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OIL AND GAS TAXATION

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that what you may be getting in the way of apportion income and income tax payments may be off the mark of what profitability really is. So, we receive that as kind of the key draw back to this. You go in the right direction, but you don't know where you really are. Some people could be underpaying income taxes, other people could be overpaying, and how it would balance out to the State as a whole, it's difficult to say.

We would make this suggestion. If the legislature decides that this new approach in the bill submitted by the Governor is the approach it wants, and it might well because of ease of administration or whatever reasons that one chose this, we would suggest that perhaps the legislature might want to consider at the same time that it did this, that it ask or require of the Department of Revenue that it provide every year, estimates of profitability on oil and gas production within Alaska, perhaps with input from company, I don't know, but estimates by Revenue, the best estimates they can make and how much is made on oil production, pipelining or whatever in Alaska, so that the legislature can take this information, set it against the income tax receipts it's actually getting, and try to get some measure of how this thing is really working, that is how well is it achieving its goal of identifying income in Alaska.

Perhaps such reports could even have data by company not identified or something of this sort so that one could also, so that the legislature could evaluate over time how well it was working company by company. So that if you take this approach, we suggest that you might want to consider also getting some sort of information estimates out of the Department so that you would be in a position to evaluate in subsequent years how well it seems to be working.

Moving from this approach to a second and quite different approach to income taxation, take a look at direct accounting. Now, in principal of course, direct accounting is getting around some of these problems of apportionment. It's going directly at a measure of how much income there is from oil and gas operations in Alaska, so that in principal at least, if it can be done in a reasonable way, it does not suffer from the defects of this other approach. It is trying to measure directly what you really want to tax, in total in company by company, and we've always felt if it was legally possible to do this, and it were administratively possible to do this, this would seem to be the logical approach to taxation. Now, the problem as will be pointed out by many other people who will be testifying in here is that there are

problems of administration. There clearly are, and they are real. There are various problems of how one allocates expenses to Alaska, how does one look at and evaluate inter-affiliate sales, and things of this sort, corporate overhead and how much is allocated to Alaska, and so on. So that there are very real administrative problems to this approach, even though it is a more straight forward approach. It requires, on the part of tax administrator's rules, regulations, rather extensive ones, and obviously involves audit capabilities. One has to audit. There is a lot more auditing under this approach, and so on. And a lot, I think, has been said in the reports by the Department of Revenue and by Professors Zeifman and Ainsworth about these administrative problems. What we would urge the legislature to do though is really to try to weigh these very carefully. This is the major drawback, the administrative problems in this more direct more logical approach, weigh very carefully just: what are the magnitude of these problems? How difficult are they to handle? How many people will be involved? How much money would have to be spent and so forth. How difficult is it really? And what seems to me the attempt you have to get some judgement as is to weigh whether the difficulties in administrating this thing are really worth the effort. It is a difficult thing, really, to assess, and I think that in assessing these kinds of things, one can't necessarily

look for parallels elsewhere or general problems of separate accounting or direct accounting in other states. I don't think you can put too much weight simply on the fact that companies sometimes favor separate accounting. I think when you're looking at the difficulties here, you've really got to look at the circumstances of the oil producing operations in Alaska and try to get some handle on this by looking at that, not by looking at parallels elsewhere. Try to assess \_\_\_\_\_ ask questions on how to assess, how difficult it would be for the oil producing industry in Alaska. That's what we're talking about.

I won't really spend much time on the net proceeds. It was an attempt last year, really, an indirect attempt at direct accounting by a separate oil and gas production tax. It based, although differing in some respects from separate accounting and from the separate accounting bill, it's basically the same approach as direct accounting. So I think if one is going the route of attempting directly to estimate or tax income in Alaska, one would worry about the differences between the net proceeds and the separate accounting tax, but more important, I think, are the two basic approaches to income taxation in Alaska, and what you're going to have to do is weigh very carefully the pros, cons, advantages and disadvantages of these two basic approaches to a problem inherent in the present corporate income tax

regime in Alaska as it applies to oil and gas production.

Chairman Poland, I had planned at this time to go on with some comments on severance tax. I don't know whether you would want to break for questions on corporate income taxation or go on.

CHAIRMAN POLAND - Do any members of the committee have any questions that they would like to ask Mr. Kilgore at this time?

SENATOR HUBER - Madam Chairman, I thought that Dick might want to make some comments on the data base which you gather by a net proceeds tax approach that you may not find available in the other ones. That's been a major consideration by Levy Company and Associates, helping to develop that particular item.

RICHARD KILGORE - Okay, this is one of the obvious. Looking at this and direct accounting, this is one of the aspects to it. And the net proceeds things, you are doing it on kind of a property by property basis. You are not aggregating everything as you might under certain separate accounting approaches, and having access to that kind of information

would be of use to the State, because it does give the State some feel for profitability of individual properties, ranges of profitabilities, what are cost value relationships in various fields, and so on. And that is of value obviously in designing or further modifying the tax regime in Alaska.

CHAIRMAN POLAND - Any questions? Very well, Mr. Kilgore. We will go on to the severance tax at this time then.

RICHARD KILGORE - I believe our firm is on record as saying that this really is an appropriate time to review your severance tax. We have major new production coming on in Prudhoe Bay, and this production which is obviously quite different in character from that you have now in Cook Inlet. The second reason is that our office has been concerned for some time about the way the present tax works for Cook Inlet production receiving old oil prices. We've been concerned about this, and we think that the legislature should appropriately review this at this time. And I'll come back to that.

Now you have two bills - two severance taxation bills before you, but before I turn to the bills themselves, I would like to review with you certain principals we feel you should keep in mind in reviewing severance

tax legislation. First of all, we've said this before, but I will say it again, severance tax is something that one, a tax which the State cannot really expect to continue to raise endlessly without running into serious problems because of the nature of the tax itself. The tax is a tax on gross value or it's affixed per barrel tax of some sort for unit tax. It does not directly take into account the cost of production, nor net profitability of production. Cost relationships between prices or values and cost can vary considerably amongst producing fields and areas, and where costs are very high, severance taxes, being gross taxes can seriously impinge on profitability and at the extreme they can even result in shutting down production. So, there really are limits on how far the State should think in terms of pushing up severance taxes because of the nature of the tax. We have always felt that as a rule of thought that Alaska severance tax should probably not go above the highest rate in other major producing states, and the highest rate in other producing states per comparable kinds of production, and I think this is probably still a reasonable rule, to keep a severance tax within bounds. Second, given the potential problems with a gross tax such as a severance tax, we have always urged some protection for lower productivity on higher cost wells. This kind of advice goes back to our first written report for the legislature back in January of 1970

where we urged a step schedule which the State later adopted, and your current law does have a step schedule, and does provide some protection for lower productivity wells. So that the two principals basically are not pushing severance tax, try to provide some protection for lower productivity, higher cost wells. Now, you have two bills before you at this time that in principal seems to follow these guidelines. One submitted by the Governor, and the other by the subcommittee on leasing and taxes. While each raises overall severance taxes, neither bill goes above an effective rate higher than Louisiana's 12 1/2 percent on oil. Basically, they are in line with our first guideline, and both of the bills attempt to deal with the problem of higher cost wells, but we feel with different degrees of effectiveness.

The tax subcommittee's bill is basically an extension of the current law. It adds higher well productivity brackets than you presently have, and for the higher well productivity brackets, puts in higher rates of taxation, and at the same time, that bill lowers the rate at the lower end of the brackets. That is lower productivity wells would pay lower taxes under this subcommittee's bill, and this is in line with our second principal.

Now the Governor's bill developed out of the recommendations of the Department of Revenue, introduces a new and rather novel approach. An economic limit factor which attempts to deal with the economic impact of severance tax on high cost wells, and what it does instead of having a step schedule, in a sense it has a continuous schedule, so that the nearer a well is to very low levels or to its economic limit, the less tax it pays. The further it is from that limit the higher it pays. And in principal, this is a very sound thing. But we have reservations about how this particular bill would work in practice. And it appears to us, that despite the intent of the bill, it could work in the direction, and probably would work in the direction of considerably higher taxes, for example, on various Cook Inlet wells in the low well productivity ranges. So despite its adherence to what we feel is a good principal, the way the bill was drafted, and the way it appears to work on our own calculation, it does not seem to achieve its aim. And I think this is something we can take up in more detail when we come to that, and we certainly would illustrate how this appears to work to us. So despite a good principal, it would appear to not meet that principal, and I would feel that is a problem with that particular bill. Despite a good attempt, it doesn't seem to work.

