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Overall, Section 441b underscores one of the basic issues in the discussion of PACs—who can be solicited for contributions. Although PACs may accept contributions from any source generally permitted to contribute to American elections, they are strictly limited as to whom they may solicit to contribute. For example, organized labor has argued that the definition of "executive or administrative personnel" is so broad that the vast majority of corporate employees can be considered eligible to receive company solicitations. At issue is the potential for influence; the greater the audience to whom one can direct one's appeals and communications, the greater the potential harvest of funds and, in turn, political clout.

The provisions relating to Government contractors were recodified as 2 U.S.C. 441c. The prohibitions on political contributions and expenditures by contractors were moved to subsection (a), and the explicit authority for Government contractors to maintain separate segregated funds was placed in subsection (b). PACs set up by contractors would be treated as they would by any other organization and would abide by the same principles as elaborated in section 441b.

The framework in which PACs were to operate following the 1976 Amendments was completed by that section of the new law which established the limitations on contributions and expenditures. Section 441a added new limits on contributions and expenditures, introduced the term "multicandidate committee," and imposed anti-proliferation rules on PACs established within a single organization.

Whereas the 1974 Amendments had already established three criteria which a political committee had to meet in order to qualify for the \$5000 limit on contributions, the 1976 Amendments simply gave this preferentially-treated political committee a new name. For purposes of the contribution limitations, section 441a(a)(4) defined the term "multicandidate political committee" as:

a political committee which has been registered under section 433 of this title for a period of not less than 6 months, which has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office.

The distinctions between the multicandidate political committee and the political committee lies principally in the different contribution limits imposed on each. Section 441a(a)(2) imposed the following limits on multicandidate committees:

- (A) \$5,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee;
- (B) \$15,000 to national political party committees; and
- (C) \$5,000 to any other political committee.

The \$5,000 limit on candidate contributions was unchanged from the 1974 Amendments, whereas the limits on national party committees and on other political committees were imposed for the first time in 1976.

In contrast with the multicandidate committee, the limits on the ordinary political committee were, in all but one respect, the same as those imposed on the individual. Section 441a(a)(1) imposed the following limits on contributions by persons (including both an individual and a political committee):

- (A) \$1,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee;
- (B) \$20,000 to national political party committees; and
- (C) \$5,000 to any other political committee.

The \$1,000 limit remained unchanged from 1974, but the limits affecting national party committees and other committees were innovations of the 1976 legislation. While a multicandidate committee may give less than an individual or an ordinary political committee to national party committees, this feature imposed little hardship on the multicandidate committees which have strongly preferred contributing directly to candidates. The one distinction in limits which has

had a great impact on the electoral process is that affecting contributions to Federal candidates, the \$5,000 versus the \$1,000 limit.

As mentioned above, only in one respect are individuals and political committees treated differently under the law for purposes of contributions. Under Section 441a(a)(3), the individual is limited to an aggregate of \$25,000 for all contributions in a calendar year (to candidates, parties, PACs, etc.). There is no aggregate limit on political committees; nor is there for multicandidate committees. Thus, in this crucial respect, any political committee, whether or not it qualifies as a multicandidate committee, is given a greater opportunity to affect the outcome of elections than is any individual (at least through the direct candidate contribution route).

Section 441a(a)(5) established the anti-proliferation rules, which declared that:

In any case in which a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, departments, or local units, or a labor organization and any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, departments, or local units establish or finance or maintain or control more than one separate segregated fund, all such separate segregated funds shall be treated as a single separate segregated fund for purposes of the limitations provided by paragraph (1) and paragraph (2).

This provision overruled the SUN PAC Opinion which allowed separate contribution limits for each PAC established within a single organization. It was intended to restrict the activities of both labor and business. As described in the conference report on the 1976 Amendments:

The anti-proliferation rules established by the conference substitute are intended to prevent corporations, labor organizations, or other persons or groups of persons from evading the contribution limits of the conference substitute. Such rules are described as follows:

1. All of the political committees set up by a single corporation and its subsidiaries are treated as a single political committee.

2. All of the political committees set up by a single international union and its local unions are treated as a single political committee.

3. All of the political committees set up by the AFL-CIO and all its State and local central bodies are treated as a single political committee.

4. All the political committees established by the Chamber of Commerce and its State and local Chambers are treated as a single political committee.

5. The anti-proliferation rules stated also apply in the case of multiple committees established by a group of persons. 112/

The 1976 Amendments were considered at the time a victory for labor, whereas business groups expressed concern over their impact. 113/ In fact, "they gave the business community far greater running room in the electoral process than theretofore." 114/ Furthermore, the explicit authority given to trade associations, membership organizations and others to establish PACs adds to the overall impression that all types of PACs benefitted from the 1976 Amendments.

G. Conclusion

Each law and judicial and administrative ruling discussed above added new and more detailed guidelines for the establishment and operation of PACs. Each one served to reduce barriers to their existence, thus individually and cumulatively contributing to their proliferation.

112/ U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976. Report to accompany S. 3065. 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Report no. 94-1057. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. p. 58.

113/ Epstein, Labor and Federal Elections, p. 268.

114/ Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, p. 37.

GROWTH OF PACs SINCE 1972: THE NUMBERS, THE DOLLARS, AND THE REASONS

The previous chapter traced the political action committee as it evolved in Federal law during the 1970s. This chapter will present and analyze the data which document the PAC growth facilitated by the changes in the law. In fact, it must be remembered in reviewing these data that not only was PAC growth made possible by the laws but that the laws were necessitated by the growth in PACs; the process of amending the FECA was coupled with the proliferation of PACs which these statistics reveal.

Section I presents the growth of PACs since 1974 in terms of the numbers. Section II offers evidence of PAC growth in terms of financial activity. It examines the levels of PAC spending in every election from 1972 to 1980, placing the figures in the context of overall campaign spending activity. In addition, it provides such information as which types of PACs have grown the most rapidly, who has benefitted from their growth, and which PACs have spent the most money in each election year. Finally, Section III offers a discussion of the reasons for PAC growth in the past decade, in light of the foregoing documentation of the legal and statistical bases for it.

I. PAC GROWTH SINCE 1974

On April 6, 1972, the day the FECA of 1971 took effect, there were 113 PACs in existence (according to unpublished FEC data). By January 1, 1975, when the Federal Election Commission was established and began systematically keeping tabs on PACs, the number stood at 608. In the seven-year period since

then, the number of nonparty committees (PACs) registered with the FEC has nearly quintupled, increasing to 2,901 by December 31, 1981. The following table presents the numbers of nonparty committees registered with the FEC from 1974 through 1981. The data is broken down by type of PAC, using the categories the Commission devised in 1977: corporate, labor, trade/membership/health, non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock. Prior to the year-end figures for 1977, all PACs other than corporate and labor were included in the trade/membership/health grouping (thus explaining the drop in that category from December 31, 1976, to December 31, 1977).

TABLE 1. Number of Registered PACs: 1974-1981 1/

Category	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Corp.	89	139	433	550	784	949	1204	1327
Labor	201	226	224	234	217	240	297	318
Trade/ Memb./ Health <u>2/</u>	318	357	489	438	451	512	574	608
Non- Conn.				110	165	250	378	539
Coop.				8	12	17	42	41
Corp. w/o stock				20	24	32	56	68
Total	608	722	1,146	1,360	1,653	2,000	2,551	2,901

1/ Data as of December 31 for every year except 1975 (November 24).

2/ Includes all non-corporate and non-labor PACs through 12/31/77.

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. PACs Increase at Declining Rate (press release): Jan. 17, 1982.

Although the numbers relating the net growth in PACs shown in Table 1 are largely self-explanatory, some observations may be appropriate. The sharpest percentage increase occurred between November 24, 1975, and December 31, 1976. The earlier date is significant because it marked the issuance of Advisory Opinion 1975-23--the SUN PAC ruling. In the following 13 months, PACs experienced a net increase of 59 percent, from 722 to 1,146. Thereafter, PACs grew in every-increasing increments: 214 in 1977, 293 in 1978, 347 in 1979, and 551 in 1980. The net growth in 1980, the largest numerical increase during the six-year period, is attributable in large measure to the enormous amount of publicity accorded PACs in the media since the 1978 elections.

The statistics for 1981 indicate a notable drop in the rate of PAC proliferation, showing an increase of 350 or fourteen percent over the year-end total from 1980. This constituted the smallest percentage increase since 1974; the average increase had been 21 percent a year. It is too soon to tell whether these data may have marked the beginning of a trend toward a tapering off of PAC growth or whether the reduced rate is merely indicative of a temporary decline in interest in the wake of a major election.

Beyond the overall growth in PACs, Table 1 reports the relative growth of the various categories of PACs. Clearly, the corporate committees have demonstrated the most enormous growth in their ranks--with an increase of some 1400 percent in seven years, from 89 in 1974 to 1,327 in 1981. Here, the SUN PAC ruling can be seen as having had a particularly salient effect on the willingness of corporations to establish separate segregated funds; corporate PACs more than tripled in number in the 13 months following that advisory opinion. As of 1981, nearly half of all PACs were grouped in the "corporate" category.

As notable as the dramatic increase in corporate PACs has been the relative stability in the area of labor PACs. Having increased just 58 percent in seven years, labor PACs actually experienced a net decline in several of those years. Unlike in the corporate sector, the potential for increase in labor PACs is distinctly limited. Most of the large, politically active unions have operated PACs for many years. In contrast, most of the remaining unions are either too small or not sufficiently political or, as affiliates of national and international unions, are subject to the same single contribution limit as their parent bodies, thus reducing the incentives to establish PACs. ^{115/} Thus, the data reveal that while labor unions pioneered the field of political action committees, establishing precedents for others to imitate, they have been increasingly dwarfed by the PAC growth in other sectors. In 1974, labor PACs constituted one-third of all PACs; at the end of 1981, they constituted only one-ninth. In 1974, there were over twice as many labor PACs as there were corporate PACs; by 1981, corporate PACs exceeded those of labor unions by a more than 4 to 1 ratio.

The growth of the trade/membership/health category is more difficult to document, in view of the inclusion between 1974 and 1977 of PACs which were ultimately assigned separate categories. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the growth here has been significant. If all 318 PACs in the trade/membership/health category in 1974 were appropriately listed there under the standards introduced in 1977, one can say that they increased by 91 percent as of 1981. If, on the other hand, the 138 PACs separated into new categories in 1977 were

^{115/} Epstein, Edwin M. Business and Labor Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. In Malbin, Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws, p. 143.

in existence in 1974, the accurate 1974 count of trade/membership/ health PACs would be 180, thus indicating an increase of 238 percent through 1981. In fact, the correct estimate of growth in this category likely falls somewhere between the 91 percent and the 238 percent figures--not as high as the 377 percent increase in PACs overall, but high enough to add measurably to the increasing business orientation of PACs today. (See further discussion of this aspect below.)

The "non-connected" category (those PACs not affiliated with an existing organization) has experienced extremely rapid growth in the five years it has been used by the FEC. As a reflection of the political climate in which PACs operate today, the sharp increase of non-connected PACs is hardly surprising, comprised, as they are, largely of ideological interest groups. In just four years, PACs in this grouping have quintupled--from 110 in 1977 to 539 in 1981, during which time the overall number of PACs doubled.

The data presented and discussed above offers partial evidence of the growth of political action committees in general and the growth of corporate, non-connected, and trade/membership/health PACs in particular. It also offers partial evidence of the overshadowing of labor PACs by other interest groups. All of these phenomena will be further developed as the financial activity data is presented later in this chapter.

The relative power of labor and business to influence our political process is an age-old struggle. Thus, a closer look at relevant statistics which may shed light on this struggle is warranted. As bleak a picture as the data depict for organized labor, they, in fact, do not adequately represent the magnitude of the increasing gap between labor PACs and those associated with the business sector. A comparison of the numbers for corporate vs. labor PACs does not tell

the whole story. There is a strong business orientation in the trade/membership/health category, as represented by such powerful trade groups as the National Association of Realtors and such important health groups (largely professional associations) as the American Medical Association. Among non-connected PACs, is the Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC), the first major business PAC. Among cooperatives are the PACs of the Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (AMPI), and the Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. The corporations without stock are, by definition, business-oriented, as exemplified by the California Almond Growers Exchange. 116/ Thus, many business-oriented PACs are classified in categories other than the "corporate" one.

In an attempt to construct a system which more accurately reflects the number of PACs which promote a basically pro-business philosophy, political scientist Edwin Epstein has estimated that one-half of all non-labor and non-corporate PACs under the FEC scheme can be classified as business-related, along with all of the "corporate" PACs. 117/ Based on this system and using the data in Table 1, one can construct the following chart of labor and business-related PACs.

116/ Ibid., p. 118.

117/ Ibid., p. 116.


TABLE 2. Numbers of Labor and Business-Related PACs: 1974-1980

Category	1974	1976	1978	1980
Labor	201	224	217	297
Business-oriented <u>1/</u> 248		678	1100	1729

1/ Business-oriented equal all corporate PACs plus one-half of all trade/membership/health, non-connected, cooperative, and corporations without stock.

While these data do present a more accurate picture of business strength in the PAC movement, there are many tools which organized labor uses to compensate for this perceived imbalance; of course, the business sector has other strengths, as well. These approaches will be discussed in Chapter Four. More fundamentally, one may question the extent to which issues which face modern society lend themselves to the traditional framework of a conflict essentially between business and labor interests. Increasingly, one finds public policy issues which pit various interests against the combined forces of labor and business, with, unpredictable results. This, too, will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

In concluding this section on the numerical growth of PACs, it is instructive to examine the data in graph format (from 1974-1980), as prepared by the FEC.



Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Record, March 1981,

II. PAC GROWTH FROM 1972-1980: THE DOLLARS

This section of the report places the discussion of political action committees within the context of their financial activity during the past decade. The tables of data and the accompanying analysis will explore many fundamental questions concerning PAC spending. Part A will examine the aggregate data on PAC expenditures and contributions since 1972, from the perspective of both the PACs and the candidates. Part B will address the question of where the money originated, by looking at the relative levels of activity among the various types of PACs and at the leading PACs in each election year. Part C will explore the question of where the money has been going, from the perspective of both the PACs and the candidates. Finally, Part D will summarize the major findings of this (and the previous) section.

