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SYMPOSIUM--September 10, 1977
Anchorage Westward Hilton

Present: Dr. Barbara Bergman, University of Maryland; Dr. Donald Gordon, Simon Fraser University; Citizens' Panel: Dr. George Rogers; John Havelock; Dr. John Lindauer; Jamie Love; Tim Bradner; Members of House Special Committee on the Permanent Fund: Clark Gruening, Chairman; Russ Meekins; Bill Miles; Mike Doogan, Administrative Assistant; Pat Rodey, Vice Chairman, Senate Special Committee on the Permanent Fund.

Introductions made by Chairman Gruening--continues:

GRUENING: I had a long statement on the Permanent Fund and my views on it, but due to a self-inflicted wound playing racket ball yesterday, I'm going to have to cut it short. I would like, before I turn it over to the Economists, to state briefly we do have a very challenging task before us. I know when I originally favored the concept establishing a Permanent Fund, I saw many goals and many objectives that the Fund could accomplish. As I get into the subject and see the complexity of it, I see that maybe our goals can be achieved by finding that which is best achieved by a special fund such as the Permanent Fund.

Today I want to explore that. I want to explore the possibility on a philosophical basis as opposed to what your pet investment may be. I know that people discuss various things the Fund can do and we, as Committee members, have received suggestions from people for investments--everything from artifacts to wheat.

What we want to explore today are the reasons why that particular investment is consistent with your philosophy or your goal that you wish the Permanent Fund to seek. With that I'd like to turn it over to Dr. Bergman.

BERGMAN: Thank you. In trying to think over what kind of a contribution I could make, what occurred to me was to try to say some things that would sort out the issues, which would try to separate one issue from another and show how they're related. What economists have to offer, I think, is rules of thumb and wisdoms of various types. I think our major expertise is trying to sort out the issues. So let me try to do that. I don't think I'm going to tell you anything you don't know. But perhaps by putting them or classifying into a little bit of light. A good way to start out would be to discuss three kinds of scenarios for the state. Let me call the three scenarios: the spend as you get scenario--dole it out as fast as you get it--that's one. The development fund approach, which is to try to take some of the oil revenues and use it to develop the state. And the third scenario, let's call the gilt edge approach, which is to take the Permanent Fund and essentially invest it, for the most part, in the lower 48, in the capital markets and use only the income.

Now, very kindly provided here was a thing with which no professor travels--that is a blackboard. Let me try to contrast these and then show what they entail in some respects. We have three panels here and measure time on the horizontal axis and dollars on the vertical axis. This is the spend as you

get approach. Let's assume, without inquiring for the moment, where the numbers come from, that at more or less a current level of services, there are certain financial needs, which the state has. Let me for the moment put those down as more or less horizontal, perhaps with a very slight, a moderate growth trend; but certainly not a big growth trend. Let's call that needs for spending. At the moment, there are some non-oil taxes, and let us assume that those also, tax breaks remaining the same, have a more or less horizontal trend. So these are non-oil related taxes. They depend on the economic state. They would presumably grow unless the tax breaks change as the days go. And then, of course, what we've got is this thump of the oil revenues which are going to exceed by some very considerable amount for some considerable time the needs for outlay of services at current levels. The spend as you get approach very simply is just to do this sort of thing; use them all up; and then when they run out, go back to that situation. Of course that is the approach the Permanent Fund presumably designed to avoid. I just put that in as a base line.

The next one represents the gilt edge approach--g-i-l-t--I suppose some of those who want to see the development of the Fund might spell gilt in another way. There again, people assume that the Fund revenues will not be used for development purposes. All of it, and this is an extreme case, will again be devoted to gilt edge investment and so that the non-oil revenues will not be any different than they would have been, but the spending will look more like this. There will be perhaps some spending out of the oil revenues for current purposes--again I'm putting needs, the same in the second panel as in the first panel. But after a while there'll be considerable income from the Permanent Fund assets and the Permanent Fund income will take over as the oil revenues come out. So there might be some excess of the Permanent Fund income over needs; but in general possibly that might be devoted to raising levels of services or sending some of the funds back, possibly lowering taxes or a variety of things.

The third approach is the development fund approach, and then the scenario is something like this. I might say, the scenario from the developmental fund approach is somewhat controversial; that is, the first two I put down naturally you can't foresee even how gilt edge investments will do. We all know that. Nevertheless, you might say, this is a conservative approach from the point of a risk--the one we're about to talk about perhaps is, at least from the standpoint of a risk persay, somewhat more risky. But the more optimistic scenario, from some points of view anyway, goes something like this. The use of the Fund for development purposes will broaden the tax base, and instead of having the non-oil revenues flat, as we do in the other two cases, they sort of take off. Here again, we have the oil revenues helping us and they peter out. It may be that some capital has also been lost because there is going to be a greater risk--the kind of loans we make--so the income from the Fund will probably not be as big as it would in Case 2; but nevertheless, there'll be some and the non-oil base in the state will have done well enough to cover the needs. Those are the three scenarios.

Now, say the third one is not as sure fire in the sense of being able to tell what will happen as the others. For example, Dr. Tussing's view is, in general, with certain rather limited exceptions, the use of the Fund as a development fund would not have this take-off effect on the economy. In general, the economy is going where it's going. It's got a dynamic of its

own; it depends largely on such an opportunity; the investment opportunities there are will be financed through private channels, which will be adequate to finance in the deserving one--the ones that will pan out. That kind of adjustment has what the private sector does well; if there is a shortage of some type in Alaska which can be remedied through capital flow and so on, so forth. This is one view. That view is that, in fact, the development fund scenario that I've drawn here wouldn't really work out. That is the non-oil revenues will not be materially effected by whether it is used this way or this way. What will mainly be effected is the amount of the capital which is left and return on it. If you ask me what I think, I would say that you need to decide whether you do believe in the efficacy of the development fund approach. I'm sure a lot of people do. I may say, that since I knew I was coming here, I did some work in Washington trying to find out what some people in Washington who are in capital markets think about closed funds to places like Alaska. The general views that I got were that the market mechanism for getting funds into places like Alaska has much improved in the last 10 years--federal infrastructure, federal homeown bank board....

So if you believe that, then one might be rather doubtful that the development fund should have been. On the other hand, I tend to be skeptical of doctrinaire pronouncements of that sort. I think there is some merit to that scenario, although I would certainly argue caution. I would say that, in general, the idea of the Permanent Fund--the thing that makes it different from the spend as you get case is a desire to preserve some of the resources for future generations. I think, in a way, the best way you could put this is comparing the people who have to manage the Fund to the trustees for a family. Suppose the trustees have been given the instruction to make sure the grandchildren are taken care of. That kind of instruction would argue to the gilt edge route. Suppose the current adults in the family come and say, 'we have a family business which is in terrible need of funds, and if we can get these funds, the grandchildren will be better off, not through the silly gilt edge securities you're going to buy but rather through the business that we are going to develop. Come on, trustee, give us the money.' Now should the trustee do that? I don't think in a doctrinaire way the answer is yes or no. I think you can say the trustee ought to watch out. I think the question the trustee has to ask is why can't the present adults in the family get commercial funding? Does the trustee know something about the family that perhaps commercial markets don't know about that family? Also, and this leads to a rather different point, is that you've got more than one grandchild, you have to worry about intra-personal equity; you have to worry about different groups in the constituent population. Let me turn to that for a minute. I'm used to a much bigger blackboard. This is the only deprivation I've suffered since coming to Alaska. You can think of the cast of characters we have that the people planning for this Fund have to take into account. Most planning models involve summary statements of this much income and that much expenditure; but the real guts of the thing are the benefits and costs to individuals or groups of this Committee. Not everybody in Alaska has the same interests and there are some opposing interests, I'm sure. For example, what interests the kinds of people we have here to consider. First of all, the people who are in business; there are people who work in those businesses; there are professional people; and there are native Americans. You can divide those into people who are here now and people who might come if you get this development fund scenario, if it goes the way this diagram says it will go. Even those people

you can then branch off into twice as many groups by talking about different values. For example, some business people are here regardless of the special characteristics of the Alaskan community and environment. They're here to make a buck. Others make a lot of bucks. And there's nothing wrong with that; it's the good old American way. Economists could find in his or her hearts to do that. Then there are the people who are here because of the special nature of the Alaskan economy; the special nature of the Alaskan environment; the special nature of the people here. And they have an interest in keeping it that way. So you classify people in three different ways: 1) by their role in the economy; 2) by their value system; and 3) by whether they're here or whether they're not here yet. It seems to me that it's very hard to do any planning for the state should, in some formal way, try to weigh costs and benefits. For example, I would weigh costs to the native American community as very high, in my calculations. I wouldn't just subtract the native American communities costs from the benefits, say to a hotel owner. Usual calculations, you subtract the cost from the benefits; or you take a ratio of the cost of the benefits. If the ratio looks good, say let's go ahead. I think there's a waiting process that has to be put in here. I would discourage any planning process due to the fact that there are the different groups and they do have different interests and different values to be taken into consideration.

GRUENING: Doctor, I just wanted to mention that this hotel is owned by native Americans.

BERGMAN: Why don't I stop here.

GRUENING: That wasn't intended to cut you off.

Incidentally, although we're elevated on this stage, it wasn't intentional. I think the audience here is just as elevated, and we want to make this informal. After the panel makes their statements and questions, I hope that people will feel free to come up here and make a statement and ask questions of either the Economists, the Panelists, or even us, for that matter. Go ahead, Dr. Gordon.

GORDON: Well, to some extent, I think I'll be overlapping with Professor Bergman, so I'll eliminate that kind of consideration. I am struck, as the Chairman said, with what I consider the awesome responsibility of those people who are to decide what is going to happen to the Permanent Fund in particular, and other oil revenues. I am struck by that because, while I find the numbers tossed around a bit confusing, there're all pretty big. If we take the kinds of figures that are in the little green pamphlet, we can talk about number like \$8 billion, whether in the Permanent Fund is in some assumptions it is, or whether or it's in the Permanent Fund or not, it's a transitory income from these oil revenues. Now, it's very hard to

get people to take numbers like 8 billion and have it mean something. I find it useful to use this as a person in a family. So I got out my World Almanac and I find that there are about 400,000 Alaskans. Suppose this Fund has by 1985 about \$8 billion, and suppose we can define an Alaskan, and as Professor Bergman pointed out, that may be the trickiest part of the problem--suppose we define Alaskans as people who were here when the oil was discovered, suppose we say it legally belongs to the entity, the state of Alaska--it morally belongs to those people. It's their money. Those people who are going to make the decision have to spend that money for them. If we divide the \$8 billion by 400,000 people, we get \$20,000 a piece. If we estimate the average family is four persons, that's \$80,000 per family.

It is just as Professor Bergman suggested, it is like being in the role of a trustee. If you want to dress up the story--the father dies; his young wife and three children--but she happens to have \$80,000. You are a brother or a friend or something, and you are appointed trustee. It is assumed in trustee agreements, as I've had the misfortune to read some of them, that the people who are the beneficiaries of the trust really can't be charged with spending their own money. So somebody else has to spend it, and a guess is the implication of the way the Fund is set up. Now, \$80,000 will set up the average American family--it will be an enormous asset. It will make their whole way of life different than it otherwise would be. So, I think, that the most important thing is to think of this as making a decision for about 100,000 four-person families out there, each of which has \$80,000 which you have been entrusted with spending.

Now, the tricky thing is going to be defining an Alaskan. For that purpose, I assume you can define an Alaskan in some limited way as consisting of a certain number of people and it's those people who, in effect, own the \$20,000 a piece or the \$80,000 per family. There's another thing that struck me in looking around the world in the last few years. There are countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the press almost universally and a lot of people who should know better, go to these countries and and say, 'You know, these countries have a real problem; they can't spend that money.' These countries aren't democracies. So what they must mean is that the king and his beaucracy can't spend the money, because we all know that if you passed this money around among the average Bedouin in Saudi Arabia, that with the help of Sears Roebuck and a thousand other firms from the rest of the world, they'd have no trouble spending the money at all. But in those countries the money isn't the people's money. It's the king's money. But again, the notion that you have a problem spending the money is only appropriate for a very different kind of society than we think we have. A third question that I think is very important is what, apart from what is currently is in the Permanent Fund or what is in the Permanent Fund in the future according to different assumptions, there was a very significant question about what should be treated as income from a depleting resource and permanent income. In economics, there is a very common distinction between what you might call regular income and windfall income. Sometimes these are called permanent income and transitory income. In principal, it's just as every prudent household would treat those two things quite separately. If you have an income of \$15,000 a year and you expect it to continue forever, you treat it one way. If in one particular year, an aunt dies and totally unbeknownst to you, she had some money and she left you \$15,000. Now it's hard to find

one person, I think, who would say they'd treat that once and for all \$15,000 in the same way as their regular \$15,000. In otherwise, they wouldn't just double their spending that year because their income happened to double.

The most important thing is to think of transitory income as different from permanent income. When some oil money is going to last some 25 years, especially at the beginning, that money is partly transitory and partly permanent. For simplification, I want to think of it as transitory. One way to compare any other ways of treating this money would be to imagine a world in which we don't live and imagine just giving that \$80,000 to each family--what it would do for them and what they could do with it. With that as a bench mark, consider alternative problems. In considering these other alternative policies, we have to make some critical assumptions. Perhaps we should investigate the facts. We have to make some presumption about a very critical thing and that is the flow of labor and capital into and out of Alaska. That's part of the problem defining an Alaskan. That has been already eluded to by Professor Bergman and she referred to the paper by Dr. Tussing in which he argued that, subject to further research, capital flow is very easily into and out of Alaska, and therefore, the rate of return to capital in Alaska is primarily set in the United States, or even better in the world market. Capital flow is pretty easily around quite a few countries. I would like to extend that and just for the sake of argument, subject to a lot of further research on the problem that the same is true of labor. The labor flows pretty freely from one part of the United States to another. If that's true, then there's nothing that can be done with this Fund that can change the wage of labor. Now, of course, it isn't the wage of labor, there's a whole structure of wages--from high priced brain surgeons down to busboys. But those wages will be set, not in Alaska, they'll be set in the United States; because there's free migration back and forth. I want to make those assumptions for the moment anyway. Assume that there is competitive capital market and competitive labor market. I will modify that later on. Now consider two or three alternative ways of using this money. One of them I have I asked my conservative friends. They have the assumption that giving money to the government is pouring it down the rathole to some degree--they have different rathole co-efficients, but it's significantly bigger than zero. So they say cut taxes. If we cut taxes, then we won't keep the level of government expenditures of what it would be otherwise. Cut taxes, then the money would be used by the people for sensible purposes--cut sales taxes, cut income taxes, so forth. Now if you ask yourself what that means, subject to the assumption that the flows of labor and capital between the United States and Alaska are perfectly free, then the initial effect of that would be that real wages after taxes would rise in Alaska relative to what they were in the United States. As soon as they did that, more people would come from the United States to Alaska. The final result of that would be that the real wage would be precisely the same as it was before. The real return on capital would be the same. Nothing would happen. Who would gain. Well, there'd be more people here. If you would own a local monopoly, with the economy scales such as the local newspaper, you would probably gain, because as opposed to being a barber or even a hotel owner, if more people came, then more barbers would come. If more people came, more people would set up hotels. You wouldn't rake off a big gain. On the other hand, if more people came, it is unlikely more newspapers would be set up. So that's one small way in which local would gain.

Secondly, local people would gain to the extent they own scarce resources here that can't be reproduced. Not a hotel because you can build another hotel; but the land on which the hotel is built. If you own scarce, high priced land in downtown Anchorage, you would gain.

Finally, it could very well be that you have a labor union. I guess Economists like to call that a labor monopoly. Unions don't like that word; they don't mind talking about market power, but these are all words. Let's suppose there is a labor group here which has the power to raise the wage or lower the wage to some degree. Subject to, of course, the constraint that when they raise the wage, not so many people will be hired as when they lower the wage. Now, if we imagine a cut in taxes, we abolish the competitive market for labor which we assumed; now if we imagine cutting taxes, people will come here; but the labor union can keep the wage; the people coming here won't depress the wage to make up for the taxes. The labor union can keep the wage the same way because the demand for labor will be the same as before; so that, in the case of a local monopoly in labor, and in the small bits of income that are earned by land rents in scarce areas, there might be some gain. But the overwhelming bulk of income which is the competitive wage plus capital, won't be effected in the long run. What will happen, of course, is that the \$8 billion will be spread over the rest of the United States, because by some small amount, as labor leaves the rest of the United States wages will rise--higher than they otherwise would be. Let's consider another thing. Another scenario. I think this is something like developing the economy. The word development is a bit tricky. It's generally used, always used, in economics to apply to so-called underdeveloped areas, developing economies in places like Bangladesh and Peru and Zaire and so forth. But that's not true in Alaska, because clearly, even without making the rigorous assumption those countries think of trying to take an economy where the real wage rises very significantly. Nothing is going to make the real wage rise very significantly in Alaska because that's set in the United States. Just as the real wage in Seattle is set in the United States. It's not development in the same sense. I'm always a little confused about development. Sometimes people say, we want to create jobs. I see in Alaska, people talk about diversifying the economy and developing renewable as opposed to non-renewable resources. But all these things, seem to me, subsidizing local industry in some way so that there will be industries here that otherwise wouldn't exist. Dr. Tussing, in his paper, was talking about situations where you don't subsidize. He said, as Professor Bergman indicated, that he generally believed that if you don't subsidize, then you're not going to create any more industry. But he did not say, and I don't think Professor Bergman intended to imply that he did, that you couldn't subsidize industries and create industries that wouldn't otherwise exist. If you did that, there would be more people. There'd also be a bigger tax base. There'd be more services to supply those same people, presumably required. Basically, when you got all through that, just as in the, what I call, conservative case, this is the interventionist case. The people who trust government more than the rathole theory. The interesting thing is that they both come out with roughly the same conclusion. You have more people; you have more capital; the real wage is the same; the rate of return on capital is the same; and in the case of a few local monopolies, they have gained but nothing else has happened. The reasons it happens, of course, is that the benefits are flowing to Alaskans, but an Alaskan is really defined is any body who can benefit by moving here or by not moving here, for that matter.

Now, let's consider a third thing--amenities. You create amenities. The trouble is if you build a big opera house in Anchorage, I'd be much happier to come for a lower wage than I otherwise would. An amenity is a real part of the real wage. People would then have their real wage and amenities rather than lower taxes. Incidentally, when you talk about amenities and providing government expenditures, there is no difference in principal between whether the income is a renewable resource or a non-renewable resource. If income flows to the state, one question is that should always be asked is, if this income is flown directly to the people, it's their income, would they then be willing to be taxed some of that income to create the thing which they would consider building? A better university, a big opera house, play fields, golf courses--all those things. Before you build a golf course, which I'd be much in favor of, you've got to think about the fact, would the people be willing to be taxable on the course, if instead of going first to the state, it had gone to them. That's of course true whether the funds are transitory funds or permanent funds.

Now, another thing mentioned is stabilizing the economy. I thought Dr. Tussing's paper had an adequate analysis of that question. It is very easy when one has looked back on a time series of what happened to the economy. To say, if we had only put a little more money into the economy there, and then taxed a little more there, the economy would be much more stable. In fact, it is sort of inevitable to think it sensible to pour money in there and take it out there. The problem is, as anyone who tries to make money in the stock market will know, that's not nearly as simple. If you look back at the stock market over the last four years and you would say, 'gee, it was easy to make money in the stock market--all you had to do was buy here and sell here.' It may seem that the problem of stabilizing the economy is not that different. It is a problem of prediction. It is the problem of getting the spending going very rapidly relative to when you need it. As Dr. Tussing says those problems are not easy to solve.

I might add something, if you can predict the economy, then you can stabilize without any Permanent Fund. You borrow the money when you need and you pay it back other times. It's not hard to stabilize if you can predict, without having any special Permanent Fund. When I think more about this problem, here's this money, which it is said, belongs to Alaskans; but what are you going to do with it so it will make some difference in Alaska--some real difference to the average Alaskan? I come back to what I call the bench mark. The best thing would be to take it, the \$80,000, and spread it around to each family. Suppose you can't do that? Is there some way you could spread around the income from that? Not by cutting taxes. The income from that goes to certain people who, as it is interpreted, own the resources. Incidentally, I think the idea of just giving the money to the people is somehow associated with conservative views, whatever conservative means. My understanding is that Milton Friedman has suggested that view. Everyone knows he's conservative enough. It must have occurred to a lot of people since the beginning of time--it certainly occurred to people in Alberta at the time oil revenues were discovered there. Whether it's conservative or not, it's profoundly egalitarian because it would take \$80,000 and give it to each family. Not depending on whether they're rich or poor--exactly the same

amount. It's not egalitarian because you're soaking the rich to help the poor. That money didn't belong to the rich any more on a one for one basis to begin with. So it would have a profoundly egalitarian effect on the distribution of wealth and the distribution of income, if you can't distribute the wealth. I was intrigued by the suggestion in the green pamphlet of the Governor that you might pass out the income. I understand there's some legal problems in all this. The legal problem is again defining an Alaskan. I understand perhaps the legal problems will be solved if you think of pension for when a person's 55. There's nothing in nature that says a pension has to be distributed at 55--maybe at 45, maybe 25. Anyway, I think if you regard these resources as being morally belonging to Alaskans, you should think of some way to give it to those people you define as Alaskans. Otherwise you might as well write a check for \$8 billion and send it to Jimmy Carter, because that's where it's going, for all practical purposes.

If you took \$20,000 per person and put it in the stock market, would he own it--\$20,000 per person; \$80,000 per family. You notice that the average Alaskan, who let's suppose is like the average American now, wouldn't have \$4,000 rounding out the \$3900 to \$4000 but he'd have \$24,000. Of course, there's other wealth besides the stock market. Houses, some wealth that isn't counted, like future pension plans. But I come back to a number like that to impress, because I'm impressed, to try to impress you with the awesome nature of this responsibility. There are a lot of poor people in Alaska. I can't imagine one way that would do better for those poor people and for some people who are not so poor than to contrive some scheme whereby you can benefit them, if you believe they morally own those resources. Now you may say they shouldn't own those resources, they belong to the United States. You might even say they shouldn't own those resources, they belong to the whole world. If you believe they morally belong to Alaskans, it seems to me that the thing is to contrive some scheme where, in fact, the Alaskans will do the benefitting. Some defined body of Alaskans.

To make one final note. If you talk about future Alaskans--that's pretty confusing. You see, there's where the analogy with the family breaks down. If you think of a trustee and a family, you want to take care of the children and the grandchildren; and if Alaskans were defined that way, it would be simple. It would be the children and the grandchildren of the original 400,000. If you talk about who might live in Alaska who now lives in Alabama or New York City or Seattle, then it becomes very hard to do anything with it. Of course, if you gave the money out as a grant, which you couldn't, chances are the parents would take care of the children; and they would take care of their grandchildren, as is the normal way we treat wealth. The normal way we treat wealth in the United States we assume people are responsible and are capable of handling their own money better than the government. If we say that's not possible, then we should probably try to devise a method by Alaska, Inc. or a pension at some age, so that the people who morally own the resources get some access to them, who really do the benefitting. You might ask them if they'd rather have the income from \$80,000 or some vague thing called diversifying the economy. There isn't such a thing as economy of state, there are just people there.

Anyway, I think it's a very tricky problem. It appears to be in a large respect a legal problem. The only economic aspect of it, I think, is to recognize that nothing you do with this money can change, for all practical purposes, the real wage and the rate of return of the capital, and that's the bulk of normal income.

Whether resources invested in Alaska or Toyoko, for that matter, or New York Stock Exchange, it doesn't so much matter. I think it depends more on whether you use it to deliberately subsidize income or not. Presumably, as a prudent trustee, you invest it with considerations of real earnings after allowing for inflation, which makes it more complicated, and some safety. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, doctor. Thank you, Dr. Bergman and Dr. Gordon. I think you've specifically trampled on a lot of people's assumptions. I think they ought to have the opportunity to trample on yours. We have a panel that will hopefully do that. I would like to make just one remark on the figures that are being tossed around here today. \$80,000 is, of course, very hypothetical. The revenue projection includes both the Permanent Fund and the general fund, based on the pipeline presuming a full design capacity, based upon a reasonable tariff, based upon a lot of things. We are dealing with a lot of if's. I think the point is well taken.

Maybe the panel can proceed in the order in which they were introduced.

HAVELOCK: We must make a determination of how it's to be managed in the future. Both of our panelists have referred to the analogy of the family. We are trustees for a family. You can reduce this to the position of a person in a family. There are profoundly different ways in which a regional economy operates and in which a family operates. The differences, I think, need to be addressed. I think we need to get the Alaska public out of the situation of thinking about it in purely family terms--the kind of terms, which say, for instance, on the national level, that because the national debt went up last year we're worse off. Those kind of economics are very dangerous. As far as the scenarios that Barbara pointed out, they're not real--any of them. That is, the scenarios of reality are sort of a merged concept of all three. There is a tendency to confuse oil revenue with Permanent Fund revenue, when, in fact, so far, as you know, the Permanent Fund is only a committed percentage of oil revenue. I don't like little bumps like that, that sort of look like here today, gone tomorrow. We are not talking about a bump--we are talking about a very long curve. It may start high, but oil revenue isn't going to suddenly shut down. The economics of scarcity, we're the last major producer of oil on the American continent, say as the amount of oil available goes down, the value per unit will go up. The whole business of Alaska running out of money strikes me as a basic error in viewing the situation which could get tangled up in managing the fund.

The discussion of what constitutes an Alaskan has been a troublesome one in this state. I'm not sure it's very fruitful other than it provides entertainment in setting one group of Alaskans against another based upon their longevity in the state. But I think you do need in any scheme that's being set up to look at the winners and the losers under various schemes of investment.

One of the basic problems of the family analogy, of course, is that it assumes that when you put something away we aren't spending it. Particularly if you are involved in investment in Alaska--what the Permanent Fund is really doing is simply shifting the expenditure of funds from more of a tilt to the public sector, which is the effect of having a legislature the dominant controlling factor in the expenditure of funds, to having a predominantly private sector investment to the extent that Permanent Fund money is committed to profit making enterprises automatically. It's a long panel. I think one analogy I'd like to throw out for you to think about--it's a long panel so I'm just going to throw a few pot shots and then back out. There is an analogy, there are a lot of analogies to what's happened in Alaska. One of them is presumably supposing you'd had an Appalachian regional commission when they started getting into coal, would you have set up a Permanent Fund and devoted part of Appalachian money into that? What about the grandchildren today in Appalachia? How would they have benefitted from that fund?

BERGMAN: Stock and General Motors

HAVELOCK: Well, if the function was to keep people in Appalachia, it worked because there was such a fund in a sense insofar as the United Mine Workers took money and put it into various pension funds and so on. If we did that and helped to pin people down to going on and living in an economy which was not self-sustaining, I don't think we've done anybody's grandchildren any great favors. I think it's great to be an Alaskan, but if there are no jobs here, why the hell not move out--for those who have no employment? I don't see the public purpose served in subsidizing people who are two generations beyond me who are only marginally going to be related to me, who, if you look at the general trends of the economy of the United States, are going to be far richer than I am anyway. Those are some of the reasons why I think you have to look at the management very carefully.

GRUENING: I have one question. If you want to discourage future generations, what about present generations?

HAVELOCK: The assumption of statehood incidentally, one of the assumptions on that chart is that we have the income to sustain a moderate level of public need. The assumption of statehood was that we would use resource money in order to meet public need. All over the record of statehood hearings the basic opposition of making Alaska a state was that there was not the income from regular tax revenues to sustain the public need level. I think you can invest. I would say that we've got to meet a schedule of unmet public sector needs before we start going on with a heavy dose of private expenditure the worst risk of which is going to subsidize premature development of natural resources that we should be developing at the end of that curve.

GRUENING: Any questions here of Dr. John Havelock?

MEEKINS: Dr. Havelock, I have a couple questions. We hear a lot on this Committee that needs, you know it's very difficult to define needs, pressing needs expand to meet the amount of revenue that's available. I think that that concept is somehow inherent in the desire to have a Permanent Fund. Do you have any thoughts on that? In other words, saying that we should meet

our needs first means that we should spend all the money that we have to some people. This argument has been made to me anyway that we should spend all the money that we have simply because needs will expand infinitely.

HAVELOCK: Well, I think that the legislature can sort of define a minimum sustainable standard of living in Alaska, the kind of picture of Alaska you want and hold to it. There is some truth in what you say--that needs will go expanding indefinitely. The tendency of heavy private sector investments is going to be to spread the benefits to much more extremes. That is, losers in our society are going to go on being losers, even though you're putting all this in. Losers benefit out of public sector expenditure--some kinds of it. I'm not sure I'm ready for the opera house; there are a lot of things before that. I think that is a legislative problem and it involves taking a management approach to public sector needs in terms of establishing your base line.

MEEKINS: One more question. You were talking about what you consider to be fallacy in the analogy of the family. I'm just wondering if I have it correctly. As I understood what you said, you seemed to be implying anyway, that investments are going to be made with this money because people are going to deposit it in their bank accounts. If we did have an Alaska, Inc. of some sort, that this money would then be deposited in the private financial institutions, and they would make the relevant decisions about investments. Is that not as preferable in your view as the legislature making those decisions about how that money is invested?

HAVELOCK: Generally speaking, no. My basic point is simply you should know that's what's going on. That you are transferring the decision making process over the use of funds. I think that's obviously very healthy for a pure investment policy, for instance. I don't think you guys know what you're doing if you're giving the legislature the authority to run around money markets and decide what kind of instruments to buy and sell. Obviously, it's the kind of things you want to give to the private sector. Prejudice is the same in any form of development banking. I've seen too much development banking with heavy political control that amounted to shenanigans. I would rather see, if you are going to go into development banking, the use of banking standards of risk evaluation. I'd rather not have that muddied by politics.

GRUENING: Thank you, John. We have now next to him Dr. George Rogers. Incidentally, the two Economists, if our panel isn't going to ask you questions, you can ask them questions.

ROGERS: Clark, one of the things I'm going to do after this meeting is inquire into the nature of your racket ball inflicted injury. I think as a public spirited citizen I might suggest the state invest in racket ball courts as a means of cutting down on public discussion somewhat.

I, like John, will make a statement and then be available for questions. I'm an Economist but find it difficult to act as an Economist when I get into a political setting for obvious reasons. I, unlike John, was not opposed to the Permanent Fund but I was in favor of it for different reasons than the stated reasons. I know how the legislature acts when it gets a pot of money. I know it's going to spend every penny that comes in. I looked upon it as a curb upon legislative spending. I'm not too concerned about the intricacies of whether we call it a development bank or not. I agree with Dr. Arlon Tussing that the development bank has very limited, or will have very limited, impact upon the Alaska economy, which gets me very quickly to my statement. I would like to put the statements made by Professors Bergman and Gordon into the Alaska economic context. I think this is very important. In Jim Rhode's covering letter inviting them to attend here, he made one passing remark that, I think the statement was that of every dollar gross state product \$.64 leaks out. I think this gives you an idea of the nature of our economy. It's a colonial economy in which the state product is largely exported, the value is largely exported.

BERGMAN: What do you think that statistic is for the state of Maryland?

ROGERS: It's probably something like that, but the point I want to get to quickly on that...

BERGMAN: Alaska's not that very much different from the rest of the country in that respect.

ROGERS: Okay. That's right, because we do--as states we are part of a national entity. There are these traits and so on.

First of all, the value is not an Alaskan value. It is something that goes into the national economy very definitely. Looking at the regional economy, however, you find that we generally define in the terms of such measures as per capita real income earned by residents and other measures. You find that the Alaska economy is dominantly a government economy. Very quickly, if you were to look at the basic part of our economy--the part that generates the whole thing--looking at the resource we find that before oil came along, it was very, very minimal. A fading fishing industry, a stagnant forest products industry, and then this great military establishment, construction industry that was generated by that. Then from the 1940's on, whatever measure you use of the regional economy, you find that half or more of the employment, income, and so on generated by it is in terms of state and federal government income directly.

Then the support industry in the private sector is primarily in support. These people, these programs are living off them in some way. If we were to eliminate or reduce the rat hole co-efficient on the Alaska economy back to a level that would be a more reasonable one in terms of Professor Gordon's philosophies, we would have something like the 1939 economy.

At that time, we had a thriving fisheries industry; we had mining industry, which, in terms of labor employed, was probably larger than the oil industry's going to be here. So in terms of a natural resource economy, we would be reducing ourselves to something like 75,000 people operating primarily a few natural resource extractive industries with a minimum of federal and state government services required to maintain that work force in operation.

The thing is that the state government has become the driving force in our economy. This is the reason that the scenarios by Professor Bergman are relevant. I don't agree with John that they are irrelevant because she concentrated on state revenue. Each one of these is a hypothetical projection of what the state revenues might be given three different scenarios or three different ways of managing the oil revenues--spend as you go; putting it into a development bank type operation; or working out the investment--I think the investment was the second and the development bank was the last one--because the reason we have a community like Anchorage is because of government spending. The government spending has almost assumed a life of its own. When we are talking about stabilizing the economy, we are really, in essence, talking about stabilizing the level of government spending; because if it drops off, our economy drops off; or if the private sector, for example, the oil revenue drops off, if there isn't anything else to take its place, then one way of doing it is to increase government employment. If you are talking about distributing under Professor Gordon's per capita distribution model, distributing the money to the average Alaskan, you would, in many cases, be distributing to a government bureaucrat and his family. So that the Kuwait model is a relevant one in Alaska, except that the bureaucracy is much larger and represents a much larger segment of the population.

BERGMAN: What about the privates on the base?

ROGERS: The privates on the base--yes. That's a whole sector of the economy that is generally there, they generate income in Alaska but they are only here for a couple of years on an average, depending on what their turn around is. But we consider them part of the bureaucracy too, because they are paid by the government; they perform governmental functions of safety and protection.

But what I am saying is we've got to get our talk about investment, management, talk about the use of the fund into a realistic Alaskan economic setting. When we talk about diversification, we are talking desperately about trying to get something else besides government in the picture. Not simply to proliferate a lot of little business around, which is probably what we will end up doing. But it is a tough job to find something, an alternative, to continued government spending, government employment.

Another thing, I notice the Alaska Humanities Forum is one of the sponsors of this. When I saw this, I wondered what a nice organization like that was doing in a place like this. I decided that we should make some comments on that too. Professor Gordon talked about amenities. I think this is what the Alaska Humanities Forum is interested in--making Alaska a better place to live. Now this is something that Economists can't give you advice on, except we can give you some analogies, cost benefit type of analogies, and help you in that way. This is another thing we should consider. The Permanent Fund, we have two functions: one is to manage the investment policy of it. In other words, maintain the integrity of the fund, so that, in fact, the Fund is a Permanent Fund; and that we do get the maximum income generated which we can then use for current spending. The current spending could be used for a number of purposes. We could use it for the creation of new development, or we could use it for amenities--a whole range of things we might consider. I don't want us to get caught in the development bank syndrome and just stick there. I think there are other things that we should consider as citizens when we talk about the use of the Permanent Fund.

I don't have any questions at this time. I made quite a few notes. As the discussion goes on, I think we can come back to that, Clark, I think I'll stop now.