Now, the other thing of concern to us is that both of these severance tax bills which we have before us retain an escalating sense \_\_\_\_\_ feature in them. That is, as the percent of wellhead value is lower than a certain cents per barrel, it's the cents per barrel tax which has effect, whichever is higher a percentage of value or a cents per barrel. Now, this tends to work in a direction of putting a very high effective severance tax rate on Cook Inlet wells that are getting the old oil price. That is that price which is being held at low levels by the federal government. They pay a cents per barrel tax because that is higher than the percentage of value, and that cents per barrel tax works out to a very high percentage of the value of production, so this present tax and both of the taxes being proposed as alternatives have this feature. High effective rates of taxation on Cook Inlet wells have old oil prices. Not only that, but since they have escalation features in them, the present legislation and the two bills being proposed have escalating features, this gets worse over time. That is the cents per barrel tax goes up, and this feature of high effective rates of taxation for these wells continues. Incidentally, if you make your calculations, you will find out that the Cook Inlet wells producing and getting old oil prices and low productivity wells will pay a higher effective rate of taxation than will Prudhoe Bay wells, than very productive Prudhoe Bay wells under cents per barrel. And this feature would

get worse with escalation. We think the legislature should seriously consider, if not eliminating this feature, that is if not eliminating the cents per barrel, and you may not because this would result in some loss of tax revenues for the State. If you don't feel you can do that, you might want to consider at least putting a halt to further escalation in the cents per barrel tax, that this feature of the taxation, I don't think is really what was intended in the beginning just doesn't continue to get worse over time.

Now, I would like to conclude by saying a little bit about the total tax package in Alaska because I think you will be hearing a lot about this from many people, and while you obviously are going to be evaluating the merits of different approaches to corporate income taxes, the different approaches to severance taxes, you will also have to be concerned with the impact of the total package of oil and gas taxation in Alaska. Severance tax, corporate income tax, property taxes, and so on, the whole range.

Industry witnesses, I'm sure, are going to talk at some length about this, and it is obviously of special importance. The total tax package and how it affects the oil and gas industry is important along with sensible approaches to each part. You obviously do not want to

destroy the oil and gas industry in your state. Here it seems to us, there ought to be two basic considerations when you're looking at the sum of all taxes in the state. Obviously you don't want the sum of all taxes in the State on oil and gas to be really an extreme burden on profitability or the prospects for profitability on successful ventures here. You don't want to do violence to the economics of ongoing oil and gas producing operations. But this is a difficult thing to measure. What may be a larger tax burden in Alaska, while in one state versus another, really can't be considered simply in the absolute. That is how much cents per barrel in total is being paid, and what really matters, obviously, is how the total sum of all the taxes paid by the industry relate to their profitability. What may be greater total taxes in one state, in a more profitable environment may be less of a burden than lower seller taxes in other states. So it has to be considered against the background of what appears to be profitability, and the second principal, another obvious one, I guess, is that you obviously don't want a total tax system which put together really discourages ongoing exploration in your State and the development of your resources.

Now those are two very, very broad principals, and there really are no easy answers as to exactly how the sum total of the package of taxes in the State can be set against

these two, which we think are very important criteria. It is a difficult assessment really to make, and reasonable men can obviously differ in their assessments as to the effect of a total tax package.

In our role as consultants to the legislature, we will do our best to assist and advise you in what is, we think, a difficult task of assessing oil and gas tax legislation.

CHAIRMAN POLAND - Thank you Mr. Kilgore. I don't really think that we have time for questions right now. We will be going into session right away. The Senate has a very light calendar this morning, and what I had hoped to do was for us to come back at 11:00 AM and continue with any questions that we might have or discussions with Mr. Kilgore. This afternoon we will hear from Professor Zeifman and Professor Ainsworth at 1:30 PM. Senator Huber.

SENATOR HUBER - Yes. I'd like to ask that Mr. Kilgore look into a couple items before he comes back. I think most of us here have heard Dick or Milton at least 10 or 15 times criticize the cents per barrel floor that we have in our severance tax, and of course, what I'm looking for is something to replace it, so that we can listen to this, we know that \_\_\_\_\_ cause in certain cases some unfairness,

but we need something to replace it in case the percentage of wellhead value is eroded by either federal action or other economic factors to where we have the old "bugaboo" negative wellhead value or something that is approaching that, so we would need something to replace that as a floor if we're going to work on that particular area. I wanted, maybe, Dick to look into that and give us some recommendations in that area because it must appear to him like we completely ignore him when he talks on that subject.

RICHARD KILGORE - We have given some thought to this. What we are talking about is a floor which protects you in case the general price level goes down, but also one which does not impose this particular problem on old oil production in Cook Inlet. We have given some thought to this.

(Chairman Poland adjourned the meeting at 9:55 AM)

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TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD KILGORE  
OF WALTER J. LEVY CONSULTANTS CORP.  
FOR THE JOINT SENATE AND HOUSE  
RESOURCES COMMITTEE MEETING ON  
OIL AND GAS TAXATION - MARCH 22, 1977 (AM)

RICHARD KILGORE - I appreciate the opportunity of coming back so fast, and what I'd like to do is fire my remarks, really, to the corporate income tax issue and amplify on the very brief remarks I made yesterday morning, and also comment on what appeared to be some differences with other testimony yesterday. What I propose to do is review again in more detail, really, the pros and cons of the two basic approaches to income tax which are before you. I want to make it clear at the outset, though, that it is not our role here to advocate one approach or another. Basically, we see our role as giving you an appreciation of how we see the pros and cons, and advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches, what they seek to accomplish, how well they seem to accomplish the goals that they are intended for, and leaving it to you to make the final judgement. So I don't want my remarks to be construed as advocacy of either separate accounting or apportionment to modified apportionment approaches, and so on. I think, and I'd also really like to get down to basics on some of this, and I think maybe we lost some of the basics in some of the testimonies yesterday. I think it is important to appreciate at the outset that our concern here, my concern, your concern, is not really with how apportionment or separate accounting work in general in other

states for other industries and so on, what we are concerned with here is not with these approaches as general approaches to income taxation, but what we're talking about is their applicability to the oil and gas industry in Alaska. This is what we're talking about, and I think we have to keep this in mind. Not how well it works for other states, but why other people use it, and so on. If you will remember our original concern with the approach that you now have, the three factor approach that you now have with your income tax system didn't have anything to do with general worth, its general ability, and its general applicability. It had to do with how this thing specifically worked toward the oil and gas industry in Alaska, and this is how this whole question of reviewing your income tax came up, and it appeared to us, and we have testified many times, that the approach didn't seem to work very well for oil and gas operations in Alaska, that is in a portion, a very much smaller amount of income to Alaska than would appear to be earned by the oil and gas industry on producing operations and pipeline operations in Alaska. Now, if the oil and gas industry in Alaska were small scale, and I guess this really wouldn't matter, you probably wouldn't be very much concerned with it, and you probably also could view it as if it doesn't work for the oil industry, it probably works well for other industries, maybe for other industries it apportions more than you might expect, and so on if they wash out. But, as

you all know, the oil and gas industry will be by far the biggest income producing industry in Alaska as far as we all can see, so it obviously is of very considerable importance to you. It is important to you, I think, that you have a tax structure which gets you something like your 9.4% of what appears to be the profits generated by oil and gas operations in the State of Alaska, so we have to keep in mind, we're really talking about these two approaches very specifically in the context of oil and gas in Alaska, not as general approaches. Now, I noted the other day that Professor Zeifman argued against separate accounting at one point, and one of his arguments, I think repeated a number of times, was that a good reason for not adopting separate accounting was that no state has adopted it as a general approach to income taxation. This was an argument against separate accounting. Now, basically, I don't find that a very persuasive argument. First of all, we're not talking about other states, we're talking about Alaska, and we're not talking about general applicability to all industries, we're talking here about oil and gas, and I don't think anybody has suggested that the State of Alaska should adopt separate accounting as a general approach to income taxation in the State, and certainly the two bills before you, Senate Bill 105 on separate accounting, and Senate Bill 202 on net proceeds, both of these are clearly

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intended to apply only to the oil and gas industry in Alaska, so I don't find this a very persuasive argument against separate accounting, and I think we have to keep this in mind. Conversely, just because a number of states use this three factor apportionment formula, I don't think it's a particularly persuasive reason for applying it in Alaska if it isn't appropriate to your oil and gas producing industry.

