

ALASKA LEGISLATURE COMMITTEE FILES 1987-1988 8672  
5537 SSJA SJR 19 - SJR 22

absolute values. References to theistic religions as Christianity and Islam are excluded from school texts, the plaintiffs contend, then so must cases to secular human-

defendants, who in the Alabama state of education and 12 who entered the case

all term for any textbook, classroom course or teaching method contrary to their fundamentalist religious beliefs.

In his 172-page decision, Hand said: "For purposes of the First Amendment, secular humanism is a religious belief system, entitled to the protections of, and subject to the prohibitions of, the religion clauses of the U.S. Constitu-

tion may be promoted and advanced in the public schools."

He also said that the case represented neither an "attempt of narrow-minded or fanatical pro-religionists to force a public school system to teach only those opinions and facts they find digestible" nor an "attempt by anyone to censor materials deemed undesirable, impro-

per the allegedly improper promotion of certain religious beliefs, thus violating the constitutional prohibitions against the establishment of religion..."

At a news conference on the steps of the federal courthouse in Mobile after the decision was released, Robert Sheirling of Mobile, an attorney for the plaintiffs, said: "This is exactly what we

cused at the outset of having some hidden agenda in this matter, and I think Judge Hand... has stated very succinctly what this case is and what it is not."

But John Buchanan, a former Alabama congressman and Baptist minister who is chairman of People for the American Way, said: "Today's order is judicial book-burn-

less than government censorship of the school curriculum.

The challenged textbook included those used in teaching home economics, history and social studies. Among other things, the plaintiff charged that passages in the books about one-parent families and divorce offended their beliefs about traditional families.

## DAR: Navy plans to spend \$92 million for advanced surveillance system on Amchitka Island

(Continued from Page A-1)

Additional line-of-sight

Officials have said of how the Amchitka will work — and what be used for — are ed, and they have re-to discuss it in any A lengthy environmental-essment of the project, d by the Navy last or federal and state s, says only that the is "required for strate-ense purposes" and is interest of national

System's mission is ap- different from the ce's \$450 million over-izon "backscatter" ra-tively scheduled to ver the next several ar Tok and Gulkana. stem is primarily an rning system aimed ing for Soviet planes se missiles, Air Force have said. The sys-th a range of about les, will be directed d west and Air Force claim it will be able planes flying hun- miles inside the Sovi-


okesman for the Air Electronic Systems

Division in Massachusetts said the Navy system "has a different mission. It's not related at all" to the Air Force's Alaska project. The spokesman, Kevin Gilmartin, said he understood the Navy project was to primarily monitor sea-launched missiles in the North Pacific, as well as Soviet sea and air movement, but he said the Air Force could not provide details.

"That's essentially what it does," said Shawn O'Keefe, a staff member for the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. "It has other capabilities, too, as I understand it. It's the capabilities and the mission that are classified... The basic point is to further the range. The more range you have, the more information you can collect."

Amchitka is a treeless, uninhabited, 35-mile-long strip of land in the Rat Island group, about 1,400 miles southwest of Anchorage. An American air base was built there during World War II and it was the site of underground nuclear tests in the 1960s and early 1970s.

The Navy has increased its activity in the North Pacific in recent months, including sea exercises in the Gulf of Alaska and Aleutians. There



is a Navy base at Adak, about 200 miles east of Amchitka, that includes surveillance and communications facilities, an underwater weapons detachment and a group of P-3 aircraft that track Soviet ships and submarines.

Military researchers at the Washington-based Center for Policy Studies have reported that Adak is the storage site for some 70 nuclear anti-submarine depth bombs. The Navy has refused to comment on whether there are nuclear weapons at the base.

About 250 miles west of

Amchitka is Shemya Island, site of a largely-classified Air Force base that includes radar systems and reconnaissance planes which monitor Soviet missile tests.

According to diagrams in the Navy's environmental assessment, the Amchitka radar antennas will be pointed directly west, toward the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Soviet Union. The major Soviet Pacific submarine base is on the eastern shore of the peninsula, at Petropavlovsk, and the sea between there and the Aleutians is a major Soviet

naval operating area, according to "Soviet Military Power," an annual U.S. Defense Department publication.

About 800 miles separate Amchitka from the Kamchatka Peninsula.

According to the Navy budget office, about \$92 million has been budgeted for the project through the scheduled completion in late 1988. Site work is scheduled to start this spring, with construction of the transmitter and receiver antennas sometime next year.

The project is being coordinated by Navy officials in Silverdale, Wash., but all questions were referred to a spokesman at the Pentagon, who said he could not discuss the project.

The over-the-horizon system uses the ionosphere — the electrically-charged layer of atmosphere 100 to 250 miles above the Earth's surface — to flex high-frequency radio signals around the curve of the Earth. It's the same principle that causes short-wave radio signals to bounce around the globe.

The signals bounce off the ionosphere and return to earth downrange. Whatever the beam strikes causes the signals to scatter back off the

ionosphere and return to a receiver near the transmitter where they are deciphered by computer.

The Navy environmental report doesn't describe in detail what the antennas will look like, but says that both the transmitter and receiver sites will include several hundred acres. The transmitter will be built on the western tip of the island, with the receiver based about 20 miles southeast, in the center of the island.

A base camp, with quarters for 16 crew members, will be built at the west end of the island, near the existing air strip and dock.

The Navy environmental report says the project will require construction of a diesel-fueled power plant to generate about 2 million kilowatts of electricity for the transmitter. Extensive road work also will be needed.

The Navy picked Amchitka, the report says, because of its flat terrain, "important strategic location," and existing dock, airfield and other facilities.

The island is part of the Aleutian National Wildlife Refuge, but federal and state environmental and wildlife groups have raised no serious objections to the project.

SJR

21

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT

FIRST COMMITTEE OF REFERRAL

Date of 3/11/87 5-DAY NOTICE  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULE 23

\*\*FISCAL NOTE(S) ATTACHED 1 \*\*  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AS 24.08.035  
(see below)  
3/3/87

FURTHER: HESS  
LABOR & COMMERCE

DATE TURNED INTO OFFICE 4/10/87

Mr. President:

STATE AFFAIRS Committee considered SJR 21

Requesting the President of the United States to propose an international freeze on nuclear weapons, verification safeguards for the freeze, the use of nuclear weapons funds for peaceful nonnuclear uses, and nuclear disarmament by all nations; and requesting the state Congressional delegation to urge the president to make the proposals.

and recommended:

- replace with CS \_\_\_\_\_  same title
- attached amendment(s) and  new title
- do pass
- do not pass
- no recommendation
- individual recommendations
- further referral to \_\_\_\_\_
- letter of intent adopted and attached

\*\* Committee  attached or  adopted fiscal note(s)  
 zero  fiscal impact

MEMBERS SIGNING DO PASS

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

*Rich W.*  
*William T. Hendley*  
*Joe P. Josephson*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Don [Signature]*  
Chairman signature and recommendation

Committee Backup Attached

**STATE OF ALASKA 1987 LEGISLATIVE SESSION  
FISCAL NOTE**

Bill Version : SJR 21

Publish Date : \_\_\_\_\_

**REQUEST:** \_\_\_\_\_

Revision Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Title: Requesting the President of  
the U.S. ... international freeze  
 Sponsor: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Requestor: \_\_\_\_\_

Agency Affected : \_\_\_\_\_

BRU: \_\_\_\_\_

Components : \_\_\_\_\_

**EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)**

OPERATING	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
<b>TOTAL OPERATING</b>	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

<b>CAPITAL</b>	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
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<b>REVENUE</b>						
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**FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)**

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
<b>TOTAL</b>						

**POSITIONS:**

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

**ANALYSIS :** (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Prepared by : \_\_\_\_\_ Phone : \_\_\_\_\_

Division : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Approved by CHAIRMAN Senator Sheldon Alford Date : 4/8/87  
Commissioner

Agency : Senate State Affairs

**Distribution (by preparer):**

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)
- Senate Secretary

Reagan  
p.1

ANNOTATED LIST OF SOURCES FOR OPPOSITION TO  
THE NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE

I. The Administration's Position.

- A. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, APRIL 1982. (U.S. Department of State)  
Explains reasons for Reagan Administration's opposition to nuclear arms freeze. Cites massive Soviet strategic build-up in 1970's, etc..
- B. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE CONGRESS; FEBRUARY 4, 1985, p.45.  
Secretary Weinberger -- "the Pentagon" -- states, "We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'" Explains that even if we Americans don't believe nuclear war is winnable, Soviet leaders -- judging by their preparations (rather than their propaganda) -- apparently do. Further explains that to continue deterring Soviet miscalculations and nuclear war we must meet their standards of deterrence -- not just our own.
- C. SOVIET MILITARY POWER, 1986. (U.S. Defense Department)  
Describes ongoing build-up of Soviet war machine and threat it poses. Describes tactical and strategic weapons systems such as first-strike SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and Soviet "star wars" weapons development.
- D. NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. (U.S. Air Force Air University)  
Analysis and discussion of warnings about the risk of "nuclear winter" from members of our American scientific community.

II. 30Mar83 WASHINGTON POST editorial, "The Freeze Debate".  
"But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy." Other, excellent points.

III. ARMS FREEZE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST. 1984.  
Soviet Novosti Press Agency pamphlet promoting a nuclear arms freeze which I picked up in Soviet San Francisco consulate. Attacks Reagan Administration for its objections to the freeze.

IV. Soviet KGB involvement in formation of American freeze movement.

- A. Oct82 READER'S DIGEST, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" by John Barron.  
Describes KGB's infiltration/manipulation of Western peace movements. Active involvement of Soviet KGB operatives Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov at March 1981 Georgetown University meeting where America's nuclear arms freeze movement was organized and operationally begun.
- B. 13Nov82 NY TIMES, "Sources are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze."  
President Reagan had claimed involvement of "foreign agents" in American freeze movement. Critics howled "McCarthyism". White House cites Barron's READER'S DIGEST article as primary source. FBI says President "accurate" in describing "Soviet attempt to influence the peace movement." *[The KGB did not get involved to promote peace and disarmament.]*

V. KGB psychiatric persecution of genuine Soviet peace activists.

- A. 13Sep82 NEW YORKER magazine, "The Talk of the Town: Peace."  
Russian peace activist Mikhail Ostrovsky expelled from Soviet Union, describes KGB persecution of members of the nonviolent nongovernment Soviet "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA." Asks Western peace movements to pressure Soviet leaders into releasing group leader Sergei Batovrin from KGB psychiatric prisons. Batovrin forced to take psychiatric drugs. [Batovrin later expelled from USSR.]  
Ostrovsky describes how the 80 million members of the official Soviet peace organization are so government-dominated that their demonstration signs are made for them, never handmade.
- B. 21Mar86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "An Appeal for Help for Prisoners of Conscience."  
Juneau peace and human rights advocate Charles Rohrbacher describes condemnation of genuine Soviet peace activists -- including two 17-year-old girls, to KGB psychiatric prison. [Under Amnesty International pressure like this KGB later released three of the prisoners.]

RECEIVED BY LOUIS COATNEY  
MARCH 1987

- C. 21Mar86 JUNEAU EMPIRE editorial: "Two Faces of Soviet 'Peace'"  
 Biting contrast of "Soviet Samantha Smith" Katya Lycheva's trip to Disneyland with the KGB condemnation of young Soviet peace activists to psychiatric prison.
- D. 7Jul86 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "The Trap of Arms Control", by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
 President Carter's National Security Advisor explains how Kremlin negotiates arms treaties only for propoganda and improving military superpower status -- not for genuine disarmament. Describes damage done to Western negotiating efforts for genuine disarmament by freeze movement and other anti-deterrence agitation.

VI. Soviet violations of arms treaties.

- A. Spr83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "'Yellow Rain' and the Future of Arms Agreements."  
 Documents treaty-violating use of Soviet toxin weapons against civilians in Afghanistan and Indochina. Describes "bee-droppings" disinformation disseminated through Western media -- hideously obscene, considering the victims' suffering. State Department castigated for bungling the handling of this Soviet treaty violation.
- B. 30Nov83 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet Violations of Arms Treaties."  
 Describes Soviet treaty violations covered in Western media, including accident in Sverdlovsk germ warfare laboratory. Explains "Catch-22" inadequacies of remote sensing -- "national technical means" -- for treaty compliance verification.
- C. ARMS CONTROL: U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, PROBLEMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE.  
 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
- D. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 122: SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1Feb85  
 (U.S. State Department)  
 FINALLY, Reagan Administration documents and lists Soviet arms treaty violations. U.S. goal of strategic arms reduction (rather than just freeze) described.

VII. Soviet environmental disregard.

- A. 4Oct84 EMPIRE, "Once-pure Arctic Air Dirtied by Soviet, European Industry.", by David Foster, AP.  
 "Despite the area's pristine image, scientists say Arctic air contains as much dirt as some rural and suburban areas, with the Soviet Union the major polluter."
- B. 21Nov84 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Other Testaments" (re-titled by EMPIRE as "Soviet System Poses Biggest Threat of All")  
 Written before Chernobyl, letter describes Soviet radioactive waste disaster at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk germ disaster, etc., and now Soviet environmental policies represent a longterm threat to human survival even greater than the risk of nuclear war/winter. Says "Day After" and "Testament" films are out of context and distorting since there have been no similar dramatizations broadcast about Soviet environmental disasters, psychiatric prisons, Afghanistan atrocities, etc..

VIII. Soviet interest in Alaska.

- A. 20Feb86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet 'Ultimatum' Delivered to Senators."  
 Alaska Performing Artists for Peace organizer Dixie Belcher lobbies against State Senate's Wrangel Island resolution, claiming Soviets had threatened to end plans for her musical peace tour to Siberia. Dixie never conceded that using her group as a political hammer against the Wrangel resolution was wrong or wouldn't happen again.
- B. 30Apr86 EMPIRE, "Moscow Editor Promotes U.S., Soviet Relationship."  
 Kremlin propagandist Gennadi Gerasimov visits Juneau as guest of Dixie Belcher. (Later, at his World Affairs Council talk, Gerasimov promotes his book attacking U.S. star wars program. In response to my question about the Soviet killing of U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicolson (in the course of his treaty-authorized direct/on-site verification inspection duties) Gerasimov says Major Nicolson was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time" -- no regrets or Soviet commitment to prevent future killings.)

