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3. The legal effects of the proposed constitutional amendment can not be predicted with any degree of certainty. The recent experiences of West Virginia illustrate the unreliability of political statements made by proponents of this type of amendment.

4. The only effect of the amendment that can be stated with certainty is that it transfers power currently in the hands of the legislature to the judiciary. A similar and well-known example of such a power transfer occurred when the constitution was amended to specifically mention the right of privacy. The legislature is still struggling with the resulting supreme court opinion which recognized a constitutional right to use marijuana.

5. Based on the broad reading the Alaska court gives to the provisions of our constitution, and the lack of any language in the amendment giving the legislature the authority to regulate the exercise of the constitutional right, it is more likely that portions of Alaska's statutes regulating firearms will be declared unconstitutional. Case authority exists as legal precedent for invalidating, or seriously weakening, both the state statute prohibiting all felons from having firearms, and the Anchorage municipal ordinance against carrying concealed weapons in automobiles.

6. If the Legislature decides to approve a constitutional amendment modifying the right to bear arms in Alaska, the language of the amendment should affirmatively state

that the legislature continues to have the authority to reasonably regulate firearms by law.

1. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Alaska

The Alaska Constitution addresses the right of the people to keep and bear arms at Article I, Section 19. It provides: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Although this section of the constitution has never been interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court, existing law grants Alaskans broad and relatively unrestricted rights to keep and bear arms.

Alaska's right to bear arms provision is virtually identical to language found in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, as noted by Legislative Counsel Tamara Brandt Cook in her memorandum to Senator Rodey dated April 14, 1983, "the [United States] Supreme Court has never directly considered whether the Second Amendment provides any protection to the private ownership of arms for lawful purposes." There is ample legal authority for the proposition that protection of the individual right to bear arms is provided by the language of both the Second Amendment and Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.

For example, in one scholarly article,<sup>1</sup> the author demonstrated that the amendments guarantee the individual right to keep and bear arms for the following purposes: (1) to enable the individual to perform militia duties; (2) to deter governmental oppression; (3) to maintain public order; and (4) to enable the individual to exercise the right to self-defense. The author concluded his analysis by clearly stating that, under language identical to the Alaska Constitution, common and traditional users of private firearms are protected and that it would be unconstitutional to enact

(1) any law that infringes the right of the people (excepting those people who fall into a traditional high-risk category, such as felons, the mentally deficient, and infants) to keep any arms commonly used for personal protection or any of the modern equivalent of arms that were fairly commonly possessed by the people at the adoption of the Constitution, or  
(2) any law that infringes the right to bear those arms for traditional lawful purposes.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Dowlut, "The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?," 36 Oklahoma Law Review 65 (1983).

<sup>2</sup>Id. at 101. The following articles have been cited as authority for the proposition that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms: S.P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (Univ. of N. Mex. Press 1984); Dowlut, "The Current Relevancy of Keeping and Bearing Arms," 15 U. Balt. L. F. 32 (1984); Kates, "Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment," 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983); Malcolm, "The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition," 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 285 (1983); Caplan, "The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend," 1982 Detroit Col. L. Rev. 789; Shalhope, "The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment," 69 J. Am. History 599 (1982); Halbrook, "To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791," 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 13 (1982); Gardiner, "To Preserve Liberty--A Look at The Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 63 (1982); Halbrook, "The

An analysis of the constitutional right to bear arms in Alaska must of necessity consider the history of gun regulation in the state.<sup>3</sup> The right of the people to bear arms for legitimate purposes is widely recognized in Alaska, and has never been

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Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments," 4 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 1 (1981); Cantrell, "The Right to Bear Arms," 53 Wis. Bar Bull. 21 (Oct. 1980); Caplan, "Handgun Control: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?," 10 N.C. Central L. J. 53 (1978); Caplan, "Restoring The Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited," 5 Fordham Urban L.J. 31 (1976); Whisker, "Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 171 (1976); Weiss, "A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law," 52 Jour. Urban Law 577 (1974); Hardy & Stompoly, "Of Arms and the Law," 51 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 62 (1974); McClure, "Firearms and Federalism," 7 Idaho L. Rev. 197 (1970); Levine & Saxe, "The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms," 7 Houston L. Rev. 1 (1969); Olds, "The Second Amendment and The Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 46 Mich. St. Bar. J. 15 (Oct. 1967); Comment, "The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Necessary Constitutional Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights?," 31 Albany L. Rev. 74 (1967); Sprecher, "The Lost Amendment," 51 Am. Bar Assn. J. 554 and 665 (1965); and Hays, "The Right to Bear Arms: A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation," 2 Wm. & Marv L. Rev. 381 (1960).

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System, 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 1975): "In determining the scope of a constitutional right, the focus of the court's inquiry is not, however, on the question of whether there is a burden on the exercise of that right. We must look to the intent of the framers of the constitution concerning the nature of the right itself, the problems which they were addressing and the remedies they sought. While prior practice and the framers' purposes are not necessarily conclusive, an historical perspective is essential to an enlightened contemporary interpretation of our constitution."

infringed.<sup>4</sup> Alaska and Vermont share the distinction of having the least restrictive firearms laws in United States.<sup>5</sup>

Proponents of the amendment indicate it is not proposed to rectify a current injustice nor to overturn existing guns laws or regulations, but to protect the rights of individuals to keep and bear arms against the caprice of an irresponsible legislature. We believe the protection of the existing constitution and the respect and restraint historically shown by the Alaska legislature and courts for the people's right to bear arms renders the proposed amendment unnecessary, and worse, the amendment interjects the uncertainty of judicial interpretation into a new and uncharted area.

## 2. Constitutional Interpretation in Alaska

It is often difficult to predict how a court will interpret the scope and effect of a new constitutional amendment, and how the power of the legislature will thereafter be limited. This unpredictability is very familiar to Alaskans. In 1972, the

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<sup>4</sup>In previous years, a 1983 informal Attorney General's opinion has been cited as proof of the need for a constitutional amendment. The opinion addressed whether a landlord could prohibit a tenant from having firearms. This analysis of the right to bear arms, rendered in the context of a contractual relationship between private parties, did not comprehensively address the issue of governmental regulation of arms.

<sup>5</sup>Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, State Laws and Published Ordinances: Firearms (18th Ed. 1988).

people explicitly recognized the right to privacy in Alaska by approving a constitutional amendment. In the first major case interpreting the privacy amendment, the Alaska Supreme Court in Ravin v. State,<sup>6</sup> struck down the law that criminalized possession of marijuana in the home for personal use. The legislature has been struggling for many years to deal with this unique interpretation of our constitution.<sup>7</sup>

Ravin is only one example of the propensity of the state supreme court to interpret the Alaska constitution as giving broader protection to individual rights than similar constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions. As a result, the judicial decisions of other states interpreting individual rights cannot be

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<sup>6</sup>537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).

<sup>7</sup>Although other states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington, have adopted similar constitutional provisions recognizing the right to privacy, the Alaska court stands alone in its conclusion that the right to privacy protects the right to possess marijuana in the home.

heavily relied upon in predicting what will happen when the Alaska courts are asked to analyze identical issues.<sup>8</sup>

With respect to the actions of individual citizens, Alaska court decisions frequently rely on the privacy amendment to justify constitutional interpretations that are significantly broader than those reached by other courts. Our court has repeatedly determined that the effect of the right of privacy is to amplify the protections afforded by other constitutional rights. The complexity of anticipating the court's interpretation of a right to bear arms is compounded by the potentially augmenting effect of the explicit right to privacy.

For example, the Alaska constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is held to be broader in scope than identical guarantees under the federal constitution, in part because of the right to privacy.<sup>9</sup> Despite considerable authority

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<sup>8</sup>In addition to the cases discussed below, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the Alaska Constitution provides greater protection in areas ranging from the free exercise of one's religious beliefs, Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (defendant entitled to exemption from fish and game regulations on account of his religious beliefs even though the charges against defendant would have been upheld under the federal constitution) to the right to counsel, Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) ("the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution is more expansive than the corresponding right under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.").

<sup>9</sup>Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979). In this case, the court reversed a conviction for possession of heroin. The defendant had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a correctional officer discovered the heroin inside a balloon in

to the contrary in other jurisdictions, the Alaska court has held that the state constitution prohibits warrantless administrative inspections of private business premises.<sup>10</sup> The warrantless monitoring of private conversations with the consent of one participant, acceptable under federal constitutional standards, is held in Alaska to be an unreasonable search and seizure in light of the combined effect of the Alaska constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Alaska constitutional right of privacy.<sup>11</sup>

The Alaska court has also forged new legal ground in interpreting the equal protection clause of the state constitution. This amendment provides additional protection for the exercise of constitutional rights such as the right to bear arms because it is used by the court in evaluating whether legislation is

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the defendant's pocket. Although it was permissible for the officer to take the balloon away from the defendant before he was booked into the jail, the court held that the defendant's right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the officer looked inside the balloon.

<sup>10</sup>Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).

<sup>11</sup>In the cases of Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1978) (court reversed conviction of marijuana dealer); Aldridge v. State, 584 P.2d 1105 (Alaska 1978) (court reversed conviction of heroin dealer); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (court agreed charges against heroin dealer should be dismissed), the decisions were based on the court's broad interpretation of Alaska's constitutional rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Federal courts faced with the same issues have interpreted similar federal constitutional guarantees relating to searches and seizures differently, and would have upheld the convictions.

constitutional. In developing its own equal protection analysis, our court rejected the deferential test applied by the United States Supreme Court, holding instead that the Alaska Constitution requires social and economic legislation to pass a more rigorous test.<sup>12</sup>

In Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair v. DOT, 754 P.2d 1111 (1988), the court explained its expansive equal protection analysis as follows:

In reviewing equal protection claims under the Alaska constitution ... the minimum burden that the state must meet when defending legislation challenged on equal protection grounds under the Alaska constitution is greater than that required under the United States Constitution. The burden on the state increases in proportion to the primacy of the interest involved. Eventually this burden reaches the functional equivalent of the federal compelling state interest test in those cases where fundamental rights and suspect categories are at issue.<sup>13</sup>

Another liberal interpretation of Alaska's constitution was set out in Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982). In this case the court invalidated statutes relating to ballot access by

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<sup>12</sup>Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).

<sup>13</sup>754 P.2d at 1114. The court in Herrick also pointed to an additional burden placed on the state in defending against an equal protection challenge. "[T]he rational basis test articulated by the Supreme Court allows a court to 'hypothesize' facts. Under that test, a party challenging legislation on equal protection grounds, cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). In Alaska, the court will not hypothesize facts.

candidates of small parties. The court relied on the free speech and equal protection provisions of the Alaska constitution, and acknowledged that the statutes would have been upheld under the interpretation the federal courts have given to identical provisions of the United States constitution. The court declared that Alaska restrictions on the right to associate in pursuit of political beliefs are permissible only where the government is able to show that the restrictions are justified by compelling governmental interests. Further, the restrictions must be no broader than needed to accomplish the governmental interests which justify them.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, any effort to predict the interpretation of any amendment relating to an individual right in the Alaska court must be mindful of the court's tendency to interpret individual rights broadly, in often unexpected contexts, and the court's frequent insistence that regulatory schemes satisfy a compelling state interest test.

### 3. The West Virginia Experience

Despite Alaska's unique constitution and the willingness of our court to adopt novel legal interpretations, we have also considered the experience of other states with right to bear arms amendments. For example, based on its newly-enacted right to bear

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<sup>14</sup>651 P.2d at 5.

arms amendment, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently struck down a statute that prohibited carrying dangerous or deadly weapons without a license.

Proponents of the amendment had argued during legislative hearings that existing laws would not be affected by the amendment, but when an existing law was challenged, the proponents switched positions and argued for the unconstitutionality of the West Virginia law. This case shows the dangers that arise when a legislature approves a constitutional amendment that does not spell out in plain language its precise intent. A detailed description of what happened in West Virginia is therefore important because many of the same issues are currently being discussed in the context of your consideration of SJR4.

a. Legislative History

In 1986, West Virginia amended its constitution to expand the right to keep and bear arms. The new constitutional provision stated, "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreation use."