Now, I'd really like to get down to basics here. Starting off by considering what do we really mean by income in oil and gas operations in Alaska. Is it really so scrambled up by other activities of multi-national, multi-state enterprises that it just can't be unscrambled? Are we really talking about some kind of affliction which can never be put together and that we really just shouldn't bother with it? What is this income in Alaska that we're attempting to identify? Well, let's look first at what the industry does in Alaska. It comes to Alaska, it explores Alaska, hopefully finds oil or gas. It develops those resources, transports them to a point of export in the State, be it Valdez, Cook Inlet, or whatever - at least a bulk of the oil or gas does that, and then it moves into consumption in other states. Now it is true that a lot of this kind of activity and what goes on in this whole process does take place within the integrated scheme of operations of major oil companies. In fact, in many cases the final sale of the oil produced in your state

may not be a sale between third parties until it actually gets to the gasoline pump in California, for example, that may be the first point at which the sale is made, and the rest is within integrated operations. But what does this imply about income earned in Alaska? Is there a concept of income earned in Alaska, if this is the process by which a lot of your oil really moves. Well, I would put it to you that your oil when it leaves the State of Alaska does have a value. It will have a value, and it will have a value that's highly visible. We don't know what the FEA is going to do on the pricing of Prudhoe Bay oil, for example. But it may very well be that they will establish a value at Valdez for example. It may be that they will set a wellhead value. If they set a wellhead value, we can add on a pipeline charge, and we can have a value of oil as it leaves Alaska. So, basically, it's this value of oil leaving Alaska that is identifiable which is really the final revenues from producing oil and gas in this State. These are the revenues which you can identify as being earned by oil and gas producing operations in Alaska. Obviously when you are talking about a net income, you're talking about deducting various kinds of costs. Exploration development costs, pipeline costs, operating costs, amortization of capital costs and the like. The large number of these costs are incurred in the State and can be identified as incurred in the State.

Some of them are obviously some of the costs incurred to produce your oil. To get out of the State are the costs which are incurred elsewhere. Corporate overheads, obviously, a certain amount of corporate overhead time has to do with planning for the oil producing operations in Alaska. Some of the services which are provided to the operations in Alaska come from outside the State, and these are just some of the areas where accounting problems arise, but still these are within reason, identifiable also. So the income we're really talking about identifying in taxing is the value of the oil leaving the State of Alaska and an appropriate allowance for the various costs involved. Now the question for you, with your consideration of income tax, is which of these approaches really identifies income as we seem to see it and say that it is earned by the oil and gas industry by virtue of their operations up here. Which one is going to identify a portion of income which you apply your 9.4% tax. You'll get an appropriate tax on that income. Now, as I discussed yesterday, there are basically two approaches, and those are the approaches which are before you. One is apportionment, and this is where the approach is to look at the total income available, total income earned by a company, and try to work some fraction which gets applied to that total income, gets you income in Alaska. The other

approach is basically separate accounting which goes back to those revenues and cost categories that I discussed just a little while ago, and attempts directly to identify them and come up with income in Alaska, and the question is which of these seems to identify and work best that has come closest to identifying what would appear to be the true income on operations in Alaska, but not only that, taking into account also cost difficulties of tax administration, and that cannot be ignored. An approach which gives you the perfect answer and which is extremely costly or impossible to do in practice, obviously is not the kind of tax that you want.

Now, I'll start with apportionment. You have an apportionment formula in place in your tax laws today. You have Senate Bill 236, which is a modified version of an apportionment formula, but still an apportionment formula nonetheless, and the approach is to start, as I said, with total income of the company before taxes, under your present law, taxable income. This proposal suggests shifting it to book income, but nonetheless starting with the total income earned by an enterprise. The next step in apportionment, whether it be the one you have now or a new one, is to develop a fraction to apply to this total income in a corporation which hopefully when applied, brings back to Alaska an

appropriate amount of income. Now, you do that by taking factors that appear to be indicative of income generating activities, such things as properties, payrolls, sales and the like. These are things which indicate income producing activities are taking place, and what you do is you take ratios of these in the State to the total. Now, the question is does this really work? Does it correctly assign income to Alaska, or maybe \_\_\_\_\_ when does it work? When would this give you the kind of answer that you would hope to throw up? Well, it would work if roughly the same income is generated per unit of these income identifying factors in Alaska, as in Alaska and outside Alaska. These are the circumstances under which it appears to work. That is, just let's take one factor for a moment. Let's take property, if income is proportional to property in Alaska as it is elsewhere. That says in effect, if rates are returned the same in Alaska as they are elsewhere. If that's the case, and then you take the ratio of property in Alaska to the total, then you will allocate, and apply that to the total income of corporation, you will correctly bring into Alaska the amount of income that's earned there. That's if the ratio of income, in this case the property is the same inside Alaska as it is outside Alaska. And the same would go for the other factors. If you're looking at payrolls, if income to payrolls are the same in Alaska and outside, then this would be the correct factor for

allocating income in Alaska. Now, it's obvious, I guess, to anybody looking at any of these factors, it's unlikely that they will be identical in Alaska and outside Alaska. Rates of return aren't the same. You need fewer people and payrolls under some circumstances to generate income in Alaska and elsewhere, and so on. So that the apportionment approach basically says factors are not perfectly going to be the same in Alaska and outside, and therefore work perfectly, so what do we do? We take a number of these factors. Three in this case and we average them, and hope that that will give us an overall fraction which will appropriately apportion income into Alaska when applied against the total income of a corporation operating here. It averages somewhat obviously better than any single one of these factors taken by itself. Now, the question is how well it really works even when you average these factors, and how much better will it work if you move from the factors that you have now, to an extraction factor. Professor Zeifman was asked in testimony yesterday, how well his approach would work in Prudhoe Bay and Alyeska. Now, his answer was that his approach would be more effective because it takes into account the whole picture. All the profitability of the corporation was the answer. In a more general vein he also said that in reviewing the disadvantages of separate accounting, in my review of the

disadvantages of separate accounting, I didn't mention the most important disadvantage of separate accounting, that is again that it didn't look at the whole pie, it didn't look at the total income of the corporation. So he was saying first of all that his approach would seem to work better for Prudhoe Bay and Alyeska because it looks at the total income of the corporation. And he also said this is one of the disadvantages to separate accounting. Now, it seems to us that looking at the whole pie, that is the whole income of the corporation, all of the income it generates everywhere, it in itself has no value, unless the apportionment you come up with that you apply to this whole pie, the fraction that you apply to it, really works to get the appropriate amount of income in Alaska. What we're saying is that simply looking at the whole pie, looking at the total \_\_\_\_\_ of the corporation in and of itself is no virtue. Its only virtue only works if the apportionment formula of the fraction you apply to it is appropriate and brings it in, and I think that's very important to appreciate, simply looking to the whole income of the corporation doesn't say that this is an appropriate approach of getting a lot of income as it were.

Now, you remember our analysis all along, with the present system you have looked at these factors and tried to come up with how appropriate they really were. We pointed out

that if you looked at the payroll factor, it was relatively \_\_\_\_\_ . You have relatively few people on payrolls in the kind of functions that you will have in Alaska in the oil and gas industry. Very few payrolls for production for pipeline and so forth relative to the income generating, so we were critical of this particular fact. In sales, it's been pointed out are often zero in Alaska. Sales are made outside Alaska. Property, that to us appeared to be a better factor. That is, you have very heavy investment here in Alaska to generate the kind of income that you are going to generate, but our analysis said that property being a better factor couldn't make up for these other ones. Now, Senate Bill 236, this new approach, substitutes extraction for sale, and this is clearly an improvement. Oil production is a good measure of generation of income, and therefore it is a better factor. But the question remains, does even this modified apportionment formula do the job? Not just get more revenues, which it clearly will, and the other part of the approach is moving to book net income also will get more revenue, and it's not simply a question of does it get more revenue, does it really get the income apportioned to Alaska that is appropriate? This still remains the question. And this is what I said yesterday, the biggest drawback to the whole apportionment approach and even a modified apportionment approach as proposed

