN:1115002

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- Sec. 405. CBO study on implementation of national minimum payment standard.
- Sec. 406. Study of new national approaches to welfare benefits for low-income families with children.

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“(ii) the date as of which the custodial parent requests that such withholding begin, if the State determines, in accordance with such procedures and standards as it may establish, that the request should be approved, or

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(1) by inserting “(A)” before “Procedures”;

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and

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“(iii) The requirements of paragraphs (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10) of subsection (b), where applicable.

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(c) **STUDY ON MAKING IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING MANDATORY IN ALL CASES.**—The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall conduct a study of the administrative feasibility, cost implications, and other effects of requiring immediate income withholding with respect to all child support awards in a State and shall report on the results of such study not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

42 USC 666.

Effective date.

Reports.
42 USC 666 note.

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
STATE OF ALASKA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

FAIRBANKS

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AT SEATTLE
CLARK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
DEPUTY

18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
19 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

20 NATALIE JENSEN, SHARYN WOODRUFF, and
21 CAROLYN OLSON, individually and on
22 behalf of all others similarly situated,

23 Plaintiffs,

24 vs.

25 RICHARD THOMPSON, Secretary, State of
26 Washington Department of Social and
27 Health Services,

28 Defendant.

C90-5313

NO.

COMPLAINT
CLASS ACTION

29 I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

30 1.1 Plaintiffs are present and former public assistance
31 recipients. They bring this class action to challenge defendant's
32 failure to follow federal law in distributing child support that
33 defendant collects after a family stops receiving public assistance
34 (AFDC/FIP). Plaintiffs' rights arise under Titles IV-A and IV-D of

1 the Social Security Act and federal regulations, which require the
2 defendant to collect and distribute support for former assistance
3 recipients to increase the family's self-sufficiency, decrease its
4 need to return to public assistance, and ensure that needy children
5 receive support from their parents.

6 1.2 As a condition of receiving public assistance for their
7 children, plaintiffs must assign to the State of Washington the
8 right to collect child support that was owed before the family went
9 on assistance and that accrues while the family is receiving
10 assistance. In return, the State is required to undertake
11 collection efforts and to distribute the amounts collected among
12 the family, the State, and the federal government.

13 1.3 The assignment of support rights terminates when a family
14 goes off assistance. However, the defendant illegally claims
15 ownership of all child support due and unpaid as of the date the
16 family stops receiving assistance up to the full value of
17 assistance the family has ever received. Defendant further
18 illegally deems as a matter of policy, whenever a family reapplies
19 for assistance after a period of not receiving assistance, that it
20 is entitled to retain support arrears which have accrued since the
21 family stopped receiving assistance to reimburse itself for all
22 assistance previously furnished.

23 1.4 Defendant also illegally fails to provide notice which
24 informs families who are reapplying for assistance that if they go
25 back on assistance the defendant will claim all support arrears
26 which have accrued since the family last received assistance to
27 repay itself for any benefits the family received in the past.

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II. JURISDICTION

2.1 This action arises under 42 USC §1983 (Civil Rights Act) and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

2.2 Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by 28 USC §1331 and 28 USC §1343(a)(3). Plaintiffs' action for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 USC §2201 and §2202.

III. PARTIES

3.1 Plaintiff, NATALIE JENSEN, is the mother of four children, ages 11, 9, 2 and 11 months, and resides in Clark County, Washington.

3.2 Plaintiff, SHARYN WOODRUFF, is the mother of two children, ages 17 and 15, and resides in Clark County, Washington.

3.3 Plaintiff, CAROLYN OLSON, is the mother of two children, ages 19 & 15, and resides in Clark County, Washington.

3.4 Defendant, RICHARD THOMPSON, is the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, which through its Office of Support Enforcement (OSE), is the State agency responsible for administering Titles IV-A and IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 USC §601 et seq. and 42 USC §651 et seq. Defendant is responsible for establishing, enforcing, collecting, and distributing child support that public assistance recipients assign to the State during the period the family is on assistance. Defendant is also responsible for administering the support enforcement program that is required when a family stops receiving assistance.