GRUENING: Thank you very much, Dr. Rogers. Incidentally, thanks for mentioning the Humanities Forum. It is on the agenda the fact that they helped sponsor this. I should say again we're very grateful to the Alaska Humanities Forum for sharing half the cost of the room and other incidental costs we have in setting this up. Are there any questions for the Economists or this panel? As soon as we get through the panel, we're going to open this up to the audience to inquire of anybody here. Representative Meekins.

MEEKINS: Dr. Rogers, I have a question that really arose when Dr. Gordon was speaking. Perhaps I'll direct it to you, and see if you have any thoughts on it. He was indicating, I think, he felt very strongly, it seemed, that the individuals in Alaska could make better decisions regarding the spending of what is morally their money than the legislature. I think we've coined a phrase here talking about the rat hole co-efficient. I think that's the implication of that phrase that the legislature isn't as wise and can't spend the money as wisely as individuals can or least not as efficiently. One of the things that, I think, legislators are always confronted with is our system of government is representative in the sense that we are expected to know a little bit more than the general public. They are expected to vote for us, and then we are supposed to get more involved in the individual decisions. Sometimes we find that when we study something, at second thought, it's a little more complicated than it seems to the public. Even though we represent our constituents, we find ourselves voting in opposition to say a majority view. We don't have a strict case of radical democracy in the sense that the majority view does not always prevail in the legislature. This sometimes is extremely good. So if you apply that thinking to

decisions about how best to provide for the benefit of the people of the state. You sometimes maybe would have a contradiction between what the majority of the people would vote for, even allocate their own money for, and what might indeed be best for them. It's a difficult question, but as an example, in some states, the public votes upon appropriations to education. In some of the states lately, they've had a very difficult time getting any appropriations at all. They've gone for weeks and sometimes even months without any appropriation for their school system. I would think that, it seems to me to be an example, at least it's quite obvious to me--I'm very supportive of education--and I think there's a benefit distributed throughout the entire society, whether or not people have children, when we spend money on education. Using that as an example, I just wondered if you have any thoughts on that.

ROGERS: I don't have any profound thoughts on this. I think this is an extreme example of what might be done with the money. The assumption is that all spending is done by individuals. If that were so, I think this would certainly be a valid model to use. You mention education. Education is a group or a social decision. The individual may not have any children, therefore, that individual would not spend any money in education. However, society as a whole has some responsibility, whether you have children or not, so that there are a number of social decisions. We still have to have taxation. I think what Professor Gordon is talking about, I think we had better get you into the discussion, is the distribution of windfall income, incomes that are transitory. We need the distinction between permanent income and transitory income. This would be, for example, the \$900 million bonus we received, which is all gone now. Would it have been better if we had handed it to Alaskans because it's going to go in three or four years anyhow and let them have a spree or invest it wisely, or set it aside in a permanent fund? We did neither. We let it dribble out into our general revenues and it was spent. The effect of that was difficult to trace. They are assigned to--how much the expansion of expenditures reflected need and how much merely reflected the availability of money to the legislature? But I am getting off the point. As I say, I think it was intended as a poll.

GRUENING: Dr. Gordon, would you like to comment?

GORDON: Well, in some questions it matters a lot whether the money coming in is transitory or permanent; and some questions, it doesn't matter much at all. Obviously, there are some things that we choose to provide collectively. There's some argument as to how many of those things we should choose to provide collectively. But there's no question of some things with the exception of very few people. Everybody agrees that some things should be provided collectively, so that when the income of the community goes up, there should be, presumably, more private goods and more public goods. I think it's important, however, to distinguish between something abstract called the economy. And the economy doing this and the economy doing that. What's happening to the individuals? Fundamentally, our whole system of government is set up on the idea that the people vote for these things. And that if the money happens to go to the state first, whether it's permanent or whether it's transitory, one always wants to keep in mind

suppose it had gone to the people first, then you could go to them and say, 'Let's have a better school.' They could allocate the money that way. If, in fact, it goes to the state first, I think really the people get a little unconscious of what's involved. In a way, I'm amazed at some of the answers that have come, because I think, if you want to use this number of 20,000, if you said, 'Would you want to dole out \$80,000? Maybe you can't spend a lot of money but you want to get the income on \$80,000. We'll take care of the principal. We'll give you the income.' Or do you want to diversify the economy? You put that up to them. I find that incredible that people would say, 'No, we don't want the income; we want to diversify the economy.' I think we've got a loose-I'd like to ask Dr. Rogers another question. So the economy has expanded from 75,000 to 400,000 people--the economy has--and that's mostly from state spending. But the question is whose better off than they otherwise would be? The economy isn't somebody whose better off or worse off. It's individuals. I don't think for a moment, and I don't think Dr. Rogers thinks otherwise, it would really go back to 75,000 people. If you took this money, invested most of it outside of Alaska, invest it as a prudent trustee would invest it, and then pay the income to the population--I'd be wanting to know, not what happened to what some people call the economy, what happened to the individuals, who, I guess, morally own that money. Would it have any harmful effect on any other individuals? It's a little hard to see who would be hurt by it.

BERGMAN: I'd like to say one thing. First of all, of course, the \$80,000 is not coming in an instant. It wouldn't be a check. I think that would be pretty hard to resist. On the other hand, I think realistically that if the state of Alaska did propose to send every family a check for \$80,000, I think the people of the United States would re-think the ownership of those resources. I think that the fact that it does come over a period and it is not being handed out in cash to the residents of the state, some degree maps the fact that is in part what is going to happen regardless to the scenario you adopt. I think when you talk about taking the either the capital sum and doling it out as it comes in presumably or doling out the income in cash--particularly when you talk about the capital sum--doling out the capital sum, which I think is beyond the question anyway. But I think there is a difference in what individuals might do and what they might compact as a body of politics would do. I think that the government properly does have a longer vision, a longer horizon than individuals, certainly than many individuals. That is right and proper. I am not as devoted to consumer sovereignty as many Economists are, that is, I am not as devoted to the proposition that every citizen ought to have the right to handle, to make every decision himself, and that the government should not constrain any economic decisions. I think a lot of people would do things they would be sorry for if this money were handled that way. I don't think that's the question anyway. I think the major practical question is the filling of public need, which governs how much goes into the Permanent Fund. Once you've got the Permanent Fund, the use of it or the investment of it, when I gave my list of different kinds of Alaskans what I was intending to do was, Professor Gordon was also calling attention to, and that is to try to get it from a gross concept called the economy down to people. I don't happen to think that the provision of amenities within reason by the public sector is a bad thing. I don't think building a very good university here, building very good sports facilities, reducing some of the problems that are inherent

in the geography of Alaska is really going to spread this benefit around to the entire United States. By the way, if it did, that wouldn't be so bad either--if some of it went that way.

GRUENING: Senator Rodey.

RODEY: I had a question for Dr. Rogers regarding the rate of contribution. The proposal has been made that we put into the Permanent Fund 100% of the royalties plus all monies coming in from the severance taxes and allow the state budget to reflect only a base year figure, population increase, inflation, and perhaps an adjustment factor. As a veteran legislative observer, this would deal with the question you mentioned previously and that was one of a budget constraint. How do you feel about proposals for this sort of input to the Permanent Fund that would essentially take all of the royalty and a good portion of the severance tax leaving only what is necessary for state expenditures on a predetermined level?

ROGERS: This would be, I don't have the figures--I don't know what size figures we're talking--and the fact I've been trying to avoid getting involved in the Permanent Fund controversies entirely--but I certainly feel that this would serve the purpose of putting a damper or rather constraining by putting some limits on state spending in the future which would be a good thing. The income, however, from that fund is still available for use. As I recall, some of the calculations made on that was that it began to become quite sizable, quite a monster in its own right. Even using a relatively low interest rate, you come up with annual income. This, then in a few years, becomes the critical thing. Not so much the principal as what is done with the income--if this is re-invested in the Permanent Fund, it then compounds the problem in a future date. I'm calling it a problem now rather than a solution. If it is then added into the general fund, then again it accelerates the level of state spending. I can't really give you an answer until I've seen the actual solid figures on that. Certainly, the very crude projections we made using our man in the arctic model and using 25 to 50%, 100%, we found that the greater the contribution made to the Permanent Fund had a general dampening effect on the level of the economic attainment in terms of employment income; and this is simply because the assumption was that the government spending would continue at the rate of the revenue increase and employment would continue at that rate. So it's a dog chasing its tail proposition. It does provide a great slowing down of the runaway process.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dr. Rogers. Next in order is Jamie Love of the Alaska research group. Go at it Jamie.

LOVE: Okay. Are the microphones working?

GRUENING: Yes. If you have a question, you can go ahead and ask it.

LOVE: Can I be heard in the back of the room? I don't want to repeat or go over a lot of the things that have been said by some of the other participants here, although there are a lot important things that have been brought out. I know that most of us can agree that the money in oil wealth and Permanent Fund basically is to improve our qualities of life and standard of living and that type of thing. I know that there's one sort of philosophical difference that's immerging right now and that is on this issue whether or not people should just be given the money so they can benefit themselves, or whether the government should spend it for them, and whether or not the main focus of the Permanent Fund ought to be some type of vehicle to get money in the people's hands--get the oil revenue in their hands. I know that's been the primary focus of the public debate that I've heard on the Permanent Fund, more than any other issue--is how you're going to disburse the earnings from the Fund. I think that's been the very main issue. For some reason, I haven't been personally concerned about that area. I've been more concerned about what I consider management issues with the Fund. I think realistically there's going to be sort of a lot of ways the oil wealth is going to be managed to help us. There's some areas, I think everyone's going to agree, that consumer sovereignty, or whatever you want to call it, probably makes a lot of sense. I don't want the government to do my grocery shopping for me or a lot of other things. But I think there are areas where some type of public actionary or adventurist is the only way that certain projects are going to get accomplished. I think it's going to be realistically, in fact as we go along, probably a mixture of those two.

I would like to make one observation relative to things like the difference between a rat hole and a pressing need for a lot of people. I don't always think it's just the project persay. There are examples, there are times when the same project can turn out to be either one. I think most of us are familiar with a lot of efforts to develop housing in rural parts of Alaska. It's very difficult for people living in rural Alaska to provide housing through conventional, their own resources--people living not in a cash economy types of impact that we felt here in urban areas, I'm sure are even more dramatic in rural areas. In that area, I think if housing is going to be provided for people in rural Alaska, the government's going to have to provide certain types of subsidies for financing to accomplish that. I think some people look at rural housing projects as more in the rat hole area than in the pressing needs type area--it's because they're poorly managed. I think there's a tremendous recognition by a lot of people. There's a lot of waste in mismanagement. There's probably some other reasons why the housing wasn't done properly in some areas. I think this is one of the problems the state's going to be facing as we go along and we come into a lot of wealth and we try and take a very activist role in terms of improving qualities--people's qualities of life.

We've sort of taken a big quantative jump into a new area of running the government and providing services. I think we've been very interested, at least in our organization, at looking at the ways and vehicles the state can best put together a lot of planning mechanisms and management functions to have more quality control or better evaluation system as we try to accomplish whether it's a loan program or a cash subsidy or a number of different other things.

One thing I want to note briefly before I get into some other comments is when we talk about the Permanent Fund and we talk about investments, I'm sure that everyone in his mind is thinking that we're also talking about capital spending by the government in terms of just cash--just building projects that aren't really an income producing venture like infrastructure development--roads, highways, that sort of thing--which don't produce revenue by themselves, but may help contribute revenue from another project and level of state services. I know that it's critically important. I think, that the state, when they think about managing their investments, the social investments, that they make in the state of Alaska to be coordinating the development of their capital programs and studying for services with their investment policy--and this has been elaborated in some detail by earlier consultants, Dr. Daniels and Dr. Tussing, I think touched upon this. I just wanted to bring that out. So when we talk about developing investments, we also have to be closely coordinating these policies with other types of problems we're faced with.

Other than those management issues, which, of course, we're very interested in, because, I think, our own examination of some of the state's projects in different areas including the state's existing loan program and the state's housing programs has not been good. I'm not talking about some of our absolute, right up-to-date current but I'm just saying as a general comment--in the last 10 years, for example, we've seen a lot of problems. There are other reasons why we're concerned about the development of the Permanent Fund. One area, and I'm talking primarily about social investments. Those monies that are invested domestically in Alaska, I think, it's important that there be a clear concept of equity in the benefits that people realize. Just as a very quick example: the tourism revolving loan provides loans, I think it's up to \$4 million, or it's up to 3. It used to be up to \$1 million. It used to be, I think 8% for developing tourism facilities. A lot of the loans went, for example, to the Captain Cook Hotel and the Baranof Hotel--they each got a million dollars a piece, as I recall, for developments--8% interest--to develop something, I'm sure would have been developed had they had to go to private credit markets for that money, probably at a higher interest rate. On the other hand, you have some student getting a \$2500 loan to go to the University of Alaska for a year or maybe go outside to school. Then you have a fisherman loan and a VA loan to buy a house. Just trying to determine the equity between all Alaskans to determine whether or not the so-called subsidy or the so-called benefit to the person with the student loan or the home loan was equal compared to the person who got a cheap to build an extension to a hotel that could have been financed anyhow. I think that's an important concept because the wealth is public wealth. When we set up the social loan programs, there's a degree of equity that's involved and the type of social loans that are made--and I think there probably will be some that will and ought to be made.

Another thing is the openness and fairness in the management of the Fund. It is not so much an economic consideration, I guess, after listening to some of the comments. But I think, everyone has talked about what a big burden this is going to be--to manage all this money--and what a mind boggling kind of a problem it is. To me, what's mind boggling is you're going to give the public confidence that the funds are being managed fairly--that the funds are being managed in a way that respects the wishes of the public, and that it's not just controlled by certain interest groups, special interest groups, whatever you want to call them--certain groups or

individuals and that they have a sense of participation and that they feel that everything is on the table. One reason we were concerned is that the administration, and I guess I sort of serve the administration in a capacity on the Advisory Board, there's a lot of discussion on making a \$900 million loan to guarantee financing for the gas pipeline. I sit on the state appointed advisory committee on state investment policies, which I've served on for almost a year now. Our 21 member committee has never had a presentation from the Commissioner of Revenue or anyone else on this mere billion dollar investment that we're thinking about making for the gas pipeline.

GRUENING: You might have to defend yourself. The Commissioner of Revenue, Sterling Gallagher, is in the room. He'll get a chance.

LOVE: I've made my views already now. What struck me as a bad thing to start out with if we're talking about managing the Permanent Fund. Here we have an amount of money that is incredible. Almost four times as big as the Lockheed loan that Congress debated quite a bit before it even took action on it. To my knowledge, there has been no public presentation on the details, the official advisory board for the Governor was never consulted; negotiations went on for almost a year. We still have, as yet, to even have a memorandum mailed to us even though requests for information have been made. I'm not saying that to hop so much on Sterling, although I know it's coming across as criticism.

GRUENING: Sterling, we're going to let you respond to this if you want. You may decline if you want. Go on, Jamie.

LOVE: I'm saying it because I'm not worried--I never really thought--I thought that there was not a large likelihood that that loan would have been made, primarily because I thought that the El Paso line would probably prevail. There may have been a couple other reasons why those offers be made. It sure is important, as we get into this area, that we force the people who manage this Fund to disclose, in as many levels as possible, the planning that is going on, the terms and types of arrangements they are making. The public should have confidence in the management of this money. Along that line, I think, we're very concerned that the public is convinced; I personally am convinced that there is integrity in the way that the money is managed. This again is not so much an economic consideration, but it is an important social consideration, and it is an important thing that we've thought about quite a bit. I know others have. I think in this area, there are two areas where we have to ensure integrity to manage the Fund. The first one I want to touch on is the integrity of the programs. In other words, are the programs doing what they're supposed to be doing? If you have a small business program, does the small business program start small businesses that otherwise would not be functioning. Is it really matching its goals? Is the money getting out to who it should get out to? It's supposed to create jobs. Is there a way to measure whether they're actually creating jobs? Because you can really see kind of a rat hole syndrome developing if you don't have

an honest way of going back and taking a look at what you've already done and seeing if actually, in fact, it accomplished your goals. Do agriculture loans stimulate or encourage agriculture. If so, how much can you quantify? I think a good way of having this program evaluation is important. Now we had a presentation from Tony Motley when he was still Commissioner of Commerce on the state loan programs that the state already manages. He could tell us what their default rate was, what their interest rate was, and everything else; but he couldn't tell us a damn thing about whether or not the programs were accomplishing what the legislature wanted them to when they first created them. He said they didn't have any way of doing that. They didn't run program audits. In a way that's not surprising, because some of those programs are very big; some of them are kind of small. But as we get into the stage where we have the Permanent Fund, and we start talking about investment programs, then I think there's a much bigger responsibility on the state to tackle this very tough issue. How do you evaluate these things.

I think the next issue is the fiscal integrity of the Fund. We don't want people stealing from the Fund. We don't want people making bribes to get loans and this sort of thing. This is an area that is of concern to a lot of people. I, personally, have spent sometime taking a look at some of the other areas where we've been concerned about the fiscal integrity of some of the things that have happened in some programs. When you start talking about billions of dollars, the temptation level really increases quite a bit. I think everyone realizes this. This is a tough problem. I don't know what the solution is. This relates to this whole area--the fairness, the openness, and the integrity of the way the Fund is managed. These are areas that maybe aren't economic considerations persay; but we're really concerned about them.

I would like to say that it's been helpful to take a look at whether or not we ought to spend all the money right now or whether or not we ought to invest all the money. There hasn't been much discussion about if we invest it, the types of investments we ought to do or if there's even any need to have any kind of investments on a local level beyond this issue of whether or not there's just a subsidy involved. I'd just like to discuss a couple of areas where I think it makes sense to have what could be called sort of a subsidized loan. It makes good economic sense, good bottomline economic sense. There are simply some areas where capital markets don't work. Where they're not perfect. For example, in the area of redlining--housing in certain communities and certain areas within communities--you can't get a mortgage on homes or you can't get rehabilitation financing on homes. There's been testimony before a committee, in Anchorage, for example, in the area of Mountain View or Government Hill there is this kind of a problem. The reason I'm bringing this out is, and talking about it, from an economic point of view, the cost of not providing mortgage, rehabilitation financing in a certain community may be that there's increased cost to the housing or that valuable housing stock deteriorates. It may not be a cost to the community, that the community has to pay for. It has to pay for lost taxes if the housing stock deteriorates; the public has to pay for higher housing costs, if that housing is lost and has to be constructed at a higher cost. So there are external costs to the community that the community realizes in this area. Just as an example, the normal market test

of the sort of disinterested lender and the disinterested receiver of the money, they're not really the same. The bank doesn't have to worry about the social costs of redlining; but the state of Alaska has to worry about it. If the state of Alaska becomes the lender, I think it can make some wise, some real contributions in that area and still make good bottomline economic sense. I just used that as an area. There are other areas where it might make sense--where capital markets aren't perfect. They certainly don't function as well for rural areas in Alaska as they do for urban areas.

In other areas, in the utilities, we've had testimony that good sound financial utilities can't get long term financing because they're not big enough and, therefore, as Dr. Belden Daniels noted, poverty line starts at \$200 million in sales a year. A company that's large, that's a big corporate entity, has better access to national capital markets. A smaller enterprise like some of the smaller utilities in Alaska can't get long term financing. That resolves the very high utility rates. I think that in that area that's just another example where the capital markets aren't perfect. The state can put long term capital into local utilities, invest your own utilities, as well as publically owned utilities. The result is going to be a reduction in utility rates. This is an area where it might make sense to make a so-called domestic loan without the state really incurring any higher risk than it might otherwise. Working on some problems in insurance financing where premiums are now being financed for as high as 80% by Outside insurance financing companies in almost a risk free type of occupation area. There are certain types of consumer credit that could be from people who are really frankly getting gouged. I'm not speaking in terms of providing 3% financing. There are some areas of consumer credit where the state can get a return commensurate with what they get on the market except doing it here locally in certain lines of consumer credit.

Aside from this area of imperfect capital markets, there are other reasons why the state might want to make loans domestically besides stimulating the economy or trying to encourage growth. For example, you might want to own certain large resource projects. Russ Meekins gave me a little lecture one time on how if the state had financed the gas pipeline, it would be able to control local hire through contract.

GRUENING: Jamie, you might want to know, Russ Meekins just reminded me that the legislature directed Sterling to investigate the possibility of financing the line so in fairness to him, he was following the direction of the legislature. Russ pointed that out. I thought it should be noted. Go ahead.

LOVE: Sure. It might make sense for the state to own certain types of large industry that occur. For the simple reason that (1) it may prove to be a good investment; but secondly, it may allow to implement such things as local hire and other types of social considerations. This is an area I think the state should be careful in, but certainly not something that should not be written off as not a potential type of thing to consider.

In other areas, they may want to change the ownership of something from, for example, a foreign owned fishing canneries they may want to allow fishermen to form cooperatives and become the owners of the fish processing plant. The reason for that may be that maybe the public would see some use in that. They may feel that the fishermen are presently being exploited by the present owners. They may feel this may be a vehicle of overcoming that. They may feel they want to use the money to help people capitalize and start credit unions to strengthen consumer owned credit institutions which, incidentally, are the only credit intermedia that is feasible to provide financing to very small communities in Alaska. Commercial banks simply will not ever be a feasible economic intermedia in very small towns. Credit unions are probably the only things that can function in that area. There's a lot that can be done to strengthen the effect of credit unions beyond just consumer credit and to things of actual economic development financing particularly on a small community basis. So I'm going to have to cut this short because my notes are going a lot longer than I wanted to. But I just wanted to tell you that a lot of the talk has been on the issue whether or not we should spend the money or whether we should give it back to the public and what should we do with the earnings from the Fund. Although I think that's very important, I think there's a lot of dialogue and discussion that has to take place relative to how we're going to manage the funds and what types of investments we might make. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jamie. Do you have a comment?

DOOGAN: Just one question. Jamie, in speaking of social projects that could be financed, are you advocating then that they be financed through the Permanent Fund?

LOVE: Different types of social projects? The types of investments that I talked about--I'm suggesting that they could be financed by the state of Alaska using some other revenues we're getting from the oil industry. Whether through the so-called Permanent Fund or whether through the general fund or whether through another financial intermedia would depend upon the legal structure that the legislature sets up to management. I think it's possible to have more than one fund. I'm just talking in general about surplus revenue.

GRUENING: To follow that up you mentioned housing. There is ASHA, there's Alaska Housing Finance Corporation, there's the veteran loan program. For what reason would the Permanent Fund be doing something that the general fund could do by setting up another loan program or increasing the size? Is there any special reason why the Permanent Fund, as opposed to another general fund loan program, would be used?

LOVE: I think the idea of setting up financial intermediaries in some of these areas, like the Housing Finance Corporation specializing in a certain area, might be the best way to manage these things. It could either sell its paper either the Permanent Fund or the general fund or some body else on its credit rating. I think Dr. Daniels has done a good job of addressing

to some degree, if you're going to be involved in some of these areas, some different scenarios persay about financial areas. I, personally, don't think -I've been addressing my remarks so much to the Permanent Fund persay as I have all state loan programs because we're talking about making investments, and I think it's important that we sort of re-evaluate our entire philosophy towards investments, loans and that sort of thing at a state level.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jamie. Mr. Tim Bradner. Someone remarked that it's your money we're using.

BRADNER: Thank you, Clark. My thoughts about the Permanent Fund, and to an extent the larger question of the whole amount of excess or what some people call surplus revenues in the general fund is essentially a political problem which we're going to have to be dealing with. And I think--just a couple observations I'd like to throw out here real quick--about the next 5 or 10 years in the dialogue that's going to have to develop in Alaska about how we're going to handle these things. The Permanent Fund and the surplus wealth, the existence of excess revenues in the general fund, and some estimates go to as high as \$10 billion by 1985 between the general fund and the Permanent Fund, really puts Alaska in a unique position in the United States and even in the democratic West. No state, to my knowledge, or even any Western democracy has had this kind of a problem on this kind of a scale with a small with a small population yet a large diverse state with pressing social and poverty needs among many of its people. We do have a situation we can look to in some states where they are coping with excess surplus revenues this current year. For instance, Texas right now has a \$2 billion surplus, I believe, in their treasury that they're debating what to do with. Some other states have a small amounts of surplus in the treasury. But nothing quite on the magnitude of the scale we're looking to here in Alaska. Norway perhaps might be a situation in Europe that we could look at where there are large natural resource revenues and a small population. But nothing quite as extreme. There are extremes in the OPEC countries, but again you have a different political situation there. Yet our per capita income over the next 10 years is probably going to be of the magnitude of some of the OPEC countries in Alaska in terms of the annual income from natural resources per person or per family unit will probably range near what at least some of the OPEC countries are getting. We have to ask some questions about how capable our democratic institutions are going to be handled, to handle these kind of problems. For instance, governments in the United States, state and local governments, are used to the whole idea of working with the scarcity of public dollars. The fact that tax revenues come from a lot of individuals and a lot of small businesses and there's always a scarcity in priorities and the logic by which decisions are made start from the standpoint that there's a shortage of public money, and the priorities have to be sorted out from that standpoint. So in Alaska, it's always been easy for the legislator to withstand the very severe constituent pressure he gets for 'what about that bridge' or 'what about that dam' or 'what about this program or that program' by saying 'hey, there's just not enough money in the treasury this year. We just can't fund it.' However, he's not going to have that excuse next year or the year after that or years on down the road because there is going to be money in the treasury. And there's going to be money in the Permanent Fund. I am concerned about

how permanent the Permanent Fund is going to be in the face of these kind of pressures, particularly if we have a situation in Alaska where we don't have a viable, steadily growing, private economy to generate jobs and income in the state's economy. People would tend to look to the government just as they did in the years 1970 - 1975 with the \$900 million for various kinds of help.

Already I hear people talking about the use of the Permanent Fund in its relation to the general fund. The Permanent Fund makes loans to income producing loans. Okay. Why can't the general fund borrow money from the Permanent Fund and promise to pay it back at 5% interest? I hear that sort of thing going on. So I worry about that. No state has been in a situation like this, and, I think, it's going to bring about some changes in some very different kind of pressures than we're used to in Alaska. I think, too, we look at why people voted for the Permanent Fund in the first place. I think the kind of dialogue that's going to go on this year where Clark's Committee and other people are going to be going out and having meetings around the state to try to re-assess why people did vote for the Permanent Fund and what they were thinking about when they voted for it, and now that it's a fact, what is going to be done with it. To a large extent, I think people voted for the Permanent Fund because they had a feeling that there was going to be an excess in the treasury and they were concerned about the legislature spending the money. So it was kind of a reflection of that traditional American, even Alaskan, hostility to government that we seem to bring along as a tradition in part of our political heritage. Okay. So you set it aside into a Fund that the legislature can't spend, but what you also do is you create another mechanism, and you create managers of that Fund, and how accountable to the people are the managers of that Fund? The legislators are really accountable to the people. If there's any fault in the system, maybe we should look to that rather than to setting up another layer for managing the Fund that might not be responsive to public needs or public desires.

Just a couple other real quick thoughts. I am concerned about the Permanent Fund and the surplus revenue question from the standpoint of its effects on dividing the state politically in the future. Already we're having problems in differences of direction between urban Alaskans, who live in Anchorage and Fairbanks and Juneau, and rural Alaskans, who live in small villages and have a different set of concerns and priorities. I think you'll find that many rural Alaskans are skeptical of the Permanent Fund and the reasons by which it's been created. This whole dialogue we're going through here today because the Permanent Fund as more of an urban orientated kind of a thing. They look at the requirement for safe investments to be made by the Permanent Fund; and yet they know that many rural loans are in the frontier high risk area. So they're concerned that a lot of those loans will wind up going to large scale development projects to benefit primarily cities and the urban areas and the urban work force. They also realize that a lot of their benefits come from the state programs, state services in rural areas. They are concerned that if more money is dedicated out of the general fund, more than 25% of royalties into the Permanent Fund, then it will tend to short change the services and the kind of programs they are getting. I worry about that.

We have no place to really look for examples on how to cope with this problem. We do have a couple examples here in Alaska. We have the case of what happened to the 900 million from 1970. Now there was a situation where there were surplus revenues, and we can look to how it was handled by the government. There's been a lot of debate and a lot of pro and con about what happened to the 900 million. To a large extent, I think, the case can be made that the money was used for things people wanted. People asked for that money to be spent. If you look at the record, you'll see that a lot of it, probably most of it, went for education, because people asked for it. I think those kind of pressures are going to happen again in the future. That's really all I have to say.

GRUENING: Thank you very much, Tim. If there are no questions at this time, we'll proceed to Dr. Lindauer.

LINDAUER: I'd like to remind everybody that we really have two aspects to this thing. We keep running them together. We have the question on how to spend the income that's going to come off this thing. And we have the question of the investments that are going into it. It seems to me that we're continually talking about the income, but as a matter of fact, it may well be that how we make the investments are going to have more impact on those people who are in Alaska today. I'm going to come to that. There's also the question of what our objectives are. I'm not so sure we've specified them. That is, how much of what we are doing is for us and how much of what we're doing should be for people in the lower 48 or for our grandchildren to make them even more richer than they're otherwise going to be richer than we are. I don't think we've really decided whether it's for us or for the future.

I think we've had many, many proposals as to what to do. But almost all of them, as far as I can see, with the exception of the Alaska, Inc. kind of distribution of income would appear to have no real benefit for the people who are in Alaska today in terms of either improving the general quality of the life of the mass of the people and their standard of living, perhaps even for future Alaskans. I think that most of them would tend to make Alaskans more numerous rather than better off. I think it would be a terrible shame if 30 years from now we looked back on the Permanent Fund and the way the income was spent. I'm primarily concerning myself now with the investments and how the capital is put together rather than the income and how it is spent. But I think it would be a terrible shame if we said that the main impact on the day to day life of the average Alaskan was he got stuck in a few more traffic jams and was three deep at the Russian River instead of shoulder to shoulder. At the present time, I'd say that we're likely to be three deep. I think that bothers me because for better or for worse, Alaska owes nothing to the New York City bond brokers. It really does not have an obligation to provide a job for everybody who wants to come up here to find one. Indeed the panelists and their comments about labor mobility are all too correct because people will come up here to take advantage of these things. The average Alaskan will, in fact, not be better off. I think the goals for both income and investment, again separating them, should be to use them

both to directly benefit and encourage today's Alaskans to have a better quality of life, more prosperity, and hopefully to do so, and I think we can, in such a way as to build a tax base so that we will be able to continue that higher quality of life and standard of living at such a time in the future for our grandchildren when the oil runs out.

What I'd like to do very briefly is throw out my comments on the major proposals that I've heard in the most summary form and tell you why I've come to these conclusions. Let's take the development bank project and let's talk about spending \$1 billion for a big power plant or some huge, massive traditional development bank, because no matter what we call it, once we set up a major, highly financed development bank it's going to function like a development bank and it's going to tend to put its money into major development bank kind of projects, I think. I find it very difficult to believe that a dam that's going to take 20 or 30 years to build is going to have any great impact on the quality of life of people now living in Alaska. It's true that when the thing comes on line there'll be more electricity, and I assume that that will then generate electricity for the additional people who are in here building the things that the public development bank has promoted. The average Alaskan even then will be in no way better off. In any event, such projects, for better or for worse in today's world, would be built by Washington, if they had any sense or any merit at all. The Corps of Engineers has never been known to build a public works project if they could, in any way, be justified. So the fact that we would build those that they wouldn't suggests to me that we'd have a raffle factor there that would be monumental. Approaching infinity, I think. In any event, I think big projects like that probably ought to go in front of the voters and certainly can be bonded by the legislature and discussed at the legislature and put on a bond issue if they really have merit, and we just can't get Washington to provide them the way they would for all the other states in the Union, if for some reason Washington will start to ignore us in that fashion, then the legislature can take action. So I really don't see any need to have a development bank for major, huge subsidy projects.

There's also the possibility of gilt edge investments, maximum income. I find it hard to believe that pouring all that money into buying little white pieces of paper with IOU's from such major, first class things that we would have bought say five years as New York City bonds would really do much for us, or in a sense, do much for us in terms of income being generated. In the future, I suppose that we would have the income and thus perhaps slightly lower taxes, and then people would do to us exactly what they did to New York City, I assume; and that is they would tend to migrate in and take advantage of the services provided with the lower taxes and/or higher revenues. I'm not so sure that in some years accumulating investments through the bottom market and then in order to build a New York City is exactly what we ought to do.

There's also the suggestion that we ought to make such things as direct loans and guarantees to Alaskans and Alaskan businesses, and that has some merit on it. The trouble is that if we make them directly, there's too much chance that the loans and guarantees will be made on a political basis instead of an economic basis. Everyone who has a good loan will go to the bank; and everybody who has a bag loan will go to the Permanent

Fund. The net result of that will is going to be that we will probably lose a lot of our capital. I think the Permanent Fund will unnecessarily be saddled with a great deal of public disenchantment. Overall it's not lost and I'd like to make a suggestion which might kill the two birds that we need to have killed. And that is to provide benefits for Alaskans as well as benefits for future Alaskans without having that kind of risk involved. What I would think we should do heavily, at least with some of this money, would be to put it into the financial institutions of Alaska that are here today for the purpose of making the banks, the savings and loans, the credit unions, whatever the financial institutions are of the economy today and those that might be established for the purpose of making low interest loans in certain areas, certain socially desirable areas. The one that particularly springs to mind is housing. I think it's very important that everybody realize that financial institutions do not make their money because there's an absolutely high level of interest such as 10% or 9 5/8 or whatever the rate is. They make their money on the spread between whatever it takes and whatever they loan it at. So getting it at 7 and loaning it at 9 gives them the same profits as getting it at 2 and loaning at 4. It's the risk differential and the administrative costs that must be covered. So the Permanent Fund could definitely provide very low interest loans to the financial institutions to handle such things as making loans to the village utilities if that's socially desirable, or any other things that would be so enumerated. Housing, what have you. I would really suggest that this should be done. Because if we can improve the quality of life for Alaskans by letting them have better housing, that's something that can be done immediately and will effect the whole mass of people. It's also building a tax base. The same thing through lower utility costs. It is a form of subsidy which will get out to all the people whereas a major subsidy that just causes one or two big dams to be built or major capital projects will fundamentally benefit a handful of engineering companies that are headquartered in New York City or wherever the major engineering companies are headquartered. I submit to you again that our responsibility is to Alaskans and to improve the quality of their life. It is not to provide jobs and incomes for people who do not live in Alaska. If we can do both build the tax base for the future through such investments and subsidies, and that's what they are, and simultaneously provide an access to a better quality of life, and the one thing that everybody has a concern in is housing. The one thing we see right now in the economy of Alaska is a massive move toward the upgrading of housing. I would submit that that is an area in which the legislature and everyone else needs to take a very serious look. The only other thing I would say is please notice that I'm talking about the investments in the principal in the Permanent Fund. I am not talking about how we ought to spend however the income comes. I think we should seriously consider such things as Alaska, Inc. or variations of that if that is politically impossible which would get the benefits back to the people directly and not send them into a few large projects that are oriented towards outside the state and very delayed benefits.

This economy is growing and our grandchildren, no matter happens, are going to be richer than we are. I'm not so sure we need to starve everybody in order to make them even richer.

GRUENING: Thank you for that optimistic outlook. Barbara.