C. 12Apr86 NY Times U.S. and Soviet arms in Germany... *Still as explicit as public expressions of good faith by Soviet.*

IX. Consequences of U.S. quitting its military defense responsibilities.

"The Killing Fields" film  
 Scaring depiction of mass extermination of Cambodians by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Almost half the population murdered or starved by collectivization. The typical attempt to blame Cambodian suffering on Nixon didn't wash.

*See below  
1 Aug 86*

TELECOPY COVER SHEET  
ANCHORAGE INFORMATION OFFICE

TO: CAROL HODS FOR: Senate State Affairs Committee -  
Hearing on SJR NO. 21 - WED.  
APRIL 8, 1:30 P.M. PHONE: 4105-4552

FROM: CHRISTOPHER TOAL (ALASKA FREEZE '86) PHONE: 274-4648

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: Please give a copy of this to all members of the State Affairs  
Committee. I'd like it to be made part of the permanent  
record, if possible

DATE/TIME SENT: \_\_\_\_\_ PLEASE ACK. RECEIPT: \_\_\_\_\_

DISPOSAL OF ORIGINAL: \_\_\_\_\_ THROW AWAY

\_\_\_\_\_ HOLD FOR PICK UP

NUMBER OF PAGES: 3 (NOT COUNTING COVER SHEET)

BY: \_\_\_\_\_

# THE ALASKA FREEZE

Because Nobody Wants A Nuclear War

419 Barrow Street, Suite B  
Anchorage, AK 99501

Board of Directors  
Dorothy Jones, Chair  
Ed Davis, Co-Chair  
Mary Lee Nicholson  
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Charcy Craft

Chris Toal,  
Coordinator

April 6, 1987

## TESTIMONY ON BEHALF SJR NO. 21

Sen. Mitch Abood  
State Affairs Committee  
Alaska State Senate  
Pouch V (MB 3100)  
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Sen. Abood,

Some folks be surprised to discover that three of the four sponsors of SJR NO. 21 are Republicans, but they shouldn't be. The concept of a mutual and verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production and deployment originated with an amendment to the SALT II Treaty introduced by Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield in 1979. Since then, 62 out of 36 Freeze referendums have passed around the country including those in 10 out of 11 states. Over 370 city councils and ten state legislatures have passed resolutions endorsing the Freeze. Five other states have passed a Freeze resolution in the House or Senate (including the Alaska State Senate in 1982).

These legislative endorsements reflect broad public support for the Freeze. For example, according to the Gallup Report # 229 78% of the American people favor an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for an immediate, verifiable freeze on the testing and production of nuclear weapons (Republicans favor it by 74%). Another poll taken by the Los Angeles Times of delegates at the 1984 Republican National Convention showed support for the Freeze at 77% from Moderates and 62% from Conservatives.

Last summer, our non-partisan statewide group of volunteers and citizen-activists campaigned successfully for an initiative which made the promotion of a mutual and verifiable bilateral nuclear freeze followed by reductions the official policy of the state of Alaska. Endorsements of the Freeze initiative came from such diverse political figures as Sen. Arliss Sturgulewski, Gov. Steve Cowper, Dick Randolph and former governors Walter J. Hickel and Bill Sheffield. To the best of my knowledge, at least three of the five members of the Senate State Affairs Committee voted for the Nuclear Freeze initiative. This sort of bi-partisan support is entirely appropriate. After all, peace and security in a safer world are things everyone should be able to relate to.

Advanced verification technology and important recent concessions from our Soviet adversaries have finally given us an opportunity to make nuclear disarmament a reality. Indeed, it seems that the President has also reached this conclusion.

Against the advice from the hardliners in his administration President Reagan offered bold new proposals for disarmament and peace at the Reykjavik Summit last fall.

The nuclear freeze resolution sponsored by senators Eliason, Kelly, Josephson and Jones is in the spirit of the President's best instincts at Reykjavik. It recognizes that burgeoning nuclear weapons expenditures increase the U.S. budget deficit and might be used more wisely for peaceful pursuits. It calls for a freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production and deployment but demands stringent verification safeguards. In effect, SJR NO. 21 reaffirms Alaska's mutual and verifiable freeze policy and outlines a future goal of complete nuclear disarmament. It is not a panacea, but rather a modest first step towards a vision shared by most Americans. We urge you and your colleagues in the Senate to support SJR NO. 21.


Sincerely,

*Christopher Toal*

Christopher Toal  
Coordinator, Alaska Freeze '86;  
President, SANE/ALASKA

274-4648 (H)

272-0621 (O)



### DOT CHART

1 dot - represents the firepower contained in all the aerial bombing by all the combatants during World War II (1939 - 1945), including the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; 3 megatons (3 million tons TNT).

8 dots - represent the firepower contained in the nuclear missiles of 1 Trident submarine; 24 megatons. This is enough firepower to destroy every major city in the northern hemisphere.


6,000 dots - represent the explosive power in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers today; 18,000 megatons. The United States and the Soviet Union share this firepower with approximately equal destructive capability.

Detonation of a little more than one square could cause a "nuclear winter".

Source: Center for Defense Information, 303 Capitol Gallery West, 600 Maryland Ave. S.W., Washington D.C. 20024

(3)

# NUCLEAR WEAPONS CHART



The dot in the center represents all the firepower of World War II—three megatons. The other dots represent the world's present nuclear weaponry, which equals 6,000 World War II's (18,000 megatons). The U.S. and the Soviets share this firepower with approximately equal destructive capability.

The top left-hand circle, enclosing nine megatons, represents the weapons on one Poseidon submarine—equal to three World War II's, enough to destroy more than 200 of the largest Soviet cities. The circle in the lower left-hand square (24 megatons, eight World War II's) represents one new Trident sub with the power to destroy every major city in the northern hemisphere.

Just two squares (300 megatons) represent enough firepower to destroy all the large- and medium-sized cities in the world.

The amount in the shaded area—100 megatons, or less than 1% of the U.S. or Soviet arsenal—represents the amount necessary to bring on the "nuclear winter." The dust lofted into the air by the explosion of this small amount would block out sunlight and make temperatures drop so dramatically that our planet would be uninhabitable for plants, animals and humans.

This chart, which has been reviewed for accuracy by U.S. Senate staff members, appears in *The Trinitab Factor: How Business Executives Can Help Solve the Nuclear Weapons Crisis* by Harold Willens.

BY ED DAVIS  
TESTIMONY FOR THE SENATE STATE AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE REGARDING ALASKA'S NUCLEAR

4/8/87 FREEZE RESOLUTION (SJR-21) (PG 202)

SURVIVABLE, THE FREEZE GIVES US A STRONG  
DEFENSE.

THE FREEZE REDUCES THE CHANCE OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR  
WAR. WE NEED AMPLE WARNING OF AN ATTACK TO CHECK FOR  
FALSE ALARMS. BY STOPPING FASTER WEAPONS, THE FREEZE  
WOULD PRESERVE OUR 30 MINUTE WARNING TIME. THE  
ALTERNATIVE CUTS IT TO UNDER 15 MINUTES.

TODAY, A SOVIET ATTACK ON OUR LAND BASED MISSILES WOULD  
HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED FROM THE SOVIET MAINLAND. SUCH AN  
ATTACK WOULD TAKE ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

WITHOUT A FREEZE, SOVIET SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC  
MISSILES WILL BECOME SO ACCURATE THAT THEY WILL  
THREATEN OUR LAND BASED MISSILES. LAUNCHED FROM OUR  
COASTS, SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD TAKE 15 MINUTES.

WITH SHORTENED WARNING TIME AND FEAR OF SUDDEN  
ATTACK, THE DECISION TO LAUNCH MAY BE LEFT TO COMPUTERS.  
COMPUTERS MAKE MISTAKES.

IN A RECENT 18 MONTH PERIOD, OUR OWN SOPHISTICATED  
COMPUTERS SOUNDED MORE THAN 100 FALSE ALARMS OF  
ATTACK. SOVIET COMPUTERS ARE LESS RELIABLE THAN  
OURS. PLEASE SUPPORT NUCLEAR SANITY.

SUBMITTED TO

MITCH ABOOD

JAN FAIKS

RICK UENLING

WILLIE HENSLEY

JOE JOSEPHSON

FROM ED DAVIS  
BOX 1616  
FAIRBANKS, AK 99707  
PH. 907-353-7559

4/8/87

BY ED DAVIS

(PG 1 OF 2)

RIGHT NOW, AMERICA IS THE STRONGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. WE HAVE VERY CAPABLE, SURVIVABLE FORCES. OUR ICBMS ARE NOT VULNERABLE TO QUICK ATTACK, OUR BOMBERS HAVE ENOUGH WARNING TIME TO TAKE OFF, AND OUR SUBMARINES ARE SAFE, HIDDEN AT SEA.

HOWEVER, SHOULD WE FAIL TO CURTAIL SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILE IMPROVEMENTS, WE WILL BE VULNERABLE TO SURPRISE ATTACK.

THE FREEZE STOPS THE PROGRESS OF NEW SOVIET WEAPONS WHICH COULD WIPE OUT OUR ICBMS AND BOMBERS IN ONE QUICK STRIKE. WITH MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS COULD DESTROY OUR HARDENED MISSILE SILEOS. WITH FASTER WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS COULD DESTROY OUR BOMBERS BEFORE THEY COULD TAKE OFF. IF OUR OUR FORCES BECOME VULNERABLE TO NEW GENERATIONS OF SWIFT WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT FEEL THAT A SNEAK ATTACK OFFERS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES.

THE FREEZE STOPS THE ATTACKER AND FAVORS THE DEFENDER. BY STOPPING ADVANCES IN MISSILE ACCURACY AND SHORTER FLIGHT TIMES, THE FREEZE STOPS THE ATTACKER. HE NEEDS TO BE VERY SURE OF DESTROYING HIS ENEMY'S ABILITY TO RETALIATE; HE NEEDS SWIFT, ACCURATE, VERY RELIABLE WEAPONS.


BY STOPPING FASTER, MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS, THE FREEZE FAVORS THE DEFENDER. OLD WEAPONS WORK JUST FINE FOR RETALIATION, BUT ONLY IF THEY SURVIVE, BY MAKING OUR FORCES MORE

ARMS  
FREEZE:  
Who Is For  
Who Is Against

*The peaceful assurances of the US government would be much more credible if it accepted the proposal mutually to freeze American and Soviet nuclear arms. So much weaponry has already been accumulated that this step would not create the slightest threat to the security of either side. But it would considerably improve the general political atmosphere, and, one would assume, make it easier to reach agreement on a reduction of nuclear arsenals.*

**KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO**  
*General Secretary  
of the CPSU Central Committee,  
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR  
Supreme Soviet*

ARMS  
FREEZE:  
Who Is For  
and  
Who Is Against



The word "freeze" has firmly established itself in the international political lexicon. And this is quite understandable, as the idea of a freeze of armed forces and armaments is closely linked with the central problem of today—the attainment of disarmament.

The need to freeze military potentials, nuclear potentials first and foremost, is dictated by common sense itself. In order to begin genuine disarmament, it is necessary to prevent a new upswing in the arms race, which threatens to make the world less stable and more fragile and to make much more difficult the drawing up of international arms limitation accords. The possibility of getting the process of genuine disarmament under way by means of a freeze of armed forces and armaments as a first step stems from the existing balance of nuclear forces and the overall approximate military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which was made clear at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

# The USSR's Constructive Approach

The early 1980s witnessed powerful antiwar movements in the USA, Western Europe and the world over. They showed dramatically the extent of the world public's alarm over the mounting threat of nuclear war and the catastrophic consequences of a new upswing in the arms race, launched by the US Administration. It is highly significant that, regardless of their political affiliation and social status, many peace campaigners feel that in order to improve the international situation it is essential first of all to freeze nuclear arms at their present level. It would be no exaggeration to say that this demand has become one of the main demands of the antiwar movement. Other proposals, including those about the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the north of Europe and in the Balkans, have clearly the same aims.

In the early 1980s the Soviet Union made the pioneering step of proposing a qualitative and quantitative freeze on Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

Thus, in 1981 the 26th CPSU Congress proposed "coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be imposed on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, freezing the existing quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region."

In order to facilitate an equitable agreement on a major reduction of nuclear weapons by the two sides in Europe, on March 16, 1982, the Soviet leadership unilaterally declared a

moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. Weapons already stationed were frozen quantitatively and qualitatively, and the process of replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles by the more advanced SS-20s was halted\*.

On May 18, 1982, the Soviet Union announced its preparedness to impose a quantitative freeze on American and Soviet strategic weapons and maximal restrictions on their modernization.

In June 1983, in accordance with an instruction of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet government proposed to the governments of the USA, Great Britain, France, and China that a qualitative and quantitative freeze of nuclear weapons be imposed by the nuclear weapon states.

In October 1983 the Soviet Union submitted to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly as an urgent and important item on the agenda a proposal on freezing nuclear weapons. In an accompanying letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Andrei Gromyko, first Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: "The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that one of the most urgent tasks today is to end the nuclear arms buildup, to stop the new upswing in the arms race, which the world is being drawn into ever more rapidly. Implementation of this task would be a major contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear war now facing the peoples."

In a resolution adopted by the 38th UN General Assembly session on the initiative of the Soviet Union it is proposed that all nuclear states stop the buildup of all components of their nuclear arsenals, including all means of delivery and all types of nuclear warheads, refrain from the deployment of

\* This moratorium was in effect until the United States actually started deploying the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles on the European continent. While renouncing its unilateral commitments in this sphere the Soviet Union at the same time declared that they would again enter into effect if the USA and the other NATO countries show a readiness to return to the status quo prior to the deployment of the medium-range American missiles in Europe.

new type of nuclear weapons, institute a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and their new means of delivery, and discontinuing the production of fissionable materials to be used in nuclear weapons.

Taking into account the fact that the nuclear potentials of states are unequal and that two countries possess the biggest nuclear arsenals, the resolution provides for a simultaneous bilateral freeze of nuclear arms by the USSR and the USA as a first step and as an example for other nuclear-weapon states to follow. The latter are expected to freeze their own nuclear arms as soon as possible. This is the gist of the resolution.

