

ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL FILED 1983-1984

3071

SSA

SJR 28

8672

William Sheffield  
Governor

May 31, 1983  
Page 2

7. In a letter to Charlie Russell dated April 29, 1983, Wayne Ross urged that I not be confirmed. In addition, in reply to my earlier letter, he sent a letter to me dated May 18, 1983 in which he furnished copies of law review articles and urged that we review them. We have reviewed them. In our judgment, those two law review articles sustain our point of view on this particular issue.

8. It should be emphasized that we did not opine as to whether or not the state legislature may prohibit or control the possession of firearms. The issue here was whether or not a private citizen could impose a firearms prohibition in a lease term for tenants of his apartment building. We are balancing here the actions of a private citizen, a property owner, with the legitimate right to protect his property and a citizen's right to keep and bear arms. The constitutional provision is directed to prohibiting a limitation by the state or federal government on the bearing and using of firearms.

9. In addition, enclosed is another opinion dated February 16, 1983 from this office in which we indirectly discussed the same issue of the right of a landlord to impose handgun restrictions on tenants.

NCG:djc

Attachments

POUCH V  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811  
465-4990

P.O. BOX 4-1325  
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99509  
248-1515



CHAIRMAN  
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE  
MEMBER  
HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

Representative Charlie Bussell  
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 8, 1983

Norman Gorsuch, Esquire  
Attorney General  
Pouch K  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Mr. Gorsuch:


Attached is a copy of a notice to tenants brought to my attention by a constituent.

Of particular significance is Item No. 7, on page 2, wherein the landlord purports to ban possession of handguns. I should like your opinion as to the following:

1. Whether possession of handguns is a right that may not be contracted away--in the absence of statutory provisions providing for such an edict;
2. Whether there appears to be any violation of any existing law or regulations in the landlord-tenant area; and,
3. Whether there are serious implications of the insurance picture that could be forthcoming (i.e., should a particular means of self-protection be banned and then an incident occurs that overcomes the landlord's security measures that might not occur had means of self-protection been available, would the landlord be obligated for unlimited insurance protection of tenants?).

Thank you for your time in considering this matter.

Very truly yours,

  
Representative Charlie Bussell  
Chairman, Committee on Judiciary

CB:lyn

cc: Thurman W. Brock

# STATE OF ALASKA

## DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BILL SHEFFIELD, GOVERNOR

POUCH K - STATE CAPITOL  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811  
PHONE: (907) 465-3600

April 13, 1983

The Honorable Pat Rodey  
Senator  
Alaska State Legislature  
Pouch V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
Representative  
Alaska State Legislature  
Pouch V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Re: Handgun Ban

Dear Senator Rodey and Representative Bussell:

You have asked this office whether a landlord, through a leasehold agreement, may prohibit a tenant from possessing handguns. We conclude that in certain circumstances a landlord may restrict or prohibit the use and/or possession of handguns on property which is leased to another individual.

Our initial inquiry regarding this matter commenced with a review of relevant Alaskan Constitutional provisions. The Alaska Constitution directly addresses a citizens ability to bear arms at Article I, Section 19 which states:

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

The language embodied in Alaska's Constitution pertaining to arms is virtually identical, save for two changes in punctuation, to language found in Article II of the United States Constitution. Article II of the United States Constitution was proposed by the Congress on September 25, 1789 and became the law of the United States on December 15, 1791. During the one hundred and ninety two years since adoption of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and the twenty-four years since the Alaska Constitution has been in effect, numerous court cases have interpreted the constitutional language which establishes the right to bear arms.

We note the period since the adoption of the Second Amendment has witnessed an ever increasing issuance of opinions from the judiciary of the various states and the federal courts which place limits on an individual's ability to bear arms. Some commentators have theorized that the legislative and judicial limitations increased significantly with the availability of inexpensive surplus weapons following the American Civil War. <sup>1/</sup> According to this theory, the increase in restrictive gun control measures and corresponding judicial interpretations was associated with increasing acquisition of firearms by recently emancipated Black Americans and immigrants coupled with the increased availability of firearms in the post Civil War industrial America. The right of 'bearing arms' is not a right granted by the Constitution nor is it in any manner dependant upon that instrument for its existence. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 553 (D.C.La. 1875).

While offering no judgment on the propriety or effectiveness of the restrictive legislative and judicial measures, we observe that the current state of the law pertaining to the constitutional language holds that:

[The] purpose of this amendment, guaranteeing that the right of the people to keep and bear arms, was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia. U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d, cert. denied 98 S.Ct. 1493 (C.A. Kan. 1977).

The modern judicial view has increasingly found that the guaranteed right to keep and bear arms is not an individually protected right, but rather a collective right which allows the people of the various states to serve in a militia. The contemporary judicial view in the great majority of states interprets the constitutional language as posing no limitations on the legislature's power to regulate the ownership or control of firearms. Whatever the scope of any common-law or constitutional right to bear arms, it is not absolute and does not guarantee to individuals the right to carry weapons abroad at all times and in all circumstances. Application of Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980). By analogy then, a landlord, too, could restrict

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<sup>1/</sup> Kates, Don B. Restricting Handguns. North River Press, pages 7-30 (1979)

the possession of handguns on property he or she owns and leases. If the State can restrict arms without running afoul of constitutional provisions, an individual almost certainly has similar abilities.

It is conceivable that a landlord's ban on handgun ownership could be challenged under constitutional doctrines which afford a right of privacy. The United States Constitution, while not containing an express provision guaranteeing privacy has been interpreted to afford an individual certain protections, Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, including activities which might be prohibited in other contexts." Cf. U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 137, 142 (1973).

While it is unlikely that a court would find that an individuals right to possess arms (for example a gun collection) is protected by the privacy shield of the U.S. Constitution, the argument could be maintained. We are unaware of this argument being successfully asserted in any anglo-american jurisdiction.

A more likely source of protection under the right to privacy doctrine may be afforded by the Alaska Constitution at Article I, Section 22 which states that:

The right of the people to privacy shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.

The Alaska Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the right of privacy guaranteed to Alaskans is broader in scope than that guaranteed by the federal constitution. Woods & Rohde, Inc., v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (1977). Even so, the meaning of privacy of necessity must vary depending on the factual context and the often compelling interests of society and the individual. Stata v. Glass, 583 P.2d 879 (1978). The test for what interests are protected under Alaska's constitutional right to privacy are, first, whether a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable". Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31 (1980).

The question of handgun ownership in Alaska and whether such ownership is "reasonable" in the context of a landlord tenant relationship is open ended. Probably the "expectation" and reasonableness of gun ownership in Alaska is different than the reasonableness of gun ownership in many other jurisdictions where actual firearm ownership and use is reduced. In any event,

absent specific language under the Alaska Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, AS 34.03.010 et seq., or other relevant Alaska law, prohibiting inclusion of provisions in a leasehold agreement, we believe a landlord can properly restrict the terms of the tenancy. 2/ In all probability, under existing Alaska law, a landlord can restrict possession of handguns for tenants in a manner not unlike a landlord's ability to prohibit tenants from possessing dogs, operating businesses in a residential leasehold or operating obnoxious stereo equipment.

While a landlord will probably be able to impose a restriction prohibiting future tenants from possessing handguns, an across-the-board ban applicable to tenants with existing leasehold agreements may be invalid. Under classic contract principles, neither party to an agreement may superimpose an additional term on a valid contract without the consent of each party to the contract. Consequently, a landlord may not prohibit handgun possession among tenants during the pendency of an existing lease. Conversely, where a landlord and tenant agree to a lease agreement which contains a restriction banning handguns, remedial legislative action interpreting Alaska's right to privacy law to permit such possession probably would not invalidate existing prohibitions.

Finally, concern was expressed regarding the state's liability with respect to landlord/tenant agreements which prohibit handgun ownership in buildings located on property owned by the State. This last point is conceivably problematic if the land on which the Panoramic View Apartments are located is conveyed to the state as a result of the current Alaska Railroad transfer negotiations. Attached is a copy of a memorandum by Assistant Attorney General Jack McGee which deals with this subject.

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2/ In passing, we note that a landlord concerned with unjustified gun play need not necessarily prohibit gun ownership. Other remedies exist for controlling individual tenants with a propensity to abuse gun ownership. Cf. Osness v. Dimond Estates, Inc., 615 P.2d 605 (1980), where the landlord obtained a Forcible Entry and Detainer (F.E.D.) thereby removing a tenant that proved incapable of properly handling firearms.

Hon. Pat Rodey, Senator  
Hon. Charlie Bussell, Representative


April 13, 1983  
Page 5

We trust this response answers your inquiry. If you have any additional questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

NORMAN C. GORSUCH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

  
Joseph W. Geldhof  
Assistant Attorney General

JWG:vrb

cc: Norman C. Gorsuch  
Attorney General

Ronald W. Lorensen  
Deputy Attorney General

A M E N D M E N T

OFFERED IN THE HOUSE:

By: \_\_\_\_\_

To: \_\_\_\_\_ SS \_\_\_\_\_ HOUSE BILL No. 1

ATTEN

SENATE BILL No. \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE: 1

LINE: 19

AFTER SECTION 2, ADD A NEW SECTION TO READ:

\*Section 3. AS 34.03.040 is amended by adding a new paragraph to read;

(5) agrees to limit or prohibit the possession of firearms.

RENUMBER REMAINING SECTIONS ACCORDINGLY.

April 13, 1983

Mr. Wayne Anthony Ross  
Director  
National Rifle Association  
P. O. Box 1522  
Anchorage, AK 99510

Re: Gun Control Opinion  
Our file no.: 366-444-83

Dear Mr. Ross:

The attorney general requested that I thank you for the materials you conveyed to our office on February 17, 1983 regarding gun control. The information you provided was most helpful as we drafted an opinion concerning the handgun prohibition problem at the Panoramic View Apartments. I have enclosed a copy of the opinion for your convenient reference.

According to directions in your February 17 letter, I have returned the United States Senate Subcommittee Report, as well as the book by Don Kates.

Norm said to convey his best and thank you for your assistance with this matter.

Sincerely yours,

NORMAN C. GORSUCH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

  
Joe Geldhof  
Assistant Attorney General

NCG:JG:eja

Enclosures:

PATRICK M. RODEY  
3271 MONTCLAIRE CT.  
ANCHORAGE, AK 99503



DURING SESSION:  
POUCH V  
JUNEAU, AK 99811  
(907) 465-3717

ALASKA STATE SENATE

April 14, 1983

APR 17 1983

AM 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 PM

Joseph Geldhof  
Assistant Attorney General  
Department of Law  
Pouch K  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

RE: Handgun Ban  
#366-444-83

Dear Joe:

Just a note to thank you for the report you provided regarding prohibition of handguns at the Panoramic View Apartments in Anchorage.

I sincerely appreciated the time and effort you put forth in researching this issue, and providing me with the thorough report.

Also, per your request, I am enclosing a copy of the reply I received from Billy Berrier, Director of the Legislative Legal Services Division, which addresses our inquiry with his office.

Thanks again for your help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Pat".

Patrick M. Rodey

Enclosure

STATE OF ALASKA  
THE LEGISLATURE

POUCH Y - STATE CAPITOL  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811  
907-465-3800

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY

MEMORANDUM

March 8, 1983

SUBJECT: Landlord-tenant questions  
TO: Senator Patrick M. Rodey  
FROM: Billy G. Berrier *BGB*  
Director  
Division of Legal Services

We, of course, may not give legal advice concerning the specific situation you described between the landlord and his tenants.

As to the general problem of whether a landlord may prohibit possession of handguns on leased property, I see no violation of the Landlord-Tenant Act or other law. Although there are questions which reach a constitutional level when state action on handgun control is involved, the questions apply only to state action. No state action is involved in the situation you described, so in my opinion, no constitutional question exists.

BGB:ljb

1/010

**Wayne**  
**Anthony**  
**Ross & Associates**

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

WAYNE ANTHONY ROSS  
ROBERT D. FRENCH  
THOMAS S. GINGRAS  
WILLIAM D. COOK

OF COUNSEL:  
DONALD J. MILLER

MAIN BRANCH  
1007 W. THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 304  
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501  
AREA 907/276-3207 • 277-6773

CORDOVA BRANCH  
POST OFFICE BOX 207  
CORDOVA, ALASKA 99571  
AREA 907/424-7229

April 29, 1983.

Tom Fink  
1035 W. Fireweed Lane  
Anchorage, Alaska 99503


Dear Tom:

Enclosed please find a copy of a recent Attorney General's opinion issued by a Joe Geldhof, Assistant Attorney General, State of Alaska regarding the Panoramic View Apartments situation. To say I am extremely disappointed with the opinion is an understatement.

The present Attorney General, Mr. Norman Gorsuch, was appointed by Governor Bill Sheffield and has not been confirmed by the state legislature. I think this would be a good case for you to send a letter to each of the members of the Alaska State Legislature advising them that since the candidate for attorney general Mr. Norman Gorsuch does not interpret Alaska's Constitution Article I, Section 19, and by implication, the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution which reads the same, as supporting the individual's right to keep and bear arms, you oppose his confirmation. Please let me know if such assistance will be forthcoming.

Best regards. I remain,

Sincerely,



Wayne Anthony Ross  
Attorney at Law

WAR/jm

cc: Don Kates  
Ken Fanning  
Joe Nava  
The Honorable Pat Rodey  
The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
Bob Parkerson

May 10, 1983

Wayne Anthony Ross, Esq.  
Attorney at Law  
1007 W. Third Ave., Suite 304  
Anchorage, Alaska 99501

Dear Mr. Ross:

I understand that you are extremely disappointed with a recent Department of Law opinion regarding the gun prohibition problem in the Panoramic View Apartments.

As you know, I am not against individual gun ownership. As a long time resident of our state, I believe ownership of guns is both necessary and desirable. At the same time, there are certain circumstances where private parties can limit the possession of firearms. The Panoramic View Apartment situation is probably such a situation under current law.

I trust that you understand the recent Department of Law opinion is supported by case law in the great majority of American jurisdictions. Under the circumstances, it would be reckless for me or my attorneys to issue an opinion which is contrary to contemporary thinking throughout the federal and state judiciary.

Our opinion respecting a challenge to the gun prohibition comports with the advice you received from Benson, Kates and Hardy, Attorneys at Law. Recall that you requested an opinion from Benson, Kates and Hardy who outlined four theories challenging the landlords prohibition. Your counsel stated "I emphatically do not entertain great hopes for any of these theories." Enclosed is a copy of your attorneys letter for convenient reference.


While I understand your concerns, I strongly believe the immediate problem with the Panoramic View Apartment landlord can be remedied by a simple amendment to Alaska's Landlord-Tenant Act. It is my hope that you and the members of the National Rifle Association will seek relief through appropriate legisla-

Wayne Anthony Ross, Esq.  
Attorney at Law

May 10, 1983  
Page 2

tive channels to remedy problems you have with the Panoramic View situation. I look forward to your thoughts on this matter.

Sincerely,



Norman C. Gorsuch  
Attorney General

NCG:vrb

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Pat Rodey  
Senator  
Alaska State Legislature  
w/enclosure

The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
Representative  
Alaska State Legislature  
w/enclosure

Tom Fink  
1035 W. Fireweed Lane  
Anchorage, AK 99503  
w/enclosure

BENENSON, KATES AND HARDY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

MARK K. BENENSON  
747 THIRD AVENUE  
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(212) 759-2822

DON B. KATES, JR.  
ONE CALIFORNIA STREET, SUITE 2535  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111  
(415) 433-5300

DAVID T. HARDY  
100 N. STONE, SUITE 901  
TUCSON, AZ 85701  
(602) 622-7434

January 19, 1983

Wayne A. Ross, Esq.  
P.O. Box 1522  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Dear Wayne:

In response to your letter, and pursuant to our phone conversation, I would offer the following four legal theories as to your no-handgun lease problem [note: I emphatically do not entertain great hopes for any of these theories]:

1. In accordance with Alaska law forbidding leasehold requirements which are contrary to public policy, argue that this provision (a) violates the right of self defense which is a fundamental principle in every legal system and philosophy (Bob Dowlut of NRA-ILA and Steve Halbrook can give you a host of citations from legal philosophers ancient and modern; in addition, see H. Wechsler, A Rationale of The Law of Homicide 27 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 736 (1937). "the universal judgment that there is no social interest in preserving the lives of the aggressors at the cost of those of their victims."); (b) violates the fundamental constitutional, criminal and civil law privilege of the "castle doctrine" (see enclosed portion of my petition for rehearing in the Morton Grove case); (c) violates the public policy inherent in Alaska's constitutional protection of the right to keep in bare arms. See Williams v. International Brotherhood, etc. 165 P.2d 903, 905 (S. Ct. Cal 1946) applying constitutional anti-discrimination imperative to private employers:

...where persons are subjected to certain conduct by others which is deemed unfair and contrary to public policy, the courts have full power to afford the necessary protection. James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (1944).

2. 'That this is a "contract of adhesion" which forces tenants into a Hopson's Choice between giving up the only available place for their families to live and giving up the only viable defense for their families in a violent society.

3. For declaratory judgment that, by interfering with and diminishing tenants' opportunity to protect themselves and their families, the landlord assumes the

Wayne A. Ross, Esq.  
January 19, 1983  
Page Two.


responsibility of a guarantor of their safety and is absolutely liable for any criminal misconduct which they could have prevented if they had possessed handguns.

4. That, by forbidding handguns, the management is encouraging tenants to possess loaded long guns for the protection of their families, thereby greatly increasing the danger of accidental discharge and or of injury through the use of and over-penetrating long gun against burglars or other attackers in the home. See discussion in footnote 10 to my petition for rehearing in the Morton Grove case, enclosed.

With reference to your concern about possible removal to Federal Court on diversity of citizenship grounds, one possibility would be to limit your suit to one tenant and to injunct and declaratory relief. You might therefore be able to argue that the requisite amount in controversy has not been met. But this is something you should research and think out very thoroughly before trying. I am not certain either that it would work or that it wouldn't involve a host of side effects more disagreeable than the possibility of removable.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Cordially,

  
Don B. Kates, Jr.

DBK:clh

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Greg McDonald  
Michael McCabe, Esq.

Anthony

ROSS & Associates

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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THOMAS S. GINGRAS  
WILLIAM D. COOK

OF COUNSEL:  
DONALD J. MILLER

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CORDOVA BRANCH  
POST OFFICE BOX 207  
CORDOVA, ALASKA 99874  
AREA 907/424-7229

April 29, 1983

The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
Representative  
Alaska State Legislature  
Fouch V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Representative Bussell:

I am in receipt of a copy of the Attorney General's opinion dated April 13, 1983 entitled "Re: Handgun Ban" addressed to Senator Rodey and Representative Bussell. From that Attorney General's opinion written by one Joseph W. Geldhof, Assistant Attorney General under the signature of Norman Gorsuch, Attorney General, it appears that the attorney general's office as presently constituted does not believe that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution provides for the individual's right to keep and bear arms.

Such a position is in my opinion contrary to law, contrary to the desires of most Alaskans, and contrary to the report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee of the Judiciary United States Senate 97th Congress, rendered in February 1982. That subcommittee report concludes with the following:

The following represents a list of twelve scholarly articles which have dealt with the subject of the right to keep and bears arms as reflected in the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The scholars who are undertaking this research range from professors of law, history and philosophy to a United States senator. All have concluded that the Second Amendment is an individual right protecting American citizens in their peaceful use of firearms. (Subcommittee Report page 18). Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 Wm. & Mary L. R. 381 (1960); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 Am. Bar Assn. J. 554 & 664 (2 parts) (1965);

Anthony

Foss &amp; Associates

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
April 29, 1983  
Page 2

Comment, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms; A Necessary Constitutional Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights? 31 Albany L. R. 74 (1967); Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms, 7 Houston L. R. 1 (1969); McClure, Firearms and Federalism, 7 Idaho L. R. 197 (1970); Hardy & Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 Chi.-Kent L. R. 62 (1974); Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law, 54 Jour. Urban Law 577 (1974); Whisker, Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W.Va. L. R. 171 (1976); Caplan, Restoring The Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 Fordham Urban L. J. 31 (1976); Caplan, Handgun Control: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?, 10 N.C. Central L. J. 53 (1979); Cantrell, The Right to Bear Arms, 53 Wis. Bar Bull, 21 (Oct. 1980); and Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (1981).

This attorney general's opinion, coming out as it did under Mr. Gorsuch's name, must be construed as coming out with the knowledge and consent of Mr. Gorsuch. An attorney general, being one of the highest law enforcement officers of the state, is sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America.