BERGMAN: Okay, I'd like to say a few things about Dr. Lindauer's remarks. I think there's a little confusion on whether present day Alaskans are too well off or not well enough off. Here you've got the oil revenues coming in. One sort of rationale, we're segregating them in the Permanent Fund is in some sense we're too well off. That is the present day Alaskans are too well off. Certainly in some sense they would be too well off or too lavishly provided for in terms of public service if the money were not put into the Permanent Fund. What that would argue is that some of the money should go into the Permanent Fund again primarily for the benefit of future generations of Alaskans. But some of it should not go into the Permanent Fund but some of the revenue should be used to lower taxes for example. That's what that would argue.

Now I think that Dr. Lindauer shouldn't be allowed to get away with this implication that if the money were invested in the gilt edge type of program, New York City bonds would have been bought with it.

LINDAUER: Five years ago they would have.

BERGMAN: That would not have occurred because they are tax exempt. It would make absolutely no sense for the Permanent Fund to buy them. But more seriously I think what he's suggesting is that somehow or other the managers of the Permanent Fund would be poor in terms of that kind of investment. Even I'm smart enough not to have bought any New York City bonds. My record in the market is not too great.

LINDAUER: That's not what I suggested.

BERGMAN: I don't think that's a fair implication.

LINDAUER: I didn't mean that implication. Let me tell you what I meant. I meant that if we send billions of dollars out of this state and get back little white pieces of paper that 30 years hence are going to give us some income when they mature, we're going to have little white pieces of paper here and damn little else. We have people who might rather have a better housing situation. We don't need to have additional spending to have local citizens make investments of their own in housing. There are a lot of people who apparently would like to have better housing. I see no reason why they should be denied that.

BERGMAN: That relates to the issue of how well off the present day Alaskans are. Do they have needs that ought to be met out of the present day oil revenues. What you're saying is yes. I think that's something that is essentially a political question that has to be determined. Now there's sort of a subrosa question here which hasn't come out explicitly, perhaps it has, but I think it ought to be out and discussed a little more and that is the problem - do you want to give benefits to the present

citizens of Alaska and positively avoid giving benefits to people who will migrate subsequently or people who have migrated recently? There are pros and cons on this. I think, even if you restrict the present benefits of people who are citizens of Alaska now, and by the way, I am thinking of renting an apartment and moving my voting residence here before the grandfather's clause takes effect; but seriously, if you do that, you are going to create a two class economy. Some people are going to move here subsequently anyway. I think there are social problems with that, that would have to be faced. If, on the other hand, as has been said and said correctly many times, you provide the benefits to whoever is to come here that will to some degree encourage immigration. That might be bad because it would spread the benefits more thinly, but also because it could be said that those people have no moral right to it in some sense. I think that as a practical matter you are going to end up having to give benefits to whoever is here. Even if some of them have been brought in because of the generosity of these programs. I don't think you will want to, or can afford to, set up a two tier system where some people of privileged nobility and other people are pariahs.

LINDAUER: I think you have misinterpreted. I think what you've done is you've gone back and you're confusing the discussion of how to spend the income with the question of how to invest the principal.

BERGMAN: No. Those are two different comments. Perhaps I should have said I'm now moving from the area of how to invest the principal to the area of how to spend the income.

LINDAUER: Well I didn't really discuss how to spend the income. I have my own value judgment would be, without thinking it through, I would use it to have a form of property tax relief to encourage, again, the average citizen, who is in Alaska, to benefit by being able to afford a better class of housing, if that's what that person wants. Or to be able to expand a business, if that's what that person wants. I was discussing the question of how to make the investments of the principal of the capital of the Permanent Fund and suggesting that we would be better off, if the principal, wherever possible, was invested in Alaska in such a way as to build a tax base and in such a way as to benefit Alaskans. And I still believe that we owe nothing to bond brokers in New York and we owe nothing to a handful of engineering companies who would come up here to make major capital projects and bring in itinerate laborers who would come in and out, and we would get little, if any, benefit from this. I'd rather see everybody living in a better house, if that's what they want or having decent utilities in their villages, if that's what they want.

BERGMAN: Well, some of that itinerate labor is going to be required to build those better houses.

LINDAUER: That's right.

GRUENING: I would like to ask one question and that is how hungry is the audience? I think we're getting to the more important part of this symposium and that is letting the very patient audience get into the fray here and ask questions of whomever. We can go another half an hour and then break for lunch and come back if there are still questions to be asked. Or we can break right now. I'm asking for the Quaker sense. What do you say sir?

MAN (UNIDENTIFIED): I'd like to make a comment and ask a couple questions, but considering the time-now that he's had a cooling off period, I'd like to refer to Mr. Gallagher and let him make a comment in response.

GRUENING: Okay. That's fair enough, but I want to hear how hungry the rest of the group is. Representative Carpenter.

CARPENTER: We may not necessarily be hungry, but there may be other reasons to leave the room.

GRUENING: We don't have a sign out sheet. Anyone can leave. Okay. Sterling, you can make a remark if you want. We'll be back at 1:00 o'clock sharp. We have some people who need to catch planes. We can maybe wrap it up earlier this afternoon. Thank you. I urge you all to come back because I think it will be the more interesting portion this afternoon.

LUNCH BREAK

GRUENING: We'll try to wrap this thing up in a time that's appropriate; we won't drag it out. Dr. George Rogers has to return to Juneau tonight and the last plane leaves at 3:00 so if you have any questions of him specifically, you should ask them first. I think before we open it up to general questions, Dr. Lindauer wanted to clarify a statement he made and from that point on you can ask any questions you want of the two Economists, the panelists, or the legislature, for that matter. If you have specific proposals for investments, I think we're also interested in mostly in your philosophy for why that is a good thing for the Permanent Fund to do and why the Permanent Fund as opposed to maybe the general fund or the revolving loan funds that are created from the general fund could not do it as well. I only have one comment on what's transpired so far and that is it appears to the extent that the Permanent Fund becomes active in the Alaska economy, intervening in the Alaska economy we have increasing problems with how to fairly distribute the subsidy, if there is one applied in the loan and how to manage it in a way that it's accountable to changing desires in needs of the people. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't do it; it just means the problem is a little more difficult as the Permanent Fund becomes active in the economy. You may want to have a comment or a question on that. But as long as the panelists are here, you might as well get your questions out first. Dr. Lindauer.

LINDAUER: Somebody asked me a question which led me to think that something I had said had been misunderstood. It had to do with development banks and development bank projects. My concern is not with the establishment of a development bank persay and particularly not with the establishment of a development bank kind of analysis of projects. My concern is with the kind of big project that one finds the World Bank engaging in. Something that would be a \$5 billion hydro project that would have overruns to \$8 billion. Something that would be a single project or a handful of projects which would be an all or nothing kind of use of the Permanent Fund monies. I am particularly opposed to putting all the money into a big project such as a major dam. I am certainly opposed in any way to the establishment of a development bank concept to analyze various and sundry projects.

GRUENING: Thank you for clarifying that. When you come to ask questions, please come to the microphone. The lights now are provided and the cameras are provided by Media Services, which is producing a program that may be used on channel 7. It'll be put together so you may see yourself on T.V. We also plan to do a transcript on this hearing. So when you come to the microphone, please identify yourself. If you wish to do so, tell us your occupation. Yes, sir.

GERSTENFELD: My name is Sol Gerstenfeld. I've been in this neck of the woods about 30 years, so I've done this, that, and the other thing. I've done some visiting Outside and kept coming back. Along the lines that Jamie raised, the thing that concerns me the most is not just how much we spend and how much we take in, but what we get for our money. I would like someone to explain to me how come criminal justice is a better investment than consumer protection?

GRUENING: Anyone want to take a stab at that?

HAVELOCK: I don't think that they're mutually exclusive objectives. It's a historically, over the last few years, there's has been more... (cut off) If I understand the question, my comment is simply that the trend in the direction of the question is addressing.

GERSTENFELD: Trends don't happen; they're made.

GRUENING: Okay. Trends don't happen, they're made. Now if you have any comment with which to follow-up your questions, I'd invite the audience to do that. As long as no one's making a long speech, there's time to follow your own questions. Are you satisfied? Does anyone wish to comment further on that? Okay. Does anyone else have any questions from the audience?

CUC: Two questions. First, just a general information question.

GRUENING: Identify yourself please.

CUC: Okay. Dennis Cuc. Specifically with the oncoming gas production and new discoveries that will be found in Prudhoe Bay, how much extra are we going to have in the Permanent Fund? Does the Permanent Fund just anticipate Prudhoe oil and gas or does it anticipate other discoveries at all?

GRUENING: I think I can answer that. The amendment applies to all oil revenue produced through royalties and leases and bonuses on state land, so that if the Beaufort Sea, for example, were sold next year for a bonus payment, 25% of that bonus payment would go into the Permanent Fund; and if it were sold under the same arrangement where the state gets 12 1/2% of the oil or the value of it, then 25% of that would also go into the Permanent Fund. But, I think the impetus for the Permanent Fund was the vast wealth that people saw coming out of Prudhoe, although other revenues are subject to contribution. The projections that you see in that little green book that some of you picked up, and there are more out there, if you want them, are based strictly on Prudhoe Bay.

CUC: My second question is for Dr. Lindauer. Do you think the banks are willing to enter into some kind of arrangement with the state whereby the state does provide monies? Do you think the banks, as a private capital resource, would be interested in this proposition?

LINDAUER: I would think yes. By the very definition of what you just said. They tend to be private, profit-making corporations. They make their money on the difference between what they pay for it and what they charge for it, not on the absolute rate. So that it would be very profitable to a bank to make low-interest loans if it can get the money at an even lower interest loan. Then again, let me tell you, I'm not just talking about banks, I'm talking about all financial institutions including state mortgage agencies and all related, anything that is presently acting as a financial institution could conceivably take money and put it into whatever the legislature thought was a good idea.

CUC: I haven't done any research on this and the only reason I ask the question is because the Commissioner of Revenue seemed to indicate he is a banker, of course he was a banker. He seemed to believe it wouldn't fly. You haven't talked to him about it to find out the reason? I haven't either at length.

LINDAUER: I did speak very briefly with him during the lunch hour about that, and I think one of the things that was discussed was the capital requirements of banks. It may well be that there would have to be enough profits involved in the break to generate additional capital so that they could continue to expand. I think that we're really talking about a conceptual thing here. The question of whether the money should flow through the Alaskan financial institutions or should it flow through a bond brokerage house in New York City. Other things equal, I'd

just as soon let the Alaskan institutions make the money.

GRUENING: Thank you Doctor. That's a worthy objective, although I'm told and I don't have the information before me, that when the \$900 million was deposited in local banks, most of it went Outside. Somebody may wish to comment on that.

BERGMAN: Let me say that when money is deposited in banks, the first thing they do is buy government bills with it.

GRUENING: Why is that?

BERGMAN: They don't want to expand their loans very quickly. Because very prudently they want to take care to see that they're good loans. So when they get a sudden big deposit, what they will do is put the money to work in a relatively riskless way, which is the government bill market, where the funds are liquid and they get a rate of return. Of course, it's open to the Alaskan government to buy its own bills instead of putting large sums in interest free accounts, even temporarily. With large sums so that even putting them in interest free accounts for relatively short periods can lose a lot of money. Now you know, I hear sort of contradictory things. In one ear, I hear that you're so rich it doesn't matter, and with the other ear, I hear that you have a lot of slums that need attention and so on. No matter how rich you are, it's foolish to unnecessarily enrich bankers even Alaskan bankers.

GRUENING: Any bankers in the crowd?

BERGMAN: I must say with respect to brokerage houses that Dr. Lindauer is warning us against, they now do negotiate down commission rates. So I'm sure, that for an account like the State of Alaska, one would get a rather low rate.

LOVE: I think what we are getting into is sort of technical discussion as to whether or not the Permanent Fund working through the banks buy CD's or whether they buy loans or whether they sell CD's or buy loans. I think what Clark was talking about, at one point they take the certificates of deposit down to the banks, hoping they'd make some local loans. Sterling Gallagher, I think, was quoted once as saying they put the money Outside into treasury bills outside the state to make a profit. I think they could also accomplish what Dr. Lindauer wanted to do by purchasing loans on the secondary money market, thereby ensuring that the loans were properly qualified Alaska investments under certain criteria. I'm not speaking so much to his proposal, but I think we're getting into a technical area, and I'm not sure how helpful that is for the general audience in terms of discussing some of this stuff. And I think there's probably different ways of accomplishing what Dr. Lindauer was talking about other than putting money in CD's.

LINDAUER: I never advocated putting money in CD's. In fact, quite the contrary. My whole point is that if you channel it through regular institutions in a regular way, it will, just as in the past, not benefit Alaska all that much. But if you can channel it through some restricted beneficial way to limit the loans not by CD's but let them draw on money they're willing to loan out at some lower rate of interest. The loans that they would otherwise would not make--it could benefit Alaska. The whole thing is to keep the benefits and orient the loans within Alaska--not just throw them in the national economy.

MEEKINS: I think there's a precedent to that in terms of link deposits that, I understand, Colorado did that with their state deposits. They give them under the condition that they're used for certain purposes. I think that's one vehicle.

GRUENING: Sir, did you have a comment on that? It's open to the audience. Just come to the microphone.

FISKE: I am Roy Fiske. I'm a retired Lieutenant Colonel and a 15 year Alaskan. I think that what you've just been saying here on restricting where you make your investments can be legislated, and the money we're talking about could be put in the hands of Alaskan institutions with restrictions on it that it be invested in Alaska only and at specific rates. And that that specific amount of money, while it's in the bank, would not necessarily be handled the same as the other funds of the bank. I would like to later on make some further comments, if I may.

GRUENING: Sure, you may. Thank you very much. Mike, do you have a comment?

DOOGAN: Yes, I'd like to get back to a slightly more general question. This is directed more or less to Dr. Lindauer, but just generally to stated goals of the Fund. When you discussed making loan interest loans to Alaskans using the principal that way, taking the earnings and distributing them to Alaskans in some sort of direct manner, you raised the question of trade-offs. You have two goals and they can, on this scenario, be accomplished; but you have to decide what your first goal is. If it's to put the most possible money in the pockets of Alaskans, and obviously you don't make low interest loans, you try to make as much interest as you can, because you can put more money in. If it's to build houses, then you have to sacrifice the goal somewhat of putting money in the pockets of Alaskans. So the question is when you made that sort of proposal, what was your primary goal?

LINDAUER: When I first spoke, I said that we really had things divided into two separate parts--the question of how to spend whatever income came and the question of how to take the principal and how to build up the principal. I don't think the goals should be maximum. I don't think that was what the voters voted on. The voters voted on putting it into income earning things. You can earn an income at 3 or 4%; you can earn an income at 6 or 7%. Whatever the managers of the Fund decide is the socially responsible thing to do should be what we do. I would, personally, not think

that we should go for the high risk investments that would conceivably yield the highest incomes. I think that we should consider that how we invest that money is going to be as important, in my view even more important, than whether we get an extra one percent on the top by taking some risks for the money. Last time we took some risks I understand there were some big losses. You get more interest when you take a risk as a risk premium. Should we really be risking it? I think there should be something in between the final recipient and the state as a guarantor of the repayment of that money, so there is a guaranteed income. That's one reason I like financial institutions, because if the loan goes sour, it's their loan that went sour. They would owe the state whatever they paid to get that money.

BRADNER: I have just a more general question. What is the status of the definition of income producing? Are you going to try to do this through your statute? What's your present thinking about it? What are the words of the initiative? I can't quite remember.

GRUENING: Income producing. We've had Attorneys General's opinions, for what they're worth, and other legal opinions--no offense, John, you're being an ex-Attorney General. It's been the consensus...

HAVELOCK: Some currency depreciates very rapidly.

GRUENING: Down to zero? It means some interest. In other words, you couldn't do it, say, argue indirectly, give it as a grant and say, "well, that's incoming producing because there'll be side benefits." It has to produce some income, but it doesn't say how much. It could be anywhere from 1% to 10%. As a legal matter, I don't think you could argue it could produce no income and be income producing, based on kind of a spent off benefit thing. The interest range is wide.

BERGMAN: I'd like to say just two words about the trade-offs. Say you take a million dollars and you subsidize loans in Alaska, or you take a million dollars and you invest it in treasury bonds and make a better return on it. You're giving up something in each case. Presumably the benefit is to the person who gets the concessional loan, and that, very frankly, tends to be middle class people. They're the ones who qualify even for concessional loans. What you're doing, in effect, is you are giving a benefit to a middle class person and sacrificing a benefit, as a result, for the beneficiaries of the income, which is the whole population. I don't say you should never do it. There may be very good reasons to do it. But you have to be clear that whatever track you take, there are going to be costs and there are going to be benefits. You have to see who gets the benefits and who bears the costs. They're generally not the same people.

MC CUTCHEON: I'd like to ask Dr. Rogers a question before he leaves.

GRUENING: And you're Jerry McCutcheon.

MC CUTCHEON: Yes. Dr. Rogers, you raised a question of the philosophy of the Permanent Fund, and you never stated what your opinion was. Why do you believe there should be a Permanent Fund? And divorce it from whether or not political tricks were played in the voting process, or who introduced bills, and aside from all that stuff, strike all of that and get down to why there should be a Permanent Fund.

ROGERS: The purpose of the Permanent Fund--we're faced with an unusual situation, or what seems to be an unusual situation in which we have for a period of time the prospect of drawing upon resources that belong to Alaska in this case, they're state lands, that will be depleted over a period of 20 to 30 years. The benefits of these, if they are not put into a Permanent Fund, would be used for current expenditures, current benefits. One of the underlining things, I think of the whole idea was that this was a way of creating a nest egg, which would be available, which would share some of the benefits with future generations. The other thing was because Alaska has been through boom and bust cycles in the past, we have this fear of there being a let down right after a particular period of prosperity comes to an end. Most of our past development has been gold, defense, construction, the Alaska earthquake briefly, and then oil development. Each of these had had different cycles. So the idea of creating this Fund as a cushion at the end to give us a basis for moving on...

MC CUTCHEON: I'd like to ask my next question.

GRUENING: Let him finish. Are you finished, Dr. Rogers?

ROGERS: I think that's one of the underlining points of creating a Permanent Fund. The other is, of course then we get into the use of the money. I think we've all talked about it this morning. But you asked me what the basic idea was. You had another question.

MC CUTCHEON: As to your anticipated number of years, I would suggest you get the State of Alaska's report of January 1976 having to do with the production of sandy schist formation of Prudhoe Bay oil. So I guess I've got to go one question, so why do you think this anomaly, this variation, or this large income occurred? Why is it occurring?

ROGERS: It's occurring because the oil industry is coming up to Alaska because of the energy shortage. Is that the sort of question you're asking?

MC CUTCHEON: Well, you're getting close. Why has it occurred? Tell us why it has occurred. Why couldn't it be level?

ROGERS: Why couldn't the income be level? Because there's an immediate

national need for the resource, the energy resource. It's being developed. During this period...

MC CUTCHEON: I understand the need for the resource will be greater in 1985 than it is today. If that is the case, will we not need it worse in the future than we do today.

ROGERS: You see, these are decisions over which we have no control.

MC CUTCHEON: I see, you say we have no control. Who does control those decisions?

ROGERS: If I understand your deep question which is emerging, is why do we develop oil today? Is that the question?

MC CUTCHEON: That could be one of them.

ROGERS: That is a good question. We had an alternative. As a state, we could've withheld those lands. But the decision was made to develop them.

MC CUTCHEON: So in relation to the Permanent Fund, where does this fit with the philosophy that apparently we could not control?

ROGERS: The control of the timing of the income generation is what you're getting at, isn't it?

MC CUTCHEON: Correct.

ROGERS: We had a voice in that. It's a political decision that was made. I don't think that, if put to a vote, the people would have come up with an answer different than the decision made, but that's a speculation. But you're correct. The income is being generated now because the decision was made to develop the oil or to put the state lands up for lease.

MC CUTCHEON: Would you think then it might be prudent as far as the state is concerned not to have any further lease sales? In other words, not to enhance the Permanent Fund?

ROGERS: Yes. I think it might very well be prudent to do that.

MC CUTCHEON: Then the Permanent Fund can be considered in two ways. That

which is resources you own, and that which is postponed?

ROGERS: That's right. Yes. It's one way of giving the resources that you're giving up now a life after death.

MC CUTCHEON: Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jerry. Are there any further questions from the audience?

MC GINNIS: I'm not clever enough to turn all these into questions, so I'd just like to make a couple of statements. My name is Tim McGinnis. I'm a citizen of the state of Alaska.

My first comment is that I believe that the Permanent Fund arose more in response to a political situation than an economic one. Here in Alaska since 1969, the question has been most often left by the outs wishing to get in in the political structure. What has happened to the \$900 million? If they had devoted as much research or as much to research as they did to rhetoric, they could have found out what happened to the \$900 million. But again and again and again, we hear, 'what has happened to the \$900 million?' Even though everybody knows. I think in response to that, a lot of political people, generally liberals afraid of a conservative challenge, said, 'let's make a Permanent Fund.' A lot of the questions we're addressing today are the results of that kind of dichotomy between political need, which may or may not have reflected a true economic need.

My second point, from what I've heard today and what I, as an Alaskan, have been coming around to in the last couple of years, is that we really don't want the money. What is it going to bring us? More people. We've heard that from every edge of the room today. What is it going to bring us? But there's an important qualification on that, which is we don't want the money now; but we do want it later. So that's one of the things that has to be worked around. Something which hovers in the background of the entire Permanent Fund discussion up to now is the question of what percentage of those monies subject to the Permanent Fund are actually going to end up being used by the Permanent Fund. Will it be 25; will it be 50; will it be 75; will it be 100? I think that it's absolutely the most important decision to be made right at the outset. There are numerous arguments about which is cart, which is horse; but the principal first effect of the Permanent Fund will be these visavis the general fund. There's been a lot of talk in this room today about how we don't need any more government growth. Obviously making 100% Permanent Fund would have quite an effect on slowing government growth. And that may or may not be a worthy goal, but to bring all these comments to a head. There's one kind of quality, we've been talking all day about social quality, we've been talking about economic values and investments. But no one has really touched on the subject of environmental quality. I would like to suggest to

you people today that the Permanent Fund could be used to buy back Alaska. And to buy environmental quality for this state. We all heard about trade-offs. It's a favorite economic word. We've heard about externalities. I'm not going to tell economists about externalities; they all know about it. But the fact remains that our resources are not being developed by the same people who hope to profit by them or by the same people who would hope to keep a reasonable level of environmental quality while those resources are being developed. BP Alaska or the Alyeska Pipeline Service -- they have their own, very rightly so, idea of what trade-offs are going to be and what they consider to be a wise trade-off. The Alaskan people are in almost a hypocritical stance because they want the values that come with oil development but they are screaming to high heaven about the environmental trade-offs. Once in a film a fellow made the comment that Alaskans want wilderness at the back door and civilization at the front door. When someone moves in behind them, they've got a problem. That's one of the best comments I've ever heard on that matter. But to continue with the idea of environmental quality and trade-offs, I'd like to suggest some concrete things which have been brought up by the conversation of our last speaker, one of which is that the state of Alaska could buy leases, oil leases, with the Permanent Fund. It could've bought the entire northeast gulf for half a billion dollars, that's one sixteenth of an \$8 billion Permanent Fund. We could've held it off the market. We could've particularly held off the market those tracks that were environmentally sensitive; and, when the time arose when we needed more development in the state, we could then have begun to develop.

The second thing, and this has been brought up before, Russ and I have talked about this before, is we could have decided unilaterally two years ago that we were going to build the Alaska gas line. Would Congress have told us not to build it? If we said we were going to invest \$4 billion building a state owned pipeline to Alaskan tidewater, would there be an Alcan line now? I think when the most dramatic results of the Permanent Fund could be controlled over how those resources are developed. That to me is more the essence than the money which might conceivably come from those resources. We could control the environmental stipulations to a much greater degree, not only in terms of the letter of the law, but carrying out that intent if we were ourselves the owners and controllers, not of the resources but also of their extraction. We could also, in line with the conversation that was just here, control the sequence and the timing of development of resources if we do truly own them. A lot of our problem right now is the federal government can't control that; but we could form ourselves an oil company and bid against anyone who wanted to develop our resources before we did if we were lucky enough to calculate what they thought they were worth and put ten more dollars on top of it, we would have control of it.

One of the conflicts here is that if we set up 100% Permanent Fund in order to try to keep state government from growing, we may unfortunately put into higher gear the mechanism of development, which has been the need for state revenues, that is by putting 100% in the Permanent Fund we might make the

Beaufort Sea be sold 15 years earlier. That's a conflict, I recognize that. But in many, many cases, we can't control that development or its speed or its tempo. We haven't even really wanted to, we've been so greedy. We want it all right now. We've got a long time to go in this state. A couple thousand years. Oil is going to get more valuable, everybody knows that. We're holding it as a national trust. It's nice that the Carter administration has the moderate views it has about development. But we had better, after Carter, get ready for another Nixon. Somebody who, you know, doesn't care about what's in the northeast gulf--somebody who doesn't know anything about, well, this wasn't federal, but somebody who doesn't know anything about Kachemak Bay and why not to put an oil rig there. My faith in Alaska is the faith that we can control our own destiny, but in order to do that we may have to remodify our idea of what is income producing or when it becomes income producing or when we would like it to become income producing. To me that is one of the outstanding possibilities of the Permanent Fund, which so far, has not been touched.

One more comment, which is simply that if it's really an \$8 billion Permanent Fund or \$10 billion or even \$6 billion, the impact on the state is going to be as incredible as if we were creating an entirely new state government. The last time we created a state government, we had a constitutional convention, a couple years of debate. This time we're creating a Permanent Fund with an audience of about 25. I would hope that by the time we actually come to making those decisions about the Permanent Fund, that something of the scale of inquiry of a new constitutional convention will be attempted because it's going to be that important to the state. Those are my comments.

GRUENING: Tim, could you stick around for some questions? That was a very thought provoking statement. I think Mike has one question. We'll open it to the audience themselves. If the audience has questions of the participant without getting into an argument, they can ask them.

DOOGAN: It seems to me that your statement hasn't really so much given us a solution to the problem of what to do with the Permanent Fund, but rather re-capped, like many people who live in the state, you have a tendency to speak of Alaskans as though they were a homogeneous group. The Committee's goal is to try to get some sort of an idea of what Alaskans in general would like to see done with the money. If you postpone that just by saying we'll use the money to buy oil leases, then we'll have to have another committee with a different name trying to figure out when people want the oil leases sold.

MC GINNIS: That seems to be the nature of government--a committee about a committee about a committee.

GRUENING: Tim, I had one question. I agree that the question of the increased contribution to the Permanent Fund whether you're going to raise it above the mandatory 25% set in the constitution is important. I think you implied this in your statement, but I'm checking. Shouldn't we decide

basically what the goal of the Fund should be or what we think it should be before we decide to increase the contribution. If in fact a lot of these goals can be achieved through the general fund, why put it into the Permanent Fund unless that has a special goal? And shouldn't we determine that first before we increase the contribution?

MC GINNIS: I'm going a little bit backwards from your deduction, which is I'm saying that it might better be put into the Permanent Fund as a place to put it when we don't know what to do with it, rather than to put it in the general fund when we don't know what to do with it. What I'm saying is that one of our big problems here--we spent all morning talking about how to keep people from coming to Alaska because we've got so much money. To my mind, that's the vital question about the Permanent Fund vs. the general fund.

MEEKINS: Tim, you mentioned, and I think it was a very good point, that one of the effects of putting 100% into the Permanent Fund may be, at some point, and thereby reducing the surplus in the general fund to force development, or at least to speed up the development of other areas by leasing oil leases or other mineral leases or any other resources the state owns. I think that's a good point. I'm wondering what you'd think about it in terms of, if I could remember my question now that I've said that. I'll come back to it.

GRUENING: Tim, you had a question, why don't you ask it?

BRADNER: I just had a question, Clark. The way the thing is now written, is it possible for the legislature to annually increase the amount of money into the Permanent Fund or does it have to be done by legislation. For instance, if the Finance Committee were to find that they bent the budget for one year and there was X amount left over, could they, by resolution, put what was left over of the excess revenue that year into the Permanent Fund? Or does it have to be a set percentage?

GRUENING: Not by resolution or at least that's debatable, but by a bill which could be a budget bill, it could put additional amounts. In the constitutional amendment it does say at least 25%, which has interpreted to allow the legislature to make a higher contribution.

MEEKINS: I remember what I was going to say fortunately. I'm wondering if you find that same logic to Alaska, Inc.? Do you think that having an Alaska, Inc. proposal that you distributed money from the Permanent Fund investments to the public would have the same effect of generating an enthusiasm for selling the Beaufort lease sale so that 25% of those monies or 50%, whatever the contribution rate, would then go into the Permanent Fund and their shares would increase in value and that that would generate its own? I'm just trying to follow that logic out as applied to Alaska, Inc.

MC GINNIS: It's a definite possibility. Whether it's Alaska, Inc. or any of a number of other things we've got in mind. It all goes back to whether we really want the money.

GRUENING: Any further questions? Jerry.

MC CUTCHEON: You raised the question of investing \$4 billion in gas line. I keep hearing about Alaska putting money in the gas line. Are you aware that the state of Alaska is--it would cost \$16 billion for the gas line? And there'd probably be an additional \$3 billion. And what would the cost of gas be and why when at Tidewater?

MC GINNIS: 19 billion.

MC CUTCHEON: inaudible

MC GINNIS: I'm not sure that they have. El Paso--I guess they're not an oil company, they're a gas company, but they sure wanted it.

MC CUTCHEON: inaudible

GRUENING: As I understood the proposal was illustrative only of the type of resource investment that could be gotten into. I have had enough of royalty gas right now. I hope we don't get into that debate again.

MC GINNIS: One variant on the proposal--we don't have to own 100%; we may not, in order to exercise effective control, even have to own 51%. We might do it with 40. We might be just a greater among many equals. I'm talking about co-venture as well as outright ownership. But I don't feel that you're ever going to get a company from outside Alaska, wherever it's from, and however many ads or dog races or whatever it is they sponsor to tell us they're Alaskans, I don't think you're ever going to get them to care the way the Alaskan public is going to care. If the Alaskan public doesn't care, then we might as well bag it.

GRUENING: Thank you. Panelists or anybody can come up.

BRADNER: I just had a question I wanted to address to you and Russ. What are the pros and cons more or less of money going into the Permanent Fund? Do you think it's a good idea to increase it to 50% or 75%? What do you see as disadvantages or advantages of that?

GRUENING: I'm not dodging the question, but one of the things we're trying to find out...I personally think you have to find out what you feel basically are the major goals. I have some opinions on that. But I haven't concluded yet to what the percentage ought to be--increased or remain the same. It's something I want to wait on frankly. That's my answer to it. I think I'd like to hear more from the public as to if they think it should be increased, why they do.

MEEKINS: I think one of the purposes of these types of things is to get some input on that question. We, of course, have spent a lot time thinking about it. It's sort of funny because at the same time we need to make that decision up front, because a lot of things depend on it, we have very little information upon which to base it. We don't know what the prices of the oil and the tariff and all those things are going to be so we can't really project what our revenues are going to be. At the same time, we don't know what our population increases and our expenditures are going to be, or even our needs. So we don't know what our budget is going to be. Really our judgment on how much extra we're going to have to put one place or another is not very accurate at this point. So it's very difficult to say put 100% of it in. I guess we could always change it, but we're sort of in a dichotomy of wanting to do it up front and not having all the information we need to do it.

HAVELOCK: I just want to say since you don't know what you're going to use the money for, it's absolutely insane to raise the percentage of money you're going to dedicate to the Fund. Supposing you assume the purpose of the Fund was to control random government spending of windfall funds, but you don't want a fixed percentage anyway. That is, what you need is some sort of a floating percentage that takes excess cream off the top. I assume since you feel that the legislature doesn't trust itself to do this on an annual basis, you need some sort of a formula system for doing that. I would not care to broach on how you put that formula together, but I'm sure that the Economists in the room could do it.

GRUENING: We are looking at that, John. It's a complicated problem, but I happen to agree that a formula approach makes more sense than a fix of 50, 75, 80.

HAVELOCK: I'm also concerned. This is something that George and I talked over at lunch. The importance of perserving the distinction in whatever you do between investment policy and spending policy. As you've got all kinds of potential subsidy operations going on if just have a floating category of anything that makes a profit. The fact that you are, in fact, spending money to support housing, or rural facilities, or whatever it may be, it becomes disguised. It seems to me from the accountability perspective you want to have some sort of standard as to what you would do in investment policy, that is what do you do with money that you don't have a purpose for using to spend on something that would encourage some social end. Establish yourself some sort of an interest rate on that and appropriate the money that

is necessary to fulfill social objectives on money which may be loaned beyond that to special purpose programs.

LOVE: I'd like to ask Dr. Gordon a question to briefly respond to some of the comments that Tim McGinnis, the fellow who was just up here talking. He was giving the description of the state using surplus money to invest in the resource industry to gain more control over a lot of management decisions or development decisions. I'd just like to hear you comment on that.

GORDON: I don't understand exactly what people mean by the word 'control.' By in large, I think it would be a bad thing to invest oil money back in oil. The very simple proposition about diversification, you don't want to have all your eggs in one basket. If you had a little money to put in the stock market, would you want to put all of it in one industry, the future of which you could not predict. By taking oil money, which you are already getting, and reinvesting in oil, you are increasing the risk.

He made the statement that the price of oil, everyone knows, is going to rise. There's one thing that is clear--everyone doesn't know what is going to happen to the price of things in general. It may be that oil is a very good investment, maybe it isn't. If you look at the price of oil company stock, it doesn't look all that good. But I would think that it would be a more desirable thing to invest it widely in a diverse set of things and protect the income and distribute it, as I say, equally. It'll do more for the poor. It'll do more for equality in the state of Alaska than any other proposal I've heard, and I think by a large margin.

BERGMAN: Let me add a footnote to this. I think that Mr. McGinnis is right. I think the environmental problems have been given rather short shrift in the discussion. Then again, I think it's quite reasonable for Alaska to, in some sense, trade-off environmental benefits for either Permanent Fund capital or Permanent Fund income. It's, of course, up to Alaskans to decide what a reasonable rate of trade-off is. But if, as I think I hear, the environment is something that is of great concern to everybody, then I don't think it's unreasonable to pay great attention to it, to sacrifice some income, possibly there's even some safety to it. I certainly think in terms of future leases, that perhaps environmental impact ought to be given greater stress than they have in the past. For example, insistence be made that people who exploit these resources ought to finance the clean-up or ought to use possibly high cost methods, which do the least damage. I'm a little confused by the discussion as to whether Alaska's really very poor, or very rich. If we take the view that there is a lot of leeway here, then certainly saving the environment, creating environmental amenities, or not destroying those that exist, should have a very prominent place in the planning.

ROGERS: Clark, I'm going to have to leave.

GRUENING: Okay. Russ wanted to ask Dr. Rogers one question before he left.

MEEKINS: My question is if we are assuming that Alaska, Inc. proposal finally won out and that we were distributing a thousand or two thousand dollars a year to the share holders of the Alaska, Inc. proposal, my question is what do you think about the possibility of that feeling inflation and then that increase in income would just drive up prices and thereby the real income would stay the same.