The Soviet Union's adherence to the idea of an arms freeze was reiterated on March 2, 1984, by Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in his speech at a meeting with voters of the Kuibyshev district in Moscow. He said:

"Curbing the nuclear arms race is, of course, of key significance for peace and international security. The USSR's stand on this issue is clear. We are against rivalry in the buildup of nuclear arsenals. We have been and remain in favour of the prohibition and destruction of all types of these weapons. We have long since tabled our relevant proposals, both at the UN and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, but the United States and its allies are blocking their discussion."

## Why Washington Doesn't Agree to a Freeze

A nuclear freeze would open up favourable prospects for creating a healthier political climate in the world. However, this idea should not be allowed to be distorted by warmongers who still hope either to emasculate it or to make it serve their own interests.

It is common knowledge that in the 1960s the USA put forward a proposal to freeze certain components of nuclear arsenals, but in doing so it pursued goals which had nothing in common with a desire to secure peace on earth. On September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower said that the United States was prepared, on the basis of reciprocity with the USSR, to shut down one major facility producing fissionable materials after another under international inspection and verification. At the UN Commission on Disarmament the USA also proposed that the USA and the USSR should each place 30 tons of weapons-grade fissionable material under international inspection. However, it was not disclosed what amount of fissionable material the USA was going to keep at its disposal. It was obvious that the implementation of that proposal would not have reduced the nuclear war threat because this remaining amount was clearly substantial.

The Soviet Union stressed at the time that it would have been a different matter altogether if the USA agreed to discuss the question of eliminating existing stockpiles and a ban on nuclear weapons simultaneously with stopping the production of fissionable materials. Since it was clear that the USA was not ready to do so, this meant that its proposal was a propaganda ploy designed to perpetuate US superiority in the number of nuclear warheads and to place the whole of the Soviet Union's nuclear industry under US control.

In the 1960s the United States tried hard to preserve its superiority in nuclear weapons, to stop or at least slow down the growth of the Soviet Union's nuclear missile potential. With this in mind, in January 1964 President Johnson put forward a proposal about a "controlled freeze" of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

A detailed plan of such a controlled freeze was submitted to the Committee of 18 on Disarmament by a special US representative on August 27, 1963. What the proposal amounted to was the United States' desire to find out the exact nature of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, their deployment, and the scale and character of the Soviet missile industry, as well as to try and slow down the production and modernization of such weapons by the Soviet Union. The intent of the proposal was thus patently clear: to "freeze" further progress of the USSR in the deployment of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and to impose strict control over the USSR's activities in this sphere.

Past experience shows that the United States put forward nuclear-freeze proposals only when it wanted to secure its superiority in certain components of military arsenals and to block off those channels in weapons development which would have enabled the Soviet Union to achieve parity in the corresponding types of weapons. At the same time the USA has never put forward or supported the idea of a comprehensive nuclear freeze. What is more, when military and strategic parity was achieved between the USSR and the USA, the US leadership subjected this idea to especially fierce attack.

An example of this is provided by the April 18, 1982, statement of the US Department of State. In it the idea of a comprehensive nuclear freeze is roundly condemned. For example, it is said that a nuclear freeze at the existing levels would perpetuate the military inferiority and vulnerability of the United States and its allies (despite the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, admitted by many prominent political and military leaders, some of them in the United States itself), would thwart efforts to reach agreement on substantial reductions of the two sides' nuclear arsenals and arouse serious doubts about America's leading role in the NATO alliance, and so on. Steering a course toward brightening international tensions, the US Administration has stepped up its propaganda campaign against a nuclear freeze. The newspaper *Novydyz* (October 19, 1982) carried an article by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in which he assured the readers that a

freeze would not reduce the possibility of war. It would run counter to the first and primary objective of arms control, he said, because it would leave the USA and its allies in a position of permanent military inferiority. This, he went on, would undermine the deterrent which has kept the peace. At a subsequent press conference the Pentagon chief asserted that the adoption of a resolution on the freeze would lead to a greater threat of war and this would cause the Russians to stay away from the negotiating table. The US Secretary of Defense also touched upon the problem of verifying the nuclear freeze. He stressed that the Soviet Union had never agreed to on-site inspection and that in the case of a complete freeze verification could be effected only on the condition that it would be possible as a minimum requirement to carry out inspection on the spot, that is, a very thorough verification in the country itself. In contrast to the US conception of verification as an end in itself, isolated from the freeze, the Soviet Union has been consistently advocating verification as a means of enforcing the observance of agreements in this field. This, in the USSR's view, is the sole purpose of control. In Soviet proposals verification is regarded as being inseparably linked with the process of disarmament. It cannot and must not play an independent and overriding role, while its extent, forms and methods must be determined by the nature and volume of disarmament measures. Without underestimating the importance of verification, the Soviet Union nevertheless believes that it should play a subordinate role in relation to a nuclear freeze. Therefore, verification can only be a part of a freeze agreement, serving as an instrument contributing to its implementation. The Soviet Union considers that verification should be effected primarily with the help of national technical means. These might also be used for effective control of the countries' commitments under the freeze. However, the USSR is prepared to discuss certain additional measures to be agreed upon through negotiations with the participants in a nuclear freeze. It is quite possible to resolve this

problem on the basis of cooperation. This means that Weinberger's "arguments" against the freeze are completely groundless.

Addressing in March 1983 the annual conference of the national evangelical association in Orlando, Florida, the US President rejected the idea of any negotiations with Moscow aimed at attaining an early nuclear freeze. The US Administration also turned down the Soviet government's proposal of June 1983.

Thus, the White House's stand on the nuclear freeze is entirely clear. It is part and parcel of the US militarist policies aimed at attaining military supremacy over the USSR. A freeze would preserve the existing rough parity between the Soviet and American nuclear arms; that is why it does not suit the US leadership which, despite its recent, increasingly frequent claims that it seeks dialogue with the USSR, is still staking on military confrontation with the socialist world.

## Politically Isolated

The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, adopted on January 5, 1983, at their meeting in Prague, points out that a vast majority of states and an increasingly representative cross-section of the world public support a freeze on nuclear arsenals.

Indeed, at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly, as at the previous one, such countries as India, Mexico and Sweden submitted draft resolutions on freezing nuclear weapons. For example, India proposed calling on all nuclear states to agree to a freeze which among other things would provide for a simultaneous complete cessation of further production of nuclear weapons and a complete halt to the production of fissionable materials for weapons manufacture.

Mexico and Sweden tabled a draft resolution calling for a nuclear freeze, addressed first and foremost to the USSR and the USA as the two biggest nuclear-weapon states whose example would be followed by other nuclear-weapon states. It is proposed that the freeze should be announced simultaneously in two unilateral declarations or in a joint declaration. The resolution's preamble expresses the belief that the existing conditions are most favourable for such a freeze since the USSR and the USA have at present equal nuclear might and, as it seems obvious, there is an approximate parity between them.

The discussion of these draft resolutions convincingly exposed the absurdity of US arguments against a freeze, according to which such a measure is allegedly an obstacle to disarmament talks. As Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere justly noted in his speech at the session, a nuclear freeze would be the basis for successful, serious

disarmament talks, inasmuch as at present new weapons are produced more quickly than agreement on control of old weapons is reached. The way to an all-encompassing programme in the disarmament sphere, stressed M. Qionibaravi, the representative of Fiji, should begin with a nuclear freeze. It is our belief that a nuclear freeze would constitute not only a major step in the disarmament process, but would also create favourable conditions for conducting such negotiations as the START talks in a spirit of good will and mutual trust, he said.

The 38th Session of the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrated that in spite of differences in approach, the nuclear freeze idea is shared by a majority of states. Only the USA and its NATO allies, which found themselves in political isolation, voted against the freeze resolutions.

## The World Public Says "Yes"

However, the US leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to pursue an obstructionistic policy on the question of a nuclear freeze. This is largely due to the fact that a powerful antiwar movement has emerged in the USA, with its central demand being a halt to the nuclear arms buildup. The movement is a nationwide one, representing virtually all age groups, social strata, political groups and religious trends. Its participants are united by a profound conviction that urgent measures to curb the arms race are needed, as well as by an awareness of the dangers inherent in the US foreign policy designed to achieve military-strategic superiority over the USSR.

The movement already has a history of its own. In April 1980 Randall Forsberg, Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Brookline (Mass.), issued a memorandum calling for the freezing of American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. A year later Washington was the venue of a national conference of peace forces which brought together representatives of tens of public organizations with a membership of several million. The conference approved an Appeal for an End to the Nuclear Arms Race which stressed the need for the immediate conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement in this field. At the same time the National Campaign to Freeze Nuclear Arms, a coalition movement, was set up with the aim of coordinating the activities of all peace forces in the country.

The nuclear freeze movement grew rapidly. According to public opinion polls its aims are supported by more than 70 per cent of Americans.

The impact of mass antiwar actions which swept the country and the resolutions of state legislatures in favour of the freeze was felt on Capitol Hill. At first a small group of legislators cautiously voiced support for the freeze

campaign: in late 1981 the idea was endorsed by 25 legislators. Later on, draft resolutions were tabled in Congress. The first one, sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield, called on the President to seek a freeze on the nuclear armaments of the USA and the USSR. Soon dozens of Senators and more than 150 Congressmen supported the resolution.

Another resolution, sponsored by Senators John Warner and Henry Jackson, also spoke of a nuclear freeze, even a reduction of nuclear weapons. Its real objective, however, was quite different: it was designed to calm the waves of mass protest and to take the edge off the main demand of the movement. As a precondition for a freeze the resolution proposed eliminating the "strategic vulnerability" of the USA. This means that the call for a freeze was but a camouflage for the continuation of the arms race.

Nevertheless, the resolution shows that nowadays even some "hawks" are trying to take advantage of the mass antinuclear protest movement which has attained such a scale that it can no longer be ignored by Congress and the Administration. The growing movement against the nuclear arms race and the threat of a suicidal war has become a tangible political factor in the USA.

Speaking in the US Senate, Edward Kennedy said that the demand for the freezing of nuclear arsenals was meeting with growing support in the United States and that steps in this direction were essential because they might represent the country's last hope for putting an end to the arms race.

In May 1983 the US antiwar forces won a definite victory when the House of Representatives endorsed a resolution calling for a nuclear freeze. It recognized an approximate parity of the nuclear potentials of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the possibility for monitoring a mutual freeze and reduction of nuclear armaments.

The resolution was to be discussed in the Senate. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, clearly under pressure from the White House, decided after lengthy delays not to put it to a vote.

Still, many realistic politicians in the USA are aware of the fact that the present round of war preparations initiated by the US Administration is leading to a drastic deterioration of the international political climate. The deployment of MX and D-5 missile systems (the latter are to be installed on Trident-2 submarines) along with plans of extending the arms race to outer space may lead to a heightening of the first-strike capabilities of the two sides, thus sharply increasing the vulnerability of the strategic forces of retaliation. Some US politicians believe that this in turn will create a strategic situation radically different from that prevailing in the 1970s. In these new conditions each of the sides will have greater incentive to deliver a first nuclear strike out of the fear of being forestalled by the enemy. In stating their views, the proponents of an immediate end to the nuclear arms buildup say that at the present level of military confrontation it would be most advantageous to put an end to the nuclear arms race because the nuclear might of the USA and the USSR is in balance. They estimate that in the next five years a freeze would save \$90,000 million and even more if it is followed by arms reductions. But what is most important is that the freeze is neither a service nor a gift to the USSR. It needs the freeze no more and no less than the USA does. The two sides need it equally, because a nuclear war, which the freeze is called upon to ward off, would destroy both.

The advocates of the freeze also reject the logic according to which "in order to have less one must have more", considering this to be profoundly wrong: the USA does not have to build up arms and make the Russians feel more vulnerable in order to induce them to enter into serious negotiations, they declare.

Unfortunately, the present US Administration has paid no heed to this sober point of view. It finds more pleasure in its liking the views of the bosses of the military-industrial complex and right-wing Senators and in cooperating with politicians in the USA. It is no accident that the US President has described the nuclear freeze movement as

being dangerous and contrary to US interests, adding that the movement was organized by those who would like to see America weakened.

The idea of a nuclear freeze has taken root worldwide. It is noteworthy that in the United States more and more people, both prominent politicians and rank-and-file Americans, are coming to support the idea. Senator Gary Hart, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the 1984 Presidential elections, Senator John Glenn (Democrat) and others have expressed themselves in favour of a freeze. Senator Cranston, for instance, observed that the vast majority of the people, in contrast to their leaders, continue to see an acute need for an end to the arms race. This view is best borne out by the impressive demonstrations in support of a nuclear freeze, which took place on October 1, 1983, in 200 cities and towns at a time when the White House continued to whip up the anti-Soviet hysteria.

The situation is very similar in Europe. Towards the end of September 1983, 300 prominent British scientists called for a nuclear freeze. A decision was taken at a congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany last November, which contained an appeal to the USA and the USSR "to begin at an agreed-upon time a controlled freeze of the testing and deploying, and then of the production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles".

Neither has the nuclear freeze movement on both sides of the Atlantic subsided in the least after the USA and NATO started the deployment of new American missiles on the European continent. Proof of this is the setting up in the USA last December of a new national antiwar organization: Electors in Support of a Freeze—1984. The primary task of the new organization is to draw American peace advocates into the election campaign in the country, to put the problem of curbing the arms race, freezing nuclear arsenals and averting a thermonuclear catastrophe in the focus of this campaign.

The West European public is resolutely coming out against the new round of the arms race being launched by the USA

and NATO. Demanding an immediate end to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles there, it is also calling for urgent measures to freeze nuclear arsenals. The scope of this struggle is steadily growing.

In today's world the proposal for a nuclear freeze has become a sort of a litmus paper with the help of which one can accurately identify the proponents and the opponents of the arms race.

The Soviet Union's attitude to the nuclear freeze movement is set forth in the statement of the Soviet delegation at the 2nd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament of June 15, 1982: "In search of measures that could effectively put an end to the arms race many politicians and public figures of different countries have turned lately to the idea of a freeze—an end to the further buildup of nuclear potentials. Although there are differences in views on the subject, on the whole they seem to be in the right direction. We regard them as a reflection of the profound concern of the peoples about their fate. Figuratively speaking, the peoples have cast their votes in favour of preserving the most precious thing in the world—human life".