The compilation of the data presented in this section's tables has been made difficult by many factors, not the least of which is the absence of a single, uniform source for the various statistics. The sophistication and the reliability of the data has increased enormously in the last two election cycles, as a result of the efforts by the Federal Election Commission to impose systematic and comprehensive methods of compiling the various statistics from the disclosure statements filed with that agency. Before the FEC was established and before it established its primacy as the source of campaign finance data, private organizations assumed the responsibility of reporting the aggregate data to the public. Common Cause maintained campaign finance monitoring projects during the elections of 1972, 1974, and 1976. The Citizens Research Foundation, under the direction of Professor Herbert Alexander, compiled its own data for the 1972 and 1976 elections.

Each of these organizations adopted its own methods for organizing data, and, as a result, they reached varying conclusions about spending levels in the years their research overlapped. In 1976, the Federal Election Commission was operational, but its reports did not reflect the comprehensiveness of its more recent studies. Thus, for each of the three earliest elections covered in this chapter—1972, 1974, and 1976--between one and three sources are available for information.

For 1972, there is the additional handicap of two different systems of campaign disclosure required during that year. The Federal Election Campaign Act did not take effect until April 7, 1972, prior to which time disclosure was governed by the 1925 Corrupt Practices Act, which had long since been regarded as an ineffective system. Furthermore, five changes in the election law over the past ten years and the concomitant changes in the disclosure forms, have made compiling uniform, comparable data even more difficult.

In addition to three organizations which compiled campaign finance data during the past ten years, several scholars have also sought to compile data in useful ways, often basing their work on the findings of the three organizations but sometimes exploring on their own. The work of these scholars, notably among them Edwin Epstein, Michael Malbin, and Gary Jacobson (all cited in the ensuing pages), has generally clarified the data from other sources. Sometimes, unfortunately, their findings appear to conflict, either with one another or with those of Common Cause, the Citizens Research Foundation, or the FEC. Journalists, too, have presented useful campaign finance data, which often highlighted events or statistics at a given time, without analysis of overall trends; often they clarified, but other times they confused, the overall picture.

This chapter makes use of the findings of all of the above sources. In attempting to reconcile seemingly conflicting data, the guiding principles have been simplicity, uniformity of data, availability of data in useful breakdowns, and comparability with other data within a table or with data in other tables. Because of the variety of sources and the different methods of categorizing data from source to source or from year to year, frequently data within a table are not exactly comparable with other data in that table. Consequently, the tables are filled with explanations and caveats; the accompanying analysis offers broader explanations and caveats. Such questions as why some tables offer data for only House races or why some offer data only for candidates in general elections will be explained within these pages. One obvious and overriding reason is that such types of data may have been all that were compiled by any of the various sources used herein.

In terms of PAC contributions to candidates, this chapter confines itself exclusively to congressional candidates. Since 1976, PACs (and others) have been prohibited from making contributions to Presidential candidates accepting public funds in the general election. Although they have been allowed to contribute in the primaries, they have not taken much advantage of this opportunity; as will be discussed later, PACs generally save their money for the general election contests. In 1980, only 3 percent of PAC contributions to Federal candidates went to Presidential contenders. For this reason and because most PAC activity in recent years has been directed at the congressional elections, it is the role of PACs in those elections on which this chapter will focus.

A. PAC Spending Since 1972: The Aggregate Data

This subsection provides the broad overview of the significance of the PAC phenomenon in American politics during the past ten years. Data and analysis presented in part 1 offer the spending figures from the PACs' perspective: "How much has been spent by PACs?" The data and commentary in part 2 address the question from the candidates' perspective: "How reliant have candidates become on PAC money, in view of their other sources of funding?" All of the tables and discussion that follow in Chapter Three must be viewed in the context of this overview.

1. The Overview from the PAC Perspective

Table 3 provides aggregate data on PAC receipts, expenditures, and contributions to congressional candidates in each election cycle since 1972. Although some of the receipt and expenditure figures for the three earlier years are either non-existent or of limited reliability (as in the 1974 expenditure figure), the overall trend is unmistakable. PACs spent almost 600 percent more in the 1980 elections than they did in the 1972 elections, from \$19.2 million in 1972 to \$131.2 million in 1980. PACs contributed some 550 percent more to congressional candidates in 1980 than they did in 1972, from \$8.5 to \$55.2 million.

In terms of the rate of increase, the rise in both direct contributions and spending was the sharpest from 1974 to 1976, an 80 percent and 100 percent increase, respectively--certainly a function to some extent of the FEC's 1975 SUN PAC ruling. The second highest jump was from 1978 to 1980 when the level of contributions to congressional candidates rose by some 57 percent and the

level of adjusted expenditures rose by an even higher 69 percent. The increase in contributions from 1972 to 1974 and from 1976 to 1978 was approximately 50 percent--a significant rise, despite the fact that they did not equal the magnitude of increase witnessed in 1976 and 1980.

TABLE 3. Financial Activity of Political Action Committees: 1972-1980
(full election cycle data)

Election cycle <u>1/</u>	Adjusted receipts <u>2/</u>	Adjusted expenditures <u>2/</u>	Contributions to congressional candidates
1972	n.a.	\$ 19,168,000	\$ 8,500,000 *
1974	n.a.	\$ 25,000,000 **	\$ 12,526,586
1976	\$ 54,045,588	\$ 52,894,630	\$ 22,571,912
1978	\$ 79,956,291	\$ 77,412,860	\$ 35,187,215
1980	\$137,728,528	\$131,153,384	\$ 55,217,291

1/ The periods covered by the election cycles vary. Data for 1972 is limited for the period prior to April 7, 1972, the effective date for disclosure under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Until then, campaign finance disclosure was governed by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, under which much activity went unreported. 1974 data covers Sept. 1, 1973, to Dec. 31, 1974. 1976 data covers Jan. 1, 1975, to Dec. 31, 1976. 1978 data covers Jan. 1, 1977, to Feb. 22, 1980. 1980 data covers Jan. 1, 1979, to Dec. 31, 1980.

2/ Adjusted receipts and expenditures exclude monies transferred between affiliated committees and are thus more representative of levels of financial activity.

* Excludes contributions to candidates defeated in primaries.

** This is a rough estimate and does not correspond to the detailed breakdowns in table 8.

Source: For 1972 expenditures: Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976: p. 93, 95. Total represents the sum of the totals for labor, other special interest, and ideological spending.

For 1972 contributions: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974, v. 1. p. vi.

TABLE 3. Financial Activity of Political Action Committees: 1972-1980
(full election cycle data)--Continued

For 1974 expenditures: [National Information Center on Political Finance]. Interest Groups: Bigger Spenders on '74 Races. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 31, September 28, 1974: 2583-2584. Estimate reflects \$13.3 million in adjusted expenditures plus the great bulk of the \$13.0 million in cash on hand.

For 1974 Contributions: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. xii.

For 1976 receipts and expenditures: Federal Election Commission, unpublished data.

For 1976 contributions: Common Cause data. In Interest Group Gifts to 1976 Congressional Campaigns. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 35, April 16, 1977. p. 710.

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Final Report. Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 1--Summary Tables. April 1980, p. 138, 140, 142.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report for 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982.

The gap between adjusted expenditures and contributions to congressional candidates is readily observed in Table 3. While the gap widened substantially every election in dollar amounts (\$10.7, \$12.5, \$30.3, \$42.2, and \$75.9 million, respectively), the percentage of expenditures constituted by contributions remained at a rather constant level in every election: 42-50 percent--the low figure in 1980 and the high in 1974, which, being based on estimated data, is not an especially reliable figure. The somewhat less than 1 to 2 ratio of contributions to expenditures is a key finding of Table 3, one which has a bearing on data presented in the pages that follow.

The following list of commonly-made PAC expenditures specifies the components of PAC spending other than contributions to congressional candidates. It thus helps account for the gap discussed above.

1) contributions to State and local candidates (these must be disclosed within the various States, but not necessarily to the FEC);

2) contributions to Presidential candidates (in primaries); these play a smaller role than they did perhaps in 1972 and earlier, before the prohibition against accepting private contributions was imposed on general election candidates taking public funds. As mentioned above, only 3 percent of PAC contributions to Federal candidates in 1980 was given to Presidential contenders;

3) contributions to national party committees and other political (non-candidate) committees, including other PACs;

4) administrative costs--a particularly significant budget item for the non-connected PACs, which cannot have such costs borne by a sponsoring organization (as can corporate, labor, and trade/membership/health PACs);

5) fundraising costs--again, a particularly large factor for non-connected PACs which are not limited in terms of who they may solicit to any sponsoring organization's membership lists. As they are permitted to solicit funds from the general population, they have turned increasingly to the direct-mail route--a method of growing sophistication and growing costs, as well. Estimates of the cost of raising money through direct-mail range as high as 90 percent of the total funds raised; 118/ and

6) independent expenditures--funds spent directly on communication with voters, for or against candidates and without any advance consultation with candidates, are not subject to any limits under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Consequently, these have been a growing force in American politics in the past three elections. The FEC reported that a little over \$2 million was spent independently in the 1976 elections; 119/ the level of independent

118/ Shaw, Robert D., Jr. Direct-Mail Pleas Raise Thousands for Fundraisers, Little for Causes. Miami Herald, March 30, 1981: 1A, 4A.

119/ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Information on Independent Expenditures (press release): October 9, 1980.

expenditures rose to \$16.1 million in the 1980 elections. ^{120/} This large increase is particularly relevant to the subject of PACs since all but about 12 percent of these funds were spent by PACs. (The great majority of this spending, however, was by a handful of PACs, and most of it was concentrated in Presidential contests.)

The growing amounts of money spent on fundraising and independent expenditures are the two most important factors in the widening gap in recent years between PAC expenditures and PAC contributions to congressional candidates. This is hardly surprising, in view of the heavy use of direct-mail and independent expenditures by the ideological (generally non-connected) PACs, which, as will be demonstrated later, have constituted of late the fastest growing component of overall PAC spending.

Table 4 takes the last column of the previous table--contributions to congressional candidates--and presents the breakdown of how much of the money (and what percentage) went to House vs. Senate candidates. Furthermore, because those figures represent financial activity during the entire election cycle (usually the election year and the one preceding it), the table also presents the data (with similar House and Senate breakdowns) for only those candidates who competed in general elections. It excludes contributions to candidates defeated in primaries and, in some of the years, candidates who ran in special elections; primary election contributions are included for only those contenders who appeared on the general election ballot.

^{120/} U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top \$16 Million (press release): Nov. 29, 1981.

TABLE 4. PAC Contributions to House and Senate Candidates in General Elections and in Full Election Cycles: 1972-1980
(in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/

Year	Full Election Cycle <u>2/</u>	House	Senate	General Election <u>3/</u>	House	Senate
1972	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	\$ 8.5	\$ 5.4 (64%)	\$ 3.1 (36%)
1974	\$12.5	n.a.	n.a.	\$11.6	\$ 8.4 (72%)	\$ 3.2 (28%)
1976	\$22.6	n.a.	n.a.	\$20.5	\$15.0 (73%)	\$ 5.4 (26%)
1978	\$35.2	\$25.0 (71%)	\$10.2 (29%)	\$31.8	\$22.9 (72%)	\$ 8.9 (28%)
1980	\$55.2	\$37.9 (69%)	\$17.3 (31%)	\$51.9	\$36.0 (69%)	\$15.9 (31%)

1/ Dollar amounts rounded off to the nearest tenth; percentages are based on rounded dollar amounts and are rounded off to nearest whole percent.

2/ Full election cycle includes data for all candidates in primaries and special and general elections for the election year and the year preceding it (except for 1974 which goes back to September 1, 1973). These data correspond to those in Table 3, *infra*.

3/ General election data excludes defeated candidates in primaries (and, perhaps, candidates in special elections). These data correspond to those in Table 5, *infra*.

TABLE 4. PAC Contributions to House and Senate Candidates in General Elections and in Full Election Cycles: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/--Continued

Source: For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974. v. 1. p. vi.

1972 breakdowns extrapolated from: Jacobson, Gary C. The Pattern of Campaign Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-78. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-78. From the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1979. p. 25 (table 6).

For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. ix, xii.

For 1976 general election data: Common Cause. 1976 Federal Campaign Finances. Interest Group and Political Party Contributions to Congressional Candidates. Washington, 1978. v. 1. p. viii.

For 1976 full election cycle: Common Cause data. In Interest Group Gifts to 1976 Congressional Campaigns. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 35, April 16, 1977: p. 710.

For 1978 full election cycle: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Final Report: Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 1--Summary Tables. Washington, April 1980. p. 142.

For 1978 general election data: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5--U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 32, 34.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

Although the gap between the general election and the full election cycle figures has increased since 1974, signaling a greater willingness on the part of PACs to contribute in primaries, the chart demonstrates that the great bulk of PAC contributions are contributed (during the entire two-year cycles) to candidates who will be in the general elections (this could be shown more clearly if it were possible to sort out only those funds contributed in the general election, per se). In some of the tables which follow, data is presented only for the general election (again, including primary contributions which may have been given to candidates who later appeared on the general election ballot).

Although it might have been preferable to see the relevant breakdowns on a particular chart for the entire election cycle, it can be justified nonetheless by the fact that the general election data does constitute most of the PAC contributions.

The second salient feature in Table 4 is that, regardless of whether the data is for the general election or the full cycle, the proportion of funds going to House vs. Senate candidates remains constant, as it has roughly since 1974. (The slight increase in the Senate's favor from 1978 to 1980 may be indicative of a trend toward proportionately more PAC funds to Senate candidates, although it is too soon to tell.) Approximately 70 percent of PAC money goes to House candidates, as compared with 30 percent to Senate candidates. Of course, it must be noted that there are many more House candidates than Senate candidates in any given year, thus accounting in large measure for the disproportionate share going to one of the two bodies. The greater amounts of PAC money given to House candidates, combined with the greater reliance of House candidates on PAC money (as will be demonstrated shortly), provide some justification for the focus on only House elections in some later charts.