Despite the popularity of the right to keep and bear arms amendment in the West Virginia legislature, the legislative process "failed to give the amendment's language any real definition beyond

a general sense that passage of the amendment would leave undisturbed current law and constitutionalize existing state law prohibiting municipal governments from banning the ownership of weapons or ammunition. The very popularity of the concept seemed to insulate the proposed amendment from the 'hard look' analysis appropriate for amendments to a constitution."<sup>15</sup>

No significant statement of legislative intent was prepared by any of the committees that considered the proposal, nor was any substantive research done by the legislative committees that recommended the measure for passage. As a result, there was little in the legislative history to assist the court in fixing any specific meaning to the words, phrases, or the intent of the amendment. In researching the legislative history, McNeely concluded, "All that can be said without question was that legislative proponents consistently took the position that the amendment, if adopted, would not change existing laws, and that legislative opponents consistently attempted, with no ultimate success, to amend the measure to assure that the state would retain its ability to maintain the existing state of the law."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>McNeely, "The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where - West Virginia's Firearms Law v. The Right-To-Bear-Arms Amendment," 89 West Virginia Law Review 1125 (1987) at 1160.

<sup>16</sup>McNeely at 1152.

In an analysis provided to the West Virginia legislature by the National Rifle Association, the proponents argued that under the amendment the bearing of constitutionally-protected arms "may be regulated." The analysis described the various statutes that the NRA believed would be upheld if the proposed amendment were adopted, and specifically stated that "a license may be required to carry a pistol away from one's home, place of business, or land."<sup>17</sup>

In attempting to predict the effect the court would give to the amendment, McNeely predicted that,

Given the legislature's failure to provide clear legislative intent in any formal sense, it shall be up to the judicial branch of the state to interpret the amendment consistent with its language and demonstrated intent. With that interpretation, the court may continue the state's traditional legal attitude toward firearms by finding the amendment consistent with state law, or it may embark the state on an uncharted course of repeal and revision of long-standing statutes and case law ... It is, perhaps, ironic that such a lack of legislative research and formal legislative findings, coupled with the broad, unqualified

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<sup>17</sup>The National Rifle Association "Analysis of Proposed West Virginia Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" is set out as Appendix H to the McNeely article at 1176-78. It is virtually identical to the "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" contained in the Senate Judiciary file for SJR4.

In addition, at least one advertisement by the NRA for the amendment in West Virginia contained "a prominent statement that no existing federal or state law would be repealed by passage, with the statement reading 'Amendment 1 keeps Federal and State firearms laws the law.'" McNeely at 1148.

language of Amendment No. 1, have combined to place the future of firearms regulation, heretofore primarily a legislative activity, in the hands of the judicial branch of state government.<sup>18</sup>

b. Princeton v. Buckner

The case of Princeton v. Buckner<sup>19</sup> began when a police officer searched a drunk driver who had been placed under arrest, and found a .22 caliber automatic pistol concealed in the driver's pocket. Under existing West Virginia law, a license was required to carry a concealed weapon. Although the drunk driver did not have a license, the magistrate refused to issue charges for illegally carrying a firearm because he concluded that the licensing law was unconstitutional under the newly-enacted right to bear arms amendment to the West Virginia Constitution.

Despite the assertions during the legislative and public debates that existing West Virginia firearms laws would not be affected, the challengers to the law in Buckner lost little time in proving the non-binding nature of such statements.<sup>20</sup> In their analysis of legislative intent, the challengers pointed to the

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<sup>18</sup>McNeely at 1162.

<sup>19</sup>Case No. CC972, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, July 1, 1988, reconsideration denied December 20, 1988.

<sup>20</sup>The National Rifle Association filed an amicus brief in the Buckner case on behalf of its West Virginia members, which concluded: "... the licensing statute is unconstitutional because it frustrates rather than regulates the right to bear arms."

legislature's refusal to modify the amendment to specifically state that the legislature retained the power to regulate firearms.

For example, in his brief to the Supreme Court, Buckner argued as follows:

The State, in its brief, concludes that "it is clear that the Right to Keep and Bear [Arms] Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution was not meant to nullify existing laws." This conclusion is without factual support or logic. Had the efforts of Delegate McNeely to add the word "lawful" and had the efforts of Delegate Knight to make the amendment subject to the "police power" of the State, or either of these efforts, been successful, then the argument of the State might bear some logic. The fact that both of these efforts were specifically turned down by the Legislature indicates clearly that the Legislature had no such intent as stated by the State. Had that been the clear intent of the Legislature in passing the resolution, it could have simply added language to that effect, or adopted on of the amendments referred to. (emphasis added) Brief of Respondent Buckner at 4.

The basis of the argument of the State is that the proponents took the position that the right to bear arms amendment did not change existing laws. The fact of the matter is that the opponents of the amendment took the position that it would, in fact, change existing law and the Legislature refused, although given opportunity to do so, to word the amendment in such a fashion so as to deal with that question. (emphasis added) Brief of Respondent Buckner at 5.

In addition to pointing out that the legislature refused to address the extent to which it retained the power to pass firearms legislation, the challengers concluded that the

legislature and the people must have wanted to place restraints on the legislature. At page 6 of his brief, Buckner argued that if the constitutional amendment "means anything, it has to mean that the people of the State wanted to change the law in existence at the time, and place restraints upon the Legislature. Any other conclusion is illogical and would render the act of the Legislature and the people in adopting the constitutional provision an exercise in futility." In other words, it doesn't matter what the supporters of the bill said; it only mattered what the legislature itself said in the language of the amendment.

The West Virginia Supreme Court accepted the arguments presented by the challengers, and held that a "constitutional amendment will supersede any inconsistent portions of antecedent constitutional or statutory provisions, as 'the latest expression of the will of the people.'"<sup>21</sup> The court rejected the position taken by the state that "West Virginia's licensing statute evinces an intent to control, but not prohibit, carrying weapons, such as handguns, which are both easily concealable and deadly."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Princeton v. Buckner, at page 10.

<sup>22</sup>Brief of Petitioner State of West Virginia, at 15.

On December 20, 1988, the West Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that the statute was unconstitutional. The opinion did not isolate the specific provisions of this statute, or the related licensing requirements, which rendered the statute violative of the right to keep and bear arms amendment. Instead, the court declared that the prohibition against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon for defensive purposes without a license or other statutory authorization was overly broad.

c. Current Status of West Virginia Gun Law

Similar to the current situation in Alaska where the legislature is trying to pass a constitutional statute prohibiting people from possessing marijuana in their homes, the West Virginia legislature is now working on developing a constitutional statute relating to the carrying of deadly and dangerous weapons.<sup>23</sup> In the meantime, unless a person commits a separate criminal offense with a firearm, West Virginia law enforcement authorities are prohibited from arresting persons for, or protecting persons from, carrying concealed weapons, regardless of whether the offender is carrying the weapon for defensive or other purposes. (Source--West Virginia Department of Public Safety)<sup>24</sup>

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Although the court acknowledged that the legislature "may, through the valid exercise of its police power, reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in order to promote the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of this State, provided that the restrictions or regulations imposed do not frustrate the constitutional freedoms guaranteed by...the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment," the court recognized that each statute regulating firearms would need to be evaluated in light of the new constitutional provisions. The court cautioned that "a governmental purpose to control or prohibit certain activities, which may be constitutionally subject to state regulation under the police power, may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the realm of protected freedoms, such as the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by our State Constitution." (emphasis added)

<sup>23</sup>Telephone conversation, Steve Hernden, West Virginia Assistant Attorney General.

<sup>24</sup>Petition for Reconsideration of Remedy filed by the State of West Virginia at pages 1-2.

4. The Proposed Alaska Amendment

The proposed amendment to the Alaska constitution states that "The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state."

The first and most significant effect of the constitutional amendment proposed in SJR4 is to limit the legislative authority to regulate the right to bear arms. The amendment takes authority away from the people's elected representatives as to what policies the state will follow concerning the right to keep and bear arms and, shifts to the courts the ultimate authority to decide state policy through the uncertain course of constitutional interpretation.

The sweeping but ambiguous language of the proposed amendment means that, if passed, it can be expected to trigger a great deal of litigation in a number of different contexts. If the courts were to construe the amendment in a fashion that the Legislature felt was harmful to the public interest, the only way that the law could be changed, without inducing the court to change its own position, would be through another constitutional amendment. Thus, the amendment would give the courts a much greater role in interpreting the regulatory authority of the Legislature than it has at present.

As discussed above, relying on legal precedents from the courts of other states to predict what the Alaska court may decide under the proposed amendment is fraught with difficulty. Although proponents of amending Alaska's constitution argue that at least 42 states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms, and that all firearms laws have been upheld in every state, this assertion is incorrect and misleading, as discussed below.

Most constitutional provisions enacted by other states differ from SJR4 because they either define the circumstances in which the constitutional right applies, or they expressly recognize that the constitutional provision is subject to legislative regulation.<sup>25</sup> Only Rhode Island has a constitutional provision, like SJR4, that grants an apparently unfettered right to keep and bear arms.<sup>26</sup>

Each of the 50 state supreme courts interpret its own constitutional provisions consistent with the legal precedents of that state. Decisions made by courts of sister states may be

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<sup>25</sup>See R. Dowlut & J. Knoop, "State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 7 Oklahoma City U.L. Rev. 177, 235-240 (1982).

<sup>26</sup>We have been unable to find any cases in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court has directly interpreted this constitutional provision.

informative, yet are not persuasive or conclusive authority from which one can predict the result in a different jurisdiction. For example, the West Virginia court struck down its licensing statute after considering and rejecting an Indiana Supreme Court decision that reached the opposition conclusion.<sup>27</sup> In the Indiana decision, the dissent noted that "The decisions from other jurisdictions are not uniform on the right to keep and bear arms any more than the constitutional provisions are stated in the same language."

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<sup>27</sup>An Indiana statute which imposed licensing requirements on handguns similar to those of West Virginia was addressed in Matthews v State, 148 N.E. 2d 334 (1958). As in West Virginia, the Indiana statute placed no restrictions on possessing or carrying a weapon on one's own premises, but to carry a gun elsewhere required a license conditioned on a showing that, among other things, "the applicant has a proper reason for carrying a pistol and is of good character and reputation and a suitable person to be so licensed." 148 N.E.2d at 336. The Indiana constitution provided that "the people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State." The Matthews court affirmed the statute and held that the licensing statute was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power to provide for the public safety and welfare.

In a subsequent case, Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Indiana App. 1980), the Indiana court relied on the constitutional right to bear arms provision in reversing the denial of a license to carry a handgun made by an applicant who claimed he needed a gun for self-defense. The authorities had denied the license after reviewing evidence showing that the applicant "was a 'chronic liar' suffering from a 'gigantic police complex.'" Evidence also showed that when the applicant had previously held a license, he "had carried and displayed his pistol at inappropriate times." Other witnesses testified that the applicant had "mental problems."

The Schubert court reiterated that establishing a licensing procedure for handguns is not violative of the constitution. However, the court ruled that once a person makes the claim that a gun is needed for self-defense, the constitutional right to bear arms provision prohibits authorities from withholding the license, or even making a factual determination as to whether the person actually needs a gun.

Since the analysis of each case turns on the precise wording of each constitutional provision, it is difficult to use the cases for purposes of comparison. For example, the court's reasons for upholding a challenged statute in State v. Grob, 690 P.2d 951 (Idaho App. 1984) are illustrative of the limited precedential value out-of-state decisions would have in Alaska. In this case, the defendant argued that a statute providing a mandatory sentence for using a firearm while engaged in kidnapping or aggravated battery violated his constitutional right to bear arms. Since Idaho's constitutional right to bear arms provision was amended in 1978, the court looked to the language of both the pre-1978 and post-1978 constitutions. The court found that the statute was constitutional under the pre-1978 language because the provision specifically stated "the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law." Similarly, the statute was found to be constitutional under the post-1978 language based on the specific authorization given the legislature to prescribe "minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm" and to punish the unlawful "use of a firearm."<sup>28</sup>

5. The Risk to Specific Alaska Statutes

a. Constitutionality of Concealed Weapons Statutes

Despite the assertions of supporters of this amendment, it is by no means certain that a new right to bear arms amendment

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<sup>28</sup>State v. Grob, 690 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Idaho App. 1984)

would leave current Alaska statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons untouched. If the Alaska courts interpreted the amendment to permit the carrying of concealed weapons, AS 11.61.220(a)(1) would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the Alaska Supreme Court would hold that this was an area beyond legislative regulation. The matter is simply uncertain.