For Mr. Gorsuch to come to a conclusion that "the modern judicial view has increasingly found that the guaranteed right to keep and bear arms is not an individually protected right, but rather a collective right which allows the people of the various states to serve in a militia" demonstrates a total lack of knowledge of the history and intent of the very constitution which he is sworn to uphold. Such a lack of legal reasoning ability, which leads to a derogation of the rights of the individual residents of this state to keep and bear arms pursuant to their own constitution, justifies you and other members of the legislature in voting not to confirm Mr. Gorsuch's appointment. You may use this letter as you see fit. I urge you and

Anthony


**R**oss & Associates

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

The Honorable Charlie Bussell  
April 29, 1983  
Page 3

your fellow legislators to not confirm Mr. Gorsuch. I remain,

Sincerely,



Wayne Anthony Ross  
Attorney at Law  
Past President, founder member  
Alaska Gun Collector's Ass'n.  
Director,  
National Rifle Association  
Member, Ohio Gun Collector's Association  
Member, Smith & Wesson Gun  
Collector's Association  
Member, Colt Collector's Ass'n.  
Director, National Firearms Museum,  
Inc.  
Vice Chairman, NRA Gun Collector's  
Committee  
Member and Legislative Liaison  
Officer, Alaska Rifle & Pistol  
Association  
Member, Alaska Rifle Association  
Member, McKinley Mountainmen  
Member, Alaska Peace Officers Association  
Member, Alaska Professional  
Hunter's Association

WAR/jm

**Wayne**

**Anthony**

**Ross**

*Norman  
to Joe  
see me  
M*

RECEIVED  
Department of Law

MAY 20 1983

AM PM  
2 3 4 5 6

DIRECTOR - NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION

May 18, 1983

GUN COLLECTOR

Norman Gorsuch  
Attorney General  
Pouch K  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Specializing in fine  
Smith & Wesson  
and Colt handguns.

Endowment member-  
National Rifle Association.

President & charter member-  
Alaska Gun Collectors  
Association.

Member - Smith & Wesson  
Collectors Association.

Member - Ohio Gun  
Collectors Association.

Dear Norm:


Thanks for your recent letter attempting to explain why, while you profess to believe in the individual's right to keep and bear arms, you don't feel confident coming out with a formal opinion stating this.

I always believed a man should be judged by his actions, not by his words. Your action in allowing a legal opinion to come from your office predicting judicial trends scares the hell out of me. Therefore, I have decided to do what I can to oppose your confirmation as this State's Attorney General.

I still like you personally however. I just think that you and Mr. Geldhof haven't done your homework on the current status of the law regarding the right to keep and bear arms, and its history. In an effort to educate you further, I've enclosed two more law review articles which point out the fallacy of your reasoning.

Upon review of these articles, should you decide to change your opinion, I would be happy to change mine concerning your confirmation.

Sincerely,



Wayne Anthony Ross  
Attorney at Law  
Director  
National Rifle Association

WAR/jm

Enclosures

P.O. Box 1522  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Telephone: (907) 349-4106

cc: Joe Geldhof

# MEMORANDUM

State of Alaska

TO: Kevin Bruce  
Special Assistant to the  
Governor  
Office of the Governor

DATE: February 16, 1983

FILE NO:

TELEPHONE NO: 465-3603

FROM: Norman C. Gorsuch  
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Effect of Alaska  
Railroad Transfer on  
rental agreements  
between tenants and  
landlords who lease  
railroad property

By:

Jack McGee *J.M.*  
Assistant Attorney General  
Transportation Section-Juneau

In reference to your letter of January 31, 1983 to Mr. Brock of Anchorage, it should be noted that section 604(d)(2)(A) of the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982 requires the State of Alaska to assume all existing obligations and leases of the Alaska Railroad. Thus, in the event the railroad is transferred to the state, the obligations of the railroad that are set out in the lease agreement between Mr. Brock's landlord and the railroad will be assumed by the state. The fact of the transfer will not, per se, change the conditions of the rental agreement relating to the prohibition of hand guns. If Mr. Brock's landlord now has the legal right to impose hand gun restrictions on tenants, a right which I believe the landlord presently has, this right will not be affected by the transfer. Accordingly, the transfer of the railroad to the state will not have any direct effect on the rental agreement between Mr. Brock and his landlord.

JM/ebc

TESWORTH

ER.

V.  
ACKSON.

## AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

### ARTICLE I.

**Freedom of religion, of speech and of the press.** Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.<sup>9</sup>

### ARTICLE II.

**Right to keep and bear arms.** A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.<sup>10</sup>

### ARTICLE III.

**Quartering of soldiers.** No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.<sup>11</sup>

### ARTICLE IV.

**Searches and seizures.** The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.<sup>12</sup>

### ARTICLE V.

**Rights of accused in criminal proceedings; due process; eminent domain.** No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor

9. Proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and declared ratified on December 15, 1791.

10. Proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and declared ratified on December 15, 1791.

11. Proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and declared ratified on December 15, 1791.

12. Proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and declared ratified on December 15, 1791.

the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

[3] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

## ARTICLE VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION.

## AMENDMENT I [1791]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

## AMENDMENT II [1791]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

## AMENDMENT III [1791]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

## AMENDMENT IV [1791]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

## AMENDMENT V [1791]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject to the

indictment, self-incrimination,  
double jeopardy, due process,  
eminent domain.

# STATE OF ALASKA

Bill Sheffield, Governor

## DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

POUCH K - STATE CAPITOL  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811  
PHONE: (907) 465-3500

June 27, 1983

The Honorable Patrick M. Rodey  
Senator  
Alaska State Legislature  
Pouch V  
Juneau, AK 99811

Re: SJR-28  
A. G. #366-444-83

Dear Senator Rodey:

The Department of Law has completed a preliminary analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 28 regarding the proposed amendment to the Alaska Constitution pertaining to the right of a person to keep and bear arms.

You may wish to consider inserting the word "lawful" after the term "for" and before the word "defense". With this insertion, the new constitutional clause would read as follows:

The right of a person to keep and bear arms for lawful defense of self, home and property, or for lawful hunting and recreational use, or for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed.

I believe it would be wise to make explicit that the Constitution provides for lawful activities, which of course are established by the legislature. In the absence of the term "lawful", I can envision a situation where persons attempt to use the constitutional language as a defense to behavior which ordinarily would constitute a violation of the Alaska criminal statutes. Also, I'm not sure the explicit mention of lawful hunting, recreational use and other specific activities is necessary to insure that individuals have a guaranteed right to keep and bear arms, however, I realize this language may be reassuring to certain groups within our state.

\* You may wish to review the language in other state Constitutions which relates directly to the right to keep and bear arms. In many instances this right is explicitly characterized as an individual right without mentioning specifically what constitutes appropriate use by an individual citizen. The

constitutional clauses relating to arms from the thirty-seven states which have such constitutional language are as follows:

Alabama: That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state. ALA. CONST. art I, §26.

Alaska: A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.

Arizona: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26.

Arkansas: The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for their common defense. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5.

Colorado: The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13.

Connecticut: Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15.

Florida: The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, ~~except that the manner of bearing arms~~ may be regulated by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8.

Georgia: The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne. GA. CONST. art I, § 1.

Hawaii: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. HAWAII CONST. art I, § 15.

Idaho: The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of legislation

providing minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the passage of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a felony. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.

Illinois: Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.

Indiana: The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State. IND. CONST. art I, § 32.

Kansas: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 4.

Kentucky: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: ...The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons. KY. CONST. § 1.

NO Louisiana: The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.

Maine: Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for the common defense; and this right shall never be questioned. ME. CONST. art I, § 16.

Massachusetts: The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence. And as, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 17.

Michigan: Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state. MICH. CONST. art I, § 6.

Mississippi: The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power where thereto legally summoned, shall not be called question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12.

Missouri: That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. MO. CONST. art I, § 23.

Montana: The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. MONT. CONST. art II, § 12.

SJR 28 | New Mexico: No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreation use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6.

North Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.

Ohio: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. OHIO CONST. art I, § 4.

Oklahoma: The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons, OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.

Oregon: The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defense of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power. OR. CONST. art. I, § 27.

Pennsylvania: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned. PA. CONST. art. I, § 22.

South Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner not in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law. S.C. CONST. art I, § 20.

South Dakota: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24.

Tennessee: That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.

Texas: Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23.

Utah: The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6.

Vermont: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State-and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should b kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 16.

Virginia: That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the

people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.

Washington: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.

Wyoming: The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied. WYO. CONST. art I, § 24.

In addition, thirteen states do not have express constitutional provisions related to the right to keep and bear arms.

I would be happy to discuss this matter with you in more detail.

Sincerely,



Norman C. Gorsuch  
Attorney General

NCG:ml

Distribution of  
identical letter: The Honorable Jalmar M. Kerttula  
Alaska State Senate

The Honorable Rick Halford  
Alaska State Senate

The Honorable Don Bennett  
Alaska State Senate

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS  
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 1982

STATE OF ALASKA

THE LEGISLATURE

1981

Source

Legislative  
Resolve No.

CSHJR 32(Jud) am S

36



Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to the Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

\* Section 1. Article IV, sec. 10, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amended to read:

SECTION 10. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT [QUALIFICATIONS]. The Commission on Judicial Conduct [QUALIFICATIONS] shall consist of nine members, as follows: three persons who are justices or judges of state courts [ONE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT], elected by the justices and judges of state courts [OF THE SUPREME COURT; THREE JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, ELECTED BY THE JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT; ONE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, ELECTED BY THE JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT COURT]; three [TWO] members who have practiced law in this state for ten years, appointed by the governor from nominations made by the governing body of the organized bar and subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session; and three [TWO] persons who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the state bar, appointed by the governor and subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session. In addition to being subject to impeachment under Section 12 of this article, a justice or judge may be disqualified from acting as such and may be suspended, removed from office, retired, or censured by the supreme court upon the recommendation of the commission. The powers and duties of the commission and the bases for judicial disqualification shall be established by law.

\* Sec. 2. The amendment proposed by this resolution shall be placed before the voters of the state at the next general election in conformity with art. XIII, sec. 1, Constitution of the State of Alaska, and the election laws of the state.

# STATE OF ALASKA

## THE LEGISLATURE

1981

Source

FSS-FCCSSJR 4

Legislative  
Resolve No.

1



Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to limiting increases in appropriations.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

\* Section 1. Article IX, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amended by adding a new section to read:

SECTION 16. APPROPRIATION LIMIT. Except for appropriations for Alaska permanent fund dividends, appropriations of revenue bond proceeds, appropriations required to pay the principal and interest on general obligation bonds, and appropriations of money received from a non-State source in trust for a specific purpose, including revenues of a public enterprise or public corporation of the State that issues revenue bonds, appropriations from the treasury made for a fiscal year shall not exceed \$2,500,000,000 by more than the cumulative change, derived from federal indices as prescribed by law, in population and inflation since July 1, 1981. Within this limit, at least one-third shall be reserved for capital projects and loan appropriations. The legislature may exceed this limit in bills for appropriations to the Alaska permanent fund and in bills for appropriations for capital projects, whether of bond proceeds or otherwise, if each bill is approved by the governor, or passed by affirmative vote of three-fourths of the membership of the legislature over a veto or item veto, or becomes law without signature, and is also approved by the voters as prescribed by law. Each bill for appropriations for capital projects in excess of the limit shall be confined to capital projects of the same type, and the voters shall, as provided by law, be informed of the cost of operations and maintenance of the capital projects. No other appropriation in excess of this limit may be made

except to meet a state of disaster declared by the governor as prescribed by law. The governor shall cause any unexpended and unappropriated balance to be invested so as to yield competitive market rates to the treasury.

\* Sec. 2. Article XV, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amended by adding new sections to read:

SECTION 26. APPROPRIATIONS FOR RELOCATION OF THE CAPITAL. If a majority of those voting on the question at the general election in 1982 approve the ballot proposition for the total cost to the State of providing for relocation of the capital, no additional voter approval of appropriations for that purpose within the cost approved by the voters is required under the 1982 amendment limiting increases in appropriations (art. IX, sec. 16).

SECTION 27. RECONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENT LIMITING INCREASES IN APPROPRIATIONS. If the 1982 amendment limiting appropriation increases (art. IX, sec. 16) is adopted, the lieutenant governor shall cause the ballot title and proposition for the amendment to be placed on the ballot again at the general election in 1986. If the majority of those voting on the proposition in 1986 rejects the amendment, it shall be repealed.

SECTION 28. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT. The 1982 amendment limiting appropriation increases (art. IX, sec. 16) applies to appropriations made for fiscal year 1984 and thereafter.

\* Sec. 3. The amendments proposed by this resolution shall be placed before the voters of the state at the next general election in conformity with art. XIII, sec. 1, Constitution of the State of Alaska, and the election laws of the state.

# STATE OF ALASKA

## THE LEGISLATURE

1987

Source

Legislative  
Resolve No.

CSHJR 71(SA)

18



Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to incurring general obligation indebtedness for veterans housing.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

\* Section 1. Article IX, sec. 8, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amended to read:

SECTION 8. STATE DEBT. No state debt shall be contracted unless authorized by law for capital improvements or unless authorized by law for housing loans for veterans, and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters of the State who vote on the question. The State may, as provided by law and without ratification, contract debt for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, defending the State in war, meeting natural disasters, or redeeming indebtedness outstanding at the time this constitution becomes effective.

\* Sec. 2. The amendment proposed by this resolution shall be placed before the voters of the state at the next general election in conformity with art. XIII, sec. 1, Constitution of the State of Alaska, and the election laws of the state.

# AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION - REAPPORTIONMENT EFFECTIVE JULY 11, 1982

## ARTICLE XIV APPORTIONMENT SCHEDULE

### Election Districts

SECTION 1. Members of the house of representatives shall, according to the reapportionment schedule of the governor, dated July 24, 1981, be elected from the election districts and in the numbers shown below:

House District	Name of District	Number of Representatives
1	Ketchikan-Wrangel-Petersburg	2 (A-B)
2	Inside Passage-Cordova	1
3	Baranof-Chichagof	1
4	Juneau	2 (A-B)
5	Kenai-Cook Inlet	2 (A-B)
6	North Kenai-South Coast	1
7	South Anchorage	1
8	Hillside	2 (A-B)
9	Sand Lake	2 (A-B)
10	Mid-Town	2 (A-B)
11	West Side	2 (A-B)
12	Downtown	2 (A-B)
13	Mountain View-University	2 (A-B)
14	Huldoon	2 (A-B)
15	Chugiak-Eagle Rivers-Bases	2 (A-B)
16	Matanuska-Susitna	2 (A-B)
17	Interior Highways	1
18	Southeast North Star Borough	1
19	Outer Fairbanks	1
20	Fairbanks City	2 (A-B)
21	West Fairbanks	1
22	North Slope Kotzebue	1
23	Horton Sound	1
24	Interior Rivers	1
25	Lower Yukon-Kwin	1
26	Bristol Bay-Aleutian Islands	1
27	Kodiak-East Alaska Peninsula	1

In all two member house districts candidates will run for designated seats indicated by Seat A and Seat B. Candidates will file for one of the available seats. Each qualified voter in the district may cast one vote for their choice among the candidates for each seat. The candidate receiving the greatest number of votes cast for each seat is elected.

### Senate Districts

SECTION 2. Members of the senate shall be elected in 1982 from the following senate districts except those seats where an asterisk (\*) indicates the existing senator's term will continue until January 1985:

Senate District	Composed of Election Districts	Length of Term
A	Ketchikan-Wrangell-Petersburg	4 years
B	Inside Passage-Cordova-Baranof-Chichagof	2 years*
C	Juneau	4 years
D	Kenai-Cook Inlet-North Kenai-South Coast-South Anchorage	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
E	Hillside-Sand Lake	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
F	Mid-Town-West Side	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
G	Downtown-Mountain View-University	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
H	Muldoon-Chugiak-Eagle River-Bases	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
I	Matanuska-Susitna	2 years*
J	Interior Highways-Southeast North Star Borough	2 years
K	Outer Fairbanks-Fairbanks City-West Fairbanks	Seat A - 2 years Seat B - 4 years
L	North Slope-Kotzebue-Norton Sound	4 years
M	Interior Rivers-Lower Kuskokwim	4 years
N	Bristol Bay-Aleutian Islands-Kodiak-East Alaska Peninsula	2 years

In all two member senate districts candidates will run for designated seats indicated by Seat A and Seat B. Candidates will file for one of the available seats. Each qualified voter may cast one vote for their choice among the candidates for each seat. The candidate receiving the greatest number of votes cast for each seat is elected.

Description of Election Districts

SECTION 3. The election districts set forth in Section 1 shall include the following territory:

1. Ketchikan-Wrangell-Petersburg -- District 1 is an area within a line proceeding from Dixon Entrance in a northerly direction up Clarence Strait, passing west of Zarembo Island, northerly up Duncan Canal, across Frederick Sound to a point just north and west of Cape Fanshaw, then northeasterly to the Canadian border and southerly along the Canadian border to the point of beginning at Dixon Entrance. The district includes the Ketchikan Gateway Borough, Wrangell, Petersburg, Metlakatla, Hyder, Saxman, Meyers Chuck and Kupreanof.

2. Inside Passage-Cordova -- District 2 is composed of that portion of Southeast Alaska between Dixon Entrance and Port Gravina on Prince William Sound that is not contained in Districts 1, 3 and 4. Included within its boundaries are the

communities of Cordova, Yakutat, Haines, Skagway, Klukwan, Gustavus, Angoon, Kake, Thorne Bay, Klawock, Craig and Hydaburg.

3. Baranof-Chichagof -- District 3 consists of Baranof Island and Chichagof Island. The communities on the islands include Sitka, Pelican, Hoonah, Tenakee Springs and Port Alexander.

4. Juneau -- District 4 boundaries coincide with those of the City and Borough of Juneau.

5. Kenai-Cook Inlet -- District 5 includes all of the coastal areas on the east and west sides of Cook Inlet that lie south and west of Nikishka. Sterling is also with the district.

6. North Kenai-South Coast -- District 6 includes the northern quarter of the Kenai Peninsula, Nikishka, Hope, Cooper Landing, Moose Pass, Seward, Whittier and Valdez.

7. South Anchorage -- District 7 contains the suburban southern and southeastern reaches of the Municipality of Anchorage, including the community council areas of Eldon, Old Seward/Oceanview, Rabbit Creek, Turnagain Arm and Girdwood Valley. Its northern boundary proceeds east from the inlet on Klatt Road to the New Seward Highway, southerly on the New Seward Highway to DeArmon Road, east on DeArmon Road to Morgaard Road, easterly on Morgaard Road to DeArmon Road, easterly and southerly on Rabbit Creek.

8. Hillside -- District 8 is bounded on the south by Rabbit Creek, Morgaard Road and DeArmon Road and on the west by the Seward Highway. At Tudor Road the boundary proceeds east to Bragaw Road where it turns south. This district includes the neighborhood council areas of Campbell Park, Abbott Loop, Huffman-O'Malley, Mid-Hillside, Hillside East and Glen Alps.

9. Sand Lake -- District 9 is bounded by a line beginning at the inlet and proceeding east on Klatt Road. The line proceeds north on the New Seward Highway to Diamond Boulevard where it turns west. At Minnesota Drive the line turns north and proceeds to International Airport Road where it turns west and extends to the inlet. The district includes the community council areas of Sand Lake and Klatt Road.

10. Mid-Town -- District 10 is bounded by a line beginning at the intersection of the Seward Highway and Diamond Boulevard. The line proceeds west to Minnesota Drive, north to International Airport Road, east to the Alaska Railroad, north by northwest along the railroad right of way to Tudor Road, east to Arctic Boulevard, north to 36th Avenue, east on 36th Avenue to C Street, north to Northern Lights Boulevard,

west to Spenard Road, north to W. 25th Street, west to Minnesota Drive, north to Chester Creek, easterly to Lake Otis Road, south to Tudor Road, west to the New Seward Highway and south to the point of beginning. The district includes the community council areas of North Star, Rogers Park, Tudor, and parts of Spenard and Taku-Campbell.

11. West Side -- District 11 is bounded by the boundary of District 10 on the east, International Airport Road on the south, and the inlet and Chester Creek on the north. It includes the community council area of Turnagain and the major part of the Spenard area.