1 IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

2 4.1 Plaintiffs pursue their claims on behalf of themselves
3 and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and
4 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as representatives
5 of the class defined to include as follows: All persons who (a)
6 now are, or in the future will be, former recipients of public
7 assistance, and who (b) had or will have child support obligations
8 owing to them that accrued during a period between when they
9 stopped receiving public assistance and before they reapplied or
10 will reapply for public assistance.

11 4.2 There are more than 71,000 families who receive Title IV-
12 A public assistance benefits in Washington State on a monthly
13 basis. OSE's average annual caseload for 1988 was 217,277. Of
14 these, 86,938 were classified as current AFDC recipients, 60,183
15 were classified as cases in which the state was collecting AFDC
16 arrears only, and 70,156 were classified as non-AFDC cases. Non-
17 AFDC cases often include past AFDC recipients. These figures are
18 based upon the annual caseload statistics defendant reported to the
19 federal government in fiscal year 1988, the most recent calendar
20 year for which data is available. (Tables 37, 39, 40, and 41,
21 Thirteenth Annual Report to Congress, Vol. II.). The number of
22 "AFDC arrears only" and "non-AFDC" cases in which a child support
23 collection was made in 1988 were 24,968 (Tables 45 and 46). Upon
24 information and belief, the number of families in these categories
25 for FY's 1989 and 1990 has increased.

26 4.3 The number of current recipients of public assistance who
27 had unpaid child support obligations that accrued after they
28 previously went off assistance is unknown, but upon information and

1 belief, number in the thousands. The number of former recipients
2 of public assistance who had unpaid child support obligations that
3 accrued between when they went off assistance and before they
4 returned to assistance is unknown, but upon information and belief,
5 number in the thousands. The class is so numerous that joinder of
6 all members is impracticable.

7 4.4 There are questions of law or fact common to the class.

8 4.5 The questions of law which are common to the class
9 include the following:

10 a) Whether, when a family stops receiving public
11 assistance, the value of the defendant's assigned support rights
12 is fixed at the amount of the support owed, even if the amount of
13 assistance furnished to the family exceeds the amount of the
14 support owed.

15 b) Whether the defendant's practice of claiming that
16 it owns and can keep child support arrears that accrued during the
17 period between when a family stops receiving assistance and before
18 the family reapplies for assistance to reimburse itself for
19 assistance previously paid out violates the Social Security Act,
20 federal regulations, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
21 federal constitution.

22 c) Whether the defendant's failure to give adequate
23 notice which informs public assistance applicants who have received
24 assistance in the past, that defendant intends to claim the child
25 support arrears which have accrued since they last received
26 assistance to reimburse itself for any past benefits the family has
27 received violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitu-
28 tion.

1 4.6 The claims of the named representative plaintiffs are
2 typical of the claims of the class members.

3 4.7 The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent
4 the interests of the class. The named plaintiffs have a sharply
5 drawn, personally vital controversy with the defendant which
6 dictates that they fully and vigorously prosecute this action. At
7 stake for the plaintiffs and the entire class is their right to
8 receive unpaid child support that accrued during periods of non-
9 receipt of public assistance. Plaintiffs are represented by
10 counsel employed by Evergreen Legal Services who are experienced
11 in class action litigation concerning public programs. Plaintiffs
12 know of no conflict between the plaintiffs and any member of the
13 class.

14 4.8 Certification of the class is proper under Civil Rule
15 23(b)(2). Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds
16 generally applicable to the class, which makes final declaratory
17 and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole
18 appropriate.

19 **V. TITLES IV-A AND IV-D OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT**
20 **AND REGULATORY SCHEME**

21 5.1 Defendant participates in two interrelated Social
22 Security Act programs which benefit children: a public assistance
23 program under Title IV-A, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. and a child
24 support enforcement program under Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et
25 seq.