An article published by Robert Dowlut, General Counsel for the National Rifle Association,<sup>29</sup> gives rise to concern about the constitutionality of an Anchorage municipal ordinance, if the proposed amendment to the Alaska constitution were approved. Dowlut asserts that the right to keep and bear arms includes the right to carry weapons in private vehicles,<sup>30</sup> something which is now prohibited by Anchorage Municipal Code 8.05.070(A), as interpreted in Municipality of Anchorage v. Lloyd, 679 P.2d 486 (Alaska App. 1984).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Dowlut & Knoop, "State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 7 Oklahoma City University Law Review 177 (1982).

<sup>30</sup>Id. at 220.

<sup>31</sup>Support for amending Alaska's constitutional right to bear arms provision has been predicated on an unwarranted assumption that the amendment will not have an effect on existing state or municipal laws. For example, Resolution No. AR 87-238, dated September 29, 1987 and passed by the Anchorage Assembly, included the bald assertion that the amendment "will not invalidate existing municipal public safety measures regulating the use and possession of firearms."

In the document entitled "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms," which was written by Dowlut and provided to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the assertion is made that "concealed carrying statutes ... are routinely upheld." A review of the cases cited in support of this proposition highlights the problems involved in relying on judicial decisions in jurisdictions outside the state of Alaska to predict how our court would interpret the proposed constitutional amendment.

For example, Dowlut cites Holland v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1956) as standing for the proposition that concealed weapons statutes are constitutional despite the broadly drafted language of SJR4. However, a review of the case shows that the Kentucky constitution explicitly declares that the right to bear arms is "subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons," a phrase not included SJR4. The court upheld the concealed weapons statute because it found that "the meaning of the constitutional provision is plain and the legislature has exercised the power granted to it by enacting [the concealed weapons statute]." Id. at 85.

Similarly, Dowlut claims that State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Oregon 1980) is another case in which a concealed weapons statute was "routinely upheld." In fact, the court in Kessler

struck down a statute that prohibited possessing billy clubs. Despite Dowlut's claim, the court did not address the constitutionality of concealed weapons laws, although it noted in passing that the court in State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72 (Idaho 1945) upheld a concealed weapons statute.

In Hart the Idaho court specifically based its decision to uphold the ordinance on the language of Idaho's constitutional right to bear arms provision. At the time Hart was decided, the Idaho constitution stated "The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense; but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law."

The final case cited by Dowlut to support his claim that Alaska's courts will uphold concealed weapons statutes is State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1986). However, once again, the constitutional provision that was analyzed in McAdams is significantly narrower than the proposed amendment contained in SJR4. The Wyoming constitution provides, "The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied." The court upheld the concealed weapons statute because it did not believe that the law placed unnecessary restraints on the right to possess arms for self defense: "We are cognizant of the fact that our concealed deadly weapons statute imposes some limitation on a person's right to bear arms in defense of himself;

but, when balanced against the object of the statute, we do not find the limitation unreasonable." Id. at 1238.

b. Constitutionality of Felon in Possession Statutes

It is also by no means certain that the Alaska Supreme Court would uphold current laws controlling or prohibiting convicted felons from owning or possessing weapons if SJR4 were adopted. Felons convicted of bootlegging or drug dealing would be allowed to possess firearms with impunity if the opinion expressed by the General Counsel of the National Rifle Association, and discussed below, were adopted in this state. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted its constitutional right to bear arms as providing a defense to the charge of felon in possession. If the Alaska courts reached a similar interpretation, the ability to prosecute felons for possessing firearms would certainly be impaired.

The supporters of SJR4 have provided you with the "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" which implies that Alaska's felon in possession statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, Robert Dowlut, General Counsel for the National Rifle Association, has previously published contrary statements. In a law review article, he stated, "To prevent the people from being disarmed by the expedient of classifying regulatory offenses as felonies, the disqualification

# **CORRECTION**

**THIS DOCUMENT  
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED  
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**

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for felons should be restricted to common law felonies and their modern equivalents and to offenses requiring some state of mind above strict liability which are inherently inimical to life and property."<sup>32</sup> (emphasis added). Thus, under Dowlut's view, felons charged with drug dealing and bootlegging, which are not "common law felonies," could legally carry weapons.

Under current AS 11.61.200, all persons convicted of any felon<sup>32</sup> are prohibited from possessing a firearm capable of being concealed on the person, and this law applies to persons convicted of regulatory offenses such as bootlegging and drug dealing, as well as the common law felonies such as murder, assault or kidnapping. If Dowlut's interpretation were adopted, Alaska's statute would be overbroad, and struck down as unconstitutional.

A conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Ford, 568 P.2d 26 (Colorado 1977), based on the "right to bear arms" provision of the Colorado Constitution. The court held that the constitutional protection extends to a defendant "who presents competent evidence showing that his purpose in possessing weapons was the defense of his home, person, and property" and that this type of evidence provides a complete defense to a felon-in-

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<sup>32</sup>Dowlut & Knoop at 192.

possession charge.<sup>33</sup> Once the defendant has raised the issue as a defense, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's purpose in possessing firearms was not for defense. Thus, unless the felon is committing a crime with the gun, it is virtually impossible to prove that the weapon was not for "defense." As a practical matter, the teeth have been taken out of the law because of the problems of proving that a felon in possession of a gun at the felon's home, on the felon's person, or on the felon's property is using it other than for defense.

As with the concealed weapons statutes, there are problems in relying on the judicial decisions of other states in reaching the conclusion that Alaska's statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, in the North Dakota case distributed to the Senate Judiciary Committee, State v. Ricehill<sup>34</sup>, the statute only prohibited persons "convicted anywhere for a felony involving violence or intimidation" from owning firearms. Unlike current Alaska law, North Dakota's narrower felon in possession statute would fall within the category of felon in possession statutes that Dowlut considers to be constitutional, in

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<sup>33</sup>The court noted at page 28 that this affirmative defense is available in cases involving the charge of carrying a concealed weapon.

<sup>34</sup>415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).

that it only prohibits felons convicted of common law felonies from having firearms.<sup>35</sup>

Other state courts have upheld felon in possession statutes based on express constitutional language that preserved the right of the legislature to regulate arms. In Landers v. State, 299 S.E 2d 707 (Ga. 1983), the court affirmed the conviction of a felon charged with possessing a firearm, and held "Where a State constitution in terms provides, in connection with the right to bear arms, that the State may regulate this right, or may regulate the manner of bearing arms, these words expressly

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<sup>35</sup>See also, Dickerson v. State, 517 So.2d 625 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986), Bristow v. State, 418 So.2d 927 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) and Mason v. State, 103 So.2d 337 (Ala.App. (1956), aff'd 103 So.2d 341 (1958) (Statute prohibited "a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence from owning or possessing a pistol); State v. Krantz, 164 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1945) and State v. Tully, 89 P.2d 517 (Wash. 1939) (Statute prohibited possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1982) (Statute prohibited persons convicted of "murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault to commit murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary or sexual assault in the first or second degree, or mayhem" to possess any firearms.); State v. Noel, 414 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1966) and State v. Rascon, 519 P.2d 37 (Ariz. 1974) (Statute prohibited any person convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a pistol); Sheppard v. State, 586 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), McGuire v. State, 537 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976) and Webb v. State, 439 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969) (Statute prohibited persons convicted of "a felony involving an act of violence or threatened violence to a person or property" from possessing firearms "away from the premises where he lives."); State v. Cartwright, 418 P.2d 822 (Ore. 1966) (Statute prohibited possession where convicted of "a felony against the person or property of another."

recognize the police power in direct connection with the constitutional declaration as to the right."<sup>36</sup>

Similarly, in Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1967), the conviction for possession of a pistol by a defendant who had previously been convicted of a felony was upheld. Although the statute applied to persons convicted of all felonies, Florida's constitutional provision said "The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law."

The court in Amos v. State, 343 So.2d 166 (La. 1977) upheld charges for felon in possession of a firearm because the "purpose [of the statute] is to limit the possession of firearms by person who, by their past commission of certain specified serious felonies, have demonstrated a dangerous disregard for the law and present a potential threat of further or future criminal activity." However, two justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court dissented from the opinion, believing that the statute impermissibly infringed on the right to bear arms.

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<sup>36</sup>Georgia's constitution states "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne."

The reasoning of the two dissenting justices in Amos is important, since if this position were adopted in Alaska, AS 11.61.200 would be struck down. The dissenters stated that the felon in possession statute "impermissibly limits the affirmative constitutional guarantee and as such is not a valid exercise of the police power." The dissenters looked at other state decisions upholding felon in possession laws and concluded "These states, however, have constitutional provisions different from ours. Every one of these constitutions link the right to bear arms to the need for a militia. Unlike these provisions, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly grants to each citizen the 'right to keep and bear arms,' a right which 'no law' shall abridge. This constitutional guarantee is not limited by linking it to a militia or a defense for the people as a whole. It is limited only by one state exception: the legislature has the authority to prohibit the concealment of weapons on the person. Otherwise, the legislature lacks the authority to nullify the right of Louisiana citizens to keep and bear arms."

An analysis of the effect the proposed right to bear arms amendment will have on the state's felon in possession statute must be undertaken with both the right to privacy and the Alaska Supreme Court's expansive equal protection standard in mind. Alaska law prohibits all felons, including persons convicted of non-violent felonies such as embezzlement and certain sex offenses, from

possessing firearms. If SJR4 were adopted, the court would require the state to prove that the law is based on a compelling state interest. In relation to non-violent felons, it is not unlikely that the state would be unable to meet the burden of proving it had a compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession of firearms by non-violent felons.

c. Constitutionality of Prohibited Weapons Statutes

The possession of certain classes of weapons is prohibited in Alaska.<sup>37</sup> Included in the category of prohibited weapons are switchblades, gravity knives, and metal knuckles. Under SJR4, this law would be unconstitutional, if the court in this state accepted the analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Ore. 1984); State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824 (Ore. 1981); and State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Ore. 1980).

In Delgado, the Oregon court held that a statute prohibiting mere possession of a switchblade was unconstitutional under the right to bear arms provision of the Oregon constitution.<sup>38</sup> The court first determined that the drafters of Oregon's constitution "intended that the private citizen have the

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<sup>37</sup>AS 11.61.200(e).

<sup>38</sup>Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution provides: "The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State..."

right to possess arms for the defense of person and property."<sup>39</sup>  
Next, the court reasoned that switchblades were arms, and as a result, possession of a switchblade is a constitutionally protected in Oregon and the statute making such possession a crime is unconstitutional.

d. Constitutionality of Game Regulations

Alaska's regulatory scheme relating to the lawful methods of taking game is potentially at risk if the proposed amendment is adopted.<sup>40</sup> Since each of the game regulations infringes on the right to bear a particular type of arm, in order for the regulation to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the state would need to prove that it had a compelling state interest for adopting the regulation.

For example, under 5 AAC 92.100(a)(1), it is illegal to shoot waterfowl with a rifle or pistol. The purpose of the regulation is to make hunting waterfowl less efficient, and more

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<sup>39</sup>Delgado at 611.

<sup>40</sup>5 AAC 92.075 (the permissible weapons for taking big game are a shotgun, a muzzle-loading rifle, or a rifle or pistol using a center-firing cartridge); 5 AAC 92.080 (it is prohibited to take game with the use or aid of a machine gun, set gun, or a shotgun larger than 10 gauge); and 5 AAC 92.100 (it is prohibited to take waterfowl, snipe and cranes with a rifle or pistol, a shotgun larger than 10 gauge, or a shotgun not plugged to a three shell capacity).

sporting.<sup>41</sup> However, many biologists have argued that the regulation is unnecessary as it doesn't matter how a bird is killed, it only matters how many animals are shot, and whether the appropriate bag limit was exceeded.<sup>42</sup> In the face of this type of expert testimony, it is not unlikely that a court would strike down 5 AAC 92.100(a)(1) as an infringement of the right to bear arms.

6. The Legislature Should Affirmatively State Its Intent

The State, through exercise of its police power, is vested with the authority to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the general welfare of its citizenry. The Alaska Supreme Court examined the state's police power in light of express constitutional limitations on regulatory authority in Matthews v. Quinton.<sup>43</sup> In this case, the court analyzed whether a statute providing for the transportation of children to nonpublic schools at public expense was in contravention of a constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public funds for the support of private schools. Since the statute had been on the books before the constitutional provision was adopted, the court

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<sup>41</sup>Telephone conversation with James Sheridan, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Law Enforcement, Alaska Region, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

<sup>42</sup>Id.