2. The Overview from the Candidates' Perspective

While the overall dollar figures reflect the magnitude of PAC giving, one must examine the data from the candidates' perspective to round out a basic understanding of the role PAC money has been playing in elections. Tables 5-7 offer evidence that PAC contributions have grown significantly in relative importance among the various sources of candidate funding, that this trend has been particularly pronounced in House races, and that 1980

marked a notably increased level of Senate candidate reliance on PAC giving. As Table 5 indicates, PAC contributions to congressional candidates in general elections as a percentage of all candidate receipts has risen from 13.7 percent in 1972 to 25.7 percent in 1980. The sharpest percentage increase occurred in the 1980 election--5.6 percent over 1978. The second highest increase was the 3.9 percent jump from 1974 to 1976, which, as Table 3 revealed, marked the highest increase in PAC spending and contributing.

TABLE 5. PAC Contributions as a Percentage of Congressional Candidates' Overall Receipts in General Elections: 1972-1980 1/

Year	Candidate Receipts <u>2/</u>	PAC Contributions <u>2/ 3/</u>	Percent Given by PACs
1972	\$ 62.2	\$ 8.5	13.7%
1974	\$ 73.9	\$11.6	15.7%
1976	\$104.8	\$20.5	19.6%
1978	\$158.2	\$31.8	20.1%
1980	\$201.6	\$51.9	25.7%

1/ Data combines House and Senate receipts (adjusted, where possible) only for candidates who ran in the general election; data for defeated primary election candidates is excluded.

2/ in millions of dollars

3/ These amounts correspond with those in the third from last column in Table 4, infra.

TABLE 5. PAC Contributions as a Percentage of Congressional Candidates' Overall Receipts in General Elections: 1972-1980 1/--Continued.

Source: For 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978 receipts: Malbin, Michael J. Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs, Campaigns, and Public Policy. In His Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. p. 154-155 (Table 1).

For 1972 contributions: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974. v. 1, p. vi.

For 1974 contributions: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. ix.

For 1976 contributions: Common Cause. 1976 Federal Campaign Finances. Interest Group and Political Party Contributions to Congressional Candidates. Washington, 1978. v. 1. p. viii.

For 1978 contributions: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5--U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 34.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

Tables 6-7 present for each the House and Senate the percentages of overall receipts which were constituted between 1972-1980 by the four principal sources of candidate funding: PACs, individual contributors, political parties, and candidate contributions to their own campaigns. These tables amplify the findings in Table 5 by showing how the PAC component of candidate receipts compared with the other key funding sources and how that component factored into House versus Senate campaigns.

At a glance, one notices that PAC contributions have consistently accounted for a greater share of House candidate receipts than of Senate candidate receipts. The proportion of PAC money among all sources of funding has increased steadily for House candidates, from 14.0 percent in 1972 to 28.9 percent in 1980--with the sharpest rise occurring in 1976, followed by a rise in 1980 to approach the one-third level.

In contrast with the House, it was not until 1980 that PAC contributions constituted a major share of the campaign receipts of Senate candidates (with 20 percent used here as being indicative of a major share). Between 1972 and 1978, the proportion of PAC money among overall Senate receipts fluctuated, without any discernible trend. The 4 percent jump in 1976 was in keeping with the overall growth in the importance and level of PAC spending that year, but the increase was transitory, as the PAC percentage fell again in 1978. (Senate data is made more difficult to analyze in view of a much longer fundraising period than for House races.) The outcome of the 1982 elections may reveal whether or not there is a new trend in PAC giving to Senate candidates. But it is interesting to note that the percentage increase for the Senate in 1980 was even greater than it was for the House.

A commonly offered explanation for the greater proportion of PAC contributions to House candidates relates to the lower visibility of House Members and campaigns vis-a-vis their Senate counterparts. It is far more difficult for the typical House Member to attract the attention of the news media, particularly in view of the concentration of so many Members in the same media markets, than it is for the typical Senate Member. As news of the official activities and election contests of the latter is more widely disseminated than for their House counterparts, it generates a greater degree of citizen interest in and enthusiasm for the Senate election and its contestants; from this enthusiasm flows a higher level of individual contributions, which, in turn, renders PAC donations less important in the scheme of things. Furthermore, the much larger population of States, as compared to the average congressional district, combined with the

greater resources generally available to Senate contenders, makes the direct-mail system of fundraising more viable in a Senate jurisdiction than in a congressional district. Direct-mail is a key component of modern efforts to raise small individual contributions. Lacking both the same degree of citizen interest in their contests and the means to finance costly direct-mail campaigns, House candidates may be more reliant on contributions from groups (parties or PACs), through which they can raise money in larger amounts from fewer sources.

TABLE 6. Funding Sources for Candidates in House General Elections:
1972-1980

Year	Candidate Receipts <u>2/</u>	Source (in percentages) <u>1/</u>			
		PACs	Individuals	Parties <u>3/</u>	Candidates
1972*	\$ 38.9	14.0%	59%**	17%	---
1974*	\$ 45.7	17.1%	73%	4%	6%
1976	\$ 65.7	22.4%	60%	8%	9%
1978	\$ 92.2	24.8%	57%	7%	9%
1980	\$ 124.6	28.9%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

1/ Percentages rounded off to nearest whole percent, except for PACs, which are rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent.

2/ In millions of dollars, adjusted where possible

3/ Data in this column are not likely to be highly internally comparable: the high figure for 1972 is considered by some experts to be greatly exaggerated by the methods by which it was calculated, and the 1974 figure is deemed somewhat low.

* Includes candidates with major party opposition only.

** Includes candidate contributions to own campaign.

TABLE 6. Founding Sources of Candidates in House General Elections:
1972-1980--Continued

Source: For 1972-1978 data: Malbin, Michael J. Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs, Campaigns, and Public Policy. In His Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. p. 154-155 (table 1);

For PAC percentages: 1972-1974: Jacobson, Gary C. The Pattern of Campaign Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-78. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-1978. From the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. 20 (table 1).

1976: Federal Election Commission. FEC Disclosure Series. No. 9: 1976 House of Representatives Campaigns, Receipts and Expenditures. Washington, September 1977. p. 4.

1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5. U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 31-32.

1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

TABLE 7. Funding Sources for Candidates in Senate General Elections:
1972-1980

Year	Candidate Receipts <u>2/</u>	Source (in percentages) <u>1/</u>			
		PACs	Individuals	Parties <u>3/</u>	Candidates
1972*	\$23.3	11.9%	67%	14%	.4%
1974*	\$28.2	11.0%	76%	6%	1%
1976	\$39.1	14.8%	68%	4%	12%
1978	\$66.0	13.5%	60%	6%	8%
1980	\$76.9	20.7%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

TABLE 7. Funding Sources of Candidates in Senate General Elections:
1972-1980--Continued

1/ Percentages are rounded off to nearest whole percent, except for PACs, which are rounded to nearest tenth of a percent.

2/ In millions of dollars, adjusted where possible.

3/ Data in this column are not likely to be highly internally comparable; the 1972 figure is deemed by some experts to be greatly exaggerated by the methods by which it was calculated.

* Includes candidates with major party opposition only.

Source: For 1972 - 1978 data: Malbin, Michael J. Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs, Campaigns, and Public Policy. In His Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. p. 154-155 (table 1);

For 1972-1976 PAC data: Jacobson, Gary C. The Pattern of Campaign Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-78. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-78. From the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1979. p. 24 (table 5).

1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5--U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 31-32.

1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

Regarding other components of House and Senate funding, the single largest, by far, is the individual contributor, although this factor declined between 1974 and 1978 from roughly three-fourths to barely three-fifths of all funding sources. In keeping with the discussion above, individual contributions have consistently made up a higher proportion of Senate receipts than House receipts (from 3-8 percent higher in the four election years covered in Tables 6 and 7).

While the trend in individual contributions as a function of overall receipts has been steadily declining, there was a dramatic increase in the individual contributor factor from 1972 to 1974, both in House and Senate campaigns. This increase corresponded to a decline in 1974 of the level of political party contributions as a component in overall House and Senate receipts. This decline was likely associated with the reduced effectiveness of the political parties in raising money (particularly the Republican Party committees) in the Watergate year of 1974. Since 1974, however, the party contribution component has remained at a relatively constant level, although one might expect 1980 data to show an increase in this factor, in view of the large amounts of money which were spent by one of the two parties--the Republicans--that year.

Regarding the fourth component, no overall trends affecting candidate contributions to their own campaigns are discernible from the data in the accompanying tables, perhaps a result of inconsistent reporting methods by candidates of their own funding. The one notable exception might be the large increase in this factor from 1974 to 1976, no doubt a result of the limits imposed for the first time in the 1976 elections on the amounts individuals could give, while the limit on candidate contributions attempted by the FECA Amendments of 1974 was struck down by the Supreme Court's 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision. With the \$1,000 limit in place, it is understandable that candidates looked more in 1976 to their own resources--and to PACs--as a means of raising their campaign funds.

It appears from Tables 6-7 that the decrease in individual contributions as part of the overall campaign treasuries of Senate and, especially, House candidates has been accompanied by an increase in the percentage of PAC

contributions. Given the notable increase in the share of PAC contributions in 1980 and the presumed increase in the percentage of party contributions, it is likely that 1980 will register a further decrease in the share which individual contributions made up of the overall receipts. If this proves to be the case, it will mean that, for House candidates, individual contributions will outweigh PAC contributions by a less than 2:1 ratio--in contrast to the ratio in 1972 of over 4:1. For Senate candidates it would indicate a 1980 ratio of less than 3:1, in contrast to the over 5:1 ratio in 1972. These statistics, if such trends hold up, will have a bearing on future debates over the relationship of individuals and interest groups to the electoral process.

B. PAC Spending Since 1972: Where the Money Has Come From?

This section examines the components of the vast increases in PAC spending since 1972. Subsection 1 traces the growth of each category of PAC (labor, corporate, etc.), in terms of adjusted expenditures and contributions to congressional candidates. Subsection 2 examines the biggest spenders and contributors among PACs between 1972 and 1980, primarily as a means of illustrating broader trends in the PAC arena.

1. Expenditures and Contributions by PAC Groupings Since 1972

Tables 8 and 9 contribute to an understanding of where the PAC money has been coming from, by demonstrating the trends in spending and contributing among the various sectors of the PAC community. Because of different sources and standards for grouping PACs in the three earlier years, there exist significant

limitations in the comparability of data within and between these two tables. While all of the break-downs are comparable for 1978 and 1980, only the figures for labor PACs are based on fairly consistent standards of inclusion in 1972-1976. Conclusions can be drawn affecting labor PACs and the total PAC community for 1972-1980 and affecting every PAC grouping for 1978-1980, but observations about the business-related, non-connected, and other PACs for 1972-1976 are subject to dispute. All of the totals in both tables correspond to those in Table 3, except for the 1974 expenditures, which, as explained in the notes to Table 8, are thought to be low. Despite the limitations of Tables 8 and 9, they provide important insights into sources of PAC growth.

According to Table 8, spending by labor PACs tripled in the five-election period. However, with overall PAC spending increasing by more than six and one-half times during this period, one sees further evidence of the erosion of labor's pre-eminent role in the PAC community since 1972. While labor PACs accounted for roughly half of PAC expenditures in 1972 and 1974, their share of total spending fell to one-third in 1976, one-fourth in 1978, and one-fifth in 1980. Although labor's sharpest spending increase occurred in 1980, each of the other three major PAC groupings exhibited an even higher dollar rise that year over their 1978 spending.

In contrast to labor, the corporate PACs experienced a meteoric rise in expenditure levels in just the last three elections, a more than five-fold increase, which, by 1980, allowed them to overtake labor PACs as a group for the first time. It is likely, in fact, that 1976 marked the point at which the "business-related" PACs first outspent the labor PACs. Recent corporate spending increases are a reflection, to some degree, of changes in methods of reporting State and local candidate contributions (i.e., through the Federal PAC, rather through separate State PACs).

The trend among the trade/membership/health grouping is made more difficult to discern because of unavailability of a breakdown for 1976, although one might estimate that between \$15-\$20 million (of the amount listed for "other") was spent by these PACs. They ranked first in expenditures in 1978 and were exceeded in 1980 only by non-connected PACs.

Expenditures by the non-connected PACs increased at an even greater rate from 1978-1980 than did those of the corporate PACs, a \$21 million dollar increase and more than twice the amount of spending in two years. It is possible that their level of expenditures as much as doubled from 1976 to 1978, as well, but, again, the absence of breakdowns makes such estimates difficult to substantiate. From 1978-1980, non-connected PACs rose from third to first place in expenditures by the four major groups.

TABLE 8. Adjusted Expenditures of PACs by Category: 1972-1980
(in millions of dollars) 1/

Type of PAC	1972	1974*	1976	1978	1980
Labor	\$ 8.5	\$11.0	\$17.5	\$18.6	\$ 25.1
Business-related <u>2/</u>	\$ 8.0	\$ 8.1	---	---	---
Corporate	---	---	\$ 5.8	\$15.2	\$ 31.4
Trade/ Membership/ Health	---	---	---	\$23.8	\$ 32.0
Non-connected <u>3/</u>	\$ 2.6	\$.8	---	\$17.4	\$ 38.6
Other <u>4/</u>	---	\$ 1.1	\$29.6	\$ 2.4	\$ 4.0
Total <u>5/</u>	\$19.2	\$20.9	\$52.9	\$77.4	\$131.2

TABLE 8. Adjusted Expenditures of PACs by Category: 1972-1980
(in millions of dollars) 1/--Continued

1/ Adjusted expenditures excludes transfers of monies between affiliated committees.

2/ This category is based on a large assumption that the majority of PACs it encompasses do indeed have a basically pro-business orientation. It is included here for the purpose of listing the data for 1972 and 1974, before the specific breakdowns were devised by the FEC for the corporate and other categories, and it is only roughly comparable to the combined corporate and trade/membership/health data in 1978 and 1980. For 1972, it includes PACs listed by the Citizens Research Foundation as business/professional, dairy, education, health, and rural; for 1974, it includes those PACs grouped by Common Cause under the headings of business/professional, health, and agriculture/dairy. Most of these PACs would today fall into the corporate and trade/membership/health categories used by the FEC, although some would be scattered in the non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock categories.

3/ For 1972 and 1974, this represents spending by ideological PACs, as grouped by the Citizens Research Foundation (1972) or Common Cause (1974). After 1976, it corresponds directly to the FEC category by that name (which is dominated by the ideological groups).