26 5.2 The IV-A program was established to "encourage the care
27 of dependent children in their own homes..., to help maintain and
28 strengthen family life and to help such parents and relatives to
attain or retain capability for the maximum self support and

1 personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing
2 parental care and protection...." 42 USC §601.

3 5.3 The IV-A program provides cash grants to dependent
4 children with caretaker relatives who, although legally responsi-
5 ble, are not financially able to provide adequate care and support
6 for the child without public assistance. To qualify for public
7 assistance benefits, a family's income must fall below state
8 established limits, and countable resources may not exceed limits
9 established by federal law.

10 5.4 The financial assistance received by a family eligible
11 for public assistance is not a loan to that family. There is no
12 expectation or requirement that the family will, upon attaining
13 self-sufficiency, repay the public assistance that has been
14 furnished.

15 5.5 Defendant's child support enforcement program is
16 administered through the cooperation of the federal and state
17 governments pursuant to Title IV-D (Child Support and Establishment
18 of Paternity) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et. seq.
19 As a condition of receiving federal financial participation for its
20 public assistance program under Title IV-A, the defendant is
21 required to participate in and abide by the rules of Title IV-D .

22 5.6 As a condition of participation in the IV-D program,
23 defendant is required to submit to the U.S. Department of Health
24 and Human Services a state plan for provision of IV-D services, in
25 which it must promise to comply with the requirements of Title IV-A
26 (public assistance) and IV-D (support enforcement) of the Social
27 Security Act, and federal regulations implementing those require-
28 ments, 42 U.S.C. §654, 45 CFR §301.10. Federal funds pay part of

1 the state's cost of administering the program if the State meets
2 the federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. §655.

3 5.7 Defendant has been required to provide support enforce-
4 ment services to non-AFDC families since 1975. The importance of
5 providing services to non-AFDC families was underscored in the
6 Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 (CSEA) (P.L. 98-378)
7 when Congress expanded the Title IV-D statement of purpose to
8 specifically guarantee child support services to non-AFDC children.
9 The purpose of the non-assistance support enforcement program is
10 to ensure that children receive needed court ordered support from
11 absent parents and to reduce the likelihood that a family will need
12 to seek public assistance.

13 5.8 Defendant is required to provide non-assistance support
14 enforcement services to parents who have never received public
15 assistance under the provisions of 42 USC §654(6), and to provide
16 non-assistance support enforcement services to former recipients
17 of IV-A benefits under the provisions of 42 USC §654(6) and 42 USC
18 §657(c).

19 5.9 The State is also required to designate a single state
20 agency responsible for collecting and distributing child support
21 pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 42 USC §654.
22 In Washington, the IV-D agency is the DSHS Office of Support
23 Enforcement (OSE).

24 5.10 As a condition of eligibility for IV-A assistance, an
25 applicant or recipient of benefits is required by 42 U.S.C.
26 §602(a)(26)(A) to:

27 assign the State any rights to support from
28 any other person such applicant may have (1)
in his own behalf or in behalf of any other
family member for whom the applicant is apply-

1 ing for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have
2 accrued at the time such assignment is execut-
3 ed.

4 5.11 In Washington State, when IV-A benefits are sought for
5 a child, the custodial parent is required to execute an assignment
6 and power of attorney in favor of the defendant. In addition, the
7 receipt of IV-A benefits operates as an automatic assignment to the
8 State of the right to collect support. RCW 74.20.330, 74.20A.030;
9 WAC 388-14-200, 388-24-108.

10 5.12 The amount of the support obligation assigned under 42
11 U.S.C. §602(a)(26)(A) is either the amount specified in a court
12 order or, in the absence of a court order, an amount administra-
13 tively established by the State. 42 U.S.C. §656.

14 5.13 The support assigned under 42 USC §602(a)(26)(A), if
15 collected during the time the family is receiving AFDC, is not
16 automatically retained by the State. Instead, it is distributed
17 among the State, the federal government, and the family in
18 accordance with the provisions of 42 USC §657(b) and 45 CFR
19 §302.51(b).