<sup>43</sup>362 P.2d 932, app. dismiss., cert. den. 82 S.Ct. 530, 368 U.S. 517, 7 L.Ed.2d 522 (Alaska 1961)

considered the effect of subsequently adopted constitutional provisions on existing statutes.

The court concluded that for a constitutional provision to operate retrospectively to validate antecedent legislation in the face of claimed unconstitutionality, "the validating constitutional provision must make some reference, however slight or inferential, to the statute intended to be validated." The statute authorizing transportation of private school pupils was declared void because the newly adopted constitutional provision did "not show by the language used, either directly or by necessary implication, that it was intended to operate retrospectively so as to validate [the statute]." Id. at 939.

Whether the statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the state was also considered in Matthews. The court noted that "the police power -- broad and comprehensive though it is -- may not be exercised in contravention of plain and unambiguous constitutional inhibitions." Although the state has "inherent and reserved police power to enact laws to promote the safety, health and general welfare of society," the court emphasized that "this power must be exercised within constitutional limits." Id. at 944.

During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Legislatures, versions of the right to bear arms amendment contained a general statement of "legislative intent" indicating that the constitutional amendment, if adopted, "should not be construed to preclude the regulation of the manner in which arms may be borne, carried, or used." We are concerned that this indirect statement of legislative intent will not be effective to preserve the present power to reasonably regulate the possession and use of weapons.

As a general rule, a statute or constitutional provision will be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language on its face. If the intent behind the adoption of the amendment were to later become an issue, it is the intent of the voters who adopted the measure that will be relevant, rather than the intent of the legislators who drafted it. Although last session's resolution directed the Legislative Affairs Agency to consider the stated "legislative intent" when preparing its neutral summary for the election pamphlet, the intent language would not appear on the ballot itself, and might not be contained verbatim in the election pamphlet. See art. XIII, sec. 1 of the Alaska Constitution and AS 15.58.010.

#### Conclusion

It is our belief that the present provision of the Alaska constitution and the traditional restraint of the legislature in

regulating firearms adequately protect the right to bear arms. However, if the legislature believes this issue should be placed before the people in the form of a constitutional amendment, that amendment should be drafted to explicitly recognize the legislature's regulatory authority with regard to arms.

Both legal principles and common sense dictate that a well-drafted statute or constitutional provision should reduce uncertainty and disputes about interpretation. Statements of "legislative intent" are not an adequate substitute for clear, unambiguous language in the proposed constitutional amendment. A more precisely drafted amendment would minimize the possibility that a criminal defendant would later be able to successfully convince a court, as has been done in other that states, that a statute, regulation, or ordinance is unconstitutional.

As alternatives to SJR4, we suggest language such as:

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state, except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

or

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state, except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law.

The Honorable Jan Faiks  
SJR4 - Right to Keep and Bear Arms

January 29, 1989  
Page 38

We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and trust that we can work together to accomplish your goals in a way that does not detrimentally affect our ability to prosecute activities that we all agree should be against the law.

Respectfully submitted,

GRACE BERG SCHAIBLE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: 

Laurie H. Otto  
Assistant Attorney General

cc: The Honorable Pat Podey  
The Honorable Peter Goll  
The Honorable Max Gruenberg  
The Honorable Dave Donley  
Grace Berg Schaible  
Bob Evans

# STATE OF ALASKA

## DEPARTMENT OF LAW

### CRIMINAL DIVISION

STEVE COWPER, GOVERNOR

REPLY TO

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February 23, 1989

The Honorable Jan Faiks  
Alaska State Senator  
P.O. Box V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Senator Faiks:

As I'm sure you remember, I recently testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee and explained the Department of Law's concerns about the proposed right to bear arms amendment, SJR 4. The type of problems we identified have started to arise in Nebraska as a result of an amendment to the Nebraska constitution that passed last November. Attached for your information are two opinions issued by Nebraska trial courts that declared unconstitutional both the Nebraska felon in possession law, and the Nebraska law making it a crime to possess a firearm with the serial numbers obliterated. I have also included two newspaper editorials from the Omaha World-Herald.

Based on the reasons we explained in both our written and oral testimony, as well as the new developments in Nebraska, we once again urge you to take a second look at the need to amend the Alaska constitution. If you decide a constitutional amendment is necessary, we implore you to add language to the proposed amendment that reserves the right of the legislature to reasonably regulate arms. A list of eight possible ways to reserve this right is attached to this letter.

If you have any questions about this issue, or if I can provide you with any additional information, please let me know and I will be glad to meet with you at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

DOUGLAS B. BAILY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: 

Laurie H. Otto  
Assistant Attorney General

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RESERVING THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO  
REASONABLY REGULATE ARMS IN SJR 4

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state,

1. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

2. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may reasonably regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

3. ... except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law.

4. ... except that the exercise of this right may be reasonably regulated by law.

5. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

6. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may reasonably regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

7. ... except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

8. ... except that the exercise of this right may be reasonably regulated by law. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

Omaha World-Herald

**Editorial Page**

Unsigned articles are the opinion of the World-Herald.

Nebraskans Were Warned**Ironic Use of Gun Law  
Shouldn't Be Surprise**

Nebraskans shouldn't be surprised at the news that some defense attorneys are using the state's new right-to-bear-arms amendment to defend clients against gun-related criminal charges. Voters had adequate warning that the amendment could make it harder to prevent the misuse of firearms. Unfortunately, a majority chose to vote for the amendment anyway.

Omaha Police Chief Robert Wadman expressed concern before the Nov. 8 election. He called attention to the fact that the amendment, which was backed by the National Rifle Association, guarantees "all persons" an "inherent and inalienable" right to bear arms and lists a number of purposes for which the right to bear arms is protected. State and local governments are forbidden to deny or abridge the right.

"All people," as Wadman pointed out, could be construed to include felons. It could include children, drug addicts and the mentally deranged. The amendment left too many questions unanswered, Wadman and other opponents of the measure said, and therefore could undermine reasonable laws restricting the possession and use of firearms.

The NRA's response, in effect, was that nothing would go wrong. Former Nebraska State Sen. Gary Anderson, an Olympic gold medal rifleman and the NRA's director of operations, said that the amendment would not change restrictions that have been upheld in court.

"How does he know?" we asked in a July 2 editorial commenting on his assurance. "No one can accurately predict how the courts, under new constitutional language, might rule on questions con-

cerning laws forbidding the ownership of machine guns, the carrying of concealed weapons and the purchase of firearms without a mandatory waiting period."

Recent news stories magnify the concerns. Among them:

— Attorneys for death row inmate C. Michael Anderson are using the amendment as a basis for appealing Anderson's death sentence in a 1975 murder. The attorneys contend that the amendment made the death penalty unconstitutional by forbidding government from abridging the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the right to bear arms.

— The amendment has been the basis of defense motions for two other defendants. One is charged with second-degree assault and the use of a weapon to commit a felony. The other is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

— Lancaster County Public Defender Dennis Keefe has said: "Attorneys are going to be looking at any offense involving a firearm, given the amendment. The consensus of attorneys in our office is that there are serious questions about felon-in-possession charges and carrying-a-concealed-weapon charges that are going to have to be answered."

How ironic. The NRA and other backers of the amendment said they wanted to block future laws that would abridge the right of law-abiding people to bear arms. But no such laws have been contemplated. Now Nebraska is stuck with potentially far-reaching language in the constitution, where it can't be repealed or amended without another statewide vote.

# Omaha World-Herald

## Editorial Page

Unsigned articles are the opinion of the World-Herald.

### *Another Nebraska Vote Needed*

# Rulings on Gun Laws Show NRA Was Wrong

A statewide vote may be needed to clear up the mess that passage of Nebraska's right-to-bear-arms amendment has caused. But a petition campaign, which some people have suggested, should not be necessary. The Legislature should use its authority to place the issue on the 1990 ballot.

The need for action became clearer when two Lincoln County district judges ruled that two important Nebraska gun laws were unconstitutional. Judge Donald Rowlands II struck down a law prohibiting the possession of a handgun by a felon. Judge John P. Murphy threw out a law prohibiting the possession of a firearm with its serial number obliterated.

The judges said those laws are unconstitutional because the right-to-bear-arms amendment, approved by the voters in November, prohibits state government from denying or infringing on the right to bear arms.

One way of correcting the situation would be to repeal the amendment, as Nebraska Attorney General Robert Spire recommended. Spire said Nebraskans should consider repeal "for public safety reasons" unless the Lincoln County decisions are overturned.

The Legislature shouldn't wait for the Supreme Court to act, however. No one knows how long that would take.

Another approach that has been discussed is to draft substitute language. The idea would be to balance the concerns of people who want a right-to-bear-arms provision and the concerns of people who believe that the elected officials need the flexibility to pass gun laws that are needed to protect the public. Omaha Police Chief Robert Wadman and State Sen. Brad Ashford have said they will push for a vote that would repeal the current language and give the voters a chance to approve language that would guarantee the right of sportsmen

to own firearms but leave room for reasonable gun regulations.

The Spire approach would be preferable, in our opinion. A number of Nebraskans, including the editors of this newspaper, have been concerned since the beginning of the right-to-bear-arms campaign about the risk of embedding the amendment's restrictive language in the constitution, where it is difficult to change or repeal.

The National Rifle Association and Nebraska backers of the amendment assured the public that such concerns were misplaced. The Lincoln County decisions demonstrate that the NRA was wrong. Another sign of trouble was a recent statement by Alan Stoler, a defense attorney who suggested that the voters inadvertently made the death penalty unconstitutional when they approved the right-to-bear-arms amendment.

Stoler said he believes the amendment opened the door for anyone to possess firearms — children, felons, drug addicts and people who are mentally ill and dangerous. If Nebraskans are smart, Stoler said, "they'll get an initiative petition drive going right now ... to change it."

Ashford had proposed a seven-day waiting period for purchasers of handguns. In a recent World-Herald Poll, 79 percent of the 621 registered voters who were interviewed expressed support for a seven-day waiting period. Ashford says that, in view of the Lincoln County decisions, he now believes that a seven-day waiting period would be found unconstitutional.

Wadman, Ashford and Stoler mentioned a petition campaign. We hope it doesn't come to that. The Legislature has the authority to place the question of repealing the amendment before the voters and should do so this session.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, NEBRASKA

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, )  
Plaintiff, )  
v. )  
CHARLES A. COMEAU, )  
Defendant.)

Case No. 96-300

ORDER

ANITA R. CILLEGORSTON  
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

2003 FEB - 2 PM 3:13

FILED

"Democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

Winston Churchill's words remind us of the occasional difficulties that arise in the continual evolution of the democratic process. That is so because in a democracy the government must bend to the will of the governed. This, by its very nature creates change and dynamism. The predictability of life where government controls those who are governed is not present in a democracy. This lack of predictability in democracy creates occasions where the exercise of the will of the people has unforeseen consequences and, perhaps, unfortunate results. But this does not mean we turn our back on the democratic process and ignore the results of democratic action.

The cornerstone of our nation and our state is the will of the people. Abraham Lincoln said:

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.

So too, the Constitution of the State of Nebraska belongs to the people. It is not the legislature's constitution, the Governor's constitution, or the courts' constitution. It is the people's constitution and they may amend it as they see fit.

The argument has been advanced that the proponents of the amendment to Article I, Section 1, and the voters did not mean for it to be read too literally. The argument has been advanced that the amendment is poorly worded and overbroad. The argument has been advanced that the amendment was pushed to a vote by outside interests who had no concern for its full ramification on the state. All of these arguments may be fit and proper topics for debate, discussion, or editorials. They are not, however, fit topics for consideration by the courts of this state.

No court is free to presume that it can interpret the "will of the people." No court is free to substitute its judgment for that of the citizenry. No court can arrogate to itself the sole power to determine that the voters did not understand the full import of their vote. If the language of the amendment is clear, the duty of the courts to give free reign to that language is equally clear. To ignore the plain language of the amendment and to put restrictions upon the amendment by way of interpretation is to invite the replacement of the exercise of the people's will with judicial fiat. That way lies tyranny.

This position finds expression in cases previously decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In Omaha National Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209 (1986), the court stated

"With regard to an initiative enactment, however, a different rule must apply. There is no meaningful way to determine the intent which motivates voters to sign a petition for the submission of an enactment, nor is there any real way to determine the intent of those voters who vote for the adoption of an enactment. The motivations and mental processes of the voter in Verdigré or the elector in Elkhorn cannot be determined - except from the words of the enactment itself. Beyond that, all that can be known by this court is that the voters have been subjected to tornadolike winds in voting on this highly

political question. We hold that the intent of the voters adopting an initiative amendment to the Nebraska Constitution must be determined from the words of the initiative amendment itself.