here, is that it is unclear how close you will come to true profitability through this approach. It's a very elusive and very uncertain thing, and it appears to us there's by no means a guarantee that this will happen, and this we see as the most serious drawback to this approach, and there are really two aspects to the question of whether appropriate income is apportioned to Alaska under this approach. One has to do with how much in total is apportioned to the State of Alaska. If you take each of the individual companies, apply this approach, apportion income to Alaska, sum it up, how close does that come to the overall profitability of the industry operating in Alaska, the profitability as I laid it out before. And the second question is, how does it work for individual companies. That is, we apportion use this approach for each individual company operating here. How close does the apportionment formula come to apportioning appropriate income to Alaska for individual companies. Does it work well for some companies, not well for other companies, and so on? If this is the case, that works unevenly amongst the companies, then you have a question of equity of taxation. So these are the two aspects that are important, and this is an uncertain thing and difficult to really try to come to grips with. How well would this thing do the job? Now, I stated yesterday that our office had done some illustrative analysis to try to get some handle on this question. We had been somewhat reluctant to put this

formally on the record and discuss with you a little bit about the results, what I saw as the major results that came out of this thing yesterday, but we were somewhat reluctant to lay out because there are a lot of caveats involved in what we did, and when you put this thing into the public record, it's often used without regard to the caveats which are very important, and we hate to see those get lost. I have been asked if we would put this formally into the record, and I'm going to do so now, and I would then like to discuss it with you including all the caveats and get those on the records. I would like to distribute this to you at this time and discuss it. I would like to spend some time on this. I hate to burden you too much, as I say, I want to make it clear in your own minds exactly what we have here and what we don't have. Now what we have done, we have labeled very carefully a hypothetical illustration. Because it is a hypothetical illustration, I would underscore that. It is a hypothetical illustration of this modified apportionment formula applied to book income which is the feature of this new legislation, and we've done it for three major Prudhoe Bay producers. Now, I would call your attention to the note first of all because this is important. The note says the calculations shown on the table above are not intended to represent projections of income that actually would be of portion to Alaska in 1978 for the three companies

if this new approach were taken. It is not that. Rather their calculations are meant to provide a rough illustration of how this approach might work for three Prudhoe Bay producers that vary in size and scope of overall operations, and even though these are identified as SOHIO, ARCO, and EXXON, and we use some of their data, it really is not meant so much that it is these companies, it is companies of these characteristics, and these are quite diverse companies as you know. EXXON is a huge international company. SOHIO has been basically limited to domestic activities with very little production so far, and ARCO being somewhere in between, so they are not meant to be really the companies. We have used their data just to illustrate what will happen with companies of different size. Now, what we've done in this illustration is on the first line to take from the 1975 annual reports of these companies, these are the latest available to us, the pre-tax net book income of these companies outside Alaska. We've just taken a pre-tax net book income, and since basically in these companies virtually everything is outside Alaska in those years anyway, we take this as the income outside Alaska, and this is data for 1975, and all we've then attempted to do is to graph on to this sort of a Prudhoe Bay operation. Now, we cast around for data to use for Prudhoe Bay, we considered making our own estimates, but we finally settled for some data that had been submitted by SOHIO to the legislature at the request of the legislature, and we reluctantly

used this. It was readily available, reluctant because when SOHIO put this information into the record, they did it with a lot of reservations, and we have the same reservations about it, and anybody looking at these numbers, I think, certainly should take it in the context of all the reservations that SOHIO had about their own data, and we apologize to SOHIO in a way for using it without a complete list of all their reservations.

SENATOR CROFT - Could I ask just one question in that regard? That was the information that was furnished by SOHIO, at the request of the committee was furnished to you?

RICHARD KILGORE - This is SOHIO submission 1.

SENATOR CROFT - To Greg Erickson, analyzing the corporate tax? So it was for that purpose.

RICHARD KILGORE - Yes. It was for that purpose, and they labeled it as hypothetical and so on, which it is, and I want you to understand that that's all that it is, and we appreciate their reservations about it, but we had to have something to give us an idea, something that we could graph upon to present data, and we simply and arbitrarily gave 50% of that to SOHIO and 25% each to the other two companies,

simply because that seems to be roughly their equities in this thing, and if we add that, we end up with a figure for total pre-tax income. This is obviously hypothetical, it has '75 data, it has what someone hypothetically says might go on in Prudhoe Bay in '75 \_\_\_\_\_ purposes. Then, we attempted to apply the approach of Professor Zeifman to this. Looking at property factors where the numerator were the property factors used in the SOHIO thing. The denominator was property as we found it in the annual reports of the companies. Payroll, we just took an arbitrary 2%. It's arbitrary that makes relatively little difference to the analysis. The extraction factor, we took net production as assumed in the SOHIO hypothetical illustration. We took as a denominator, net production as it appeared in the annual reports of the companies without worrying about whether net production was quite what was meant in this bill, and we averaged the factors for the companies. We then applied it to pre-tax book income which included other activities of companies and this hypothetical illustration for Prudhoe Bay. Divide the average of the three, which is the way this approach would work, and that gave us the income that would be apportioned to Alaska under these circumstances, and that's the second to the last line down there, and then what we did on the final line was

to take this income apportion to Alaska out of the theoretical model, but applying this new approach to this hypothetical model, and looked at what percent that was of the income assumed to have been earned on Prudhoe Bay and Alyeska operations above.

I think that the most striking thing that came out of this was the difference in the way the approach worked for the three companies. Again, three companies of these different characters. In the case of the EXXON type company, the approach came very close to apportioning what is assumed in the beginning was the income there. 650 up on the top. 625 apportion. So it worked very effectively for the EXXON type company in this particular situation. It worked much less effectively in the case of an ARCO type company with these sort of data. It added up to less than half, the income apportion to Alaska, than it was assumed to be earned there in the first place. And of course, in this simple model, EXXON and ARCO are earning the same money in Alaska, but the amount of income apportioned to Alaska under this mechanism are quite strikingly different. In fact in the ARCO type case it's about half. The SOHIO type company comes somewhere in between, and in total the approach allocates about two thirds of the total income from three companies in Alaska. I certainly wouldn't put too much stock in the two thirds, but I think the more striking thing is the differences that

get thrown up amongst the three companies here. Now, these are very \_\_\_\_\_ calculations, and things could very well change. I might point one thing out to you. What is striking in the case of the EXXON type corporation is that, as I say, it appears to be very effective in this case. And the question is, why? If you go to an addendum on the third page, it basically explains why this works in this particular instance for this type of a company. If you will recall, I said a while ago that if ratios of income to the various kinds of factors you use are the same within and without Alaska, then the approach works in general quite well. To take that a step further, the ratios of income to the various factors such as property or extraction are higher outside Alaska than they are inside Alaska, then the apportionment formula tends to favor Alaska. That is, it brings in more income than it should. If the ratio is higher in Alaska than outside, then these kinds of ratios work to the disadvantage of Alaska. Let me put it this way, if we look at a property factor for example, and within the State of Alaska, one earns whatever 20% on property (on assets) that's the rate of return. If it's 10% on operations outside Alaska, a lower rate of return, and you simply take the total income of the corporation then use the ratios of property to allocate to Alaska, you will not get the income to the State of Alaska that you should.

If the rates of return are higher in Alaska than they are elsewhere, then if you simply had a one factor apportionment formula, simply property, and that says that, say, 15% of the property is in Alaska, and you apply that to the total income, but the problem is that that 15%, what is it going to bring in? It's going to bring in average profitability to Alaska. An average of everything, and if Alaska is higher you're not going to bring in as much income as you should in effect. That is because what you're bringing in is average profitability if you do that. If you simply go with the ratios of property bringing in average profitability into Alaska, when in fact it's higher. And the other way around. If profitability is higher outside Alaska, higher say relative to property, and again you only have a one factor formula, and then you use the proportion of property, you bring in average profitability into Alaska, and in fact it's higher outside, so that you apportion more than you properly should. Now what this is getting to is why does this particular formula for these set of circumstances seem to work for an EXXON type corporation? Well, the answer is basically shown on the addendum. These, what we've done, if you'll look at the top panel, we've got the ratio of income pre-tax net book income to property in this model outside Alaska inside Alaska. Now, if you'll look at EXXON, it has a very much higher ratio of income to property outside Alaska than inside Alaska, Pre-tax income.