*Editing completed on April 12, 1984*

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ЗАМОРАЖИВАНИЕ: КТО ЗА И КТО ПРОТИВ

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PLEASE DO NOT PASS H. J. RES. 4: ANY KIND OF NUCLEAR  
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## Sources Are Cited for Charge Of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze

By LESLIE MAITLAND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — The White House today cited Government reports and magazine articles as documentation for President Reagan's contention that "foreign agents" had helped "insurgate" the movement in the United States to freeze nuclear arms.

Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary, said the State Department had issued reports on the Soviet infiltration of the peace movement and said further documentation was contained in articles in The Reader's Digest, Commentary and The American Spectator.

President Reagan's remark at his news conference Thursday night came in response to a question as to whether evidence existed of foreign involvement in the movement to freeze the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Mr. Reagan said he could not discuss "intelligence matters," but that "plenty of evidence" existed. He said that the "overwhelming majority" of those who supported nuclear freeze proposals were "sincere and well-intentioned."

But he added, "There has been, in the organization of some of the big demonstrations, the one in New York, and so forth, there is no question about foreign agents that were sent to help instigate and help create and keep such a movement going."

### Remarks Called 'McCarthyism'

Some critics of the President's remarks accused him of trying to stifle debate on the issue.

"It is disheartening to see an American President returning to the tactics of McCarthyism," said Morton H. Halperin, speaking for the American Civil Liberties Union. "Charges of secret manipulation by foreign agents poison the well of public debate.

"Americans must be free to debate issues on their merits and speak out without being subject to red-baiting," Mr. Halperin asserted.

Leslie Cagan, one of the coordinators of the disarmament rally held in New York June 12, said: "The President is hypocritical when he argues for increased military spending to help 'defend democracy' while at the same time he undermines our democratic right to public protest. The assertion that the American people are being manipulated by 'foreign agents' only serves to divert our energies away from the real issues: the clear and present dangers presented by our nuclear arsenals."

However, Roger S. Young, assistant

director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Congressional and public affairs, said that the President was "accurate" in describing "the Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." Mr. Young said, "The F.B.I. has received that information and has furnished it for the White House.

"We are not casting aspersions on the peace movement," he said, "but we know the Soviets have targeted it as the place to exert influence, not just in the United States, but in other parts of the world."

The Reader's Digest article cited by the White House as a source of documentation for Mr. Reagan's remark — "The K.G.B.'s Magical War for 'Peace'" — appeared last month and was written by John Barron. In it, Mr. Barron wrote that the "objective" of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, is "to secure military superiority for the Soviet Union by persuading the United States to abandon new weapons systems." The name of its campaign, he says, is "nuclear freeze."

Another article mentioned by the White House, "Perspective on the Peace Movement," by William E. Griffith in last June's Reader's Digest, stated, "The Soviets have fed funds and propaganda materials to some European peace groups and that 'a Soviet-front organization has allied itself to the movement.'"

Other sources listed by the White House included:

"The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," by Vladimir Bukovsky in Commentary last May; "The Counterfeit Peace Makers: the Atomic Freeze," by Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, in The American Spectator of June 1982; a State Department report of last July entitled "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," and hearings of February 1980 before the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which involved testimony from the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet covert actions abroad.

But some critics of the President were not satisfied. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, speaking in New Orleans at a meeting of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen, said that as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he would "challenge the President to produce" information supporting his statement "in closed session, if he chooses."



Sent by State Dept  
June 1986

## A Nuclear Freeze

--While the U.S. Government shares the concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end costly competition in nuclear arms, a nuclear freeze is not an effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives.

--A nuclear freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military buildup and lock in Soviet advantages. A freeze would preserve existing Soviet advantages in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that have resulted from the massive Soviet buildup of the last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised considerable restraint.

--About three quarters of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over half the the total Soviet strategic weapons are on launch systems five years old or less; only four percent are on systems over 15 years old. Thus a freeze would ensure that the U.S. strategic systems would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet systems.

--A freeze would undercut the US commitment of the NATO Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring 1985) in LRINF warheads.

--A freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and many elements would be unverifiable. It would require extensive and complex negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of the proposed freeze, especially those involving production and testing of certain systems, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement for genuine arms reductions.

--By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.

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**THE  
NUCLEAR  
FREEZE**

April 1982



# The Nuclear Freeze

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

## What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- *Produce significant reductions* in the arsenals of both sides;
- *Result in equal levels of arms on both sides*, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- *Are verifiable*, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- *Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war*, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*.

## What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- *A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- *A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- *A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult.* The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating

Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
 SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile  
 SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine  
 ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile




table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- *A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- *A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

### A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

**ICBMs.** Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

**Sea-Based Forces.** The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

**Bombers.** When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

The chart on pages 4 and 5 compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced 12 new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

### **Conclusion**

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

quest for lasting peace. And, over time, as the nations mutually reduce their nuclear armaments (again, in a way that can be scientifically verified by all concerned) the threat of atomic holocaust will significantly diminish.

If the world fails to achieve this kind of nuclear disarmament is there any doubt that sooner or later, either by design or accident, one nation or the other will use its nuclear weapons?

And if that happens it is foregone that other nations will respond without restraint.

The result would have to be near-total destruction of life on earth. (Just recall the panic, loss of human life, damage and contamination of food hundreds of miles away when a single accidental melt-down occurred recently in the Soviet Union.)

But nuclear destruction need not happen. We have the capacity, through verifiable agreements such as the initiative proposes, to make the threat of nuclear war obsolete.

What would be the State of Alaska's role in this? The initiative calls upon the governor to conduct our Alaskan affairs in ways that conform with this policy. It directs the lieutenant governor to deliver copies of the Act to Congress and to the President of the United States. It lets our national leaders and policymakers know that Alaskans stand for common-sense peace.

Similar initiatives have already passed in local Alaska elections. Now Alaska, alone of all the states, has a nuclear freeze initiative on the ballot this fall. This is our chance to speak and act positively on the issue of peace not only statewide but nationally through press attention to our unique ballot question.

Mike M. Miller, Alaska State Representative & prime sponsor.

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## Statement OPPOSING the Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition

Your vote on this resolution sends a message—an international message. Unfortunately, this resolution aims the wrong message at the wrong people. It is also a naive, simplistic and cruelly false solution to a complex and deadly problem which it would only aggravate.

Chernobyl and Bhopal show that the ultimate danger to human survival is technology itself, not just the risk of nuclear war. Future energy or biogenetic disasters could terminate life on our planet even more certainly than "nuclear winter", and the Soviet system suppresses genuine environmental activism. A primary source of Arctic air pollution is the USSR. Nuclear weapons ended the "conven-

tional" holocaust of World War II, and Deterrence has been one of the few successes in curbing Soviet militarism and mistakes.

A "freeze" of the research, development and production of nuclear weapons cannot be verified. Our spy satellites may read license plates, but the Soviets have nonetheless succeeded in seriously violating existing nuclear and biological weapons treaties. The Soviets' unrepented murder of Major Arthur Nicolson demonstrates that even their signed guarantees of on-site treaty verification inspections mean nothing.

Our government has heard our concern about the cost and dangers of the arms race. It has tried to negotiate fair, verifiable disarmament treaties which will also continue deterring war. The Soviets refuse these and break others. Genuine Soviet peace activists attempting to petition their government are condemned to KGB psychiatric prisons.

Soviet leaders do not feel threatened by the terror and terrible costs of the arms race. They see Western "peace" activism as only a tool for nuclear terrorism, to demoralize our resistance to their increasingly aggressive militarism. Our FBI verified KGB involvement in the formation of the American freeze movement.

When unilateral agitation like this resolution undercuts our government's bargaining position and even leads Soviet leaders to think the arms race may be winnable, they have no use for genuine disarmament. While the Kremlin promotes a nuclear arms freeze, even the **Washington Post** has editorially opposed it as bad policy.

This resolution tells the Kremlin that nuclear terrorism works on Alaskans. Such fear and weakness precipitated Hitler's invasion of Poland and the Pearl Harbor attack. Such agitation led to our desertion of the Cambodians and Vietnamese and to the genocide which resulted.

Despite Kremlin propaganda, Soviet military preparations betray a doctrine that nuclear war is "winnable". (Even our Pentagon has renounced that.) Strategic advantage goes to the attacker, and Soviet development and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems surpassed us in the 1970's. Freezing our attempt to restore deterrence encourages Soviet attack.

Judging by their fast reaction to our State Senate's Wrangel Island resolution and Gennady Gerasimov's recent visit here, Soviet leaders realize Alaska's military and geopolitical importance and monitor us closely.

If you want to do something to help deter another world war, to express solidarity with our government's struggle for genuine disarmament and to send the Kremlin a strong and clear message that Alaskans can't be snowed, then please help vote this down.

Lou Coatney, Juneau

**BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1**  
**Initiative No. 83-03**

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE**

The initiative would officially recognize that the prevention of nuclear war is the greatest challenge facing the Earth and that the nuclear arms race dangerously increases the risk of a war that would destroy humanity. The initiative would promote mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze, to be followed by nuclear weapons reduction. The initiative would direct the governor to conduct the states affairs in conformity with the initiative's goals.

A vote "FOR" adopts the initiative.

FOR

A vote "AGAINST" rejects the initiative.

AGAINST

**NEUTRAL SUMMARY—83-03**

**Prepared by the Legislative Affairs Agency**

This initiative would declare as the policy of the state the promotion of a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze to be followed by a reduction in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The initiative bases this policy on its recognition that the greatest challenge facing the earth is the prevention of nuclear war by accident or by design and that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that could be humanity's final war. The governor is directed to conduct the affairs of the state and to carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

**FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSITION**

**For An Act Entitled:** "An Act relating to the establishment of a nuclear freeze as the policy of the State."

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

Section 1. **DECLARATION OF POLICY.** It is the policy of the State of Alaska: (1) to recognize that the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occur-

rence of nuclear war by accident or design;

(2) to recognize that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war;

(3) to promote a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Section 2. **IMPLEMENTATION.** (a) The governor shall conduct the affairs of state and carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

(b) The lieutenant governor shall deliver copies of this Act to Congress and the President of the United States.

Section 3. **EFFECTIVE DATE.** This initiative shall be effective when enacted according to law.

**Statement IN SUPPORT of the  
Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition**

Alaskans have a wonderful opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to world peace when they vote August 26. They can do this by casting their vote in the "For" (meaning "yes") column on the Nuclear Freeze Initiative question they'll find on the ballot.

It is important, however, to realize several things the initiative does **not** do:

The initiative does **not** encourage or obligate the U.S. to any sort of **unilateral** or "go-it-alone" policy regarding a freeze or reduction of nuclear warheads. It calls, instead, for a **mutual** freeze and reduction of such weapons. If other nations--particularly the Soviet Union--will not participate, then there is no obligation for the U.S. to do so.

And, the initiative does not call for any sort of "blind trust" toward the Soviets or any other nation. Instead it specifies that any agreement must be not only mutual but **verifiable** before we agree to participate. In other words we have to have arrangements in place to scientifically verify that no one is cheating, or there's no deal.

Truly, we have nothing to lose by adopting this policy.

But what will we gain?

For starters, just the freezing of production of nuclear weapons, just the limiting of arsenals to their present strength—which is already sufficient to destroy civilization as we know it today, many times over—will be a significant step forward in the

(CONTINUED ON BACK SIDE)

## I. The Administration's Position.

### A. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, APRIL 1982. (U.S. Department of State)

Explains reasons for Reagan Administration's opposition to nuclear arms freeze. Cites massive Soviet strategic build-up in 1970's, etc..

### B. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE CONGRESS; FEBRUARY 4, 1985, p.45.

Secretary Weinberger -- "the Pentagon" -- states, "We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'" Explains that even if we Americans don't believe nuclear war is winnable, Soviet leaders -- judging by their preparations [rather than their propaganda] -- apparently do. Further explains that to continue deterring Soviet miscalculations and nuclear war we must meet their standards of deterrence -- not just our own.

### C. SOVIET MILITARY POWER, 1986. (U.S. Defense Department)

Describes ongoing build-up of Soviet war machine and threat it poses. Describes tactical and strategic weapons systems such as first-strike SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and Soviet "star wars" weapons development.

### D. NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. (U.S. Air Force Air University)

Analysis and discussion of warnings about the risk of "nuclear winter" from members of our American scientific community.

## II. 30Mar83 WASHINGTON POST editorial, "The Freeze Debate".

"But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy." Other, excellent points.

## III. ARMS FREEZE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST. 1984.

Soviet Novosti Press Agency pamphlet promoting a nuclear arms freeze which I picked up in Soviet San Francisco consulate. Attacks Reagan Administration for its objections to the freeze.

## IV. Soviet KGB involvement in formation of American freeze movement.

### A. Oct82 READER'S DIGEST, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" by John Barron.

Describes KGB's infiltration/manipulation of Western peace movements. Active involvement of Soviet KGB operatives Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov at March 1981 Georgetown University meeting where America's nuclear arms freeze movement was organized and operationally begun.

### B. 13Nov82 NY TIMES, "Sources are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze."

President Reagan had claimed involvement of "foreign agents" in American freeze movement. Critics howled "McCarthyism". White House cites Barron's READER'S DIGEST article as primary source. FBI says President "accurate" in describing "Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." *[The KGB did not get involved to promote peace and disarmament.]*

## V. KGB psychiatric persecution of genuine Soviet peace activists.

### A. 13Sep82 NEW YORKER magazine, "The Talk of the Town: Peace."

Russian peace activist Mikhail Ostrovsky expelled from Soviet Union, describes KGB persecution of members of the nonviolent nongovernment Soviet "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA." Asks Western peace movements to pressure Soviet leaders into releasing group leader Sergei Batovrin from KGB psychiatric prisons. Batovrin forced to take psychiatric drugs. [Batovrin later expelled from USSR.]

Ostrovsky describes how the 80 million members of the official Soviet peace organization are so government-dominated that their demonstration signs are made for them, never handmade.

### B. 21Mar86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "An Appeal for Help for Prisoners of Conscience."

Juneau peace and human rights advocate Charles Rohrbacher describes condemnation of genuine Soviet peace activists -- including two 17-year-old girls -- to KGB psychiatric prison. [Under Amnesty International pressure like this KGB later released three of the prisoners.]

