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HSA

HB 240

(FILE NO. 2)

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directors or officers or are financially interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:

(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; or

(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or

(c) the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.

Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction.

We suggest the new provision follow Act § 10.50.200. This new provision will also strengthen our position with the SEC concerning the need for application of section 17 of the ICA to the AGSOC. See Attachment A.

(v) Replacing Directors

The ICA requires (section 16) that when a vacancy occurs in the Board of Directors of an investment company it may be filled only if after it is filled, two thirds of the Board has been elected by the shareholders. No such restriction exists in Act § 10.50.195, and we recommend adding such a provision. The first sentence of § 10.50.195 would then read:

"A vacancy occurring in the board of directors may be fulfilled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors if immediately after filling any such vacancy at least two thirds of the directors then holding office shall have been elected by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting."

(vi) Disqualification

The ICA places certain restrictions on who may serve as an officer, director, or employee of an investment company, forbidding (unless an exception is granted) persons convicted within 10 years of a securities related crime or subject to an injunction arising from past securities laws violations (section 9). The staff has indicated, and our research has confirmed, that this provision of the ICA is one for which exceptions are only very infrequently given. The enabling legislation contains no equivalent, and we suggest that a provision such as the following

be added, to follow § 10.50.260:

" INELIGIBILITY OF CERTAIN AFFILIATED
PERSONS AND UNDERWRITERS

"It shall be unlawful for any of the following persons to serve or act in the capacity of employee, officer, or director of a corporation:

"(1) any person who within ten years has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving the purchase or sale of any security or arising out of such person's conduct as an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment adviser, or as an affiliated person, salesman, or employee of any investment company, bank, or insurance company; or

"(2) any person who, by reason of any misconduct, is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction from acting as an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment adviser, or as an affiliated person, salesman, or employee of any investment company, bank, or insurance company, or from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such activity or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."

(vii) Public Utility Holding Company Act

Finally, as we have advised previously, the Public Utility Holding Company Act places very severe restrictions on a company owning in excess of 10 percent of (or otherwise controlling) a "public utility" as that term is defined in the Act. The staff has indicated that it

would be useful if a mechanism were worked into the legislation so that the directors would be advised of the possibility that an investment would fall within the terms of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and either seek specific exemption from the SEC as permitted under section 3 of that Act, or comply with the Act's extremely rigid requirements. For this reason, we suggest a new section be added to follow Act § 10.50.015:

PROHIBITION. A corporation may not own, control or hold with power to vote ten percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a public utility company or a public utility holding company (as those terms are defined in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 et seq.), without first taking steps to come within the requirements of that Act, or seeking exemption from the Act's coverage from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Wilmer & Pickering
WILMER & PICKERING

ATTACHMENT A

DRAFT
January 22, 1980

Houghton R. Hallock, Jr., Esq.
Division of Investment Management

Paul Roye, Esq.
Division of Investment Management

Securities and Exchange Commission
500 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20549

Re: Request for Exemption for Alaska
General Stock Ownership Corporation

Dear Sirs:

You have asked us to amplify our opinion as to why exemption of the AGSOC from the conflict of interest provisions of the Investment Company Act ("ICA") would not work to the detriment of the investing public. In addition, this letter responds to several other concerns you have expressed to us.

As we have stated previously (Memorandum to the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, dated December 5, 1979), the AGSOC, while it may technically fit within the definition of an investment company, is not at all the sort of entity typically regulated under the ICA. It will not invest in portfolio securities, will not use traditional investment advisors or underwriters, and will not engage in more than occasional purchases or sales of securities. Thus, the traditional

abuses which section 17 of the ICA was created to outlaw -- such as conflicts of interest on the part of investment advisors, mutual backscratching and other self-dealing -- will not take place. Moreover, one obvious potential for abuse -- loans to AGSOC officers and directors -- is strictly forbidden by the Alaska legislation. (Act § 10.50.225).