And, therefore, application of this formula for the EXXON type corporation is beneficial in the State of Alaska. It pulls in more income than it otherwise would. This very high ratio of 42.4 here, has the effect of favoring Alaska, and that's basically why you get the results that you have here. That's why it works better for the EXXON type than it does for other models that we have. Now, I want to tie back to something that I said the other day. If you look at the question of why does pre-tax net book income to property look so high for EXXON. Is it because it has really such profitable operations outside the United States? This would suggest then that on a pre-tax basis they make 42% return on their property. The answer is that this number, this ratio, is inflated by all those foreign income tax payments that I talked about the other day. EXXON works big international operations. In the year 1975 it payed tremendous amounts of income tax to foreign governments, and that inflated its pre-tax net book income. After tax it would look quite different, but we're talking pre-tax here. This is the way this thing works. So, that has inflated this figure, you get a very high figure. It happens to work to the advantage of the State of Alaska under this model. Now, as I said the other day, this is a particular aspect of this thing, pre-tax net book income including foreign income taxes that may not be the case in the future. These may very well dwindle. Income tax payments

probably will be replaced by purchases of oil, so that this high factor that's built in here with our particular model that happens to throw up a reasonable amount of income for income corporations, may not in the future, may not be this way in the future, but the fact that this EXXON type corporation, international corporation in this particular illustration ends up with an apportionment formula working correctly may not hold in the future. It's uncertain for a lot of reasons, including this particular income tax feature. If we went through this illustration five years from now, the results might be quite different here. In total, and I think amongst companies, I think really there is no way of knowing. Now, again, this is merely illustrative, nothing more. We've taken these three companies because they're quite different companies, they're quite different companies of the type that will be operating in Alaska. Their own income will be quite different obviously, but if you just grafted on the Prudhoe Bay Alyeska thing to this on some rough assumptions as profitability and investments and so on, this is the way it would appear to work, and all I submit is that it does raise questions about this approach and about its ability really to identify income. Clearly, the apportionment by picking another factor that takes up a higher amount of income, but that in the process of merely increasing the income, it creates some inequity, and if what you want to do is simply

increase the take, you ought to increase the rate instead of tinkering with one of the factors to simply produce additional income.

RICHARD KILGORE - Of course, if you increase the rate, you have to increase the rate for other corporations.

SENATOR CROFT - Sure, then what you're saying is that Alaska operations themselves are not paying enough once you've isolated it. Then your solution to that problem is to increase the rate if you think you have to have more, rather than trying to increase one of the factors that go into determining what portion of the income is allocated to the State.

RICHARD KILGORE - Well, this might be one approach. If you're not willing to change the factors, you would be left with changing the tax base which has also been suggested, or you would be left with changing the rate.

SENATOR HUBER - I wish that Dick would discuss the pre-tax net book income on extraction because I want to ask him a question about the sales factor that it replaces. It looks to me like the sales factor that it replaces would be on the same side of the book as how he explained the income

from property up above to where Alaska would get more than its share, because we have less than a reasonable share of the world-wide sales.

RICHARD KILGORE - Well, accept that to the extent that sales are really zero. This may drop out of your thing all together.

SENATOR HUBER - You mean that doesn't work out because we have a multiplying factor, or a dividing factor of zero? I don't like these mathematics that don't work both ways.

REPRESENTATIVE MEEKINS - I'm just trying to figure out how this works. Is it, I might have it backwards, is it the ratio of whatever the factor is to income to the factor if it's higher than outside then.....

RICHARD KILGORE - Then it's to your disadvantage because you're bringing it in at the average.

SENATOR CROFT - In that regard, our best guess as far as Prudhoe Bay is concerned is that with regard to about 75% of the operations at Prudhoe Bay is going to work to our disadvantage. We're talking about 50% SOHIO, and 25% ARCO.

RICHARD KILGORE - Or in total, but as I said, I would not put any precision on these at all. In this particular model, what happens in total, you throw up about two thirds when

the companies combine.

If you'll just look at the illustration itself, you will see that total income apportioned to Alaska, the sum of the three companies is seventeen sixty. When in fact by definition they are earning 2.6, it's about two thirds, but I would not take that as indicative of how much this approach will really do. I think that the more important thing here is how it seems to work for the different companies, and also in a sense says, at least suggests, that for this particular model it also doesn't throw up all of the income as well in total.

REPRESENTATIVE MEEKINS - But you could get a rough estimation of how that's going to work by seeking out different companies and going with their finding what their ratios are in terms of the profitability of their Alaskan activity versus their average, and you could see whether or not you are losing or gaining the respect of that individual company, couldn't you in that respect if you knew clearly that the profits rates in Alaska were much greater than for those factors than their average world-wide, then you wouldn't know exactly how much, but you would know that we're not getting what's appropriate, and we're taking the average instead of the higher rate.

RICHARD KILGORE - It is possible to gather enough information to look around and see how it would work with various companies, but that's not really what I suggest that you do. This is, as I said, intended purely as an illustrative to demonstrate how it works under these particular set of circumstances assumed here, and again I would look very carefully at the notes to this and also to the note which sets out some caveats about this.

Now, this illustrates, I think, some of the potential problems and I think, at least I hope, focuses on the workings of this thing, so you can think about the workings of this approach. This was described, I think, in testimony yesterday, as fictional and I guess it is illustrative based on some real data, but it certainly is not intended to be a projection of what will happen or anything of that sort. It was described as fictional as opposed to some actual data that were used, tax return data that were used to develop this approach, and I would like to make at least a couple comments on some of the inferences that were drawn from those tax return data. For one thing, they were used to illustrate net book income if you'll remember exceeded taxable income for the companies and it certainly demonstrated that, and no one was surprised at that result. Now, the second thing though, is that what turned up in those tax return data is that for

companies for which you had both apportioned income and separate accounting if you'll remember, the former, that is the apportionment is always higher, it was positive, described as always positive, and the latter, separate accounting always zero or negative, and this was taken as evidence that separate accounting doesn't work. Now, I'd like to address myself to that problem. The question is why did you get this result. Why did apportionment give you positive, and in this case which is oil companies operating in the State, 14 of them I believe back in '73, '74, and '75 that you got this kind of result. It was said that Mr. Lipton was wrong when he guessed that perhaps the reason was that you had zero sales and therefore when you went to separate accounting you had zero sales and you started subtracting and so on, but it wasn't indicated what it is that really gives you this kind of result, and I think that it would be of considerable interest to you to find out why you got this kind of result. The explanation really was not given, and when I say it was said that zero sales were not the reason, zero sales in the sense that producers that were producing and selling would declare their sales at zero. That was a hypothesis that we had, apparently that's not it. I can only speculate, I would guess that in the years covered what happened was that there were companies operating in Alaska and spending

money on payrolls, they have some office space, property, exploration, money, geophysical work maybe, bonuses, I think that bonuses were paid and the like, and there must have been such companies that had little or no revenue that were not gaining revenue out of production in Prudhoe Bay, and for these companies they would in fact be running losses. That is they would have no income. Not a question of your producing, but selling outside the State, simply that they don't have any income. Now, if they don't have any income, no revenues incurring these various expenses, they would run losses and separate accounting would certainly show them with losses, but I don't think if this is the explanation, and if it's not I think we'd like to know. If this is the explanation, I think one doesn't go from that to assume that separate accounting always ends up with no income or negative income, clearly if you apply accounting to the producers on Prudhoe Bay, they will not throw up no income. I would also point out the results which said separate accounting negative apportionment positive, why does that happen? Well that happens probably because these companies had payrolls in Alaska. People were here, and they were getting interested in the search here, and so forth, so you threw up some positive income by apportionment. You had some payroll, you had some property and so on. And you throw up positive income, but I think you have to ask the question of whether

this is really what you intend to do if we have companies operating in Alaska at losses because they haven't found any oil, haven't generated any income, do you really want to apportion income to them in Alaska and tax them on it? Should they pay income taxes when in fact they have no income in Alaska?

CHAIRMAN POLAND - Mr. Kilgore, I'm afraid we're going to have to break now. Our schedule this afternoon is 1:30 PM at the Supreme Court Room again, and we only have one individual scheduled to speak this afternoon, and that's the gentleman from British Petroleum, so possibly when he's through, we can resume the rest of this discussion with you. Thank you very much.