20 5.14 When a family stops receiving benefits, the assignment
21 terminates as to future support. Accruals of future support belong
22 to the family. 42 U.S.C. §657(c); 45 C.F.R. §302.51(f); R.C.W.
23 26.23.035. Defendant has no right to accruals of future support
24 even when the total amount of assistance furnished by the State
25 exceeds the total amount of the support obligation owed by the
26 delinquent parent.

27 5.15 When a family goes off assistance, the State retains a
28 right to try to collect the support obligation that accrued during
the months the family received assistance to offset the benefits

1 provided to the family. If the State collects amounts which
2 represent support owed before the family went on assistance, it may
3 apply the amounts so collected towards the difference between the
4 assistance the family received in a subsequent month and the
5 support owed for that same month. In no event may the State's
6 recovery exceed the lesser of 1) public assistance paid out or 2)
7 child support due and unpaid as of the date the family terminated
8 public assistance.

9 VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10 PLAINTIFF JENSEN

11 6.1 Plaintiff, NATALIE JENSEN, resides with Danieal Roberts.
12 Danieal Roberts is NATALIE JENSEN'S former husband. They have
13 reconciled but are not remarried. They now have four children,
14 ages 11, 9, 2 and 11 months.

15 6.2 NATALIE JENSEN and her oldest children, Jessica and
16 Crystal, received AFDC from DSHS for approximately two and one-half
17 years, from March 1982 to August 1984.

18 6.3 NATALIE JENSEN and Danieal Roberts were divorced in June,
19 1982. Mr. Roberts was ordered to pay \$250.00 total per month in
20 child support for Jessica and Crystal beginning May 21, 1982.

21 6.4 When NATALIE JENSEN began receiving AFDC in March 1982,
22 she signed an assignment of support rights, as required by 42 USC
23 §602 (a)(26)(A). (A copy of the assignment form is attached as
24 Exhibit A.)

25 6.5 The divorce decree, which ordered Mr. Roberts to pay
26 \$250.00 per month in child support, set the amount of Mr. Roberts'
27 child support obligation as of May 1982. 42 USC §656; 45 CFR
28 §302.50. As long as NATALIE JENSEN's family remained on AFDC, the

1 \$250.00 coming due each month under the decree was available to the
2 State under the child support assignment to reimburse it for public
3 assistance paid out.

4 6.6 NATALIE JENSEN also received assistance for two months
5 before the divorce decree was entered. The amount of support the
6 defendant could collect for these months, March and April 1982, was
7 the amount, if any, that was administratively established by the
8 defendant up to the AFDC paid out for those two months. 42 USC
9 §656; 45 CFR §302.50.

10 6.7 The total amount of AFDC that NATALIE JENSEN and her
11 children received from March 1982 through August 1984 exceeded
12 \$13,500.00.

13 6.8 The total amount of the support obligation due under the
14 decree from May 1982 through August 1984 was \$7,000.00. NATALIE
15 JENSEN does not challenge defendant's entitlement to that support.

16 6.9 When NATALIE JENSEN stopped receiving assistance in
17 August 1984, defendant was not entitled to claim future child
18 support obligations to repay the balance of assistance received by
19 the Jensen family from March 1982 to August 1984, even though the
20 monthly amount of assistance that was furnished during this period
21 exceeded the monthly amount of support owed by Mr. Roberts. The
22 maximum amount defendant was entitled to claim under the AFDC
23 assignment as of September 1984 was child support due and unpaid
24 (approximately \$7,000.00), not the total of AFDC paid out (approx-
25 imately \$13,750.00).

26 6.10 When NATALIE JENSEN and her children went off assistance
27 in September, 1984, the child support installments coming due under
28

1 the divorce decree after August, 1984, became solely the family's
2 property.

3 6.11 Between September 1984 and June 1988, the support that
4 became due under the decree was approximately \$11,500.00.