4/ This is a catch-all category, for which only the 1978 and 1980 figures are comparable to one another. For 1974, this represents PACs grouped as "miscellaneous" by Common Cause and includes such groups as the NEA (and affiliates), environmentalists, and some cooperatives. For 1976, it includes all PACs now grouped by the FEC as trade/membership/health, non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock. For 1978 and 1980, it combines the FEC categories of cooperatives and corporations without stock.

5/ Totals (which are keyed to those in Table 3) may not add up exactly because of rounding off.

* Data for 1974 does not correspond with that in Table 3. The latter reflects an estimated amount, because the data in Table 8 was thought to be low.

Source: For 1972: Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976. p. 93, 95.

For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. Total expenditures derived by adding the figures for contributions to congressional candidates by each type of PAC (on page xii) to the amounts each type gave to State and local candidates and to organizations, as listed on the summary pages (1, 16, 135, 214, 396, and 425).

For 1976 (labor): U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Disclosure Series. No. 10: Labor-Related Political Committees. Receipts and Expenditures. 1976 Campaign. Washington, January 1978. p. 6.

TABLE 8. Adjusted Expenditures of PACs by Category: 1972-1980
(in millions of dollars) 1/--Continued

For 1976 (corporate): U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Disclosure Series. No. 8: Corporate-Related Political Committees. Receipts and Expenditures. 1976 Campaign. Washington, September 1977. p. 8.

For 1976 (other): U.S. Federal Election Commission, unpublished data.

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Final Report: Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 1--Summary Tables. April 1980. p. 140. (adjusted disbursements column).

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report For 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982.

Turning attention to the growth of PACs in terms of their contributions to congressional candidates, Table 9 provides continued evidence of the strength of the corporate and trade/membership/health PACs, of the diminished power of labor PACs (albeit less diminished than it appeared from the overall expenditure patterns), and, in the one divergence from the data in Table 8, the relatively insignificant role played by non-connected PACs in their contributions to congressional candidates.

As they did in Table 8, labor PACs experienced a steady growth in the amount of money they contributed to congressional candidates, even while becoming increasingly dwarfed by the contributions of other sectors of the PAC community. The percentage of overall PAC contributions which was constituted by labor declined steadily from the high point in 1974 (50 percent) to their 1980 level of 24 percent. Nevertheless, labor accounted for a significantly higher share of all PAC contributions to congressional candidates than of all PAC expenditures. It can be surmised from Table 9 that labor PACs were in first place as late as 1976 in terms of their contributions, while retaining this status only through 1974 in terms of overall expenditures. (This ignores the "business-related" category, basing the ranking instead on today's PAC groupings.) By 1978, labor

PACs ranked second among contributors; and, in 1980, they ranked third. A little more than half of labor expenditures took the form of congressional candidate contributions in both 1978 and 1980.

Corporate PACs contributed the third highest amount to congressional candidates in 1978, jumping to first place in 1980. Table 1 may provide some insight into this development; the sheer numbers of corporate PACs and the growth thereof account in large measure for the ability to rank first in contributions by 1980. In fact, one-third of all PAC contributions in 1980 came from corporate PACs. Corporate PACs spent about three-fifths of their money in both 1978 and 1980 on congressional contributions, a higher proportion than was given by labor.

Trade/membership/health groups fell to second place among PAC contributors in 1980, from their first place status in 1978. In both of those years, about one-half of their money was spent in the form of congressional candidate contributions, a smaller proportion than was given by either the labor or corporate PACs.

Perhaps the most striking feature arising from a comparison of Tables 8 and 9 is the first place ranking of the non-connected PACs in terms of their overall expenditures in 1980 and their rather token level of contributions to congressional candidates that same year. In sharp contrast to the spending patterns of all three of the other major PAC groupings, only 13 percent of non-connected expenditures took the form of congressional candidate contributions. This suggests once again a higher degree of spending by these PACs—largely ideological in nature—on activities such as fundraising by direct-mail and independent expenditures. This will be confirmed in later illustrations of some of the largest non-connected PACs.

TABLE 9. Contributions to Congressional Candidates of PACs by Category:
1972-1980 (in millions of dollars). ^{1/}

Type of PAC	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
Labor	\$3.6	\$ 6.3	\$ 8.2	\$10.3	\$13.2
Business- ^{2/} related	\$2.7	\$ 4.4	\$10.0	---	---
Corporate	---	---	---	\$ 9.8	\$19.2
Trade Membership/ Health	---	---	---	\$11.3	\$15.9
Non-connected ^{3/}	---	\$.7	\$ 1.5	\$ 2.8	\$ 4.9
Other ^{4/}	\$2.2	\$ 1.0	\$ 2.8	\$ 1.0	\$ 2.0
Total ^{5/}	\$8.5	\$12.5	\$22.6	\$35.2	\$55.2

^{1/} All data is for full election cycle, except for 1972, wherein primary losers are excluded.

^{2/} This encompasses the Common Cause categories for business, health, and, in 1976, lawyers. This category is included here for the purpose of listing the data for 1972-1976, before the specific breakdowns were devised by the FEC for the corporate and other categories, and it is based on the assumption that the majority of PACs it includes have a basically pro-business orientation. It is only roughly comparable to the combined corporate and trade/membership/health groups in 1978 and 1980, but most of the business-related PACs would fall into those two FEC categories (some would be scattered in the non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock groupings).

^{3/} For 1974 and 1976, the non-connected category, as defined by the FEC, correlates with the ideological group used by Common Cause for those two years. Most of the ideological PACs are today listed in the non-connected grouping, but the latter also includes PACs not ideological in nature. Thus, the data for 1974 and 1976 are not exactly comparable to those for 1978 and 1980, in view of the different standards applied to the non-connected and the ideological groupings. (Ideological PACs in 1972 were lumped into Common Cause's "miscellaneous" group.)

TABLE 9. Contributions to Congressional Candidates of PACs by Category:
1972-1980 (in millions of dollars) 1/--Continued

4/ This is a catch-all category, in which the earlier figures are only roughly comparable to the later ones. For 1972-1976, the data represents Common Cause's "miscellaneous" category, which included such groups as the NEA (and affiliates), environmentalists, and some cooperatives, and its agriculture/dairy category. In 1972, Common Cause included the ideological PACs under "miscellaneous," prior to their separate listing in 1974; thus 1972 includes more types of PACs than the 1974 and 1976 data did. For 1978-1980, the "other" data equates directly with the FEC's cooperatives and corporations without stock groups. Thus, the data for 1972 is not exactly comparable with those for 1974 and 1976, which, in turn, are not highly comparable with those for 1978-1980. The common thread is the inclusion of the major dairy PACs--ADEPT, C-TAPE, and SPACE--in "other" for all five election years.

5/ Totals (which are keyed to Table 3) may not add up exactly, because of rounding off.

Source: For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974. v. 1. p. vi.

For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. xii.

For 1976: Common Cause data. In Interest Group Gifts to 1976 Congressional Campaigns. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 35, April 16, 1977: p. 710.

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Final Report. Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 1--Summary Tables. Washington, April 1980. p. 142.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report For 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982.

Tables 8 and 9 present evidence of the growing strength of the corporate and trade PACs, the diminished but residual power of labor PACs, and the "wild card" role left to the non-connected PACs. Having assessed the major components of aggregate PAC spending, these can next be compared with the activities of the major individual PACs.

2. The Largest PAC Contributors and Spenders

This section provides for each election since 1972 a listing of the largest PACs in terms of their contributions to Federal candidates and, for each election since 1976, a listing of the largest PACs in terms of their overall expenditures. This indicates how large contributors changed in rank over the five-election period and how the large spenders changed in rank over the last three elections, while comparing the listings of the different kinds of PACs reflected in these two arrangements.

At the outset, it must be stated that the top 20 lists tell only part of the overall PAC story. They are useful in understanding which PACs may have the most power, if one equates power with a high level of financial activity. They also help to demonstrate which sectors of the society have most successfully employed the PAC route. Finally, they are helpful in illustrating in yet another form the various standards which are used to gauge PAC activity and the shortcomings of the respective standards.

These lists cannot, in and of themselves, tell the reader where power lies in American politics today. The fact that not a single corporate PAC appears on any of these lists is one of most important overall observations one can make. But, rather than being indicative of an absence of corporate political interest or influence, it is more the result of the proliferation of PACs among a wide number of corporations. While few corporate PACs reach significant levels of spending on an individual basis, they may have a significant combined effect on behalf of particular industries. Furthermore, to the extent that some corporations sponsor numerous PACs (despite the

single overall limitation on contributions), it goes unnoticed on charts such as these, arranged by PAC instead of by sponsoring organization. The conclusion for this section will return to this point, while offering comparative comments on the two types of listings used in Tables 10-17.

a. Top 20 PAC contributors from 1972-1980

Tables 10-14 present the largest 20 PACs in each biennial election since 1972, ranked in terms of their direct contributions to Federal candidates. The measurement of PACs according to their contribution levels is a less reliable indicator of their financial activity and influence today than it was earlier in this ten-year period. As later tables will reveal, PACs have become increasingly willing to spend money in other, perhaps more imaginative, ways than limiting themselves to direct contributions to candidates. Nonetheless, it can be argued that if one is seeking to determine which PACs have the greatest potential for access to elected officials, the level of contributions still may be the most useful single measure. This discussion highlights some of the most salient features of each year's list, concluding with observations of trends in the top 20 grouping over the five-election period.

The 1972 group (Table 10) covers a range of \$137,500 to \$824,301 in contributions, with the AFL-CIO's COPE—the father of modern PACs—in first place and the UAW's V-CAP in second place. Labor PACs constitute ten of the top twenty, not surprising in view of labor's undisputed predominance in the PAC arena as the 1970s began. Four trade associations—those connected with the realtors, the Associated General Contractors, the AMA, and the National Association of Manufacturers (BIPAC)—were in the top 20. The list includes

all three of the major dairy co-ops--Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (C-TAPE), Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust (ADEPT), and Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community Education (SPACE); in view of the later revelations about their illegal contributions in 1972, the total of their contributions listed in Table 10 actually understates the level of their financial giving that year. ^{121/} Finally, three unaffiliated PACs are included, one of which is Democratic in orientation--the DSG Campaign Fund--and the other are liberal--National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC) and the Committee for Twelve.

In 1974 (table 11), the range of contributions was \$134,100 (lower than in 1972) to \$1,090,696 (the first PAC to top the million dollar mark in contributions during this period). COPE was again in first place, but the AMA's PAC supplanted the UAW in second place. Labor PACs increased their representation from 10 to 12 of the top 20, while none of three dairy co-ops were included at all, undoubtedly a result of the negative publicity they received in the wake of the disclosures of their illegal contributions in the previous election. The trade associations increased their ranks from 4 to 6, with the American Medical PAC (AMPAC), Business-Industry PAC (BIPAC), and the Realtors PAC remaining, and the PACs of the American Dental Association, the Trucking Association, and the California chapter of the AMA added. Two unaffiliated PACs were included, with a conservative one--Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress--joining (and surpassing) one of the liberal ones from 1972 (NCEC).

^{121/} Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election, p. 495.

In 1976 (Table 12), the cut-off level for inclusion more than doubled, in conjunction with the overall jump in PAC spending that year; the range in contributions was \$290,125 to \$1,167,365. Labor PACs remained at about the same level, with 11 included. The trade associations dropped to five--with AMPAC, Realtors PAC, BIPAC, and American Dental PAC (ADPAC) remaining, and the National Automobile Dealers Association's PAC added. Two of the dairy co-ops--C-TAPE and ADEPT--returned to the list, and the number of unaffiliated PACs remained at two--NCEC, again, and National Conservative PAC (NCPAC), replacing the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC) as the largest conservative ideological contributor.

In 1978 (Table 13), the cut-off level increased slightly--to \$307,902, while the maximum contributed increased by almost 50 percent--to \$1,639,795. AMPAC was again in first place, and for the first time, neither of the top two were labor PACs. Furthermore, UAW V-CAP, in third place, for the first time supplanted COPE as the leading labor contributor. The trade associations increased in number to six--with AMPAC, ADPAC, Realtors PAC, and the Automobile and Truck Dealers EAC remaining (BIPAC left the top 20 for the first time) and the Life Underwriters PAC and the Trial Lawyers Association PAC added. In addition, the membership organization--the National Rifle Association (NRA)--had its Victory Fund added to the list, thus bringing the trade/membership/health total to seven, and adding a conservative single-issue PAC (NRA) to the top 20--the first single-issue PAC to make the lists at all since 1972. The unaffiliated PACs were down to only one, the conservative Citizens for the Republic, which was organized to promote the philosophy and political fortunes of Ronald Reagan. Citizens for the Republic was the forerunner of the candidate-oriented PACs, which many candidates, often Presidential, organized to conduct

the early, pre-formal operations of their campaigns. Finally, the 1978 top 20 list included one dairy co-op--C-TAPE.

The 1980 list (Table 14) includes PACs whose contributions ranged between \$424,008 (a 40 percent rise from the 1978 cut-off) and \$1,536,573 (a slight drop from the high point in 1978). The Realtors PAC was in first place, followed by the UAW V-CAP, and then AMPAC. The AFL-CIO's COPE dropped to sixth place, no longer even among the top five. Labor PACs again constituted 11 of the top 20. The trade/membership/health group was again represented by seven of its members--with AMPAC, Realtors PAC, Automobile and Truck Dealers EAC, ADPAC, Life Underwriters PAC, and the NRA Victory Fund included again, and the American Banking Association BANKPAC on the list for the first time--in 13th place. C-TAPE was again the sole dairy co-op included, and only one unaffiliated PAC--NCEC--ranked among the top 20. Thus, the only non-connected PAC was a liberal one, in a year in which conservative PACs received so much attention in the media (unless, of course, the NRA Victory Fund is included as a conservative ideological PAC). This apparent incongruity will be resolved when the top 20 PACs are ranked by overall expenditures.