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AGO 547627

(Answer to question asked by George Silides in Commissioner  
Gallagher's testimony)

Tom Williams Madame Chairman with your permission I would like to try to address that question and also try to speak a little bit to what Senator Radar was talking about earlier. For the record my name is Tom Williams I'm the Director of Petroleum and Revenue. We have two changes in the severance tax that we are suggesting. One is the economic limit factor and the other is the increase in cents per barrel floor. Right now we have a federal pricing decision to give oil , to Prudhoe Bay oil new oil treatment for both pricing purposes and for entitlements purposes. Entitlement is a transfer of money back and forth among the refiners to equalize their apposition costs to the national average, that is the objective of the entitlement, and new oil in the lower forty eight comes in the refinery less than imported oil consequently there is a fraction of an entitlement that didn't flow, for the right to run as new oil. Our oil when it gets there, will not be below the cost for import oil it will be right at the cost for import oil. In fact the national policy has been for new oil like high risk North Slope production we got right from our Prudhoe Bay field. National policy is to give that, right now a \$10.95 average price, cause of the realities of market, we tried, if we insisted

or if the producers who own that insisted on getting a market price at the refinery that corresponded to a \$10.95 well-head price, someone is going to have to pay the transportation cost, and if you have say a total \$5.00 transportation cost you would be getting into the market place at \$15.95 the Saudi oil which is competitive with ours is selling for \$13.50 to \$13.75 so somebody would have to, I mean where's the incentive to buy, you'd have to compell people to buy our oil to get \$10.95 price or there would have to be a subsidy. This has not been a thing that we have been requesting the federal government to do. We recognize the fact that this is how the market is, we are far away from it in terms of cost. Consequently the well-head value is not that it's realized by a refinery price that's competitive with the Saudi Arabian oil. Our well-head value is going to be lower than the ceiling. The problem is that they are going to, if they treated this new oil, they are going to try to equalize something that is already equalized and it is going to result in a penalty over \$3.00 a barrel, this equalization. They will equalize all the rest of new oil for the lower forty eight, it won't hurt them too much, it will cause some problems though, because it will over equalize new oil producers in the lower forty eight. But for us it doesn't, it's completely inappropriate because our oil is already coming in at the level corresponding to imports. There is no need to equalize. Consequently if you make them buy at a fractional entitlement at a cost of \$3.00 or \$3.35 that means the refiner is going to pay that much less instead of paying \$13.50 he will pay \$10.50, and that means a Prudhoe Bay producer or the State of Alaska if it takes its royalty in kind and goes out and tries to sell it, when he gets it to the west coast is gonna see only \$10.50 coming to him. \$3.00 goes into the entitlement,

we never see that. So you start from \$10.50 down there in California and then you have that when you get to a \$4.00 welling price. Our contention is that if that happens the game is over. There will be no more exploration. There are no more Prudhoe Bays. It is highly unlikely, there is only one Prudhoe Bay in the United States and there may be a second one down in Mexico, in the Tabascoarea in the farmers fields, but a, there pretty darn few and far between to find a field that large and at \$4.00 well-head value. If that's the prospect, four dollar well-head with

today's cost, even if you found it out of Prudhoe Bay the chances are nil that it would be developed. And so the game is over because we are not likely to find fields twice and three times the size of Prudhoe Bay. So given that the game would be over, we are not doing any more damage by saying that well, instead of \$6.00, \$7.10 is the floor and the point which is our present floor with the cents per barrel, we are simply saying, Why should the people of Alaska follow the resource? At the game, it then becomes a question of priorities and where our allegiance lies, with the people of Alaska or the share holders in the larger corporations? Now there is a balance, but given that \$7.50 is not a reasonable well head price for North Slope oil in the beginning of a cut, and as production continues and through what builds up, if it, the federal began, assuming the federal government doesn't screw things up and destroy the insensitivities, the increase throughfare will lower the pipeline tariff. This will allow the well head value to rise. OPEC countries can be expected to raise their price, that includes Arabia. So if the refinery price for our oil, our refineries will raise the charge for getting our oil from Prudhoe Bay to the refineries will be less. These two things will combine to raise our well head value and by the early 1980's we won't get by talking about the well head value of \$7.50, we will be talking about well head values greater than \$10.00. In fact extrapolating out by the end of this century, we will be seeing well head values of well, your world market values it sounds absurd today, but \$20.00 well values are certainly not inconceivable at that time, and that's \$20.00 in terms of today's dollars, you know, not inflation dollars of the year 2000, that twenty of today's dollars,

thats simply because we have increasing demand, our Latin American neighbors for instance, their energy consumption is growing at a rate ten times ours, their population keeps growing, and world energy demands are far outstripping our own nation's demand and as vast as the OPEC resources are, this is a world wide shortage developing in the next 10-15 years. This shortage is going to cause, ask developers, its going to cause the price to rise in real terms that is to say in addition to the effects of inflation, we will have an additional increase in the real rather than the illusion. Consequently when we turn back, to the point, if the federal government gives us new oil in Tilener's treatment, the question then becomes whether we are willing to sit by and say OK we will take 8% or 10% off for dolars and there it is, its not good, but thats all there is to it. Even though we are paying right now, importing almost 10 mission barrels a day to each, though I don't know what the latest figures are and we are paying our good, loyal allies, Arabs, Iranians, Abu Dhabians, and all those nice people and Indonesians, Nigerians and Algerians, 14-15 somewhere in that range, 14-15 dolars is the average per import acquisition cost.

QUESTION- Tom, I understand what you are saying, I really do, but how, I must have missed somthing, how does that help Cook Inlet today?

- OK, with Cook Inlet, we, Sterling and I have gone to the Federal Energy Administration last summer and in fact, the hearings that they had earlier, in April or May, it was in Anchorage regarding the price of new oil and how to compound the upper and lower tears should move through time, and also about this problem

of oil production that reaches its break-even point with the control oil price. Right now, I mean the federal government is not reluctant to price our oil severly below what its actually worth, in the inlet that oil is beginning from \$5.00 to \$5.15, and for oil of similar quality we are paying, almost, we are probably paying over \$15.00 a barrel to get it from Indonesia to the west coast or Pudget Sound. So we don't see a very friendly attitude on the behalf of the federal government toward Alaska production to begin with. We went there and pointed out that there are some properties in the oil that were at that time dangerously close to reaching this break-even point at \$5.00 a barrel, we said we know you have shis procedure to allow pricing on this basis, to allow the price to go up, so that they continue to have more revenue than expenditures. Then they, thats indeed true, then they said that of course we are not going to give it to the State of Alaska because thats fixed cost, you are going to be stuck there at \$5.00. Well that presents an interesting question about how they rewrite our lease, but they said that they would allow that much pressing relief and return the property to the level of profitability enjoyed in May of 1973 when price controls, that's the reference period they all relate back to, May of '73. But he said, we'll allow to have that same measure of profitability, which to my thinking would include among as profit, you have what's over for tax. So if you raised the severence tax, that's an increase cost, but an oil company can go into the FEA and present the case saying, here are my thoughts, now give me my May 1973 rate of return,

and in fact that should accelerate the movement to a more realistic price to the upper tier which is not still the market price, but at least its, \$10.95 is a good site better than \$5.00. And consequently, if the Federal Energy Administration is doing what they say they are going to do and if they can do it in a timely fashion, there should be no problem for the oil companies because this is simply an expence, severence taxes are recognised as such.

- that had not been explained before, thank you.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN TESTIMONY  
OF COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER, DEPARTMENT  
OF REVENUE FOR THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE  
RESOURCES COMMITTEE MEETING ON OIL AND  
GAS TAXATION (24 MARCH 1977)

Senator Radar - Madame Chairman, Commissioner, your testimony on the pricing problems, state's position, governor's position; that we do need a maximum well-head or a maximum price to encourage further exploration and development. Aren't your bills which are calculated to persist for barrel and so and so forth as you say to protect the state against federal pricing manipulation or corporate manipulation, let's say take the federal pricing manipulation. Aren't you saying then that under one set of circumstances if the pricing goes bad which means that the companies have no incentive to develop further that we are going to add further burden to that disincentive by a cents per barrel floor so to speak so as to protect the state's revenues?

Commissioner Gallagher - If the federal government is so foolish as to lower the well-head value down to \$4.30, I don't think the state should be any part, have any part of that policy.

Senator Radar - Well but then our policy makes it even more burdensome from the point of view of the further exploration or development of petroleum in the state because we revert to a cents per barrel floor so that the, the very policy that you are adopting here to protect our budget, and I understand why you are doing it, it is because you want to protect our budget, but it, if the course is completely inconsistent with

any state policy which would be to encourage for the petroleum development. If that happened.

Commissioner Gallagher - I don't agree with that Senator. One of the things that we've done to encourage petroleum development and one of the things we talked about in our testimony was about the marginal fields. Prudhoe Bay will be produced at \$4.30.

Senator Radar - Well it would be produced at \$2.00 maybe because it would minimize their losses, but if your talking about the excuse me, go ahead.

Commissioner Gallagher - But Kuparik and Lisburne will not be produced unless they receive substantial return because its an incremental decision. One of the things that we tried to address in our tax policy where these marginal fields they are one and two billion barrel marginal fields. The tax rate under our tax proposals, we would actually lower the taxes on those fields, in fact encourage further production in the state.