- C. 21Mar86 JUNEAU EMPIRE editorial: "Two Faces of Soviet 'Peace'"  
 Biting contrast of "Soviet Samantha Smith" Katya Lycheva's trip to Disneyland with the KGB condemnation of young Soviet peace activists to psychiatric prison.
- D. 7Jul86 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "The Trap of Arms Control", by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
 President Carter's National Security Advisor explains how Kremlin negotiates arms treaties only for propaganda and improving military superpower status -- not for genuine disarmament. Describes damage done to Western negotiating efforts for genuine disarmament by freeze movement and other anti-deterrence agitation.

VI. Soviet violations of arms treaties.

- A. Spr83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "'Yellow Rain' and the Future of Arms Agreements."  
 Documents treaty-violating use of Soviet toxin weapons against civilians in Afghanistan and Indochina. Describes "bee-droppings" disinformation disseminated through Western media -- hideously obscene, considering the victims' suffering. State Department casigated for bungling the handling of this Soviet treaty violation.
- B. 30Nov83 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet Violations of Arms Treaties."  
 Describes Soviet treaty violations covered in Western media, including accident in Sverdlovsk germ warfare laboratory. Explains "Catch-22" inadequacies of remote sensing -- "national technical means" -- for treaty compliance verification.
- C. ARMS CONTROL: U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, PROBLEMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
- D. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 122: SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1Feb85 (U.S. State Department)  
 FINALLY, Reagan Administration documents and lists Soviet arms treaty violations. U.S. goal of strategic arms reduction (rather than just freeze) described.

VII. Soviet environmental disregard.

- A. 4Oct84 EMPIRE, "Once-pure Arctic Air Dirtied by Soviet, European Industry.", by David Foster, AP.  
 "Despite the area's pristine image, scientists say Arctic air contains as much dirt as some rural and suburban areas, with the Soviet Union the major polluter."
- B. 21Nov84 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Other Testaments" (re-titled by EMPIRE as "Soviet System Poses Biggest Threat of All")  
 Written before Chernobyl, letter describes Soviet radioactive waste disaster at Kymlytym, Sverdlovsk germ disaster, etc., and how Soviet environmental policies represent a longterm threat to human survival even greater than the risk of nuclear war/winter. Says "Day After" and "Testament" films are out of context and distorting since there have been no similar dramatizations broadcast about Soviet environmental disasters, psychiatric prisons, Afghanistan atrocities, etc..

VIII. Soviet interest in Alaska.

- A. 20Feb86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet 'Ultimatum' Delivered to Senators."  
 Alaska Performing Artists for Peace organizer Dixie Belcher lobbies against State Senate's Wrangal Island resolution, claiming Soviets had threatened to end plans for her musical peace tour to Siberia. Dixie never conceded that using her group as a political hammer against the Wrangal resolution was wrong or wouldn't happen again.
- B. 30Apr86 EMPIRE, "Moscow Editor Promotes U.S., Soviet Relationship."  
 Kremlin propagandist Gennadi Gerasimov visits Juneau as guest of Dixie Belcher. (Later, at his World Affairs Council talk, Gerasimov promotes his book attacking U.S. star wars program. In response to my question about the Soviet killing of U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicolson (in the course of his treaty-authorized direct/on-site verification inspection duties) Gerasimov says Major Nicolson was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time" -- no regrets or Soviet commitment to prevent future killings.)

IX. Consequences of U.S. quitting its military defense responsibilities.

"The Killing Fields" film

Searing depiction of mass extermination of Cambodians by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Almost half the population murdered or starved by collectivization. The typical attempt to blame Cambodian suffering on Nixon didn't wash.

*Handwritten signature and date:*  
 [Signature]  
 1 Aug 86



## Senate Rules Committee

Senator Richard I. (Dick) Eliason, Chairman

RECEIVED

MAR 06 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Mitch Abood

FROM: Senator Dick Eliason

RE: Nuclear disarmament

Please read the resolution to which Secretary of State Shultz refers in his telegram and read SJR 21 which I introduced.

SJR 21 is an expression of support for the goals which the Secretary of State has been pursuing in Geneva for the past two years on behalf of the Reagan administration.

I would appreciate a hearing on SJR 21 as soon as possible, so that we may send our message of support to Washington, D.C. It seems timely in light of recent developments in negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

All excerpts from Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy, (emphasis added throughout)

Excerpts from "Prospects for World Peace" by President Reagan, an address before the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in New York City on Sept. 22, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, November 1986:

"It is for this reason that I wrote last summer to Mr. Gorbachev with the new arms control proposals. Before discussing the proposals, let us be clear about which weapons are the most dangerous and threatening to peace. The threat does not come from defensive systems, which are a shield against attack, but from offensive weapons -- ballistic missiles that hurtle through space and can wreak mass destruction on the surface of the earth, especially the Soviet Union's heavy, accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple warheads, which have no counterparts in size or number in any other country.

"That is why the United States has long urged radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these offensive systems. Note that I said reduction; for this is the real purpose of arms control; not just to codify the levels of today's arsenals, not just to channel their further expansion, but to reduce them in ways that will reduce the danger of war. Indeed, the United States believes the prospect of a future without such weapons of mass destruction must be the ultimate goal of arms control.

"I am pleased to say that the Soviet Union has now embraced our idea of radical reductions in offensive systems. At the Geneva summit last November, we agreed to intensify work in this area. Since then, the Soviets have made detailed proposals which, while not acceptable to us, appear to represent a serious effort. So, we continue to seek a 50% reduction of American and Soviet arsenals -- with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. If the Soviet Union wants only a lesser reduction, however, we are prepared to consider it but as an interim measure. In other provisions, as well, we have sought to take account of Soviet concerns. So, there has been movement.

"Similarly, in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States seeks the total elimination of such missiles on a global basis. Again, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing such a goal in stages, we are prepared to conclude an interim agreement without delay."

"As the United States has repeatedly made clear, we are moving toward a future of greater reliance upon strategic defence. The United States remains prepared to talk about how -- under what ground rules and process -- we and the Soviet Union can do this cooperatively. Such strategic defenses, coupled with radical reductions in offensive forces, would represent a safer balance and would give future statesmen the opportunity to move beyond it to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth."

Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations  
White House Statement excerpt  
Aug. 31, 1986  
Department of State Bulletin, November 1986

The United States and the Soviet Union will begin a new round of discussions on arms control in Geneva on September 18. An interagency arms control group has been meeting during the past several weeks to prepare for this round of talks. The United States considers this new round to be important in the process of reaching an agreement for meaningful arms control leading to total elimination of nuclear weapons. The September discussions come at a critical juncture in the process.

The recent exchanges between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have served to underscore the seriousness of the discussions. We are pleased that the Soviet Union has moved from a position of limiting the expansion of the arms race to a discussion of reducing the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

U.S. Policy on Arms Control: Purpose, Prospects, and Process  
by Allen Holmes (Ambassador Holmes, Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs) Excerpt from address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on June 2, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Sept. 1986:

"The objective of this Administration is to enhance security and reduce the risk of war, to ensure strategic stability at the lowest feasible level, and ultimately -- some day -- to do away with nuclear weapons."

Excerpt from letter from President Reagan to the Congress, August 5, 1986, accompanying unclassified version of classified report on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Sept. 1986:

"I want again to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to receive my highest priority. This is the most direct path to achieving greater stability and a safer world."

Excerpts from Unclassified Report to the Congress on U. S. Interim Restraint Policy and Representative Soviet and U.S. Dimantlement and Strategic Force Projections With and Without SALT I and II, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Oct. 1986

From I. Introduction: U.S. Interim Restraint Policy and U. S. Responses to Soviet Noncompliance

"In his May 27 statement, the President emphasized that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and will continue to receive, his highest priority. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed to focus, in particular, on areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, as well as an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world."

From IV. Soviet Political and Negotiating Responses

"No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

"Our objectives in Geneva remain the same as stated at the summit: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals."

Excerpts from remarks delivered by President Reagan in Glassboro, New Jersey, June 19, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, September 1986:

"When I met Mr. Gorbachev last November in Geneva, he and I agreed to intensify our effort to reduce strategic arms...And we both spoke of the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons."

"In this essay on peace, then, we can assert that the time has come to move forward. Let us leave behind efforts to seek only limits to the increase of nuclear arms and seek instead actual arms reductions -- the deep and verifiable reductions that Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed to negotiate. The goal here is not complicated. I am suggesting that we agree not on how many new, bigger, and more accurate missiles can be built, but on how to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear missiles.

"Let us leave behind, too, the defense policy of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, as it's called, and seek to put in its place a defense that truly defends. You know -- let me interrupt right here and say that possibly you haven't considered much about this system. This MAD policy, as it's called -- and incidentally, MAD stands for mutual assured destruction, but MAD is also a description of what the policy is. It means that if we each keep enough weapons that we can destroy each other, then maybe we'll both have enough sense not to shoot those weapons off. That's not exactly the way for the world to go on, with these massed terribly destructive weapons aimed at each other and the possibility that some day a madman somewhere may push a button and the next day the world starts to explode."

ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE - SENATE

SENATOR RICHARD I. ELIASON

RULES COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN  
LABOR & COMMERCE COMMITTEE, VICE-CHAIRMAN  
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL  
RESOURCES COMMITTEE  
FISHERIES SUBCOMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN



(C)

*See me plz*

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M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Senate State Affairs Committee  
Senator Mitch Abood, Chairman  
Senator Rick Uehling, Vice-Chairman  
Senator Jan Faiks  
Senator William Hensley  
Senator Joe Josephson

FROM: Senator Dick Eliason

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick Eliason".

DATE: March 30, 1987

RE: SJR 21 -- Requesting the President of the United States to propose an international freeze on nuclear weapons, verification safeguards for the freeze, the use of nuclear weapons funds for peaceful nonnuclear uses, and nuclear disarmament by all nations; and requesting the state Congressional delegation to urge the president to make the proposals.

Attached you will find some information which I turned up in a cursory review of some U.S. foreign policy bulletins. The information identified here, in my opinion, is specifically what Senate Joint Resolution 21 addresses.

Attachments

RECEIVED  
MAR 31 1987

SJR

22

532 22

REQUESTING OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE EFFORTS TO  
MAKE THE ARCTIC AND SUBARCTIC POLLUTION-FREE, AND  
REQUESTING ALASKA'S CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO URGE OUR  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO DO SO

WHEREAS our planet's polar areas are proving to be especially sensitive and vulnerable to environmental harm and pollution of many kinds and from sources in the Northern Hemisphere well outside Arctic and subarctic regions

- 1) as evidenced by the atmospheric pollution now accumulated in the Arctic which exceeds acceptable levels and which is principally from the Soviet Union and industrial Europe, ~~generally~~
- 2) as evidenced by our Arctic peoples already having body burdens of radionuclides in excess of all the world's peoples, except for the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a result of nuclear explosions and accidents which occurred prior to the current ban on atmospheric testing
- 3) as evidenced by the serious and longterm radioactive pollution of Arctic Europe by the recent Soviet civilian nuclear plant disaster at Chernobyl which has contaminated the food supply of the Saami people, *among others*
- 4) as evidenced by the complete destruction to tundra vegetation and soils which even conventional tracked vehicles can do simply by normal movement across such terrain in moderate weather
- 5) and as evidenced by a <sup>polar</sup> disappearance of our planetary atmosphere's vital ozone layer (~~which has started in the Antarctic~~)

WHEREAS any further deposition of nuclear materials in the food-chain of the Arctic and subarctic regions will result in biologically unacceptable radiation *levels* for our peoples and ecosystems  
*Arctic*

WHEREAS the storage or transportation of highly toxic materials and wastes therefore poses unusually high potential risk to the health, safety and environment of Alaskans

WHEREAS war of any kind in the Arctic or another world war anywhere — which would probably include the use of nuclear, chemical, biological or other strategic weapons of mass destruction — would environmentally devastate the Arctic

WHEREAS our Federal government's defense policy of nuclear deterrence — up-to-date nuclear weapons backed by our solidarity — has given the world over 40 years of safety from another world war of any kind and has thereby proven its effectiveness *and safety*

WHEREAS the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the legislative bodies of Yukon and Greenland have unanimously approved resolutions calling for the Arctic to be restricted to uses which are environmentally safe and conducive to world peace

RECEIVED BY LOUIS COATNEY  
MARCH 1987

AND WHEREAS the people of Alaska desire to live in a world safe from war and pollution and also desire to continue to live in freedom

BE IT RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature that we fully share the concern and outrage about the violations of the Arctic and subarctic environment, previously expressed by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the legislative bodies of Greenland and the Yukon

FURTHER RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature that our Federal government and Alaska Congressional delegation are requested to initiate and promote diplomatic efforts to

1) compel Soviet and other world governments to conduct their nuclear and other industrial activities in an environmentally safe manner or accept severe penalties for not doing so

2) hold the next ~~summit~~ USA/USSR summit conference in Alaska so that world attention and concern might be drawn to the environmental concerns of Arctic and subarctic peoples

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature asks our Federal government to redouble its efforts within our own country to protect the Arctic and subarctic environment

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature appreciates and fully supports our Federal government's continuing efforts to negotiate genuine, verifiable arms reduction treaties which will reduce the probability of war and weapons of massive environmental destruction being used anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere or world in general *in the*

FURTHER RESOLVED that, until Soviet and other governments agree to genuine and verifiable arms reduction treaties, the Alaska State Legislature asks our Federal government to continue to preserve world peace with nuclear deterrence or whatever other strategic means which will most effectively and safely achieve that noble and vital goal

COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Ronald Reagan, President; the Honorable Ted Stevens and Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; the Honorable George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State; and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USSR.



RECEIVED MAR 09 1987  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 4 1987

The Honorable Jan Faiks  
Senator  
Alaska State Legislature  
Post Office Box V  
Juneau, Alaska 99881

RECEIVED  
MAR 20 1987

Dear Senator,

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on HJR 4, relating to a nuclear-free zone in the arctic, subarctic, and the state of Alaska

For over four decades, the policy of deterrence has successfully prevented the outbreak of global war or armed conflict between nuclear powers. The integrity of the Western alliance system has been a central element in maintaining the credibility of deterrence against both nuclear and conventional attack. The United States has played a central role in this effort by maintaining the capability to project its military forces thousands of miles from its shores in order to meet the security commitments that lie at the heart of deterrence.