ROGERS: This is one of the things when you ask an Economist that question, you get all sorts of answers. We have of, first of all, put this into a total context. The distribution of income to Alaska--we have to have the total model of the economy we could relate that to--what would be driven up? It would mean that more money would be spent in Alaska possibly. Whether or not this creates inflation, I can't tell you off-hand because my experience with Alaska has been when more money was spent in Alaska, prices tend to go down because the scale of the market's increased and a lot of offsetting things came into effect. I can't give you an answer off the top of my head. We'd have to relate it to what is going to be going on. But we would have to consider those things when we're talking about the effect on the economy. I'm going to have to catch a plane so I'll have to make this short.

One point I just wanted to repeat what John said and what Professor Gordon mentioned. We've got to separate in our thinking the Permanent Fund, the management of the Fund itself, the investments of the money in the Fund to create income--separate that from doing good providing loans and providing subsidies. If we do that, it's true we can do it, we can manage it. It puts upon the management of the Fund an impossible task of accountability. If it's just a simple matter of preserving the capital, maximizing the income from that, then the annual income would be available for doing all sorts of things. We could throw it out the window; we could build a power plant; we could do a lot of things on an annual basis. That should be left flexible, because what we perceive is our needs are going to change. What Alaskans want will be changing. The whole scene will be changing. But the management of the Fund, as a financial entity, should be subject to straight forward attempt to get the most prudent management possible as a financial transaction. Don't clutter it up with a lot of other ends, no matter how valuable these might be. That's my final point.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dr. Rogers. I know you had a busy schedule. There'll probably be some disagreement with that closing statement. But you can escape.

ROGERS: I'm sure. I'll escape on that one.

GRUENING: Mr. Paul Foose---I think had a statement or a question.

FOOSE: I'm a laborer and I'm a part time student out here at the University. What I want to say speaks to the philosophy of the Fund. I think that we have to get away from looking at it as some way to maximize profit. And we have to see how the Fund can be used to help stabilize the Alaskan economy. The tool that's usually used by Economists in looking at this, I haven't heard much about it, looking at the multiplier effects of different kinds of industries and what kind of re-circulation we get -- money spent in certain ways. I think the Department of Economic Development comes out with those figures. They show some industries, like tourism, to be one point something. In other words, that money turns around and goes straight back out.

What I'm talking about the Permanent Fund being used for is to fund projects, let's say, we look not just at housing, but look more at a total system. Let's look at providing development funds. Going in with a native regional corporation to develop a sawmill in southeast Alaska.

(portion not taped)...where people could be sold these houses, giving the savings out along the line. Where now we have all these sponges called businessmen, which are raising capital along the line. I think we need to look at the needs of Alaskans and not at the needs of these companies. They don't care about our people, only as much as they can make off us. Not just the small industries either. I think we ought to look at some of the large industries, as has been said, so we can control the rate of development more so we don't end up not only with a high unemployment rate because so many workers have flooded in, but we have such high population influx completely tears our cities apart. Where crime is just you know. Anchorage is not anything like it used to be. And that's a reflection of that. That's a social cost that means something to Alaskans.

Another thing I'd say is that you can't trust the current banking structure to manage these loans and just turn the money over to them, because what they've done is they have not used it in rural Alaska which needs the money more. Sure the bankers in Anchorage are rich. But when you go to the villages, any of them, even the ones that are better off, I think the living conditions that people just wouldn't believe, if they actually saw it. I think we can't leave it to them. If they manage it to make the most money or if the Permanent Fund is managed to make the most money, the money is not going to be put into projects where it's needed most--like fishing cooperatives and things like that.

The other point I want to make is that, I think some of the forms of economic organization that we have seen here lately, like the development of some cooperative, is an important concept for the Permanent Fund to look in to especially in giving preference to funding those types of enterprises, especially in the native villages, where it more lends itself to the cooperative culture that is already among the native people and also among non-natives. I think it's an important concept that we start, just as a matter of economic justice, to promote economic democracy, where the people work at a place; they elect their management; and they decide on the work process, rather than having it shoved down their throats. People

who are working on the line live with this every day. I think if you could look towards that, nearly the whole social picture of what it means to live in Alaska, I think, perhaps, the Permanent Fund could be used towards this end.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Foose. Could you stay for a few questions. Mr. Doogan.

DOOGAN: It's not so much a question. I just would like to again restate my comment that I made after Tim McGinnis finished. We have a tendency to talk about Alaskans as though they were one thing. Let's put it like this. Bankers, who live in Alaska not matter how greedy or conspiratorial they might be, are also Alaskans. The appeal is not an appeal that you can deal with unless you can define Alaskans not to include conspiratorial bankers. Do you see the point? Granted everybody wants to make Alaska a better place to live for Alaskans. The question is how do you do that?

FOOSE I guess I'm talking about if you have to you set up a non-profit banking service of the Permanent Fund. Why should we guarantee their profits? What are they doing besides shuffling the paper and doing the accounting? And sitting between us and our money?

DOOGAN: So you'd be prepared to trade that off against the benefit to bankers and stockholders of banks in Alaska?

FOOSE: I'd say so, yes.

DOOGAN: The existing financial structure?

FOOSE: At least to have some alternative to that, which there is not at this point.

RHODE: Do you believe that the kind of purposes you talked about, a non-profit cooperative fisheries, canneries, related small scale business--- do you think there's \$8 billion worth of such ventures? And secondly, how are you to get into those ventures without attracting new people, crime, all the other things?

FOOSE: That's a problem that's a little bit bigger issue in terms of more people coming in. I was just reading in a Manpower report that there's more unemployed workers in Detroit than we have in our total work force. That's the kind of magnitude in a lot of the economic problems down in the United States that are forcing people up here into an area that's expanding. I don't know how to deal with that but I think any kind of immigration controls are unconstitutional. I agree with what the woman said here, I can't remember your name, about having two classes of citizens. I would never believe in

anything like that. Yet somehow we have to protect ourselves.

BERGMAN: The only way you can protect yourself from new people coming is by being poor and unattractive.

FOOSE: It's a constant loss, how can we gain?

BERGMAN: I think, for example, if a lot of the revenue is put into environmental improvements, that will attract less, shall we be frank and say undesirables, than if every Alaskan lives tax-free or if everybody can get a loan at exceptional rates. So you can't have it both ways. As I say, you really cannot, I don't see how you could, ennoble the people here and make pariahs of the people to come. But the only way you can get them not to come is by staying poor.

FOOSE: Okay. Well that's a political question we have to face. In terms of our relationship with the United States, but I think that's beyond the scope of this. Another thing about the \$8 billion, there probably would not be that much of a need for that much money. But we could look towards oil development. Even if, in the beginning, going a little slow, even if we are a little more inefficient, we'd have to be really inefficient to not be able to make money. If the oil companies are going to make \$98 1/2 billion out of Prudhoe Bay field, if we even recovered half of that by developing these resources ourselves, we'd be far ahead.

One other thing I wanted to mention, I think, just in terms of having control of our resources, that we could look more towards our oil resource, I think it's wrong to turn it over to an oil company, that's going to turn it into gasoline to drive the third cadillac to the country club for some guy down in Arizona. I think, since we know petrochemicals are such important industries that people need, we should look more towards putting our resources like into agriculture inputs in countries where they have fire machinery standing idle because they can't get petroleum. Yet they have people starving in our country. I think, if no one else will look at that, they maybe we Alaskans ought to be looking towards that also.

GORDON: I would like to question the figure about the 98 and wonder where it comes from.

FOOSE: It comes from Wainwright Security Industries. It was a report made to the legislature.

GORDON: Let me say this year all the corporations in the United States, all over the world, in oil and everywhere else, and mostly outside of Alaska are going to make about that much in after tax profits. That's all.

FOOSE: That's before taxes.

GORDON: Are you talking about long term future or are you talking about any one year?

FOOSE: That's over the 20 years. Life of the field. The other thing is what you're talking about--the figure you're talking about profit also doesn't include all the advertising and the high rates--hundreds of thousands dollars paid to managers.

GORDON: It is also true that if you take all the high paid managers and reduce them to zero, it would not effect that figure by any significant amount. In fact, it isn't even true the owners of corporations take out anything like that. What they really take out is the dividend. And the dividends are only around a third of that--about \$35 billion currently. And about a third of those dividends in turn, go to work in pension plans. So the notion that there's a huge pot of gold there that you can get a hold of just isn't true.

LOVE: That may be true in all industries. But wouldn't you agree that in, for example, the Prudhoe Bay development that it's more capital intensive than maybe certain other types of industries in terms of pension plans?

GORDON: Well, I'm not talking about returning to capital. Returning to capital includes the interest of course, as well as corporate earnings. I'm just talking about specific corporations. The corporation doesn't make the money they pay out in interest; they make the corporate earnings. However there's a widespread misapprehension about the nature of corporate earnings and particularly how big they are.

LOVE: There's also, I think, a wide misapprehension, in this case, about the concept of how profitable Prudhoe Bay is. I think that it's unwise to compare the development of Prudhoe Bay to industry in general, or even the oil industry in general. Because it's a fairly special and unusual situation. I'm sure you know it's got more proven reserves in the entire, everything in Canada and about 30% of the nation. So it's a very unusual field. It's an unusually profitable venture that Mr. Foose is talking about. I don't think it avails itself to really simple comparison to standard industry practice.

FOOSE: Just even a small cut of how much they're going to make is what all this money is in the Permanent Fund. There's supposedly so much we don't even know what to do with it. That's just a fraction of it. It's a low test. Depending on how other nations act to it.

GORDON: I don't know what you mean. Do you mean that Alaska should attempt to expropriate that money? That hypothetical \$98 billion before taxes.

FOOSE: I don't think there's anything wrong with that. It's our resource.

GORDON: I don't know legally whether it's your resource or not. Do you mean morally it's your resource.

FOOSE: Well, let's say if they're going to make \$98 1/2 billion, why...

GORDON: You're not making \$98 1/2 billion; that's just nonsense. You don't make 98 1/2 billion if that's gross. And the question is the period over which they make it. But if you're going to do that, why don't you export all the corporations. What's so peculiar about those corporations that they should be expropriated rather than all the other corporations?

HAVELOCK: Mr. Chairman, is there any rule to germaneness to this discussion?

GRUENING: Well, I was hoping that it would kind of peter out. See what you started, Paul? I think that we should take a break. Rep. Carpenter has indicated that I was amiss in the beginning, and I won't do it again. This gentleman in the back wanted to speak. Would you like to do it now or after the break?

DI NARDO: I'd like to make a few points. I'm Dan DiNardo. I've made a few notes here. One is management of the Fund, what to do with the money. When you do invest it, we're worrying about the profit sharing that might take place by the managers, the social cause, how you measure effectiveness, etc. My suggestion is an alternative of not doing away with the Permanent Fund. It's very much important for this reason. There was a doctrine signed, the Constitution of the United States of America, that laid the ground work for a system called free enterprise. Free enterprise means that every individual in this room, in this state you answer the question as to whether social needs get the best allocation. This is up to the individual people to decide. They do not need another government agency to decide for them. This has been the cause of the present problem that you're talking about in the state of Alaska. (inaudible).. position of what the state of Alaska holds for the people here and for the nation. One, because of the resource. And now ...(inaudible) The only thing I would caution Dr. Lindauer on is this idea of necessarily needing, we're talking about the Permanent Fund, I haven't heard anybody say we don't need it to this point, is channelling the money through local financial institutions. They all belong to the group called the Federal Reserve System (inaudible). You'll find out the Federal Reserve Corporation (inaudible)... Free enterprise across the board, and I'll tell you buddy, on a historical basis, on economic basis, free enterprise is the most efficient system ever invented by man to allocate that resource called money to where it should go. (inaudible) ...

That's why I'm opposed to the Permanent Fund. (inaudible)

DOOGAN: I had a comment before the break. It seems to me that with the last few speakers we've more or less set possible boundaries in this discussion. Maybe when we come back, we can confine ourselves within those boundaries.

GRUENING: Five minutes. Thank you.

BREAK

BLACK: (portion of Cliff Black's statement not taped)

My main question seems to state who really is going to administer the Fund? It boils down to a very deep philosophical question. If we are going to allow the legislature in Juneau to dictate what happens in Alaska to funds like these which provide an unusual and great opportunity for Alaskans to somehow effect local decision-making, local regional planning efforts, to me this strikes a very great disservice and injustice to areas of Alaska that have been left out over many, many decades. I was going to get into a number of other points, but I would probably just say that that probably to me has to be re-addressed more than anything else. I was going to get into things like how does that again measure the effectiveness of the utilization, the regionalization of utilization of the Fund? Well, certainly it would more enhance the possibilities for decision-making, the possibilities for effectiveness measurement, the development of innovative and creative ideas as to how utilize rural areas of Alaska. I happen to be from Deering, Alaska, which is up by the Arctic Circle; and I certainly recognize there are resources in that area, renewable and non-renewable, that have not been tapped, that could be tapped, that certainly will be tapped--either through good, sound planning or through a process forced upon the regional corporations that are there now because of their non-involvement in a windfall fund like this.

What I'm saying is the state of Alaska certainly has an opportunity to guard its environment, to guard its integrity in all areas, streams, its wildlife, fish, to guard also culture that is fast disappearing. These are assets that cannot be regained, cannot in any manner be brought back. What I'm hoping is that we will look at this Fund in a different sense than we look at just another dollar or two in our pocket. What I'm hoping is that we can, in some manner, incorporate all of Alaska into this planning and utilization of these dollars. I think the regionalization of planning efforts certainly bring about a more indepth review of what is there and has ever been done before. It will not only identify the resources that are there, renewable and non-renewable, but also the resources in human kind. Too many time, asinine I have to say, we assume so much. Assume that we have no resources of the human kind out there. We assume that they are having yet language problems, problems of identifying with the different cultures, problems of getting to work on time, well you hear that from biased, judgmental, prejudiced and sometimes bigoted individuals. You'll

hear that whether or not the rest of Alaska catches up and even surpasses the majority of society. You'll hear that from the natives as well as the non-natives. You'll hear that from the blacks as well as the Hispanics. You'll hear that from everyone when they have a problem of identification and a problem of realization that we are one. You'll hear that all the time. What I'm saying is that this is an opportunity to do away with a lot of those problems. This is an opportunity to incorporate planning endeavors and planning opportunities for other groups that are not now in the planning that's going on, who have not been asked to participate; yet have 40 plus million acres that they're going to have to incorporate to your system, their own system, simply because they're citizens of the state, citizens of the country. How are you going to say to them that you don't have to pull out your oil, you don't have to pull out your gas now, when they know they do have to now. Because the society is forcing upon them their own rules of the game, forcing them to become involved in the 20th century capitalist system overnight, which is the system I believe in, by the way, even though I feel that cooperatives certainly will, most likely, work best in rural Alaska for many years, because the communal system inbred into our people to do away with it very quickly for a capitalist system.

I guess what I'm trying to say is that I don't see how we can plan for the Fund utilization until we have identified more clearly and more fluently who, in actuality, is going to administer the Fund; because if you identify the areas by region of the state of Alaska, and I view Alaska as six states not one, six areas of Alaska that are somewhat separate from each other. If you do identify those areas for planning purposes, you will identify how the Fund will be utilized. You have no real commonality between southeastern Alaska and northwest Alaska. One is fishing and timber industry base area and the other is a subsistence area. The two are not in any manner similar. The only similarity might be in the fact that some communal systems still work in both parts of Alaska. If we then recognize that there are different parts of Alaska that need to be taken into consideration in our planning endeavors and in the utilization of this Fund, we then certainly must recognize that the administration and the utilization of the dollars and the actual expenditures and how they are best put to work for Alaskans, how they will best incorporate more equity into our lifestyle, and how they will better do away with the inequities that cause prejudices and fears and the misinformation and the wasteland that sometimes we don't even like to think of and the fact that we do many times disallow each other a good life style simply because we are different. I think that we need to re-evaluate what we're doing with these dollars. We need to re-evaluate in the sense that we need to take into consideration that we can't, as one group of people sitting in Juneau, dictate for all of Alaska a system that will be compatible to all of Alaska. Simply because there has never been a time when anyone has really looked at my part of Alaska, for instance, and never really been a time when anyone has looked at other parts of Alaska. It's an opportune time. It's an opportune time to make a pact with the national government on D2 lands. We should not actually determine what the D2 lands are going to be until Alaska has had the opportunity to utilize some of its new gained wealth to evaluate our state, to thoroughly recognize what's under the ground before we determine what it should be called on top. I think that's something we should look at--some of the things

that we need to fairly evaluate. A gentleman made the comment that the educated are moving into Alaska. I hope they're not coming from places like New York and places where it has been shown that their system has failed miserably.

BERGMAN: Let's not have any bigotry here.

BLACK: This is not a racial statement whatsoever. I'm hoping that what we have in Alaska is a start of a new planning effort that can incorporate more Alaskans on a regional basis. I hope that you gentlemen don't take this as a personal thing that I don't believe that the legislature should be by itself in handling these dollars. I think that the legislature has great wisdom, but I do believe the people out there can plan and have some policy control over these dollars. I would certainly agree that they should be involved in the final determination.

GRUENING: Thank you, Cliff. Can you stay for questions? Is there a question of Mr. Black? Representative Meekins.

MEEKINS: Cliff, I am wondering what you think about where would the greater benefit be, I suppose this is contained in your comments, but I wanted to ask you directly, if you think there would be greater benefit in an Alaska, Inc. type proposal where the income from the Fund is directly distributed to people in the rural areas, for instance, or if you think a development bank concept with planning agencies and regionalized, as you have talked about, would be preferable.

BLACK: I think the Alaska, Inc. ... (portion not taped). ...more opportunity for Alaskans, in general, to see what they can really do when funds are now available. I haven't really made up my mind seriously on Alaska, Inc. Whether or not I could go beyond the distribution of funds beyond the retirement level so that Alaskans who have lived here all their lives don't have to leave the state to retire. I think that's a tragedy. It's a shame. It's the worst kind of injustice that can happen to people. They have lived here all their lives, then they retire, then are forced by economics to leave our state, simply because we lose their expertise, we lose their knowledge in vast areas that cannot be gained overnight. Only those people who have lived here for many, many years understand Alaska. We are losing them very rapidly. I would say that the majority of dollars be put into, not the majority of dollars because I cannot even comprehend that kind of money, but a good amount should be put into the development of really significant homes for the aged, take care of them and keep them in the state so we can utilize their expertise. Beyond that, I have still to make up my mind. I would certainly have made up my mind further had I been more comfortable with who would be administering the Fund in the long haul.

GRUENING: Senator Rodey.

RODEY: Cliff, could I ask you another question in regard to administration? I'm as concerned about it as you are. Do you favor a method of electing members to the Permanent Fund board or an appointed mechanism such as has been embodied in the Governor's bill?

BLACK: Well, elected representation is always good if it is on a regional level. If you put it into a state level, a good portion of Alaska is left out of any major decision making possibility. I view the Permanent Fund in the sense that it's an opportunity for a full type of revenue sharing that would incorporate the different costs in Alaska. For instance, if you buy a dozen eggs in Barrow right now, it'll cost you \$2.00 or more. The cost of service, the cost of product, the cost of anything that happens in Barrow is tremendously different from the cost in Anchorage. What I'm saying is simply that if there's a revenue sharing device used for the distribution of these dollars, it incorporates very clearly the different cost of living differentials and it is distributed in that sense, then I could see a regionalization utilization based on election processes and very well could even see it go beyond that to dictate that a particular community would be represented and a person from each community would be represented on the regionalized board. So that way you wouldn't have to have any communities left in the process.

RODEY: Your main concern is to ensure that some of the areas of Alaska which have a smaller population are represented on whatever Permanent Fund administrative body is finally formed. Is that what you mean?

BLACK: I guess my concern is--I'll go back to comments about the federal system in Alaska, the paternalism system that has for many, many years placed its hand on our head and said, 'we will do it this way,' and have never reached the point where they've done anything that we've wanted them to. They've always gone and done things as they've wanted to do them. What I'm saying is that in this case I would like to see, since we're all citizens of the same state, since we are all part of the same state, that there be some manner where all Alaskans will determine the direction and utilization of these funds.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Black. Are there questions from the audience? We have panelists here; we want to keep them on their toes. If you have some questions. Representative Chatterton.

CHATTERTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me from here alright? Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on getting this group together. I can assure you it has been stimulating and very thought provoking. I hope you'll keep up the good work because the total picture can only be seen once all the various, however conflicting they might be, parts of the picture come before you. Keep up the good work.

GRUENING: Thank you, Chat. I didn't ask for that plug.

CHATTERTON: (inaudible) ...I really have two questions for the panel, that developed this morning, but I can't help feel a little bit facetious. There was a person who testified here a little earlier this afternoon and made a suggestion as to how to use some of the Permanent Fund funds. I felt I should provide you also with a corollary suggestion for their use. Instead of buying all of the federal lands that are put up for oil and gas leases or along with that, I suggest that we buy the national interest land and thereby immediately solving the D2 question.

Mr. Chairman, through you I would like to ask the panelists or anyone that would care to comment--we did hear earlier comments about: 1. loaning money; 2. investing money. It was even suggested earlier--there was some comment about investing in a pipeline or a petrochemical plant--state funds. My question to the panel and to the Economists--if they have any background on this, would they care to comment--does the potential for a conflict of interests develop when a taxing entity becomes a participant in the profitability of a taxable entity?

My next question is--is there a degree of parallelism, at least in some facets, between what is before you, Mr. Chairman, with this Permanent Fund and what had to be before the U.S. Congress some years ago when they were faced with seeing that each and every native Alaskan got a fair share out of the Alaska Native Settlement Act? Is there a parallelism? That's my second question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GRUENING: I'll leave that up to the panelists, the Economists, anyone who wants to speak up.

GORDON: I am really no expert on the problems of taxable entities. The notion that some of the investment proposals put forth recently here remind me very much of where I now live. I happen to have moved to Canada in the last few months. In Canada, there are truly an astounding number, they talk about free enterprise like everybody, there's just an astounding number of what they call their Crown Corporation, Federal Crown Corporations, and Provincial Corporations. Now when you say is there a conflict of interests, they attempt, at least, by this device called a Crown Corporation, to make the Crown Corporation totally operate like an individual enterprise, despite the fact that the state or the province or the nation owns all the shares--sometimes not all the shares, most of the shares. I think if you survey the record of those Crown Corporations, that it is dismal. They have a Crown Corporation selling what Westinghouse sells--atomic reactors. They got involved in a little bribery, but the most significant think is they managed to sell two of their atomic reactors to Argentine at a loss of \$130 million. The Province of Alberta has something called Alberta Heritage Fund. They're visably in the business of setting up businesses that otherwise wouldn't be there--irrigation facilities, food packing plants, huge petrochemical operations. The other thing they're doing is providing more services than otherwise would be the case and lower taxes. They're the lowest tax province in Canada by some piece. The result is that an enormous number of people

are leaving the rest of the country and going there. The wages are lower there than they are where I happen to live in British Columbia, but people are moving there--that's where the jobs are. It is not benefitting, as far as I can see, the average Albertan at all. Rents are going up. Land is getting scarce. I see very little merit, what apart from the conflict of interest problem.

GRUENING: Is there any comment on the second half of the question, which was--was there any parallel between the Native Land Claims and what we might be trying to do with the Permanent Fund? Mr. Love.

LOVE: I don't have a comment on that but on Dr. Gordon's comment. Dr. Gordon, do you operate out of British Columbia right now?

GORDON: Right now, yes.

LOVE: Well, it is my understanding that in British Columbia, under the new democratic party, there's a lot of acquisitions in terms of the Crown Corporation. As a result, partially because of their policy for rapid acquisitions, there's a problem with the insurance industry that the new democratic party was defeated and replaced by the conservative government of Mr. Bennett. It's also my understanding that Mr. Bennett's conservative government has not divested themselves of any of the acquisitions made by the NDP and that most of them, in fact, are now on the whole profitable. Is that in an accurate summation? Just as a parallel to the experience the Federal Crown Corporation as looking to British Columbia where you teach.

GORDON: No, not entirely. You see, to describe the present government as conservative is, I think, quite incorrect. We have two kinds of parties in British Columbia. One is socialist and the other is more socialist. It is not true that those have become profitable. It's not true--they've all been losers. In fact, if you investigate in the theories of finance they teach in business schools, it is extremely difficult to lose money consistently by investing. The NDP did not succeed in doing so. But more serious, some of their acquisitions, a distressing number of their acquisitions, have lost money. They perhaps could have been defended on the grounds that they had some social purpose. There's a great dispute about what the social purpose was and whether it helped anybody significantly. I'd say in Canada, there's all kinds of conservative government of another province in far east. New Brunswick. They bought all kinds of things, setting up another conservative government. They got into an endless stream of business--nearly all of which went bankrupt. The one advantage, incidentally, of the Crown Corporation is it isn't like many of the Corporations into which the British government bails people out. When they set up a Corporation, it is like a private corporation. When it goes bankrupt, it's bankrupt. So it doesn't continue forever. It's just draining off the public purse. That is a legal device which, I think, is of some usefulness. I think there's a great parallel; it's a little hard to classify political opinion. It seems to be so simple

that a liberal, radical person interested in the poor and egalitarianism should be for one thing. And that is give the money to everybody, if they could, and they can't. Okay. Invest it as good income as possible, and give that good income to the people. That would do more for the world of Alaskans. It would be an immediately equalizing phenomenon. I cannot think of one thing that has been proposed here that is going to do nearly as much for the poor in Alaska as that kind of proposal.

LOVE: Which you stated on several occasions.

GRUENING: I think we've got the different philosophy pretty well outlined here. Is there any comment on the second half of that question? Or another question from the audience?

HAVELOCK: I think the answer to Mr. Chatterton's second question is yes.

GRUENING: Okay. That's the kind of answer I like. Mr. Dave Hickok, did you have a comment?

HICKOK: I agree with John. I think the answer is very definitely yes. (inaudible)...

GRUENING: I believe this gentlemen in the red shirt wanted to ask a question. Could you identify yourself please.

WICKS: Not specifically a question or even an answer. My name is Alan Wicks. I'm a recently retired teacher, in the Anchorage School District for the past 20 years. I came to Alaska initially in 1940 working for the Territorial Department of Health. At that time, supported our Chairman's grandfather, Governor Gruening of the Territory of Alaska, in his efforts to roll back an unseemly rate increase by Alaska Steamship Company and have been more or less a Gruening supporter ever since. One thing that is lacking in all of this commentary and discussion as to profits investment management--there's one thing lacking, because it seems as if everybody is making an effort to play God for everybody else. While we like our benefits and we like our dividends, and I like them as well as anybody else and have been lucky, and like the Wall Street Journal has said 'nothing succeeds like dumb luck.' A little bit of that can go a long way if you're on the lucky end. I want to put a diagram on that board. As a teacher, I just can't resist the opportunity, as a late teacher. Then I'm going to come back and make a couple of comments about it and then a question at the end.

GRUENING: Okay. It's getting a little late. We want to keep everyone interested.

WICKS: I didn't need the eraser. I didn't want to wipe off the rest of that. There again, somebody made illusions and maybe I'm, well no, I'm not, just reiterating what a couple other people said. We've arrived at a place in international affairs, in national affairs, in Alaskan affairs, in United Nations affairs. I'll flash back to pre-World War II and depression times. We've arrived now with technology and science and my background is basically biological science--we've arrived now at a place where humanity with its science and technology doesn't really know where it's going. But I submit to you, and this is an independent, personal formulation, I won't give the blame to anybody else; but unless and until humanity arrives at a umbrella concept, and that's what that is, of first basic, foremost environmental ecologic concern before the Fund, before the investment of the Fund, before the applications from the return from the Fund.

What I'm saying is that civilization and humanity, at this juncture is up against it. If we don't learn or haven't learned what the aborigines, the native peoples, learned long ago, was to live and operate in concert with nature, with earth. Not as its master, not as God who says, 'I'll scrape it, I'll build it, I'll erect the edifices in my own way and to my own needs and beliefs and likes.' Now I'm going to leave that idea, but I think it's the one that needs the most emphasis, first and before just about anything else. I'd like to turn to the panel, and while I respect and admire Dr. Lindauer's views, he is a relatively new and accurate able observer of the Alaskan scene. I'd like to ask him how he discriminates on one hand between the need for application for funds to this or that industry or development, to get to a specific point, or the abhorrence of the use of the funds because they would be an economic magnet to people elsewhere to come to Alaska, but on the other hand, my, and I'm tickled to death I've got it, my 5 1/4% FHA, if it is made available to them, it's not going to just be for the people who are here now. Not by a long shot. There is going to be a drove, a hoard on hoard, who are attracted to the magnet of 4% or 5% or 7% Alaskan style FHA. We're not going to be able to differentiate between those things in any way.

LINDAUER: That's really an excellent question. (inaudible)...If you have a legislature this fall--those who are eligible for loans and recipients of those types of loans, then the financial institutions could make it very possible, perhaps desirable and profitable to specify not only the kinds that could be made, but who is eligible to receive them. One could easily say that you could do the same, for example, with Alaska, Inc. as using eligibility for loans for business. It could, in fact, be those people who are here now and could have such time variety for qualification that no one in their right mind would come up and spend 5 years, 10 years, or 20 years, and you pick the number in order to qualify. It wouldn't really qualify that they'd be eligible. What we'd assume the utility serving a native village would be instantly qualified. We'd assume a long term Alaskan would be instantly qualified. The question is where do you draw the line. That wouldn't seem to be that difficult.

BERGMAN: Let me ask a question about Alaska, Inc. Suppose you have two kids born the same day, and one of them is the child of a long term resident and the other is the child of someone who is not a long term resident. Are you going to give one of them the Alaska, Inc. payment and not the other?

GRUENING: The Governor isn't here to defend himself. The more you get into the Alaska, Inc., the more difficult it is to exactly define who an Alaskan is or who is the beneficiary. It doesn't mean it's impossible. But obviously if it's going to be a meaningful program, you've got to draw the line somewhere.

BERGMAN: I understand that you might be able to draw it with adults, but I think if what you're trying to do is enfranchise only those who are here now and their decedents, you've got a tough row to hoe. I don't think you can do that.

GRUENING: Alaska, Inc. does have a residency. The child isn't really eligible until it's been here a certain number of years.

LINDAUER: What would, for example, require 18 year residency, at least, so an 18 year old can enter into contract. So whatever is the legal age for entering contracts, that means every child will be eligible if they've lived here long enough. As would be anybody who arrived.

HAVELOCK It's not going to stand up constitutionally though.

GRUENING: I know that's being studied. I'm sure there's some way you can find a way, but we're not here to discuss that. Somebody who hasn't made a comment yet. Mr. Hickok, would you like to follow up?

HICKOK: I'd like to say a couple things that tie in on this subject. My name is Dave Hickok. I'm the director of the Arctic Environmental Information and Data Center at the University of Alaska, currently the president of the Alaska Division in the American Association for the Advancement of Science. I think there's two or three items that seem to me have not been covered. One of the things the Economists appears to have said is that the need on the curves is a function of economics alone. I'd like to say that I don't think it is. I'd like to give a few examples of what's happened to history in Alaska. One of the needs trends that has determined what has happened in bush Alaska has been, for example, many years ago, in the Arctic latitudes here, we did a lot of research on ionospheric scatter and so on. We were able then to develop satellite communication systems for these latitudes which was not a possibility under existing technology of lower latitudes. Now what has happened here is

because communication was available to bush Alaska, technologically, and because there was a political decision made by very, very few people for the sale of the Alaska communications system about 1970, the whole need trend for communication and development for this kind of thing in rural Alaska changed. Not by virtue of economics, but by virtue of technology and science and by virtue of political decision. There also have been a number of other of these kind of things. In the health field, two doctors made the breakthrough in tuberculosis following World War II here in Alaska. The highest incident rate in the world in the early 1950's of birth rate and death rate in rural Alaska beat the Kalahari Desert in Africa and everywhere else--were brought down by science and technology. The application of money, in that sense, of the political decision to stamp out disease. These things make aspirations. These things make needs that are not just driven by the common market place. I would suggest, in addition to the economics of capital investment and so on, there are at least three or four other items that are driving the need co-efficient and that is law and politics, which I put in despite Mr. Havelock's qualms, hand in glove, science and technology and perhaps a population expansion. These things are making change in Alaska. The need curve is escalating at a tremendous rate despite what happens in economics. The aspirations of the bush communities, where there are hundreds of them, have no water, no sewer, no schools. These aspirations are real. They are going to drive a demand for public expenditure funds to satisfy these problems. I would certainly agree with John Havelock that the statehood act called for the expenditure of tax revenues and so forth to support a verging new state. I would also suggest to you that the Alaska Native Land Claims Act also had the same effect. The one thing that Alaska has not recognized, or several things it hasn't recognized, but one thing it hasn't recognized is that rural Alaska should not pay the price for the public services that everyone else in Alaska enjoys in the urban settings. Through their compensation dollars that came under the Native Land Claims Act, they are entitled to the same public services as anyone else. I guess that's about enough.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dave. Would you mind remaining for a minute in case the Economists or the legal field would like to respond.

BERGMAN: I'm the one that introduced the word and when you started talking, I instantly regretted it. Then I recall that I had put quotes around it. I actually agree with you that there is no such thing as absolute need. You can't take a certain desire and say this particular desire is a need and this particular desire is not a need. What I'm trying to point out here, though, is that if the population were to grow, just to maintain a certain level of services would require a growing trend of revenues, which is an entirely different point.

HICKOK: I think you're right. But regardless of that, the need curve, the demand curve, perhaps, of social aspiration, human aspiration is escalating at a tremendous rate, regardless of the economics of the state. Because of broader expansion in health, in education, in other factors.

BERGMAN: Well, I think what you're saying is what some other people have said--that perhaps it would be more reasonable to use the oil revenues for this kind of purpose. Use them all for this kind of purpose--setting up schools, setting up water supplies, setting up electrification plants, instead of either sending it to these much maligned New York brokers to be kept for future generations or perhaps for giving concessional loans to people of Anchorage. That, I think, is a matter of simply social policy. You've got to fight it out. That's not a matter of economics. That's a matter of what you can get the people of the state to spend their income on. I feel that the Supreme Court had said schooling had to be provided throughout the state in a more or less equal way. There's a famous California case on that.

HICKOK: Well, we had one here in Alaska too.

BERGMAN: So I don't quite understand the fact that it hasn't been done already.

MEEKINS: Doctor, are you saying that expectations or needs, whatever you want to call it, are not related to the economics?

HICKOK: I think they're related, but I think there are a number of external forces that make new aspirations. Prior to the research on ionospheric scatter and so on, that made possible high altitude communication systems, there were no aspirations for it because nobody knew it could be done. There are a lot of these kinds of sayings. Before you could put a sanitation system in Arctic permafrost, you have to know how to do it. Then by virtue of it being able to be accomplished, there's aspiration for it.

MEEKINS: I think that's the common denominator between the two. Because when you have money, it's therefore possible to build things, it's therefore possible to do things. When you have new technology, other things become possible that weren't before. It's the possibilities that seem to feel the needs.

HICKOK: No, I think that the possibility may fuel the need, but not necessarily money. In the case, for example, of the communication situation here in Alaska that wasn't a function of money.

MEEKINS: I'm not limiting it to money.

HICKOK: It's research of science and technology and a political decision to sell the Alaskan communication system away from the military and to put it into modern science.