Senator Radar - Do you disagree with the a analysis that was presented by a, Mr. Ronaldson SOHIO here as to where are our tax, our total tax burden relates as against Louisiana, California, and Texas?

Commissioner Gallagher - Yes I do, in looking at some of those numbers, I and we haven't run all the numbers ourselves but it seems to me that they've mixed a few apples and oranges and got fruit salad and I can see alot of the numbers they say they are in constant dollars but the only way I can get to some of those

numbers is using current dollar basis.

Senator Radar - Well you agree though that such an analysis is rather important to us don't you?

Commissioner Gallagher - I would, I would, I agree that that analysis is important. We attempted to do that in this tax study but due to only getting two man years into the study, we didn't have time and it takes substantial amount of time to do that sort of study.

Senator Radar - But if that is an important decision, then the fact that we haven't completed that study, if you do take the issue with the a SOHIO approach and perhaps you are correct, I am not saying that you are not but, but you agree that that is important information in this decision making process. A and we disagree with it but we don't have one of our own. Wouldn't that argue that fact alone would argue in waiting until we have that information before we made that decision, wouldn't it?

Commissioner Gallagher - We could provide you with that information so next year, I think it is a real danger to sit around and wait while, let the federal government do things to us.

Senator Radar - Alright then, let me ask you this then. For purposes of balancing our budget this year, we could do that with your ad valorem tax, could we not?

Commissioner Gallagher - I believe, well lets put it this way.

Senator Radar - Go ahead, I was going to say we balanced it the last several years that way, and we could do it this year too, couldn't we?

Commissioner Gallagher - You mean the reserves tax?

Senator Radar - Reserves tax yes.

Commissioner Gallagher - I assume we could, I don't favor extending the reserves tax off into the future though. To me it's a bad policy, its a poor tax and I would like to see it die a natural death.

Senator Radar - But from the point of view of balancing your budget this year you could do it that way, as we have in the last couple of years.

Commissioner Gallagher - Well you could also by raising the cents per barrel to a free market value and also do the same thing.

Senator Radar - Yes, but here's our problem. Neither the state nor the industry knows what incentives or disincentives may occur because of the federal pricing, and yet you are suggesting that we make tax decisions in which we all agree that that federal pricing is very very important if we are at all concerned about the future attractiveness of Alaska as a investment for petroleum industry.

Commissioner Gallagher - Well, one of the things that we have tried to address in our, is our testimony has been directed in all these

hearings toward getting the maximum production out of Alaska. Our tax policy is also directed in that and it addresses these marginal fields.

Senator Radar - Well but, but if the federal government were so foolish as to pursue this policy that you said that we should not have participated in then your floors make it even more difficult as far as the petroleum industry is concerned or as far as the producing marginal wells in Alaska is concerned, isn't it?

Commissioner Gallagher - Well, if they were that foolish, I don't see why we should be a part of that foolish action.

Senator Radar - It seems to me like we are adding on to it and not detracting from their fool hardiness, if they are foolish.

Commissioner Gallagher - If you know, if they did do this there wouldn't be an incentive to developing another Prudhoe Bay, so you know.

Senator Radar - Well but we are adding to whatever, we are adding to the difficulties in the production of whatever fuel might be found by adopting the floors that you are talking about here. Are we not?

Commissioner Gallagher - Not necessarily you may find one down in the Cook Inlet with the free market value should be substantially

above that.

Senator Radar - No.

Commissioner Gallagher - Also the economic limit factor comes into play on these large fields.

Senator Radar - Let me ask you if we're talking about an industry who doesn't know the value that they are going to get from their product and isn't going to know until next year, then how do we develop a stable tax policy at this time, that is dependent upon that? It seems to me as though, and I don't have any answer except that you can balance your budget with the other method. And I also recognize the difficulties of the limits in the future, on that. But at least when we come back here a year from now, when we start talking about the profitability or the non-profitability or the incentives or disincentives, won't we be talking about something that we can relate to the real world at that time, that we can't relate to the real world now?

Commissioner Gallagher - I think our policies to the real world, that's what we are trying to address in fact, if the real world says you should price the energy supply at the alternative market, the alternative market may be \$20.00 a barrel, the alternate energy supplies. The OPEC countries are actually being very nice to the United States and not taken up the alternate energy supply cost. If you want to go to the real world we should maybe put our policies up at \$20.00 a barrel.

Senator Radar - But we can't do that as a state.

Commissioner Gallagher - You could set a cents per barrel that was based on \$20.00 which is the alternate energy cost. That's the real world.

Senator Radar - Well but that option isn't available to us, to tax at that rate, is it?

Commissioner Gallagher - Under a cents per barrel floor, of course, it is. Also, Senator, the FEA may open the pricing decision every ninety days after 1/1/78 or there after. I really doubt that they are going to make a decision on April 15th. I think you will not see a decision until somewhere around June 1. I really expect them to wait and see what the tariffs are, the initial tariffs are before they make some sort of decision.

Senator Radar - That's all. Thank you Madame Chairman.

Senator Colletta - Commissioner do you have one of these in front of you?

Commissioner Gallagher - Yes, I do.

Senator Colletta - O.K., On page 2 and you know just for the purposes of conversation and let's assume that you develop your tax package with the governors' standards, as to what they should include, now I think my question could be simply answered in two steps. First if you do agree that the industry says that they have between fourteen

and 16% worth of return on this project.

Commissioner Gallagher - I don't agree with that, but other than that.

Senator Colletta - O.K. with the assumption then the new tax proposals increase the tax by what percent?

Commissioner Gallagher - About 18% over all five bills.

Senator Colletta - What will their profitability be now that's different between that 14 and 16 percent?

Commissioner Gallagher - I reject number one the 14 to 16 percent that has the risk, under the Mortaida Study they multiplied all the assets by 4 to get the risk factor that may be appropriate to do an exploration work but it may not be important in doing other sort of work, you know the development work. If you want to use the Tanziers 33% or 35%, I don't think that is going to make 1 or 2 percent difference.

Senator Colletta - Commissioner I think I am going to try it another way. But anyway, the governor said it must generate sufficient revenues not only to compensate the state for additional service costs, attending such development but also to provide a reasonable additional dividend to Alaska. Now I would suspect you have computed that dividend in there. Can you tell me what the dividend is?

Commissioner Gallagher - The dividend to Alaskans? Well let me take you through the Prudhoe Bay numbers and maybe, you know I can work it right off the top of my head. We can talk about the dividends to various people. If you had a million two barrels a day there is four hundred and thirty eight million barrels of oil produced each year, three hundred and sixty five times one two, have you got your slide rule with me, times four hundred and thirty eight million times seven dollars and fifty cents per barrel is right on about three billion two. Is that correct, somewhere in there, less one eighth which is our royalty share. So that brings it down to four hundred million, three point two gets down to two billion eight, and let's subtract off the operating costs for the field, about three hundred and fifty million, four hundred million, let's say four hundred million we'll up it fifty million over the estimates, and that makes it down to two four. And let's say the State of Alaska through it's severance taxes takes another four hundred million, that brings it down to two billion and lets say our income taxes in effect takes us down a hundred and eighty, another hundred and eighty million, that leaves a billion eight left to share between the federal government and the oil industry. And so you have, before tax, you have a billion eight on a three billion dollar investment. Lets say they have three billion dollars investment. That's a nice return for oil industry too. One point eight billion dollars pre-tax on three billion dollars is a nice rate of return. Now they might claim that they pay forty eight percent taxes, I, you can look at SOHIO'S last report that was shown in their annual report and they showed they had effective tax rate of under ten percent. One of the things that they

happen to have is about three billion dollars of carry forwards of investment credits that will cancel off, pretty well wipe out at least fifty percent of their tax liability for the next five years. And they all have substantial investment credits so they should have developed substantial investment credits to be carried forward for the next several years, so whatever the effective federal tax rate is, you know, let's say they do pay three hundred million dollars income tax they still get in a billion and a half return on a three billion dollar investment, that's a fifty percent return per year. That's, I would take that, any day.

Senator Colletta - O.K. now, you know, we lost the Chinese and now your gettin to me, I'm understanding the last part of what you said and that's the part that a you know, I still want to come back to, a all of these companies collectively it seems and most of these reports we read, range within a two to teen percent, at least all I've seen, with the exception of one that happened last year, that say that this thing will return to those investors somewhere between this fourteen and sixteen and are you working under the assumption that they have thirty-five to fifty?