In the past the US has supported, on a case-by-case basis, certain international regional nuclear free zone proposals which advanced non-proliferation interests while not undermining existing security arrangements or our deterrent capabilities. Thus the U.S. supported the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Antarctic Treaty and the Seabed Treaty, while opposing proposed Nordic and Central European nuclear free zones. With regard to the Treaty of Rarotonga, generally known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), the U.S. decided recently that in view of its global security interests and responsibilities it is not, under current circumstances, in a position to sign the associated protocols to that treaty.


The US has a deep commitment to bringing about a safer strategic environment involving progressively less reliance on nuclear weapons. It shares the vision of a world freed from the incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear devastation. The US goal in arms control is to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war by reaching equitable and verifiable agreement on deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

The U.S. believes, however, that the growing number of proposals for regional nuclear free zones has the potential to undermine deterrence as the cornerstone of Western security. The proliferation of such zones, especially when unmatched by

disarmament in the Soviet bloc, clearly would be detrimental to Western security and could also limit our future ability to meet security commitments world-wide.

In view of your concerns regarding national defense, I have taken the liberty of sharing your letter with the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jayne H. Plank".


Jayne H. Plank  
Director, Intergovernmental Affairs  
Office of Legislative and  
Intergovernmental Affairs

*Jr*  
Drafted: PM/ISP:WFHickman  
Wang 7528S 3/2/87

Cleared: PM:VLehovich  
PM/ISP:CDuelfer  
PM/ISP:SButcher  
PM/PD:DMozena  
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
# THE ARCTIC WORLD



# **CORRECTION**

**THIS DOCUMENT  
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED  
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY**


# THE ARCTIC WORLD



9 March 87  
Bill Leighty, 586-1424

1. Does it declare Alaska a nuclear-free zone (as the City of Chicago did) or does it request Congress and the Governor to negotiate treaties for such designation?
2. Has it any legal effect on the U.S. military's ability to move equipment and personnel into or within Alaska?
3. Does it confirm and endorse Alaska voters' request to end the nuclear arms race, in their 58.4% approval of the "nuclear freeze" initiative in August '86?
4. Does it blame the President, Congress, the military, or anyone else for the nuclear arms race?
5. What IS the purpose and probable effect of this legisla?
6. What is security? How do we get it?
7. What are "weapons"? What are "nuclear weapons"? How does one use them?
8. Would ending the nuclear arms race make Alaskans, Americans, and the world more secure or less secure? Can, and should, the Alaska legislature influence our change in thinking about security in this nuclear age?
9. Three-Mile Island, Bhopal chemical plant, Challenger, and Chernobyl are complex systems that failed catastrophically. "Nuclear deterrence" is an enormously complex system of bombs, warheads, missiles, planes, ships, satellites, computers, and people. Will it also fail catastrophically? What will be the result? Will we have a nuclear war? What can the Alaska Legislature do to prevent that?
10. What is your identification and loyalty on this issue:
  - to the President and his advisers?
  - to our Congressional delegation?
  - to the military?
  - to deterrence theory or policy?
  - to the U.S.A.?
  - to our specie?
  - to life on Earth?
11. Is "peace", as the absence of war or an interlude between wars, adequate in our nuclear age? Has war become obsolete, because:
  - it doesn't work any more, for us in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, for Iraq and Iran, in Central America?
  - we're afraid to use total war, as we did in WW II?
  - any war could escalate to nuclear and threaten all life?Do we need to build a new kind of security?
12. Is this an ethical, moral, religious issue? How do you personally justify the nuclear arms race? Is this an appropriate opportunity to speak against it?

RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1987



NATO troops on maneuvers in West Germany. In the alliance, an attack on one is an attack on all.

Hawke postponed an ANZUS council meeting planned for 1985 and said the alliance existed "in name only."

Lange credits Labor's electoral success to his strong antinuclear stance. Yet critics within his own party want it modified, while the opposition National Party says that only the Kremlin will benefit. Lange shows no inclination to yield. "Every country in the world has a compelling interest in the process of disarmament and arms control. No country can abdicate its interest in that process. . . . We pledged there will be no nuclear weapons in New Zealand, and there will not be," he said.

By itself, the loss of New Zealand from Western strategic planning would have little impact. Its forces are too small to tip even the regional power balance. Even so, New Zealand's position is highly disturbing to U.S. policymakers and to several other nations that rely on America for their security.

A big concern is the antinuclear policy of Japan, which theoretically also bars visits by either ships or planes carrying nuclear weapons. As of now, Tokyo does not ask about the vessels and planes at U.S. bases in Japan, and Washington volunteers no information.

**Rising worry.** If New Zealand carries out its plan, the Japanese government's no-questions, no-answers posture could revive pressure from the nation's antinuclear movement. Concern over a weakening of American influence also would be felt in Southeast Asia, where governments friendly to the U.S. already worry about Vietnam and the growing Soviet military presence there.

Moreover, some strategists argue that the breakup of ANZUS inevitably would weaken other alliances and mutual-defense treaties. Events already have frayed the network inspired by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when the cold war was at its most frigid three decades ago. But those that remain are central to Western defenses in the more complex 1980s. Two such pacts already have collapsed.

First to go was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, created by Dulles in 1954 to defend Indo-China against Communism. SEATO failed the test of Vietnam. In 1977, two years after the Communists occupied Saigon, the sizable organization was disbanded, its loss mourned only by bureaucrats in its Bangkok headquarters. The treaty still

## Why Another U.S. Treaty Is Going Down the Drain

**A mix of domestic politics and antinuclear sentiment spells trouble for America and the decades-old ANZUS accord.**

Stubborn opposition to nuclear weapons by one small South Pacific nation threatens to break another link in the worldwide chain of security treaties that defend America and its allies against Communist adventurism.

The immediate controversy centers on legislation introduced in New Zealand's Parliament on December 10 by the government of Prime Minister David Lange that would bar from the country's ports ships capable of carrying nuclear arms.

The Reagan administration worries that if New Zealand goes non-nuclear, there would be political fallout in a dozen or more other nations that are friends or allies of the United States. It could even affect such a strong—and so far tightly knit—security alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Lange's legislation would let him deny port access to any ship unless he was satisfied that it had no atomic weapons. Washington adamantly refuses to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear warheads aboard its warships to avoid tipping off the Soviet Union. Passage of the measure surely would end the 34-year-old ANZUS de-

fense treaty linking New Zealand with the U.S. and Australia. The U.S. State Department already has warned that enactment probably would mean "termination of our alliance relationship with New Zealand."

Lange's plan furthers a drive that began in 1984 when his Labor Party swept to power on an antinuclear platform. Last February, he refused to let a U.S. destroyer dock during ANZUS military exercises unless Washington certified that it had no nuclear arms.


The U.S. and Australia reacted firmly. Washington canceled the exercises, expressing "grave concern." A few days later, Australian Prime Minister Robert



Lange's policies imperil relations with U.S.

# U.S. Commitments, Active and Defunct

Treaties pledging United States to defend other countries—



Note: Cuba was suspended in 1962 from the Rio Pact's framework organization, the Organization of American States, but remains a signatory of the treaty itself.

exists, but there is no prospect that it will be revived.

Next to fall was the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), put together in 1958 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain to contain Soviet expansion southward into the Mideast or the Arabian Sea. Iraq opted out quickly, contributing little more than the original name of the umbrella treaty, the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. was only an associate member, but it played a dominant role in the treaty's decade-plus of reasonably vigorous life.

By the late 1970s, the interests of CENTO's full members had so diverged that the organization was a political anachronism. The treaty was dissolved in 1979 at the request of Turkey, which by then was more concerned with thwarting Greek ambitions on Cyprus than with containing Soviet expansion.

The 1947 Rio Pact covering much of the Western Hemisphere was the first product of U.S. efforts to set up multinational security systems. It still exists. So does the Organization of American States (OAS), established the next year to reaffirm the pact's security commitments and bring together 30-odd other inter-American agencies.

The OAS umbrella enabled President Johnson to send troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent a

possible Communist takeover. Yet Latin American suspicion of the U.S. prevented Washington from establishing a permanent inter-American force to deal with insurgencies.

One oddity of the group's loosely drawn provisions is that Cuba remains a signatory of the Rio Pact even though it has been "excluded" from OAS affairs since 1962 and was the target of OAS-imposed sanctions in 1964. Even more bizarre is the fact that, at least in theory, Nicaragua could call on the U.S. and other Rio Pact members to help defend against U.S.-financed *contras* fighting to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Managua.

**Honored alliances.** Of all the cold-war security pacts, only NATO and bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines remain strong enough to weather successive crises. Questions sometimes are raised, however, about the strength of the U.S. commitment to its treaty partners and about NATO's long-term ability to cope with threats outside the Central European heartland.

NATO nations are firmly pledged to regard an attack on one member as an attack on all. Direct, conventional aggression anywhere between the North Sea and Italy certainly would be met by joint action. Less certain is how other countries in the alliance, including the U.S., would respond to Soviet nibbling at NATO's Greek or Turkish flanks. Most doubtful of all is whether

NATO would counter a Soviet thrust into the Middle East.

The U.S. would be certain to fight if South Korea were attacked, if only because American troops help guard the northern frontier. Any attack on Japan also would trigger a U.S. military response. Maintaining the world's second largest economic power as a democratic ally is one of the most basic American strategic aims.

There is less certainty about whether the U.S. would defend the Philippines, especially against internal aggression. This reluctance is partly the bitter legacy of Vietnam and partly distaste for the embattled regime of President Ferdinand Marcos.

No matter what a treaty may promise, the hard facts of national interests and perceived dangers are the final determinants of whether security agreements endure or fall apart.

NATO works because its key members have common interests and see a direct threat from the Soviet Union. But to Lange in the South Pacific, according to a U.S. official, "it is not credible that Soviet tanks might someday roll onto New Zealand beaches."

Unless this view changes and international goals take preference over national interests, the curtain seems certain to ring down on ANZUS just as it did on SEATO and CENTO. □

By JAMES WALLACE with the overseas bureau and BOB HORTON in Washington

essential to ship safety, interdependent ocean commerce, and prevention of pollution from ship accidents—subjects of equal concern to all nations.

We can also see the probability of greater use of international organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, as umbrellas for cooperative marine scientific research, including that within national EEZs.

#### Closing Remarks

As you can appreciate, our government's LOS program is a replete and active one whether it is in the area of navigational freedoms, EEZ implementation, fisheries, deep seabed mining, the marine environment, maritime boundaries, or marine scientific research. The areas of activity address every major part of the LOS Convention. So when one hears the cliché that the law of the sea is dead, I think it is well to reflect upon the multiplicity of issues of oceans use and oceans law which arise and must be dealt with on a continuing, daily basis. The trend, if anything, is intensifying.

To be sure, there are those who will argue that an LOS system can only be meaningful if the United States is party to an agreed deep seabed minerals regime. And I can understand this point of view, while at the same time disagreeing with it. There are too many other aspects of oceans use and law which we must press forward. That is precisely what we have done and in an internationally coordinated fashion. We must continue to work cooperatively and diligently with other countries, especially coastal states, to ensure that the positive results of the LOS Convention are accentuated and that extensions of coastal jurisdiction are carried out in conformity with international law. I hope my remarks this evening have succeeded, at least in part, in conveying both the flavor and the detail of how our government is going about this challenging and fascinating task in this important period in the evolution of oceans law. ■

## U.S.-New Zealand Disagreement on Port Access for U.S. Ships

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
JULY 2, 1986<sup>1</sup>

In Manila Prime Minister Lange and Secretary of State Shultz discussed the ship visit problem between our two countries. The meeting concluded with a recognition that the Government of New Zealand does not feel that it can live with U.S. policy on this issue, but that we would part company as friends. We regret that the position of the United States, both with reference to that meeting and with respect to our efforts to find a satisfactory resolution, has been misconstrued.

The United States maintains a worldwide policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. Implicit in this policy is a requirement for ambiguity about the nature of the armaments of our ships. Our other allies recognize the need for this ambiguity, and none feel constrained to make judgments about individual ships. It is on this point that the policy of the Government of New Zealand differs significantly from that of all our other allies.

If New Zealand maintains its intention to say no to ships operating under the ambiguity of neither confirming nor denying, or to nuclear-powered ships, then it is not possible for us to send Navy vessels into New Zealand's ports. This vitiates the principal contribution that New Zealand makes to the alliance.

Suggestions that the United States has refused to engage in negotiation or

consultation on this issue are at variance with the facts. The United States has made a considerable effort to work with New Zealand over the past 2 years to resolve the port ban issue and to restore normal port access. We have maintained intensive contacts and understand fully the New Zealand Government's position. Unfortunately, the New Zealand Government has as yet not put forward any proposal to restore normal port access compatible with our global neither confirming nor denying requirements.

It has been alleged that the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security pact] treaty contains only an obligation to consult. Article IV of the treaty clearly states that an armed attack on any of the parties in the Pacific area would be a danger to the other parties and that all would act to meet the common danger. The U.S. Government has consistently confirmed that it would fully and promptly fulfill its security commitments under ANZUS, by both military and nonmilitary means, as best would meet the threat.

New Zealand's withdrawal of an essential element of its ANZUS participation inevitably must alter the obligations of the United States with respect to its security responsibilities to New Zealand. We continue to hope that New Zealand will eventually restore normal port access on a basis comparable to other alliance partners.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department deputy spokesman Charles Redman. ■

DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN

# ***gist***

A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations  
Not a comprehensive policy statement  
Bureau of Public Affairs • Department of State

## Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

October 1985

Background: In response to requests by Congress, President Reagan submitted reports in January 1984 and February 1985 on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. They document the grounds for serious US concern regarding the Soviet Union's observance of the agreements. In the February 1985 report the President stated: "In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them."

Following are the key findings of the President's 1985 report:

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol: The Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of the 1972 Convention as well as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting into the atmosphere of radioactive matter and caused such matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize environmental contamination by radioactive substances.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 by conducting underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding its 150 kiloton limit. Although this treaty has not been ratified, both parties are obligated under customary international law to abide by its terms because neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Further, each country has stated it would observe the kiloton limit.

Helsinki Final Act: During the Polish crisis in 1981, the Soviet Union violated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act when it conducted a military maneuver exceeding 25,000 ground troops without providing the prior notification or other information required.