MEEKINS: Just to clarify--I'm not limiting it to money. I'm saying that things being possible is the common denominator between technology and economics in your scenario, because even if the technology made it possible to have telecommunications, if we didn't have the money, even if we had the political will, we wouldn't have it.

HICKOK: Then I would go back to Tussing's scenario. I think what Tussing is saying is that the private sector, the private demand for these things is running, and we have a large sector of private money, by virtue of Native Land Claims and the growth of the Alaskan economy--I guess economics is what I really want to shut up.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Hickok. Okay, in the waning hours, are there any more questions? Sure, you're welcome to ask again, if there's anybody who hasn't had a chance to ask...

FISKE: I'm Lieutenant Colonel Fiske--Retired. I'd like to say first that I strongly support Dr. Lindauer's position on adequate investment of Permanent Fund in Alaska and for the lowest, reasonable interest rates, and where present Alaskans can enjoy the benefits of employment, social amenities, health services, recreation, etc., etc., and etc. It would appear that the Permanent Fund should continue to receive input as long as our resources last--into the indefinite future--to possible amounts much in the excess of the figures we are now discussing. If this is true, why worry about future generations? The input will continue to come in, the earnings will continue to be there. I'm interested in providing something to occupy the leisure time of the many small communities, particularly during long winter hours. Something that involves all ages, both sexes, from youth to octogenarian. Most of our rural communities have churches, bars, but many have little else to occupy the people when they're not busy at making a living or subsisting. It seems to me that an excellent way to use some of the earnings and possibly some of the Permanent Fund would be to develop a program to provide indoor recreation facilities--I'm referring to curling, skating, and I'd like to draw a comparison with what the Canadian government has done. Many, many of their small communities have been funded to build curling, skating facilities, which also provide a place for the community to assemble for all kinds of things. I believe that if the Permanent Fund and the native regional corporations get together, many of these small communities could be provided with something that would knit the communities together. Their needs, then, would be brought forth as a community organization, a community requirement. I think it would do much to knit the communities together throughout the state of Alaska. I would suggest that all of the other comments today have been primarily on what to do with the Fund. I submit that this is just one idea that might be considered in providing for Alaskans who can enjoy it through all ages. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you. In bringing this to a close, I want to ask the audience once again if there's any questions they'd like to ask the panel?

HAVELOCK: I'd like to make a comment on that last statement. I think that if the Permanent Fund Committee does adopt some sort of internal investment policy as part of the Permanent Fund, you should be careful at the same time to keep a count of the public costs that are going to be associated with that private investment. Perhaps, Dr. Gordon could comment on what kind of ratios those are. It's clear you're going to be giving money for loans for small business, etc. that you are going to kick off at the same time a lot of pressure for public amenities to go with that. If you haven't taken proper account of that, you're going to create substantial social unrest.

GORDON: I can't really answer that. I would be very surprised, however, if you could make some generalization about that. If you subsidize investment on the private sector, it might entail as considerable amount of public spending outside of that. In other cases, perhaps a very much smaller amount. I think you'd have to investigate each on a case by case basis.

GRUENING: Mr. McCutcheon, you were going to ask the last question.

MC CUTCHEON: It will probably turn out to be a rhetorical question. There are several things here I'd like to state. Professor Gordon, you challenged Paul Foose's estimation of the greater return on investment of Prudhoe Bay. I don't necessarily share Mr. Foose's view of what should be done. I thought that you might possibly give us some idea of your estimation of the greater return on Prudhoe Bay, and maybe you could start with by getting to the size of the reservoir, the amount of recovery under current production practices, the amount left in the ground, the amount of additional recovery through secondary treatment, what will be the value of oil, price of oil on the west coast, what will be the value of the oil delivered at the west coast, what is the value of the investment that's going to be happening? (inaudible) What are the profits contributable to tax relief, tax loopholes?

GRUENING: May I just interject here? These are very interesting questions. I think they, at least have some relevance to the Permanent Fund...

GORDON: I'd like to answer that. In the first place, nobody can rate that question. Anybody who thinks they can tell you the price of oil ten years hence, as has been suggested around here, is engaged in witchcraft. Let me explain one other thing. What I wanted to do was find out how this Prudhoe Bay figure came out \$98 billion, and I happen to know that's the sum total of all American corporations from ma and pa ones up to Exxon--all over the whole world in any one year, after taxes. He gave a figure, which is spread

over 25 years, and he gave a gross which is totally irrelevant.

MC CUTCHEON: Well, the picture here isn't spread over 25 years. That's a very classical mistake that's made here. Mr. Havelock, you very definitely ought to find out what the reservoir will produce in the ninth year and what it'll produce by the fifteenth year. You might learn something and maybe your idea of long run term is not correct. Professor, you should learn what about Prudhoe Bay and find about the numbers--they are very shocking. I'd like to go on here, if I might. I appreciate the problems of the Committee, and particularly the Chairman's work. And particularly his deference sometimes. But I think you're going to have to go back and find why the Permanent Fund. I realize this will be a very painful process. However, it's one that will have to be faced. There will be enormous political problems, political pressure placed on the Committee. But I cannot see how this Committee can determine where it's going to go and what you're going to do when you get there unless you know where you've been and how you got to where you are. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jerry. I think that's a perceptive comment. In a way, this Symposium kicks off that search for what people meant and what they want the Fund to mean. There'll be a series of meetings that this Committee and the Senate Permanent Fund Committee will be engaged in. We're going to Fairbanks next week; we're going to Kotzebue; there'll be further meetings in Anchorage, in Southeastern before we draft any specific legislation. Long about November or December, the Committee will probably draft some legislation for the entire legislature to consider. At that time there'll be specific hearings on the formal type hearing process for people to comment on the bill. I really want to thank everyone here for coming and spending, devoting their afternoon to this problem. I think it's, although we've reached no conclusions, I think exploring philosophically the problems of the Fund is beneficial to us. So we have some ground to stand on before we launch into anything specific.

I want to thank the Economists, who have come a long way and have added to this discussion; and the Committee members and panel, who have spent their afternoon; and the Alaska Humanities Forum for helping to pay for it. If there are any comments from the rest of the Committee, I'd like to hear them.

MEEKINS: One very brief thing. I think probably most people here know this. In case there's someone who doesn't--we've been concentrating on the Permanent Fund today; but the Committee is also charged with thinking about the same questions in regard to Renewable Resources Development Fund, which takes 5% of the same revenues that the Permanent Fund takes 25% of, so it is different in some situations. But at least initially, it's the same kind of thing, but it's 1/5 as large, which is still extremely large. It's dedicated to enhance renewable resources. If people are interested in the Permanent Fund, they might think about that. There will be some meetings in regard to that in the future.

RODEY: On behalf of the Senate Permanent Fund Committee and the Chairman, Senator Hohman, I'd like to thank the House for putting this Symposium on. This is the first in a series of meetings that the Senate and the House will be participating in. The House effort is more visible here in Anchorage because Chairman Gruening has done a very good job of getting the Committee's work planned and accomplished. The Senate Committee's work is being done primarily in Juneau at this point; and we are trying to work in conjunction with the House to provide as much possible information on the Permanent Fund as we can before our January deadline of drawing up legislation. If there are questions or concerns, I know either the House or the Senate would be happy to address them.

TRANSCRIPT
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Proceedings
of
The House Special Committee on the Permanent Fund

SYMPOSIUM
September 10, 1977
Anchorage

- Rep. Clark Gruening, Chairman
- Rep. Terry Gardiner, Vice Chairman
- Rep. Ernie Haugen
- Rep. Russ Meekins
- Rep. Bill Miles
- Rep. Leo Schaeffer
- Rep. Rick Urion

PRESENT: Dr. Barbara Bergman, University of Maryland; Dr., Donald Gordon, Simon Fraser University. Citizens' Panel: Dr. George Rogers, John Havelock, Dr. John Lindauer, Jamie Love, Tim Bradner. Members of House Special Committee on the Permanent Fund: Clark Gruening, Chairman; Russ Meekins, Bill Miles, Mike Doogan, Administrative Assistant. Senate Special Committee on the Permanent Fund: Pat Rodey, Vice Chairman.

Introductions made by Chairman Gruening--continues:

GRUENING: I had a long statement on the Permanent Fund and my views on it, but due to a self-inflicted wound playing racquet ball yesterday, I'm going to have to cut it short. I would like, before I turn it over to the economists, to state briefly, we do have a very challenging task before us. I know when I originally favored the concept establishing a Permanent Fund, I saw many goals and many objectives that the fund could accomplish. As I get into the subject and see the complexity of it, I see that maybe our goals can be achieved by finding that which is best achieved by a special fund such as the Permanent Fund.

Today, I want to explore that. I want to explore the possibility on a philosophical basis as opposed to what your pet investment may be. I know that people discuss various things the fund can do and we, as committee members, have received suggestions from people for investments-- everything from artifacts to wheat.

What we want to explore today are the reasons why that particular investment is consistent with your philosophy or your goal that you wish the Permanent Fund to seek. With that I'd like to turn it over to Dr. Bergman.

BERGMAN: Thank you. In trying to think over what kind of a contribution I could make, what occurred to me was to try to say some things that would sort out the issues, which would try to separate one issue from another and show how they're related. What economists have to offer, I think, is rules of thumb and wisdoms of various types. I think our major expertise is trying to sort out the issues. So let me try to do that. I don't think I'm going to tell you anything you don't know.

A good way to start out would be to discuss three kinds of scenarios for the state. Let me call the three scenarios: the spend as you get scenario--dole it out as fast as you get it--that's one. The development fund approach, which is to try to take some of the oil revenues and use it to develop the state. And the third scenario, let's call the gilt edge approach, which is to take the Permanent Fund and essentially invest it, for the most part, in the Lower 48, in the capital markets and use only the income.

Now, very kindly provided here was a thing which without which no professor travels--that is a blackboard. Let me try to contrast these and then show what they entail in some respects.

We have three panels here and measure time on the horizontal axis and dollars on the vertical axis.

This is the spend as you get approach. Let's assume, without inquiring for the moment where the numbers come from, that at more or less a current level of services there are certain financial needs which the state has. Let me for the moment put those down as more or less horizontal, perhaps with a very slight, a moderate growth trend; but certainly not a big growth trend. Let's call that need for spending. At the moment, there are some non-oil taxes, and let us assume that those also, tax breaks remaining the same, have a more or less horizontal trend. So these are non-oil related taxes. They depend on the economic state. They would presumably grow unless the tax breaks change as the days go. And then, of course, what we've got is this hump of the oil revenues which are going to exceed by some very considerable amount for some considerable time the needs for outlay of services at current levels. The spend as you get approach very simply is just to do this sort of thing: use them all up, and then when they run out, go back to that situation. Of course that is the approach the Permanent Fund presumably designed to avoid. I just put that in as a base line.

The next one represents the gilt-edge approach: g-i-l-t. I suppose some of those who want to see the development of the fund might spell gilt in another way. There again, people assume that the fund revenues will not be used for development purposes. All of it, and this is an extreme case, will again be devoted to gilt-edge investment. So the non-oil revenues will not be any different than they would have been, but the spending will look more like this. There will be perhaps some spending out of the oil revenues for current purposes--again I'm putting needs, the same in the second panel as in the first panel. But, after a while there will be considerable income from the Permanent Fund assets and the Permanent Fund income will take over as the oil revenues come out. So there might be some excess of the Permanent Fund income over needs; but in general, possibly that might be devoted to raising levels of services or sending some of the funds back, possibly lowering taxes or a variety of things.

The third approach is the development fund approach, and then the scenario is something like this.

I might say, the scenario from the developmental fund approach is somewhat controversial; that is, the first two I put down naturally you can't foresee even how gilt-edge investments will do. We all know that. Nevertheless, you might say, this is a conservative approach from the point of

a risk. The one we're about to talk about perhaps is, at least from the standpoint of a risk per se, somewhat more risky.

But the more optimistic scenario, from some points of view anyway, goes something like this. The use of the fund for development purposes will broaden the tax base, and instead of having the non-oil revenues flat, as we do in the other two cases, they sort of take off. Here again, we have the oil revenues helping us and they peter out. It may be that some capital has also been lost because there is going to be a greater risk--the kind of loans we make--so the income from the fund will probably not be as big as it would in case 2. But nevertheless, there'll be some and the non-oil base in the state will have done well enough to cover the needs. Those are the three scenarios.

Now, say the third one is not as sure-fire in the sense of being able to tell what will happen as the others. For example, Dr. Tussing's view is, in general, with certain rather limited exceptions, the use of the fund as a development fund would not have this take-off effect on the economy. In general, the economy is going where it's going. It's got a dynamic of its own. It depends largely on such

an opportunity, the investment opportunities there are will be financed through private channels, which will be adequate to finance in the deserving ones, the ones that will pan out. That kind of adjustment has what the private sector does well; if there is a shortage of some type in Alaska which can be remedied through capital flow ect. This is one view. That view is that, in fact, the development fund scenario that I've drawn here wouldn't really work out. That is the non-oil revenues will not be materially affected by whether it is used this way or that way. What will mainly be affected is the amount of the capital which is left and return on it. If you ask me what I think, I would say that you need to decide whether you do believe in the efficacy of the development fund approach. I'm sure a lot of people do. I may say, that since I knew I was coming here, I did some work in Washington trying to find out what some people in Washington who are in capital markets think about closed funds to places like Alaska. Their general views that I got were that the market mechanism for getting funds into places like Alaska has much improved in the last 10 years: federal infra-structure, federal homeowned bank boards.

So if you believe that, then one might be rather doubtful that the development fund should have been. On the other hand, I tend to be skeptical of doctrinaire pronouncements

of that sort. I think there is some merit to that scenario, although I would certainly argue caution. I would say that, in general, the idea of the Permanent Fund--the thing that makes it different from the spend as you get case-- is a desire to preserve some of the resources for future generations. I think, in a way, the best way you could put this is comparing the people who have to manage the fund to the trustees for a family.

Suppose the trustees have been given the instruction to make sure the grandchildren are taken care of. That kind of instruction would argue to the gilt-edge route. Suppose the current adults in the family come and say, "we have a family business which is in terrible need of funds, and if we can get these funds, the grandchildren will be better off, not through the silly gilt-edge securities you're going to buy but rather through the business that we are going to develop. Come on, trustee, give us the money." Now should the trustee do that?

I don't think in a doctrinaire way the answer is yes or no. I think you can say the trustee ought to watch out. I think the question the trustee has to ask is why can't the present adults in the family get commercial funding? Does the trustee know something about the family that perhaps commercial markets don't know about that

family? Also, this leads to a rather different point, that you've got more than one grandchild, you have to worry about intra-personal equity; you have to worry about different groups in the constituent population.

Let me turn to that for a minute. I'm used to a much bigger blackboard. This is the only deprivation I've suffered since coming to Alaska. You can think of the cast of characters we have that the people planning for this fund have to take into account. Most planning models involve summary statements of this much income and that much expenditure; but the real guts of the thing are the benefits and costs to individuals or group. Not everybody in Alaska has the same interests and there are some opposing interests, I'm sure. For example, what interests the kinds of people we have here to consider. First of all, the people who are in business; there are people who work in those businesses; there are professional people; and there are native Americans. You can divide those into people who are here now and people who might come if you get this development fund scenario, if it goes the way this diagram says it will go. Even those people you can then branch off into twice as many groups by talking about different values. For example, some business people are here regardless of the special characteristics

of the Alaskan community and environment. They're here to make a buck. Others make a lot of bucks. There's nothing wrong with that; it's the good old American way. Then there are the people who are here because of the special nature of the Alaskan economy: the special nature of the Alaskan environment; the special nature of the people here. And they have an interest in keeping it that way. So you classify people in three different ways:

- 1) by their role in the economy
- 2) by their value system
- 3) by whether they're here or whether they're not here yet.

It seems to me, that it's very hard to do any planning for the state, should you in some formal way, try to weigh costs and benefits. For example, I would weigh costs to the native American community as very high, in my calculations. I wouldn't just subtract the native American communities costs from the benefits, say to a hotel owner. Usual calculations, you subtract the cost from the benefits; or you take a ratio of the cost and the benefits. If the ratio looks good, say let's go ahead. I think there's a waiting process that has to be put in here. I would discourage any planning process due to the fact that there are the different groups and they do have different interests and different values to be taken into consideration.

GRUENING: Doctor, I just wanted to mention that this hotel is owned by native Americans.

BERGMAN: Why don't I stop here.

GRUENING: That wasn't intended to cut you off. Incidentally, although we're elevated on this stage, it wasn't intentional. I think the audience here is just as elevated, and we want to make this informal. After the panel makes their statements and questions, I hope that people will feel free to come up here and make a statement and ask questions of either the economists, the panelists, or even us, for that matter. Go ahead, Dr. Gordon.

GORDON: Well, to some extent, I think I'll be overlapping with Professor Bergman, so I'll eliminate that kind of consideration.

I am struck, as the Chairman said, with what I consider the awesome responsibility of those people who are to decide what is going to happen to the Permanent Fund in particular, and other oil revenues. I am struck by that because while I find the numbers tossed around a bit confusing, they are all pretty big. If we take the kinds of figures that are in the little green pamphlet, we talk about numbers like \$8 billion, whether in the Permanent

Fund, as in some assumptions it is, or whether it's in the Permanent Fund or not, it's a transitory income from these oil revenues.

Now, it's very hard to get people to take numbers like \$8 billion and have it mean something. I find it useful to use this as a person in a family. So I got out my World Almanac, I find that there are about 400,000 Alaskans. Suppose this fund has by 1985 about \$8 billion, and suppose you can define an Alaskan, and as Professor Bergman pointed out, that may be the trickiest part of the problem, suppose we define Alaskan as people who were here when the oil was discovered, we say it legally belongs to the entity, the state of Alaska, it morally belongs to those people. It's their money. Those people who are going to make the decision have to spend that money for them. If we divide the \$8 billion by 400,000 people, we get \$20,000 apiece. If we estimate the average family is four persons; that's \$80,000 per family.

It's just as Professor Bergman suggested, It's like being in the role of a trustee. If you dress up the story, the father dies, he leaves a young wife and three children, but she happens to have \$80,000. You are a brother or a friend or something, you are appointed trustee. It's assumed in trustee agreements, as I've had the misfortune to read some of them, that people who are the beneficiaries of the trust

really can't be charged with spending their own money. So, somebody else has to spend it, and a guess is, the implication of the way the fund is set up. Now \$80,000 will set up their whole way of life different than it otherwise would be. The most important thing is to think of this as making a decision for about 100,000 four-person families out there, each of which has \$80,000 which you have been entrusted with spending.

Now, the tricky thing is going to be defining an Alaskan. For that purpose, I assume you can define an Alaskan in some limited way as consisting of a certain number of people and it's those people who, in effect, own the \$20,000 apiece or the \$80,000 per family.

There is another thing that struck me in looking around the world in the last few years. There are countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the press almost universally, and a lot of people who should know better, go to these countries and say, "You know, these countries have a real problem; they can't spend that money." These countries aren't democracies. So what they must mean is that the king and his bureaucracy can't spend the money, because we all know that if you passed this money around among the average Bedouin in Saudi Arabia, that with the help of Sears Roebuck, a thousand other firms from the

rest of the world, they'd have no trouble spending the money at all. In those countries the money isn't the people's money. It's the king's money. But, again, the notion that you have a problem spending the money is only appropriate for a very different kind of society than we think we have.

A third question that I think is very important, apart from what is currently in the Permanent Fund or what is in the Permanent Fund in the future according to different assumptions, there was a very significant question about what should be treated as income from a depleting resource and permanent income. In economics, there is a very common distinction between what you might call regular income and windfall income. Sometimes these are called permanent income and transitory income. In principal, it's just as every prudent household would treat those two things quite separately. If you have an income of \$15,000 a year and you expect it to continue forever, you treat it one way. If in one particular year an aunt dies, totally unbeknownst to you, she has some money and she left you \$15,000. Now it's hard to find one person, I think, who would say they'd treat that once and for all \$15,000 in the same way as their regular \$15,000. They wouldn't just double their spending that year because their income happened to double.

The most important thing is to think of transitory income as different from permanent income. When some oil

money is going to last some 25 years, especially at the beginning, that money is partly transitory and partly permanent. For simplification, I want to think of it as transitory.

One way to compare any other ways of treating this money would be to imagine a world in which we don't live and imagine just giving that \$80,000 to each family--what it would do for them and what they could do with it. With that as a benchmark, consider alternative problems. In considering these other alternative policies, we have to make some critical assumptions. Perhaps we should investigate the facts.

We have to make some presumption about a very critical thing and that is the flow of labor and capital into and out of Alaska. That's part of the problem defining an Alaskan. That has been already alluded to by Professor Bergman and she referred to the paper by Dr. Tussing in which he argued that, subject to further research, capital flow is very easily into and out of Alaska, and therefore, the rate of return to capital in Alaska is primarily set in the United States, or even better in the world market. Capital flow is pretty easily around quite a few countries.

I would like to extend that and just for the sake of argument, subject to a lot of further research on the problem, that the same is true of labor. The labor flows

pretty freely from one part of the United States to another. If that's true, then there's nothing that can be done with this fund that can change the wage of labor. Now, of course, it isn't the wage of labor, there's a whole structure of wages--from high priced brain surgeons down to busboys. But those wages will be set, not in Alaska, they'll be set in the United States because there's free migration back and forth. I want to make those assumptions for the moment anyway. Assume that there is competitive capital market and competitive labor market. I will modify that later on.

Now consider two or three alternative ways of using this money. One of them I asked my conservative friends. They have the assumption that giving money to the government is pouring it down the rathole to some degree--they have different rathole co-efficients, but it's significantly bigger than zero.

So, they say cut taxes. If we cut taxes, then we won't keep the level of government expenditures at what it would be otherwise. Cut taxes, then the money would be used by the people for sensible purposes--cut sales taxes, cut income taxes, so forth. Now, if you ask yourself what that means, subject to the assumption that the flows of labor and capital between the United States and Alaska

are perfectly free; the initial effect of that would be that real wages after taxes would rise in Alaska relative to what they were in the United States. As soon as they did, more people would come from the United States to Alaska. The final result of that would be that the real wage would be precisely the same as it was before. The real return on capital would be the same. Nothing would happen.

Who would gain? Well, there would be more people. If you would own a local monopoly, with economy of scale, such as the local newspaper, you would probably gain as opposed to being a barber or even a hotel owner. If more people came, more people would set up hotels. You wouldn't rake off big gain. On the other hand, if more people came, it is unlikely more newspapers would be set up. So that's one small way in which local people would gain. Secondly, local people would gain to the extent they own scarce resources, that can't be reproduced. Not a hotel because you can build another, but not the land on which the hotel is built. If you own scarce, high-priced land in downtown Anchorage, you would gain.

Finally, it could very well be that you have a labor union. I guess economists like to call that a labor monopoly. Unions don't like that word. They don't mind talking about market power, but these are all words. Let's suppose there is a labor group

here which has the power to raise the wage or lower the wage to some degree. Subject to, of course, to the constraint that when they raise the wage, not so many people will be hired as when they lower the wage. Now, if we imagine a cut in taxes, we abolish the competitive market for labor which we assumed. If we imagine cutting taxes, people will come here. The labor union can keep the wage. The people coming here won't depress the wage to make up for the taxes. The labor union can keep the wage the same way because the demand for labor will be the same as before. In the case of a local monopoly in labor, and in the small bits of income that are earned by land rents in scarce areas, there might be some gain. The overwhelming bulk of income, which is the competitive wage plus capital, won't be affected in the long run.

What will happen, of course, is that the \$8 billion will be spread over the rest of the United States, because by some small amount, as labor leaves the rest of the United States wages will rise--higher than they otherwise would be.

Let's consider another thing, another scenario. I think this is something like developing the economy. The word development is a bit tricky. It is generally used, always used, in economics to apply to so-called underdeveloped areas, developing economies in places like Bangladesh and

and Peru and Zaire, etc. But that's not true in Alaska, because clearly, even without making the rigorous assumption, those countries think of trying to take an economy where the real wage rises very significantly. Nothing is going to make the real wage rise very significantly in Alaska because that's set in the United States. Just as the real wage in Seattle is set in the United States. It's not development in the same sense.

I'm always a little confused about development. Sometimes people say, we want to create jobs. I see in Alaska, people talk about diversifying the economy and developing renewable as opposed to non-renewable resources. But all these things, seem to me, subsidizing local industry in some way so that there will be industries here that otherwise wouldn't exist.

Dr. Tussing, in his paper, was talking about situations where you don't subsidize. He said, as Professor Bergman indicated, that he generally believed that if you don't subsidize, then you're not going to create any more industry. But, he did not say, and I don't think Professor Bergman intended to imply that he did, that you couldn't subsidize industries and create industries that wouldn't otherwise exist.

If you did that, there would be more people. There'd also be a bigger tax base. There'd be more services to supply those same people, presumably required.

Basically, when you got all through that, just as in the, what I call, conservative case, this is the interventionist case. The people who trust government more than the rathole theory. The interesting thing is that they both come out with roughly the same conclusion. You have more people, you have more capital, the real wage is the same, the rate of return on capital is the same, and in the case of a few local monopolies, they have gained but nothing else has happened. The reason it happens, of course, is that the benefits are flowing to Alaskans, but an Alaskan is really defined as anybody who can benefit by moving here. Or by not moving here, for that matter.

Now, let's consider a third thing--amenities. You create amenities. The trouble is if you build a big opera house in Anchorage, I'd be much happier to come for a lower wage than I otherwise would. An amenity is a real part of the real wage. People would then have their real wage and amenities rather than lower taxes. Incidentally, when you talk about amenities and providing government expenditures, there is no difference in principal between whether the income is a renewable resource or a non-renewable resource. If income flows to the state, one question that should always be asked is, if this in-

come is flown directly to the people, it's their income, would they then be willing to be taxed some of that income to create the thing which they would consider building? A better university, a big opera house, play fields, golf courses--all those things. Before you build a golf course, which I'd be much in favor of, you've got to think about the fact, would the people be willing to be taxable on the course, if, instead of going first to the state, it had gone to them? That's of course true whether the funds are transitory funds or permanent funds.

Now, another thing mentioned is stabilizing the economy. I thought Dr. Tussing's paper had an adequate analysis of that question. It is very easy, when one has looked back on a time series, what happened to the economy. To say, if we had only put a little more money into the economy there, and then taxed a little more there, the economy would be much more stable. In fact, it is sort of inevitable to think it sensible to pour money in there and take it out there. The problem is, as anyone who tries to make money in the stock market will know, that's not nearly as simple. If you look back at the stock market over the last four years and you would say, "gee, it was easy to make money in the stock market--all you had to do was buy here and sell here." It may seem that the problem of sta-

bilizing the economy is not that different. It is a problem of prediction. It is the problem of getting the spending going very rapidly relative to when you need it. As Dr. Tussing says, those problems are not easy to solve.

I might add something. If you can predict the economy, then you can stabilize without any Permanent Fund. You borrow the money when you need and you pay it back other times. It's not hard to stabilize if you can predict, without having any special Permanent Fund.

When I think more about this problem, here's this money, which it is said, belongs to Alaskans; but what are you going to do with it so it will make some difference in Alaska, with some real difference to the average Alaskan? I come back to what I call the benchmark. The best thing would be to take it, the \$80,000, and spread it around to each family.

Suppose you can't do that. Is there some way you could spread the income from that? Not by cutting taxes. The income from that goes to certain people who, as it is interpreted, own the resources.

Incidentally, I think the idea of just giving the money to the people is somehow associated with conservative views, whatever conservative means. My understanding is that Milton Friedman has suggested that view. Everyone knows he's conservative enough. It must have occurred to a

lot of people since the beginning of time--it certainly occurred to people in Alberta at the time oil revenues were discovered there. Whether it's conservative or not, it's profoundly egalitarian because it would take \$80,000 and give it to each family. No depending on whether they're rich or poor. Exactly the same amount. It's not egalitarian because you're soaking the rich to help the poor. That money didn't belong to the rich any more on a one-for-one basis to begin with. So it would have a profoundly egalitarian effect on the distribution of wealth and the distribution of income, if you can't distribute the wealth.

I was intrigued by the suggestion in the green pamphlet of the Governor that you might pass out the income. I understand there's some legal problems in all this. The legal problem is again defining an Alaskan. I understand perhaps the legal problems will be solved if you think of pension for when a person's 55. There's nothing in nature that says a pension has to be distributed at 55--maybe at 45, maybe 25. Anyway, I think if you regard these resources as being morally belonging to Alaskans, you should think of some way to give it to those people you define as Alaskans. Otherwise, you might as well write a check for \$8 billion and send it to Jimmy Carter, because that's where it's going, for all practical purposes.

If you took \$20,000 per person and put it in the stock market, would he own it--\$20,000 per person; \$80,000 per family. You notice that the average Alaskan, who let's suppose, is like the average American now, wouldn't have \$4,000, rounding out the \$3,900 to \$4,000, but he'd have \$24,000.

Of course, there's other wealth besides the stock market. Houses, some wealth that isn't counted like future pension plans. But, I come back to a number like that to impress, because I'm impressed, to try to impress you with the awesome nature of this responsibility. There are a lot of poor people in Alaska. I can't imagine one way that would do better for those poor people and for some people who are not so poor than to contrive some scheme whereby you can benefit them, if you believe they morally own those resources. Now you may say they shouldn't own those resources, they belong to the United States. You might even say they shouldn't own those resources, they belong to Alaskans, it seems to me, that the thing is to contrive some scheme where, in fact, the Alaskans will do the benefiting. Some defined body of Alaskans.

To make one final note. If you talk about future Alaskans--that's pretty confusing. You see, there's where

the analogy with the family breaks down. If you think of a trustee and a family, you want to take care of the children and the grandchildren; and if Alaskans were defined that way, it would be simple. It would be the children and the grandchildren of the original 400,000. If you talk about who might live in Alaska who now lives in Alabama or New York City or Seattle, then it becomes very hard to do anything with it.

Of course, if you gave the money out as a grant, which you couldn't, chances are the parents would take care of the children; and they would take care of their grandchildren, as is the normal way we treat wealth. The normal way we treat wealth in the United States, we assume people are responsible and are capable of handling their own money better than the government. If we say that's not possible, then we should probably try to devise a method by Alaska, Inc. or a pension at some age, so that the people who morally own the resources get some access to the, really do the benefitting. You might ask them if they'd rather have the income from \$80,000 or some vague thing called diversifying the economy. There isn't such a thing as economy or state, there are just people there.

Anyway, I think it's a very tricky problem. It appears to be in a large respect a legal problem. The only economic aspect of it, I think, is to recognize that nothing you do

with this money can change, for all practical purposes, the real wage and the rate of return of the capital, and that's the bulk of normal income. Whether resources invested in Alaska or Toyko, for that matter, or the New York Stock Exchange, it doesn't so much matter. I think it depends more on whether you use it to deliberately subsidize income or not. Presumably, as a prudent trustee, you invest it with considerations of real earnings after allowing for inflation, which makes it more complicated, and some safety. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, doctor. Thank you, Dr. Bergman and Dr. Gordon. I think you've specifically trampled on a lot of people's assumptions. I think they ought to have the opportunity to trample on yours. We have a panel that will hopefully do that. I would like to make just one remark on the figures that are being tossed around today. \$80,000 is, of course, very hypothetical. The revenue projection includes both the Permanent Fund and the general fund, based on the pipeline, presuming a full design capacity, based upon a reasonable tariff, based upon a lot of things. We are dealing with a lot of if's. I think the point is well taken.

The panel can proceed in the order in which they were introduced.

HAVELOCK: We must make a determination of how it's to be managed in the future. Both of our panelists have referred to the analogy of the family. We are trustees for a family. You can reduce this to the position of a person in a family.

There are profoundly different ways in which a regional economy operates and in which a family operates. The differences, I think, need to be addressed. I think we need to get the Alaska public out of the situation of thinking about it in purely family terms--the kind of terms, which say, for instance, on the national level, that because the national debt went up last year we're worse off. Those kind of economics are very dangerous.

As far as the scenarios that Barbara pointed out, they're not real--any of them. That is, the scenarios of reality are sort of a merged concept of all three. There is a tendency to confuse oil revenue with Permanent Fund revenue, in fact, so far as you know, the Permanent Fund is only a committed percentage of oil revenue. I don't like little bumps like that, that sort of look like here today, gone tomorrow. We are not talking about a bump. We are talking about a very long curve. It may start high, but oil revenue isn't going to suddenly shut down. The economics of scarcity, we're the last major producer of oil on the American continent, so as the amount of oil available goes down, the value per unit will go up. The whole business of

Alaska running out of money strikes me as a basic error in viewing the situation which could get tangled up in managing the fund.

The discussion of what constitutes an Alaskan has been a troublesome one in this state. I'm not sure it's very fruitful, other than it provides entertainment in setting one group of Alaskans against another, based upon their longevity in the state. But, I think you do need in any scheme that's being set up to look at the winners and the losers under various schemes of investment.

One of the basic problems of the family analogy, of course, is that it assumes that when you put something away we aren't spending it. Particularly if you are involved in investment in Alaska. What the Permanent Fund is really doing is simply shifting the expenditure of funds from more of a tilt to the public sector, which is the effect of having a legislature the dominant controlling factor in the expenditure of funds, to having a predominantly private sector investment to the extent that Permanent Fund money is committed to profit-making enterprises automatically.

It is a long panel. I think one analogy I'd like to throw out for you to think about--it's a long panel so I'm just going to throw a few pot shots and then back out. There are a lot of analogies to what's happened in Alaska. One of them

is presumably supposing you'd had an Appalachian regional commission when they started getting into coal, would you have set up a Permanent Fund and devoted part of Appalachian money into that? What about the grandchildren today in Appalachia? How would they have benefitted from that fund?

BERGMAN: Stock in General Motors.

HAVELOCK: Well, if the function was to keep people in Appalachia, it worked because there was such a fund in a sense insofar as the United Mine Workers took money and put it into various pension funds, and so on. If we did that, and helped to pin people down to going on and living in an economy which was not self-sustaining, I don't think we've done anybody's grandchildren any great favors.

I think it's great to be an Alaskan, but if there are no jobs here, why the hell not move out--for those who have no employment? I don't see the public purpose served in subsidizing people who are two generations beyond me, who are only marginally going to be related to me, who, if you look at the general trends of the economy of the United States, are going to be far richer than I am anyway. Those are some of the reasons why I think you have to look at the management very carefully.

GRUENING: I have one question. If you want to discourage future generations, what about present generations?

HAVELOCK: The assumption of statehood incidentally, one of the assumptions on that chart, is that we have the income to sustain a moderate level of public need. The assumption of statehood was that we would use resource money in order to meet public need. All over the record of statehood hearings, the basic opposition of making Alaska a state was that there was not the income from regular tax revenues to sustain the public need level. I think you can invest. I would say that we've got to meet a schedule of unmet public sector needs before we start going on with a heavy dose of private expenditure, the worst risk of which is going to subsidize premature development of natural resources that we should be developing at the end of that curve.

GRUENING: Any questions here of John Havelock?

MEEKINS: Mr. Havelock, we hear a lot on this Committee about needs, you know it's very difficult to define needs, pressing needs expand to meet the amount of revenue that's available. I think that the concept is somehow inherent

In other words, saying that we should meet our needs first, we should spend all the money that we have to some people. This argument has been made to me, that we should spend all the money that we have simply because needs will expand infinitely.