What we do know, and may use in our interpretations of a part of our Constitution, are the historical or operative facts in connection with the adoption of a constitutional amendment. As stated in State ex rel. State Railway Commission v. Ramsey, 151 Neb. 333, 341, 37 N.W. 2d 502, 507 (1949), 'It is permissible to consider the facts of history in determining the meaning of language of the Constitution.'

In considering Omaha National's contentions in this regard, we must consider the words of the initiative petition, as the initiative petition signers submitted those words to the voters for enactment, and the words actually voted on and adopted by the voters. Any other approach would only be a selective choice, made by a reviewing court, of diametrically opposed allegations made by those favoring or opposing the enactment. The intent with which a statute is adopted by a small number of legislators, or even the intent with which a larger group in a constitutional convention adopt a Constitution, or a part thereof, may be divined from examination of the proceedings of such groups, but it is impossible to divine the intent of myriad voters who adopt a constitutional amendment."

More recently, in Banner County v. State Board of Equalization, 226 Neb. 236 (1987), the Nebraska Supreme Court once again stated:

"In determining the meaning of a Constitutional provision, we must look to the plain and clear language contained therein."

This Court, then, must look to the clear and plain language of the amendment in order to determine whether Section 28-1207 R.R.S. 1943, can withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The language that appeared on the ballot for Initiative Measure #403 is as follows:

"Shall Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of Nebraska, be amended to establish a right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, and to provide that such

right shall not be Infringed by the State or any subdivision of the State?"

The explanatory language contained on the ballot stated:

"A vote 'FOR' will amend the Constitution of Nebraska to establish a right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, and to provide that such rights shall not be infringed by the State or any subdivision of the State.

"A vote 'AGAINST' will not cause the Constitution of Nebraska to be amended in such a manner."

Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska now states as follows:

"All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the State or any subdivision thereof."

It is obvious, that the people have decided that the possession of firearms is an inherent and inalienable right that may only be infringed upon by the State if the firearm is possessed for something other than a "lawful purpose".


Section 28-1207 R.R.S. (1943), makes the possession of a firearm that has been defaced a criminal offense. It is the possession, not the use of the weapon that is prohibited. It can not be said that the statute prohibits an unlawful purpose in regard to the possession of the firearm, and, therefore, logic leads to a determination that this statute is prohibited by the clear language of Article I, Section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution.

The legislature may prohibit unlawful uses of firearms, but may not prohibit their possession, unless that possession is for an unlawful

purpose. It may be argued that any statute that prohibits the possession of a weapon, unaccompanied by any affirmative act on the part of the possessor which is unlawful, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Court need not reach such a conclusion but only needs to determine the constitutionality of Section 28-1207 R.R.S. 1943. Since the defendant in this case is not charged with actually defacing a firearm, his mere passive possession of a firearm may not be prohibited.

Therefore, the Court finds that Section 28-1207, R.R.S. (1943) is unconstitutional and may not be the basis of an information filed against the Defendant in this case. Therefore, the Demurrer, which the Court treats as a Motion to Dismiss, is sustained; the information dismissed at the State's costs; and the Defendant released from his recognizance.

SO ORDERED.



John P. Murphy  
District Judge

AMITA R. CHILDERSTON  
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

1989 FEB - 6 AM 11: 36

FILED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, NEBRASKA

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	CASE NO. 97-26
	)	
v.	)	ORDER
	)	
LARRY L. RUSH,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

NOW ON THIS 6th day of February, 1989, the above-captioned matter comes on for Disposition on the Demurrer to Count I of the Amended Information. The Demurrer filed by the Defendant asks this Court to declare that portion of Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 28-1206 (1) restricting possession of a firearm unconstitutional in light of the recent amendment to Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska by Initiative Petition Measure #403.

This Court in deciding the issue advanced by the Defendant and opposed by the State of Nebraska is required to look to the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court for precedent. In so doing, the recent decision of Omaha National Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209 (1986), is directly on point. In the Spire decision the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the validity of Initiative 300 prohibiting corporate ownership of farm and ranch property and stated:

"The judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.

Even more so, in a case involving the people's amendment to their Constitution, we make no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability in enacting such amendments.

\*\*\*

The ultimate source of power in any democratic form of government is the people. Our Nebraska Constitution is a document belonging to the people. Subject only to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, the people may put in their document what they will. Even to the shock and dismay of constitutional theoreticians, the people may add provisions dealing with 'non-fundamental' rights, as well as provisions bearing the most tenuous of relationships to the notion of what constitutes the basic framework of government. The people may add provisions which legal scholars might decry as legislative or statutory in nature. But the people may do it nonetheless."

It is apparent from a reading of the Spire decision that this Court's opinion as to the desirability of Initiative Measure #403 is entirely irrelevant. One may argue that the voters of the State of Nebraska were duped by a special interest group from outside the state to pass an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution which was unnecessary or imprecisely drafted. Similarly, a logical person might argue that Initiative Measure #403 should have permitted the State of Nebraska to exercise reasonable restrictions to prevent the possession of: semiautomatic or automatic assault rifles originally developed for combat; plastic handguns designed to evade detection at airport security stations; other types of firearms which are unreasonably dangerous and without social utility in a civilized society; or firearms by persons previously convicted of a felony.

Whatever the relative merits or demerits of those positions might be, they must be considered matters of public policy more properly left to debate and decision by the people of the State of Nebraska and their elected representatives in the Nebraska Unicameral. If the voters of this State are dissatisfied with their Constitution, they may modify the language at any time in their sole and absolute discretion.

The authority of the people of Nebraska to amend the Constitution of the State of Nebraska is set forth in Article III, Section 2, which provides in part:

"The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the Legislature. This power may be invoked by petition wherein the proposed measures shall be set forth at length."

The language that appeared on the general election ballot on November 8, 1988, for Initiative Measure #403 was as follows:

"Shall Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of Nebraska, be amended to establish a right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, and to provide that such right shall not be infringed by the State or any subdivision of the State?"

The explanatory language contained on the ballots stated:

"A vote 'FOR' will amend the Constitution of Nebraska to establish a right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, and to provide that such rights shall not be infringed by the State or any subdivision of the State.

"A vote 'AGAINST' will not cause the Constitution of Nebraska to be amended in such manner."

As a result of the passage of this measure, Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska now states as follows:

"All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof."

In this case, the defendant is not charged with using a firearm for any unlawful purpose. Rather, the defendant is charged with a "status" offense of possession of a firearm with a barrel less than 18

Inches in length.

If the Nebraska Legislature passed a law after the adoption of Initiative Measure #403 prohibiting the possession of handguns, but not shotguns and rifles, would the law be unconstitutional? The answer is obviously yes. Is there any language in #403 which prevents the possession of handguns by prior felons? The answer is an unfortunate no.

Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 28-1206 (1), is clearly unconstitutional in that it makes possession of a firearm with a barrel less than 18 inches in length by a prior felon a crime rather than prohibiting the unlawful use of that weapon. To illustrate the distinction one need only look to the preceding statutory section, Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 28-1205, which provides that any person who uses a firearm to commit any felony commits a Class III Felony, which is treated as a separate and distinct offense requiring the imposition of a consecutive sentence by the sentencing court.

Without a doubt Section 28-1205, remains as a significant deterrent to criminal activity which retains its validity despite the Court's ruling on today's date.

Frequently in the past, judges have been criticized by certain politicians and commentators for liberally interpreting the Constitution to read into it language or a result which could not be found within the "four corners" of the Constitution. This Court neither adopts a conservative nor liberal interpretation in this case, but rather reads the clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska to determine the result. As further stated by the Nebraska

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Supreme Court in the Spire decision:


"In construing provision of a constitution, courts may examine debates and proceedings of a constitutional convention to determine the framers' intended meaning of words, phrases, or clauses of a constitution. (Citations omitted).

With regard to an initiative enactment, however, a different rule must apply. There is no meaningful way to determine the intent which motivates voters to sign a petition for the submission of an enactment, nor is there any real way to determine the intent of those voters who vote for the adoption of an enactment. The motivations and mental processes of the voter in Verdare or the elector in Elkhorn cannot be determined-except from the words of the enactment itself. Beyond that, all that can be known by this court is that the voters have been subjected to tornadolike winds in voting on this highly political question. We hold that the intent of the voters adopting an initiative amendment to the Nebraska Constitution must be determined from the words of the initiative amendment itself."

For the reasons stated above, this Court sustains the Demurrer filed by the Defendant to Count I of the Amended Information, treats it as a Motion to Dismiss, and dismisses Count I. I hold that Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 28-1206 (1) so far as it pertains to possession of a firearm with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length by a prior felon is unconstitutional in that it violates Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

  
DONALD E. ROWLANDS II  
District Judge

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES ON  
THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

Forty-one (41) states have constitutional guarantees on the right to keep and bear arms.

Alabama: That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state. Article I, Section 26.

Alaska: A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article I, Section 19.

Arizona: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. Article 2, Section 26.

Arkansas: The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for their common defense. Article II, Section 5.

Colorado: The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons. Article II, Section 13.

Connecticut: Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state. Article I, Section 15.

Florida: The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law. Article I, Section 8.

Georgia: The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne. Article I, Section I, para. VIII.

Hawaii: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article I, Section 15.

Idaho: The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person, nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent passage of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted

felon, nor prevent the passage of legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition. Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a felony. Article I, Section 11.

Illinois: Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article I, Section 22.

Indiana: The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State. Article I, Section 32.

Kansas: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. Kansas Bill of Rights, Section 4.

Kentucky: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: \*\*\* 7. The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state, subject to the power of the general assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons. Kentucky Bill of Rights, Section I, para. 7.

Louisiana: The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person. Article I, Section 11.

Maine: Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense; and this right shall never be questioned. Article I, Section 16.

Massachusetts: The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense. And as, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it. Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Part I, Article XVII.

Michigan: Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state. Article I, Section 6.

Mississippi: The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power where thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons. Article 3, Section 12.

Missouri: That the right of every citizen to keep and bear

arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. Article I, Section 23.

Montana: The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. Article II, Section 12.

Nevada: Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes. Art. 1, Section II, para. 1.

New Hampshire: All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property, and the state. Part First, Art. 2-a.

New Mexico: No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. No municipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of the right to keep and bear arms. Article II, Section 6.

North Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice. Article I, Section 30.

North Dakota: All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are ... to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed. Article I, Section 1.

Ohio: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. Article I, Section 4.

Oklahoma: The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the

Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons. Article 2, Section 26.

Oregon: The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power. Article I, Section 27.

Pennsylvania: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned. Article I, Section 21.

Rhode Island: The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article I, Section 22.

South Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law. Article I, Section 20.

South Dakota: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied. Article VI, Section 24.

Tennessee: That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime. Article I, Section 26.

Texas: Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime. Article I, Section 23.

Utah: The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the State, as well as for the other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. Article I, Section 6.

Vermont: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State -- and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. Chapter I, Article 16.

Virginia: That a well regulated militia, composed of the

body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Article I, Section 13.

Washington: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. Article I, Section 24.

West Virginia: A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home, and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use. Article III, Section 22.

Wyoming: The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied. Article I, Section 24.

#### STATES WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

Nine (9) states do not have a constitutional provision on arms: California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin.

§ 10. Right of assembly. — The people shall have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature for the redress of grievances.

Comp. provisions: Cal. Art. 1, § 3.  
Mont. Art. 2, § 26.  
Ore. Art. 1, § 26.  
Wyo. Art. 1, § 21.

of this section. *Lowiston v. Frary*, 91 Idaho 322, 420 P.2d 805 (1966).

Newspaper Report of Assembly.

Newspapers had a conditional privilege to publish with accuracy the proceedings of a public gathering called for the purpose of inducing a district judge to call a grand jury. *Borg v. Boas*, 231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1956).

Collateral References. Discussion of this section in constitutional convention. *Constitutional Convention Proceedings*, Vol. I, p. 281; Vol. II, p. 1695.

16A Am. Jur. 2d, *Constitutional Law*, §§ 528-532.

16 C.J.S. *Constitutional Law*, § 214.

Constitutional questions involved in conviction based on failure or refusal to obey police officer's order to move on, on street. 65 A.L.R.2d 1152.