The AGSOC is in many ways a political entity; its few investments and loan transactions will be highly visible and a subject of widespread public comment and debate. This scrutiny alone provides a strong disincentive for self-dealing. Certain provisions of the Alaska enabling legislation provide additional "sunshine" protections against conflict of interest situations. For example, shareholders have the right to examine AGSOC books and records (Act § 10.50.270), and the AGSOC must file an annual report to the Secretary of the Treasury. 24 U.S.C. § 6039B. Extensive publicity will undoubtedly surround the appointment of officers and directors. As for deterrence, these persons are subject to court-ordered removal for fraudulent or dishonest acts and criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders or creditors or making misleading statements. (Act §§ 10.50.290, 10.50.635, 10.50.630).

In addition, Alaska law creates strict fiduciary duties owed every corporation by its officers and directors.

Although we have discovered no Alaska statutes specifically dealing with conflicts of interest, the most complete statement of Alaska law on this subject is contained in the Supreme Court of Alaska's opinion in Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 398 P.2d 213 (1965), a copy of which is attached hereto. Under the rule of law set forth in this case, corporate officers or directors are fiduciaries and cannot personally profit from a corporate opportunity even with the concurrence of the company's Board of Directors. (Op. at 216). Any such conflict could only be waived by the shareholders (id.), and it is not necessary to allege bad faith by an officer or director in an action against him for dereliction of his fiduciary duties and recovery of the opportunity diverted.

We have also secured agreement from our client that a new provision modeled on section 41 of the Model Business Corporation Act will be added to the proposed Alaska legislation. The new section will provide:

DIRECTOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association or entity in which one or more of its directors are

directors or officers or are financially interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:

(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; or

(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or

(c) the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.

Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction.

We believe that such a provision is more suited to the AGSOC than are the complex "interested person" restrictions of section 10(a) of the ICA, and that this provision will

further assure that any transaction carrying the potential for abuse will be the subject of focus by a disinterested board.

Thus, persons associated with the AGSOC will have few opportunities to profit personally and even less chance to do so successfully. In light of these circumstances, we feel application of section 17 of the ICA is unnecessary in the case of the AGSOC.

* * * * *

After consultation with us, our client has agreed to make certain other changes in the state legislation to satisfy your concern that the protections offered by the ICA are adequately dealt with in the state AGSOC legislation. Below is a list of changes we propose to CSSS Senate Bill No. 170:

1. Add a new provision after § 10.50.015 as follows:

PROHIBITION. A corporation may not own, control or hold with power to vote ten percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a public utility company or a public utility holding company (as those terms are defined in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 et seq.), without first taking steps to come within the requirements of that Act, or seeking exemption from the Act's coverage from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

2. Act § 10.50.015(15) - Amend the section to read as follows:

"(15) pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit-sharing plans, and other incentive plans for its directors, officers and employees, except that such pensions or plans shall not include the issuance of stock options;"

3. Act § 10.50.020(f) - Delete.

4. Act § 10.50.080 - Amend the second sentence to read as follows:

"The decision to issue shares without consideration or for consideration if that consideration is less than the current net asset value of such shares shall be made by the vote of a majority of the shareholders."

5. Act § 10.50.085 - Amend the first sentence to read as follows:

"Consideration for the issuance of shares if required shall be paid in cash."

6. Act § 10.50.195 - Amend so that the first sentence reads:

"A vacancy occurring in the board of directors may be fulfilled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors if immediate, after filling any such vacancy at least two thirds of the directors then holding office shall have been elected by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting."

7. Add new provision after § 10.50.260, as follows:

" INELIGIBILITY OF CERTAIN AFFILIATED
PERSONS AND UNDERWRITERS

"It shall be unlawful for any of the following persons to serve or act in the capacity of employee, officer, or director of a corporation:

"(1) any person who within ten years has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving the purchase or sale of any security or arising out of such person's conduct as an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment adviser, or as an affiliated person, salesman, or employee of any investment company, bank, or insurance company; or

"(2) any person who, by reason of any misconduct, is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction from acting as an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment adviser, or as an affiliated person, salesman, or employee of any investment company, bank, or insurance company, or from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such activity or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."