HAVELOCK: Well, I think that the legislature can sort of define a minimum sustainable standard of living in Alaska, the kind of picture of Alaska you want and hold to. There is some truth in what you say, that needs will go expanding indefinitely.

The tendency of heavy private sector investments is going to be to spread the benefits to much more extremes. That is, losers in our society are going to go on being losers, even though you're putting all this in. Losers benefit out of public sector expenditure, some kinds of it. I'm not sure I'm ready for the opera house; there are a lot of things before that. I think that is a legislative problem and it involves taking a management approach to public sector needs in terms of establishing your baseline.

MEEKINS: One more question. You were talking about what you consider to be fallacy in the analogy of the family. I'm just wondering if I have it correctly. As I understood what you said, you seemed to be implying that investments are going

to be made with this money because people are going to deposit it in their bank accounts. If we did have an Alaska Inc., this money would then be deposited in the private financial institutions, they would make the relevant decisions about investments. Is that not as preferable in your view as the legislature making those decisions about how that money is invested?

HAVELOCK: Generally speaking, no. My basic point is simply you should know that's what's going on. That you are transferring the decision making process over the use of funds. I think that's obviously very healthy for a pure investment policy, for instance. I don't think you guys know what you're doing if you're giving the legislature the authority to run around money markets and decide what kind of instruments to buy and sell. Obviously, it's the kind of things you want to give to the private sector. Prejudice is the same in any form of development banking. I've seen too much development banking with heavy political control that amounted to shenanigans. I would rather see, if you are going to go into development banking, the use of banking standards of risk evaluation. I'd rather not have that muddied by politics.

GRUENING: Thank you, John. We have now next to him Dr. George Rogers. Incidentally, the two economists, if our panel isn't going to ask questions, you can ask them questions.

ROGERS: Clark, one of the things I'm going to do after this meeting is inquire into the nature of your racquet ball inflicted injury. I think as a public-spirited citizen I might suggest the state invest in racquet ball courts as a means of cutting down on public discussion somewhat.

I, like John, will make a statement and then be available for questions. I am an economist, but find it difficult to act as an economist when I get into a political setting for obvious reasons.

I, unlike John, was not opposed to the Permanent Fund but I was in favor of it for different reasons than the stated reasons. I know how the legislature acts when it gets a pot of money. I know it's going to spend every penny that comes in. I looked upon it as a curb upon legislative spending. I'm not too concerned about the intricacies of whether we call it a development bank or not. I agree with Dr. Tussing, that the development bank has very limited, or will have very limited, impact upon the Alaska economy, which gets me very quickly to my statement.

I would like to put the statements made by Professors Bergman and Gordon into the Alaska economic context. I think this is very important. In Jim Rhode's covering letter, inviting them to attend here, he made one passing remark that, I think the statement was that of every dollar gross state product \$.64 leaks out. I think this gives you an idea of the nature of our economy. It's a colonial economy in which the state product is largely exported, the value is largely exported.

BERGMAN: What do you think that statistic is for the state of Maryland?

ROGERS: It's probably something like that, but the point I want to get to quickly on that...

BERGMAN: Alaska's not that very much different from the rest of the country in that respect.

ROGERS: Okay. That's right, because we do--as states we are part of a national entity. There are these traits, etc.

First of all, the value is not an Alaskan value. It is something that goes into the national economy very definitely. Looking at the regional economy, however, you find that we generally define in the terms of such measures as per capita

real income earned by residents and other measures. You find that the Alaska economy is dominantly a government economy.

Very quickly, if you were to look at the basic part of our economy--the part that generates the whole thing--looking at the resource we find that before oil came along, it was very, very minimal. A fading fishing industry, a stagnant forest products industry, and then this great military establishment, construction industry that was generated by that. From 1940 on, whatever measure you use of the regional economy, you find that half or more of the employment, income, etc. generated by it is in terms of state and federal government income directly.

Then the support industry in the private sector is primarily in support. These people, these programs are living off them in some way. If we were to eliminate or reduce the rat hole co-efficient in the Alaska economy back to a level that would be a more reasonable one in terms of Professor Gordon's philosophies, we would have something like the 1939 economy.

At that time, we had a thriving fisheries industry; we had mining industry, which, in terms of labor employed, was probably larger than the oil industry's going to be here. So in terms of a natural resource economy, we would be reducing

ourselves to something like 75,000 people operating primarily a few natural resource extractive industries with a minimum of federal and state government services required to maintain that work force in operation.

The thing is that the state government has become the driving force in our economy. This is the reason that the scenarios by Professor Bergman are relevant. I don't agree with John that they are irrelevant because she concentrated on state revenue. Each one of these is a hypothetical projection of what the state revenues might be, given three different scenarios or three different ways of managing the oil revenues: spend as you go; putting it into a development bank type operation; or working out the investment---I think the investment was the second and the development bank was the last one---because the reason we have a community like Anchorage is because of government spending.

The government spending has almost assumed a life of its own. When we are talking about stabilizing the economy, we are really, in essence, talking about stabilizing the level of government spending; because if it drops off, our economy drops off. If the private sector, for example, the oil revenue drops off, if there isn't anything else to take its place, then one way of doing it is to increase

government employment. If you are talking about distributing the money to the average Alaskan, you would, in many cases, be distributing to a government bureaucrat and his family. So that the Kuwait model is a relevant one in Alaska, except that the bureaucracy is much larger and represents a much larger segment of the population.

BERGMAN: What about the privates on the base?

ROGERS: The privates on the base. Yes. That's a whole sector of the economy that is generally there, they generate income in Alaska but they are only here for a couple of years on an average, depending on what their turnaround is. But we consider them part of the bureaucracy too, because they are paid by the government. They perform governmental functions of safety and protection.

But what I am saying is we've got to get our talk about investment, management, talk about the use of the fund into a realistic Alaskan economic setting. When we talk about diversification, we are talking desperately about trying to get something else besides government in the picture. Not simply to proliferate a lot of little businesses around, which is probably what we will end up doing. But it is a tough job to find something, an alternative, to continued government spending, government employment.

Another thing, I notice the Alaska Humanities Forum is one of the sponsors of this. When I saw this, I wondered, what a nice organization like that was doing in a place like this. I decided that we should make some comments on that too.

Professor Gordon talked about amenities. I think this is what the Alaska Humanities Forum is interested in: making Alaska a better place to live. Now this is something that economists can't give you advice on, except we can give you some analogies, cost-benefit type of analogies, help you in that way.

This is another thing we should consider. The Permanent Fund, we have two functions: one is to manage the investment policy of it. In other words, maintain the integrity of the fund, so that, in fact, the fund is a Permanent Fund; and that we do get the maximum income generated which we can then use for current spending. The current spending could be used for a number of purposes. We could use it for the creation of new development, or we could use it for amenities--a whole range of things we might consider. I don't want us to get caught in the development bank syndrome and just stick there. I think there are other things that we should consider as citizens when we talk about the use of the Permanent Fund.

I don't have any questions at this time. I made quite a few notes. As the discussion goes on, I think we can come back to that Clark, I think I'll stop now.

GRUENING: Thank you very much, Dr. Rogers.

Incidentally, thanks for mentioning the Humanities Forum. It is on the agenda the fact that they helped sponsor this. I should say again, we're very grateful to the Alaska Humanities Forum for sharing half the cost of the room and other incidental costs we have in setting this up.

Are there any questions for the economists or this panel? As soon as we get through the panel, we're going to open this up to the audience to inquire of anybody here. Rep. Meekins.

MEEKINS: Dr. Rogers, I have a question that really arose when Dr. Gordon was speaking. I'll direct it to you, and see if you have any thoughts on it.

He was indicating he felt very strongly, it seemed, that the individuals in Alaska could make better decisions regarding the spending of what is morally their money than the legislature. We've coined a phrase here talking about the rat hole co-efficient. That's the implication of that phrase that the legislature isn't as wise and can't spend the money as wisely as individuals can or least not as efficiently.

One of the things that, I think, legislators are always confronted with is our system of government is representative in the sense that we are expected to know a little bit more than the general public. They are expected to vote for us, and then we are supposed to get more involved in the individual decisions. Sometimes we find that when we study something, at second thought, it's a little more complicated than it seems to the public. Even though we represent our constituents, we find ourselves voting in opposition to say, a majority view. We don't have a strict case of radical democracy in the sense that the majority view does not always prevail in the legislature. This sometimes is extremely good.

So, if you apply that thinking to decisions about how best to provide for the benefit of the people of the state, you sometimes maybe would have a contradiction between what the majority of the people would vote for, even allocate their own money for, and what might indeed be best for them.

It's a difficult question, but as an example, in some states, the public votes upon appropriations to education. In some of the states lately, they've had a very difficult time getting any appropriations at all. They've gone for weeks and sometimes even months without any appropriation

for their school system. It seems to me to be an example, at least it's quite obvious to me--I'm very supportive of education, I think there's a benefit distributed throughout the entire society, whether or not people have children, when we spend money on education. Using that as an example, I just wondered if you have any thoughts on that.

ROGERS: I don't have any profound thoughts on this. I think this is an extreme example of what might be done with the money. The assumption is that all spending is done by individuals. If that were so, I think this would certainly be a valid model to use. You mention education. Education is a group or a social decision. The individual may not have any children, therefore, that individual would not spend any money in education. However, society as a whole has some responsibility, whether you have children or not, so that there are a number of social decisions. We still have to have taxations.

I think what Professor Gordon is talking about, I think we had better get you into the discussion, is the distribution of windfall income, incomes that are transitory. We need the distinction between permanent income and transitory income.

This would be, for example, the \$900 million bonus we

received, which is all gone now. Would it have been better if we had handed it to Alaskans because it's going to go in three or four years anyhow, let them have a spree or invest it wisely, or set it aside in a permanent fund? We did neither. We let it dribble out into our general revenues and it was spent. The effect of that was difficult to trace. They are assigned to--how much the expansion of expenditures reflected need and how much merely reflected the availability of money to the legislature? I'm getting off the point. As I say, I think it was intended as a poll.

GRUENING: Dr. Gordon, would you like to comment?

GORDON: Well, some questions it matters a lot whether the money coming in is transitory or permanent; some questions, it doesn't matter much at all. Obviously, there are some things that we choose to provide collectively. There's some argument as to how many of those things we should choose to provide collectively. There's no question of some things with the exception of very few people. Everybody agrees that some things should be provided collectively, so that when the income of the community goes up, there should be, presumably, more private good and more public goods.

I think it's important, however, to distinguish between something abstract called the economy. The economy doing this and the economy doing that. What's happening to the individuals? Fundamentally, our whole system of government is set up on the idea that the people vote for these things. If the money happens to go to the state first, whether it's permanent or whether it's transitory, one always wants to keep in mind, suppose it had gone to the people first, then you could go to them and say, "Let's have a better school." They could allocate the money that way. If, in fact, it goes to the state first, I think really the people get a little unconscious of what's involved.

In a way, I'm amazed at some of the answers that have come, because I think, if you want to use this number \$20,000, if you said, "Would you want to dole out \$80,000? Maybe you can't spend a lot of money but you want to get the income on \$80,000. We'll take care of the principal. We'll give you the income." Or do you want to diversify the economy? You put that up to them. I find that incredible that people would say "No, we don't want the income; we want to diversify the economy. "

I'd like to ask Dr. Rogers another question. So the economy has expanded from 75,000 to 400,000 people, the economy has--and that's mostly from state spending. The question

is who's better off than they otherwise would be? The economy isn't somebody better off or worse off. It's individuals.

I don't think for a moment, and I don't think Dr. Rogers thinks otherwise, it would really go back to 75,000 people. If you took this money, invested most of it outside of Alaska, invest it as a prudent trustee would invest it, and then pay the income to the population-- I'd be wanting to know, not what happened to what some people call the economy, what happened to the individuals, who, morally own that money. Would it have any harmful effect on any other individuals? It's a little hard to see who would be hurt by it.

BERGMAN: I'd like to say one thing. The \$80,000 is not coming in an instant. It wouldn't be a check. I think that would be pretty hard to resist. I think realistically, that if the state of Alaska did propose to send every family a check for \$80,000, the people of the United States would re-think the ownership of those resources. The fact that it does come over a period and it is not being handed out in cash to the residents of the state, to some degree maps the fact that is in part what is going to happen regardless of the scenario you adopt.

I think when you talk about taking either the capital sum and doling it out as it comes in, or doling out the income in cash--particularly when you talk about the capital sum--doling out the capital sum, which I think is beyond the question anyway.

I think there is a difference in what individuals might do and what they might compact as a body politic to do. The government properly does have a longer vision, a longer horizon than individuals, certainly than many individuals. That is right and proper.

I am not as devoted to consumer sovereignty as many economists are, that is, I am not as devoted to the proposition that every citizen ought to have the right to handle, to make every decision himself, and that the government should not constrain any economic decisions. A lot of people would do things they would be sorry for if this money were handled that way. I don't think that's the question anyway.

I think the major practical question is the filling of public need, which governs how much goes into the Permanent Fund. Once you've got the Permanent Fund, the use of it or the investment of it, when I gave my list of different kinds of Alaskans what I was intending to do was, Professor Gordon was also calling attention to, and that is to try to get it from a gross concept called the economy down to people. I don't happen to think that the provision of amenities within reason

by the public sector is a bad thing. I don't think building a very good university here, building very good sports facilities, reducing some of the problems that are inherent in the geography of Alaska is really going to spread this benefit around to the entire United States. By the way, if it did, that wouldn't be so bad either-- if some of it went that way.

GRUENING: Senator Rodey.

RODEY: I had a question for Dr. Rogers regarding the rate of contribution. The proposal has been made that we put into the Permanent Fund 100% of the royalties plus all monies coming in from the severance taxes and allow the state budget to reflect only a base year figure, population increase, inflation, and perhaps an adjustment factor.

As a veteran legislative observer, this would deal with the question you mentioned previously and that was one of a budget constraint. How do you feel about proposals for this sort of input to the Permanent Fund that would essentially take all of the royalty and a good portion of the severance tax leaving only what is necessary for state expenditures on a predetermined level?

ROGERS: This would be, I don't have the figures-- I don't know what size figures we're talking--and the fact is I've been trying to avoid getting involved in the Permanent Fund controversies entirely. I certainly feel that this would serve the purpose of putting a damper or rather constraining by putting some limits on state spending in the future which would be a good thing.

The income, however, from that fund is still available for use. As I recall, some of the calculations made on that was that it began to become quite sizable, quite a monster in its own right. Even using a relatively low interest rate, you come up with annual income. This, then in a few years, becomes the critical thing. Not so much the principal as what is done with the income--if this is re-invested in the Permanent Fund, it then compounds the problem at a future date. I'm calling it a problem now rather than a solution. If it is then added into the general fund, then again it accelerates the level of state spending.

I can't really give you an answer until I've seen the actual solid figures on that. Certainly, the very crude projections we made using our Man in the Arctic model and using 25 to 50%, 100%, we found that the greater the contribution made to the Permanent Fund had a general dampening effect on the level of the economic attainment in terms of employment income; and this is simply because the assumption was that

the government spending would continue at that rate. It's a dog chasing its tail proposition. It does provide a great slowing down of the runaway process.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dr. Rogers. Next in order is Jamie Love of the Alaska Public Interest Research Group. Go at it Jamie.

LOVE: I don't want to repeat or go over a lot of the things that have been said by some of the other participants here, although there are a lot of important things that have been brought out. I know that most of us can agree that the money in oil wealth and Permanent Fund basically is to improve our qualities of life and standard of living. I know that there's one sort of philosophical difference that's emerging right now and that is on this issue of whether or not people should just be given the money so they can benefit themselves, or whether the government should spend it for them, and whether or not the main focus of the Permanent Fund ought to be some type of vehicle to get money in the people's hands--get the oil revenue in their hands. I know that's been the primary focus of the public debate that I've heard on the Permanent Fund, more than any other issue, is how you're going to disburse the earnings from the Fund. Realistically there's going

to be sort of a lot of ways the oil wealth is going to be managed to help us.

There's some areas, I think everyone's going to agree, that consumer sovereignty, or whatever you want to call it, makes a lot of sense. I don't want the government to do my grocery shopping for me or a lot of other things. But I think there are areas where some type of public actionary or adventurist is the only way that certain projects are going to get accomplished. I think it's going to be, in fact as we go along, probably a mixture of those two.

I would like to make one observation relative to things like the difference between a rathole and a pressing need for a lot of people. I don't always think it's just the project per se. There are examples, there are times when the same project can turn out to be either one.

Most of us are familiar with a lot of efforts to develop housing in rural parts of Alaska. It's difficult for people living in rural Alaska to provide housing through conventional, their own resources--people living not in a cash economy. Types of impact that we felt here in urban areas, I'm sure are even more dramatic in rural areas. In that area, if housing is going to be provided for people in rural Alaska, the government's going to have to provide certain types of subsidies for financing to accomplish that. Some people

look at rural housing projects as more in the rat-hole area than in the pressing needs type area--it's because they're poorly managed. There is a tremendous recognition by a lot of people. There's a lot of waste in mismanagment. There's some other reasons why the housing wasn't done properly in some areas. This is one of the problems the state's going to be facing as we go along and we come into a lot of wealth and we try and take a very activist role in terms of improving qualities, people's qualities of life.

We've taken a big quantative jump into a new area of running the government and providing services. We've been very interested, at least, in our organization, at looking at the ways and vehicles the state can best put together a lot of planning mechanisms and management functions to have more quality control or better evaluation system as we try to accomplish, whether it's a loan program or a cash subsidy or a number of different other things.

One thing I want to note briefly before I get into some other comments is when we talk about the Permanent Fund and we talk about investments, I'm sure that everyone in his mind is thinking that we're also talking about capital spending by the government in terms of just cash, just building projects that aren't really an income producing venture like infrastructure development--roads, highways,

that sort of thing--which don't produce revenue by themselves, but may help contribute revenue from another project and level of state services.

I know that it's critically important. I think, that the state, when they think about managing their investments, the social investments, that they make in the state of Alaska to be coordinating the development of their capital programs and studying for services with their investment policy--this has been elaborated in some detail by earlier consultants.

Dr. Daniels and Dr. Tussing touched upon this. I just wanted to bring that out. So when we talk about developing investments, we also have to be closely coordinating these policies with other types of problems we're faced with.

Other than those management issues, which, of course, we're very interested in, because our own examination of some of the state's projects in different areas including the state's existing loan program and the state's housing programs has not been good. I'm not talking about some of our absolute, right up-to-date current but I'm just saying as a general comment. In the last 10 years, for example, we've seen a lot of problems.

There are other reasons why we're concerned about the development of the Permanent Fund. One area, I'm talking primarily about social investments. Those monies that are invested domestically in Alaska, it's important that there be

a clear concept of equity in the benefits that people realize. Just as a very quick example: the tourism revolving loan provides loans, I think it's up to \$4 million, or it's up to 3. It used to be up to \$1 million. It used to be, I think 8% for developing tourism facilities. A lot of the loans went, for example, to the Captain Cook Hotel and the Baranof Hotel--they each got a million dollars a piece, as I recall, for developments--8% interest--to develop something, I'm sure would have been developed had they had to go to private credit markets for that money, probably at a higher interest rate. On the other hand, you have some student getting a \$2500 loan to go to the University of Alaska for a year or maybe go outside to school. Then you have a fisherman loan and a VA loan to buy a house. Just trying to determine the equity between all Alaskans to determine whether or not the so-called subsidy or the so-called benefit to the person with the student loan or the the home loan was equal compared to the person who got a cheap loan to build an extension to a hotel that could have been financed anyhow.

I think that's an important concept because the wealth is public wealth. When we set up the social loan programs, there's a degree of equity that's involved and the type of

social loans that are made. I think there probably will be some that will and ought to be made.

Another thing is the openness and fairness in the management of the Fund. It is not so much an economic consideration, I guess, after listening to some of the comments. Everyone has talked about what a big burden this is going to be to manage all this money and what a mind boggling kind of problem it is.

To me, what's mind boggling is you're going to give the public confidence that the funds are being managed fairly, that the funds are being managed in a way that respects the wishes of the public, and that it's not just controlled by certain interest groups, special interest groups, whatever you want to call them--certain groups or individuals--and that they have a sense of participation and that they feel that everything is on the table. One reason we were concerned is that the administration, I guess I sort of serve the administration in a capacity on the advisory board, there's a lot of discussion on making a \$900 million loan to guarantee financing for the gas pipeline. I sit on the state appointed advisory committee on state investment policies, which I've served on for almost a year now. Our 21 member committee has never had a presentation from the Commissioner of Revenue or anyone else on this mere billion dollar investment that we're thinking about making for the gas pipeline.

GRUENING: You might have to defend yourself. The Commissioner of Revenue, Sterling Gallagher, is in the room. He'll get a chance.

LOVE: I've made my views known already. What struck me as a bad thing to start out with, if we're talking about managing the Permanent Fund. We have an amount of money that is incredible. Almost four times as big as the Lockheed loan that Congress debated quite a bit before it even took action. To my knowledge, there has been no public presentation on the details, the official advisory board for the governor was never consulted. Negotiations went on for almost a year. We still have, as yet, to even have a memorandum mailed to us even though requests for information have been made. I'm not saying that to hop so much on Sterling, although I know it's coming across as criticism.

GRUENING: Sterling, we're going to let you respond to this if you want. You may decline if you want. Go on, Jamie.

LOVE: I'm saying it because I'm not worried. I thought that there was not a large likelihood that that loan would have been made, primarily because I thought that the El Paso line would probably not prevail. There may have been a

couple other reasons why those offers be made.

It sure is important, as we get into this area, that we force the people who manage this fund to disclose in as many levels as possible, the planning that is going on, the terms and types of arrangements they are making. The public should have confidence in the management of this money. Along that line, I think, we're very concerned that the public is convinced. I, personally, am convinced that there is integrity in the way that the money is managed. This again is not much an economic consideration, but it is an important social consideration, and it is an important thing that we've thought about quite a bit. I know others have.

I think in this area, there are two areas where we have to ensure integrity to manage the fund. The first one I want to touch on is the integrity of the programs. In other words, are the programs doing what they're supposed to be doing? If you have a small business program, does the small business program start small businesses that otherwise would not be functioning. Is it really matching its goals? Is the money getting out to who it should get out to? It's supposed to create jobs. Is there a way to measure whether they're actually creating jobs? Because you can really see kind of a rat-hole syndrome developing if you don't have an honest way of going

back and taking a look at what you've already done and seeing if actually, in fact, it accomplished your goals. Do agriculture loans stimulate or encourage agriculture. If so, how much can you quantify? A good way of having this program evaluation is important.

Now we had a presentation from Tony Motley when he was still Commissioner of Commerce on the state loan programs that the state already manages. He could tell us what their default rate was, what their interest rate was, and everything else; but he couldn't tell us a damn thing about whether or not the programs were accomplishing what the legislature wanted them to when they first created them. He said they didn't have any way of doing that. They didn't run program audits. In a way that's not surprising, because some of those programs are very big; some of them are kind of small. But as we get into the stage where we have the Permanent Fund, and we start talking about investment programs, then I think there's a much bigger responsibility on the state to tackle this very tough issue. How do you evaluate these things?

The next issue is the fiscal integrity of the fund. We don't want people stealing from the fund. We don't want people making bribes to get loans and this sort of thing. This is an area that is of concern to a lot of people. I, personally, have spent some time taking a look at some of

the other areas where we've been concerned about the fiscal integrity of some of the things that have happened in some programs. When you start talking about billions of dollars, the temptation level really increases. I think everyone realizes this. This is a tough problem. I don't know what the solution is. This relates to this whole area--the fairness, the openness, and the integrity of the way the fund is managed. These are areas that maybe aren't economic considerations per se, but we're really concerned about them.

I would like to say that it's been helpful to take a look at whether or not we ought to spend all the money right now, or whether we ought to invest all the money. There hasn't been much discussion about if we invest it, the types of investments we ought to do or if there's even any need to have any kind of investments on a local level beyond this issue of whether or not there's just a subsidy involved.

I'd like to discuss a couple of areas where I think it makes sense to have what could be called sort of a subsidized loan. It makes good economic sense, good bottomline economic sense.

There are simply some areas where capital markets don't work. Where they're not perfect. For example, in the area of redlining--housing in certain communities and certain areas within communities, you can't get a mortgage on homes or

you can't get rehabilitation financing on homes. There's been testimony before a committee in Anchorage, for example, in the area of Mountain View or Government Hill there is this kind of a problem. The reason I'm bringing this out is from an economic point of view, the cost of not providing mortgage, rehabilitation financing in a certain community may be that there's increased cost to the housing or that valuable housing stock deteriorates. It may not be a cost that the community has to pay for. It has to pay for higher housing costs, if that housing is lost and has to be constructed at higher cost. So there are external costs to the community that the community realizes in this area.

Just as an example, the normal market test of the sort of disinterested lender and the disinterested receiver of the money, they're not really the same. The bank doesn't have to worry about the social costs of redlining but the state of Alaska has to worry about it. If the state of Alaska becomes the lender, it can make some wise, some real contributions in that area and still make good bottom-line economic sense. I used that as an area. There are other areas where it might make sense--where capital markets aren't perfect. They certainly don't function as well for rural areas in Alaska as they do for urban areas.

In utilities, we've had testimony that good sound financial utilities can't get long term financing because they're not big enough and, therefore, as Dr. Belden Daniels noted, poverty line starts at \$200 million in sales a year. A company that's large, that's a big corporate entity, has better access to national capital markets. A smaller enterprise like some of the smaller utilities in Alaska can't get long term financing. That results in the very high utility rates. In that area, that's just another example where the capital markets aren't perfect. The state can put long term capital into local utilities, invest your own utilities, as well as publically owned utilities. The result is going to be a reduction in utility rates. This is an area where it might make sense to make a so-called domestic loan without the state really incurring any higher risk than it might otherwise.

Working on some problems in insurance financing where premiums are now being financed for as high as 80% by outside insurance financing companies in almost a risk free type of occupation area. There are certain types of consumer credit that could be from people who are really frankly getting gouged. I'm not speaking in terms of providing 3% financing. There are some areas of consumer credit where the state can get a return commensurate with what they get on the market except doing it here locally in certain lines of consumer credit.

Aside from this area of imperfect capital markets, there are other reasons why the state might want to make loans domestically besides stimulating the economy or trying to encourage growth. For example, you might want to own certain large resource projects. Russ Meekins gave me a little lecture one time on how if the state had financed the gas pipeline, it would be able to control local hire through contract.

GRUENING: Jamie, you might want to know, Russ Meekins just reminded me, that the legislature directed Sterling to investigate the possibility of financing the line so in fairness to him, he was following the direction of the legislature. Russ pointed that out. I thought it should be noted. Go ahead.

LOVE: Sure. It might make sense for the state to own certain types of large industry that occur. For the simple reason that (1) it may prove to be a good investment. Secondly, it may allow to implement such things as local hire and other types of social considerations. This is an area the state should be careful in, but certainly not something that should not be written off as not a potential type of thing to consider.

In other areas, they may want to change the ownership of something, for example, a foreign-owned fishing cannery. They may want to allow fishermen to form cooperatives and become the owners of the fish processing plant. The reason for that may be that maybe the public would see some use in that. They may feel that the fishermen are presently being exploited by the present owners. They may feel this may be a vehicle of overcoming that.

They may feel they want to use the money to help people capitalize and start credit unions to strengthen consumer-owned credit institutions which, incidentally, are the only credit intermediary that is feasible to provide financing to very small communities in Alaska. Commercial banks simply will not ever be a feasible economic intermediary in very small towns. Credit unions are probably the only things that can function in that area. There's a lot that can be done to strengthen the effect of credit unions beyond just consumer credit and to things of actual economic development financing particularly on a small community basis.

I'm going to have to cut this short because my notes are going a lot longer than I wanted to. I just wanted to tell you that a lot of the talk has been on the issue whether or not we should spend the money or whether we should give it

back to the public and what should we do with the earnings from the fund. I think that's very important, I think there's a lot of dialogue and discussion that has to take place relative to how we're going to manage the funds and what types of investments we might make. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jamie. Do you have a comment?

DOOGAN: Just one question. Jamie, in speaking of social projects that could be financed, are you advocating then that they be financed through the Permanent Fund?

LOVE: Different types of social projects? The types of investments that I talked about--I'm suggesting that they could be financed by the state of Alaska using some other revenues we're getting from the oil industry. Whether through the so-called Permanent Fund or whether through the general fund or whether through another financial intermediary would depend upon the legal structure that the legislature sets up to management. It's possible to have more than one fund. I'm just talking in general about surplus revenue.

GRUENING: To follow that up you mentioned housing. There is ASHA, there's Alaska Housing Finance Corporation,

there's the veteran loan program. For what reason would the Permanent Fund be doing something that the general fund could do by setting up another loan program or increasing the size? Is there any special reason why the Permanent Fund, as opposed to another general fund loan program, would be used?

LOVE: I think the idea of setting up financial intermediaries in some of these areas, like the Housing Finance Corporation specializing in a certain area, might be the best way to manage these things. It could either sell its paper either the Permanent Fund or the general fund or somebody else on its credit rating. Dr. Daniels has done a good job of addressing, to some degree, if you're going to be involved in some of these areas, some different scenarios per se about financial areas. I, personally, don't think I've been addressing my remarks so much to the Permanent Fund per se as I have all state loan programs because we're talking about making investments, and I think it's important that we sort of re-evaluate our entire philosophy towards investments, loans and that sort of thing at a state level.

GRUENING: Thank you Jamie. Mr. Tim Bradner. Someone remarked that it's your money we're using.

BRADNER: Thank you, Clark. My thoughts about the Permanent Fund, and to an extent the larger question of the whole amount of excess or what some people call surplus revenues in the general fund, is essentially a political problem which we're going to have to be dealing with. Just a couple observations I'd like to throw out here real quick-- about the next 5 or 10 years in the dialogue that's going to have to develop in Alaska about how we're going to handle these things.

The Permanent Fund and the surplus wealth, the existence of excess revenues in the general fund and some estimates go to as high as \$10 billion by 1985 between the general fund and the Permanent Fund really puts Alaska in a unique position in the United States and even in the democratic West. No state, to my knowledge, or even any Western democracy has had this kind of a problem on this kind of a scale with a small population yet a large, diverse state with pressing social and poverty needs among many of its people.

We do have a situation we can look to in some states where they are coping with excess surplus revenues this current year. For instance, Texas right now has a \$2 billion surplus, I believe, in their treasury that they're debating

what to do with. Some other states have a small amount of surplus in the treasury. Nothing quite on the magnitude of the scale we're looking to here in Alaska.

Norway perhaps might be a situation in Europe that we could look at where there are large natural resource revenues and a small population. Nothing quite as extreme. There are extremes in the OPEC countries, but again, you have a different political situation there. Yet our per capita income over the next 10 years is probably going to be of the magnitude of some of the OPEC countries; in terms of the annual income from natural resources per person or per family unit probably range near what at least some of the OPEC countries are getting.

We have to ask some questions about how capable our democratic institutions are going to be handled, to handle these kind of problems. For instance, governments in the United States, state and local governments, are used to the whole idea of working with the scarcity of public dollars. The fact that tax revenues come from a lot of individuals and a lot of small businesses, there's always a scarcity in priorities. The logic by which decisions are made start from the standpoint that there's a shortage of public money, and the priorities have to be sorted out from that standpoint. In Alaska it's always been easy for the legislator to withstand the very severe constituent pressure he gets

for "what about that bridge" or "what about that dam" or "what about this program or that program" by saying "hey, there's just not enough money in the treasury this year. We just can't fund it." However, he's not going to have that excuse next year or years on down the road because there is going to be money in the treasury. There is going to be money in the Permanent Fund.

I am concerned about how permanent the Permanent Fund is going to be in the face of these kind of pressures, particularly if we have a situation in Alaska where we don't have a viable, steadily growing, private economy to generate jobs and income in the state's economy. People would tend to look to the government just as they did in the years 1970-1975 with the \$900 million for various kinds of help.

Already I hear people talking about the use of the Permanent Fund in its relation to the general fund. The Permanent Fund makes loans to income producing loans. Okay. Why can't the general fund borrow money from the Permanent Fund and promise to pay it back at 5% interest? I hear that sort of thing going on. I worry about that. No state has been in a situation like this, and I think, it's going to bring about some changes in some very different kind of pressures than we're used to in Alaska.

I think, we look at why people voted for the Permanent

Fund in the first place. I think the kind of dialogue that's going to go on this year where Clark's committee and other people are going to be going out and having meetings around the state to try to re-assess why people did vote for the Permanent Fund and what they were thinking about when they voted for it, and now that it's a fact, what is going to be done with it. To a large extent, people voted for the Permanent Fund because they had a feeling that there was going to be an excess in the treasury and they were concerned about the legislature spending the money. It was kind of a reflection of that traditional American hostility to government that we seem to bring along as a tradition in part of our political heritage.

So you set it aside into a fund that the legislature can't spend, but what you also do is you create another mechanism, and you create managers of that fund, and how accountable to the people are the managers of that fund? The legislators are really accountable to the people. If there's any fault in the system, maybe we should look to that rather than to setting up another layer for managing the fund that might not be responsive to public needs or public desires.

I am concerned about the Permanent Fund and the surplus revenue question from the standpoint of its effects on dividing the state politically in the future. Already we're having problems in differences of direction between urban Alaskans,

who live in Anchorage and Fairbanks and Juneau, and rural Alaskans, who live in small villages and have a different set of concerns and priorities. I think, you'll find that many rural Alaskans are skeptical of the Permanent Fund and the reasons by which it's been created. This whole dialogue we're going through here today is because the Permanent Fund is more of an urban orientated kind of a thing. They look at the requirement for safe investments to be made by the Permanent Fund; yet they know that many rural loans are in the frontier, high-risk area. They're concerned that a lot of those loans will wind up going to large scale development projects to benefit primarily cities and the urban areas and the urban work force.

They also realize that a lot of their benefits come from the state programs, state services in rural areas. They are concerned that if more money is dedicated out of the general fund, more than 25% of royalties into the Permanent Fund, then it will tend to short change the services and the kind of programs they are getting. I worry about that.

We have no place to really look for examples on how to cope with this problem. We do have a couple examples here in Alaska. We have the case of what happened to the \$900 million from 1970. Now, there was a situation where

there were surplus revenues, and we can look to how it was handled by the government. There's been a lot of debate and a lot of pro and con about what happened to the \$900 million. To a large extent, I think, the case can be made that the money was used for things people wanted. People asked for that money to be spent. If you look at the record, you'll see that a lot of it, probably most of it, went for education, because people asked for it. I think those kind of pressures are going to happen again in the future. That's really all I have to say.

GRUENING: Thank you very much, Tim. If there are no questions at this time, we'll proceed to Dr. Lindauer.

LINDAUER: I'd like to remind everybody that we really have two aspects to this thing. We keep running them together. We have the question on how to spend the income that's going to come off this thing. And we have the question of the investments that are going into it. It seems to me, that we're continually talking about the income, but as a matter of fact, it may well be that how we make the investments are going to have more impact on those people who are in Alaska today. I'm going to come to that.

There's also the question of what our objectives are.