12. Downtown -- District 12 is bounded by Chester Creek on the south, Bragaw Road on the east, Commercial Drive and the Elmendorf reservation boundary on the north and the inlet on the west. Included are the community council areas of Government Hill, Downtown, Penland Park and South Addition, and parts of the areas of Fairview, North Mountain View and Airport Heights.

13. Mountain View-University -- District 13 is bounded by a line beginning at the intersection of Tudor Road and Lake Otis Road proceeding east to Baxter Road, north to Northern Lights Boulevard, west to Boniface Road, north to the Glenn Highway, west on the Glenn Highway, northerly and westerly around North Mountain View along the Elmendorf military reservation boundary, south to the Glenn Highway, east to Bragaw Road, south to Chester Creek, westerly to Lake Otis Road and south to the point of beginning. The district includes the community council areas of Russian Jack Park and University, and parts of the North Mountain View and Airport Heights areas.

14. Muldoon -- District 14 includes Stuckagain Heights and the community council areas of Northeast and Scenic Park. That part of the Northeast area bounded by Boniface Road, DeBarr Road, Turpin Street and the Glenn Highway is included in District 15.

15. Chugiak-Eagle River-Bases -- District 15 includes the community council areas of Eklutna Valley, Chugiak, Birchwood, and Eagle River Valley. Also included are Fort Richardson, Elmendorf Air Force Base and that area of the Northeast community council area bounded by Boniface Road, DeBarr Road, Turpin Street and the Glenn Highway.

16. Matanuska-Susitna -- District 16 is comprised of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, including the communities of Talkeetna, Willow, Houston, Big Lake, Bastilla, Roderburg Butte, Palmer, Sutton, Peter's Creek, Montana and Chickaloon.

17. Interior Highways -- District 17 is made up of those areas outside of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough and the

Fairbanks North Star Borough which are along the Glenn, Parks, Richardson and Alaska Highways. Included are Paxson, Gulkana, Glennallen, Copper Center, Tonsina, Tazlina, McCarthy, Eagle, Delta, Fort Greely, Tanacross, Tok, Tetlin, Northway, Henana, Anderson, Healy and Cantwell.

18. Southeast North Star Borough -- District 18 encompasses the southeast section of the Fairbanks North Star Borough. It includes North Pole, Eielson Air Force Base, Salcha and Harding Lake.

19. Fort Wainwright-Outer Fairbanks -- District 19 includes Livengood, Ester, Goldstream Road, the Steese Highway, the eastern half of Farmers Loop Road, Fort Wainwright, Chena Hot Springs Road, Circle, Central and Circle Hot Springs.

20. Fairbanks City -- District 20 is bounded by the Noyes Slough and University Avenue on the west, the Fairbanks International Airport on the southwest, the Tanana River on the south and Fort Wainwright on the east. The Creamers Field area is included as the northern edge of the district.

21. West Fairbanks -- District 21 includes the western half of Farmers Loop Road and the area west of Noyes Slough and University Avenue to, but not including, the Ester area.

22. North Slope-Kotzebue -- District 22 includes the areas of the North Slope Borough/Arctic Slope Regional Corporation and the Northwest Alaska Native Association.

23. Norton Sound -- District 23 includes the area of the Bering Straits Regional Corporation; Shishmaref, Diomedea, Teller, Nome, Koyuk and Saint Michael, and the coastal communities as far south as Hooper Bay and Palmit. Chevak is also included along with Yukon River villages down river from Mountain Village.

24. Interior Rivers -- District 24 includes the communities on or near the great interior rivers, the Yukon, the Koyukuk and the Kuskokwim, as far down river as Mountain Village on the Yukon and Tuluksak on the Kuskokwim. Minto and Manley Hot Springs are included; Eagle and Circle are not included.

25. Lower Kuskokwim -- District 25 includes the Kuskokwim River communities down river from Aklak and the coastal communities from Newton to Platinum.

26. Bristol Bay-Aleutian Islands -- District 26 includes all of the Bristol Bay Native Corporation area except Ivanof Bay, Perryville, Chignik Lake, Chignik Lagoon and the Lake Clark-Lake Iliamna communities. Included are the remainder of the Alaska Peninsula communities, the Aleutian

communities, the Bristol Bay communities as far west as Twin Hills, communities as far up river as Aleknagik and Koliganek and the Lake Clark and Lake Iliamna communities. The Bristol Bay Borough is also included.

27. Kodiak-East Alaska Peninsula -- District 27 covers the Kodiak Island Borough and the Alaska Peninsula communities of Ivanof Bay, Perryville, Chignik Lake, Chignik and Chignik Lagoon.

THE RIGHT OF A PERSON TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS SHALL NOT BE INFRINGED,  
BUT THE MANNER OF BEARING ARMS MAY BE REGULATED BY LAW.

~~O.K.~~ Chief Porter

~~O.K.~~ Allen Bailey

~~O.K.~~ Ed Hoff

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# OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

Commentaries

The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or  
the Predilection of Judges Reign?

*Robert Dowlut*

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PMS HONORABLE VIC FISCHER, ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE

POUCH V (MS 3100)

JUNEAU AK 99811

DEAR SENATOR FISCHER,

WE WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED  
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT FOR THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS WHICH IS  
CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED BY YOUR COMMITTEE.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION #28, SPONSORED BY SENATORS PAT RODEY, JAY  
KERTTULA, DON BENNETT AND RICK HALFORD, WILL AFFIRM AN INDIVIDUAL  
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS AND WILL CLEARLY SPECIFY THAT THE RIGHT  
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS EXTENDS TO: +THE DEFENSE OF SELF, HOME AND  
PROPERTY, OR FOR LAWFUL HUNTING AND RECREATIONAL USE, OR FOR OTHER  
LAWFUL PURPOSES.

AS ONE OF THE ORIGINAL FRAMERS OF THE ALASKAN CONSTITUTIONAL  
PROVISION FOR THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN ALASKA, WE VERY MUCH  
APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE 1955 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN THE  
LAST TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE IN 1956.

OUR DESIRE TO ASSIST SENATORS RODEY, KERTTULA BENNETT AND HALFORD IN STRENGTHENING THE +INDIVIDUALS+ RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS PROVISION IS BASED ON OUR CONCERN THAT SOME HAVE FORGOTTEN THE INTENTION OF YOUR ORIGINAL PROVISION.

MANY OF OUR ALASKAN MEMBERS VOICE CONCERN WHEN ATTORNEY GENERAL NORMAN C. GORSUCH RELEASED AN APRIL 13, 1983, OPINION ON THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 19 OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION.

THE OPINION, FIRST SENT TO SENATOR PAT RODEY AND REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE BUSSELL NOTED THAT: +THE MODERN JUDICIAL VIEW HAS INCREASINGLY FOUND THAT THE GUARANTEED RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IS NOT AN INDIVIDUALLY PROTECTED RIGHT, BUT RATHER A COLLECTIVE RIGHT WHICH ALLOWS THE PEOPLE OF THE VARIOUS STATES TO SERVE IN A MILITIA.+

THE EFFORTS OF OUR ALASKAN MEMBERS TO STRENGTHEN THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS MOTIVATED BY THE NUMEROUS STATES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES WHERE LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS HAVE SOUGHT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT.

AS MORE AND MORE COMMUNITIES ATTEMPT TO ENACT RESTRICTIVE GUN CONTROL ORDINANCES, LAW-ABIDING FIREARMS OWNERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO OFFSET THIS PATTERN THROUGH THE PASSAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.

IDAHO PASSED SUCH REFORM LEGISLATION IN 1979. IN 1982 THE STATES OF  
NEW HAMPSHIRE AND NEVADA PASSED SIMILAR AMENDMENTS BY OVERWHELMING  
PERCENTAGES, AND UTAH VOTERS WILL BE VOTING ON A STRENGTHENED  
AMENDMENT THIS FALL.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION HAS CAUSED CONCERN AMONG OUR  
MEMBERSHIP WHO FELT THAT WE COULD HELP PROTECT THE RIGHTS WHICH  
ALASKANS HOLD DEAR TO THEM BY INCLUDING LANGUAGE WHICH SPECIFICALLY  
EXTENDS TO PROTECTION BY SELF-DEFENSE AND LAWFUL HUNTING/RECREATION  
USE AND OTHER LAWFUL PURPOSES.

WE HOPE THAT THROUGH THE AMENDATORY LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SENATE  
JOINT RESOLUTION #28, THE RIGHTS WHICH YOU SOUGHT TO PROTECT IN 1955  
WILL BE FURTHER PROTECTED FOR A FUTURE GENERATION OF ALASKANS.

SINCERELY,

LOUIS J BRUNE III STATE LIAISON

1044 EST

IPMAFUB AHG

# HANDGUN PROHIBITION AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

*Don B. Kates, Jr.\**

## INTRODUCTION

Federal or state handgun prohibition legislation<sup>1</sup> is often suggested as one way to reduce the incidence of homicide and other violent crime in the United States.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the criminological merits of this suggestion,<sup>3</sup> constitutionally speaking it raises a diverse set of issues. Among those which this Article will not cover in any depth are:

\* LL.B. 1966, Yale Law School. Member of the California, District of Columbia, Missouri and United States Supreme Court Bars. Partner, Benenson, Kates and Hardy (San Francisco office). Of counsel, O'Brien & Hallisey, San Francisco, California. Mr. Kates authored one of the petitions for certiorari in *Quilici v. City of Morton Grove*. — Ed.

The author wishes to thank the following for their assistance: Professors William Van Alstyne (Law, Duke University Law School), Roy Wortman (History, Kenyon College), and Stephen Hallbrook (Philosophy, George Mason University); Dr. Joyce Malcolm (Law Fellow, Harvard Law School), Dr. David L. Caplan, Mr. Willis Hannawalt (Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro, San Francisco), and Mr. David Hardy (Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Interior Department, Washington, D.C.). Of course, the responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation is the author's alone.

1. Such legislation could, for example, take the form of a restrictive permit requirement designed and administered to exclude more than 99% of the civilian population from handgun ownership. On the constitutionality of restrictive permit systems, see notes 253-54 *infra* and accompanying text.

2. See J. ALVIANI & W. DRAKI, *HANDGUN CONTROL: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES* 48-54 (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1975) (quoting resolutions to that effect from: The Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church, Common Cause, National Alliance for Safer Cities, Union of America Hebrew Congregations and Unitarian Universalist Association).

3. The criminological literature is as bitterly divided as anything else in this emotion-laden area. Studies that minimize the extent or importance of firearms crime receive severe censure in Zimring, *Guns with Guns and Statistics*, 1968 *Wis. L. REV.* 1113. On the other hand, various statistical arguments purporting to show that widespread gun ownership causes violence or that severe anti-gun laws reduce it are convincingly mauled in Benenson, *A Controlled Look at Gun Controls*, 14 *N.Y.L.J.* 718 (1968), and in Hardy & Stompoly, *Of Arms and the Law*, 51 *CALIF. L. REV.* 62, 79-114 (1974).

The most complete and authoritative study to date, done by Professors J. Wright and P. Rossi of the Social and Demographic Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts under a three-year grant from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, involved a comprehensive review and analysis of all the various studies and relevant criminological data developed as of 1980. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, *WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA* (1981) [hereinafter cited as *WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA*]. Scrupulously neutral despite its authors' admitted anti-gun sentiments, this study evenhandedly rebukes champions of both sides for having been so result-oriented that most of the pre-1975 work in the area is simply not credible. Its abstract provides the following "bottom-line" conclusions:

- (1) whether Congress has jurisdiction under the commerce clause or otherwise to enact a federal handgun prohibition;<sup>4</sup>
- (2) whether such a prohibition would violate the "castle doctrine" embodied in the third and fourth amendments;<sup>5</sup>
- (3) whether the constitutional privacy protections of the fourth and fifth amendments would inhibit enforcement of such a ban;<sup>6</sup> and
- (4) whether handgun confiscation would trigger the fifth amendment's just compensation requirement.<sup>7</sup>

The constitutional issue that comes most immediately to mind in

There appear to be no strong causal connections between private gun ownership and the crime rate. . . . There is no compelling evidence that private weaponry is an important cause of, or a deterrent to, violent criminality.

It is commonly hypothesized that much criminal violence, especially homicide, occurs simply because the means of lethal violence (firearms) are readily at hand, and thus, that much homicide would not occur were firearms generally less available. There is no persuasive evidence that supports this view.

*Id.* at 1-2.

4. Clearly, the commerce power provides Congress jurisdiction to prohibit the continued importation of firearms, their domestic manufacture for interstate sale or their sale after travel in interstate commerce. In theory, the extension of commerce clause jurisdiction to the confiscation of handguns which might have been purchased by the present owner or his family 25 or more years ago would be questionable. *But see* *Scarborough v. United States*, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (indicating that the commerce power extends to prohibiting possession of any firearm which has at any time traveled in interstate or foreign commerce). Since a substantial minority of firearms are foreign imports, and the rest are manufactured by a few firms located in the New England states, most, if not all, firearms would have the required "minimal nexus" of having crossed a state or federal border at some time. Moreover, existing precedents at least arguably extend the commerce power to confiscation of even those firearms which have never crossed a state or federal border on the ground that the metals and other materials out of which they are fabricated have so moved. *See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

5. In *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Supreme Court barred legislation prohibiting the home possession of pornography. The implications of that holding have become increasingly ambiguous, as it has been honored more in the breach than in the observance. *Cf. Leary v. United States*, 544 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977) (no federal right of privacy preempts legislative prohibition of home possession of marijuana). *Stanley* has been described as no more than "a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). Yet if *Stanley* has any vitality at all it surely encompasses the right to equip one's "castle" with firearms, locks, metal grilles and other devices specifically designed to protect its privacy. However the *Stanley* castle doctrine may be narrowed, it would be difficult logically to exclude from it the home possession of firearms since the doctrine that "a man's home is his castle" originated in cases upholding the right to possess and use arms for home defense. *Semayne's Case*, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603) (quoted with approval in *Payton v. New York*, 445 U.S. 573, 596 n.44 (1980)); *Dhutti's Case*, Northumberland Assize Rolls (1255) (88 Publications of Surtees Society 94 (1891)) (household servant privileged to kill nocturnal intruder); *Rex v. Compton*, 22 *Liber Assisarum* pl. 55 (1347) (homicide of burglar is no less justifiable than that of criminal who resists arrest under warrant); *Anonymous* 1353, 26 *Liber Assisarum* (Edw. III), pl. 23 (householder privileged to kill arsonist).

6. *See* Hardy & Chouner, *The Potentiality for Civil Liberties Violations in the Enforcement of Handgun Prohibition*, in *RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT* (D. Kates ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as *RESTRICTING HANDGUNS*]; Kessler, *Enforcement Problems of Gun Control: A Victimless Crimes Analysis*, 16 *C. M. L. BULL.* 131 (1980).

7. *See* *Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago*, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). *But cf. Miller v. Schoene*, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (no duty to compensate if one class of property is destroyed rather than taken for public use).

connection with handgun prohibition-confiscation, however, is the second amendment's injunction:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.<sup>8</sup>

The meaning of this language has been extensively debated in light of what has aptly been termed "The Great American Gun War."<sup>9</sup> Predictably, but unfortunately, the discussion has mirrored the terms, conditions and bitterness of that "war." Debate has been sharply polarized between those who claim that the amendment guarantees nothing to individuals, protects only the state's right to maintain organized military units, and thus poses no obstacle to gun control (the "exclusively state's right" view), and those who claim that the amendment guarantees some sort of individual right to arms (the "individual right" view).

The individual right view is endorsed by only a minority of legal scholars,<sup>10</sup> but accepted by a majority of the general populace who, though supporting the idea of controlling guns, increasingly oppose their prohibition, believing that law-abiding citizens may properly have them for self-defense.<sup>11</sup> Though the individual right view reigns

8. U.S. CONST. amend. II.

9. See Bruce-Briggs' article with that title in *PUBLIC INTEREST* 37 (1976).

10. See, e.g., Caplan, *Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited*, 5 *FORDHAM URB. L. J.* 31 (1976); Dowd, *The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?*, 36 *OKLA. L. REV.* 65 (1983); Gardiner, *To Preserve Liberty -- A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms*, 10 *N. KY. L. REV.* 63 (1982); Hardy & Stompolo, *supra* note 3; Hays, *The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation*, 2 *WM. & MARY L. REV.* 381 (1960); Sprecher, *The Last Amendment*, 51 *A.B.A. J.* 554 (1965). Based upon special research by its staff in the archives of the Library of Congress, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee has also endorsed the individual right view. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., *THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS* (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as *REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION*]. Dr. Joyce Malcolm, an historian whose study in England of the antecedent English legal principles was funded by the American Bar Foundation, Harvard Law School and the National Endowment for the Humanities, has also accepted the individual right view. Malcolm, *The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition*, 10 *HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.* 285 (1983) (in press), reprinted in *FIREARMS & VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY* (D. Kates ed., forthcoming 1984) [hereinafter cited as *FIREARMS & VIOLENCE*].

Though not necessarily agreeing with all of their conclusions, this Article relies heavily upon the research and insights that appear in Malcolm, Caplan and the *REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION*, *supra*, and Halbrook, *The Second Amendment as a Phenomenon of Classical Political Philosophy*, in *FIREARMS & VIOLENCE*, *supra*. The following unpublished materials have also been extremely useful: C. Ashbury, *The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in America: The Origins and Application of the Second Amendment to the Constitution* (1974) (unpublished doctoral thesis in history, U. of Michigan) (available at U. of Michigan Graduate Library); A. Lugo Janer, *The System of Defense in the Massachusetts Bay Colonies from 1629 to 1650* (1982) (graduate paper, U. of Pa. Law School); A. Lugo Janer, *A Thesis on the Second Amendment* (1982) (masters thesis, U. of Pa. Law School); J. Smith, *The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms* (1959) (thesis, Harvard Law School).

11. In answer to a 1975 national poll asking whether the second amendment "applies to each individual citizen or only to the National Guard," 70% of the respondents endorsed the

among nonlegal scholars,<sup>12</sup> the exclusively state's right position is dominant among lawyers and law professors<sup>13</sup> and enjoys the support of the American Bar Association.<sup>14</sup> That bastion of individual rights, the American Civil Liberties Union — a member organization of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns — emphatically denies that the second amendment has anything to do with individuals.<sup>15</sup>

individual right alternative, with another 3% saying it applied to both. 121 Cong. Rec. 42, 112 (1975). A 1978 national poll which asked, "Do you believe the Constitution of the United States gives you the right to keep and bear arms?" received an 87% affirmative response. Decision Making Information, Attitudes of the American Electorate Toward Gun Control (1978) (Mimeo).

At the same time, national polls generally show widespread public support for the concept of "gun control." But since there are presently more than 20,000 federal, state and local "gun control" laws, the relevant inquiry is: "What specific kinds of present or proposed "gun controls" does the public endorse? Polls seeking opinion on specific proposals suggest that the public approves replacement of the present hodgepodge of diverse federal, state and local controls by a national system. This system would be at once substantially less onerous than those presently in effect in the most restrictive jurisdictions and yet substantially more onerous than those of the least restrictive jurisdictions. Registration would be required for all guns (not just handguns) and lawful ownership would be dependent upon qualification for a permit. On the other hand, permits would be automatically available as a matter of right to every responsible law-abiding adult. See Bordua, *Gun Control and Opinion Measurement: Adversary Polling and the Construction of Social Meaning*, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, *supra* note 10; Kates, *Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States*, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, *supra* note 6, at 27-30; Tonso, *Social Problems and Sagecraft in the Debate of Gun Control*, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 325 (1983); Wright, *Public Opinion and Gun Control: A Comparison of Results From Two Recent National Surveys*, 455 ANNALS 24 (1981); *cf.* Part IV-C *infra* (on the constitutionality of such a system).

12. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10; J. MALCOLM, *DISARMED: THE LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN RESTORATION ENGLAND* (1980); Halbrook, *supra* note 10; Marina, *Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second Amendment in Global Perspective*, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, *supra* note 10; Shalhope, *The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment*, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982); Whisker, *Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms*, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 171 (1975); C. Ashbury, *supra* note 10. *But see* Shalhope, *supra*, at 599-600 (citations to several historians who embrace the exclusively state's right view).

13. "For some years, the second amendment has been regarded by the great majority of constitutional scholars as irrelevant to the issue of gun control." Kaplan, *Foreword*, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, *supra* note 10; see, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, *FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE* 113 (1970) [hereinafter cited as G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING]; Feller & Gotting, *The Second Amendment, A Second Look*, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 46 (1966); Jackson, *Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed*, 8 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 867 (1977); Levin, *The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience*, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148 (1971); Rohner, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (1966); Weatherup, *Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment*, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 961 (1972); Note, *Right to Keep and Bear Arms*, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 423 (1977).