We hope this submission is helpful in your review of our exemption application. Please feel free to call on us should other questions arise.

Sincerely,

Samuel A. Stern

Appellant alleges that error was committed when evidence of the value of the property in dispute, supplied by the records and testimony of a tax assessor, was admitted.

As is pointed out by appellant, there is a difference of opinion among the various jurisdictions¹⁶ as to whether such evidence should be admitted. The testimony of the tax assessor was that the taxing district regularly assessed at 100 per cent of value based upon a record of comparable sales in the area within the preceding two years.

[9] Appellant has not shown how or why this testimony was unreliable with respect to the value of the property or how its admission prejudiced his case in any particular. The basis employed in arriving at the valuation was sound. The evidence had relative value and should have been admitted. No error was committed.

The trial court, over objection, permitted counsel for appellee to question appellant in detail concerning his military record, the nature of his discharge, wounds received while in the service, the degree of disability thereby created, the amount of government pension received by appellant and appellee's inability to obtain employment because of his wounds and disability. Admission of this testimony is asserted as error.


Appellant's first objection was overruled, apparently on the ground that appellee's physical ability to earn money was material to the determination of the issues. Appellant's second objection was overruled on the ground that the evidence was necessary to carry out the intent of the parties.

[11] We hold that no error was committed. The financial condition of the parties in a suit of this nature is a relevant factor to be considered.¹⁷ So also

may his physical ability to earn be relevant and material.

[12] Appellant's allegation of error committed in admitting certain exhibits is not briefed sufficiently to be readily understandable and will not be considered.

The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment are set aside and the case remanded for retrial.



ALVEST, INC., Appellant,
v.
SUPERIOR OIL CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. 503.

Supreme Court of Alaska.
Jan. 21, 1965.

Proceeding on appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Ralph E. Moody, J., affirming decision of state division of lands cancelling award to corporation which had been awarded first priority at noncompetitive oil and gas lease drawing. The Supreme Court, Dimond, J., held that fact that two officers of corporation filed applications for themselves in non-competitive oil and gas lease drawing conducted by state division of lands when corporation itself had filed application violated administrative regulation providing that each applicant shall have only one chance in any one drawing, and division of lands properly cancelled award to corporation which had been awarded first priority at drawing.

Judgment affirmed.

¹⁶ See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1640 (3d ed. 1940) for a discussion of the subject and citations of the holding of the various jurisdictions.

¹⁷ Finmons v. Finmons, 217 Miss. 504, 64 So.2d 755, 753 (1953).

1. Corporations ⇨307

Corporate officer or director stands in fiduciary relationship to his corporation.

2. Corporations ⇨310(1)

Out of fiduciary relationship between corporate officer or director and corporation arises duty of reasonably protecting interests of corporation.

3. Corporations ⇨315

It is inconsistent with and breach of duty of corporate officer to reasonably protect interests of corporation for officer or director to take advantage of business opportunity for his own personal profit when, applying ethical standards of what is fair and equitable in particular situation, opportunity should belong to corporation.

4. Corporations ⇨315

Where business opportunity is one in which corporation has legitimate interest, officer or director may not take opportunity for himself, and if he does, he will hold all resulting benefit and profit in his fiduciary capacity for use and benefit of corporation.

5. Corporations ⇨315

Whether business opportunity is corporate one or one within legitimate scope of individual interests of officer or director depends on facts and circumstances of each case.

6. Mines and Minerals ⇨5

Fact that two officers of corporation filed applications for themselves in non-competitive oil and gas lease drawing conducted by state division of lands when corporation itself had filed application violated administrative regulation providing that each applicant shall have only one chance in any one drawing, and division of lands properly cancelled award to corporation which had been awarded first priority at drawing.