SALT II Treaty: The Soviet Union has been encrypting telemetry (radio signal) information from missile tests in a way that violates the SALT II Treaty. The treaty bans deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by the other party's national technical means. Although the US has stated its intention not to ratify SALT II, both parties in 1981 made political commitments not to undercut the treaty. Soviet encryption practices violate this commitment.

SALT II Treaty: By testing the SS-X-25 ICBM, the Soviet Union has violated the SALT II Treaty provision that permits only one new type of ICBM. The Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type of ICBM. Even if one accepts the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, the missile would violate the treaty provision prohibiting the testing of an existing ICBM with a single re-entry vehicle whose weight is less than 50% of the ICBM's throw-weight. This provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single-warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to multiple-warhead systems.

SALT II Treaty: Although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union probably has violated the SALT II Treaty's ban on deployment of the SS-16 ICBM.

ABM Treaty: A large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To preclude construction of radars that could be used for a territorial ABM defense, the treaty limits deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Krasnoyarsk radar meets neither of these requirements.

ABM Treaty: This construction and other Soviet activities suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which would entirely negate the ABM Treaty. Other activities include development of components of a new ABM system that apparently could be deployed in a mobile mode, and probable testing of components of surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) in an ABM mode. Mobile ABM components are banned by the ABM Treaty; SAMS are permitted to counter aircraft, but they may not be given the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and they may not be tested in an ABM mode.

US action: The Soviet Union thus far has failed to provide satisfactory explanations or undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate US concerns. Nevertheless, the President decided early in June to continue our policy not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements to the extent the Soviets exercise comparable restraint. He stated his determination that we go the extra mile--to try to establish a framework of mutual, interim restraint to support our ongoing effort in Geneva to reach agreement on reducing nuclear arms. We will constantly review our policy in light of Soviet conduct, including correction of violations, continued growth in Soviet strategic forces, and Soviet seriousness in the negotiations. The President has directed the Defense Department to identify specific actions the US could take to augment as necessary our strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations.

*Boys "on-site verification"*

## IN PERSON

Thomas B. Cochran

René T. Riley

Thomas B. Cochran, senior staff scientist for the Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. (NRDC), has put himself in the epicenter of the debate over nuclear testing.

The council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences agreed last May to participate in a joint nuclear test ban verification project, an undertaking intended to show that it's possible to collect and exchange testing information with the Soviets.

Cochran, one of the persons in charge of NRDC's nuclear program in the council's Washington office, subsequently traveled to the Soviet Union to set up monitoring stations 100 miles from the primary Soviet underground testing site in Semipalatinsk. Three aboveground seismic stations are currently in place; one was damaged by a fire in mid-January. Cochran is due to return in February to install more sensitive equipment and a computer system. Three seismic stations are also being set up near the primary U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada.

"We're making a statement," Cochran said. "And we've backed up our statement with some facts by putting hardware in the field."

W. J. Hannon, the assistant program manager for verification at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., says the data recorded by NRDC could "provide potentially useful information about the seismographic characteristics in the region around the [Soviet] test site." Physicist Richard Garwin, a veteran defense consultant who once worked on developing the hydrogen bomb, calls the project "a remarkable advance."

However, Frank J. Gaffney Jr., deputy assistant Defense secretary for nuclear forces and arms control policy, doesn't see much good that can come of it all. "We are under no illusions as to the mischievous and counterproductive purpose that Soviet authorities hope the NRDC experiment will serve . . ." he wrote in *The Washington Post* last summer. The Soviets are using Cochran's group, he wrote, "to confuse the domestic debate about the need for American nuclear testing and the reasons why we oppose the effort of the Soviet Union and others to



## A Physicist Blasts Away At Verification 'Myths'

promote an inequitable and unverifiable ban on nuclear testing."

In 1980, Cochran started the council's *Nuclear Weapons Databook* series, which details the world's major nuclear arsenals. He says his work on the databooks, and his related research on the environmental impact of nuclear weapons production, led him to believe that private citizens could demonstrate how a test ban might work. The Soviet's unilateral nuclear testing moratorium (which Moscow has threatened to abandon after the next U.S. underground blast, now set for early February), and the refusal of the House last year to approve funds for anything but relatively small-scale nuclear tests, provided fertile ground for Cochran's proposal.

The first year of the verification project is likely to cost NRDC more than \$2 million, most of which will be covered by foundation grants, with the council's 62,000 members providing the rest.

Cochran came to NRDC—a New York-based, nonprofit organization "dedicated to the protection of America's natural resources and the human environment"—13 years ago, planning to stay only temporarily while finishing a critical book about liquid metal fast breeder reactors.

Now Cochran says he wouldn't think of leaving. "To have the same

impact in terms of shaping federal policy, you'd have to have a very high position in government," he said. "Here you can accomplish that at a younger age."

The 46-year-old Cochran is not your typical arms control advocate. A former Navy officer, he once taught mathematics and physics at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Along the way, he earned master's and doctoral degrees in physics from Vanderbilt University. From 1969-71, while on the payroll of a private consulting firm, Cochran helped evaluate new weapons planned for the Army. That work, he said, gave him "a taste of the military-industrial complex from the industrial side."

Subsequently hired by Resources for the Future Inc. in 1971, Cochran concentrated on the environmental effects of the nuclear power industry in general and the liquid metal fast breeder reactor in particular. "The Atomic Energy Commission people were fudging the information to make the breeder look good, when really it looked terrible," he recalled. "It took 12 years to take that program from the highest energy priority program in the nation to the lowest priority in the nation. I don't think it will take 12 years to accomplish a test ban because the major obstacle has now been resolved." □

was not sound. It resulted in the illegal award of the parking garage contract, and other ensuing violations.

Now, the city-borough assembly has hired outside legal assistance. Mr. Gross is being paid at the rate of \$150 per hour of citizens' funds to fight a "citizen," i.e. Ms. Breck. This action raises a few new questions. Why was Mr. Gross selected? What was the procedure used to hire his services as opposed to those of many attorneys who may be more competent and available? Is the present legal staff of the city deemed not competent to represent the city in the lawsuit? If not, is it time the deadwood be weeded out?

After the results of (recent) elections the citizens have expressed themselves by not returning most of the members back to the assembly. I am hopeful, that our newly elected members as well as the existing members will take the sentiments of the citizens into account and be more responsive.

Most of us would like to see a parking facility for the downtown area, but it has to be done right.

Personally, I'd like to express my gratitude to Ms. Breck for reminding us that the municipality and the assembly are accountable to the people. We need to realize the power and the role of the citizen, and be constantly alert for a productive and better government.

SUBMITTED - BEFORE  
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in 99801  
2/Nov 84  
EMPIRE

Dear Editor:

It was indicative that Steve Dahl couldn't even get the date of my 5 Nov. 1984 Empire letter right in his clumsy attempt to distort it. It is more than ironic when anti-defense activists (who have made a fine art of terrifying us with the specter of nuclear holocaust) start accusing others of "paranoia." However, this does raise an interesting aspect of the arms race ques-

tion. "Paranoia" is falsely imaginig or grossly exaggerating danger. "Denial," on the other hand, is denying or irresponsibly minimizing danger which actually does exist. A classic example of this was Churchill's "paranoia" about Hitler before World War II. History proved his critics to be suffering "denial."

I do not deny that there is a continuing possibility of a USA-USSR war occurring, that there is a probability that nuclear germ-gas weapons would be used in such a war — although probably not in the "all-out" manner that anti-defense activists want us to believe — and that there is therefore a (smaller but nonetheless significant) possibility of a "nuclear winter." However, the inability of people like Steve to realize that the Soviet system itself poses an even greater danger to humanity typifies the denial and self-deceit underlying anti-defense agitation in the West.

It is not only that nuclear and biological environmental disasters in the Soviet Union have been worse than what have occurred in the West. More importantly, the automatic cover-ups by the Soviet government have largely succeeded because there is no free press to expose them. (There is literally "no telling" of what more disasters than the few known to us have occurred within the Soviet Union.)

Most importantly (and thanks to KGB slave labor camps, psychiatric prisons, etc.) Soviet government and industry are not accountable to or controllable by the Soviet people. Soviet abuses of human rights, world peace, wildlife and the environment have only been able to be seriously questioned (and sometimes restrained) by external pressures from the West. (This still does not hinder the Soviet Union's killing of whales and its principal contribution to Arctic pollution.) The Soviet commitment to ever-advancing technology means that ever more catastrophic and eventually terminal environmental disasters are inevitable unless the Soviet system is controlled and reformed. Just allowing that system to continue is an intolerable environmental risk.

Massive strategic military power is

all Soviet leaders have or need to give them superpower status and political control. (As Stalin once said, "...and how many divisions does the Pope have?") They are not going to concede any of that power merely out of any kindly concern for humanity. The only genuine hope for us — let alone for Soviet-Bloc peoples — is to compel Soviet leaders to accept real disarmament and political reform by confronting them with the prospect of us strategically dominating them if they don't.

The television film "The Day After" shown a year ago was fundamentally out of context and deceiving simply because it visually confronted people with the horror of the nuclear war we must risk, while overlooking the even more terminal alternative. (I have seen no television dramatizations of KGB psychiatric prisons or Soviet environmental disasters.) This is an artistic (?) form of terrorism.

When we watch reruns of "China Syndrome" we might think of the permanently and radioactively contaminated and quarantined region near Kyshtym in the Soviet Union. (The KGB expended quite a few political prisoners in the clean-up attempt.) Watching "The Andromeda Strain" can also remind us of the future implications of a treaty-violating germ war laboratory accident in Sverdlovsk in 1979 which resulted in the anthrax infection of up to 3,000 Soviet people — many of whom died horribly.

KTOO-TV will be soon showing yet another aftermath film, "Testament." (The 14 Nov 83 Newsweek pans it better than I ever could.) Reminiscent of "On the Beach," the last post-war moments of some American families awaiting a cloud-delivered radioactive death in their strangely untouched middle class surroundings are savored in morbid detail. For those who do enjoy wallowing in this sort of thing, it might be more plausible to imagine the plot delivered by a radioactive or germ-laden cloud generated by the final Soviet environmental disaster.

Respectfully  
Lou Coatney  
9706 Trappers Lane  
Juneau 99801

BY GARRY TRUDEAU

NOW, REMEMBER, PEOPLE, NO PAIN, NO GAIN! I WANT YOU OUT ON THE VOLLEYBALL COURT IN FULL SWEATS EVERY DAY TO GO ON TO MAKE TIME TO CALIFORNIA

DUUUKE!  
DUUUKE!

SO LETS  
GET OUT  
THESE



LOOK AT THAT.  
THEYRE DOING  
THE WAVE.

THEY

**NUCLEAR-  
FREE  
ZONES  
MUST  
BECOME  
A REALITY**






Measures aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world hold an important place in the struggle for the reduction of the sphere of nuclear preparations... We believe that the creation of such zones is not wishful thinking or idealistic day-dreaming. It is a positive phenomenon of international life, reflecting the will of ordinary people to promote peace, cooperation and detente.

*Mikhail GORBACHEV*

## STOP THE NUCLEAR MADNESS





**H**ow can we remove the threat of nuclear war? There is no greater problem facing mankind today. Such quantities of nuclear bombs and shells have been stockpiled in the world that they are enough to destroy all living things on earth many times over. And besides nuclear weapons, chemical, biological, climatic, space-based and other mass destruction weapons have been or are being developed. This is a monstrous distortion of the meaning of human civilization.

This madness was started by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. By using the greatest discovery in nuclear physics for the destruction within seconds of cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, the United States brought mankind to the brink of nuclear suicide.

Common sense revolts against such prospects and demands that nuclear weapons be banned and their appearance where they do not yet exist be prevented. No one should use or threaten to use them, and instead of confrontation there should be peaceful cooperation of nations for the common good.

One of the ways to a non-nuclear world is to create **ZONES FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS**. Thus, villages, towns and vast regions in dozens of countries have declared themselves nuclear-free zones in order to protect themselves from possible nuclear devastation. The activists of this movement have come up with ingenious ways of fighting against the common evil. They put up road signs and posters and devise mottoes warning against the nuclear danger, draft appeals, hold rallies and festivals. They have sponsored international rallies and conferences in Britain, Bulgaria and Spain. The participants in these forums spoke on behalf of tens of millions of people who stand for nuclear-free zones.





## NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

The idea is not a new one. It was put forward by the Soviet Union at a session of a subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on March 27, 1956, as a means of geographical limitation of the sphere of proliferation of nuclear weapons. At that session the Soviet delegate proposed that a zone of nuclear arms limitation and inspection be set up in Europe, more specifically, that the stationing of nuclear-armed units and any atomic and hydrogen weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the neighbouring countries be banned.

The Soviet Union has from the very start attached special importance to lowering the level of nuclear confrontation, especially in those regions where it is the most dangerous, that is, where only a narrow strip of land divides the opposing military-political groupings and where the concentration of armaments and armed forces is very great. Europe was and remains such a region. For the Soviet Union the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe is an important part of the struggle for strengthening peace and reducing the war danger in this continent, a way towards freeing Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet position is appreciated by millions of people around the world. They realize that the creation of nuclear-free zones is not only a means for preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons, but also a sure way leading to:

freeing Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet position is appreciated by millions of people around the world. They realize that the creation of nuclear-free zones is not only a means for preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons, but also a sure way leading to:

- ) AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORLD POLITICAL CLIMATE,
- ) CONSOLIDATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
- ) A CURBING OF THE ARMS RACE, AND
- ) THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

For millions of people the creation of nuclear-free zones also provides a real possibility of not being drawn into a nuclear conflict, of warding off the threat of a nuclear attack, and at least partly reducing for their countries the horrible and unpredictable consequences of a world nuclear conflagration.

The idea of setting up nuclear-free zones has been welcomed with enthusiasm by large numbers of people in dozens of countries, the governments of most of the Balkan states, legislators and local government bodies, by thousands of populated localities—from large European cities to a tiny village on the Fiji Islands, by the inhabitants of vast regions—from the Middle East to the Korean peninsula, who have declared that they do not want to have anything to do with nuclear weapons, and by the residents of individual city districts, villages and even streets.





# PEACE TO OUR HOMES!

In the autumn of 1983 the residents of Zillestrasse in West Berlin unanimously signed a declaration proclaiming their street a nuclear-free zone.