TABLE 10. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1972

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation*)	Contributions
1	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$ 824,301
2	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$ 599,183
3	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$ 473,105
4	Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of Manufacturers)	\$ 428,100
5	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$ 393,888
6	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$ 301,865
7	United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 294,935
8	Agricultural & Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.)	\$ 264,150
9	Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America)	\$ 239,234
10	Trus. for Special Political Agricultural Community Education (Dairymen, Inc.)	\$ 222,900
11	CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America)	\$ 217,007
12	Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association)	\$ 193,175
13	Machinists Non-Partisan League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 177,793
14	ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union)	\$ 176,294
15	Democratic Study Group Campaign Fund (non-connected)	\$ 175,500
16	Committee for Twelve (non-connected)	\$ 165,136
17	Laborers' Political League (Laborers Union/AFL-CIO)	\$ 164,950
18	AMCOPE (Meatcutters Union/AFL-CIO)	\$ 152,651
19	Committee for Action (Associated General Contractors)	\$ 145,049
20	Real Estate PEC (National Association of Real Estate Boards)	\$ 137,850

* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status.

Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project.
1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties.
Washington, 1974, v. I-III.

TABLE 11. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1974

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation*)	Contributions
1	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$1,090,696
2	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$ 861,052
3	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$ 835,958
4	Machinists Non-Partisan League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 446,680
5	MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association)	\$ 391,864
6	United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 357,975
7	Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association)	\$ 276,055
8	Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of Manufacturers)	\$ 271,000
9	Real Estate Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$ 248,600
10	Laborers' Political League (Laborers Union/AFL-CIO)	\$ 237,400
11	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 233,720
12	NEA-PAC (National Education Association)	\$ 227,680
13	Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America)	\$ 198,250
14	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected)	\$ 197,500
15	Railway Clerks Political League (Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks)	\$ 181,596
16	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$ 162,869
17	CAL-PAC (American Medical Association-California)	\$ 159,298
18	Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (Carpenters Union)	\$ 157,700
19	Truck Operators Non-Partisan Committee (Trucking Association, Inc.)	\$ 136,050
20	American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association)	\$ 134,100

* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status.

Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project.
1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and
Political Parties. Washington, 1976.

TABLE 12. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1976

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation*)	Contributions
1	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$1,167,365
2	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$ 935,723
3	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$ 894,930
4	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$ 671,525
5	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$ 635,939
6	NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association)	\$ 611,492
7	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 525,100
8	Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.)	\$ 466,035
9	United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 464,867
10	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 450,006
11	National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected)	\$ 433,357
12	Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Automobile Dealers Association)	\$ 424,710
13	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$ 344,376
14	CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America)	\$ 325,758
15	Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America)	\$ 313,321
16	American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association)	\$ 310,741
17	Business-Industry Political Action Committee (National Association of Manufacturers)	\$ 306,000
18	Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association)	\$ 302,393
19	MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association)	\$ 300,871
20	Laborers Political League (Laborers Union/ AFL-CIO)	\$ 290,125

* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status.

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (from reports on file)

TABLE 13. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1978

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation)	Contributions
1	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$1,639,795
2	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$1,123,378
3	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$ 976,245
4	Automobile & Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Automobile Dealers Association)	\$ 964,175
5	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$ 884,441
6	United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 599,930
7	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 559,403
8	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 525,410
9	American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association)	\$ 510,050
10	CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America)	\$ 471,183
11	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$ 446,161
12	Citizens for the Republic (non-connected)	\$ 431,586
13	MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association)	\$ 410,166
14	Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America)	\$ 396,052
15	Life Underwriters Political Action Committee (National Association of Life Underwriters)	\$ 380,638
16	NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association of America)	\$ 366,161
17	Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust (Association of Trial Lawyers of America)	\$ 349,850
18	NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association)	\$ 338,987
19	Railway Clerks Political League (Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks)	\$ 320,908
20	Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America)	\$ 307,902

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Report on 1977-78 Financial Activity of Non-Party and Party Political Committees, press release: April 24, 1980.

TABLE 14. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1980

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation)	Contributions
1	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$1,536,573
2	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$1,422,731
3	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$1,348,985
4	Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers)	\$1,035,276
5	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 847,708
6	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$ 776,577
7	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$ 738,289
8	Seafarers Political Activity Donation (Seafarers International Union of North America)	\$ 685,248
9	United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 681,370
10	National Association of Life Underwriters PAC (National Association of Life Underwriters)	\$ 652,112
11	American Dental Political Action Committee (American Dental Association)	\$ 647,875
12	MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association)	\$ 614,795
13	American Bankers Association BANKPAC (American Bankers Association)	\$ 592,960
14	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 584,144
15	Active Ballot Club (Food & Commercial Workers International Union)	\$ 569,775
16	Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America)	\$ 553,675
17	ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union)	\$ 488,810
18	CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America)	\$ 444,520
19	NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association)	\$ 434,603
20	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$ 424,008

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report for 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982.

Looking at the five tables as a set, one can venture several observations about the relative strengths of the major PAC groupings:

1) Labor PACs have consistently constituted 10-12 of the top 20 PAC contributors in each of the five elections. They have, in fact, made up around half of the top 10, although some decline has been evidenced since 1974 when seven of the top 10 were labor PACs; the number fell to six in 1976 and 1978 and five in 1980. Although labor PACs have remained constant in number since 1972 and have been surpassed in aggregate contributions and expenditures by both corporate and trade/membership/health committees, their strength has consistently remained concentrated in a relatively small number of large, well-organized, politically-minded unions.

2) The reverse of the above description of labor PACs can be applied to corporate PACs. No single corporate committees achieved any predominance among corporate PACs, with none appearing on any of the top 20 lists. Rather, corporate PAC strength has been emanating from their ever-increasing proliferation, which, in turn, has contributed to their high rate of increase in aggregate level of expenditures--tripling it from 1976 to 1978 and more than doubling it again in 1980.

3) The trade/membership/health committees have modestly increased their representation among the top 20 contributors, from four in 1972 to seven in 1980. These committees ranked second in terms of their inclusion on these lists, as they ranked second in terms of the aggregate level of expenditures in 1980.

4) The non-connected PACs, despite their astonishing growth in both numbers and financial activity in recent years, receive just token representation among the big PAC contributors. And the conservative ideological groups, which have led the growth in the non-connected category, were no better represented than the liberal groups.

5) Only one single-issue PAC--the NRA Political Victory Fund--ranked among the twenty largest contributors in any given year. This, too, appeared to conflict with the impression one may have received through the media regarding the era of single-issue politics.

6) The dairy co-ops, once a major cornerstone in the PAC movement, have dwindled among the twenty largest contributors from three in 1972 to one in 1978 and 1980.

7) Seven PACs were included among the twenty largest contributors in all five elections: the AFL-CIO COPE, the UAW V-CAP, the Realtors PAC, the American Medical PAC, the Seafarers Political Activity Donation, the United Steelworkers Political Action Fund, and the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League.

Among the four largest PAC contributors over the five-election period, there have been some noteworthy developments. The Realtors PAC has experienced a meteoric rise from number twenty in 1972 to number one in 1980. AMPAC, the oldest major non-labor PAC, has remained in the top three in every election. COPE, the modern precedent-setter among all PACs, declined steadily from first place in 1972 and 1974 to sixth in 1980. COPE has been supplanted since 1978 as the foremost labor PAC--in terms of contributions to Federal candidates--by the UAW V-CAP. The latter committee has remained in the top three in every election since 1972. Finally, while the top three PACs from 1972-1976 included two labor and one trade PAC, the situation since 1978 has been reversed.

b. Top 20 PAC spenders from 1976-1980

This subsection focuses on Tables 15-17, which list the top 20 PACs ranked by their adjusted expenditures in each of the last three elections. Highlights of each table will be described, along with key differences between the largest contributors and the largest spenders in that year. The conclusion of this subsection will review the trends over the three elections covered.

The twenty largest PACs in 1976 (Table 15) spent between \$512,844 and \$2,878,490, with the former 75 percent higher and the latter 150 percent higher than the twentieth and the first largest contributors in 1976 (Table 12). Fifteen of the committees in Table 15 also were listed among the twenty largest contributors that year; the five not ranking among the large contributors included one union (ILGWU), one co-op (SPACE), two conservative membership groups (Gun Owners and ACU PAC), and one conservative unaffiliated group (CSFC). Among the categories of PACs represented were nine labor unions (compared with eleven on the top contributors list), three non-connected groups (the same number as in Table 12), three trade associations (with five in Table 12), two membership committees, both conservative (compared with none in Table 12), and three co-ops (one more than in Table 12). In the top five spenders were, in order, two conservative unaffiliated PACs, one conservative membership organization, one liberal unaffiliated committee, and one association. The two most prominent labor PACs, COPE and UAW V-CAP, ranked numbers seven and eight, compared with their rankings of two and three among the PAC contributors that year.

The twenty largest 1978 PACs (Table 16) spent between \$658,236 and \$4,509,074, respectively 30/60 percent higher than the 1976 range and 114 percent more than the twentieth largest contributor and 175 percent more than the top contributor

in 1978. Twelve PACs ranked among both the largest contributors and the largest spenders, three less than in 1976, with the other eight including four conservative non-connected PACs (Citizens for the Republic, NCPAC, CSFC, and Conservative Victory Fund), one conservative membership group (Gun Owners), one liberal unaffiliated group (NCEC), and two associations (the California and Texas chapters of the AMA). Among the key types of PACs, labor PACs dropped to only six (down from nine in 1976 and compared with eleven among the largest 1978 contributors), non-connected jumped to six (from three in 1976 and compared with one among the top contributors), associations rose to six (from three in 1976 and the same number as in the top contributors list in 1978), membership groups dropped to one (from two in 1976, and the same number as in the 1978 largest contributors list), and co-ops dropped to one (from three in 1976, and the same number as in Table 13). It should be noted that two of the conservative non-connected PACs (Citizens for the Republic and the John Connally Citizens Forum) were, in fact, oriented heavily to furthering the candidacies of two Presidential candidates (Reagan and Connally). Also, the rise among associations was largely the result of two of AMA's State PACs joining it among the top 20 spenders. The two big labor PACs ranked eighth (COPE) and ninth (UAW) among spenders, in contrast to their respective rankings of fifth and third among contributors. The top five PAC spenders were, in order, three conservative non-connected committees and two associations.

The range of the top twenty PAC spenders in 1980 (Table 17) rose by respectively 50/67 percent over the 1978 level to a range of \$995,501 to \$7,530,060, 134 percent higher than the twentieth largest contributor and nearly 400 percent higher than the largest contributor in 1980. Again in 1980, twelve committees were on both the top spender and top contributor lists, but, in 1980, all eight of the top spenders that did not rank among the top contributors were conservative ideological PACs: seven non-connected (NCPAC, Congressional Club, FCM, Citizens for the Republic, Americans for an Effective Presidency, CSFC, and Americans for Change) and one membership group (Gun Owners). The non-connected PACs constituted the largest category of the top spenders with eight in number (the seven above plus the liberal NCEC), a gain of two over 1978, but in contrast with only one among the largest contributors in 1980--NCEC. Membership groups added one over 1978, giving them two top spenders (the Gun Owners and the NRA PAC), one more than on the top contributors list for 1980. Labor PACs declined in number to five, compared with eleven in 1980's contributor list. Labor's big two committees ranked sixth (UAW) and seventeenth (COPE) among spenders, but second and sixth, respectively, among contributors. Associations declined to four, compared with six among the top contributors, and co-ops remained constant with one, the same as in the contributors listing. The top five PAC spenders in 1980 were, in order, four conservative non-connected committees and one association.

TABLE 15. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1976^{1/}

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation*)	Expenditures
1	National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected)	\$2,878,490
2	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected)	\$2,249,451
3	Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee (Gun Owners of America)	\$2,094,821
4	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$1,298,986
5	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$1,297,296
6	Committee for Thorough Political Agricultural Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$1,256,019
7	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$1,197,965
8	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$1,193,188
9	American Conservative Union Political Action Committee (American Conservative Union)	\$1,116,016
10	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$ 893,656
11	NEA Political Action Committee (National Education Association)	\$ 762,994
12	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 754,089
13	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 732,484
14	Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust (Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.)	\$ 712,142
15	United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 649,330
16	ILGWU Campaign Committee (International Ladies Garment Workers Union)	\$ 647,190
17	Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community Education (Dairymen, Inc.)	\$ 643,212
18	Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers)	\$ 556,771
19	Active Ballot Club (Retail Clerks International Association)	\$ 521,056
20	MEBA Political Action Fund (Marine Engineers Beneficial Association)	\$ 512,844

* Affiliation does not necessarily correspond to legal status.

^{1/} Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of the committee minus monies transferred to affiliated committees.

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (unpublished data).

TABLE 16. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1978^{1/}

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation)	Expenditures
1	Citizens for the Republic (non-connected)	\$4,509,074
2	National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected)	\$3,030,408
3	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected)	\$2,029,122
4	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	\$1,879,164
5	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	\$1,805,390
6	Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee (Gun Owners of America)	\$1,548,075
7	Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers)	\$1,541,761
8	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	\$1,290,404
9	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	\$1,158,673
10	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	\$1,052,142
11	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	\$1,016,040
12	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	\$ 945,963
13	United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	\$ 810,688
14	Texas Medical Political Action Committee (Texas Medical Association)	\$ 757,074
15	The John Connally Citizens Forum (non-connected)	\$ 718,884
16	Conservative Victory Fund (non-connected)	\$ 697,211
17	California Medical Political Action Committee (California Medical Association)	\$ 674,808
18	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	\$ 665,035
19	Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust (Association of Trial Lawyers of America)	\$ 658,306
20	CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee (Communication Workers of America)	\$ 658,236

^{1/} Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of the committee minus monies transferred to affiliated committees.

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (press release):
April 24, 1980.