5 6.12 After NATALIE JENSEN stopped receiving public assistance
6 in 1984, she supported herself and her family from her own
7 earnings. However, in June 1988, NATALIE JENSEN reapplied for
8 public assistance because of the birth of her third child, a
9 temporary disability associated with her pregnancy, and Mr.
10 Roberts' absence from the house.

11 6.13 As a condition of receiving public assistance, NATALIE
12 JENSEN executed a new child support assignment. Neither the
13 assignment form NATALIE JENSEN signed nor any other communication
14 with the defendant advised her that if she returned to public
15 assistance, the defendant would claim as its property her rights
16 to unpaid support arrears from September 1984 to June 1988
17 (\$11,500.00) to reimburse itself for the earlier period that she
18 received public assistance (March 1982 through August 1984). If
19 NATALIE JENSEN had been so notified, she would not have reapplied
20 for public assistance. (A copy of the assignment form is attached
21 as Exhibit B).

22 6.14 NATALIE JENSEN and the three children (Jessica, Crystal,
23 and Monica) received a total of \$1,734.00 in public assistance for
24 a three month period from July 1988 through September 1988.
25 NATALIE JENSEN went off public assistance as soon as she was able
26 to return to work. NATALIE JENSEN and her children have not
27 received public assistance since then.

28

1 6.15 The amount of the child support owed under the divorce
2 decree for the three months NATALIE JENSEN and the children
3 received assistance (July, August, and September 1988) is \$750.00
4 (\$250.00 x 3). NATALIE JENSEN does not challenge defendant's
5 entitlement to that support.

6 6.16 Defendant claims, because NATALIE JENSEN returned to
7 assistance, that it is entitled to retain support arrears that
8 accrued from September 1984 to June 1988 to reimburse itself for
9 assistance the Jensen family received from March 1982 to August
10 1984.

11 6.17 According to defendant, the total amount of unreimbursed
12 assistance benefits that NATALIE JENSEN and her children have
13 received is over \$15,000.00. Consequently, when NATALIE JENSEN
14 stopped receiving assistance in October 1988, defendant claimed it
15 was entitled to over \$15,000.00 of the total unpaid support
16 obligation.

17 PLAINTIFF WOODRUFF

18 6.18 Plaintiff SHARYN WOODRUFF lives with her two minor
19 children ages 17 & 15.

20 6.19 SHARYN WOODRUFF and one of her children received AFDC
21 from DSHS at different intervals between 1976 and 1986.

22 6.20 SHARYN WOODRUFF and her former husband, Nicholas
23 Thompson, were divorced in 1977. The divorce decree ordered Mr.
24 Thompson to pay \$150.00 per month in child support.

25 6.21 When SHARYN WOODRUFF first began receiving assistance
26 in 1976 and at required occasions after that date, she signed an
27 assignment of support rights as required by 42 U.S.C. §602
28

1 (a)(26)(A). (A copy of the assignment form signed in 1984 is
2 attached as Exhibit C.)

3 6.22 The divorce decree, which ordered Mr. Thompson to pay
4 \$150.00 per month in child support beginning February 1977,
5 established the amount of Mr. Thompson's child support obligation.
6 42 USC §656, 45 C.F.R. §302.50. As long as SHARYN WOODRUFF's
7 family received AFDC, the \$150.00 coming due each month under the
8 decree was available to the State under the child support assign-
9 ment to partially offset the public assistance being paid.

10 6.23 The monthly amount of public assistance that SHARYN
11 WOODRUFF and her child received between 1976 and 1986 exceeded the
12 monthly amount of Nicholas Thompson's support obligation during
13 that same period.

14 6.24 When SHARYN WOODRUFF terminated AFDC, defendant was not
15 entitled to retain future accruals of support to reimburse itself
16 for assistance previously paid, even though the monthly amounts of
17 assistance Ms. Woodruff received in AFDC exceeded the monthly
18 amount of Mr. Thompson's support obligation. SHARYN WOODRUFF did
19 not believe that the assistance her family received from 1976 to
20 1986 was considered to be a loan which she was obligated to repay.