Participation of student in demonstration on or near campus as warranting imposition of criminal liability for breach of peace, disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, or similar offense. 32 A.L.R.3d 551.

Peaceful picketing of private residence. 42 A.L.R.3d 1353.

ANALYSIS

Deprivation of right.  
Newspaper report of assembly.

Deprivation of Right.

Labor union was not deprived of right of assembly, contrary to this section, where it was enjoined from picketing and displaying sign which announced that plaintiff's store was unfair to labor union where the employees of the store did not belong to the union, did not participate in picket line, and were not involved in any labor dispute with the plaintiff. *J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n*, 78 Idaho 85, 298 P.2d 375 (1956), rev'd, 352 U.S. 987, 77 S. Ct. 386, 1 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1957).

The assembly of defendants for the purpose of threatening other persons with assault and battery after an automobile chase of such persons by defendants across a state line and through the city streets was not an assembly in a peaceable manner within the protection

*the individual*

§ 11. Right to keep and bear arms. — The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the passage of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition. Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a felony crime.

Compiler's notes. As originally adopted, this section read as follows:

"§ 11. Right to bear arms. — The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense; but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law." This section was amended as proposed by S.J.R. No. 116 (S.L. 1978, p. 1031) and ratified at the general election on November 7, 1978, to read as it now appears.

Cross ref. Fish and game law, restrictions on carrying uncased shotguns and rifles, § 36-401.

Comp. provisions: Mont. Art. 2, § 12.

Ore. Art. 1, § 27.

Utah. Art. 1, § 6.

Wyo. Art. 1, § 24.

Cited In: *Fall Creek Sheep Co. v. Walton*, 24 Idaho 760, 136 P. 438, 1915C Ann. Cas., 1252 (1913).

ANALYSIS

Legislative regulation.

Municipal regulations.



NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

1600 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

RECEIVED

FEB 22 1989

JAN FAIKS  
STATE OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE  
GENERAL COUNSEL

February 17, 1989

The Honorable Jan Faiks  
Alaska State Senator  
P.O. Box V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

RE: Letter of January 29, 1989, from Laurie H. Otto, Assistant  
Attorney General

Dear Senator Faiks:

I have reviewed the above referenced letter. I shall cite but a few examples to demonstrate that its concerns are mistaken.

The letter argues that the Alaska Supreme Court takes a unique view of the state constitution, especially with the right to privacy. The issue of arms and privacy has already been addressed. In State v. Weaver, 736 P.2d 781 (Alaska App. 1987), the court upheld a statute which makes it a felony to possess a gravity knife in one's home despite an argument that such a statute is violative of the right to privacy under Article I, §22 of Alaska's Constitution. The decision in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), was distinguished by the court in Weaver.

A West Virginia case is cited as proof that present Alaska law would be vulnerable if the proposed arms guarantee were adopted. West Virginia Code §61-7-1 makes it unlawful to carry openly or concealed a pistol, club, or knife unless a person has a license. West Virginia Code §61-7-2 establishes the plutocratic criteria for obtaining a license. A \$5,000 bond has to be posted and a \$50 fee must be paid. Moreover, the issuance of a license is discretionary because the statute uses the term "may". The court in State of West Virginia ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, \_\_\_ S.E.2d \_\_\_ (West Virginia Sup. Ct. No. CC972, July 1, 1988), held that the statute is overbroad and violative of the right to bear arms guarantee. On page 16 of the slip opinion, the court cited numerous cases as examples of permissible regulation. These cases include laws forbidding convicted felons from having arms, carrying arms concealed, and carrying arms into a place where alcohol is sold. It was the opinion of the court that regulation is permissible so long as it does not broadly stifle the exercise of this right. The plutocratic approach to gun control has been voided in the past. See State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921). In Kerner the court struck down a law which required the posting

J. Falks  
February 17, 1989  
Page Two

of a large bond before a person could obtain a gun carrying license. Kerner noted that it is common knowledge that such laws were enacted to disarm the common man.

The claim that West Virginia expanded its right to keep and bear arms is erroneous. Prior to the 1986 amendment, West Virginia had no specific guarantee to bear arms. It must also be remembered that Mr. McNeely was the chief opponent of the arms guarantee in West Virginia.

A claim is made that the Rhode Island guarantee to bear arms, which closely resembles the proposed guarantee in Alaska, has never been construed. State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 121, 308 A.2d 463 (1973), upheld a statute prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license except in one's home, place of business or upon land possessed by him. That case is cited in Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okl. Univ. L. Rev. 177, 225 n.220 (1982).

The letter cites People v. Ford, 568 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1977), for the proposition that a statute forbidding felons to have guns has been declared unconstitutional. Ford raised the affirmative defense of self-protection, and his wife also testified "that the three pistols and one rifle in question were all kept by her and her husband in their bedroom for her protection." Ford simply recognizes that self-defense may be raised as an affirmative defense to such a charge. This is well-settled law. See United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982). Federal law forbids convicted felons to possess any firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C.A. §922(g) (1988 Pocket Part). Nevertheless, Panter, like all other courts, has recognized self-defense as a narrow affirmative defense to such a charge. Other courts define such an affirmative defense as the defense of necessity. The exact scope of this defense has not been uniformly decided.

Colorado's felon with a gun statute has been found not to violate the right to bear arms under the state constitution. People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975); People v. Taylor, 544 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1975); People v. Bergstrom, 544 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1975) (there the sentence was life under a habitual offender statute). The statute has also survived equal protection challenges under the state and federal constitutions. People v. Trujillo, 497 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1972). It also survived an equal protection and second amendment challenge. People v. Marques, 498 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1972). Possessing a firearm while under the influence of alcohol or drugs may also be constitutionally prohibited. People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1979).

J. Faiks  
February 17, 1989  
Page Three

The Attorney General's letter claims that Alabama only forbids violent felons from having guns. On the surface, the Alabama statute forbids persons convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a gun. However, a review of the statutory definition reveals that the term "crime of violence" also includes "larceny". The courts have sustained the conviction of a person possessing a gun subsequent to a larceny conviction.

Article I, §32 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees a right to bear arms. It makes no mention of regulation. In Schubert v. DeBard, 73 Ind. Dec. 510, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Ct. App. 1980), the court held that self-protection is constitutionally a proper reason for obtaining a license. A license must be issued to any suitable person. However, because of Schubert's odd behavior, the court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court because "there was conflicting evidence on Schubert's suitability to be licensed and that those issues were not attempted to be resolved in the original determination." 398 N.E.2d at 1341. Therefore, while the right to bear arms guarantee mandates the issuance of a license, it does not prevent the denial of a license to a person who is found to be unsuitable by virtue of criminal convictions or mental problems.

A claim is made that the Anchorage ordinance would be struck down because of the proposed amendment. One of my law review articles is cited as authority for this claim. Reliance on that article to strike down a concealed carrying ordinance is misplaced because the passage reads as follows: "The specific boundaries of this right indicate that the open peaceful carrying in one's business place, vehicle, or on a public street in the ordinary course of one's travels cannot be prohibited. The concealed carrying of arms in the home should be protected, especially since the home is specifically mentioned in the guarantees. Obviously the ends to be served by the guarantee would not be defeated or called into question by a prohibition against carrying arms while drunk, or to a polling place, court, church, or public assembly, or in a manner calculated to inspire terror." Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okl. City Univ. L. Rev. 177, 220-21 (1982) (emphasis added).

One of my law review articles is again cited for the proposition that felons charged with drug dealing and bootlegging, which are not "common law felonies", could legally carry weapons. Again, this is an erroneous reading. The quote in the law review article clearly covers drug offenses because they require some state of mind above strict liability and are inherently inimical to life. They are not offenses of strict

J. Faikes  
February 17, 1989  
Page Four

liability because the standard jury instruction for possessing drugs requires that the possession be a knowing possession. An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and purposely and not because of mistake, inadvertence, or accident. It is well settled law that the due process clause places limits on which offenses may be classified as felonies. See United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985).


A claim is made that Alaska's hunting laws could be violated. Courts from sister states have held to the contrary. State v. Barnhardt, 67 Or. App. 771, 680 P.2d 7 (1984); State v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86 (1940) (state has right to prohibit absolutely killing of game animals, but a game animal may be killed in self-defense).

In summation, it is worth remembering the following: "We stress again, as we have stressed before, that this decision does not mean individuals have an unfettered right to possess or use constitutionally protected arms in any way they please. The legislature may, if it chooses to do so, regulate possession and use." State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 614 (Or. 1984).

I trust that this response will clear up some of the claims in the letter from the Attorney General's Office. Hopefully, my letter will help enable the Senate to make its decision after a complete airing of all views on this issue. However, I am flattered that the Attorney General feels I should be promoted to General Counsel of the National Rifle Association.

With all kind wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,



Robert Dowlut  
Deputy General Counsel

RD:sep

STEVE COWPER, GOVERNOR

**DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY**

**COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT**

P.O. BOX N  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-1200  
PHONE: (907) 465-4356

OFFICE ADDRESS: 450 WHITTIER STREET

January 31, 1989

The Honorable Jan Faiks, Chair  
Senate Judiciary Committee  
P. O. Box V  
Juneau, AK 99811

Re: Senate Joint  
Resolution 4


Dear Senator Faiks:

I am writing on behalf of the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault. The Council opposes Senate Joint Resolution 4. Of particular concern is the lack of any language in S.J.R. 4 which explicitly preserves the state's right to regulate firearms. We strongly believe the state must retain the right to regulate firearms. Recent incidents in Alaska and in other states demonstrate that unlimited access to firearms by everyone, including the mentally unstable and convicted felons, can lead to tragedies like the death last April of the woman in an insurance office in Anchorage, and the more recent shootings of children on a school playground in Stockton, California.

The mission of the Council is to provide for planning and coordination of services to victims of domestic violence. We believe this proposed resolution directly affects victims of domestic violence. In 1987, 51 murders occurred in Alaska. 36% of the victims in these murders were either family members or in a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. Furthermore, firearms were used in 61% of the murders.

If this proposed amendment is approved, we urge that it be amended to add a phrase preserving the state's ability to reasonably regulate the possession and use of firearms.

Sincerely,



Barbara Miklos  
Executive Director



**ALASKA CHAPTER  
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF  
SOCIAL WORKERS**

8923 Tanis Drive  
Juneau, Alaska 99801  
(907) 789-7099

Executive Director  
William Diebels, ACSW

January 31, 1989

The Honorable Jan Faiks, Chair  
Senate Judiciary Committee  
P. O. Box V  
Juneau, AK 99811

Re: S.J.R. 4

Dear Senator Faiks:

The Alaska Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers is opposed to Senate Joint Resolution 4. We believe that to delete the provisions in the existing constitution that give the state the right to regulate the use and possession of firearms would create serious problems in a state that already has such high rates of violent deaths and accidents which are caused by firearms.

The National Association of Social Workers represents more than 300 professional social workers throughout the state. As a group working daily with a wide range of social problems, we urge you to consider the potential negative effects of this proposed Constitutional amendment.

Our organization is not opposed to the responsible use of firearms for hunting or sport. However, we believe that it is in the best interests of all the citizens of Alaska that the state retain the power to regulate the purchase and possession of weapons. If this amendment were to pass, the state could not prohibit convicted felons and mentally deranged individuals from purchasing and possessing weapons.

We do not believe there is a need to change the existing provision in the Constitution. However, if S. J. R. 4 is adopted, we strongly urge that you add a clause to the amendment that will allow the state to continue to regulate the use of firearms, such as "except that this right may be regulated by state law or municipal ordinance".

Sincerely,

Alaska Chapter  
National Association of Social Workers

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Homer

**STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE—1989**  
Colleen Seyd  
Anchorage

BILL NO: SJR 4

DATE: January 30, 1989

TITLE: "Proposing an amendment...  
relating to the right to  
keep and bear arms."

CONTACT: Gayle A. Horetski  
Deputy Commissioner  
465-4322

DEPARTMENT OF  
PUBLIC SAFETY

If passed by the legislature, SJR 4 would place a proposed constitutional amendment before the voters at the next general election. The resolution contains an amendment to article I, section 19 of the state constitution, relating to a citizen's right to keep and bear arms.

The stated purpose of the proposed amendment is twofold:

- 1) to establish that the right to keep and bear arms under the state constitution is an individual right, rather than a collective one; and
- 2) to preclude local regulation of the possession or use of firearms. (At present, local regulations regarding firearms may differ from state law.)