I'm not so sure we've specified them. That is, how much of what we are doing is for us and how much of what we're doing should be for people in the lower 48 or for our grandchildren to make them even more richer than they're otherwise going to be, richer than we are. I don't think we've really decided whether it's for us or for the future.

We've had many, many proposals as to what to do. Almost all of them, as far as I can see, with the exception of the Alaskan, Inc. kind of distribution of income, would appear to have no real benefit for the people who are in Alaska today in terms of improving the general quality of the life of the mass of the people and their standard of living, perhaps even for future Alaskans. Most of them would tend to make Alaskans more numerous rather than better off.

I'm primarily concerning myself now with the investments and how the capital is put together rather than the income and how it is spent. I think it would be a terrible shame if we said that the main impact on the day to day life of the average Alaskan was, he got stuck in a few more traffic jams and was three deep at the Russian River instead of shoulder to shoulder. At the present time, I'd say that we're likely to be three deep. That bothers me because for better or for worse, Alaska owes nothing to the New York City bond brokers. It really does not have an obligation to

provide a job for everybody who wants to come up here to find one. Indeed, the panelists and their comments about labor mobility are all too correct because people will come up here to take advantage of these things. The average Alaskan will, in fact, not be better off. The goals for both income and investment, again separating them, should be to use them both to directly benefit and encourage today's Alaskans to have a better quality of life, more prosperity, and hopefully to do so, I think we can, in such a way as to build a tax base so that we will be able to continue that higher quality of life and standard of living at such a time in the future for our grandchildren when the oil runs out.

What I'd like to do very briefly is throw out my comments on the major proposals that I've heard in the most summary form and tell you why I've come to these conclusions.

Let's take the development bank project and let's talk about spending \$1 billion for a big power plant or some huge, massive traditional development bank. No matter what we call it, once we set up a major, highly financed development bank, it's going to function like a development bank of projects. I find it very difficult to believe that a dam that's going to take 20 or 30 years to build is going to have any great impact on the quality of life of people now living in Alaska. It's true that when the

thing comes on line there'll be more electricity, I assume that that will then generate electricity for the additional people who are in here building the things that the public development bank has promoted. The average Alaskan even then will be in no way better off.

In any event, such projects, for better or for worse in today's world, would be built by Washington, if they had any sense or any merit at all. The Corps of Engineers has never been known not to build a public works project if they could, in any way, be justified. So the fact that we would build those that they wouldn't, suggests to me, that we'd have a rat-hole factor there that would be monumental; approaching infinity, I think.

Big projects like that probably ought to go in front of the voters and certainly can be bonded by the legislature and discussed at the legislature and put on a bond issue if they really have merit, and we just can't get Washington to provide them the way they would for all the other states in the Union, if for some reason Washington will start to ignore us in that fashion, then the legislature can take action. I really don't see any need to have a development bank for major, huge subsidy projects.

There's also the possibility of gilt-edge investments,

maximum income. I find it hard to believe that pouring all that money into buying little white pieces of paper with I.O.U.'s from such major first class things, that we would have bought five years ago, as New York City bonds, would really do much for us, or in a sense, do much for us in terms of income being generated. In the future, I suppose that we would have the income and what they did to New York City, I assume, that is they would tend to migrate in and take advantage of the services provided with the lower taxes and/or higher revenues. I'm not so sure that in some years accumulating investments through the bond market in order to build a New York City is exactly what we ought to do.

There's also the suggestion that we ought to make such things as direct loans and guarantees to Alaskans and Alaskan businesses, and that has some merit in it. The trouble is that if we make them directly, there's too much chance that the loans and guarantees will be made on a political basis instead of an economic basis. Everyone who has a good loan will go to the bank; everybody who has a bad loan will go to the Permanent Fund. The net result of that is going to be that we will probably lose a lot of our capital. The Permanent Fund will unnecessarily be saddled with a great deal of public disenchantment. Overall, it's a net loss, I'd like to make

a suggestion which might kill the two birds that we need to have killed. That is to provide benefits for Alaskans as well as benefits for future Alaskans without having that kind of risk involved.

What I would think we should do heavily, at least with some of this money, would be to put it into the financial institutions of Alaska that are here today for the purpose of making the banks, the savings and loans, the credit unions, whatever the financial institutions are of the economy today and those that might be established for the purpose of making low interest loans in certain areas, certain socially desirable areas.

The one that particularly springs to mind is housing. It's very important that everybody realize that financial institutions do not make their money because there's an absolutely high level of interest such as 10% or 9 5/8 or whatever the rate is. They make their money on the spread between whatever it takes and whatever they loan it at. Getting it at 7 and loaning it at 9 gives them the same profits as getting it at 2 and loaning at 4. It's the risk differential and the administrative costs that must be covered. The Permanent Fund could definitely provide very low interest loans to the financial institutions to handle such things as making loans to the village utilities

if that's socially desirable, or any other things that would be so enumerated. Housing, what have you? I would really suggest that this should be done. If we can improve the quality of life for Alaskans by letting them have better housing, that's something that can be done immediately and will affect the whole mass of people. It's also building a tax base. The same thing through lower utility costs. It is a form of subsidy which will get out to all the people whereas a major subsidy that just causes one or two big dams to be built or major capital projects will fundamentally benefit a handful of engineering companies that are headquartered in New York City or wherever the major engineering companies are headquartered.

I submit to you again, that our responsibility is to Alaskans and to improve the quality of their life. It is not to provide jobs and incomes for people who do not live in Alaska. If we can build the tax base for the future through such investments and subsidies, and that's what they are, and simultaneously provide an access to a better quality of life, and the one things we see right now in the economy of Alaska is a massive move toward the upgrading of housing. I would submit that that is an area in which the legislature and everyone else needs to take a very serious look.

The only other thing I would say is, please notice

that I'm talking about the investments in the principal in the Permanent Fund. I am not talking about how we ought to spend however the income comes. We should seriously consider such things as Alaska, Inc., or variations of that if that is politically impossible, which would get the benefits back to the people directly and not send them into a few large projects that are oriented towards outside the state and very delayed benefits.

This economy is growing and our grandchildren, no matter what happens, are going to be richer than we are. I'm not so sure we need to starve everybody in order to make them even richer.

GRUENING: Thank you for that optimistic outlook.
Barbara.

BERGMAN: Okay, I'd like to say a few things about Dr. Lindauer's remarks. There's a little confusion on whether present day Alaskans are too well off or not well enough off. Here you've got the oil revenues coming in. One sort of rationale, we're segregating them in the Permanent Fund is in some sense we're too well off. That is, the present day Alaskans are lavishly provided for in terms of public service if the money were not put into the Permanent Fund. What that would argue is that some of the

money should go into the Permanent Fund again primarily for the benefit of future generations of Alaskans. Some of it should not go into the Permanent Fund, some of the revenue should be used to lower taxes for example. That's what that would argue.

Now, I think that Dr. Lindauer shouldn't be allowed to get away with this implication that if the money were invested in the gilt-edge type of program, New York City bonds would have been bought with it.

LINDAUER: Five years ago they would have.

BERGMAN: That would not have occurred because they are tax exempt. It would make absolutely no sense for the Permanent Fund to buy them. More seriously, I think, what he's suggesting is that somehow or other the managers of the Permanent Fund would be poor in terms of that kind of investment. Even I'm smart enough not to have bought any New York City bonds. My record in the market is not too great.

LINDAUER: That's not what I suggested.

BERGMAN: I don't think that's a fair implication.

LINDAUER: I didn't mean that implication. Let me tell you

what I meant. I meant that if we send billions of dollars out of this state and get back little white pieces of paper that 30 years hence are going to give us some income when they mature, we're going to have little white pieces of paper here and damn little else. We have people who might rather have a better housing situation. We don't need to have additional spending to have local citizens make investments of their own in housing. There are a lot of people who apparently would like to have better housing. I see no reason why they should be denied that.

BERGMAN: That relates to the issue of how well off the present day Alaskans are. Do they have needs that ought to be met out of the present day oil revenues? What you're saying is yes. I think, that's something that is essentially a political question that has to be determined.

Now, there's sort of a subrosa question here which hasn't come out explicitly, perhaps it has, I think it ought to be out and discussed a little more, that is the problem--do you want to give benefits to the present citizens of Alaska and positively avoid giving benefits to people who will migrate subsequently or people who have migrated recently? There are pros and cons on this. Even if you

restrict the present benefits to people who are citizens of Alaska now---and by the way, I am thinking of renting an apartment and moving my voting residence here before the grandfather's clause takes effect---but seriously, if you do that, you are going to create a two class economy. Some people are going to move here subsequently anyway. There are social problems with that that would have to be faced. If, on the other hand, as has been ~~said and said~~ ~~correctly~~ many times, you provide the benefits to whoever is to come here that will to some degree encourage immigration. That might be bad because it would spread the benefits more thinly, but also because it could be said that those people have no moral right to it in some sense. That as a practical matter you are going to end up having to give benefits to whoever is here, even if some of them have been brought in because of the generosity of these programs. I don't think you will want to, or can afford to, set up a two tier system where some people of privileged nobility and other people are pariahs.

LINDAUER: I think you have misinterpreted. What you've done is you've gone back and you're confusing the discussion of how to spend the income with the question of how to invest the principal.

BERGMAN: No. Those are two different comments. Perhaps, I should have said I'm now moving from the area of how to invest the principal to the area of how to spend the income.

LINDAUER: I didn't really discuss how to spend the income. I have my own value judgement, without thinking it through, I would use it to have a form of property tax relief to encourage, again, the average citizen, who is in Alaska, to benefit by being able to afford a better class of housing, if that's what that person wants.

I was discussing the question of how to make the investments of the principal of the capital of the Permanent Fund and suggesting that we would be better off if the principal, wherever possible, was invested in Alaska in such a way as to build a tax base and in such a way as to benefit Alaskans. I still believe that we owe nothing to bond brokers in New York and we owe nothing to a handful of engineering companies who would come up here to make major capital projects and bring in itinerate laborers who would come in and out, we would get little, if any, benefit from this. I'd rather see everybody living in a better house, if that's what they want or having decent utilities in their villages, if that's what they want.

BERGMAN: Well, some of that itinerate labor is going to be required to build those better houses.

LINDAUER: That's right.

GRUENING: I would like to ask one question and that is how hungry is the audience? We're getting to the more important part of this symposium and that is letting the very patient audience get into the fray here and ask questions of whomever. We can go another half an hour and then break for lunch and come back if there are still questions to be asked. We can break right now. I'm asking for the Quaker sense. What do you say sir?

MAN (UNIDENTIFIED): I'd like to make a comment and ask a couple questions, but considering the time-now that he's had a cooling off period, I'd like to refer to Mr. Gallagher and let him make a comment in response.

GRUENING: Okay. That's fair enough, but I want to hear how hungry the rest of the group is. Representative Carpenter.

CARPENTER: We may not necessarily be hungry, but there may be other reasons to leave the room.

GRUENING: We don't have a sign out sheet. Anyone can leave. Okay. Sterling, you can make a remark if you want. We'll be back at 1:00 o'clock sharp. We have some people who need to catch planes. We can maybe wrap it earlier this afternoon. Thank you. I urge you all to come back because I think it will be the more interesting portion this afternoon.

LUNCH BREAK

GRUENING: We'll try to wrap this thing up in a time that's appropriate, we won't drag it out. Dr. George Rogers has to return to Juneau tonight and the last plane leaves at 3:00, so if you have any questions of him, specifically, you should ask them first. Before we open it up to general questions, Dr. Lindauer wanted to clarify a statement he made and from that point on you can ask any questions you want of the two economists, the panelists, or the legislature, for that matter.

If you have specific proposals for investments, I think we're also interested mostly in your philosophy for why that is a good thing for the Permanent Fund to do and why the Permanent Fund as opposed to maybe the general fund or the revolving loan funds that are created from the

general fund could not do it as well.

I only have one comment on what's transpired so far and that is it appears to the extent that the Permanent Fund becomes active in the Alaska economy, intervening in the Alaska economy, we have increasing problems with how to fairly distribute the subsidy, if there is one applied in the loan, and how to manage it in a way that it's accountable to changing desires in needs of the people. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't do it; it just means the problem is a little more difficult as the Permanent Fund becomes active in the economy. You may want to have a comment or a question on that. As long as the panelists are here, you might as well get your questions out first. Dr. Lindauer.

LINDAUER: Somebody asked me a question which led me to think that something I had said had been misunderstood. It had to do with development banks and development bank projects. My concern is not with the establishment of a development bank per se, particularly not with the establishment of a development bank kind of analysis of projects. My concern is with the kind of big project that one finds the World Bank engaging in. Something that would be a \$5 billion hydro project that would have overruns to \$8 billion. Something that would be a single project or a handful of projects which would be an all or nothing kind of use of the Permanent Fund monies. I am particularly opposed to

putting all the money into a big project such as a major dam. I am certainly not opposed in any way to the establishment of a development bank concept to analyze various and sundry projects.

GRUENING: Thank you for clarifying that. When you come to ask questions, please come to the microphone. The lights now are provided and the cameras are provided by Media Services, which is producing a program that may be used on channel 7. It'll be put together so you may see yourself on T.V. We also plan to do a transcript on this hearing. So when you come to the microphone, please identify yourself. If you wish to do so, tell us your occupation. Yes, sir.

GERSTENFELD: My name is Sol Gerstenfeld. I've been in this neck of the woods about 30 years, so I've done this, that and the other thing. I've done some visiting Outside and kept coming back. Along the lines that Jamie raised, the thing that concerns me the most is not just how much we spend and how much we take in, but what we get for our money. I would like someone to explain to me how come criminal justice is a better investment than consumer protection?

GRUENING: Anyone want to take a stab at that?

HAVELOCK: I don't think that they're mutually exclusive objectives. Historically, over the last few years, there has been more of a trend. If I understand the question, my comment is simply, the trend in the direction of the question is addressing.

GERSTENFELD: Trends don't happen; they're made.

GRUENING: Okay. Trends don't happen, they're made. Now if you have any comment with which to follow-up your questions, I'd invite the audience to do that. As long as no one's making a long speech, there's time to follow your own question. Are you satisfied? Does anyone wish to comment further on that? Okay. Does anyone else have any questions from the audience?

CUC: Two questions. First, just a general information question.

GRUENING: Identify yourself please.

CUC: Okay. Dennis Cuc. Specifically, with the oncoming gas production and new discoveries that will be found in Prudhoe

Bay, how much extra are we going to have in the Permanent Fund? Does the Permanent Fund just anticipate Prudhoe oil and gas or does it anticipate other discoveries at all?

GRUENING: I can answer that. The amendment applies to all oil revenue produced through royalties and leases and bonuses on state land, so that if the Beaufort Sea, for example, were sold next year for a bonus payment, 25% of that bonus payment would go into the Permanent Fund; and if it were sold under the same arrangement where the state gets 12½% of the oil or the value of it, then 25% of that would also go into the Permanent Fund.

But, I think the impetus for the Permanent Fund was the vast wealth that people saw coming out of Prudhoe, although other revenues are subject to contribution. The projections that you see in that little green book that some of you picked up, and there are more out there, if you want them, are based strictly on Prudhoe Bay.

CUC: My second question is for Dr. Lindauer. Do you think the banks are willing to enter into some kind of arrangement with the state whereby the state does provide monies? Do you think the banks, as a private capital

resource, would be interested in this proposition?

LINDAUER: I would think yes. By the very definition of what you just said. They tend to be private, profit-making corporations. They make their money on the difference between what they pay for it and what they charge for it, not on the absolute rate. So that it would be very profitable to a bank to make low-interest loans if it can get the money at an even lower interest loan. Then again, let me tell you, I'm not just talking about banks, I'm talking about all financial institutions including state mortgage agencies and all related, anything that is presently acting as a financial institution could conceivably take money and put it into whatever the legislature thought was a good idea.

CUC: I haven't done any research on this and the only reason I ask the question is because the Commissioner of Revenue seemed to indicate he is a banker, of course, he was a banker. He seemed to believe it wouldn't fly. You haven't talked to him about it to find out the reason? I haven't either at length.

LINDAUER: I did speak very briefly with him during the lunch hour about that, and I think one of the things that was

discussed was the capital requirements of banks. It may well be that there would have to be enough profits involved in the break to generate additional capital so that they could continue to expand. I think that we're really talking about a conceptual thing here. The question of whether the money should flow through the Alaskan financial institutions or should it flow through a bond brokerage house in New York City. Other things equal, I'd just as soon let the Alaskan institutions make the money.

GRUENING: Thank you Doctor. That's a worthy objective, I'm told and I don't have the information before me, that when the \$900 million was deposited in local banks, most of it went Outside. Somebody may wish to comment on that.

BERGMAN: Let me say that when money is deposited in banks, the first thing they do is buy government bills with it.

GREUNING: Why is that?

BERGMAN: They want to expand their loans very quickly. Because very prudently they want to take care to see that they're good loans. So when they get a sudden big deposit,

what they will do is put the money to work in a relatively riskless way, which is the government bill market, where the funds are liquid and they get a rate of return. It's open to the Alaskan government to buy its own bills instead of putting large sums in interest free accounts, even temporarily. With large sums so that even putting them in interest free accounts for relatively short periods can lose a lot of money. Now you know, I hear sort of contradictory things. In one ear, I hear that you're so rich it doesn't matter, and with the other ear, I hear that you have a lot of slums that need attention and so on. No matter how rich you are, it's foolish to unnecessarily enrich bankers, even Alaskan bankers.

GRUENING: Any bankers in the crowd?

BERGMAN: I must say with respect to brokerage houses that Dr. Lindauer is warning us against, they now do negotiate down commission rates. So I'm sure, that for an account like the State of Alaska, one would get a rather low rate.

LOVE: I think what we are getting into is sort of technical discussion as to whether or not the Permanent Fund working through the banks buy CDs or whether they buy loans or whether they sell CDs or buy loans. I think what Clark was talking about, at one

point, they take the certificates of deposit down to the banks, hoping they'd make some local loans. Sterling Gallagher, I think, was quoted once as saying they put the money Outside into treasury bills outside the state to make a profit. They could also accomplish what Dr. Lindauer wanted to do by purchasing loans on the secondary money market, thereby ensuring that the loans were properly qualified Alaska investments under certain criteria. I'm not speaking so much to his proposal, but I think we're getting into a technical area, I'm not sure how helpful that is for the general audience in terms of discussing some of this stuff. I think there's probably different ways of accomplishing what Dr. Lindauer was talking about other than putting money in CDs.

LINDAUER: I never advocated putting money in CDs. In fact, quite the contrary. My whole point is that if you channel it through some restricted beneficial way to limit the loans not by CDs but let them draw on money they're willing to loan out at some lower rate of interest. The loans that they otherwise would not make--it could benefit Alaska. The whole thing is to keep the benefits and orient the loans within Alaska--not just throw them in the national economy.

MEEKINS: There is a precedent to that in terms of link deposits that, I understand, Colorado did that with their state deposits. They give them under the condition that they're used for certain purposes. I think that's one vehicle.

GRUENING: Sir, did you have a comment on that? It's open to the audience. Just come to the microphone.

FISKE: I am Roy Fiske. I'm a retired Lieutenant Colonel and a 15 year Alaskan. I think that what you've just been saying here on restricting where you make your investments can be legislated, and the money we're talking about could be put in the hands of Alaskan institutions with restrictions on it that it be invested in Alaska only and at specific rates. That specific amount of money, while it's in the bank, would not necessarily be handled the same as the other funds of the bank. I would like to later on make some further comments, if I may.

GRUENING: Sure, you may. Thank you very much. Mike, do you have a comment?

DOOGAN: Yes, I'd like to get back to a slightly more general question. This is directed more or less to Dr. Lindauer, but just generally to stated goals of the fund. When you discussed

making loan interest loans to Alaskans using the principal that way, taking the earnings and distributing them to Alaskans in some sort of direct manner, you raised the question of tradeoffs. You have two goals and they can, on this scenario, be accomplished; but you have to decide what your first goal is. If it's to put the most possible money in the pockets of Alaskans, obviously you don't make low interest loans, you try to make as much interest as you can, because you can put more money in. If it's to build houses, then you have to sacrifice the goal somewhat of putting money in the pockets of Alaskans. So the question is when you made that sort of proposal, what was your primary goal?

LINDAUER: When I first spoke, I said that we really had things divided into two separate parts--the question of how to spend whatever income came and the question of how to take the principal and how to build up the principal. I don't think the goals should be maximum. I don't think that was what the voters voted on. The voters voted on putting it into income earning things. You can earn an income at 3 or 4%; you can earn an income at 6 or 7%. Whatever the managers of the fund decide is the socially responsible thing to do should be what we do. I would, person-

ally, do not think that we should go for the high risk investments that would conceivably yield the highest incomes. I think that we should consider that how we invest that money is going to be as important, in my view even more important, than whether we get an extra one percent on the top by taking some risks for the money. Last time we took some risks I understand there were some big losses. You get more interest when you take a risk as a risk premium. Should we really be risking it? I think there should be something in between the final recipient and the state as a guarantor of the repayment of that money, so there is a guaranteed income. That's one reason, I like financial institutions, because if the loan goes sour, it's their loan that went sour. They would owe the state whatever they paid to get that money.

BRADNER: I have a more general question. What is the status of the definition of income producing? Are you going to try to do this through your statute? What's your present thinking about it? What are the words of the initiative? I can't quite remember.

HAVELOCK: Some currency depreciates very rapidly.

GRUENING: Down to zero? It means some interest. In other words, you couldn't do it, say, argue indirectly, give it as a grant and say, "well, that's incoming producing because they'll be side benefits." It has to produce some income, but it doesn't say how much. It could be anywhere from 1% to 10%. As a legal matter, I don't think you could argue it could produce no income and be income producing, based on kind of a spent off benefit thing. The interest range is wide.

BERGMAN: I'd like to say just a few words about the trade-offs. Say you take a million dollars and you subsidize loans in Alaska, or you take a million dollars and you invest it in treasury bonds and make a better return on it. You're giving up something in each case. Presumably the benefit is to the person who gets the concessional loan, and that, very frankly, tends to be middle class people. They're the ones who qualify even for concessional loans. What you're doing, in effect, is you are giving a benefit to a middle class person and sacrificing a benefit, as a result, for the beneficiaries of the income, which is the whole population. I don't say you should never do it. There may be very good

reasons to do it. But you have to be clear that whatever track you take, there are going to be costs and there are going to be benefits. You have to see who gets the benefits and who bears the costs. They're generally not the same people.

MC CUTCHEON: I'd like to ask Dr. Rogers a question before he leaves.

GRUENING: And you're Jerry McCutcheon.

MCCUTCHEON: Yes, Dr. Rogers, you raised a question of the philosophy of the Permanent Fund, and you never stated what your opinion was. Why do you believe there should be a Permanent Fund? Divorce it from whether or not political tricks were played in the voting process, or who introduced bills, and aside from all that stuff, strike all of that and get down to why there should be a Permanent Fund.

ROGERS: The purpose of the Permanent Fund--we're faced with an unusual situation, or what seems to be an unusual situation in which we have for a period of time the prospect of drawing upon resources that belong to Alaska in this case, they're state land, that will be depleted over a period of 20 to 30 years. The benefits

of these, if they are not put into a Permanent Fund, would be used for current expenditures, current benefits. One of the underlying things, I think, of the whole idea was that this was a way of creating a nest egg, which would be available, which would share some of the benefits with future generations. The other thing was because Alaska has been through boom and bust cycles in the past, we have this fear of there being a let down right after a particular period of prosperity comes to an end. Most of our past development has been gold, defense, construction, the Alaska earthquake briefly, and then oil development. Each of these have had different cycles. So the idea of creating this fund as a cushion at the end to give us a basis for moving..

MCCUTCHEON: I'd like to ask my next question.

GRUENING: Let him finish. Are you finished, Dr. Rogers?

ROGERS: That's one of the underlying points of creating a Permanent Fund. The other is, of course then we get into the use of the money. I think we've all talked about it this morning. But you asked me what the basic idea was. You had another question.

MC CUTCHEON: As to your anticipated number of years, I would suggest you get the State of Alaska's report of January 1976, having to do with the production of Frudhoe Bay Oil. I've got one question, why do you think this anomaly, this variation, or this large income occurred? Why is it occurring?

ROGERS: It's occurring because the oil industry is coming up to Alaska because of the energy shortage. Is that the sort of question you're asking?

MC CUTCHEON: Well, you're getting close. Why has it occurred? Tell us why it has occurred. Why couldn't it be level?

ROGERS: Why couldn't the income be level? Because there's an immediate national need for the resource, the energy resource. It's being developed during this period.

MC CUTCHEON: I understand the need for the resource will be greater in 1985 than it is today. If that is the case, will we not need it worse in the future than we do today.

ROGERS: You see, these are decisions over which we have no control.

MC CUTCHEON: I see, you say we have no control. Who does control those decisions?

ROGERS: If I understand your deep question which is emerging, is why do we develop oil today? Is that the question?

MC CUTCHEON: That could be one of them.

ROGERS: That is a good question. We had an alternative. As a state, we could've withheld those lands. The decision was made to develop them.

MC CUTCHEON: So in relation to the Permanet Fund, where does this fit with the philosophy that apparently we could not control?

ROGERS: The control of the timing of the income generation is what you're getting at, isn't it?

MC CUTCHEON: Correct.

ROGERS: We had a voice in that. It's a political

decision that was made. I don't think that, if put to a vote, the people would have come up with an answer different than the decision made, but that's a speculation. You're correct. The income is being generated now because the decision was made to develop the oil or to put the state lands up for lease.

MC CUTCHEON: Would you think then it might be prudent as far as the state is concerned not to have any further lease sales? In other words, not to enhance the Permanent Fund?

ROGERS: Yes. I think it might very well be prudent to do that.

MC CUTCHEON: Then the Permanent Fund can be considered in two ways. That which is resources you own, and that which is postponed?

ROGERS: That's right. Yes, it's one way of giving the resources that you're giving up now a life after death.

MC CUTCHEON: Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you, Jerry. Are there any further questions?

MC GINNIS: I'm not clever enough to turn all these into questions, so I'd just like to make a couple of statements. My name is Tim McGinnis. I'm a citizen of the state of Alaska.

My first comment is that I believe that the Permanent Fund arose more in response to a political situation than an economic one. Here in Alaska since 1969, the question has been most often left by the outs wishing to get in the political structure. What has happened to the \$900 million? If they had devoted as much research or as much to research as they did to rhetoric, they could have found out what happened to the \$900 million. Again, and again, we hear, "What has happened to the \$900 million?" Even though everybody knows. I think in response to that, a lot of political people, generally liberals afraid of a conservative challenge, said, "let's make a Permanent Fund." A lot of the questions we're addressing today are the results of that kind of dichotomy between political need, which may or may not have reflected a true economic need.

My second point, from what I've heard today and what I, as an Alaskan, have been coming around to in the last couple of years, is that we really don't want the money. What is it going to bring us? More people. We've heard that from every edge of the room today. What is it going to

bring us?

There is an important qualification on that, which is we don't want the money now; but we do want it later. So that's one of the things that has to be worked around.

Something which hovers in the background of the entire Permanent Fund discussion up to now, is the question of what percentage of those monies subject to the Permanent Fund are actually going to end up being used by the Permanent Fund. Will it be 25; will it be 50; will it be 75; will it be 100? I think that it's absolutely the most important decision to be made right at the outset. There are numerous arguments about which is cart, which is horse; but the principal first effect of the Permanent Fund will be these vis a vis the general fund. There's been a lot of talk in this room today about how we don't need any more government growth. Obviously making 100% Permanent Fund would have quite an effect on slowing government growth. That may or may not be a worthy goal, but to bring all these comments to a head.

There is one kind of quality, we've been talking all day about social quality, we've been talking about economic values and investments. But no one has really touched on the subject of environmental quality. I would like to suggest to you people today that the Permanent Fund could be used to buy back Alaska.

To buy environment quality for this state. We all heard about trade-offs. It's a favorite economic word. We've heard about externalities. I'm not going to tell economists about externalities: they all know about it. The fact remains that our resources are not being developed by the same people who hope to profit by them or by the same people who would hope to keep a reasonable level of environmental quality while those resources are being developed. BP Alaska or the Alyeska Pipeline Service---they have their own, very rightly so, idea of what trade-offs are going to be and what they consider to be a wise trade-off. The Alaskan people are almost in a hypocritical stance because they want the values that come with oil development but they are screaming to high heaven about the environmental trade-offs.

Once in a film a fellow made the comment that Alaskans want wilderness at the back door and civilization at the front door. When someone moves in behind them, they've got a problem. That's one of the best comments I've ever heard on that matter.

To continue with the idea of environmental quality and trade-offs, I'd like to suggest some concrete things which have been brought up by the conversation of our last speaker, one of which is that the state of Alaska could buy leases, oil leases, with the Permanent Fund. It could've bought the

entire Northeast Gulf for half a billion dollars, that's one sixteenth of an \$8 billion Permanent Fund. We could've held it off the market. We could've particularly held off the market those tracts that were environmentally sensitive; and, when the time arose when we needed more development in the state, we could then have begun to develop.

The second thing, and this has been brought up before, Russ and I have talked about this before, is we could have decided unilaterally two years ago that we were going to build the Alaska gas line. Would Congress have told us not to build it? If we were going to invest \$4 billion building a state-owned pipeline to Alaskan tidewater, would there be an Alcan line now?

I think the most dramatic results of the Permanent Fund could be control over how those resources are developed. That to me is more the essence than the money which might conceivably come from those resources. We could control the environmental stipulations to a much greater degree, not only in terms of the letter of the law, but carrying out that intent if we were ourselves the owners and controllers, not of the conversation that was just here, control the sequence and the timing of development of resources if we do truly own them. A lot of our problem right now is the federal government can't control that; but we could form ourselves an oil company and bid against anyone who wanted to develop our resources before we did if we were lucky enough to cal-

culate what they thought they were worth and put ten more dollars on top of it, we would have control of it.

One of the conflicts here is that if we set up 100% Permanent Fund in order to try to keep state government from growing, we may unfortunately put into higher gear the mechanism of development, which has been the need for state revenues, that is by putting 100% in the Permanent Fund we might make the Beaufort Sea be sold 15 years earlier. That's a conflict, I recognize that. In many cases, we can't control that development or its speed or its tempo. We haven't even really wanted to, we've been so greedy. We want it all right now. We've got a long time to go in this state. A couple thousand years. Oil is going to get more valuable, everybody knows that. We're holding it as a national trust. It's nice that the Carter administration has the moderate views it has about development. But we had better, after Carter, get ready for another Nixon. Somebody who, you know, doesn't care about what's in the Northeast Gulf--somebody who doesn't know anything about, well, this wasn't federal, but somebody who doesn't know anything about Kachemak Bay and why not to put an oil rig there.

My faith in Alaska is the faith that we can control our own destiny, but in order to do that we may have to remodify

our idea of what is income producing or when it becomes income producing or when we would like it to become income producing. To me, that is one of the outstanding possibilities of the Permanent Fund, which so far, has not been touched.

One more comment, which is simply that it's really an \$8 billion Permanent Fund or \$10 billion or even \$6 billion, the impact on the state is going to be as incredible, as if we were creating an entirely new state government. The last time we created a state government, we had a constitutional convention, a couple years of debate. This time we're creating a Permanent Fund with an audience of about 25. I would hope that by the time we actually come to making those decisions about the Permanent Fund, that something of the scale of inquiry of a new constitutional convention will be attempted because it's going to be that important to the state. Those are my comments.

GRUENING: Tim, could you stick around for some questions? That was a very thought provoking statement. I think Mike has one question. We'll open it to the audience themselves. If the audience has questions of the participant without getting into an argument, they can ask them.

DOOGAN: It seems to me, that your statement hasn't really so much given us a solution to the problem of what to do with the

Permanent Fund, but rather to speak of Alaskans as though they were a homogeneous group. The Committee's goal is to try to get some sort of an idea of what Alaskans in general would like to see done with the money. If you postpone that just by saying we'll use the money to buy oil leases, then we'll have to have another committee with a different name trying to figure out when people want the oil leases sold.

MC GINNIS: That seems to be the nature of government; a committee about a committee about a committee.

GRUENING: Tim, I had one question. I agree that the question of the increased contribution to the Permanent Fund whether you're going to raise it above the mandatory 25% set in the constitution is important. I think you implied this in your statement, but I'm checking. Shouldn't we decide basically what the goal of the fund should be or what we think it should be before we decide to increase the contribution. If in fact a lot of these goals can be achieved through the general fund, why put it into the Permanent Fund unless that has a special goal? Shouldn't we determine that first before we increase the contribution?

MC GINNIS: I'm going a little bit backwards from your

deduction, which is I'm saying that it might better be put into the Permanent Fund as a place to put it when we don't know what to do with it, rather than to put it in the general fund when we don't know what to do with it. What I'm saying is that one of our big problems here, we spent all morning talking about how to keep people from coming to Alaska because we've got so much money. To my mind, that's the vital question about the Permanent Fund vs. the general fund.

MEEKINS: Tim, you mentioned, and I think it was a very good point, that one of the effects of putting 100% into the Permanent Fund may be, at some point, thereby reducing the surplus in the development of other areas by leasing oil leases or other mineral leases or any other resources the state owns. I think that's a good point. I'm wondering what you'd think about it in terms of, if I could remember my question now that I've said that. I'll come back to it.

GRUENING: Tim, you had a question, why don't you ask it?

BRADNER: I just had a question, Clark. The way the thing is now written, is it possible for the legislature to annually increase the amount of money into the Permanent Fund or does it have to be done by legislation. For instance, if the Finance

Committee were to find that they bent the budget for one year and there was X amount left over, could they, by resolution, put what was left over of the excess revenue that year into the Permanent Fund? Or does it have to be a set percentage?

GRUENING: Not by resolution or at least that's debatable, but by a bill which could be a budget bill, it could put additional amounts. In the constitutional amendment it does say at least 25%, which has interpreted to allow the legislature to make a higher contribution.

MEEKINS: I remember what I was going to say fortunately. I'm wondering if you find that same logic to Alaska, Inc.? Do you think that having an Alaska, Inc. proposal that you distributed money from the Permanent Fund investments to the public would have the same effect of generating an enthusiasm for selling the Beaufort lease sale so that 25% of those monies or 50%, whatever the contribution rate, would then go into the Permanent Fund and their shares would increase in value and that that would generate its own? I'm just trying to follow that logic out as applied to Alaska, Inc.

MC GINNIS: It's a definite possibility. Whether it's

Alaska, Inc, or any of a number of other things we've got in mind. It all goes back to whether we really want the money.

GRUENING: Any further questions? Jerry.

MC CUTCHEON: You raised the question of investing \$4 billion in gas line. I keep hearing about Alaska putting money in the gas line. Are you aware that the state of Alaska is--it would cost \$16 billion for the gas line. And there'd probably be an additional \$3 billion. And what would the cost of gas be and why when at Tidewater?

MC GINNIS: \$19 billion.

MC CUTCHEON: inaudible

MC GINNIS: I'm not sure that they have. El Paso--I guess they're not an oil company, they're a gas company, but they sure wanted it.

MC CUTCHEON: inaudible

GRUENING: As I understood the proposal was illustrative only of the type of resource investment that could be gotten into. I

have had enough of royalty gas right now. I hope we don't get into that debate again.