21 6.25 During the periods SHARYN WOODRUFF was not receiving
22 AFDC some child support was paid by Mr. Thompson. His payments
23 were received and distributed by defendant's Office of Support
24 Enforcement. Payments representing current support were forwarded
25 to SHARYN WOODRUFF as is required by 42 U.S.C. §657(c). Child
26 support arrearages nevertheless accumulated during the months
27 SHARYN WOODRUFF was not receiving assistance because Mr. Thompson's
28 payments were sporadic and in amounts less than \$150.00 per month.

1 6.26 As of October 1988, SHARYN WOODRUFF's share of child
2 support arrears, according to OSE records, was over \$5,000.00.

3 6.27 When not receiving AFDC SHARYN WOODRUFF supported
4 herself and her children with a combination of earnings, child
5 support and her disabled child's SSI. In October 1988 SHARYN
6 WOODRUFF reapplied for AFDC because of medical problems and Mr.
7 Thompson's inadequate child support payments.

8 6.28 When SHARYN WOODRUFF reapplied for AFDC in 1988 she
9 executed a new child support assignment. The assignment form she
10 signed did not inform her that if she returned to AFDC, defendant
11 would claim her child support arrears to repay AFDC previously paid
12 out. (A copy of the assignment form is attached as Exhibit D).
13 No other communication informed her of this either.

14 6.29 SHARYN WOODRUFF and her children received a total of
15 \$2,712.00 in AFDC for a 6 month period from November 1988 - April
16 1989. SHARYN WOODRUFF terminated AFDC in April 1989. SHARYN
17 WOODRUFF and her children have not received AFDC since then.

18 6.30 The amount of the child support obligation that accrued
19 during the 6 month period SHARYN WOODRUFF and her children received
20 AFDC in 1988-89 is \$900.00 (\$150.00 x 6). She does not challenge
21 defendant's entitlement to that support.

22 6.31 Defendant claims that it can retain support arrears that
23 accrued during the period before SHARYN WOODRUFF returned to
24 assistance in November 1988 to reimburse itself for any assistance
25 previously paid. Therefore, when SHARYN WOODRUFF stopped receiving
26 assistance in April 1989, defendant claimed ownership of all the
27 unpaid child support owed by Nicholas Thompson.

28

1 PLAINTIFF OLSON

2 6.32 Plaintiff CAROLYN OLSON lives with her two children,
3 Malona and Ryan, ages 19 & 15.

4 6.33 CAROLYN OLSON and her children received AFDC from DSHS
5 during different periods between 1976 and 1980.

6 6.34 CAROLYN OLSON and the father of Malona, Mickey
7 Gostischef, were divorced in 1972. The divorce decree ordered Mr.
8 Gostischef to pay \$75.00 per month in child support for Malona.

9 6.35 CAROLYN OLSON and the father of Ryan, Stephen Matthews
10 Lessard, were divorced in 1981. The divorce decree ordered Mr.
11 Lessard to pay \$170.00 per month in child support for Ryan.

12 6.36 When CAROLYN OLSON began receiving assistance in 1976
13 and at required occasions after that date, she signed an assignment
14 of support rights as required by 42 U.S.C. §602 (a)(26)(A).
15 (A copy of the assignment form signed in 1978 is attached as
16 Exhibit E.)

17 6.37 The divorce decree which ordered Mr. Gostischef to pay
18 child support established the amount of Mr. Gostischef's child
19 support obligation. 42 USC §656; 45 C.F.R. §302.50. As long as
20 CAROLYN OLSON's family received AFDC, the money coming due each
21 month under the decree was available to the State under the child
22 support assignments to partially offset the public assistance being
23 paid.

24 6.38 The divorce decree which ordered Mr. Lessard to pay
25 child support established the amount of Mr. Lessard's child support
26 obligation as of June 1981. The amount of support the defendant
27 could collect from Mr. Lessard for the months CAROLYN OLSON
28 received assistance before the divorce decree was entered was the