7. Mines and Minerals ⇨5

Administrative regulation providing that each applicant in noncompetitive oil and gas lease drawing should have only one chance in any one drawing would not have precluded corporation from making success-

ful claim for lease or its benefits against corporate officers who filed applications for themselves had either been successful at drawing.

8. Corporations ⇨315

In absence of shareholder approval, business opportunity involving application by corporate officers, as individuals and for themselves, in noncompetitive oil and gas lease drawing conducted by state division of lands was not within legitimate scope of individual interests of officers where corporation itself had filed application.

9. Corporations ⇨315

Showing of bad faith is not essential to establish duty on part of officers or directors of corporation in connection with business opportunities which they wish to acquire for themselves, and fact that business opportunity is of such nature that under particular circumstances it should fairly belong to corporation is sufficient to establish duty on part of officer or director to acquire opportunity for corporation.

Clifford J. Groh and Ronald G. Benkert, Groh. - Benkert, Anchorage, for appellant.
Paul F. Robison, Robison, McCaskey & Lewis, Anchorage, for appellee.

Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.

DIMOND, Justice.

Appellant was awarded first priority for an oil and gas lease at a non-competitive lease drawing conducted by the state Division of Lands. Appellee was given second priority. Later the Division of Lands cancelled the award to appellant and gave it to appellee for the reason that two of appellant's officers and directors, White and Mueller, had filed applications for themselves in the same drawing. The Division of Lands held that this action on the part of White and Mueller gave appellant more than one chance at the drawing in violation

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2. *Diedrick v. N.W.2d* 912
Durfee v. Mass. 257, (1948); *L. Pa.* 143, 53
v. Loft, Inc. 310 (1939)
U.S.App.D.C. (1955).

of an administrative regulation which provided:

"Each drawing shall be conducted in such a manner as the Director shall determine and each applicant shall have only one chance in any one drawing."¹

The superior court affirmed the decision of the Division of Lands and this appeal followed.

[1-4] A corporate officer or director stands in a fiduciary relationship to his corporation. Out of this relationship arises the duty of reasonably protecting the interests of the corporation. It is inconsistent with and a breach of such duty for an officer or director to take advantage of a business opportunity for his own personal profit when, applying ethical standards of what is fair and equitable in a particular situation, the opportunity should belong to the corporation. Where a business opportunity is one in which the corporation has a legitimate interest, the officer or director may not take the opportunity for himself. If he does, he will hold all resulting benefit and profit in his fiduciary capacity for the use and benefit of the corporation.²

[5,6] Whether a business opportunity is a corporate one or one within the legitimate scope of the individual interests of an officer or director depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.³ Here appellant's chance to be the successful applicant at the lease drawing was a business opportunity in which appellant had expressed a definite interest. That interest was a legitimate one because appellant had made similar applications in previous drawings, and the leasing of oil and gas lands was

within the scope of appellant's corporate activities. This was a corporate opportunity which appellant's officers and directors, White and Mueller, had no right to seek for themselves. If either had been the successful applicant at the drawing he would have held the lease in a fiduciary capacity for the use and benefit of appellant. This means that appellant did not have only one chance at the drawing, but three—its own, represented by the corporate application filed on its behalf, plus two additional chances, represented by White's and Mueller's individual applications. Since appellant had more than one chance in the drawing, it was not a qualified applicant under section 507.31 of the administrative regulations. The Division of Lands was correct in holding that appellant was not entitled to the lease.