1. TRIBI, *AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* 266 n.6 (1978), considers these views so clearly established that he echoes them without admitting even the possibility of any alternative interpretation.

14. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, *POLICY BOOK* (August 1975).

15. The ACLU's Summary of its national board's action at the June 14-15, 1980 meeting sets out the following policy declaration:

The setting in which the Second Amendment was proposed and adopted demonstrates

Indeed, "The Great American Gun War" bristles with ironies that turn our stereotypes of liberalism and conservatism topsy-turvy: While the *New York Times* editorializes that "[t]he urban handgun offers no benefits,"<sup>16</sup> its publisher is among the few privileged to possess a New York City permit to carry one at all times.<sup>17</sup> Arch-conservatives who passionately denounce marijuana and homosexuality wax eloquent against the "victimless criminalization" of gun own-

that the right to bear arms is a collective one existing only in the collective population of each state for the purpose of maintaining an effective state militia.

The ACLU agrees with the Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of the Second Amendment that the individual's right to bear arms applies only to the preservation of efficiency of a well regulated militia. Except for lawful police and military purposes, the possession of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally protected. Therefore there is no constitutional impediment to the regulation of firearms.

Nor does the ACLU believe that there is a significant civil liberties value, apart from the Second Amendment, in an individual right to own or use firearms. Interests of privacy and self expression may be involved in any individual's choice of activities or possessions, but these interests are attenuated when the activity, or the object sought to be possessed, is inherently dangerous to others. With respect to firearms, the ACLU believes that this quality of dangerousness justifies legal regulation which substantially restricts the individual's interest in freedom of choice.

At the same meeting the board approved the following clarification: "It is the sense of this body that the word 'justifies' in the policy means we will affirmatively support gun control legislation."

16. *The Real Politics of Guns*, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983, at A30, col. 1; see also *Taming the White Panthers*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at A30, col. 1 (in response to the assertion that handgun prohibition would discriminate against the poor who have less access to police protection, the editorial claims that "most civilians, whatever their income level, are likely to lack the training and alertness" required to "us[e] a gun to stop an armed criminal") (emphasis added), see n.17 *infra* and accompanying text.

17. Although such permits are officially available only on a showing of "unique need" to carry a defensive weapon, the list of permit holders is composed of people noted more for their political influence, wealth and social prominence than for their residence in high-crime areas. Along with Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the list has included such other well-known gun prohibition advocates as Nelson Rockefeller and John Lindsay. Psychologist Joyce Brothers, whose public position is that men possess handguns in order to compensate for sexual dysfunction, was not on the list. Her husband was. Kates, *Some Comparisons Between The Prohibition of Alcohol and the Banning of Handguns*, at n.21 & accompanying text (paper delivered to the 1981 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology), revised & reprinted as *Handgun Running in Light of the Prohibition Experience*, in *FIREARMS & VIOLENCE*, *supra* note 10.

Of course, contrary to the suggestions of the gun organizations which ferreted it out, this information does not *per se* demonstrate the invalidity of handgun prohibition-confiscation legislation — any more than the fact that the children of the influential parents often manage to avoid the consequences of their peccadilloes demonstrates the undesirability of having criminal laws, or the fact that the rich are best able to take advantage of tax breaks demonstrates the invalidity thereof. If we were to repeal every law or governmental program — however beneficial to society generally — from which the rich and the influential are in a position to obtain special benefits, or to avoid the most onerous effects, there would be neither government nor laws.

But such anomalies are particularly detrimental to the *enforceability* of handgun prohibition-confiscation. How can the resident of a high-crime area be convinced to give up what he believes to be his family's only real security when people who live and work in high-security buildings in the best-policed areas of the city are privileged not to do so? How can he be dissuaded from thinking that guns give security when many of those who have so derisively assailed that idea turn out to mean only that handguns are useless to those who lack the special influence necessary to secure a permit?

ers.<sup>18</sup> The National Rifle Association (NRA) has its own gun control program, involving mandatory minimum prison sentences for the use of a gun in the commission of a crime — a scheme which the NRA's opponents decry.<sup>19</sup> But these same opponents endorse mandatory minimum prison sentences for people who (without misuse) simply carry a handgun illegally — people who turn out overwhelmingly to be not criminals but frightened shopkeepers, secretaries and the elderly — respectable citizens who must live or work in high-crime areas but lack the political influence necessary to get a permit.<sup>20</sup> Normally antipathetic political extremists of virtually every persuasion join with apolitical gun collectors in paranoid visions of gun bans as persecutions directed especially against them.<sup>21</sup> Usually liberal jurists and newspaper columnists frankly call for abrogation of the fourth amendment insofar as it would hinder police confiscation of guns — “unlimited search and seizure” against anyone suspected of being a handgun owner.<sup>22</sup>

Equally ironic, the legal community's endorsement of the exclusively state's right interpretation has actually aided the gun organizations in one way. By concentrating attention on the state's right position, the gun-owner organizations have been able to avoid the details of their own individual right position, which seems inconsistent with the kinds of gun controls the organizations have themselves endorsed.<sup>23</sup> In almost every state, the basic handgun legislation, in-

18. Examples could be multiplied almost endlessly, but among the more prominent are Rep. John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), who was, until his death in 1982, a member of the NRA national board, and California State Sen. H.L. Richardson, who is both an NRA board member and the founder and head of Gun Owners of America.

19. See, e.g., M. YEAGER, *DO MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCES FOR HANDGUN OFFENDERS CURB VIOLENT CRIME* (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1976). Criticism of this NRA gun control alternative is not, however, limited to professional anti-gun analysts. See Kates, *Why Gun Control Won't Work*, *COMMONWEAL*, Mar. 13, 1981, at 136; Lofin & McDowall, *One with a Gun Gets You Two*, 455 *ANNALS* 150 (1981).

20. See Kates, *supra* note 19, at 136; see also Kates, *supra* note 17, at n.16 & accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript).

21. See, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, *supra* note 13, at 195-196 pp. F (statements of various extremist political groups); Marwick, *What Gun Collectors and Political Activists Have in Common*, *FIRST PRINCIPLES*, June 1979. For historical examples of the use of gun confiscations to persecute political enemies, see notes 136-40 *infra* and accompanying text. Others are collected in Kessler, *Gun Control and Political Power*, 5 *LAW & POLY. Q.* 381 (1983).

22. See Wilkey, *Wall St. J.*, Oct. 7, 1977, at 12, col. 4; Keegan, *U.S.A.*, “Nation of Hypocrites” *an Enforcement of Gun Laws*, *Chicago Tribune*, Apr. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 2. See generally Hardy & Chotiner, *supra* note 6.

23. Notwithstanding their portrayal in the news media (and indeed, their own self-portraits), gun-owner organizations are not necessarily against gun control, as opposed to gun prohibition-confiscation. While they frequently cite the failure of our present 20,000 gun control measures as evidence of the uselessness of a gun ban, they fail to point out that they and their predecessors are responsible for many of those controls. In addition to the controls derived from the Uniform Revolver Act, see notes 24-26 *infra* and accompanying text, the NRA

cluding both the prohibition on the carrying of concealed weapons and the restrictions on gun ownership by felons, minors, and incompetents,<sup>24</sup> stems from the Uniform Revolver Act,<sup>25</sup> drafted and promoted by the NRA and the now defunct United States Revolver Association in the first three decades of this century.<sup>26</sup> However socially desirable these and other controls may be, they raise problems for the individual right interpretation which its proponents have rarely, if ever, attempted to address. For example:

- (1) Since the amendment contains no express limitation on the kind of "arms" guaranteed, why does it only protect possession of ordinary small arms (rifles, shotguns, handguns)? Why not of artillery, flamethrowers, machine guns, and so on, to the prohibition of which gun-owner groups have readily acceded?
- (2) Likewise, since the amendment's guarantee does not explicitly limit gun ownership to responsible adults, why does it not proscribe the laws restricting handgun ownership by lunatics, criminals and juveniles?
- (3) Since the amendment guarantees an (apparently unqualified) right to "bear" as well as to "keep" arms, how can individual right proponents endorse concealed-carry proscriptions?
- (4) Conversely, if all these controls are consistent with the gun-owner groups' position, how can they contend that registration and licensing requirements are not?<sup>27</sup>

In short, even if the historical evidence does establish an individual right to arms, it remains to define its parameters, particularly with regard to gun control rather than gun prohibition-confiscation.<sup>28</sup> One of the purposes of this Article will be to sketch out at

also cooperated in enacting the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968) L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, *THE GUN IN AMERICA* 211 (1975). Although the NRA did not affirmatively support the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1976), the American firearms industry supported it for economic reasons. Kates, *Towards a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States*, in *RESTRICTING HANDGUNS*, *supra* note 6, at 25. Nevertheless, the NRA has sought only certain civil liberty modifications to the Act. For example, the Firearm Owners Protection Act, S. 1914, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 3872-74 (1983), introduced by Senator McClure (R-Idaho), seeks to amend the Act by prohibiting warrantless searches and other alleged abuses without repealing the provisions designed to forbid firearms to violent felons, juveniles and the mentally unstable.

24. See note 265 & 268 *infra* and accompanying text.

25. *A Bill To Provide For Uniform Regulation of Revolver Sales* (The United States Revolver Association), reprinted in *HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING* 728 (1924) [hereinafter cited as *HANDBOOK*].

26. See L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, *supra* note 23, at ch. 8; United States Revolver Association, *The Argument for a Uniform Revolver Act*, in *HANDBOOK*, *supra* note 25, at 716; *Report of the Committee on a Uniform Act to Regulate the Sale and Possession of Firearms*, in *HANDBOOK*, *supra* note 25, at 711.

27. The e and other issues relating to the constitutionality of specific gun control options are treated in detail in Part IV. See notes 235-71 *infra* and accompanying text.

28. This Article does not purport to resolve, or even to address, the current debate among

least some of the very substantial limitations on the right of individuals to keep and bear arms suggested by the historical evidence.<sup>29</sup> First, however, the controversy between the individual right and the exclusively state's right views must be resolved. The evidence to be examined must include: the literal language of the second amendment; the history of its proposal and ratification; the philosophical and historical background that gave rise to the Founders' belief in "the necessity of an armed populace to effect popular sovereignty";<sup>30</sup> and the contemporary understanding of the second amendment. This Article will then consider the amendment's subsequent judicial interpretation, and the question of its incorporation against the states, before returning to constitutional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms.

### I. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

The two opposing camps naturally rely on different interpretations of the origins of the second amendment. Proponents of the exclusively state's right view<sup>31</sup> see the amendment as responding to

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constitutional scholars over the proper role of original intent in constitutional adjudication. As to that debate, see, e.g., J. ELY, *DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST* (1980) (evaluating interpretive and fundamental value approaches and arguing for his own form of "ultimate interpretivism"; Bork, *Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems*, 47 *IND. L.J.* 1 (1971) (arguing that neutral derivation of principle requires adherence to original intent); Brest, *The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding*, 60 *B.U. L. REV.* 204 (1980) (arguing that interpretivism is impossible and does not serve the ends of constitutionalism); Monaghan, *Our Perfect Constitution*, 56 *N.Y.U. L. REV.* 353 (1981) (original intent is proper interpretive mode for ascertaining constitutional meaning). For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that courts and commentators continue to refer to the text and the intent behind it, taking as their guides the writings of Madison, Jefferson and the other Framers, and the historical background in colonial and English law of the provision under consideration. See, e.g., *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); *Everson v. Board of Educ.*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Even Thomas Grey, who would read the Constitution in light of modern values, justifies his interpretation on the ground that this was the Framers' intent. Grey, *Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?*, 27 *STAN. L. REV.* 703, 715-17 (1975).

29. See notes 235-71 *infra* and accompanying text.

30. Halbrook, *supra* note 10, at n. 79 & accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript).

31. What is here denominated the "exclusively state's right" position is sometimes also described as the "collective right" theory. That phrase is not used here because of the potential for confusion with a related, but occasionally discretely stated, "collective right" theory. This second "collective right" theory was first enunciated by the Kansas Supreme Court in a decision which eviscerated the right to arms provision of that state's constitution. *Salina v. Blakely*, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 61 (1905). Under this theory constitutional right to arms guarantees, whether federal or state, involve only a "collective right" of the entire people, by which is apparently meant a right that cannot be invoked by anyone either in his own behalf or on behalf of the people as a whole.

It will be unnecessary to consider at length this discrete "collective right" theory because it is patently wrong. If the amendment was intended to guarantee a right to the people (and not the states), it is self-contradictory to say that because that right was conferred on everyone, no single person may assert it, or indeed, to describe something that guarantees nothing to any

article I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16, of the original Constitution. Those clauses give Congress the power to call out the militia and "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining" it. According to the state's right interpretation, the amendment was motivated by fear that Congress might order the states' organized militias disarmed, thereby leaving the states powerless against federal tyranny. Thus, this view sees the amendment as a response to concerns that time and the course of American history have rendered anachronistic. During the Revolution, and the subsequent period of the Articles of Confederation, the states loomed larger than the federal government and jealously guarded their prerogatives against it. While the Constitution itself heralded a decisive (though limited) repudiation of those attitudes, they remained strong enough to assure two precatory admissions a place in the Bill of Rights. These became the second and tenth amendments. The purpose of the second amendment was simply to place the states' organized military forces beyond the federal government's power to disarm, guaranteeing that the states would always have sufficient force at their command to nullify federal impositions on their rights and to resist by arms if necessary.<sup>32</sup> State's right proponents also link the amendment to the traditional Whig fear of standing armies. Though the federal government could not be denied authority to maintain a small army, the basic military defense of the country would rest in the states' reserved power to maintain their own organized military forces. These could be joined together to resist foreign invasion in time of need. Thus, the philosophy underlying the second amendment not only guaranteed the states' right to keep armed forces, but obviated any need for a massive federal military which might defeat them if they found it necessary to revolt.<sup>33</sup>

This state's right analysis renders the amendment little more than a holdover from an era of constitutional philosophy that received its death knell in the decision rendered at Appomattox Courthouse. Though it yet lingers in the Constitution, it does not (for it was never

specific person or entity as a "right" at all. Thus, the discrete "collective right" theory fails to meet Chief Justice Marshall's elementary test for constitutional construction: "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect . . ." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); cf. Hardy & Stompey, *supra* note 3, at 74-75 (state provisions meaningless if right to keep and bear arms refers only to right of state to form a militia); REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 11 (individual rights interpretation gives full meaning to the words chosen by the First Congress to reflect the right to keep and bear arms).

<sup>32</sup> See generally the sources cited at notes 13-15 *supra*. The historical accuracy of this view of the amendment is analyzed at notes 86-89 *infra* and accompanying text.

<sup>33</sup> See notes 86-89 & 113 *infra* and accompanying text.

so intended) guarantee the right of any *individual* against confiscation of arms. Rather, it guarantees an exclusive right of the states, which only the states have standing to invoke. This they need not do today when any value the amendment might presently have for them is satisfied by their federally-provided National Guard structure.

Advocates of the individual right position, on the other hand, rely on the fact that the natural reading of the amendment's phrase "right of the people" is that it creates not a state right, but one which individuals can assert. This is how the identically phrased<sup>34</sup> first and fourth amendments are interpreted.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the individual right advocate may accept the state's right theory and simply assert that, even though one of the amendment's purposes may have been to protect the states' militias,<sup>36</sup> another was to protect the individual right to arms. Indeed, the evidence suggests it was precisely by protecting the individual that the Framers intended to protect the militia.<sup>37</sup> In thus yielding to the primary strength of the opposing argument, individual right advocates define the burden that the exclusively state's right theorist must bear. To demonstrate that no individual right was intended, he must show not just that there was a desire to protect the states, but that there was *no desire* to protect individuals — despite the most natural reading of the amendment's phraseology. As we shall see, this is a particularly difficult burden to bear. Such debate as the amendment received is sparse and inconclusive, while other legislative history strongly supports the proposition that protection of an individual right was at least one of the amendment's purposes.<sup>38</sup>

34. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects . . .").

35. See, e.g., *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 488 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980) (right to assemble peacefully is as fundamental as free press and speech and exists as an independent right as well as a catalyst for the exercise of other first amendment rights); *United States v. Salvucci*, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (defendants charged with crimes of possession may claim benefit of the exclusionary rule to vindicate their fourth amendment rights).

36. For the specialized 18th century usage of "militia" to encompass the entire military-age male population, see notes 39-55 *infra* and accompanying text.

37. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

38. The recorded debate, which centered on a tangential issue, is discussed at note 90 *infra*. Other direct legislative history is set out at notes 75-89 *infra* and accompanying text. The philosophical underpinning of the amendment is set out at notes 90-134 *infra* and accompanying text. Much of this material derives from unpublished background studies by Professor Halbrook which, along with some additional material, are embodied in his article *To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1797*, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 13 (1982).

A. *Parsing the Language of the Second Amendment and the Bill of Rights*

In general, the text of the second amendment, and of the Bill of Rights as a whole, provides a series of insuperable obstacles to an exclusively state's right interpretation. State's right analyses have tended not to come to grips with these obstacles; if they focus on the amendment's wording at all, it is only on the word "militia," assuming that the Framers meant "militia" to refer to "a particular military force," *i.e.*, the states' home reserve, now federalized as the National Guard.<sup>39</sup> In fact, though not unknown in the 18th Century,<sup>40</sup> that usage was wholly secondary to the one Webster classifies as now least used. "The whole body of able-bodied male citizens declared by law as being subject to call to military service."<sup>41</sup> As the paragraphs below demonstrate, the Framers' understanding of the meaning of "militia" and the other phrases of the second amendment seriously embarrasses the state's right argument.

1. *The Militia*

Throughout their existence, the American colonies had endured the constant threat of sudden attack by Indians or any of Britain's Dutch, French and Spanish colonial rivals.<sup>42</sup> Even if they had wanted a standing army, the colonists were unable either to afford the cost or to free up the necessary manpower. Instead, they adopted the ancient practice that was still in vogue in England, the militia system. The "militia" was the entire adult male citizenry, who were not simply *allowed* to keep their own arms, but affirmatively *required* to do so. In the pre-colonial English tradition there had been no police and no standing army in peacetime.<sup>43</sup> From time immemorial every free Englishman had been both permitted and required to keep such arms as a person of his class could afford both for law enforcement and for military service.<sup>44</sup> With arms readily available

39. See, e.g., sources cited in note 13 *supra*.

40. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971).

41. *Id.*

42. See Dowlut, *supra* note 10, at 69. (Dowlut also mentions that the colonists were exposed to general crime against which they both armed themselves individually and acted jointly in the *posse comitatus*.)

43. When a large scale threat, such as invasion, presented itself, the civilian militia was mobilized for military duty. In addition, civilian subjects participated in ordinary police work, both individually and as members of posses. *Id.* at 93.

44. C. GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES 7 (1972); C. HOLLISTER, ANGLO-SAXON MILITARY INSTITUTIONS ch. 2 (1962). As weapons improved or new technologies, including firearms, took their place, successive monarchs and parliaments constantly found it necessary to redefine and

in their homes, Englishmen were theoretically prepared at all times to chase down felons in response to the hue and cry, or to assemble together as an impromptu army in case of foreign invasion of their shire.<sup>45</sup>

When the American colonies were founded the militia system was in full flower in England. It was adopted *perforce* in the colonies, which were thousands of miles by sail from any succor the Mother Country might provide. With slight variations, the different colonies imposed a duty to keep arms and to muster occasionally for drill upon virtually every able-bodied white man between the age of majority and a designated cut-off age. Moreover, the duty to keep arms applied to *every* household, not just to those containing persons subject to militia service.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the over-aged and seamen, who were exempt from militia service, were required to keep arms for law enforcement and for the defense of their homes from criminals or foreign enemies.<sup>47</sup> In at least one colony a 1770 law actually required

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reemphasize citizens' continuing obligation to arm themselves with the most effectual weapons they could afford. For the legislation of Mary Tudor and Elizabeth I, see A. Lugo Janer, *supra* note 10, at 6-13. Legislation enacted by their father, Henry VIII, is discussed at note 235 *infra* and accompanying text. For the tergiversatous course followed by their Stuart successors, see notes 136-39 *infra* and accompanying text.