I am concerned that the present language of the amendment, if adopted by the voters at the next election, might allow later constitutional challenge to some existing state statutes. Present law, for example, prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a concealable firearm, prohibits possession of certain weapons such as bombs, hand grenades, silencers, and sawed-off shotguns, prohibits possession of a firearm while intoxicated, the discharge of a firearm from, on, or across a highway, the carrying of a concealed weapon, possession of a loaded firearm on licensed premises, or possession of a firearm by a minor without parental consent. (See AS 11.61.200-11.61.220.)

These statutes promote public safety by restricting the possession of especially dangerous weapons or weapons carried in an especially dangerous manner or place. If any of these laws were to be struck down by the courts as violative of the amended language of article I, section 19 of the constitution, the ability of the state to regulate the possession of deadly weapons could be seriously impaired. This, in turn, could present a serious threat to the safety of innocent persons.

The Department of Public Safety sees no compelling need to change the existing language in Alaska's Constitution. The Department of Public Safety therefore opposes SJR 4.



Arthur English  
Commissioner

*West Virginia  
Opinion*

COPY

NO. CC972

FILED

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA  
EX REL. CITY OF PRINCETON

JUL 1 1988

v.

*Alvin K. Ramsey*  
CLERK OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HAROLD L. BUCKNER, MAGISTRATE  
OF MERCER COUNTY

Mercer County

Certified questions answered.

McHugh, Chief Justice

1. "Where a provision of a constitution is clear in its terms and of plain interpretation to any ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied and not construed." Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965).

2. W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], the statutory proscription against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon, is overbroad and violative of article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, known as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment." It infringes upon the right of a person to bear arms for defensive purposes, specifically, defense of self, family, home and state, insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon for any purpose without a license or other statutory authorization.

3. "The police power is the power of the state, inherent in every sovereignty, to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the welfare of its citizens. The police power is difficult to define precisely, because it is extensive, elastic and constantly evolving to meet new and increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society and to promote the general welfare. It embraces the power of the state to preserve and to promote the general welfare and it is concerned with whatever affects the peace, security, safety, morals, health and general welfare of the community. It cannot be circumscribed within narrow limits nor can it be confined to precedents resting alone on conditions of the past. As society becomes increasingly complex and as advancements are made, the police power must of necessity evolve, develop and expand, in the public interest, to meet such conditions." Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).

4. The West Virginia legislature may, through the valid exercise of its police power, reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in order to promote the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of this State, provided that the restrictions or regulations imposed do not frustrate the constitutional freedoms guaranteed by article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, known as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment."

McHugh, Chief Justice:

This action is before this Court upon two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Mercer County. This action concerns the constitutionality of W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], relating to the carrying of certain types of dangerous or deadly weapons without a license, in light of the adoption of article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, commonly referred to as "The Right to Keep And Bear Arms Amendment," and whether the legislature may reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in West Virginia. This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel.<sup>1</sup>

I

The facts in this case are uncontroverted. On March 10, 1987, a municipal police officer in the City of Princeton, in Mercer County, stopped a vehicle and arrested the driver for driving under the influence of alcohol. After searching the driver, the policeman discovered a .22 caliber automatic pistol inside the driver's jacket pocket. The driver was then asked to produce a license allowing him to carry such a weapon, and he subsequently advised the police officer that he did not have such a license.

The police officer presented these facts to a duly elected magistrate of Mercer County, and sought a warrant for the driver's arrest for the DUI offense. The respondent

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<sup>1</sup>This Court also has before it the brief of amicus curiae filed by the National Rifle Association of America.

advised the officer that he would not issue a warrant for carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon against the driver, based upon the magistrate's conclusion that W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] violated article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution.

The prosecuting attorney then filed a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Mercer County requesting the court to compel the magistrate to issue a warrant against the driver for carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license in violation of W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975].

After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court concluded that when comparing W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] and W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22, the statute was in conflict with the subsequently adopted constitutional provision. The court further concluded that article III, section 22 of the State Constitution voided that part of W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] dealing with the carrying of firearms without a license. The court concluded that the legislature may, in some fashion, regulate the right to keep and bear arms so as not to conflict with W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22.

The court then certified the matter to this Court.

The following questions were certified:

1. Is W. Va. Code Chapter 61, Article 7, Section 1 constitutional in light of the subsequent adoption of Article 3, Section 22 of the Constitution of West Virginia?

2. May the Legislature of the State of West Virginia by proper legislation regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in the State of West Virginia?

II

This case involves the interpretation of article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution and its effect on the constitutionality of the state's weapons statute, W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], which prohibits the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license.<sup>2</sup> Because both of the questions certified to this Court are so closely associated, we choose to discuss them together.

Article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution was approved by the voters of this State on November 4, 1986, and succinctly states: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use."

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<sup>2</sup>W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] provides in pertinent part:

If any person, without a state license therefor or except as provided elsewhere in this article and other provisions of this Code, carry about his person any revolver or pistol, dirk, bowie knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than six nor more than twelve months for the first offense; but upon the conviction of the same person for the second offense in this State, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years, and, in either case, shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars[.]

The State of West Virginia has had a long history of statutory provisions regulating the use of weapons. See generally McNeely, The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where-- West Virginia Firearms Law v. The Right-to-Bear-Arms Amendment, 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 1125, 1127-41 (1987).<sup>3</sup> An 1882 statute is actually the first statutory provision which is similar to the statute now before us, W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 (1975). 1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>A comprehensive discussion of the statutory, common law and general historic backdrop surrounding this amendment, as well as its possible impact on existing weapons statutes is detailed in this law review article.

<sup>4</sup>The 1882 statute, found in chapter 135, section 7 of the acts of the West Virginia Legislature provided as follows:

If a person carry about his person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, razor, slung shot, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars, and may, at the discretion of the court, be confined in jail not less than one, nor more than twelve months; and if any person shall sell or furnish any such weapon as is hereinbefore mentioned to a person whom he knows, or has reason, from his appearance or otherwise, to believe to be under the age of twenty-one years, he shall be punished as hereinbefore provided; but nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about his dwelling house or premises any such revolver or other pistol, or from carrying the same from the place of purchase to his dwelling house, or from his dwelling house to any place where repairing is done, to have it repaired, and back again. And if upon the trial of an indictment for carrying any such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, the

(Footnote Continued)

The 1882 statutory provision was interpreted by this Court in State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891). The Court in Workman considered several issues regarding the right to bear arms, including the constitutional right to self-defense, the constitutionality, under the due process clause, of the weapons statute in effect in West Virginia at that time and the definition of the term "arms" in the context of the second amendment to the United States Constitution.<sup>5</sup>

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(Footnote Continued)

defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is a quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he lives, and at the time he was found with such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, as charged in the indictment, he had good cause to believe and did believe that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self defense and for no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty. But nothing in this section contained shall be so construed as to prevent any officer charged with the execution of the laws of the state from carrying a revolver or other pistol, dirk or bowie knife.

(emphasis added) We need not address the implications of the impermissible burden shifting to the defendant regarding the possession of arms for self-defense purposes. See syl. pt. 4, State v. Kirtley, 162 W. Va. 249, 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978) (once there is sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt that the killing resulted from the defendant acting in self-defense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense); see also Bowman v. Leverette, 169 W. Va. 589, 595, 289 S.E.2d 435, 439 (1982).

<sup>5</sup>The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

Despite language embodied in § 7 of the 1882 weapons statute which on its face appeared to grant the right of self-defense only to persons of "good character," see note 4, *supra*, the Court in *Workman* found that there was a constitutional right to self-defense guaranteed to all persons under both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article III, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution. 35 W. Va. at 370-71, 14 S.E. at 10-11.

After recognizing a constitutional right to self-defense, the Court addressed the general intent of the second amendment to the United States Constitution and determined that it involved the protection of keeping and bearing arms as a popular or collective right.<sup>6</sup> 35 W. Va. at 372-73. 14 S.E. at 11. The Court concluded that "to regulate a conceded [constitutional] right is not necessarily to infringe the same." *Id.* at 372, 14 S.E. at 11. In so holding, the Court compared a state's regulation of the right to keep and bear arms to the regulation of the freedoms guaranteed under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, the Court implied that a

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<sup>6</sup>We note that the Court in *Workman* interpreted the second amendment as though it was a restriction upon state as well as federal legislation. *Id.* at 372, 14 S.E. at 11. Of course, since our Court's holding in *Workman*, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the second amendment operates as a restraint solely upon the power of the national government and does not restrict the power of the states to regulate firearms. *Miller v. Texas*, 153 U.S. 535, 538, 14 S. Ct. 874, 875, 38 L. Ed. 812, 813 (.894). "*Workman* does not stand for the proposition that the second amendment extends to the states, but is rather a decision assuming, but not holding, that the second amendment did apply to the states." McNeely, *supra* at 1130 n. 29.

constitutional guarantee or right to keep and bear arms would subject laws regulating protected arms to the same standard of scrutiny given laws regulating first amendment freedoms. McNeely, supra at 1130.

Significantly, the Court in Workman defined the term "arms" in a second amendment context as follows:

[I]n regard to the kind of arms referred to in the [second] amendment, it must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and muskets--arms to be used in defending the State and civil liberty--and not to pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and other weapons as are usually employed in brawls, street fights, duels and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the community and the injury of the State.

35 W. Va. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11. Clearly, with this definition, the Court refused to include pistols as a constitutionally protected weapon pursuant to its second amendment analysis.

However, it is important to note that the definition of "arms" presented in Workman focuses on the "well regulated militia" language of the second amendment. No parallel language appears in our state constitutional amendment. Because the second amendment does not operate as a restraint upon the power of states to regulate firearms, supra note 6, the definition of "arms" set forth in Workman is not particularly helpful in the case now before us. Moreover, the broad language embodied in our current Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment makes any further reexamination of the Workman definition unnecessary.

In several cases where courts have considered the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances in light of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms for defensive purposes, proscriptive laws infringing on that constitutionally protected right have been voided. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 23, 501 P.2d 744, 745-46 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting possession of dangerous or deadly weapon unconstitutionally overbroad where it prohibited activities which under police power could not be reasonably classified as unlawful); In Re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 599, 70 P. 609, 609 (1902) (statute prohibiting carrying of weapons in any manner in cities, towns or villages was unconstitutional); People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 642, 189 N.W. 927, 929 (1922) (statute prohibiting possession of pistol by unnaturalized foreign born resident unconstitutional because of broad term "person" in the constitutional provision); State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 403-04, 692 P.2d 610, 614 (1984) (constitutional right to bear arms violated by statute prohibiting mere possession and mere carrying of a switchblade knife); State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 261-62, 630 P.2d 824, 827 (1981) (statute prohibiting possession of billy club in public unconstitutional infringement of right to bear arms); State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 372, 614 P.2d 94, 100 (1980) (statute prohibiting possession of billy club in home unconstitutional infringement of right to bear arms); State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 299, 55 A. 610, 611 (1903) (ordinance prohibiting carrying dangerous concealed weapon without written permission of mayor or police chief unconstitutional).

The language embodied in art. III, § 22 of our State Constitution is sweeping, and we look to the well established rules of constitutional construction in order to ascertain its meaning.

At the outset we note that "[t]he fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the framers of [the constitutional amendment] and of the people who ratified and adopted it." State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W. Va. 100, 108, 207 S.E.2d 421, 427 (1973); see also syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Smith v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 381, 141 S.E.2d 142 (1965); syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Morgan v. O'Brien, 134 W. Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 722 (1948). Unfortunately, no real statement of legislative intent is before us.

Questions of constitutional construction are governed by the same general rules as those applied in statutory construction. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W. Va. 100, 108, 207 S.E.2d 421, 427 (1973). It is a well established principle of constitutional construction that "[w]here a provision of a constitution is clear in its terms and of plain interpretation to any ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied and not construed." Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965). See also Rav v. McCoy, \_\_\_ W. Va. \_\_\_, \_\_\_, 321 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984).