Commissioner Gallagher - Well I just, I don't want to go in and talk Chinese because there's a large difference between a, between income you report to your shareholders and discounted in cash flow, because one of the cash flows is, you know discounted

at some high rate of return to lower the number and it isn't fair. But I just demonstrated for accounting purposes it would show a fifty percent at least a fifty percent return. Now a discount in cash flow would be substantially below that because those values are, are reduced through time, for the investment. The major difference between Mortuada's investment and the investment Tanzier, like I pointed out was that one uses a risk multiplier factor that multiplies the assets by four times instead of three billion dollars investment they had, they used a regular return on twelve billion dollars investment and that's how you got a sixteen percent rate on a twelve billion dollar investment and you know, my numbers there kind of match out.

Senator Colletta - O.K. Commissioner I've got one other area that a I need clarified and that's item five the governor's policy statement that it must reduce uncertainty and encourage stable expectations about future resource tax and management policies. If infact these taxes did pass, would these be the last ones, would we be creating a stable future resource?

(GAP)

Commissioner Gallagher - a premarket price. Let's say Cook Inlet was priced at a premarket price. This tax would hit McCarthur River a a higher rate then it would Prudhoe Bay because it's actually more profitable. Now the East Trading Bay Unit which is decidely less profitable, it would tend to treat that fairly. What's comin into a play here is the cents per barrel floor. Yes, our written tax rate on East Trading Bay Unit is probably one third of what the cents per barrel floor should be. Now, that oil if we wanted to go after Cook Inlet it should be maybe priced at fifteen dollars

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which is the price for Swede a 34% gravity on the west coast, we are only going to 7 1/2 because of Prudhoe Bay, so we are not being inconsistent, we are giving them a break.

Senator Colletta - Thank you Madame Chairman.

Senator Huber - Well, Senator Radar brought it up, I think that it's only fair to ask a ask of Sterling because we do need to get down to the nitty gritty of it. Sterling do you think that the Walter Leavy Associates have the best possible advice for the State of Alaska's interests, or do you think other economic consultants may have something to offer too?

Commissioner Gallagher - I've always appreciated the, I, of Dr. Mead, but you know there are consultants and there are consultants. They give you a good point of view Mead gives you a good point of view. I think there could be a whole series of people in that could give you worth while information.

Senator Huber - In other words you don't think we should base it all on one consultant.

Commissioner Gallagher - That's correct. I think you, you know, we have economists in the Department of Revenue, we should listen to those economists too.

Senator Huber - Obvious on the Walter Leavy Companys advice which we have been receiving quite heavily lately about removing the cents per barrel, do you disagree strongly on that?

Commissioner Gallagher - Absolutely.

Senator Huber - And do you, do the other consultants that you have hired agree with you on this?

Commissioner Gallagher - Of course they are hired by me.

Senator Huber - No some of them weren't hired by you. How about the other ones? How about the other ones on the cents per barrel?

Commissioner Gallagher - I don't know what Mead says. You know, he isn't here before you. I wish Tom Fink was here today, Madame Chairman.

George Silides - Commissioner a, I have a couple of easy ones and then a couple of little more difficult ones, I'll give you the hard ones first if I may. You've touched on them, but I will have to ask them again because I wasn't entirely sure on them and it's a matter of mechanics on the bills. It's been pointed out that the foreign income taxes constitute a large part of the pre-tax book income for international oil companies, and that these taxes are likely to decline sharply in the future as providing the producing governments take over and the companies become contractors and purchasers of crude from governments rather than from concessionaires, and income tax payers. Now, the questions on that is, as you recall this was mentioned a couple of days ago, you touched on it again tonight. Now wouldn't this work to erode Alaska's tax base under the proposed legislation

that is your franchise tax? And wouldn't it work to erode the tax base more if companies would measure foreign operations, let me say that again, and wouldn't it work to erode to tax base more for companies with major foreign operations than for those with only small scale foreign operations?

Commissioner Gallagher - Well Let me say, talk a minute about where the shifting centers are in the world. It's true that I think, I believe, Saudia Arabia gives the companies nine cents for every barrel they raise after they pay for expenses. I think that's what Saudia Arabia gives. And those wells are fifteen thousand or twenty thousand barrel well days with nine cents goes up in a hurry. But alot of profit centers are shifted to other areas of the business. If you will look at the transportation business for integrated companies you might find the profit center is shifted there. Federal government has, may have a oil head put on price ceilings on the well head. They also have it on some refined products but not the whole barrel. Infact the lower end of the barrel is pretty well decontrolled and they receive whatever price they want. You know, all sorts of ends of the business you can transfer your profits to.

George Silides - I'll just take it for what you said Commissioner. Well let me ask you someting - -

Commissioner Gallagher - Infact you know, it's quite obvious to me that the federal government is trying to encourage the shifting of profit centers away from production into refining and sales.

George Silides - But don't think that the fact that the companies are taking their payment as in-kind as it were, does it make any difference in the, to your bill?

Mr. Messenger - I believe I remember the comment that Mr. Kilgore made earlier this week and to the extent that the difference between some of the difference between book income and federal tax would book income before taxes and federal taxable income to the extent that some of that difference represents a foreign taxes. If those foreign taxes reproduce that would reduce that difference between book income and federal taxable income I believe that there would still be a substantial difference between, still, between federal taxable income and it would be still, in our interest to adopt book income because there is still a lot of other erosions from book income in the Internal Revenue Code Book.

George Silides - Well, I understand what you are saying Mr. Messenger but your answer is basically yes, that it does erode some if that happens.

Mr. Messenger - Yes, but it is still better than the federal tax reform.

George Silides - I see, Madame Chairman if I may ask the second question then, another question. Do you have any idea how much income your proposed legislation would apportion to Alaska as against what might be measured by separate accounting as proposed in the Senate Bill 105 for example, once Prudhoe Bay is in operation

that is if we, if income tax law really and truly represented the 9.4 percent tape.

Commissioner Gallagher - I think it should be essentially the same. We pick up some additional features though like the days in port like 50% of the income from the transportation subsidiaries assigned to Alaska and things like that. So I'm it's hard to compare it. Also ours would pick up the OCS.

George Silides - I see. Well in that regard Madame Chairman that brings up another question then. I notice that you mentioned the days in port and of course you were talking about, and you were mentioning also that brings to mind your ad valorem tax or your hardware tax. If you put a tax on the tankers aren't you increasing the cost of transportation, and if you are increasing the cost of transportation doesn't that lower the well-head price?

Commissioner Gallagher - Yea but, you only give up twenty cents on a dollar.

George Silides - What you are telling me is that the differential is what counts? Since we are on the hardware tax, there are some refineries a couple of refineries in at North Kenai and there is one going on up now, being built now in the North Pole, hardly can be termed world scale refineries, especially the one at the North Pole. If you tax those refineries who will be paying that tax in the long run? If we are trying to encourage a refinery say in the North Pole area to, so that the people in the interior can get the same price for oil, fuel oil as they do in Anchorage, aren't you giving with one hand and taking away with another?

Commissioner Gallagher - That's possible. Also they may be export refineries too.

George Silides - The North Pole an export refinery?

Commissioner Gallagher - Not the North Pole ones, obviously not.

George Silides - But the SOCAL one?

Commissioner Gallagher - I know some piloteers for it.

George Silides - The SOCAL one?

Commissioner Gallagher - Yea.

George Silides - Are they export?

George Silides - I'm just curious. And another question on hardware then, I'm presuming that the same answer you gave on the tankers (inaudible) tankers goes for the increase tax on the pipeline.

Commissioner Gallagher - The increase tax, there is no increase tax on the pipeline.

George Silides - Well, under your system there would be a greater take because - -

Commissioner Gallagher - No we're just trying to cure our court case.

George Silides - I see.

Commissioner Gallagher - We already think we have it.

George Silides - One final technical thing again Madame Chairman. Are you aware Commissioner that in addition to the Walter J. Leavy Associates finding a flaw in only part of your severance tax bill, did you know that the Research Division of Legislative Affairs Agency has also found essentially the same flaw?

Commissioner Gallagher - I don't, that is not a flaw. That is the cents per barrel for coming in and playing a part there. It works exactly like it is intended. Those fields that are, where the formula works out to be 50 percent of what the phenomenal rate should be, is in fact 50 percent.

George Silides - Well Commissioner, I'm just calling it to your attention so that you maybe can talk to Mr. Erickson because he feels like the Walter J. Leavy Associates does that the bill is not fulfilling the function that you designed it for and I'm only bringing it to your attention. I'm not in the position, I don't know enough about it to argue about it.