45. F. MAITLAND, *THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND* 276 (Fisher ed. 1961), particularly stresses the joinder of military and law enforcement purposes served by the requirement that every free man possess weapons. See also Malcolm, *supra* note 10; J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 6; note 44 *supra*.

46. From the earliest times the duty to possess arms was imposed on the entire colonial populace, with actual militia service contemplated for every male of 15, 16, or 18 through 45, 50, or 60 (depending on the colony). As noted in the REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 3 (footnotes omitted):

In the colonies, availability of hunting and need for defense led to armament statutes comparable to those of the early Saxon times. In 1623, Virginia forbade its colonists to travel unless they were "well armed"; in 1631 it required colonists to engage in target practice on Sunday and to "bring their peeces [sic] to Church." In 1658 it required every householder to have a functioning firearm within his house and in 1673 its laws provided that a citizen who claimed he was too poor to purchase a firearm would have one purchased for him by the government, which would then require him to pay a reasonable price when able to do so. In Massachusetts, the first session of the legislature ordered that not only free men, but also indentured servants own firearms and in 1644 it imposed a stern 6 shilling fine upon any citizen who was not armed.

For examples of subsequent legislation to the same effect, see an Act for Regulating the Militia, 1741, reprinted in 8 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT 379 (1874); Act for Regulating the Militia, 1693-1694, 1st sess., ch. 3, reprinted in 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 128 (1869); An Act for Settling the Militia, 1691, 1st sess., ch. 5, reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 231 (1894). Colonial practice is extensively summarized in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) ("[T]he term Militia [in the amendment] . . . comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense . . . [who] were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves . . .").

47. See, e.g., THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 42 (M. Farrard ed. 1929, reprinted from the 1648 ed.) ("But all persons exempted whatsoever as foresaid, except Magistrates and Teaching Elders shall be provided of Arms and Ammunition, as other men are."); see also Dowlat, *supra* note 10, at 74 n.37 (quoting similar provisions of various New York

men to carry a rifle or pistol every time they attended church; church officials were empowered to search each parishioner no less than fourteen times per year to assure compliance.<sup>48</sup> In 1792 Congress, meeting immediately after the enactment of the second amendment, defined the militia to include the entire able-bodied military-age male citizenry of the United States and required each of them to own his own firearm.<sup>49</sup>

What does this suggest about the word "militia" as used in the amendment? The American Civil Liberties Union's argument against an individual right interpretation states that the amendment uses "militia" in the sense of a formal military force separate from the people.<sup>50</sup> But this is plainly wrong. The Founders stated what they meant by "militia" on various occasions. Invariably they defined it in some phrase like "the whole body of the people,"<sup>51</sup> while their references to the organized-military-unit usage of militia, which they called a "select militia," were strongly pejorative.<sup>52</sup>

and Virginia statutes). As in England, the requirement of keeping arms was as much directed toward prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals as the repelling of foreign enemies. Militiamen (apparently selected by rotation) staffed the night watch which both patrolled the city and watched out over it from stationary positions to raise the hue and cry in case of felony and the alarm in case of foreign attack. A. Lugo Janer, *supra* note 10, at 33-34.

48. An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry Fire Arms to Places of Public Worship, 1770, reprinted in 1775-1770 GEORGIA COLONIAL LAWS 471 (1932).

49. First Militia Act, 1 Stat. 271 (1792). Legislation by Congress immediately following adoption of an amendment is entitled to great weight in the construction thereof. See, e.g., *Hampton & Co. v. U.S.*, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928), and cases cited therein.

50. Over and above the historical inaccuracy of the ACLU's interpretation is that, so interpreted, the amendment conflicts with Art. I § 10, cl. 3 which forbids the states to raise "troops" (i.e. formal military units) without the consent of Congress. There is not one iota of historical evidence suggesting that Madison and his Federalist colleagues who dominated the first Congress intended the amendment to undercut either the military-militia clauses of the original Constitution in general or Art. I § 10, cl. 3 in particular. See notes 86-9 & 113 *infra* and accompanying discussion.

51. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, §13 (1776) ("[A] well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people . . ."); DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 425 (3d ed. 1937) (statement of George Mason, June 14, 1788) ("Who are the Militia? They consist now of the whole people . . ."); LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 123 (W. Bennett ed. 1978) (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee) (hereinafter cited as LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER) ("[a] militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves. . ."); Letter from Tench Coxe to the Pennsylvania Gazette (Feb. 20, 1778), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Mfin. Supp.) 1779 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) ("Who are these militia? are [sic] they not ourselves.") (emphasis in original); see also R. TRENCH, DICTIONARY OF OBSOLETE ENGLISH 159 (1958); Sprecher *supra* note 10, at 556 n.29 (citing several other state constitutions).

52. Typical expressions of hostility are cited by Halbrook, *supra* note 38, at 18-19, 23-25, and REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 4-5. These expressions reflect a traditional Whig attitude, dating back to the reign of Charles II, who was thought to have used the "select militia" to disarm and tyrannize the people. Malcolm, *supra* note 10.

In short, one purpose of the Founders having been to guarantee the arms of the militia, they accomplished that purpose by guaranteeing the arms of the individuals who made up the militia. In this respect it would never have occurred to the Founders to differentiate between the arms of the two groups in the context of the amendment's language.<sup>53</sup> The personally owned arms of the individual were the arms of the militia.<sup>54</sup> Thus, the amendment's wording, so opaque to us, made perfect sense to the Framers: believing that a militia (composed of the entire people possessed of their individually owned arms) was necessary for the protection of a free state, they

53. This is not to say that the amendment's only purpose was to guarantee the arms of the militia. The philosophical tradition underlying the amendment involved three separate purposes. Certain of the early English commentators on the right to bear arms:

subtly blended several distinct, yet related, ideas: opposition to standing armies, dependence upon militias, and support of the armed citizen. Thus, while the concept of the armed citizen was sometimes linked with that of the militia, libertarians just as often stressed the idea as an independent theme or joined it to other issues.

The observations of Madison, Washington, Dwight, and Story reveal an interesting relationship between the armed citizen and the militia. These men firmly believed that the character and spirit of the republic rested on the freeman's possession of arms as well as his ability and willingness to defend himself and his society. This was the bedrock, the "palladium," of republican liberty. The militia was equally important in their minds. Militia laws insured that freemen would remain armed, and thus vigorous republican citizens.

Shallhope, *supra* note 12, at 604, 612. Thus, by guaranteeing individuals the right to arms the amendment killed three birds with one stone. First, the independence and self reliance necessary to the citizen of a republic was protected by assuring to each individual the right to possess the arms necessary to defending, and securing food for himself and his family. On the possession of arms as a vital component in the theory of virtuous republican citizenship, see notes 117-18 *infra* and accompanying text. Second and third, by guaranteeing the arms of the individual, the amendment was simultaneously guaranteeing arms to the militia and the *police comitatus* for military and law enforcement purposes. In this connection it is important to remember that, although these can be stated as three separate functions — and it seems natural to the modern mind to so conceptualize them — it would not have seemed so to the Founders. See note 93 *infra* and accompanying text.

54. That one result of guaranteeing the people's privately owned arms was to guarantee the militia's arms should not, however, be understood as suggesting that the only arms protected were those belonging to militiamen. Among other things, the amendment surely was intended at least to protect those non-militia members who were obligated to possess arms, such as the over-aged and seamen, see note 47 *supra* and accompanying text. More important, a "right" to possess arms is obviously broader than an obligation to do so. The amendment's use of "right" without further definition suggests that its purpose was to constitutionalize the right to arms which the Founders knew from the common law. This unquestionably included not only militiamen and others obligated to possess arms, but also women, the clergy and those public officials who were exempt from militia service. On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish those whose right the amendment was intended to protect although they were *exempt* from militia service, from those who were *excluded* because of perceived unfitness, untrustworthiness or alienage. The Founders would not have understood the amendment as extending to felons, children or those so physically or mentally impaired as to preclude militia service. See notes 72, 267 and 258 *infra*. The original intention would unquestionably also have been to exclude Indians and blacks on the ground of alienage or untrustworthiness. For evidence that one purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to guarantee blacks the right to arms, see notes 221-30 *infra* and accompanying text.

guaranteed the people's right to possess those arms.<sup>55</sup> At the very least, the Framers' understanding of "militia" casts doubt on an interpretation that would guarantee only the state's right to arm organized military units.<sup>56</sup>

## 2. *A "Right of the People"*

The second amendment's literal language creates another, even more embarrassing problem for the exclusively state's right interpretation. To accept such an interpretation requires the anomalous assumption that the Framers ill-advisedly used the phrase "right of the people" to describe what was being guaranteed when what they actually meant was "right of the states."<sup>57</sup> In turn, that assumption leads to a host of further anomalies. The phrase "the people" appears in four other provisions of the Bill of Rights, always denoting rights pertaining to individuals. Thus, to justify an exclusively state's right view, the following set of propositions must be accepted: (1) when the first Congress drafted the Bill of Rights it used "right of the people" in the first amendment to denote a right of individuals (assembly); (2) then, some sixteen words later, it used the same phrase in the second amendment to denote a right belonging exclusively to the states; (3) but then, forty-six words later, the fourth amendment's "right of the people" had reverted to its normal individual right meaning; (4) "right of the people" was again used in the natural sense in the ninth amendment; and (5) finally, in the tenth amendment the first Congress specifically distinguished "the states" from "the people," although it had failed to do so in the second amendment. Any one of these textual incongruities demanded by an exclusively state's right position dooms it. Cumulatively they present a truly grotesque reading of the Bill of Rights.

55. Smith "translates" the amendment's language into modern terms as follows:

Because a free state cannot be secure from either internal or external enemies unless every able-bodied [adult] in the state is trained to use weapons; the right of each individual person, in any of the 50 states, to keep in his house weapons sufficient for his own use, and to use them in such military training as is directed by his state government, shall not be interfered with by the United States Government.

J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 72. Note that Smith's formulation here reflects usage in colonial statutes and related documents which he concludes indicates an intention to broadly guarantee individuals the right to "keep" arms in their homes, but to "bear" them outside the home only in the course of actual militia service. See notes 59-61, 271 *infra* and accompanying text.

56. As we shall see, the joint-purpose interpretation of the second amendment inherent in the Framers' conception of an armed citizenry — that is, self-defense, law enforcement, and defense against invasion — implies certain limitations on any individual right that amendment may guarantee. See notes 233-71 *infra* and accompanying text.

57. In constitutional or statutory construction, language should always be accorded its plain meaning. See, e.g., *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).

### 3. Keeping and Bearing Arms

The casual attention state's right proponents pay to the text is exemplified by a third problem inherent in the amendment's literal language. Professor Levin argues that the amendment's use of the term "to bear" arms supports an exclusively state's right view: contemporary statutory usage shows eighteenth-century writers using "bear" in reference to militiamen carrying their arms when mustered to duty; whereas Blackstone uses the phrase to "have" arms in referring to individual possession of them by right.<sup>58</sup> Remarkably, Professor Levin seems to have overlooked the fact that the word that the amendment uses to guarantee a right to *possess* arms is "keep," "bear" being used only to denote carrying them outside the home. Obviously, even if a negative pregnant as to possession could have been inferred had the amendment used "bear arms" alone, that inference disappears completely when "to keep" is added.

Had Professor Levin explored colonial statutory usage of "to keep," as well as "to bear," he would have found his "to bear" argument confirmed, but only in a way which decisively refutes his exclusively state's right interpretation. Smith's extensive statutory review confirms that "bear" did generally refer to the carrying of arms by militiamen.<sup>59</sup> Since statutes referring to the transportation of arms by individuals outside the militia context (*e.g.*, statutes forbidding blacks and Indians to transport them) invariably used the word "carry" instead of "bear," he concludes that the amendment's use of "bear" is designed to protect the carrying of arms outside the home only in the course of militia service.<sup>60</sup> In contrast, Smith finds that "keep" was commonly used in colonial and early state statutes to describe arms possession by individuals in all contexts, not just in relation to militia service. Colonial statutes did require militiamen to "keep" arms in their homes, but they also required the over-aged, seamen and others exempt from militia service to "keep" arms in their homes. Moreover, what blacks and Indians (who were excluded from the militia) were forbidden to do was "keep" guns in their homes. The one context in which "keep" was *not* used was as a description of arms possession by public agencies (as opposed to individuals): "only occasionally, and then only in the 17th Century, are towns and colony governments said to 'keep' the public arms."<sup>61</sup>

58. Levin, *supra* note 13, at 148.

59. See J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 42-55.

60. *Id.* at 42-47. The implications of this conclusion for some types of gun controls are discussed in the text following note 271 *infra*.

61. *Id.* at 49, see also *id.* at 47-55. In contrast to the "keeping" by individuals of their

Based on colonial statutory usage then, the amendment's phrase "right of the people to keep" imports not a right of the states or one limited to military service, but a personal right to possess arms in the home for any lawful purpose.

Additional textual evidence of the unsoundness of the exclusively state's right position is that it renders the phrase "to keep" in "to keep and bear" superfluous — as Professor Levin's obliviousness to it unconsciously dramatizes. If the Framers' only concern had been to protect the militia's right to have arms when actually mustered, "to bear" would have sufficed. The words "to keep" take on meaning only if what is being protected is the individual's own arms, rather than those arms of the state that would be dispensed to him from an armory whenever the militia was mustered.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, the organizational structure of the Bill of Rights cuts against the exclusively state's right position. The rights specifically guaranteed to the people are contained in the first nine amendments, with the rights reserved to the states being relegated to the tenth. If the Framers had viewed the second amendment as a right of the states, they would have moved it back to the ninth or tenth amendment instead of placing it second.<sup>63</sup>

#### B. *The Proposal and Ratification of the Second Amendment*

As we have seen, the language of the second amendment supports the individual interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms. The nature of the controversy over ratification of the Constitution and the various proposals for and debate over the Bill of Rights also buttress the individual right view, for the one thing all

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private arms in their own homes, the statutes described publicly owned arms as being "lodged" in armories at such times as they were not actually being borne.

62. By the same token, however, the phrase "keep and bear" implies at least one important limitation. Because what is being guaranteed is an individual right to keep *and* bear arms, the arms could only be such if the ordinary individual could conveniently lift and transport them about with his body. For the gun control implications of this observation see text at note 241 *infra*.

63. See note 77 and accompanying text. Gardiner has suggested that the organization of the Constitution and Bill of Rights was deliberately modeled after Blackstone's organization of the five legal precepts he considered fundamental to the maintenance of English liberty. See Gardiner, *supra* note 10, at 65 n.8. The correspondence can be established as follows: parliamentary powers and privileges are comprehended in art. I; the limitations on the powers of the monarch (executive branch) are comprehended in art. II; the institution and powers of the courts of justice are comprehended in art. III; the right to apply to Parliament for redress of grievances is comprehended in the first amendment; and the right to possess arms is covered in the second amendment. If meritorious, this analysis further buttresses the individual right position since Blackstone included the right to arms among the "absolute rights of individuals." See note 153 *infra*.

the Framers agreed on was the desirability of allowing citizens to arm themselves.

### 1. *The Debate Over the Constitution*

The Founding Fathers were necessarily influenced by the fact that the entire corpus of republican philosophy known to them took English and classical history as a lesson that popular possession of arms was vital to the preservation of liberty and a republican form of government.<sup>64</sup> The proponents and the opponents of ratification of the Constitution equally buttressed their conflicting arguments on the universal belief in an armed citizenry.<sup>65</sup> The proponents denied that the newly strengthened federal government could ever be strong enough to destroy the liberties of an armed populace: "While the people have property, arms in their hands and only a spark of noble spirit, the most corrupt congress must be mad to form any project of tyranny."<sup>66</sup> As Noah Webster put it in a pamphlet urging ratification: "Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom in Europe."<sup>67</sup>

But this line of argument opened the Federalists up to a telling riposte: Since the Constitution contained no guarantee of the citizenry's right to arms, the new federal government could outlaw and confiscate them, thereby destroying the supposed barrier to federal despotism. George Mason recalled to the Virginia delegates the colonies' experience with Britain, in which the monarch's goal had been "to disarm the people; that . . . was the best and most effectual way to enslave them."<sup>68</sup> Together Mason and Richard Henry Lee are generally given preponderant credit for the compromise under which the Constitution was ratified subject to the understanding that it would immediately be augmented by a Bill of Rights. Lee's influential writing on the ratification question extolled the importance of the individual right to arms, opining that "to preserve liberty, it is

64. The influence of such philosophers as Harrington, Nedham and Machiavelli is documented at notes 114-27 *infra* and accompanying text. See also Granter, *The Machiavellianism of George Mason*, 17 W. & M. QUARTERLY 239 (2d ser. 1937). See generally the book, *supra* note 10; Shalhope, *supra* note 12. For the historical origins of this philosophy, see notes 114-29 *infra*.

65. See Parts I-C *infra*.

66. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 4-5, Halbrook, *supra* note 10, at 17 (quoting a newspaper columnist); see also *id.* at 24, 37.

67. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 5. For Madison's similar expressions from *The Federalist*, see note 100 *infra* and accompanying text. For similar expressions pro and con, see the quotations collected by Halbrook, *supra* note 10.

68. J. J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 380 (2d ed. 1836). See generally Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 606-13 (on the Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments based on the individual right to arms).

essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them."<sup>69</sup>

In line with these sentiments, New Hampshire, the first state to ratify the Constitution, officially recommended that it include a bill of rights providing "Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion."<sup>70</sup> New York and Rhode Island also recommended constitutionalizing the right to arms.<sup>71</sup> Although a majority of the Pennsylvania convention ratified the Constitution unconditionally, rejecting suggestions that a bill of rights be recommended or required, a substantial portion of the Pennsylvania delegates broke away on this issue. As a rump they formulated and published a series of proposals, including freedom of speech, press, due process of law and the right to keep and bear arms, which proved particularly influential in spurring the adoption of similar recommendations in the subsequent state conventions. The individual right nature of the Pennsylvania right to arms proposal is unmistakable:

That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for *disarming the people or any of them* unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals . . . .<sup>72</sup>

Similarly, Samuel Adams proposed to the Massachusetts ratification convention an amendment guaranteeing the right to bear arms.<sup>73</sup>

The strength and universality of contemporary sentiment on the issue of the individual's right to arms may be gauged with reference to the number of amendatory proposals which included it. Amending the constitution to assure the right to arms was endorsed by five state ratifying conventions. By comparison, only four states suggested that the rights to assemble, to due process, and against cruel and unusual punishment be guaranteed; only three states suggested that freedom of speech be guaranteed or that the accused be entitled to know the crime for which he would be tried, to confront his accuser, to present and cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to not be forced to incriminate himself; only two states proposed that double jeopardy be barred.<sup>74</sup> Such unanimity helps

69. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, *supra* note 51, at 124; *see also id.* at 21-22.

70. 1 J. ELLIOT, *supra* note 68, at 326.

71. *See id.* at 328, 335.

72. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (1971)(emphasis added).

73. *Id.* at 675; *see also* note 83 *infra*.

74. *Id.* at 1167.

demonstrate that both Federalists and Anti-Federalists accepted an individual right to arms; the only debate was over how best to guarantee it.

## 2. *The Proposal and Ratification of the Second Amendment*

To secure ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists had committed themselves to the addition of "further guards for private rights."<sup>75</sup> To this end, the Federalists put forward Madison, the leading and most ardent supporter of the original Constitution in Congress, to draft the proposed amendments. Madison's own notes on his proposal reflect the ultimate organization of the Bill of Rights;<sup>76</sup> his notes on the amendments, in which the right to arms appears very early, state that the amendments "relate first to private rights."<sup>77</sup> Equally corrosive of the exclusively state's right view is the original organizational scheme revealed by Madison's notes. Not conceiving the idea of simply appending the whole set of amendments to the Constitution as a discrete document (today's "Bill of Rights"), Madison intended to attach them to, or after, each section of the original Constitution to which they related. Had he viewed the right to arms as merely a limitation on article I, section 8's provisions concerning congressional control over the militia, he would have inserted it in section 8 immediately after clauses 15 and 16. Instead, he planned to insert it with freedom of religion, of the press and various other personal rights in section 9, immediately following clause 3, which establishes the rights against bills of attainder and *ex post facto* laws.<sup>78</sup>

Certainly the amendment was understood by Madison's congressional colleagues as guaranteeing an individual right. For instance, in private correspondence Congressman Fisher Ames noted of Madison's proposals that "the rights of conscience, of bearing arms, [etc.] . . . , are declared to be inherent in the people."<sup>79</sup> In addition, two written interpretations on the proposed amendments were avail-

75. 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 307 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson ed. 1977) (letter of Oct. 20, 1788, from Madison to Edmund Pendleton) (emphasis added). The Anti-Federalists' objections to the Constitution had not been limited to the lack of individual rights guarantees. For discussion of their objections to art. I, sec. 1, see notes 86-89 *infra* and accompanying text.