TABLE 17. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1980^{1/}

Rank	Committee (and Affiliation)	Expenditures
1	National Conservative Political Action Committee (non-connected)	\$7,530,060
2	Congressional Club (non-connected)	7,212,754
3	Fund for a Conservative Majority (non-connected)	3,150,496
4	Realtors Political Action Committee (National Association of Realtors)	2,576,077
5	Citizens for the Republic (non-connected)	2,384,426
6	UAW Voluntary Community Action Program (United Auto Workers)	2,027,737
7	Americans for an Effective Presidency (non-connected)	1,874,312
8	American Medical Political Action Committee (American Medical Association)	1,812,021
9	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (non-connected)	1,623,750
10	National Committee for an Effective Congress (non-connected)	1,420,238
11	Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee (Gun Owners of America)	1,398,670
12	Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee (National Association of Automobile Dealers)	1,389,951
13	Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education (Associated Milk Producers, Inc.)	1,274,931
14	Transportation Political Education League (United Transportation Union)	1,196,241
15	NRA Political Victory Fund (National Rifle Association)	1,125,123
16	Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (International Association of Machinists)	1,096,598
17	AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee (AFL-CIO)	1,078,150
18	Americans for Change (non-connected)	1,061,123
19	Life Underwriters Political Action Committee (National Association of Life Underwriters)	1,024,139
20	United Steelworkers Political Action Fund (United Steelworkers of America)	995,501

^{1/} Adjusted expenditures represents gross disbursements of the committee minus monies transferred to affiliated committees.

Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC Report For 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982.

In reviewing the lists of the largest spenders among PACs from 1976-1980, apart from any comparisons with their counterpart lists of large contributors, several significant trends can be discerned. The first is the enormous increase in just six years in the amount of money spent by the PACs. Whereas the cut-off level for inclusion among the top 20 was around half a million dollars in 1976, it virtually doubled to near the million dollar mark by 1980. And while the top PAC in 1976 spent an impressive \$2.9 million, the 1980 high was more than two and one-half times as much--\$7.5 million; ironically, the same PAC--NCPAC--was in first place in each of those years.

The second notable trend has been the decline in labor PACs among the big spenders by almost one-half, from nine in 1976 to only five in 1980. This decline has been accompanied by the third trend, the increase in the non-connected PACs; three were included in 1976, and, by 1980, their number had reached eight. Concomitantly, the ideological PACs (consisting of some from the membership and some from the non-connected categories) have doubled in number since 1976, and, in 1980, fully half of the largest PACs were ideological; nine out of the ten were conservative in nature.

The final major trend has been the tendency of a few large conservative PACs to skew the overall spending figures. The top three PAC spenders in each of the three elections were conservative groups whose dollar totals were distinctly, if not dramatically, higher than the next others on the list. Even among the three top ones, wide gaps in spending occurred. In 1976, only the top three crossed the \$2 million level, with the third largest spending more than 50 percent more than the fourth largest. In 1978, the third largest

PAC passed the \$2 million mark, the second largest exceeded the third by 50 percent, passing the \$3 million dollar level, and the largest was another 50 percent higher than the second, thus passing the \$4.5 million mark. In 1980, the third largest PAC passed the \$3 million mark, about 25 percent more than the fourth largest spender. This was more than doubled by the second largest committee, which outspent it by more than \$4 million dollars and reached a spending level of \$7.2 million. This was exceeded marginally by the highest spending NCPAC, with \$7.5 million in adjusted expenditures. The next subsection will discuss the skewing of the expenditure statistics by the ideological PACs by exploring the question of where the enormous sums of money have been going, as it is apparent that they have not been spent in large measure on candidate contributions.

c. Comparison of the largest spenders and contributors among PACs

The attention given to the big PAC spenders and contributors reflects an interest in determining which groups have acquired the greatest potential for influencing the political process. This section has explored this topic, particularly in the context of the aggregate data presented for categories of PACs in Tables 8 and 9. Before arriving at some conclusions about the largest PACs and the standards reflected in the two different schemes for arranging them, one additional criterion for gauging an interest group's potential for political influence should be noted.

As mentioned earlier, some unions and corporations sponsor more than one PAC, despite the anti-proliferation provisions of the 1976 FECA Amendments, which subjected all the PACs established by the same parent organization to a single contribution limit per candidate (\$5000). It was thus intended to reduce

the incentives for proliferating PACs within an organization. It appears, however, that there may be other incentives working in favor of establishing multiple segregated funds--for example, greater ease in avoiding detection of the parent group's accumulated power. Proliferation may also afford greater ease in fundraising, by having different PACs in the various branches of a union or corporation. Although the single contribution limit per candidate is in effect, the leaders of the corporation or union could retain the power to determine how the funds raised by all of its affiliated PACs will be spent.

In 1980, for example, American Telephone & Telegraph sponsored 23 PACs whose gross expenditures were \$893,637 and whose contributions to Federal candidates totaled \$654,250. While the former amount would not have placed AT&T among the top 20 spenders even had they been arranged by sponsoring organization, the latter figure would likely have led to the corporation's inclusion as the tenth largest contributor to Federal candidates. On a smaller scale but illustrative nonetheless, the LTV Corporation sponsored six PACs which spent \$446,819 in 1980, \$229,430 of which went to Federal candidates, and Dow Chemical's eight PACs spent \$350,338, of which \$270,700 went to Federal candidates. 122/

These data reveal that by sponsoring several PACs, the extent to which an organization plays a financial role in Federal elections may be obscured. It is especially useful to bear this phenomenon in mind when considering the case of the corporate PACs, which, despite their large numbers and large aggregate contributions, failed to rank among the largest spenders or contributors in any year examined herein. But, proliferation

122/ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980. Final Report: Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 3 - Non-Party Detailed Tables (Corporate and Labor). Washington, Jan. 1982.

of PACs is not limited to corporations. The AFL-CIO, for example, sponsored 17 PACs in addition to its pre-eminent COPE Political Contributions Committee. Undoubtedly, their contributions and expenditures would improve the overall ranking of the AFL-CIO vis-a-vis other PAC sponsors. Because this section of the report adopts the method of ranking PAC spending by committee, rather than sponsor, it is better able to reveal which PACs are the most important rather than which interest groups are the most important politically. Because relatively few groups maintain more than one PAC, this qualification is not of overriding significance.

The two most noteworthy trends evidenced from the comparison between Tables 10-14 and Tables 15-17 are very much interrelated: the increasing gap evidenced since 1976 in the ratio of spenders to contributors and the increasing predominance among top PAC spenders of the ideological (mostly conservative) groups. As demonstrated by the aggregate data in Table 3, the percentage of PAC contributions in adjusted PAC expenditures has ranged since 1976 between the 42 and 46 percent level or, in other words, somewhat less than one PAC dollar in two has been contributed directly to Federal candidates. The comparison between Tables 8 and 9 had shown that the 1 to 2 ratio was roughly applicable in 1978 and 1980 to every category of PAC, except for the non-connected grouping, whose contributions were exceeded by expenditures in 1978 by a 1 to 6 ratio and in 1980 by a 1 to 8 ratio.

For the largest spenders and contributors, rather than approximating the 1 to 2 ratio applicable to most PAC groups, the gap has grown significantly wider since 1976. In 1976, the 20th largest contributor gave 56 percent as much in contributions as the 20th largest spender spent; this proportion dropped to 47 percent in 1978 and to 43 percent in 1980. At the other end

of the range, the largest contributor in 1976 gave 40 percent as much to candidates as was spent by the largest spending PAC; the proportion dropped to 36 percent in 1978 and to only 20 percent in 1980.

Clearly, the increasingly high levels of expenditures by the ideological, non-connected PACs, in conjunction with their relatively low levels of direct support for Federal candidates, have been responsible for this trend. While the non-connected group increased their representation among top spenders from three to eight between 1976 and 1980, their numbers among top contributors fell from two to one in that same period. While contributions to Federal candidates constituted at least half, and often well over half, of total adjusted expenditures by virtually every other PAC appearing on the top spenders lists, this was far from true for the non-connected PACs. And it was no coincidence that the only non-connected PAC which ranked among both the largest spenders and largest contributors in 1980 was a liberal one. A brief examination of where the conservative PAC money was expended in 1980 is illustrative.

Of the \$7.5 million spent by NCPAC in 1980, only \$237,806 was given as contributions to Federal candidates, 123/ while \$3.3 million was spent independently for and against candidates, 124/ A March 1981 estimate placed NCPAC's operating expenses at \$2.1 million and its direct-mail costs at \$1.8 million. 125/

The Congressional Club spent \$7.2 million, of which \$72,383 went to Federal candidates and \$4,601,069 was spent independently. 126/ According to one account,

123/ Ibid. Vol. 4 - Non-Party Detailed Tables (No Connected Organization, Trade/Membership/Health, Cooperative, Corporation Without Stock). p. C90.

124/ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top \$16 Million (press release): Nov. 29, 1981.

125/ Shaw, New Right Gave Candidates Little, p. 20A.

126/ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980. Vol. 4. p. C42.

the \$4.6 million figure for independent expenditures greatly overstates the level of candidate-oriented activity; in fact, it asserts, as much as \$3.9 million of the \$4.6 million was spent on direct-mail fundraising. 127/

Such groups as Americans for Change and Americans for an Effective Presidency were organized in 1981 expressly for the purpose of conducting independent expenditure campaigns on behalf of Ronald Reagan. Those two groups spent nearly \$2 million independently and only \$30,250 in direct candidate contributions. 128/ Thus, the gap between spending and contributing can still be seen largely in terms of fundraising costs and independent expenditures.

Even some of the membership groups which are ideological in nature experienced larger gaps than most PACs between their levels of expenditures and contributions, although not of the magnitude witnessed among the unaffiliated PACs. According to FEC reports, the Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee contributed only \$183,480 of the \$1.4 million it spent in 1980; in contrast, the NRA Political Victory Fund spent \$1.1 million and contributed \$434,603 to Federal candidates.

With large or unlimited pools of potential contributors, the non-connected PACs have increasingly turned to direct-mail as the most effective way to reach large numbers of people sympathetic to their philosophy. For conservative groups, this trend has coincided with the pioneering efforts in the direct-mail field by conservatives--most notably Richard Viguerie--anxious to assist candidates of similar ideology through sophisticated direct-mail techniques and in-house lists of millions of likely contributors. Only recently have

127/ Shaw, New Right Gave Candidates Little.

128/ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980. Vol. 4. p. C12.

liberal groups begun to improve their capabilities in the direct-mail field. Thus, the direct-mail avenue is one that is conducive to the mission of ideological groups, and its greater development to date by conservatives has made it an especially likely method for conservative PACs to adopt.

The other major factor contributing to the high expenses of conservative ideological PACs has been their willingness to operate outside of more traditional, established channels for interest group influence in the electoral process. While officials of both major parties have expressed concern over the trend toward more independent expenditures, conservative groups have tended to defend them as a logical response to what they see as the FECA's undue restrictions on direct contributions to candidates. Furthermore, independent expenditure campaigns, as a highly visible endeavor (in contrast with direct candidate giving), have probably had some impact on the ability of the conservative groups to raise money. ^{129/} (None of this is to suggest that only conservative groups or ideological and non-connected PACs engage in independent expenditures, but it is true that the great bulk of such spending in 1980 emanated from the conservative PACs.)

Finally, with regard to the spender-contributor gap and the increasingly disproportionate spending by conservative, non-connected PACs, it is instructive to observe that by excluding the top three PAC spenders from 1976-1980, the gap between spenders and contributors more nearly approximates the 1 to 2 ratio discussed earlier. Not only have the non-connected PACs skewed the spending/

^{129/} Independent Expenditures: Tactics and Strategy. Political Action Report, v. 3, August 16, 1980: 9-10.

contributing data, but this has been especially true of a few major, highly-visible, large spending PACs in each election.

Having explored the growing gap between the top spenders and top contributors and the increasing dominance of the big spenders by the conservative, non-connected PACs, the other comparative observations appear largely to be simply by-products of the other trends. Labor PACs dominated the field in terms of their contributions to candidates in all five elections, but they increasingly were unable to compete with the overall political fundraising ability of the non-connected groups. Thus, their ranks decreased among the largest spenders. Trade and health associations grew among the largest contributors, but their numbers remained constant among the large spenders. They, also, despite their generally impressive campaign financing record, were unable to match the levels of funding of the large, ideological groups.

C. PAC Spending Since 1972: Where the Money Has Gone

The primary focus of this section is the beneficiaries of PAC giving during the past five elections--how PAC money has been distributed to candidates in terms of their political party and their electoral status (whether incumbent, challenger, or open-seat contestant). This section is intended to promote a better understanding of some of the key points of contention in the continuing debate on the subject of PACs, specifically whether there is a partisan slant in PAC giving (and whether it has undergone a shift) and whether an incumbency bias does exist among PACs. Part 1 examines these questions from the perspective of the PACs (and also sheds some light on how the specific types of PACs have been distributing their money with regard to the party and status variables). Part 2 looks at these questions from the candidate perspective--how much have PAC contributions played a role in the financing of campaigns, according to party and candidate status.

1. Candidate Preferences From the PAC Perspective

Tables 18 and 19 present the data on how PAC contributions have been distributed to candidates since 1972, according to their party and electoral status. They include statistics for both House and Senate candidates in the general elections (primary losers are excluded). While Table 18 presents the aggregate data for all PACs, Table 19 breaks the data down by categories of PACs.

As evidenced in Table 18, the division of PAC contributions has shifted since 1972 from an overwhelming Democratic bias to a nearly equal split between the two parties' candidates. In 1972 and 1974, Democratic candidates

received over twice as much in PAC contributions as did Republican candidates; the Democratic advantage declined slightly in 1976, but it remained in the 2 to 1 range. It was in 1978 that the party ratio shifted dramatically away from Democrats and toward Republicans, with a 54-46 split in Democrats' favor. This shift continued in 1980, moving closer toward a 50-50 party split in PAC giving.

TABLE 18. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Party/and Status of Candidates: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/

Year	Amount Given	Party		Status		
		Dem	Rep	Incum.	Chall.	Open
1972	\$ 8.5	\$ 5.8 (68%)	\$ 2.7 (32%)	\$ 4.4 (52%)	\$ 2.1 (25%)	\$ 2.0 (24%)
1974	\$11.6	\$ 7.9 (68%)	\$ 3.7 (32%)	\$ 6.7 (58%)	\$ 2.5 (22%)	\$ 2.4 (21%)
1976	\$20.5	\$13.6 (66%)	\$ 6.9 (34%)	\$13.2 (64%)	\$ 4.2 (20%)	\$ 3.1 (15%)
1978	\$31.8	\$17.1 (54%)	\$14.7 (46%)	\$18.8 (59%)	\$ 7.0 (22%)	\$ 6.0 (19%)
1980	\$51.9	\$26.8 (52%)	\$24.9 (48%)	\$32.5 (63%)	\$13.4 (26%)	\$ 6.0 (12%)

1/ Based on contributions only to House and Senate candidates who competed in general elections; primary losers are excluded. Percentages are based on total contributions and may not add up to 100% within a category (i.e., party or status) because of rounding; contribution amounts are rounded to the nearest tenth and may not add up to overall contributions.