Moreover, a cardinal rule of statutory construction, which of course applies to the construction of constitutional provisions as well, is that a statute, or in this case a constitutional amendment, must be considered in its entirety, with effect given, if possible, to every word

or phrase within the provision. Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetha Corp., 146 W. Va. 543, 553-54, 122 S.E.2d 436, 443 (1961). A constitutional amendment will supersede any inconsistent portions of antecedent constitutional or statutory provisions, as "'the latest expression of the will of the people.'" State ex rel. Kanawha County Building Commission v. Paterno, 160 W. Va. 195, 203, 233 S.E.2d 332, 337 (1977). (citation omitted)

Because the constitutional provision in the case before us is clear and unambiguous, this Court must apply the amendment rather than construe it. See discussion supra. Thus, the meaning of a phrase or terms would generally be sought in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words themselves. State ex rel. Dunbar v. Stone, 159 W. Va. 331, 334-35, 221 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1976) (and cases cited therein).

W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] is written as a total proscription of the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license or other authorization. W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] thus prohibits the carrying of weapons for defense of self, family, home and state without a license or statutory authorization. Article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, however, guarantees that a person has the right to bear arms for those defensive purposes. Thus, the statute operates to impermissibly infringe upon this constitutionally protected right to bear arms for defensive purposes. See City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. at 23, 501 P.2d at 745. We discuss infra the legislature's power to reasonably regulate the exercise of the right to bear arms; however, W. Va. Code, 61-7-1

[1975] prohibits the exercise of this right by infringing upon the constitutional right to bear arms for the defensive purposes guaranteed in the amendment. See In Re Brickey, 8 Idaho at 599, 70 P. at 609.

In considering the constitutionality of a particular statutory proscription against the possession of a certain weapon in public in light of the right to bear arms amendment of the state, the Supreme Court of Oregon determined that the statute was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 261, 630 P.2d 824, 827 (1981). The court's insightful discussion of the overbreadth doctrine is applicable in this case:

An 'overbroad' law, as that term has been developed by the United States Supreme Court, is not vague, or need not be. Its vice is not failure to communicate. Its vice may be clarity. For a law is overbroad to the extent that it announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited. A legislature can make a law as 'broad' and inclusive as it chooses unless it reaches into constitutionally protected ground. The clearer an 'overbroad' statute is, the harder it is to confine it by interpretation within its constitutionally permissible reach.

Id.

Eased upon the foregoing, we conclude that the language embodied in W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] sweeps so broadly as to infringe a right that it cannot permissibly reach, in this case, the constitutional right of a person to keep and bear arms in defense of self, family, home and state, guaranteed by art. III, § 22. Accordingly, W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], the statutory proscription against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon, is overbroad and violative of article III, section 22 of the West Virginia

Constitution, known as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment." It infringes upon the right of a person to bear arms for defensive purposes, specifically, defense of self, family, home and state, insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon for any purpose without a license or other statutory authorization.

The question remains whether the State may reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in this State.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The principal statute involved in this portion of our discussion is W. Va. Code, 61-7-2 [1988], which delineates the procedures to obtain a license. W. Va. Code, 61-7-2 [1988] provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any person desiring to obtain a state license to carry any such weapon as is mentioned in the first section of this article, within one or more counties in this state, shall first publish a notice setting forth his name, residence and occupation, and that on a certain day he will apply to the circuit court of his county for such state license. Such notice shall be published as a Class I legal advertisement in compliance with the provisions of article three, chapter fifty-nine of this code, and the publication area for such publication shall be the county in which such person resides. Such notice shall be published at least ten days before such application is made. After the publication of such notice and at the time stated in such notice, upon application to such court, it may grant such license to such person, in the following manner, to wit:

(b) The applicant shall file with such court his application in writing, duly verified, which application shall show, as basic qualifications, as follows:

(1) That such applicant is a

(Footnote Continued)

We stress that our holding above in no way means

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citizen of the United States of America;

(2) That the applicant has been a bona fide resident of this state for at least one year next prior to the date of such application, and of the county sixty days next prior thereto;

(3) That the applicant is over eighteen years of age; that he is a person of good moral character, of temperate habits, not addicted to intoxication, not addicted to the use of any controlled substance, and has not been convicted of a felony or of any offense involving the use on his part of such weapon in an unlawful manner, and shall prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is gainfully employed in a lawful occupation and has been so engaged for a period of five years next preceding the date of his application;

(4) The purpose or purposes for which the applicant desires to carry such weapon, the necessity therefor, and the county or counties in which such license is desired to be effective; and

(5) That the applicant has qualified under minimum requirements for handling and firing such firearms. These minimum requirements are those promulgated by the department of natural resources and attained under the auspices of the department of natural resources: Provided, That the court may waive this requirement in the case of a renewal applicant who has previously qualified.

(c) Upon the hearing of such application the court shall hear evidence upon all matters stated in such application and upon any other matter deemed pertinent by the court, and if such court be satisfied from the proof that there is good reason and cause for such person to carry such weapon, and all of the other conditions of this article be complied with, the court, or

(Footnote Continued)

that the right of a person to bear arms is absolute. See cases cited infra at pp. 15-16. Other jurisdictions concluding that state statutes or municipal ordinances have violated constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms for defensive purposes, though not specific in what ways this is to be done, have recognized that a government may regulate the exercise of the right, provided the regulations or restrictions do not frustrate the guarantees of the constitutional provision. See, e.g., In Re Brickley, 8 Idaho 597, 599, 70 P. 609, 609 (1902); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 627, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (Ct. App. 1971). Particularly, on three occasions, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in striking statutes as violative of the state's constitutional right to bear arms, has repeatedly stressed

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the judge thereof in vacation, may grant such license for such purposes, and no other, as such court, or the judge in vacation, may set out in the license (and the word 'court' as used in this article shall include the circuit judge thereof, acting either in term or vacation); but, before such license shall be effective such person shall pay to the sheriff, and the court shall so certify in its order granting the license, the sum of fifty dollars, and shall also file a bond with the clerk of such court, in the penalty of five thousand dollars, with good security, signed by a responsible person or persons, or by some surety company, authorized to do business in this state, conditioned that such applicant will not carry such weapon except in accordance with his application and as authorized by the court, and that he will pay all costs and damages accruing to any person by the accidental discharge or improper, negligent or illegal use of such weapon or weapons.

that the court's holdings should not be construed to mean that an individual has an "unfettered right" to possess or use constitutionally protected arms in any way they choose. The Oregon court has consistently emphasized that the legislature may regulate such possession and use. State v. Delgado, 298 Or. at 403, 692 P.2d at 614; State v. Blocker, 291 Or. at 259, 630 P.2d at 826; State v. Kessler, 289 Or. at 370; 614 P.2d at 99.

The State, through exercise of its police power, is vested with the authority to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the general welfare of its citizenry. See generally State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965); syl. pt. 5, Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960). In syllabus point 5 of Gainer, this Court defines the State's police power as follows:

The police power is the power of the state, inherent in every sovereignty, to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the welfare of its citizens. The police power is difficult to define precisely, because it is extensive, elastic and constantly evolving to meet new and increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society and to promote the general welfare. It embraces the power of the state to preserve and to promote the general welfare and it is concerned with whatever affects the peace, security, morals, health and general welfare of the community. It cannot be circumscribed within narrow limits nor can it be confined to precedents resting alone on conditions of the past. As civilization becomes increasingly complex and as advancements are made, the police power must of necessity evolve, develop and expand, in the public interest, to meet such conditions.

See also Security National Bank & Trust Co. v. First W. Va. Bancorp., Inc., 166 W. Va. 775, 780, 277 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1981).

Our research has revealed that courts throughout the country have recognized that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and these courts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens. See, e.g., Bristow v. State, 418 So. 2d 927, 930 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied (Ala. 1982); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 102-03, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975); State v. Rupp, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. 1980); State v. Angelo, 3 N.J. Misc. 1014, 1015, 130 A. 458, 459 (1925); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 254-55, 669 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super. 72, \_\_\_, 272 A.2d 275, 279 (1970); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871 (Wyo. 1982). We stress, however, that the legitimate governmental purpose in regulating the right to bear arms cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this right where the governmental purpose can be more narrowly achieved. City of Lakewood, supra.

At least forty-two jurisdictions have constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms; however, most are distinguishable from art. III, § 22 either in their failure to specifically recognize the right to self-defense, or in their express recognition that the constitutional provision is subject to legislative regulation. See R. Dowlut & J. Knoop, State Constitutions and

the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 177, 236-240 (1982). The State, in the appendix to its brief, cites thirteen states which, like art. III, § 22, grant a rather broad, unrestrictive right to bear arms for the defense of self and the state.<sup>8</sup> With the exception of

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<sup>8</sup>The following is a list of the jurisdictions with constitutional provisions, quoted below, guaranteeing a right to bear arms, which are worded similarly to West Virginia's amendment. Of particular note is the Delaware constitutional provision which is nearly identical to West Virginia's constitutional guarantee, except for the insertion of the word "lawful" before the word "hunting" in the West Virginia amendment.

Alabama: "That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state." Ala. Const. art. I, § 26.

Arizona: "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26.

Connecticut: "Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state." Conn. Const. art. I, § 15.

Delaware: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use." Del. Const. art. I, § 20.

Indiana: "The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State." Ind. Const. art. I, § 32.

Michigan: "Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state." Mich. Const. art. I, § 6.

(Footnote Continued)

Vermont, which imposes no significant regulation, the

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New Hampshire: "All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state." N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a.

Oregon: "The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power[.]" Or. Const. art. I, § 27.

Pennsylvania: "The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence [sic] of themselves and the State shall not be questioned." Pa. Const. art. I, § 21.

South Dakota: "The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied." S.D. Const. art. VI, § 24.

Utah: "The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms." Utah Const. art. I, § 6.

Vermont: "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves and the State--and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power." Vt. Const. ch. 1, art. 16.

Washington: "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed

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remaining jurisdictions regulate the ownership and use of arms in general, particularly handguns.<sup>9</sup>

Again excluding Vermont, certain statutory regulations are common to most of the jurisdictions having constitutional provisions comparable to West Virginia's. For instance, the prohibition against the possession or ownership of handguns by persons previously convicted of a felony or other specified crime is widely accepted.<sup>10</sup> Four states prohibit the open or concealed carrying of handguns without a license or permit; several others specifically prohibit carrying a concealed handgun without a license, while at least one of these jurisdictions, namely, Arizona, further prohibits carrying a handgun in public establishments or certain specified public places.<sup>11</sup>

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body of men." Wash. Const. art. I, § 24.

Wyoming: "The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied." Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24.

<sup>9</sup>Although Vermont imposes no significant restriction on the carrying of handguns, it nevertheless has regulations prohibiting the possession or carrying of handguns and other deadly weapons with intent to injure another person. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4003 (1974).

<sup>10</sup>Ala. Code § 13A-11-72 (1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-29 (West 1975); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-3 (Burns 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.422 (West Supp. 1988); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:3 (1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.270 (1987); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 6105 (Purdon 1983); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-7-7.1 (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-513 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.10.040 (West 1988); Wyo. Stat. § 6-8-104 (1977, 1986).

<sup>11</sup>See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-52, 13A-11-73 (1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3102 (Supp. 1987); Conn. (Footnote Continued)

West Virginia does not regulate the carrying of a weapon on one's own premises nor prohibit the carrying of such weapon to and from places where they may be lawfully used, i.e., target-shooting clubs and hunting grounds. W. Va. Code, 61-7-3 [1987].<sup>12</sup> Pursuant to W. Va. Code,

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Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-35 (West Supp. 1988); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1988); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.422, § 750.227 (West Supp. 1988); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:4 (1977); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250 (1987); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 6106 (Purdon 1983 and Supp. 1988); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-14-9 (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-513 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.1.050 (1988); Wyo. Stat. § 6-8-104 (1977, 1986).

Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana and Michigan are the four jurisdictions which prohibit the unconcealed (or open) or concealed carrying of handguns without a license or permit.

<sup>12</sup>W. Va. Code, 61-7-3 [1987] provides in pertinent part:

Nothing in this article shall prevent any person from carrying any such weapon as is mentioned in the first section of this article, in good faith and not having felonious purposes, upon his own premises; nor shall anything herein prevent a person from carrying any such weapon, unloaded, from the place of purchase to his home or residence, or to a place of repair and back to his home or residence; . . . nor shall anything herein prevent any member of a properly organized target-shooting club authorized by law to obtain firearms by purchase or requisition from this state, or from the United States for the purpose of target practice, from carrying any revolver or pistol mentioned in this article, unloaded, from his home or place of residence to a place of target practice, and from any such place of target practice back to his home or residence, for using any such weapon at such place of target practice in training and improving his skill in the use of such weapons[.]