76. See text at note 67 *supra*.

77. See, e.g., 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, *supra* note 75, at 193-94.

78. *Id.*

79. 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 52-53 (1854) (letter of June 11, 1789 to Thomas Dwight). The next day U.S. Senator William Gray wrote Patrick Henry that Madison had introduced a "string of amendments" which "respected personal liberty." 3 PATRICK HENRY 391 (1951); see also Senator Gallatin's letter of Oct. 7, 1789 ("essential and sacred rights" which "each individual reserves to himself"), quoted in Halbrook, *supra* note 38, at 36 n.90.

able to the members of the first Congress.<sup>80</sup> The first, and more authoritative — by virtue of having received Madison's imprimatur — was a widely reprinted article by his ally and correspondent Tench Coxe.<sup>81</sup> Having discussed the first amendment, Coxe moved on to describe the second in unmistakably individual right terms:

As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear *their private arms*.<sup>82</sup>

A similar interpretation appears from Anti-Federalist editorials. Samuel Adams, who had taken the modified Anti-Federalist position of conditioning ratification upon the addition of a guarantee of personal rights, had proposed in the Massachusetts Convention that "the said constitution be never construed . . . to prevent the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms."<sup>83</sup> Anti-Federalist editorials triumphantly quoted this and Adams' other proposals as Madison's Bill of Rights was wending its way through the House of Representatives. The editorials crowed that the Anti-Federalist champion, Adams, had been vindicated because "every one of" his proposals (except the prohibition against a standing army) had been adopted in Madison's bill and "most probably will be adopted by the federal legislature."<sup>84</sup> Calling upon the public to compare Madison's bill to Adams' previous proposals, the editorials demanded that the Federalists "in justice therefor for that long tried republican" formally acknowledge Samuel Adams as the real father of Madison's bill.<sup>85</sup>

The significance of the bipartisan interpretation so partisanly reflected in these editorials and the Tench Coxe article is incontrovertible. The arch-Federalist Coxe described the amendment as guaranteeing to the people "their private arms." The Anti-Federalist editorials agreed totally, seeing the amendment's language as identi-

80. Madison, apparently considering the amendment's language and purposes too clear to require comment, did not bother to discuss it in his introductory and subsequent remarks.

81. Originally published under the pseudonym "A Pennsylvanian," these "Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution" first appeared in the Philadelphia Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789, at 2, col. 1. They were reprinted by the New York Packet, June 23, 1789, at 2, cols. 1-2, and by the Boston Centinel, July 4, 1789, at 1, col. 2.

Coxe sent a copy to Madison who replied commending its "explanatory strictures" of his proposal. 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, *supra* note 75, at 257 (letter of June 24, 1789, to Tench Coxe).

82. Coxe, *supra* note 81, at 2 (emphasis added).

83. B. SCHWARTZ, *supra* note 72, at 675.

84. Editorial in the Boston Independent Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1789, at 2, col. 2.

85. *Id.*

cal to Adams' previous clearly individual right formulation. If any member of the first Congress had any difficulty in understanding that the amendment's intention was to protect the individual possession of private arms by the general citizenry, these newspaper articles would surely have stilled it. Nor is there reason to imagine that they experienced any such difficulty. Absent some substantial reason particular to the context, the phrase "right of the people" clearly indicates that an individual right was intended. The context here — its use throughout the Bill of Rights — consistently supports an individual right intent.

The second amendment, then, was a response to the perceived lack of individual rights guarantees, not, as state's right proponents contend,<sup>86</sup> a reaction to the standing army and militia control provisions of article I, section 8. The latter source of Anti-Federalist wrath was simply not addressed by the second amendment.<sup>87</sup> Nothing on the face of the amendment deals with the article I, section 8, concerns; certainly Madison did not see it as changing those portions of the Constitution.<sup>88</sup> The Anti-Federalists themselves were not placated by the amendment: when the proposed Bill of Rights reached the Senate, they unsuccessfully attempted to amend or repeal the offending clauses.<sup>89</sup> Thus, the second amendment cannot be read as a response to the Anti-Federalist objections to article I, section 8. Rather, the fear of federal government encroachment on the states was allayed by guaranteeing the individual right to arms, and thereby, the arms of the militia.

### *C. The Philosophical and Historical Origins of the Second Amendment*

The unanimity with which Federalists and Anti-Federalists sup-

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86. See sources cited in notes 13-15 *supra*. The comments of Patrick Henry and George Mason typify those cited by the state's right advocates. See J. J. ELLIOT, *supra* note 68, at 43-47, 379-81.

87. The Anti-Federalists objected to the militia and standing army provisions on the ground that the federal government might so abuse its control of the militia — either by making militia service intolerable or by failing to organize the militia at all — that a standing army would be necessary. Standing armies were considered a threat to the development of the virtuous, self-reliant citizen on whom the vitality of the republic rested. See Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 604-07; notes 117-18 *infra* and accompanying text. The unwillingness of Madison and the other Federalists who dominated the first Congress to deprive the federal government of the military and militia powers conferred by the original Constitution will be discussed in detail by Dr. Joyce Malcolm (to whom I am indebted on this point) in her forthcoming book.

88. See text at notes 76-78 *supra*. Madison modeled his draft of the amendments on the recommendations made by the state ratifying conventions, but deleted any language dealing with the art. I, sec. 8 concerns. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, *supra* note 72.

89. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, *supra* note 72.

ported an individual right to arms is a reflection of their shared philosophical and historical heritage.<sup>90</sup> Examination of contemporary materials reveals that the Founders ardently endorsed firearms possession as a personal right<sup>91</sup> and that the concept of an exclusively state's right was wholly unknown to them. The most that such an examination does to dispel the amendment's individual right phraseology is to suggest that the amendment had multiple purposes: the people were guaranteed "arms for their own personal defense, for the defense of their states and their nation, and for the purpose of keeping their rulers sensitive to the right of the people."<sup>92</sup> In short, detailed exploration of the Founding Fathers' attitudes as expressed in their utterances powerfully supports an individual right interpretation, though one which recognizes that the right was viewed as beneficial to society as a whole.<sup>93</sup>

Though such attitudes are apparent in the Founders' utterances, such contemporary materials have been so completely ignored in

90. The unanimity in the contemporary understanding of the second amendment helps explain the relative absence of recorded debate over it. (What little debate there is appears at 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80 (J. Gales ed. 1834) and relates to Madison's proposal that the amendment provide that "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Elbridge Gerry assailed this provision, expressing the peculiar fear that it would give "an opportunity to the people in power to . . . declare whom are those religiously scrupulous and prevent them from bearing arms." Gerry apparently feared that a particular faction in control of the federal government could mendaciously classify its opponents as conscientious objectors "and prevent them from bearing arms" in the militia. Moreover, the government might exclude so vast a portion of the populace from service as to turn the militia into a "select militia" of their own faction, see note 52 *supra* and accompanying text, or as to require raising a standing army because of the militia's insufficiency.

Gerry's statement remains both ambiguous and tangential to the modern debate. The most that can be said is that his usage is consistent with Levin's and Smith's view that "bear arms" is used purely in the sense of "carrying them in the course of militia service." But this only emphasizes the irrelevance of Gerry's remarks to the amendment's guarantee that arms might be kept.

91. James Monroe included "the right to keep and bear arms" in a list of basic "human rights" that he would propose be amended into the Constitution. See James Monroe Papers, N.Y. Public Library (miscellaneous papers in his own handwriting). See also 3 J. ELLIOT, *supra* note 68, at 386 (quoting Patrick Henry) ("The great object is, that every man be armed . . . Everyone who is able may have a gun."); see also notes 79-81 *supra* and accompanying text.

92. Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 614.

93. There is, of course, nothing untoward in the idea of a constitutional right bestowed upon private individuals for purposes that are largely (or even exclusively) public in nature. That is, after all, the earliest and best established explanation of freedom of expression. See, e.g., *De Jonge v. Oregon*, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (freedom of expression promotes peaceful change in government pursuant to the public will, thereby obviating any need for violent change); *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., concurring) (first amendment expresses Founders' faith that free competition in the marketplace of ideas is the only sure means of consistently achieving public policies best suited to the public welfare); *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (same); Meiklejohn, *What Does the First Amendment Mean?*, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953) (freedom of expression is necessary to the American political process).

much of the modern legal literature on the amendment that they require extended consideration here.<sup>94</sup> Perhaps the difficulty experienced by many modern scholars in dealing with the Framers' positive attitudes toward gun ownership can be explained in terms of Bruce-Briggs' "culture conflict" theory of the gun control controversy:

But underlying the gun control struggle is a fundamental division in our nation. The intensity of passion on this issue suggests to me that we are experiencing a sort of low-grade war going on between two alternative views of what America is and ought to be. On the one side are those who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized society: a society just, equitable, and democratic; but well ordered, with the lines of responsibility and authority clearly drawn, and with decisions made rationally and correctly by intelligent men for the entire nation. To such people, hunting is atavistic, personal violence is shameful, and uncontrolled gun ownership is a blot upon civilization.

On the other side is a group of people who do not tend to be especially articulate or literate, and whose world view is rarely expressed in print. Their model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes care of himself and his family with no interference from the state. They are "conservative" in the sense that they cling to America's unique pre-modern tradition — a non-feudal society with a sort of medieval liberty at large for everyman. To these people, "sociological" is an epithet. Life is tough and competitive. Manhood means responsibility and caring for your own.<sup>95</sup>

If we assume that most modern scholars fall into the first of the modern value categories described, it becomes understandable why they might find the views of the Founders so foreign, indeed repugnant, as to eschew exploring them — instead reflexively projecting their own values onto the amendment. For the second of the value categories described accords perfectly with the views of the Founders, except that, as intellectuals themselves, its aura of anti-intellectualism would have struck no responsive chord in them.

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94. Whatever the explanation for it, the fact that proponents of the exclusively state's right view have shunned exploration of the Founding Fathers' attitudes toward firearms cannot be gainsaid. None of the quotations referenced at notes 66-69 *supra* and 96-107 *infra* are mentioned (much less discussed) in any of the state's right interpretation articles listed at note 13 *supra*. The sole exception is Levin, who quotes Sam Adams' clearly individual right proposal, characterizing it as *atypical*. Levin, *supra* note 13, at 159. As will become evident, that characterization is made viable only by a failure to discuss, or even acknowledge, the copious expressions of similar sentiment set out in this Article.

95. Bruce-Briggs, *supra* note 9, at 61. Various implications of this cultural conflict explanation are explored in detail in W. R. TONSO, GUN AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO FIREARMS, chs. 1, 2, 8 & 9 (1982) and in TONSO, *supra* note 11, at 330ff. See also Kessler, Gun Control: A Symbolic Crusade? (Mimeo, Rockhurst Coll., 1981).

### 1. *Personal Attitudes of the Founders*

"One loves to possess arms," Thomas Jefferson, the doyen of American intellectuals, wrote to George Washington on June 19, 1796.<sup>96</sup> We may presume that Washington agreed, for his collection contained fifty guns, and his own writings are full of laudatory references to various firearms he owned or examined.<sup>97</sup> John Adams also agreed. In a book on American constitutional principles he suggested that "arms in the hands of citizens" might appropriately be used in "private self-defense" or "under partial order of towns."<sup>98</sup> Likewise, writing after the ratification of the Constitution, but before the election of the First Congress, James Monroe included "the right to keep and bear arms" in a list of basic "human rights" that he would propose be added to the Constitution.<sup>99</sup>

While Monroe and Adams both supported ratification of the Constitution, its most influential advocate was James Madison. In *The Federalist No. 46* he confidently contrasted the federal government it would create to the European despotisms he contemptuously described as "afraid to trust the people with arms." He assured his fellow countrymen that they need never fear their government because of "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation . . ."<sup>100</sup> Madison, who had, during the Revolution, exulted at his own and his militia comrades' ability to hit a target the size of a man's head at one hundred paces, many years later restated the sentiments of *The Federalist No. 46* thusly:

A government resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic, and could not be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, without a standing army, an enslaved press, and a disarmed populace.<sup>101</sup>

On the other side of the ratification debate, Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry left no doubt as to his feelings regarding the right to possess arms. During the Virginia ratification convention he objected equally to the Constitution's inclusion of clauses specifically author-

96. 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341 (A.A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).

97. Halsey, *George Washington's Favorite Guns*, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1968, at 23. In urging Congress to pass an act entailing the entire adult male citizenry in a general militia, President Washington opined that "a free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined. . . ." 1 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 65 (Richardson ed.) Congress responded with the First Militia Act. See note 49 *supra*.

98. 3 J. ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (1787-88).

99. James Monroe Papers, *supra* note 91.

100. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 371 (J. Madison) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1864).

101. R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY, 64, 640 (1971).

izing a standing army and giving the federal government control of the militia, and to its omission of a clause forbidding disarmament of the individual citizen: "The great object is that every man be armed. . . . Everyone who is able may have a gun."<sup>102</sup> The Virginia delegates, remembering that the Revolutionary War had been sparked by the British attempt to confiscate the patriots' privately owned arms at Lexington and Concord, apparently agreed. Henry was appointed co-chairman of a committee to draft a Bill of Rights to be added to the Constitution.<sup>103</sup> The other co-chairman was George Mason, whose warning against a federal constitution that failed to guarantee a right to arms has already been quoted.<sup>104</sup>

Thomas Jefferson played little part in this debate from the remote vantage of his position as ambassador to France, but his views on arms possession as a right may be deduced from the model state constitution he wrote for Virginia in 1776. That document included the explicit guarantee that "[n]o free man shall be debarred the use of arms in his own lands."<sup>105</sup> All the evidence suggests that Jefferson was strongly in favor of gun ownership. A talented inventor and amateur gunsmith himself, Jefferson maintained a substantial armory of pistols and long guns at Monticello and introduced the concept of interchangeable parts into American firearms manufacture.<sup>106</sup> In a letter to a nephew (then fifteen) Jefferson offered the following advice:

A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercises, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it gives boldness, enterprise and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.<sup>107</sup>

One intellectual historian has summarized the utterances of the Founding Fathers as expressing "an almost religious quality about the relationship between men and arms."<sup>108</sup> When viewed in the light of this attitude and their English militia tradition, as buttressed

102. J. J. ELLIOT, *supra* note 68, at 45.

103. Note, *supra* note 13, at 43.

104. See note 68 *supra* and accompanying text.

105. THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 51 (Foley ed., reissued 1967).

106. Tarassuk & Wilson, *Gun Collecting's Stately Pedigree*, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1981, at 24.

107. THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA, *supra* note 105, at 318. Another nephew tells us that Jefferson believed every boy should be given a gun at the age of ten, as Jefferson himself had been: T. JEFFERSON RANDOLPH, NOTES ON THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Edgehill Randolph Collection) (1879).

108. C. Asbury, *supra* note 10, at 88.

by the republican philosophical school with which the Founders were familiar, the language of the second amendment becomes perfectly intelligible: believing self-defense an inalienable natural right,<sup>109</sup> and deriving from it the right to resist tyranny,<sup>110</sup> they guaranteed the right (derived from the foregoing) of individuals to possess arms.<sup>111</sup> Further, this also protected the possession of privately owned arms of the militia (which they understood to include most of the adult male population),<sup>112</sup> an institution they regarded as "necessary to the security of a free state."<sup>113</sup>

## 2. *The Philosophical Environment of the Founding Fathers*

Fully as great an obstacle to modern understanding as Bruce-

109. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*4 ("Self-Defense, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be, in fact, taken away by the law of society."); T. HOBBS, LEVIATHAN 88, 95 (1964) ("a covenant not to defend my selfe from force by force is always voyd"); Halbrook, *supra* note 10, discussion at text accompanying notes 56-7b *supra* (unpaginated manuscript) (analyzing views of Sidney and Locke). English and American divines went further still, declaring self-defense not simply a right but an obligation as well:

He that suffers his life to be taken from him by one that hath no authority for that purpose, when he might preserve it by defense, incurs the Guilt of self murder since God hath enjoined him to seek the continuance of his life, and Nature itself teaches every creature to defend himself. . . .

C. Asbury, *supra* note 10, at 39-40 (quoting a 1747 Philadelphia sermon), see also *id.* at 28 (English writers making the same point at the time of the Glorious Revolution).

110. Eighteenth-century liberals derived the right to revolution against tyrants from Sidney and Locke, who believed that all persons possessed a universally acknowledged personal right to defend themselves against robbery or enslavement. Throughout the writings of the Founders, and particularly in the debates over the Constitution, the equation between personal self-protection and resistance to tyranny occurs again and again:

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of self defense, which is paramount to all positive forms of government. . . .

THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 227 (J. Hamilton ed. 1864); see also Halbrook, *supra* note 38, at 22-24 (similar statements from lesser known figures).

111. For instance, Blackstone's classification of "arms for their defense" as being among the absolute rights of individuals was derived from "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*121, \*143-44.

112. See notes 46-49 *supra* and accompanying text.

113. The Federalists viewed a small standing army as a necessity for dealing with the Indian threat and as a first line of defense against any foreign invasion. To them the militia and the armed citizenry from which it was raised were the ultimate defense in a military emergency too great to be dealt with by the standing army. The militia and armed citizenry were also the counter-poise to any danger posed by the standing army to personal liberty or the republican form of government. "Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed" argued the Federalists; the inherent danger of a standing army was ameliorated in the American situation where "the whole body of the people are armed and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretense, raised. . . ." REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 4-6 (quoting Noah Webster and various other contemporary arguments in favor of ratification). The conventional pro-militia sentiment expressed in the amendment's language was as far as the Federalists would go to appease the Anti-Federalists. *Id.*

Briggs' culture conflict is the inattention of modern political philosophy to "the dynamic relationship" that the Founders' philosophy saw "between arms, the individual, and society."<sup>114</sup> Our world is the product of its history: our view of that world is the product of the lessons drawn from that history by the thinkers our society embraces. A conscious effort of will and imagination is necessary to assume the mind-set of eighteenth-century men whose education began with the classics, particularly the works of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, and ended with the works of Sidney, Rousseau and Montesquieu. Thus were the Framers steeped in an understanding of liberty grounded in the role of arms in society. Thus,

the very character of the people — the cornerstone and strength of a republican society — was related to the individual's ability and desire to arm himself against threats to his person, his property and his state.<sup>115</sup>

This viewpoint devolved upon eighteenth-century liberals through historical exegesis which was then viewed as the key to philosophical truth. To them classical Greece and Rome represented the highest point that civilization had yet achieved — followed by a long dark age of brutal authoritarianism from which humanity in their time was still recovering. The history of the Greek city-states and "the Roman Republic provided at once an ideal and a condign warning of the frailty of republican institutions."<sup>116</sup> Both that ideal and that warning were inextricably connected in the Founders' minds with the individual possession of arms. English and classical law recognized in arms possession the hallmark of citizenship and personal freedom. Thus the Greeks and Romans distinguished the mere *helot* or *metic* who was deemed to have no right to arms from the free citizen whose privilege and obligation it was to keep arms in his home so as always to be ready to defend his own rights and to rush to defend the walls when the tocsin warned of approaching enemies.<sup>117</sup> The philosophical tradition embraced by the Founders regarded the survival of popular government and republican institutions as wholly dependent upon the existence of a citizenry that was "virtuous" in upholding that ancient privilege and obliga-

114. Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 601.

115. *Id.* at 604.

116. Halbrook, *supra* note 10, at text accompanying n.31 (unpaginated manuscript); see also J. MALCOLM, *supra* note 12 (on the Framers' philosophical tradition); C. ASBURY, *supra* note 10.

117. See notes 43-44 & 54 *supra* and accompanying text. James Burgh, the late-18th-century English libertarian writer "most attractive to Americans," proclaimed that "the possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave," it being the ultimate means by which freedom was to be preserved. See Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 604 (quoting Burgh).

tion. In this philosophy, the ideal of republican virtue was the armed freeholder, upstanding, scrupulously honest, self-reliant and independent — defender of his family, home and property, and joined with his fellow citizens in the militia for the defense of their polity.<sup>118</sup> The congruence between this ideal of republican virtue and the second of the modern value attitudes described by Bruce-Briggs is evident.