TABLE 18. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Party and Status of Candidates: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/--Continued

Source: For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974. v. 1. p. vi. (party breakdowns from category summaries in volumes 1-3)

For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties, Washington, 1976. p. ix.

For 1976: Common Cause. 1976 Federal Campaign Finances. Interest Group and Political Party Contributions to Congressional Candidates. Washington, 1978. v. 1. p. viii.

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report no. 5--U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 32, 34.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

In terms of candidate status, Table 18 reveals that the incumbency bias among PACs is indeed present and that it has grown since 1972. In that year, roughly one-half of PAC contributions went to incumbent Members of Congress; this proportion climbed in 1974 and again in 1976, dropped in 1978, and rose again in 1980 to the two-thirds level. Contributions to candidates challenging incumbents has remained at around the one-quarter level, although they climbed from 20 to 26 percent between 1972 and 1980. Most of the increase in PAC contributions to incumbents has come at the expense of open-seat contenders. While such contributions constituted one-fourth of PAC contributions in 1972, this percentage fell in 1974 and again in 1976, rose in 1978 (when incumbents' share declined), and fell sharply in 1980 to only 12 percent.

At issue in the discussion over candidate status as it relates to PAC spending is the nature of the primary goal being sought by political action committees through their contributions. Is money given primarily

to further the political philosophies and/or the economic interests of the group, or is it given primarily as a means of gaining the goodwill of and thereby access to elected officials? In the former case, it would seem to follow that there would be a high correlation between the political philosophies of the PAC and the candidates it supports. In the latter case, it would appear more logical to support candidates with the greatest likelihood of being elected, with their compatibility with one's own philosophy de-emphasized as a consideration.

Although incumbent Senators have not fared particularly well in recent years, between 86 and 96 percent of incumbent House Members have been re-elected in every year since 1950. ^{130/} Generally, races involving incumbents are not as competitive as open-seat contests; the latter generally spend much larger sums of money, as well.

Given the decisive bias of PACs in favor of incumbents, who generally do not need the same degree of funding as do open-seat contenders, the data in Table 18 lends support to the "access" theory behind PAC contributions. How this theory holds up in conjunction with the shift of money to Republicans, who, even after 1980, constitute a smaller share of incumbents than do Democrats, will be explored in Table 21, which merges the party and candidate status variables.

The findings in Table 18 are amplified in Table 19 by the breakdown of the data into the four principal categories into which PACs today are grouped by the FEC. One can thus examine the contribution patterns of the major sectors of the PAC community, thus gaining insight into the

^{130/} Re-election Success of Incumbents. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 38, April 5, 1980: 908.

overall trends reflected in Table 18. (As indicated in the notes to Table 19, the basis for determining the categories for corporate and trade/membership/health PACs in the early years differs from that used in Tables 8 and 9; the primary value of those categories in those years lies in the percentage distributions, rather than the dollar amounts.)

In terms of party biases, the clearest pattern is seen in the consistent and overwhelming support which the labor PACs have provided to Democratic candidates, who received between 93-97 percent of labor contributions in every election. The contributions to Democrats from organized labor apparently have enabled them to attract a greater share of PAC money overall than Republicans have, even while this advantage has been narrowed substantially in the last two elections.

Labor PACs have also emerged as the most incumbent-oriented PACs, giving three-fourths of their money to incumbents in 1980 (up from one-half in 1972) and reducing by one-half in that same period the share of its money given to challengers and open-seat contenders. This trend may well have reflected a defensive strategy to shore up friendly incumbents against the greater perceived strength of the opposition in 1978 and 1980.

The corporate (business) PACs have contributed most of their money to Republican candidates in all of the elections examined, but there has occurred a significant shift in their contribution pattern. From 1972 to 1976, the share of business PAC money contributed to Democratic candidates increased each year, from 29 percent to 43 percent, while the Republican share declined from 71 to 57 percent. Although Democratic candidates are typically thought to be less pro-business than Republicans, the contribution decisions appeared to be based on the desire of business

to support incumbents; this is reflected in the net growth in support of incumbents by corporate PACs between 1972-1976, to the 72 percent level in the latter year.

This tendency on the part of business PACs was reportedly a source of annoyance to GOP leaders, who felt that the Republican candidates generally had a better claim to the business community's support than did Democrats. 131/ This sentiment is reflected in remarks made by Ronald Reagan to politically-oriented business leaders in 1978:

I don't think the Republican Party has received the kind of financial support from corporate PACs that its record deserves. Why does half of the business PAC money go to candidates who may not be friends of business? The best thing you can hope for by following an anti-business, incumbent contribution policy is that the alligator will eat you last. 132/

Although corporate PACs continued their practice of favoring incumbents and, consequently, only barely favoring Republicans through much of 1978, this pattern changed dramatically in the closing weeks of that election. Prior to October 1, 1978, 53 percent of corporate PAC money was given to Republicans and 47 percent to Democrats; incumbents received 72 percent of corporate PAC money in that same period. Between October 1 and October 23, the party split shifted to 71-29 in the Republicans' favor, and the incumbents' share dropped to only 49 percent. 133/ Consequently, Table 19 reflects the sharp rise from 1976 to 1978 in the Republican share of corporate money and the sharp drop in incumbents' share (with challengers

131/ Glen, Maxwell. At The Wire, Corporate PACs Come Through for the GOP. National Journal, v. 11, February 3, 1979: 174.

132/ Ibid.

133/ Ibid., p. 176.

and, especially, open-seat contenders the beneficiaries). The Republican share dropped slightly in 1980 but remained in the 2 to 1 range; 1980 also saw a sharp increase in the share of PAC money given to challengers--31 percent, which came about at the expense of open-seat contenders and not incumbents.

TABLE 19. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/

Type	Year	Amount Given	Party		Status		
			Dem	Rep	Inc.	Chall.	Open
Labor	1972	\$ 3.6	\$ 3.4 (94%)	\$.2 (6%)	\$ 1.9 (53%)	\$ 1.0 (28%)	\$.7 (19%)
	1974	\$ 5.7	\$ 5.4 (95%)	\$.4 (7%)	\$ 2.8 (49%)	\$ 1.7 (30%)	\$ 1.3 (23%)
	1976	\$ 7.4	\$ 7.2 (97%)	\$.2 (3%)	\$ 4.7 (64%)	\$ 1.6 (22%)	\$ 1.2 (16%)
	1978	\$ 8.9	\$ 8.3 (93%)	\$.5 (6%)	\$ 5.6 (63%)	\$ 1.9 (21%)	\$ 1.4 (16%)
	1980	\$12.3	\$11.5 (93%)	\$.8 (7%)	\$ 9.0 (74%)	\$ 1.9 (16%)	\$ 1.3 (11%)
Corporate <u>2/</u>	1972	\$ 1.7	\$.5 (29%)	\$ 1.2 (71%)	\$ 1.1 (65%)	\$.2 (12%)	\$.4 (24%)
	1974	\$ 2.4	\$.9 (38%)	\$ 1.4 (58%)	\$ 1.9 (79%)	\$.2 (8%)	\$.3 (13%)
	1976	\$ 6.7	\$ 2.9 (43%)	\$ 3.8 (57%)	\$ 4.8 (72%)	\$ 1.2 (18%)	\$.8 (12%)
	1978	\$ 9.1	\$ 3.1 (34%)	\$ 6.0 (66%)	\$ 5.4 (59%)	\$ 2.0 (22%)	\$ 1.7 (19%)
	1980	\$18.1	\$ 6.3 (35%)	\$11.8 (65%)	\$10.5 (58%)	\$ 5.6 (31%)	\$ 2.0 (11%)

TABLE 19. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/--Continued

Type	Year	Amount Given	Party		Status		
			Dem	Rep	Inc.	Chall.	Open
Trade/ Memb./ Health <u>3/</u>	1972	\$ 1.0	\$.2 (20%)	\$.8 (80%)	\$.5 (50%)	\$.2 (20%)	\$.3 (30%)
	1974	\$ 1.8	\$.5 (28%)	\$ 1.3 (72%)	\$ 1.4 (78%)	\$.1 (6%)	\$.3 (17%)
	1976	\$ 2.6	\$ 1.0 (38%)	\$ 1.6 (62%)	\$ 1.7 (65%)	\$.5 (19%)	\$.4 (15%)
	1978	\$10.6	\$ 4.4 (42%)	\$ 6.2 (59%)	\$ 6.4 (60%)	\$ 2.1 (20%)	\$ 2.2 (21%)
	1980	\$15.0	\$ 6.5 (43%)	\$ 8.5 (57%)	\$ 9.9 (66%)	\$ 3.4 (23%)	\$ 1.7 (11%)
Non- <u>4/</u> Connect.	1972	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1974	\$.7	\$.3 (48%)*	\$.3 (52%)*	\$.1 (14%)	\$.3 (43%)	\$.3 (43%)
	1976	\$ 1.2	\$.6 (45%)*	\$.7 (55%)*	\$.4 (33%)	\$.5 (42%)	\$.3 (25%)
	1978	\$ 2.3	\$.5 (23%)*	\$ 1.7 (77%)*	\$.7 (30%)	\$ 1.0 (44%)	\$.5 (22%)
	1980	\$ 4.5	\$ 1.3 (29%)	\$ 3.2 (71%)	\$ 1.5 (33%)	\$ 2.3 (51%)	\$.7 (16%)

1/ Contributions to candidates in millions of dollars, rounded off to nearest tenth. Percentages of overall group contributions given to a type of candidate are based on the rounded off dollars and are themselves rounded off to the nearest whole percentage. The exception to this is the party percentages (from 1974-1978) in the non-connected category, which are based on total dollars, in order to better reflect the splits and trends than would percentages based on rounded dollar amounts.

TABLE 19. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1--Continued

2/ For 1972-1976, the FEC's "corporate" category correlates to the "business" category of Common Cause. Thus, the data for 1972-1976 are not exactly comparable to those for 1978-1980, as different standards governed the inclusion of PACs in the "business" vs. "corporate" groups.

3/ For 1972-1976, the "trade/membership/health" category, as defined by the FEC, correlates to the "health" and "lawyers" groupings used by Common Cause for each or some of those three years. Thus, the data for 1972-1976 are not exactly comparable for those in 1978-1980 because of the different standards used to determine PACs in the various categories. This particularly has a bearing on the enormous rise in trade/membership/health contributions from 1976 to 1978, which, in part, can be explained by the addition of non-health and non-lawyers PACs to the category.

4/ For 1974-1976, the "non-connected" category used by the FEC correlates to the "ideological" grouping of Common Cause. Most of today's ideological PACs are listed in the non-connected category, although the latter also includes some which are not ideological in nature. Thus, the data for 1974-1976 are not exactly comparable to those for 1978-1980, in view of the different standards applied to including PACs in either group. (Ideological PACs in 1972 were lumped into Common Cause's "miscellaneous" group, and are thus not reflected in this chart.)

* Based on whole dollar amounts; see note 1, infra.

NOTES: This table does not include data for the FEC's 1978-1980 categories of "cooperatives" and "corporations without stock" or the corresponding data from Common Cause's 1972-1976 categories of "miscellaneous," "dairy," and "agriculture" because of the relatively low levels of financial activity of such groups today (with some notable exceptions).

The data in the corporate and trade/membership/health groupings for 1972-1976 are based on different standards from the same groupings in Tables 8-9. Thus, they are not comparable, even apart from the difference in period of time covered by each. Those statistics in table 18 should be used primarily for the percentage breakdowns, rather than the dollar amounts.

Source: For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal Campaign Finances: Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1974. v. 1. p. vi. (party breakdowns taken from summary pages for each category in volumes 1-3)

For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. ix.

For 1976: Common Cause. 1976 Federal Campaign Finances. Interest Group and Political Party Contributions to Congressional Candidates. Washington, 1978. v. 1. p. viii.

TABLE 19. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 (in millions of dollars and percentages) 1/--Continued

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5--U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 32, 34.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional Races (press release): March 7, 1982.

The trade/membership/health PACs exhibit less pronounced contribution patterns than do the labor and corporate PACs. Most of their money has been given to Republicans, but it has shifted steadily toward Democrats during the five-election period, from only 20 percent in 1972 to 43 percent in 1980.

In terms of support for candidates by status, it appears that these PACs constitute the second most incumbent-oriented grouping. The pattern here is not easily discerned, with a very sharp increase in the share received by incumbents in 1974, a large drop in 1976 and, again, in 1978, and a notable rise in 1980, when fully two-thirds of trade/membership/health PAC money went to incumbents. With the exception of 1974, the proportion of money given to challengers has remained at a fairly constant one-fifth level (climbing a bit since 1976), while the open-seat candidates suffered a substantial net drop in support between 1972 and 1980. Although trends are not easy to determine in this group, it appears that by 1980, it was the strong incumbent slant which allowed Democrats to fare as well as they did, given the largely pro-business orientation among trade and health associations and the strong conservative leanings of so many of the membership organizations.

Alone among the four large groupings, the non-connected PACs have consistently given most of their contributions to non-incumbents. Incumbents

received just under one-third of non-connected PAC contributions between 1976 and 1980, although this constituted a rather sharp jump from 1974. It is the challengers who have been most heavily favored, with some 42-44 percent from 1974 to 1978 and an increase to just over half of the non-connected contributions in 1980. Open-seat contenders have experienced a decline in support from these PACs over the four-election period, as they did in all the other categories, but by 1980, they still fared better here than among the corporate, labor, or trade/membership/health PACs. This decline accrued to the benefit of the challengers.

In view of the predominance of ideological groups in this category, it is hardly surprising that their money would favor challengers over incumbents. It is logical that PACs which are not affiliated with established lobbying organizations would be more likely to risk alienating incumbent Members of Congress than would those that are connected with lobbying arms. Their primary commitment to ideology, in comparison with perhaps the more pragmatic philosophies of the other types of PACs, appears to make their choices of whom to support that much easier. For this reason, among others, the non-connected PACs are often viewed as "loose cannons" within the political system.