The authors of the declaration made no calculations about the military and technical chances of surviving in a nuclear war. There is no need to do that

on the scale of a street or a city district. The assessments of these West Berliners were of a different nature. By joining their voices to those of millions of like-minded people, they help shape public opinion and the world political climate. In this way they protect their homes.

To desire peace means to work for the removal of the threat of nuclear war, for the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

This is how the Japanese, the only nation that had experienced the fury and blaze of nuclear weapons, look at the matter. More than 600 cities and small towns in Japan have declared their territories nuclear-free. Half of the population of JAPAN, which stands at 120 million, live there.

A similar picture is found in AUSTRALIA, which has a population of 15 million. Many merchant fleet crews have declared their ships peaceable, thus giving them a nuclear-free status.

The city council of NEW YORK is going to carry out a referendum on the question of declaring the largest US city a nuclear-free zone. The call for such a referendum is

contained in a special petition signed by 25,000 New Yorkers—a number far exceeding that required by law.

Residents of the MANITOBA province, the first Canadian province to declare itself a nuclear-free zone,

have put out a proclamation with a striking emblem calling for the banning of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada.

NEW ZEALAND has adopted the same US and British



first Canadian province to declare itself a nuclear-free zone, have put out a proclamation with a striking emblem calling for the banning of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada.

ICELAND has refused to allow US and British nuclear-powered vessels and ships with nuclear weapons on board to call at its ports. The city council of LEEDS,

one of hundreds of British cities and towns that have declared themselves nuclear-free, has issued a booklet calling on its fellow-citizens to face the truth: once a nuclear conflict breaks out, Britain will cease to exist.

The "No to Atomic Weapons" movement in NORWAY, with 300 branches located all over the country, has launched a campaign for setting up a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and against nuclear militarization of the North Atlantic region.

in LISBON, representatives of all political parties, from Catholics to Communists, as well as delegates of different trade unions—teachers, physicians' and journalists' unions—have held a conference under the motto "For an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons".

Five largest communities of the Greek province of LARISSA, which have declared themselves nuclear-free zones, have organized a peace march to the provincial centre where a meeting was held under the slogans for curbing the arms race and turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone.





# SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY



Fighters for peace and against nuclear death are moved by a deep conviction that their cause is a just one. They have the support of all people of goodwill, all peace-loving states.

Their position is also understood and supported by the whole powerful socialist community.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries regard it as their main foreign-policy task to avert the threat of nuclear war. All their initiatives in the world arena are aimed at promoting this goal.

The Soviet Union has been making unremitting efforts in this field.

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, aware of the fatal consequences which the manufacture of superweapons would have,

the USSR proposed banning the use of nuclear arms and eliminating them altogether. The United States, then the sole possessor of these weapons, rejected the proposal, thereby ushering in a wasteful and dangerous arms race.

Soviet peace proposals are reflected in several resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. One of them,

a Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1961.

In 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was signed in Moscow.

Underground nuclear weapon tests are still being carried out, but demands to ban them are being voiced all over the world ever more forcefully with every passing year.

The Soviet Union has set a good example by unilaterally stopping all nuclear weapon tests.

In 1968 an international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded. Under the treaty those states which possess such weapons are not to transfer them to anyone.

...and that the states  
...of the manufacturing  
...of these nuclear weapons  
...with a view to their being  
...of the world community of  
...of the world  
...of the world  
...of the world

The Soviet Union has set a good example by unilaterally stopping all nuclear weapon tests.

In 1968 an international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded. Under the treaty those states which possess such weapons are not to transfer them to anyone,

and non-nuclear states are not to manufacture or acquire such weapons.

Both treaties have been signed and are being observed by an overwhelming majority of countries of the world.


Persistent efforts on the part of the USSR to curb strategic arms race led to the signing of two Soviet-US treaties: SALT-1 in 1972 and SALT-2 in 1979.

They set certain limits for strategic arms, the most destructive and dangerous types of nuclear weapons.

Special mention should be made of the unilateral commitment undertaken by the Soviet Union, in June 1982, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A similar pledge has been made by the People's Republic of China.

If the other nuclear powers follow this example, the most dreadful weapon in the history of mankind will never be used.

Finally, in connection with the Soviet-US talks in Geneva, the USSR has put forward a series of initiatives and proposals covering all the basic issues whose solution is indispensable for halting the arms race and normalizing the international situation.





## FIRST SUCCESSES

Only then do ideas become a real power when they grip the minds of people, said the great Lenin. The idea of nuclear-free zones has caught the imagination of millions of people, breaking down prejudices and resistance and showing the way to a peaceful world.

The first continent to be protected against military rivalry and nuclear weapons was the ice continent in the South pole. In December 1959 an international treaty on the continent of Antarctica was concluded, which provides for the use of its territory solely for peaceful purposes. The treaty bans militarization of the continent and prohibits nuclear tests and burial of nuclear waste there.

In 1964 the idea of turning the vast continent of Africa into a nuclear-free zone was put forward. The newly created Organization of African Unity, which unites all the free and independent states on the continent except the racist Republic of South Africa, announced its readiness to sign a treaty under the aegis of the United Nations on not producing nuclear weapons and not trying to acquire such weapons. Unfortunately, the extremely complex situation within this organization, which is systematically undermined by direct interference of colonialists and international reactionary forces, prevented the signing of such an agreement. However, the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Africa is very much alive. The leaders of many African states have once again put as one of the priority tasks that of freeing the continent from nuclear weapons.

In 1967 the Treaty of Tlatelolco banning nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed in Mexico City. This document of truly historic significance is accompanied by two protocols. According to one of them, signed and ratified by all nuclear powers, they are to observe the nuclear-free status of Latin America and not to infringe it in any form.

This was a real breakthrough in the struggle to make the world nuclear-free. For the first time a populated and rapidly developing region of the world has established for itself an internationally recognized regime prohibiting the acquisition, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. This nuclear-free status is extended to 23 Latin American states

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For almost two decades the signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have not been burdened with nuclear arms problems: there are no nuclear weapons in Latin America. The status of a nuclear-free zone is being observed on a vast territory.

In August 1985 thirteen countries of the South Pacific Forum—Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Niue, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa i Sisifo and Solomon Islands—approved, and the majority of them signed, a Treaty Declaring the South Pacific a Nuclear-Free Zone.





## TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES

In its effort to avert the war threat the Soviet Union ardently supports the idea of creating nuclear-free zones, first of all in Europe.

\* The Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to work for a Europe free from both nuclear (medium-range and tactical) and chemical weapons.

\* The Soviet Union supports proposals by other states on setting up a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons along the line dividing the forces of the two opposing blocs on the European continent, on removing step-by-step nuclear arms from the continent and on creating regional nuclear-free zones and peace zones in Northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic Sea, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

\* The Soviet Union firmly believes that states which do not possess or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories should be given reliable international guarantees as regards their security, guarantees that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.

\* The Soviet Union is prepared to recognize the status of a nuclear-free zone even in the case where not all nuclear powers give such guarantees.

\* As the biggest European power the Soviet Union is ready to consider undertaking

## TO A CRUCIAL ISSUE

a utopian dream, but a real and effective means of strengthening security is confirmed in practice by the above-mentioned Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 signed by the overwhelming majority of states. This treaty, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the treaty of the thirteen island states of the Pacific, promotes the movement for nuclear-free zones and creates the material prerequisites for the setting up of such zones in other regions. The idea of nuclear-free zones, which is sensible and threatens no one, has its enemies—those to whom life is unthinkable without a continual military buildup and who mainly stake on nuclear weapons. Specifically, these are the United States, some of its NATO allies and such militarist states as Israel and the Republic of South Africa.

Nuclear-free zones, zones of peace do not correspond to their policies and are in conflict with their objectives and aspirations. Such zones reduce the possibilities of applying pressure, of intimidation, direct military interference, terror and

guarantees that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.


its NATO allies and such militarist states as Israel and the Republic of South Africa.

• The Soviet Union is prepared to recognize the status of a nuclear-free zone even in the case where not all nuclear powers give such guarantees.

• As the biggest European power the Soviet Union is ready to consider undertaking certain obligations concerning that part of its territory adjacent to a future nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. That the creation of nuclear-free zones is not

Nuclear-free zones, zones of peace do not correspond to their policies and are in conflict with their objectives and aspirations. Such zones reduce the possibilities of applying pressure, of intimidation, direct military interference, terror and aggression. That is why the United States and those who follow its course seek to discredit the idea of nuclear-free zones and hamper its implementation.

*NOTE:  
- No spot*





## WHAT WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE TELL US

There is an old Oriental fairytale about a peasant whose only treasure was his hard-working and beautiful wife. Once he acted in a cowardly way in a critical moment and he lost his faithful wife. For a long time he wandered about the world in search of his treasure. The last of his adventures was an encounter with a huge ferocious tiger. He saw his beloved, whom he had been looking for everywhere, in the tiger's jaws. He threw himself at the tiger, caught his fangs and a miracle happened—the tiger turned into a mountain overgrown with trees where the happy couple built their new home.

The fairytale is called *Dwelling in a Tiger's Jaws*. It comes to mind when one thinks about the threat of nuclear war which can instantly destroy our planet and put an end to all living things on earth—such a colossal destructive power has been accumulated in its monstrous arsenals. Now we ask ourselves: what is to be done—to run away or to call someone for help?

Wisdom and experience tell us that we must catch the monster by its fangs. Our goal and salvation lie in tearing out those fangs, eliminating once and for all nuclear weapons so that this monster, poised for a strike that spells disaster to all living things, would disappear completely.

This evil must be driven out of one's home, street, town and country now.

Such actions will help to break the resistance of those opposed to nuclear-free zones and to prevent loopholes for nuclear weapons in the zones that are closed to them.

The Soviet Union, which is in favour of setting up nuclear-free zones, will support measures for the observance of the nuclear-free status of such zones and for protecting this status.

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The Soviet Union, which is in favour of setting up nuclear-free zones, will support measures for the observance of the nuclear-free status of such zones and for protecting this status.



"Don't you think  
I'm in bad need  
of a shave?"

## NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES ARE A

RELIABLE WAY TOWARDS THE  
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON  
EARTH. IF ALL THE NATIONS OF THE  
WORLD SET OUT ON THIS ROAD AND  
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**NUCLEAR-  
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A REALITY**

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БЕЗЪЯДЕРНЫЕ ЗОНЫ ДОЛЖНЫ СТАТЬ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬЮ

*на английском языке*

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## Sources Are Cited for Charge Of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze

By LESLIE MAITLAND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — The White House today cited Government reports and magazine articles as documentation for President Reagan's contention that "foreign agents" had helped "instigate" the movement in the United States to freeze nuclear arms.

Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary, said the State Department had issued reports on the Soviet infiltration of the peace movement and said further documentation was contained in articles in *The Reader's Digest*, *Commentary* and *The American Spectator*.

President Reagan's remark at his news conference Thursday night came in response to a question as to whether evidence existed of foreign involvement in the movement to freeze the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Mr. Reagan said he could not discuss "intelligence matters," but that "plenty of evidence" existed. He said that the "overwhelming majority" of those who supported nuclear freeze proposals were "sincere and well-intentioned."

But he added, "There has been, in the organization of some of the big demonstrations, the one in New York, and so forth, there is no question about foreign agents that were sent to help instigate and help create and keep such a movement going."

### Remarks Called 'McCarthyism'

Some critics of the President's remarks accused him of trying to stifle debate on the issue.

"It is disheartening to see an American President returning to the tactics of McCarthyism," said Morton H. Halperin, speaking for the American Civil Liberties Union. "Charges of secret manipulation by foreign agents poison the well of public debate."

"Americans must be free to debate issues on their merits and speak out without being subject to red-baiting," Mr. Halperin asserted.

Leslie Cagan, one of the coordinators of the disarmament rally held in New York June 12, said: "The President is hypocritical when he argues for increased military spending to help 'defend democracy' while at the same time he undermines our democratic right to public protest. The assertion that the American people are being manipulated by 'foreign agents' only serves to divert our energies away from the real issues: the clear and present dangers presented by our nuclear arsenals."

However, Roger S. Young, assistant

director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Congressional and public affairs, said that the President was "accurate" in describing "the Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." Mr. Young said, "The F.B.I. has received that information and has furnished it for the White House."

"We are not casting aspersions on the peace movement," he said, "but we know the Soviets have targeted it as the place to exert influence, not just in the United States, but in other parts of the world."

The *Reader's Digest* article cited by the White House as a source of documentation for Mr. Reagan's remark — "The K.G.B.'s Magical War for 'Peace'" — appeared last month and was written by John Barron. In it, Mr. Barron wrote that the "objective" of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, is "to secure military superiority for the Soviet Union by persuading the United States to abandon new weapons systems." The name of its campaign, he says, is "nuclear freeze."

Another article mentioned by the White House, "Perspective on the Peace Movement," by William E. Griffith in last June's *Reader's Digest*, stated, "The Soviets have fed funds and propaganda materials to some European peace groups and that 'a Soviet-front organization has allied itself to the movement.'"

Other sources listed by the White House included:

"The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," by Vladimir Bukovsky in *Commentary* last May; "The Counterfeit Peace Makers: the Atomic Freeze," by Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, in *The American Spectator* of June 1982; a State Department report of last July entitled "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," and hearings of February 1980 before the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which involved testimony from the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet covert actions abroad.

But some critics of the President were not satisfied. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, speaking in New Orleans at a meeting of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen, said that as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he would "challenge the President to produce" information supporting his statement "in closed session, if he so chooses."



Sent by State Dept  
June 1986

## A Nuclear Freeze

--While the U.S. Government shares the concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end costly competition in nuclear arms, a nuclear freeze is not an effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives.

--A nuclear freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military buildup and lock in Soviet advantages. A freeze would preserve existing Soviet advantages in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that have resulted from the massive Soviet buildup of the last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised considerable restraint.

--About three quarters of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over half the the total Soviet strategic weapons are on launch systems five years old or less; only four percent are on systems over 15 years old. Thus a freeze would ensure that the U.S. strategic systems would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet systems.

--A freeze would undercut the US commitment of the NATO Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring 1985) in LRINF warheads.

--A freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and many elements would be unverifiable. It would require extensive and complex negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of the proposed freeze, especially those involving production and testing of certain systems, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement for genuine arms reductions.

--By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.

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**THE  
NUCLEAR  
FREEZE**

April 1982