The same thought that held arms ownership vital to republican citizenship also warned the Framers that to be disarmed by government was tantamount to being enslaved by it; the possession of arms was the vital prerequisite to the right to resist tyranny.<sup>119</sup> The Founders learned from Aristotle that a basic characteristic of tyrants was "mistrust of the people; hence they deprive them of arms."<sup>120</sup> Aristotle showed that confiscation of the Athenians' personal arms had been instrumental to the tyrannies of the Peisistratus and the Thirty.<sup>121</sup> Machiavelli taught the Founders that Augustus and Tiberius had similarly destroyed the Roman republic.<sup>122</sup> Only so long as Greek and Roman citizens retained their personal arms did they retain their personal liberties and their republican form of government. That lesson was brought home to the Founders by the entire corpus of political philosophy and historical exegesis they knew: "Among Renaissance theorists as dissimilar as Nicholas Machiavelli and Sir Thomas More, Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington, there was a consensus that only men willing and able to defend themselves could possibly preserve their liberties."<sup>123</sup> The theme of personal

118. In the line of republican political philosophers beginning with Machiavelli and extending through Harrington, Nedham, Sidney, Trenchard, Gordon and Rousseau, "[c]ivic virtue came to be defined as the freeholder bearing arms in defense of his property and his state." Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 603. For a discussion of classical republican theory, see J. Pocock, *THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON* 54 (1977), which states:

The rigorous equation of arms-bearing with civic capacity is one of the Machiavelli's most enduring legacies to later political thinkers. . . . Classical [republican political] theory, especially in its Machiavellian form, had emphasized the notion that the bearing and possession of arms was the individual's passport to citizenship. . . .

[T]he concept of the people active in politics because disciplined arms was a vital component in republican and Machiavellian theory. . . . [Subsequent philosophers elaborated on it] in the rapturous oratory of . . . King People [based] not merely on rotatory balloting but on the union of "arms and counsel", bullets and ballots, in a setting in which the citizens appeared in arms to manifest their citizenship, casting their votes even as they advanced and retired in the evolutions of military exercise.

119. See notes 109-11 *supra* and accompanying text.

120. ARISTOTLE, *POLITICS* 218 (J. Sinclair trans. 1962).

121. ARISTOTLE, *THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION* 47, 105 (H. Rackham trans. 1935); see generally Halbrook *supra* note 10.

122. MACHIAVELLI, *THE ART OF WAR* 20 (E. Farnsworth trans. 1965). See generally J. Pocock, *THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT* (1975).

123. J. MALCOLM, *supra* note 12, at 1. These elements in the thought of Machiavelli and

arms possession as both the hallmark and the ultimate guarantee of personal liberty appears equally in the writings of Cicero, Sidney, Locke, Trenchard, Rousseau,<sup>124</sup> Sir Walter Raleigh,<sup>125</sup> Blackstone<sup>126</sup> and Nedham.<sup>127</sup> That lesson must have been even more firmly cemented in the Founders' minds by the fact that authoritarian philosophers made the same observation in reverse, recommending arms prohibitions as the surest security for absolutism.<sup>128</sup>

Moreover, although the Founders' antipathy to gun bans arose out of political philosophy, it should not be supposed that eighteenth-century liberals were unaware of the crime control rationale for such legislation and had no answer to it. In the French despotism they abhorred, the single most important duty of the police, "protecting" the public security, was effected through enforcing arms prohibitions.<sup>129</sup> Although actually aimed at continuing the subordination of the peasantry, the ostensible reason for the French arms prohibition was to reduce homicide and other violent crime, and so was it rationalized by the French monarchs and their apologists.<sup>130</sup> The Founders gave such arguments short shrift, believing that if a population were actually unfit to possess arms, it was only because of the degradation induced by subjection to the oppression and exploitation of aristocratic and monarchical authoritarianism.<sup>131</sup> For a

Hobbes were relayed to the Founding Fathers through Sidney, Locke and Rousseau. See Halbrook, *supra* note 10.

The works of Harrington provided an equally important conduit for bringing these views to the Founders. "It was [Harrington] who had first stated in English terms, the theses that only the armed freeholder was capable of independence and virtue . . ." J. Pocock, *supra* note 118, at 145. "As [the 17th Century] went on its way, Harringtonian and neo-Harringtonian ideas were absorbed into the opposition tradition of Whig political culture, a powerful current of thought whose effects can be traced in Europe and America, as well as in England and Scotland." *Id.* at 143.

124. See Halbrook, *supra* note 10; see also Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 603 (quoting Trenchard and Moyle to the effect that classical republics and commonwealths had maintained popular liberty by "a general Exercise of the best of their People in the use of Arms, . . . the People being secured thereby as well against the Domestick Affronts of any of their own Citizens, as against the Foreign Invasions of ambitious and untuly Neighbors.")

125. See Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 602.

126. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*143-44; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*411-12 (citation of classical examples).

127. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE RIGHT CONSTITUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH (1656) quoted in J. ADAMS, *supra* note 98, at 471-72.

128. See Halbrook, *supra* note 10, discussion at notes 3-16 and 48-51 *supra* (discussing Plato and Jean Bodin).

129. I. CAMERON, CRIME AND REPRESSION IN THE AUVERGNE AND THE GUYENNE (1720-1790), at 7-8 (1982).

130. See L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, *supra* note 23, at 8-16; see also Halbrook, *supra* note 10, discussion at notes 48-51 *supra* (discussing Jean Bodin).

131. If pressed, Madison might have admitted that the European despotisms he contemptuously dismissed as "afraid to trust the people with arms," see note 100 *supra* and accompanying text, were nevertheless justified in denying arms to populations so brutalized and

free and virtuous people, eighteenth-century liberalism's response, as formulated by Montesquieu and Beccaria, to the crime control argument was simply an expansive rhetorical rendition of today's slogan "when guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns."

False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real advantages for one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would take fire from men because it burns, and water because one may drown in it; that has no remedy for evils, except destruction. The laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such a nature. They disarm those only who are neither inclined nor determined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those who have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the most important of the code, will respect the less important and arbitrary ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, and which, if strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty — so dear to men, so dear to the enlightened legislator — and subject innocent persons to all the vexations that the guilty alone ought to suffer? Such laws make things worse for the assaulted and better for the assailants; they serve rather to encourage than to prevent homicides, for an unarmed man may be attacked with greater confidence than an armed man. They ought to be designated as laws not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by the tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by thoughtful consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a universal decree.<sup>132</sup>

demoralized by generations of subjection to the *ancien regime* as to be unfit to possess them. By contrast, the proud, gun-loving Americans were upstanding, responsible, strong, independent, self-reliant — the epitome of virtuous republican citizenship. Expressing this self-satisfied attitude, Joel Barlow wrote of Americans, "[i]t is because the [Americans] are civilized," *i.e.*, not demoralized by oppression or luxury, "that they are with safety armed":

The danger (where there is any) from armed citizens, is only to the *government*, not to the *society*; and as long as they have nothing to revenge in the government (which they cannot have while it is in their own hands) there are many advantages in their being accustomed to the use of arms, and no possible disadvantage.

Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 607 (quoting Barlow in *Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe: Resulting From the Necessity and Propriety of a General Revolution in the Principle of Government*) (emphasis in original). Similarly, Timothy Dwight stated,

[I]f proper attention be paid to the education of children in knowledge and religion, few men will be disposed to use arms, unless for their amusement, and for the defense of themselves and their country.

Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 607 (quoting Timothy Dwight in *Travels in New England and New York*). Nevertheless, the Founders were not so Panglossian about the American character as to blind themselves to the fact that even among the virtuous there would always be a tiny fraction of evilly-disposed people whom it would be desirable to disarm selectively. See notes 258 & 267 *infra* and accompanying text.

132. C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 145 (1819). Originally published in 1764, this work was sufficiently familiar to the colonists ten years later for John Adams to have opened the Boston Massacre trial by quoting from it. See 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 28 (1965). Montesquieu's pejorative remarks on gun prohibitions (which may well have influenced Beccaria's) appear at 2 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 79-80 (Nugent trans., Colonial Press 1900).

The English libertarian/republican philosophers were, if anything, even more solicitous than Beccaria and Montesquieu (who lived on the relatively peaceful Continent) of the right to possess arms for the defense of family, home and self from criminal attack as well as the oppression of government. As Shalhope noted, amidst the endemic criminal violence of 16th-

The influence of the republican philosophical tradition of the armed people upon the Founding Fathers is obvious from their own statements.<sup>133</sup> Likewise, the writings of lesser known figures and newspaper editorials of the period abound with favorable references to the citizenry's widespread possession of personal arms as characteristic of the "diffusion of power" necessary to preserve liberty. These writings also express fears that the new federal government might disarm the populace, leading to a "monopoly of power [which] is the most dangerous of all monopolies."<sup>134</sup> In short, the accepted philosophy of the times treated the right to arms as among the most vital of personal rights.

### 3. *English Gun Prohibition and the English Bill of Rights*

Further evidence of the link between republican government and the possession of arms was given the Founders by their view of the mother country's history. Despite England's lack of a police force, legislation prohibiting possession of firearms by others than the high nobility had been instituted under the aegis of the hated Game Acts.<sup>135</sup> Though the ostensible purpose was to protect England's dwindling game resources, the Acts' covert purpose was confirmed by Blackstone: "prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people . . . is a reason oftener meant than avowed . . ."<sup>136</sup> Particularly indicative of the nefarious intent of the 1671 Game Act (at least to the minds of the Founders) was that it was evidently modeled on the French example,<sup>137</sup> and had appeared in the reign of Charles II. Living as we do several centuries removed, in an age in which religious tolerance is so much the norm as to be taken for granted, it is difficult for us to understand the almost hysterical execration the Founders felt for the restored Stuarts. The dissolute and debauched Charles II had martyred Algernon Sidney, the Founders' beloved philosopher of the armed people. Charles and his upright but intolerantly Catholic

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18th century England, "[t]he individual's need to protect himself from vicious fellow citizens and corrupt authorities — both banes of any republican society — also became clear." Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 603, *see also* note 140 *infra* and accompanying text.

133. *See* notes 96-113 *supra* and accompanying text.

134. Halbrook, *supra* note 38, at 33 (quoting *Political Maxims*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, Aug. 15, 1789, at 2, col. 1).

135. The Game Act of 1671, 22 Car. II, c. 25 § 3.

136. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*412.

137. The Game Act of 1671 followed the French pattern in limiting firearms possession to the nobility. The French legislation went even further in that it prohibited commoners from possessing swords as well as guns. *See* M. JOSSERANT & J. STEVENSON, PISTOLS, REVOLVERS AND AMMUNITION 271-72 (1972); L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, *supra* note 23.

brother James II were viewed as traitors who had plotted to place England under the yoke of their Catholic ally Louis XIV of France; through the mechanisms of a standing army and the importation of French troops, the free English population was to be disarmed and reduced to the condition of the French peasantry, and the Protestant religion was to be extirpated with fire and sword in England as Louis had done in France.<sup>138</sup>

Arms confiscation was a basic technique of the absolutism that the Stuarts, at least in the Framers' eyes, had determined to impose on England after their return from exile in France. To that end both Charles and James seized upon a series of new and old confiscatory devices, not the least of which was the 1671 Game Act.<sup>139</sup> Conscious of the disaffection of many of his subjects, and of the precariousness of his hold on the rest, the wily Charles never went beyond sporadic and highly selective arms confiscations. But enforcement under the Game Act and other legislation was enormously (though still selectively) increased during James' short reign. In addition to disarming the actively rebellious, this policy deterred the expression of any kind of dissent or opposition. In an age as subject to apolitical crime and violence as seventeenth- to eighteenth-century England, few people were courageous or foolhardy enough to want to live without weapons to defend themselves and their families.<sup>140</sup>

Having rid itself of James through the "Glorious Revolution," Parliament composed a list of grievances against him, turning it into a Bill of Rights to which royal assent was required as part of the compact under which William and Mary were allowed to ascend the English throne. Seventh among the grievances was that James had caused his Protestant subjects "to be disarmed at a time when Papists were both armed and employed [*sic*] contrary to law."<sup>141</sup> It was concomitantly guaranteed "that the subjects which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law." The significance of the phrase "as allowed by law" is

138. M. DAVIDSON, *THE HORIZON CONCISE HISTORY OF FRANCE* 96 (1971); J. GAHRITY & P. GAY, *THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD* 738 (1972).

139. These devices and the uses made of them are detailed in J. MALCOLM, *supra* note 12, at chs. 2-4, Malcolm, *supra* note 10, and the REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 2-3, from which this narrative follows. See also notes 148-50 *infra* and accompanying text.

140. Throughout the colonial and pre-colonial period, England suffered a remarkable degree of violence surprising in light of its relative peacefulness today. See, e.g., J. OSBORNE, *THE SILENT REVOLUTION* 9 (1970) ("[T]he English were noted throughout Europe for their turbulence and proclivity to violence."); Gurr, *Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of Evidence*, 3 *ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE* (1981).

141. W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).

unclear. It could have been meant to specify that the right to arms which Protestants (who then composed about ninety-eight percent of the English population)<sup>142</sup> were receiving was no greater than that which had pre-existed at common law. To avoid a lengthy debate which might delay the Bill's enactment, Parliament had strictly agreed that "no new principle of law" was to be included; the Bill was to be "a mere recital of those existing rights of Parliament and of the subject, which James had outraged, and which William must promise to observe."<sup>143</sup>

More likely, Parliament meant the phrase "as allowed by law" to preserve its own power to disarm the subjects, simply clarifying that only the king was prevented from doing so. If this is what the phrase stood for, the qualification it adds to the English Bill of Rights is manifestly unimportant in interpreting the second amendment, which was expressly intended to restrict the legislative as well as the executive branch.<sup>144</sup> Partisans of the exclusively state's right theory have seemed to invest the question of Parliament's power with some significance, commenting that twentieth-century England has adopted one of the world's most stringent anti-gun policies, notwithstanding the 1689 Bill of Rights.<sup>145</sup> If this is intended to suggest that Congress is free to do likewise, it completely misses the distinction between the American system of constitutional rights and the non-constitutional English system in which even the most sacrosanct

142. Cf. J. JONES, *THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND* 77 n. 2 (1972) (Catholics comprised 2% of the population of England during the 17th century). As Smith points out, Catholicism was illegal and Catholics were banned from public office in England through the mid-19th century. J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 24.

143. G. TREVILYAN, *THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688-1689*, at 150-51 (1954).

144. Madison's notes in formulating the Bill of Rights expressly reflect his dissatisfaction with the English Bill of Rights because it applied only to Protestants and because, being no more than an act of one Parliament, it was subject to repeal by a later one. 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, *supra* note 75, at 193-94. Indeed, the Founders apparently believed that contemporary English arms policies were highly restrictive and assigned the blame for this to the defective and equivocal language of the English Bill of Rights. Provincial Americans like Madison, who had never been abroad, gained their knowledge of current English institutions and character from the hyperbolic philippics of the alienated English republican/libertarian philosophers. Thus the Continental Congress compared our robust men, "trained to arms from their infancy and animated by the love of liberty," to the "debauched" British population, so corrupted by "luxury and dissipation" that they had allowed themselves to be disarmed and made utterly dependent on a standing army. Shalhope, *supra* note 12, at 606. Similarly, St. George Tucker, a distinguished American jurist and member of Madison's Virginia circle, contemptuously compared the second amendment's unqualified guarantee to the English Bill of Rights, which he believed to be so rotten with exceptions "that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in house without being subject to a penalty." 1 ST. G. TUCKER, *BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT* 143 n.40 (1803).

145. See, e.g., Feller & Gotting, *supra* note 13, at 49 n.10; G. NEWTON & F. ZINRING, *supra* note 13, at 225.

rights guaranteed by one Parliament may be abrogated by its successors. Parliament's power to disarm no more proves that Congress can violate the second amendment than the fact that twentieth-century Parliaments have abolished various traditional rights of the criminally accused in Northern Ireland<sup>146</sup> proves that Congress is free to legislate in derogation of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments.

What is significant about the English Bill of Rights is the undeniable support that it provides for the individual right position. There were no states in England to be protected against disarmament. So what Parliament was complaining of could only have been the seizure of arms from *individual* citizens in violation of their common-law rights. Because the Founders knew that the English forerunner to their own Bill of Rights contained an individual right to arms, and because the Founders themselves emphatically endorsed such a right, it seems unlikely that the right to arms which they wrote into their own Constitution was not intended, at least partly, to protect such an individual right.

To avoid the highly adverse implications of the English Bill of Rights, some state's right exponents have resorted to what can only be described as fudging the facts. They deny that James II was actually confiscating any arms from his Protestant subjects. They assert, instead, that Parliament used the word "disarmed" merely figuratively, referring to the fact that James had replaced various Protestant officials with Catholics, particularly in the English military.<sup>147</sup> This interpretation is demonstrably untrue. Space does not permit full detailing of the later Stuarts' arms confiscation efforts.<sup>148</sup> Sufficient for present purposes are the details noted in the *Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution*:

In 1662, the Militia Act was enacted empowering officials "to search for and seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person or persons whom the said lieutenants or any two or more of their deputies shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom." Gunsmiths were ordered to deliver to the government lists of all purchasers.

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146. See generally Bishop, *Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory Experience*, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 140 (1978).

147. See, e.g., Note, *supra* note 13, at 426.

As one commentator has pointed out, these grievances were not intended to assert that James II disarmed Protestants in any literal sense, but instead referred to his practice of replacing Protestants with Catholics at important military posts . . . . The commentator referred to is Weatherup, *supra* note 13, at 973.

148. These efforts are the subject of a forthcoming book by Dr. Joyce Malcolm. The results of her exhaustive original research in English records (many of which are available only in that country) are summarized in J.MALCOLM, *supra* note 12; Malcolm, *supra* note 10.

These confiscations were continued under James II, who directed them particularly against the [Protestant] Irish population: "Although the country was infested by predatory bands, a Protestant gentleman could scarcely obtain permission to keep a brace of pistols." [Quoting Mauley's History of England; footnotes deleted.]

In 1688, the government of James was overturned in a peaceful uprising which came to be known as "The Glorious Revolution." Parliament resolved that James had abdicated and promulgated a Declaration of Rights, later enacted as the Bill of Rights. Before coronation, his successor William of Orange, was required to swear to respect these rights. The debates in the House of Commons over this Declaration of Rights focused largely upon disarmament under the 1662 Militia Act. One member complained that "an act of Parliament was made to disarm all Englishmen, who the lieutenant should suspect, by day or night, by force or otherwise — this was done in Ireland for the sake of putting arms into Irish [Catholic] hands." The speech of another is summarized as "militia bill — power to disarm all England — now done in Ireland." A third complained of "Arbitrary power exercised by the ministry . . . Militia — imprisoning without reason; disarming — *himself disarmed*." Yet another summarized his complaints "Militia Act — an abominable thing to disarm the nation . . ." <sup>149</sup>

These and various other examples establish beyond peradventure that James II aggressively enforced the largely dormant arms prescriptions he had inherited so as to affect not only the common people but some of their elected representatives,<sup>150</sup> that this policy was diametrically contrary to the principles of the common law as they were then understood, and that one purpose of the English Bill of Rights was to place the possession of arms beyond monarchical interference — at least as far as the Protestant ninety-eight percent of the population was concerned.<sup>151</sup>

149. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 2-3.

150. One of the Members of Parliament was Sir John Knight, former Mayor of Bristol (then England's second city), and the defendant in *Rex v. Knight*, 87 Eng. Rep. 73 (K.B. 1686). This case's rejection of James II's attempt to prosecute so prominent a Protestant under the arms laws was a *cause célèbre* and one of the events leading to the Glorious Revolution. Personal communication from Dr. Malcolm.

151. Having nullified the 1671 Game Act's gun prohibition by the 1689 Bill of Rights, Parliament went on to delete the prohibition in subsequent Game Acts. *See, e.g.*, 4 & 5 W. & M. 23 (1692), 6 Anne 16 (1706); *see also* *Rex v. Gardner*, 7 Mod. 279, 280, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241 (K.B. 1739) (holding that these Game Acts do "not extend to prohibit a man from keeping a gun for his necessary defense"); *Mallock v. Eastly*, 7 Mod. 482, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1744) ("the mere having a gun was no offense within the game laws, for a man may keep a gun for the defense of his house and family"). Writing in 1793, Edward Christian, the English editor of Blackstone's 12th edition, annotated Blackstone's strictures against the gun confiscation provisions of the Game Acts with the comment that these had long since been repealed so that "every one is at liberty to keep or carry a gun, if he does not use it for the destruction of game." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 411 (12th ed. London 1793-95). Even Catholics, though forbidden to stockpile arms, were acknowledged the right to retain such as were necessary to defend their homes by the 1689 "Act for better securing the Government by disarming Papists and reputed Papists." 1 W. & M. sess. 1, ch. 15 (1689).