In terms of party support, the non-connected PACs are the most Republican-oriented among the four major groupings. From 1974 and 1978, their support of Republican candidates over Democratic ones increased from a slight plurality to a 3 to 1 ratio. There was a marked rise in their support of Democrats in 1980, even while retaining the better than 2 to 1 advantage for Republicans. There is no clear explanation for this development, although one may venture a guess that it was a reflection of the overwhelming attention given by conservative PACs to expenditures other than candidate contributions, leaving

liberal PACs to constitute a greater proportion of PAC contributions than they otherwise would have. In any case, it is useful to remember that the trends in candidate contributions by the non-connected PACs are less important than the other forms of political expenditures in which they have been engaged.

Summing up the contributing factors to the trends evidenced in Table 18, only one of the four principal PAC groupings--labor--continues to favor Democratic candidates; this support is sufficiently lopsided to enable Democrats to retain an overall edge over Republicans in attracting PAC contributions. The non-connected PACs are the most pro-Republican in their giving, followed by the corporate PACs, and, finally, the trade/membership/health PACs. The major reduction in the Democrats' share of PAC money seen in 1978 was largely the result of a shift among the corporate PACs, with the non-connected and labor PACs making up the rest of the difference.

In terms of PAC money favoring incumbents, this has been an increasing phenomenon over the five-election period. Only the corporate PACs experienced a net decline in their level of giving to incumbents; this was tied to their shift toward greater assistance of Republicans. The overall PAC tilt toward incumbents is also evidenced in the giving patterns of all but the non-connected grouping. The drop-off in support for open-seat contenders since 1972 has been evidenced in the patterns of every one of the four PAC groupings. In contrast, the relative stability in the overall level of PAC giving to challengers masks sharp increases in corporate and, secondarily, non-connected PAC giving to challengers. These increases were offset by the decline in challenger support from organized labor; trade/membership/health groups gave a relatively constant

level of support to challengers. Finally, it is worth remembering that dealing in trends in aggregate totals may mask trends occurring in many individual PACs within a given category.

2. PAC Contributions from the Candidates' Perspective

Tables 20-21 place the question of PAC support of candidates in the context of the candidates' overall campaign receipts. Whereas Table 18 showed how PAC money was distributed to candidates according to their party affiliation and electoral status, Tables 20-21 show how important a role these contributions played for the same candidate breakdowns. The latter tables may yield different conclusions than the former, as they take into account such additional criteria as the number of candidates PAC money was distributed among and the other sources of candidate funding. Although PACs may have favored a particular type of candidate, those candidates may have been less reliant on PAC contributions than other types of candidates. The other key difference in the tables in this subsection is that they confine their focus to House candidates, in contrast to the combined House and Senate data in Tables 18-19. Table 20 presents the party breakdowns separate from the status breakdowns, while Table 21 combines the two variables for more detailed analysis.

As Table 19 indicates, Democratic House candidates have received consistently more PAC contributions relative to other funding sources than have their Republican counterparts. By 1980, nearly one-third of Democrats' campaign funding emanated from political action committees, whereas PACs contributed one-fourth of Republican campaign funds. The gap between the levels of contributions to Democrats and

Republicans of PAC money decreased in 1978, prior to which PAC funds constituted about nine percent more of Democrats' receipts than Republicans' receipts. In 1978, in keeping with the overall increase in PAC giving to Republicans, the gap was narrowed to less than five percent. The gap widened slightly in 1980, despite the continuing trend toward equalization of overall PAC giving to the two parties.

TABLE 20. PAC Contributions as a Percentage of House Candidate Receipts by Party or Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 General Elections 1/

Year	Total for House <u>2/</u>	Party		Status		
		Dem	Rep	Inc.	Chall.	Open
1972	14.0%	18.6%	9.2%	16.9%	11.6%	11.0%
1974	17.2%	21.6%	12.4%	18.7%	15.3%	16.0%
1976	22.4%	26.8%	17.6%	28.1%	15.3%	16.9%
1978	24.8%	27.1%	22.5%	31.6%	17.1%	19.4%
1980	28.9%	31.9%	26.3%	34.3%	20.0%	25.1%

1/ Based on financial activity only for candidates who ran in the general election; primary losers excluded

2/ Totals correspond with those in Table 6, infra.

Source: For 1972 and 1974: Jacobson, Gary C. The Pattern of Campaign Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-1978. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-1978. From the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. 25-26. (statistics for this chart were extrapolated from the data in Jacobson's tables 6-7.)

TABLE 20. PAC Contributions as a Percentage of House Candidate Receipts by Party or Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 General Elections 1/--Continued

For 1976: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Disclosure Series. No. 9: 1976 House of Representatives Campaigns. Receipts and Expenditures. Washington, September 1977. p. 4, 6 (for party breakdown); p. 7-8 (for status breakdowns).

For 1978: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978. Interim Report No. 5. U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, June 1979. p. 31-32 (for party breakdowns); p. 36, 51-52 (for status breakdowns).

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980. Final Report. U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, Jan. 1982. p. 49-50 (for party breakdowns); p. 52-53 (for status breakdowns).

With regard to the level of receipt of PAC money according to the electoral status of candidates, incumbents have consistently received more of this source of funding relative to other sources than have their challengers or those competing in districts with no incumbent running. Furthermore, the percentage of PAC contributions to incumbents among all receipts has increased at a significantly faster rate than for the other two categories, both of which experienced an increase during the 1972-1980 period.

Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the candidate status data is the higher degree of PAC money in the campaign treasuries of open seat contenders than of challengers to incumbents. This is contrary to the consistently higher amount of PAC dollars which have been contributed to the challengers over the open-seat contenders, as reflected in Table 18. This apparent incongruity may result from the higher number of challengers than open-seat contests; hence the lesser share of PAC money is distributed among a far lesser number of candidates in the latter category. By 1980, one-fourth of the House open-seat contenders' funds came from PACs, whereas one-fifth of the challengers' receipts were from PACs; in the case of House incumbents, PAC money constituted just over one-third of overall general election receipts.

The trends in PAC giving by party and candidate status are explored in greater detail in Table 21, which combines the two variables for the 1972-1980 elections. It is readily noticeable that there are significant differences in the level of PAC support between the two parties within each candidate status category.

While Table 20 pointed out that PAC money plays the largest role in incumbent campaigns, Table 21 demonstrates that this is especially true for Democratic incumbents. The levels of PAC money among overall receipts have increased at roughly the same rate for both Democratic and Republican incumbents between 1972 and 1978, with both experiencing a sharp rise in 1976 (a reflection of the overall increase that year in the PAC component). The 1980 figures show nearly 30 percent of GOP incumbents' funds coming from PACs, a sharp jump over the 1978 level; the rise among Democratic incumbents was more modest, leaving the PAC share at the 37 percent level. The greater percentage of PAC money in Democratic than in Republican incumbents' campaigns is attributable to the relatively smaller share of the latter's receipts constituted by individual and party contributions. 134/

134/ See source of Table 21.

TABLE 21. PAC Contributions as a Percentage of House Candidate Receipts by Party and Status of Candidate: 1972-1980 General Elections ^{1/}

Year	Total House	Incumbents		Challengers		Open Seats	
		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1972*	14.0%	21.6%	11.6%	19.6%	5.4%	12.6%	9.2%
1974*	17.2%	25.4%	14.4%	18.9%	5.0%	19.7%	11.3%
1976*	22.4%	33.2%	21.7%	20.8%	13.4%	17.6%	16.8%
1978	24.8%	35.7%	24.8%	14.6%	20.0%	17.6%	23.6%
1980 ^{2/}	28.7%	37.0%	29.7%	17.2%	21.2%	21.9%	28.9%

^{1/} Based on candidates competing in general election only; primary losers excluded.

^{2/} The 1980 figures are based on gross House receipts, in contrast with the net receipt basis for other data in this table, because only such information was available with the appropriate breakdowns. The 28.7% here compares with the 28.9% figure used in Tables 6 and 20; hence the percentages for each category are likely to be understated by around 1/5 of a percent.

* Based on candidates with major party opposition only

Source: For 1972-1978: Jacobson, Gary C. The Pattern of Campaign Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-1978. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-1978. From the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. 25-28.

For 1980: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980. Final Report. U.S. Senate and House Campaigns. Washington, Jan. 1982. p. 56, 65-66.

While Democrats received proportionately more PAC money than Republicans among incumbent candidates, the reverse was true in 1978 and 1980 among challengers and open-seat contenders. In fact, 1978 marked a turning point, prior to which PAC contributions were relatively more important to Democratic challengers and open-seat candidates than to their Republican counterparts, with the percentage difference in general decline from 1972-1976.

Among Democratic challengers, PAC money played a rather stable role between 1972 and 1976, before declining sharply in importance in 1978, only to rise again in 1980. The decline from 1976 to 1978 was accompanied by shifts in the relative share of overall receipts constituted by the other funding components: the proportion of individual contributions increased, the share of party contributions decreased, and, most important, the level of financial support from the candidates themselves increased, thus constituting 30 percent of campaign receipts. 135/ In terms of PAC distribution of funds, Table 18 indicated that challengers overall received a higher percentage of PAC money in 1978 than they did in 1976, but that Democrats overall received a significantly lower percentage that year.

Republican challengers' receipt of PAC money sharply increased in 1976 and 1978, and slightly in 1980. In 1976, the increase was accompanied by decreases in the share of individual and candidate contributions and an increase in the party contribution component, while in 1978, the increase corresponded to a lessened role played by party giving. 136/ In view of the indications that 1978 marked a turn toward increased PAC support of Republican challengers of Democratic incumbents, it appears logical PAC contributions were a larger factor for Republican challengers that year than for Democratic challengers to Republican incumbents. Summing up the situation affecting challengers in 1978, PAC money was a larger factor for Republicans than Democrats, as was party support and individual donations; only the personal contributions of candidates was a greater factor in Democratic campaigns than Republican ones. 137/

135/ Ibid.

136/ Ibid.

137/ Ibid.

1980 data not yet available will provide some clues as to what extent this was indicative of a new trend.

Open-seat contenders typically engage in the most heated elections and spend a far greater amount of money than do incumbents or (especially) challengers. They receive less money as a group from PACs than do challengers of incumbents, but, because of their fewer numbers, they benefit from PAC dollars to a greater extent than do challengers.

Table 21 indicates that Republican candidates for open House seats received increasingly higher levels of PAC contributions--relative to other funding sources--between 1972 and 1980 (with sharp jumps in 1978 and again in 1980) and that Democratic candidates in open districts received lower levels between 1974 and 1978 and an increased level in 1980. By 1978, PAC money was a bigger factor in the campaign treasuries of Republican open-seat contenders than it was for their Democratic counterparts, a trend which continued in 1980.

The increased level of importance of PAC money to Republicans in open-seat contests occurred in two stages. The 1974-1976 increase corresponded with a diminished share of funding from individuals, while the 1976-1978 increase was accompanied by a decline in the proportion of party funding. ^{138/} For Democratic open-seat candidates, the slight decline in the PAC proportion from 1974 to 1976 and 1978 was largely compensated by the higher level of candidate contributions to campaign treasuries. ^{139/} The significantly greater proportion of candidate money among Democrats' receipts was the critical factor in the relatively smaller PAC role for Democrats than Republicans. Similar analysis for 1980 must await the compilation of additional data.

^{138/} Ibid.

^{139/} Ibid.

D. Summary Observations on PAC Growth

Following a lengthy, detailed presentation and analysis of data, it is useful to summarize the key findings relating to the proliferation and growth of PACs. These observations should be viewed in the context of an overall increase in PAC spending from \$19.2 million to \$131.2 million and in PAC contributions to Federal candidates from \$8.5 million to \$55.2 million between 1972 and 1980.

The two key elections in terms of PAC growth are 1976 and 1980. The year 1976 marked the largest percentage growth in the number of PACs, while 1980 saw the largest numerical increase. The largest percentage increase in both PAC expenditures and contributions to Federal candidates occurred in 1976, with the second largest percentage increase in 1980; the latter year saw the largest dollar increase in both expenditures and contributions. The sharpest increase in the percentage of PAC money among overall receipts of congressional candidates occurred in 1980, followed by the rise in 1976. Interestingly, the increase in 1980 reflected the steepest rise for Senate candidates, while the 1976 increase reflected the steepest rise for House candidates.

Some 70 percent of aggregate PAC contributions typically is given to House candidates, while 30 percent is given to Senate candidates. This, of course, does not mean that House candidates receive larger contributions on average than do their Senate counterparts; the reverse is probably true. PAC money does play a larger role in the campaigns of House candidates than of Senate candidates, however.

On an aggregate level, Democrats have been able to attract more PAC money than have Republicans, but this advantage has been narrowed substantially,

especially since 1978. If current trends continue, 1982 may see an even split of PAC money between the two parties' candidates, or possibly even a slight GOP advantage.

PAC money continues to favor incumbents heavily, and this trend has become more pronounced since 1972. Nearly two-thirds of PAC money goes to incumbent Members.

In comparison with the other three major sources of campaign funds, Democrats overall have received more PAC money than Republicans. PAC money plays a larger role for Democratic than Republican incumbents; conversely, GOP challengers and open-seat contenders rely more on PAC money than do their Democratic counterparts. Regardless of party or candidate status, however, PAC money has become increasingly important for all candidates.

Looking at the four major PAC groupings, several important observations can be made with regard to each. Labor PACs have, as a group, declined in importance in relation to the others. While they accounted for one-third of all PACs in 1972, they account for less than one-ninth today; whereas they spent and contributed one-half of all PAC money in 1972, they spent one-fifth and contributed one-fourth of all PAC money in 1980. They were surpassed as the biggest spending category in 1976 and as the biggest contributing group in 1978. Labor PACs are both the most Democratic and most incumbent in their orientation, among all the types of PACs. Finally, despite the overshadowing of labor PACs in the aggregate, they remain a potent financial force through the activities of a relatively small number of large PACs; labor PACs accounted for more than half of the top 20 contributors in every election since 1972.

The non-connected PACs have exhibited the largest percentage growth in number since 1976. They doubled their level of expenditures from 1978 to 1980, making them the biggest spending category of PAC in the 1980 election. Their