[7] Appellant argues that it had only one chance at the drawing, because the regulation would have precluded appellant from making a successful claim for the lease or its benefits against White or Mueller had either been successful at the drawing. This argument is untenable. The regulation deals with the element of chance. When a lease drawing has been concluded and the successful applicant known, the element of chance is gone. What had been chance has now become something certain. The regulation pertains only to the situation which exists while the element of chance is present, and not afterwards. The regulation would have no pertinency in an action by a corporation claiming that one of its officers or directors held a lease as constructive trustee for the corporation. What the rights would be as between those parties

1. 11 Alaska Adm. Code § 507.31 (1964).
2. *Diedrick v. Helm*, 217 Minn. 463, 14 N.W.2d 913, 919, 153 A.L.R. 646 (1944); *Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.*, 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522, 527, 529 (1948); *Lutherland, Inc. v. Dublin*, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (1947); *Guth v. Loft, Inc.*, 23 Del.Ch. 235, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); *McKay v. Wahlenmaier*, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 220 F.2d 35, 45-46 (1955).

3. *American Inv. Co. v. Lichtenstein*, 134 F.Supp. 557, 861 (E.D.No.1055); *Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State Co.*, 117 Cal.App.2d 519, 256 P.2d 577, 636-657 (Dist.Ct.App.1953); *Johnson v. Green*, 35 Del.Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919, 923 (1954); *Guth v. Loft, Inc.*, 23 Del.Ch. 235, 5 A.2d 503, 511-515 (1939); *Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.*, 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529-529 (1948); *Beau, Corporations* § 233, at 372 (1961).

would not be governed by the regulation. The regulation would be relevant after a drawing had been concluded only insofar as it was established that before the drawing took place an applicant had had more than one chance to be successful. If that is established, then the regulation can be invoked to disqualify such an applicant from securing the lease. That is what was done here.

[8] Appellant contends that it could not have claimed the benefits of the lease had it been awarded to White or Mueller, because a full disclosure of their actions in filing their individual applications had been made to the corporation, and because the filing of applications by appellant's officers and directors was consistent with corporate policy. There was evidence that the members of appellant's board of directors had generally approved the appropriateness of officers and directors filing on the same land that the corporation had filed on, although it was not established that this in fact had ever been done prior to the filings in this case. But there was no evidence that the shareholders of the corporation had consented to such a policy generally, or that in this particular instance they had approved White's and Mueller's actions in filing in competition with appellant. In the absence of such approval by the shareholders, the business opportunity in this case was not within the legitimate scope of the individual interests of appellant's officers and directors.⁴

[9] Appellant states that White and Mueller had at all times been open and above board and had acted in good faith in all their dealings here. That is apparently true. But it has no bearing on the decision of the issues in this case. A showing of bad faith is not essential to establish a duty on the part of officers or directors in connection with business opportunities which they wish to acquire for themselves.

4. In re Lerch's Estate, 300 Pa. 80, 189 A.2d 508, 513 (1960); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandiel Co., 100 Cal. App.2d 403, 241 P.2d 68, 74-75 (1952).

The fact that a business opportunity is of such a nature that under the particular circumstances of the case it should fairly belong to the corporation is sufficient to establish a duty on the part of an officer or director to acquire the opportunity for the corporation.⁵

The judgment is affirmed.



WRIGHT TRUCK AND TRACTOR
SERVICE, INC., Appellant,

v.

STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
No. 525.

Supreme Court of Alaska.
Jan. 21, 1965.

Action on construction contract against the state. The Superior Court, First Judicial District, James A. von der Heydt, J., entered judgment for contractor for \$285,933.17 plus costs but disallowed claim for interest between date when sums became due and date of formal entry of judgment, and contractor appealed. The Supreme Court, Nesbett, C. J., held that state was not liable for interest between date sums became due and date of entry of judgment, under statute providing in effect that judgment entered for plaintiff against state shall be for legal amount found due with interest only from date of judgment.

Affirmed.

1. States C-171

Legislature intended to preclude interest on all claims, not just tort claims, against state prior to judgment. Laws 1957,

5. Rosenblum v. Judson Engineering Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 100 A.2d 858, 863 (1954).

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Roger G.
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