D. *Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Interpretation  
of the Second Amendment*

The final proof that an individual right was guaranteed by the second amendment lies in Madison's formulation of the amendment in terms that he must have known his contemporaries would interpret as protecting an individual right. As we shall see, that is how his contemporaries did read the amendment. Fundamental to understanding the original intention behind the Constitution is the observation that the Founders

were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and *thought and spoke in its vocabulary*. . . . [W]hen they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, *confident that they would be shortly and easily understood*. [For that reason,] the language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted.<sup>152</sup>

Reference to the great common law commentators known to the Founders shows Hawkins, Bracton and Coke all affirming the existence of a common law right to possess arms for home defense, while Blackstone included that right among those he classified as the five "absolute rights of individuals" at common law.<sup>153</sup>

Not only the great common law commentators, but also the English courts affirmed the individual right to arms. When Parliament overthrew the Stuarts, it wrote the common law liberty to possess arms into the English Bill of Rights. Thereafter English court decisions, reports of which were available to the Founders, had recognized that "a man may keep a gun for the defense of his house and family," denying that the Game Acts then current "prohibit a man from keeping a gun for his necessary defense. . . ."<sup>154</sup> Moreover, the English Game Acts that prohibited firearms had never been a part of the colonial law,<sup>155</sup> which the Founders knew from their own

152. *Ex parte Grossman*, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (emphasis added).

153. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \*144; see also 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 161-62 (5th ed. 1671); III HENRICI DE BRACON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 20-25 (Twiss ed. 1880); 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135-36 (5th ed. 1771).

154. *Mallock v. Eastly*, 7 Mod. 482, 489, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370, 1374 (K.B. 1744); *Rex v. Gardner*, 7 Mod. 279, 280, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241 (K.B. 1739); see note 151 *supra*. These cases were printed in English law reports that were available both in the personal collections of American lawyers and in American law libraries by the mid-18th century. In addition, the *Gardner* opinion is reported almost in full in a volume referred to by Blackstone. R. BURNS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER, *Game* § 8, at 442 (1755); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES \* 175, n."j". This legal commentary was available in the colonies. The Adams family donated John Adams' personal copy to the Boston Public Library, which still owns it. See J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 63.

155. Although colonial law was generally derived from English common law, any common

experience and to which they presumably referred in determining what the pre-existing "rights" were that the amendment guaranteed. Not only did colonial law allow every trustworthy adult to possess arms, but it deemed this right so vital that every colony or state had exempted firearms from distraint for execution because of debt.<sup>156</sup> Given this background, it is inconceivable that Madison and his colleagues in the first Congress would have chosen the language they did for the amendment unless they intended a personal right. They must necessarily have known that their undefined phrase "right of the people to keep and bear arms" would be understood by their contemporaries in light of the common law formulations like Blackstone's "absolute rights of individuals."

That indeed is precisely how their contemporaries did interpret it. The second amendment was analyzed in at least four legal commentaries, authored by men who were closely acquainted with Madison or other members of the first Congress. The earliest of these commentaries, written by Madison's ally Tench Coxe, has already been quoted.<sup>157</sup> Next came St. George Tucker's 1803 edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, annotated to explain parallel developments in American law.<sup>158</sup> We may assume that Tucker was learned in American law since he was a justice of the most distinguished court of his day, the Virginia Supreme Court. His familiarity with the thought underlying the Bill of Rights may also be assumed. Not only was he an important member of the generation that produced it, but the Virginia circles in which he moved included both Madison and Jefferson.<sup>159</sup> Tucker annotated Blackstone's inclusion

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law or statutory principle inapplicable to the situation or conditions prevailing in the colonies was excluded. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 9, at 60 (1972); Smith, *The English Criminal Law in Early America* in J. SMITH & T. BARNES, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRY OVER TO THE COLONIES 14-17 (1975). Parliamentary acts designed to provide the nobility a monopoly both of arms and of the shrinking English game resources were plainly inapplicable to the colonies, where there was no nobility and the supply of game seemed inexhaustible. It bears emphasis in this connection that the import of English common law precedent in interpreting the American Bill of Rights "is subject to the qualification that the common law rule invoked shall not be one rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political condition." *Grosjean v. American Press*, 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); see also note 234 *infra*.

156. See J. Smith, *supra* note 10, at 34. In general, the colonies and early states knew only four kinds of gun laws: (a) those which required/allowed every trustworthy citizen to possess arms, both for militia service and otherwise; (b) those prohibiting gun ownership or carrying for Indians and blacks; (c) those which prohibited hunting or shooting in or near urban areas; and (d) those which prohibited the carrying or brandishing of arms in such a manner as to cause fear.

157. See notes 81-82 *supra* and accompanying text.

158. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, *supra* note 144.

159. "The Jefferson Papers in the Library of Congress show that both Tucker and Rawle were friends of, and corresponded with, Thomas Jefferson." REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

of the right to possess firearms as among the "absolute rights of individuals" in England, with the observation that in America this right had been constitutionalized by the enactment of the second amendment.<sup>160</sup> William Rawle, whose general commentary on the Constitution appeared in 1825, seems also to have never considered any but an individual right interpretation of the second amendment. Rawle was both influential and well-known enough to have been offered the attorney generalship several times by Washington.<sup>161</sup> So far was Rawle from the state's right concept that he flatly declared that the second amendment prohibited state, as well as federal, laws disarming individuals.<sup>162</sup> More enduring in its fame than Rawle's work, though not necessarily more influential in its time, is the *Commentaries on the Constitution* of Mr. Justice Story, a younger contemporary of the Founders and a Jefferson appointee to the United States Supreme Court. He, too, eulogized "[t]he right of the citizens to keep and bear arms" as "the palladium of the liberties of a republic."<sup>163</sup>

One further point about the contemporaneity of these commentaries suggests itself: as we have seen, Coxe's article received Madison's approval even before the Amendment's enactment.<sup>164</sup> Published almost fifteen years thereafter, St. George Tucker's American edition of Blackstone became a standard reference work on Anglo-American common law for early nineteenth-century Americans. Literally hundreds of those who had served in Congress or state legislatures during the enactment of the Bill of Rights were still alive at that time. Many of them, including Madison himself, were still liv-

ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 7. The Jefferson papers archived at the Library of Congress contain 22 letters between Jefferson and Tucker spanning the period 1775 to 1809. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INDEX TO THOMAS JEFFERSON'S PAPERS 139 (Wash. D.C., Govt. Printing Off. 1976). Their actual correspondence probably exceeded this, since much of Jefferson's pre-1780 correspondence was lost when the British occupied Richmond in that year. *Id.* at viii. Tucker's association with Madison began at least as early as the Annapolis Convention of 1786 to which they were both delegates. See M. COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, CITIZEN OF NO MEAN CITY 87, 124, 182. In addition, both Tucker's brother and his best friend were members of the first Congress. *Id.* at 35, 61, 113-14.

160. 1 ST. G. TUCKER, *supra* note 144, at 143 n.40, 300.

161. D. BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 15 (1837). As to Rawle's correspondence and friendship with Jefferson, see note 159 *supra*. The Jefferson papers include five letters between them in the 1792-1793 period. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, *supra* note 159, at 118.

162. W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125-26 (2d ed. 1829). Rawle shared this view with Hamilton, who saw the people's possession of arms as guaranteeing freedom from state as well as from federal tyranny. The armed populace, "by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate" against either a federal or a state invasion of popular rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 228 (A. Hamilton) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1864).

163. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 746 (1833) (emphasis added).

164. See note 81 *supra*.

ing twenty-five years later when Rawle's and Story's commentaries were published.<sup>165</sup> Those commentaries remained the standard nineteenth-century reference works on the Constitution at least until Cooley appeared.<sup>166</sup> If these commentaries were erroneously presenting as an individual right of the people what was intended to be only a collective right of the states, surely one or more former legislators would have remonstrated the authors or publishers and, if correction was not forthcoming, publicly clarified the record.

To reiterate, the amendment was written in language which its authors would have adopted only if they intended to secure an individual right, because they knew that that was how their audience would inevitably understand it. Equally dispositive, that audience, composed of people like Coxe, Tucker, Rawle, and Story of the Framers' own generation, and of judges and commentators from the succeeding generations closest in time to the Framers, uniformly did so understand the amendment.<sup>167</sup> The general rule in constitutional construction is one of deference to contemporary interpretations with the greatest weight being accorded those interpretations closest in time to the enactment of the constitutional provision in question.<sup>168</sup> The tone and unanimity of contemporary interpretation of the second amendment discloses what was apparently a perfectly clear understanding to those generations closest in time to the amendment's formation. Thus, an exclusively state's right theory cannot survive the observation that it is so much a product of the twentieth century that neither the Framers nor any eighteenth- or nineteenth-century commentator or court breathed even the slightest intimation of it.

165. Madison lived until 1836, reiterating to the last his belief in an individually armed citizenry. See notes 96-113 *supra* and accompanying text. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both died on July 4, 1826. Without attempting to document the longevity of each legislator who passed on the amendment, thumbing through D. MORRIS & I. MORRIS, *WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS* (1974), yields the following dates of death: U.S. Senator Albert Gallatin, 1849; U.S. Representative Jeremiah Smith, 1842; U.S. Senator Paine Wingate, 1838; U.S. Senator Aaron Burr, 1836.

166. The individual right interpretation seems to have been as self evident to Cooley as it was to his predecessors Rawle and Story. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, *THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA* 298-99 (3d ed. 1898); cf. T. COOLEY, *A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION* 498-99 (7th ed. 1903) (federal and state constitutions protect the right to bear arms).

167. For 19th-century judicial interpretation, see notes 169-84 *infra* and accompanying text.

168. See, e.g., *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).

## II. SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS

In attempting to identify a pre-twentieth century origin for the exclusively state's right position, several of its proponents have noted that one pre-1789 state constitutional guarantee of a right to arms, and several early post-1789 ones specified a "common defense" purpose, without mentioning any individual self-defense purpose.<sup>169</sup> If such provisions had been interpreted as not guaranteeing an individual right to provide for common defense, they would be persuasive evidence that such a position was known to the Framers. Instead, every one of the twenty-two pre-1906 state cases construing a state constitutional right to arms provision, including some provisions that referred only to a common defense purpose, recognized an individual right to possess at least militia-type arms.<sup>170</sup> A nonindividual right interpretation first appeared in a 1906 Kansas decision which is plainly wrong even as a construction of the Kansas constitution.<sup>171</sup>

169. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, 1st Part, art. XVII ("The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence."); Other pre-20th-century state constitutional provisions with a right to arms "for the [or their] common defence" include ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 21; ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 28; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26; see also GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 4 ("A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. III (same as Georgia, plus: "This shall not prevent the passage of laws to punish those who carry weapons concealed."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVII ("for the defence of the state").

But see, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIII ("The people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.") (emphasis added). Other early state constitutional provisions providing for a right to arms "for the defence of themselves [or himself] and the state" include the following: ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 17; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 20; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 13; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 15.

170. *Wilson v. State*, 33 Ark. 557, 34 Am. Rep. 52 (1878); *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); *In re Brickley*, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902); *Bliss v. Commonwealth*, 12 Ky. 90, 2 Litt. 80 (1822); *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871); *Smith v. Ishenhour*, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214 (1866); *State v. Rosenthal*, 75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610 (1903); see *State v. Reid*, 1 Ala. 612, 619 (1840); *Fife v. State*, 31 Ark. 455, 459-62 (1876); *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18, 27, 32 (1842); *Hill v. State*, 53 Ga. 472, 474-75 (1874); *State v. Chandler*, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); *Aymette v. State*, 21 Tenn. 154, 2 Hum. 117 (1840); *Simpson v. State*, 13 Tenn. 356, 5 Yer. 292 (1833); *Cockrum v. State*, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859); cf. *State v. Mitchell*, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) (statute prohibiting wearing or carrying concealed weapons is constitutional); *State v. Jumel*, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858) (same); *State v. Newsom*, 27 N.C. 250, 5 Ired. 181 (1844) (same); *State v. Duke*, 42 Tex. 455 (1875) (similar statute); *English v. State*, 35 Tex. 473 (1872) (statute prohibiting certain unusual weapons is constitutional); *State v. Workman*, 35 W. Va. 367, 373, 14 S.E. 9 (1891) (concealed weapon statute).

171. See *Salina v. Blakley*, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905); note 31 *supra*. This case, which presents a "collective right" theory, is sometimes viewed as an early example of the exclusively state's right approach. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Kansas Supreme Court meant to suggest that its constitution's right to arms guarantee was intended to protect the state's own right to possess arms. Such an interpretation reduces the state constitutional guarantee to nonsense, construing it as if it read: "the state shall not infringe the state's right to keep arms or

Implicit in some of these nineteenth-century individual right cases is the proposition that even if a militia or "common defense" motive is specified for guaranteeing a right, that right is measured by the language of the guarantee given, and is not qualified or limited in the absence of some specific qualifying language.<sup>172</sup> As we shall see, other courts and commentators have construed the statement of a militia or "common defense" purpose as limiting the kinds of arms guaranteed individuals to those commonly used by soldiers.<sup>173</sup> Even where the right specified is to have a gun for one purpose, however, one who lawfully has it for that purpose may properly use it for such other purposes as hunting or the defense of his life or another's.

Some of these nineteenth-century state cases were based upon the second amendment in addition to the state constitutional provision.<sup>174</sup> Many of them upheld specific and limited arms controls on the ground that, while the right was individual in nature, it included only militia-type arms and extended only to carrying them openly, not concealed.<sup>175</sup> The only flat prohibitions of gun ownership that were upheld were laws from the slave states that prohibited guns to slaves or free blacks. The reasoning of these cases makes them the proverbial exception that proves the rule. Beginning from the universally accepted individual right premise, these courts reasoned that

have its militia bear them." THE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 10, at 11, argues that while it is possible to argue that a right to arms provision in the federal constitution was intended to protect the states, it is conceptually absurd to suggest that such a provision inserted into a state constitution was intended to protect the state rather than individuals. "State bills of rights necessarily protect only against action by the state, and by definition a state cannot infringe its own rights; to attempt to protect a right belonging to the state by inserting it in a limitation of the state's own powers would create an absurdity."

172 Hardy & Stompoly, *supra* note 3, at 76-77, make this argument explicit in regard to the second amendment, analogizing to the first amendment's guarantee of a right to assembly. Although the motive of allowing the people to petition for redress of grievances is specified in the first amendment, the right of assembly has not been construed as strictly limited by that statement of motivation. Indeed, it has been extrapolated into a right of association for innumerable purposes, of which petitioning for redress of grievances is but an infrequently encountered one. See also Gardiner, *supra* note 10, at 83.

173 See, e.g., *English v. State*, 35 Tex. 473, 475 (1872) (quoting 2 J. BISHOP, THE CRIMINAL LAW § 124 (3d ed. 1865)):

As to its interpretation, if we look to this question in the light of judicial reason, without the aid of specific authority, we shall be led to the conclusion that the provision protects only the right to "keep" such "arms" as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from those which are employed in quarrels and broils, and fights between maddened individuals, since such only are adapted to promote "the security of a free state." In like manner the right to "bear" arms refers merely to the military way of using them, not to their use in bravado and allray.

See also notes 193-94 *infra* and accompanying text.

174 E.g., *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); *State v. Chandler*, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); *Cockrum v. State*, 24 Tex. 394 (1859).

175 E.g., *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); *Aymette v. State*, 21 Tenn. 154, 2 Hum. 119 (1840).

blacks could be denied the right to arms because they were excluded by race from *all* privileges of citizenship.<sup>176</sup> Adopting that conclusion in *Dred Scott*,<sup>177</sup> Mr. Chief Justice Taney offered an *argumentum ad horribilis* that exemplified the individual right interpretation expounded by all the courts and commentators relatively close in time to the amendment. Obviously blacks could not be recognized as citizens, Taney declared, because then the (to him) salutary Southern laws requiring their disarmament could not stand in the face of constitutional guarantees of the right to arms.<sup>178</sup>

*Dred Scott* was apparently the only ante-bellum Supreme Court reference to right-to-arms guarantees. Several years after the Civil War the Court voided a federal prosecution of private persons for attempting to deprive blacks of their newly recognized rights as freedmen to assemble and to bear arms.<sup>179</sup> Pointing out that only private action had been alleged, the Court denied federal jurisdiction on the ground that freedom of assembly and the right to arms are guaranteed only against congressional infringement. But it obviously viewed the right to arms as an individual one, stating that the amendment leaves "the people to look [to state law] for their protection against any violation by their fellow citizens" of that right.<sup>180</sup>

Next came *Presser v. Illinois*,<sup>181</sup> in which the petitioner claimed that the amendment invalidated laws which prohibited the unlicensed organization, training and marching of para-military groups. The *Presser* Court responded by stressing the obvious: the subject matter of the second amendment is only the right of *individuals* to possess arms; constitutional provisions relating to *group* arm-bearing appear only in article I, sections 8 and 10. Moreover, those provisions refer only to the militia and formal state or federal military forces, not to private armies. Thus, the challenged state legislation simply did not fall within the amendment's subject matter. The Court also noted that, even if the right to arms had been implicated, the amendment guarantees it against only the federal government, not the states. This was standard nineteenth-century doctrine, based on prior holdings that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, standing alone, did not apply against the states themselves and were not made

176. *E.g.*, *State v. Newsom*, 27 N.C. 250, 5 Fred. 181 (1844); *cf.* *Cooper v. Mayor of Savannah*, 4 Ga. 68 (1848) (blacks were not citizens).

177. *Scott v. Sanford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 690 (1856).

178. *See* 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17.

179. *United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

180. 92 U.S. at 553.

181. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).

applicable by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.<sup>182</sup> That the Court rejected a first amendment claim on the same nonincorporation grounds emphasizes its implicit individual right view of the second amendment. Second and fourth amendment challenges were also rejected on that rationale as an additional ground in *Miller v. Texas*.<sup>183</sup> In both cases the Court treated the second amendment right similarly to first and fourth amendment rights, subjecting all three to the contemporary doctrine that individual rights were protected only against the federal government and not against the states. Likewise, in *Robertson v. Baldwin* the amendment was grouped with the Bill of Rights as a whole in illustrating the generalization that rights guaranteed to individuals are nevertheless subject to qualifications.<sup>184</sup>

*United States v. Miller*,<sup>185</sup> a 1939 case, is the Supreme Court's only extended analysis of the second amendment. *Miller* arose out of a challenge to an early federal gun law. During the decade of Prohibition, with its gang wars, and the subsequent depression years of John Dillinger and Bonnie and Clyde, sawed-off shotguns and submachine guns had become widely identified in the public mind as "gangster weapons."<sup>186</sup> The National Firearms Act of 1934<sup>187</sup> contained various provisions against such weapons, including a prohibition, which Miller and a confederate were accused of violating, against the possession of a sawed-off shotgun that had been transported in interstate commerce. The defendants successfully moved the trial court to void their indictment on the ground that this prohibition violated the second amendment. On the Government's ap-

182. See *Slaughter-House Cases*, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (denying that the Bill of Rights had been made applicable to the states by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment); *Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore*, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the fifth amendment applies only against the federal government, not against the states).

183. 153 U.S. 535 (1894). Although this case and its predecessors represent a doctrine which has long been superseded by the concept of selective incorporation, see, e.g., *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial), extended analysis of these cases is required if only to correct the extraordinary way in which they have sometimes been read in relation to the second amendment. For instance, J. ALVANI & W. DRAKE, *supra* note 2, at 9, cite the *Miller v. Texas* line of cases as evidence that "the Second Amendment does not guarantee a personal right to own firearms. . . . Personal self protection was never an issue in the adoption of the Second Amendment." In fact, nothing to support that interpretation will be found anywhere in those cases. Nor does it at all follow from their doctrine that the Bill of Rights applies only against the federal government. On the incorporation issue, see notes 206-32 *infra* and accompanying text.

184. 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).

185. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

186. See L. KENNETH & J. ANDERSON, *supra* note 23, at 202-03.

187. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934). L. KENNETH & J. ANDERSON, *supra* note 23, at 204-12, extensively discuss the history of the Act's provisions.