MC GINNIS: One variant on the proposal--we don't have to own 100%; we may not, in order to exercise effective control, even have to own 51%. We might do it with 30. We might be just a greater among many equals. I'm talking about co-venture as well as outright ownership. I don't feel that you're ever going to get a company from outside Alaska, wherever it's from, however many ads or dog races or whatever it is they sponsor to tell the way the Alaskan public is going to care. If the Alaskan public doesn't care, then we might as well bag it.

GRUENING: Thank you. Panelists or anybody can come up.

BRADNER: I have a question I want to address to you and Russ. What are the pros and cons more or less of money going into the Permanent Fund? Do you think it's a good idea to increase it to 50% or 75%? What do you see as disadvantages or advantages of that?

GRUENING: I'm not dodging the question, but one of the things we're trying to find out...I personally think you have to find out what you feel basically are the major goals. I

have some opinions on that. I haven't concluded yet to what the percentage ought to be--increased or remain the same. It's something I want to wait on frankly. That's my answer to it. I think I'd like to hear more from the public as to if they think it should be increased, why they do.

MEEKINS: I think one of the purposes of these types of things is to get some input on that question. We, of course, have spent a lot of time thinking about it. It's sort of funny because at the same time we need to make that decision up front, because a lot of things depend on it, we have very little information upon which to base it. We don't know what the prices of the oil and the tariff and all those things are going to be so we can't really project what our revenues are going to be. At the same time, we don't know what our population increases and our expenditures are going to be, or even our needs. So we don't know what our budget is going to be. Really our judgment on how much extra we're going to have to put one place or another is not very accurate at this point. So it's very difficult to say put 100% of it in. I guess we could always change it, but we're sort of in a dichotomy of wanting to do it up front and not having all the information we need to do it.

HAVELOCK: I just want to say since you don't know what you're

going to use the money for, it's absolutely insane to raise the percentage of money your're going to dedicate to the fund. Supposing you assume the purpose of the fund was to control random government spending of windfall funds, but you don't want a fixed percentage anyway. That is, what you need is some sort of a floating percentage that takes excess cream off the top. I assume since you feel that the legislature doesn't trust itself to do this on an annual basis, you need some sort of a formula system for doing that. I would not care to broach on how you put that formula together, but I'm sure that the economists in the room could do it.

GRUENING: We are looking at that, John. It's a complicated problem, but I happen to agree that a formula approach makes more sense than a fix of 50, 75, 80.

HAVELOCK: I'm also concerned. This is something that George and I talked over at lunch. The importance of preserving the distinction in whatever you do between investment policy and spending policy. As you've got all kinds of potential subsidy operations going on if just having a floating category of anything that makes a profit. The fact that you are, in fact, spending money to support housing, or

rural facilities, or whatever it may be, it becomes disguised. It seems to me, from the accountability perspective, you want to have some sort of standard as to what you would do in investment policy, that is, what do you do with money that you don't have a purpose for using to spend on something that would encourage some social end. Establish yourself some sort of an interest rate on that and appropriate the money that is necessary to fulfill social objectives on money which may be loaned beyond that to special purpose programs.

LOVE: I'd like to ask Dr. Gordon a question to briefly respond to some of the comments that Tim McGinnis, the fellow who was just up here talking. He was giving the description of the state using surplus money to invest in the resource industry to gain more control over a lot of management decisions or development decisions. I'd just like to hear you comment on that.

GORDON: I don't understand exactly what people mean by the word "control." By and large, I think it would be a bad thing to invest oil money back in oil. The very simple proposition about diversification, you don't want to have all your eggs in one basket. If you had a little money to put in the stock market, would you want to put all of it in one industry, the future of

which you could not predict. By taking oil money, which you are already getting, and reinvesting in oil, you are increasing the risk.

He made the statement that the price of oil, everyone knows, is going to rise. There's one thing that is clear--- everyone doesn't know what is going to happen to the price of things in general. It may be that oil is a very good investment, maybe it isn't. If you look at the price of oil company stock, it doesn't look all that good. But, I would think that it would be a more desirable thing to invest it widely in a diverse set of things and protect the income and distribute it, as I say, equally. It'll do more for the poor. It'll do more for equality in the state of Alaska than any other proposal I've heard, and I think by a large margin.

BERGMAN: Let me add a footnote to this. I think that Mr. McGinnis is right. I think the environmental problems have been given rather short shrift in the discussion. Then again, I think it's quite reasonable for Alaska to, in some sense, trade-off environmental benefits for either Permanent Fund capital or Permanent Fund income. It's, of course, up to Alaskans to decide what a reasonable rate of trade-off is. But if, as I think I hear, the environment is something that

is of great concern to everybody, then I don't think it's unreasonable to pay great attention to it, to sacrifice some income, possibly there's even some safety to it. I certainly think in terms of future leases, that perhaps environmental impact ought to be given greater stress than they have in the past. For example, insistence be made that people who exploit these resources ought to finance the clean-up or ought to use possibly high cost methods, which to the least damage.

I'm a little confused by the discussion as to whether Alaska's really very poor, or very rich. If we take the view that there is a lot of leeway here, then certainly saving the environment, creating environmental amenities, or not destroying those that exist, should have a very prominent place in the planning.

ROGERS: Clark, I'm going to have to leave.

GRUENING: Okay. Russ wanted to ask Dr. Rogers one question before he left.

MEEKINS: My question is if we are assuming that Alaska, Inc. proposal finally won out and that we were distributing a thousand or two thousand dollars a year to the share holders of Alaska, Inc. proposal, my question is what do you think about

the possibility of the feeding inflation and then that increase in income would just drive up prices and thereby the real income would stay the same.

ROGERS: This is one of the things when you ask an economist that question, you get all sorts of answers. We have first of all, put this into a total context. The distribution of income to Alaska--we have to have the total model of the economy we could relate that to--what would be driven up? It would mean that more money would be spent in Alaska possibly. Whether or not this creates inflation, I can't tell you off-hand because my experience with Alaska has been when more money was spent in Alaska, prices tend to go down because the scale of the market's increased and a lot of offsetting things came into effect. I can't give you an answer off the top of my head. We'd have to relate it to what is going to be going on. But, we would have to consider those things when we're talking about the effect on the economy. I'm going to have to catch a plane so I'll have to make this short.

One point, I just wanted to repeat what John said and what Professor Gordon mentioned. We've got to separate in our thinking the Permanent Fund, the management of the fund

itself, the investments of the money in the fund to create income--separate that from doing good providing loans and providing subsidies. If we do that, it's true we can do it, we can manage it. It puts upon the management of the fund an impossible task of accountability. If it's just a simple matter of preserving the capital, maximizing the income from that, then the annual income would be available for doing all sorts of things. We could throw it out the window; we could build a power plant; we could do a lot of things on an annual basis. That should be left flexible, because what we perceive is our needs are going to change. What Alaskans want will be changing. The whole scene will be changing. But, the management of the fund, as a financial entity, should be subject to straight forward attempt to get the most prudent management possible as a financial transaction. Don't clutter it up with a lot of other ends, no matter how valuable these might be. That's my final point.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dr. Rogers. I know you had a busy schedule. There'll probably be some disagreement with that closing statement. But you can escape.

ROGERS: I'm sure. I'll escape on that one.

GRUENING: Mr. Paul Fuchs, I think had a statement or question.

FUCHS: I'm a laborer and I'm a part time student out here at the University. What I want to say speaks to the philosophy of the fund. I think that we have to get away from looking at it as some way to maximize profit. We have to see how the fund can be used to help stabilize the Alaskan economy. The tool that's usually used by economists in looking at this, I haven't heard much about it, looking at the multiplier effects of different kinds of industries and what kind of re-circulation we get--money spent in certain ways. I think the Department of Economic Development comes out with those figures. They show some industries, like tourism, to be one point something. In other words, that money turns around and goes straight back out.

What I'm talking about the Permanent Fund being used for is to fund projects, let's say, we look not just at housing, but look more at a total system. Let's look at providing development funds. Going in with a native regional corporation to develop a sawmill in southeast Alaska.

(portion not taped)...where people could be sold these houses, giving the savings out along the line. Where now we have all these sponges called businessmen, which are raising capital along the line. I think we need to look at the needs of Alaskans and not at the needs of these companies.

They don't care about our people, only as much as they can make off us. Not just the small industries either. I think we ought to look at some of the large industries, as has been said, so we can control the rate of development more so we don't end up not only with a high unemployment rate because so many workers have flooded in, but we have such high population influx completely tears our cities apart. Where crime is just you know. Anchorage is not anything like it used to be. That's a reflection of that. That's a social cost that means something to Alaskans.

Another thing, I'd say is that you can't trust the current banking structure to manage these loans and just turn the money over to them, because what they've done is they have not used it in rural Alaska which needs the money more. Sure the bankers in Anchorage are rich. But when you go to the villages, any of them, even the ones that are better off, I think the living conditions that people just wouldn't believe, if they actually saw it. I think we can't leave it to them. If they manage it, to make the most money or if the Permanent Fund is managed to make the most money, the money is not going to be put into projects where it's needed most--like fishing cooperatives and things like that.

The other point I want to make is that, I think some of the forms of economic organization that we have seen here lately, like the development of some cooperative, is an important concept for

the Permanent Fund to look into, especially in the native villages, where it more lends itself to the cooperative culture that is already among the native people and also among non-natives. I think it's an important concept that we start, just people work at a place; they elect their management; and they decide on the work process, rather than having it shoved down their throats. People who are working on the line live with this every day. I think if you could look towards that, nearly the whole social picture of what it means to live in Alaska, I think, perhaps, the Permanent Fund could be used towards this end.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Fuchs. Could you stay for a few questions. Mr. Doogan.

DOOGAN: It's not so much a question. I just would like to again restate my comment that I made after Tim McGinnis finished. We have a tendency to talk about Alaskans as though they were one thing. Let's put it like this. Bankers who live in Alaska, no matter how greedy or conspiratorial they might be, are also Alaskans. The appeal is not an appeal that you can deal with unless you can define Alaskans not to include conspiratorial bankers. Do you see the point? Granted everybody wants to make Alaska a better place

to live for Alaskans. The question is how do we do that?

FUCHS: I guess I'm talking about if you have to set up a non-profit banking service of the Permanent Fund. Why should we guarantee their profits? What are they doing besides shuffling the paper and doing the accounting? And sitting between us and our money?

DOOGAN: So you'd be prepared to trade that off against the benefit to bankers and stockholders of banks in Alaska?

FUCHS: I'd say so, yes.

DOOGAN: The existing financial structure?

FUCHS: At least to have some alternative to that, which there is not at this point.

RHODE: Do you believe that the kind of purposes you talked about, a non-profit cooperative fisheries, canneries, related small scale business---do you think there's \$8 billion worth of such ventures? And secondly, how are you to get into those ventures without attracting new people, crime, all the other things?

FUCHS: That's a problem that's a little bit bigger issue in terms of more people coming in. I was just reading in a Manpower report that there's more unemployed workers in Detroit than we have in our total work force. That's the kind of magnitude in a lot of the economic problems down in the United States that are forcing people up here into an area that's expanding. I don't know how to deal with that but I think any kind of immigration controls are unconstitutional. I agree with what the woman said here, I can't remember your name, about having two classes of citizens. I would never believe in anything like that. Yet somehow we have to protect ourselves.

BERGMAN: The only way you can protect yourself from new people coming is by being poor and unattractive.

FUCHS: Okay. Well that's a political question we have to face. In terms of our relationship with the United States, but I think that's beyond the scope of this. Another thing about the \$8 billion, there probably would not be that much of a need for that much money. But we could look towards oil development. Even if, in the beginning, going a little slow, even if we are a little more inefficient, we'd have to be really inefficient to not be able to make money. If the oil companies are going to make \$98½ billion out of Prudhoe Bay field, if we even recovered half of that by developing these resources ourselves, we'd be far ahead.

One other thing I wanted to mention, I think, just in terms of having control of our resources, that we could look more towards our oil resource, I think it's wrong to turn it over to an oil company, that's going to turn it into gasoline to drive the third Cadillac to the country club for some guy down in Arizona. I think, since we know petrochemicals are such important industries that people need, we should look more towards putting our resources like into agricultural inputs in countries where they have machinery standing idle because they can't get petroleum. Yet they have people starving in our country. I think, if no one else will look at that, then maybe we Alaskans ought to be looking towards that also.

GORDON: I would like to question the figure about the 98 and wonder where it comes from.

FUCHS: It comes from Wainwright Security Industries. It was a report made to the legislature.

GORDON: Let me say this year all the corporations in the United States, all over the world, in oil and everywhere else, and mostly outside of Alaska are going to make about that much after tax profits. That's all.

FUCHS: That's before taxes.

GORDON: Are you talking about long term future or are you talking about any one year?

FUCHS: That's over the 20 years. Life of the field. The other thing is what you're talking about--the figure you're talking about profits also doesn't include all the advertising and the high rates--hundreds of thousands of dollars paid to managers.

GORDON: It is also true that if you take all the high paid managers and reduce them to zero, it would not affect that figure by any significant amount. In fact, it isn't even true the owners of corporations take out anything like that. What they really take out is the dividend. The dividends are only around a third of that--about \$35 billion currently. About a third of those dividends in turn, go to work in pension plans. So the notion that there's a huge pot of gold there that you can get a hold of just isn't true.

LOVE: That may be true in all industries. But wouldn't you agree that in, for example the Prudhoe Bay development that it's more capital intensive than maybe certain other types of industries in terms of pension plans?

GORDON: Well, I'm not talking about returning to capital. Returning to capital includes the interest of course, as well as corporate earnings. I'm just talking about specific corporations. The corporation doesn't make the money they pay out in interest; they make the corporate earnings. However, there's a widespread misapprehension about the nature of corporate earnings and particularly how big they are.

LOVE: There's also, I think, a wide misapprehension, in this case, about the concept of how profitable Prudhoe Bay is. I think that it's unwise to compare the development of Prudhoe Bay to industry in general, or even the oil industry in general. Because it's a fairly special and unusual situation. I'm sure you know it's got more proven reserves in the entire, everything in Canada and about 30% of the nation. So it's a very unusual field. It's an unusually profitable venture that Mr. Fuchs is talking about. I don't think it avails itself to really simple comparison to standard industry practice.

FUCHS: Just even a small cut of how much they're going to make is what all this money is in the Permanent Fund. There's supposedly so much we don't even know what to do with it. That's just a fraction of it. It's a low test. Depending on how other nations act to it.

GORDON: I don't know what you mean. Do you mean that Alaska should attempt to expropriate that money? That hypothetical \$98 billion before taxes.

FUCHS: I don't think there's anything wrong with that. It's our resource.

GORDON: I don't know legally whether it's your resource or not. Do you mean morally it's your resource.

FUCHS: Well, let's say if they're going to make \$98½ billion, why.....

GORDON: You're not making \$98½ billion; that's just nonsense. You don't make \$98½ billion if that's gross. The question is the period over which they make it. But if you're going to do that, why don't you expropriate all the corporations. What's so peculiar about those corporations that they should be expropriated rather than all the other corporations?

HAVELOCK: Mr. Chairman, is there any rule of germaneness to this discussion?

GRUENING: Well, I was hoping that it would kind of peter out. See what you started, Paul? I think that we should talk a break. Rep. Carpenter has indicated that I was amiss in the beginning, and I won't do it again. This gentleman in the back wanted to speak. Would you like to do it now or after the break?

DI NARDO: I'd like to make a few points. I'm Dan Ni Nardo. I've made a few notes here. One is management of the fund, what to do with the money. When you do invest it, we're worrying about the profit sharing that might take place by the managers, the social cause, how you measure effectiveness, etc.

My suggestion is an alternative of doing away with the Permanent Fund. It's very much important for this reason; there was a doctrine signed, the Constitution of the United States of America, that laid the ground work for a system called free enterprise. Free enterprise means that every individual in this room, in this state, you answer the question as to whether social needs get the best allocation. This is up to the individual people to decide. They do not need another government agency to decide for them. This has been the cause of the present problem that you're talking about in the state of Alaska.

Free enterprise across the board, and I'll tell you buddy, on a historical basis, on economic basis, free enterprise is the most efficient system ever invented by man to allocate that resource called money to where it should go. (inaudible).....That's why I'm opposed to the Permanent Fund. (inaudible)

DOOGAN: I had a comment before the break. It seems to me that with the last few speakers we've more or less set possible boundaries in this discussion. Maybe when we come back, we can confine ourselves within those boundaries.

GRUENING: Five minutes. Thank you.

BREAK

CLIFF BLACK: My main question seems to state who really is going to administer the fund? It boils down to a very deep philosophical question. If we are going to allow the legislature in Juneau to dictate what happens in Alaska to funds like these which provide an unusual and great opportunity for Alaskans to somehow effect local decision-making, local

regional planning efforts, to me this strikes a very great disservice and injustice to areas of Alaska that have been left out over many, many decades. I was going to get into a number of other points, but I would probably just say that probably to me, it has to be re-addressed more than anything else.

I was going to get into things like how does that again measure the effectiveness of the utilization, the regionalization of utilization of the fund? Well, certainly it would more enhance the possibilities for decision-making, the possibilities for effectiveness measurement, the development of innovative and creative ideas as to how utilize rural areas of Alaska. I happen to be from Deering, Alaska, which is up by the Arctic Circle; and I certainly recognize there are resources in that area, renewable and non-renewable, that have not been tapped, that could be tapped, that certainly will be tapped--either through good, sound planning or through a process forced upon the regional corporations that are there now because of their non-involvement in a windfall fund like this.

What I'm saying is the state of Alaska certainly has an opportunity to guard its environment, to guard its integrity in all areas: streams, its wildlife, fish, to guard also culture that is fast disappearing. These are assets that

cannot be regained, cannot in any manner be brought back. What I'm hoping is that we will look at this fund in a different sense than we look at just another dollar or two in our pocket. What I'm hoping is that we can, in some manner, incorporate all of Alaska into this planning and utilization of these dollars. I think the regionalization of planning efforts certainly bring about a more in-depth review of what is there and has ever been done before. It will not only identify the resources that are there, renewable and non-renewable, but also the resources in human kind.

Too many times, asininely I have to say, we assume so much. Assume that we have no resources of the human kind out there. We assume that they are having yet language problems, problems of identifying with the different cultures, problems of getting to work on time, well you hear that from biased, judgemental, prejudiced and sometimes bigoted individuals. You'll hear that whether or not the rest of Alaska catches up and even surpasses the majority of society. You'll hear that from the natives as well as the non-natives. You'll hear that from the blacks as well as the Hispanics. You'll hear that from everyone when they have a problem of identification and a problem of realization that we are one. You'll hear that all the time.

What I'm saying is that this is an opportunity to do

away with a lot of those problems. This is an opportunity to incorporate planning endeavors and planning opportunities for other groups that are not now in the planning that's going on, who have not been asked to participate; yet have 40 plus million acres that they're going to have to incorporate to your system, their own system, simply because they're citizens of the state, citizens of the country. How are you going to say to them that you don't have to pull out your oil, you don't have to pull out your gas now, when they know they do have to now. Because the society is forcing upon them their own rules of the game, forcing them to become involved in the 20th century capitalist system overnight, which is the system I believe in, by the way, even though I feel that cooperatives certainly will, most likely, work best in rural Alaska for many years, because the communal system inbred into our people to do away with it very quickly for a capitalist system.

I guess what I'm trying to say is that I don't see how we can plan for the fund utilization until we have identified more clearly and more fluently who, in actuality, is going to administer the fund; because if you identify the areas by regions of the state of Alaska, and I view Alaska as six states not one, six areas of Alaska that are somewhat separate from each other. If you do identify those areas for planning purposes, you will identify how the fund will be utilized.

You have no real commonality between Southeastern Alaska and Northwest Alaska. One is fishing and timber industry base area and the other is a subsistence area. The two are not in any manner similar. The only similarity might be in the fact that some communal systems still work in both parts of Alaska. If we then recognize that there are different parts of Alaska that need to be taken into consideration in our planning endeavors and in the utilization of this fund, we then certainly must recognize that the administration and the utilization of the dollars and the actual expenditures and how they are best put to work for Alaskans, how they will best incorporate more equity into our lifestyle and how they will better do away with the inequities that cause prejudices and fears and the misinformation and the wasteland that sometimes we don't even like to think of and the fact that we do many times disallow each other a good lifestyle simply because we are different.

I think that we need to re-evaluate what we're doing with these dollars. We need to re-evaluate in the sense that we need to take into consideration that we can't, as one group of people sitting in Juneau, dictate for all of Alaska a system that will be compatible to all of Alaska. Simply because there has never been a time when anyone has really looked at my part of Alaska, for instance, and never really

been a time when anyone has looked at other parts of Alaska. It's an opportune time. It's an opportune time to make a pact with the national government on D2 lands. We should not actually determine what the D2 lands are going to be until Alaska has had the opportunity to utilize some of its new-gained wealth to evaluate our state, to thoroughly recognize what's under the ground before we determine what it should be called on top. I think that's something we should look at--some of the things that we need to fairly evaluate. A gentleman made the comment that the educated are moving into Alaska. I hope they're not coming from places like New York and places where it has been shown that their system has failed miserably.

BERGMAN: Let's not have any bigotry here.

BLACK: This is not a racial statement whatsoever. I'm hoping that what we have in Alaska is a start of a new planning effort that can incorporate more Alaskans on a regional basis. I hope that you gentlemen don't take this as a personal thing that I don't believe that the legislature should be by itself in handling these dollars. I think that the legislature has great wisdom, but I do believe the people out there can plan and have some policy control over these dollars. I would certainly agree that they should be involved in the final determination.

GRUENING: Thank you, Cliff. Can you stay for questions? Is there a question of Mr. Black? Representative Meekins.

MEEKINS: Cliff, I am wondering what you think about where would the greater benefit be, I suppose this is contained in your comments, but I wanted to ask you directly, if you think there would be greater benefit in an Alaska, Inc. type proposal where the income from the fund is directly distributed to people in the rural areas, for instance, or if you think a development bank concept with planning agencies and regionalized, as you have talked about, would be preferable.

BLACK: I haven't really made up my mind seriously on Alaska, Inc. Whether or not I could go beyond the distribution of funds beyond the retirement level so that Alaskans who have lived here all their lives don't have to leave the state to retire. I think that's a tragedy. They have lived here all their lives, then they retire, then are forced by economics to leave our state, simply because we lose their expertise, we lose their knowledge in vast areas that cannot be gained overnight. Only

those people who have lived here for many, many years understand Alaska. We are losing them very rapidly. I would say that the majority of dollars be put into, not the majority of dollars because I cannot even comprehend that kind of money, but a good amount should be put into the development of really significant homes for the aged, take care of them and keep them in the state so we can utilize their expertise. Beyond that, I have still to make up my mind. I would certainly have made up my mind further had I been more comfortable with who would be administering the fund in the long haul.

GRUENING: Senator Rodey.

RODEY: Cliff, could I ask you another question in regard to administration? I'm as concerned as you are. Do you favor a method of electing members to the Permanent Fund board or an appointed mechanism such as has been embodied in the governor's bill?

BLACK: Well, elected representation is always good if it is on a regional level. If you put it into a state level, a good portion of Alaska is left out of any major decision-making possibility. I view the Permanent Fund in the sense that it's

an opportunity for a full type of revenue sharing that would incorporate the different costs in Alaska. For instance, if you buy a dozen eggs in Barrow right now, it'll cost you \$2.00 or more. The cost of service, the cost of product, the cost of anything that happens in Barrow is tremendously different from the cost in Anchorage.

What I'm saying is simply that if there's a revenue sharing device used for the distribution of these dollars, it incorporates very clearly the different cost of living differentials and it is distributed in that sense, then I could see a regionalization utilization based on election processes and very well could even see it go beyond that to dictate that a particular community would be represented and a person from each community could be represented on the regionalized board. So that way you wouldn't have to have any communities left out in the process.

RODEY: Your main concern is to ensure that some of the areas of Alaska which have a smaller population are represented on whatever Permanent Fund administrative body is finally formed. Is that what you mean?

BLACK: I guess my concern is--I'll go back to comments about the federal system in Alaska, the paternalism system

that has for many, many years placed it's hand on our head and said, "we will do it this way," and have never reached the point where they've done anything that we've wanted them to. They've always gone and done things as they've wanted to do them.

What I'm saying is that in this case I would like to see, since we're all citizens of the same state, since we are all part of the same state, that there be some manner where all Alaskans will determine the direction and utilization of these funds.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Black. Are there questions from the audience? We have panelist here; we want to keep them on their toes. If you have some questions. Representative Chatterton.

CHATTERTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me alright? Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on getting this group together, I can assure you it has been stimulating and very thought provoking. I hope you'll keep up the good work because the total picture can only be seen once all the various, however conflicting they might be, parts of the picture come before you. Keep up the good work.

GRUENING: Thank you, Chat. I didn't ask for that plug.

CHATTERTON: I really have two questions for

the panel, that developed this morning, but I can't help feel a little bit facetious. There was a person who testified here a little earlier this afternoon and made a suggestion as to how to use some of the Permanent Fund funds. I felt I should provide you also with a corollary suggestion for their use. Instead of buying all the federal lands that are put up for oil and gas leases or along with that, I suggest that we buy the national interest land and thereby immediately solving the D2 question.

Mr. Chairman, through you I would like to ask the panelists or anyone that would care to comment--we did hear earlier comments about: 1. loaning money; 2. investing money. It was even suggested earlier--there was some comment about investing in a pipeline or a petrochemical plant--state funds. My question to the panel and to the economists--if they have any background on this, would they care to comment--does the potential for a conflict of interests develop when a taxing entity becomes a participant in the profitability of a taxable entity?

My next question is--is there a degree of parallelism, at least in some facets, between what is before you, Mr. Chairman, with this Permanent Fund and what had to be before the U. S. Congress some years ago when they were faced

with seeing that each and every native Alaskan got a fair share out of the Alaska Native Settlement Act? Is there a parallelism? That's my second question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GRUENING: I'll leave that up to the panelists, the economists, anyone who wants to speak up.

GORDON: I am really no expert on the problems of taxable entities. The notion that some of the investment proposals put forth recently here remind me very much of where I now live. I happen to have moved to Canada in the last few months. In Canada, there are truly an astounding number--they talk about free enterprise like everybody--there's just an astounding number of what they call their Crown Corporation, Federal Crown Corporations, and Provincial Corporations.

Now when you say is there a conflict of interests, they attempt, at least, by this device called a Crown Corporation, to make the Crown Corporation totally operate like an individual enterprise, despite the fact that the state or the province or the nation owns all the shares--sometimes not all the shares, most of the shares. I think if you survey the record of those Crown Corporations, that it is dismal. They have a Crown Corporation selling what Westinghouse sells--

atomic reactors. They got involved in a little bribery, but the most significant thing is they managed to sell two of their atomic reactors to Argentina at a loss of \$130 million.

The Province of Alberta has something called Alberta Heritage Fund. They're visably in the business of setting up businesses that otherwise wouldn't be there--irrigation facilities, food packing plants, huge petrochemical operations. The other thing they're doing is providing more services than otherwise would be the case and lower taxes. They're the lowest tax province in Canada by some piece. The result is that an enormous number of people are leaving the rest of the country and going there. The wages are lower there than they are where I happen to live in British Columbia, but people are moving there--that's where the jobs are. Rents are going up. Land is getting scarce. I see very little merit, what apart from the conflict of interest problem.

GRUENING: Is there any comment on the second half of the question, which was--was there any parallel between the Native Land Claims and what we might be trying to do with the Permanent Fund? Mr. Love.

LOVE: Well, it is my understanding that in British Columbia, under the New Democratic Party, there's a lot of acquisitions in terms of the Crown Corporations. As a result, partially because of their policy for rapid acquisitions, there's a problem with the insurance industry that the New Democratic Party was defeated and replaced by the conservative government of Mr. Bennett. It's also my understanding that Mr. Bennett's conservative government has not divested themselves of any of the acquisitions made by the NDP and that most of them, in fact, are now on the whole profitable. Is that in accurate summation? Just as a parallel to the experience the Federal Crown Corporation as looking to British Columbia where you teach.

GORDON: No, not entirely. You see, to describe the present government as conservative is, I think, quite incorrect. We have two kinds of parties in British Columbia. One is socialist and the other is more socialist. It is not true that those have become profitable. It's not true--they've all been losers. In fact, if you investigate in the theories of finance they teach in business schools, it is extremely difficult to lose money consistently by investing. The NDP did not succeed in doing so. But more serious, some of their acquisitions, a distressing number of their acquisitions, have lost money.

They perhaps could have been defended on the grounds that they had some social purpose. There's a great dispute about what the social purpose was and whether it helped anybody significantly.

I'd say in Canada, there's all kinds of conservative government of another province in far east. New Brunswick. They bought all kinds of things, setting up another conservative government. They got into an endless stream of business--nearly all of which went bankrupt. The one advantage, incidentally, of the Crown Corporation is it isn't like many of the corporations into which the British government bails people out. When they set up a corporation, it is like a private corporation. When it goes bankrupt, it's bankrupt. So it doesn't continue forever. It's just draining off the public purse. That is a legal device which, I think, is of some usefulness.

I think there's a great parallel; it's a little hard to classify political opinion. It seems to be so simple that a liberal, radical person interested in the poor and egalitarianism should be for one thing. And that is give the money to everybody, if they could, and they can't. Okay. Invest it as good income as possible, and give that good income to the people. That would do more for the world

of Alaskans. It would be an immediately equalizing phenomenon. I cannot think of one thing that has been proposed here that is going to do nearly as much for the poor in Alaska as that kind of proposal.

LOVE: Which you stated on several occasions.

GRUENING: I think we've got the different philosophy pretty well outlined here. Is there any comment on the second half of that questions? Or another question from the audience?

HAVELOCK: I think the answer to Mr. Chatterton's second question is yes.

GRUENING: Okay. That's the kind of answer I like. Mr. Dave Hickok, did you have a comment?

HICKOK: I agree with John. I think the answer is very definitely yes.

GRUENING: I believe this gentlemen in the red shirt wanted to ask a question. Could you identify yourself please.

WICKS: No specifically a question or even an answer. My

name is Alan Wicks. I'm a recently retired teacher, in the Anchorage School District for the past 20 years. I came to Alaska initially in 1940, working for the Territorial Department of Health. At that time, I supported our Chairman's grandfather, Governor Gruening of the Territory of Alaska, in his efforts to roll back an unseemly rate increase by Alaska Steamship Company and have been more or less a Gruening supporter ever since.

One thing that is lacking in all of this commentary and discussion as to profits investment management--there's one thing lacking, because it seems as if everybody is making an effort to play God for everybody else. While we like our benefits and we like our dividends, and I like them as well as anybody else and have been lucky, and like the Wall Street Journal has said "nothing succeeds like dumb luck." A little bit of that can go a long way if you're on the lucky end. I want to put a diagram on that board. As a teacher, I just can't resist the opportunity. Then I'm going to come back and make a couple of comments about it and then a question at the end.

GRUENING: Okay. It's getting a little late. We want to keep everyone interested.

WICKS: I didn't need the eraser. I didn't want to wipe off the rest of that. There again, somebody made allusions and maybe I'm, well no, I'm not, just reiterating what a couple other people said. We've arrived at a place in international affairs. I'll flash back to pre-World War II and depression times. We've arrived now with technology and science and my background is basically biological science--we've arrived now at a place where humanity with it's science and technology doesn't really know where it's going. But I submit to you, and this is an independent, personal formulation, I won't give the blame to anybody else; but unless and until humanity arrives at a umbrella concept, and that's what that is, of first basic, foremost environmental, ecologic concern before the fund, before the investment of the fund, before the applications from the return from the fund. What I'm saying is that civiliziaton and humanity, at this juncture is up against it. If we don't learn or haven't learned what the aborigines, the native peoples, learned long ago, was to live and operate in concert with nature, with earth. Not as it's master, not as God who says, "I'll scrape it, I'll build it, I'll erect the edifices in my own way and to my own needs and beliefs and likes." Now I'm going to leave that idea, but I think it's the one that needs the most emphasis, first and before just about anything else.

I'd like to turn to the panel, and while I respect and admire Dr. Lindauer's views, he is a relatively new and accurate able observer of the Alaskan scene. I'd like to ask him how he discriminates on one hand between the need for application for funds to this or that industry or development, to get to a specific point, or the abhorrence of the use of the funds because they would be an economic magnet to people elsewhere to come to Alaska, but on the other hand, my, and I'm tickled to death I've got it, my 5¼% FHA, if it is made available to them, it's not going to just be a drove, a horde, who are attracted to the magnet of 4% or 5% or 7% Alaskan-style FHA. We're not going to be able to differentiate between those things in any way.

LINDAUER: That's really an excellent question.

One could easily say that you could do the same, for example, with Alaska, Inc. as using eligibility for loans for business. It could, in fact, be those people who are here now and could have such time variety for qualification or w0 years, and you pick the number in order to qualify. It wouldn't really qualify that they'd be eligible. What we'd assume the utility serving a native village would

be instantly qualified. We'd assume a long-term Alaskan would be instantly qualified. The question is where do you draw the line. That wouldn't seem to be that difficult.

BERGMAN: Let me ask a question about Alaska, Inc. Suppose you have two kids born the same day, and one of them is the child of a long term resident and the other is the child of someone who is not a long-term resident. Are you going to give one of them the Alaska, Inc. payment and not the other?

GRUENING: The governor isn't here to defend himself. The more you get into the Alaska, Inc., the more difficult it is to exactly define who an Alaskan is or who is the beneficiary. It doesn't mean it's impossible. But obviously if it's going to be a meaningful program, you've got to draw the line somewhere.

BERGMAN: I understand that you might be able to draw it with adults, but I think if what you're trying to do is enfranchise only those who are here now and their descendants, you've got a tough row to hoe. I don't think you can do that.

GRUENING: Alaska, Inc. does have a residency. The child isn't really eligible until it's been here a certain number of years.

LINDAUER: What would, for example, require 18 year residency, at least, so an 18 year old can enter into contract. So whatever is the legal age for entering contracts, that means every child will be eligible if they've lived here long enough. As would be anybody who arrived.

HAVELOCK: It's not going to stand up constitutionally though.

GRUENING: I know that's being studied. I'm sure there's some way you can find a way, but we're not here to discuss that. Somebody who hasn't made a comment yet. Mr. Hickok, would you like to follow up?

HICKOK: I'd like to say a couple things that tie in on this subject. My name is Dave Hickok. I'm the director of the Arctic Environmental Information and Data Center at the University of Alaska, currently the president of the Alaska Division in the American Association for the Advancement of Science. I think there's two or three items that seem to me have not been covered.

One of the things the economists appears to have said is that the need on the curves is a function of economics

alone. I'd like to say that I don't think it is. I'd like to give a few examples of what's happened to history in Alaska. One of the needs trends that has determined what has happened in Bush Alaska has been, for example, many years ago, in the Arctic latitudes here, we did a lot of research on ionospheric scatter and so on. We were able then to develop satellite communication systems for these latitudes which was not a possibility under existing technology of lower latitudes. Now what has happened here is because communication was available to Bush Alaska, technologically, and because there was a political decision made by very, very few people for the sale of the Alaska communications system about 1970, the whole need trend for communication and development for this kind of thing in rural Alaska changed. Not by virtue of economics, but by virtue of technology and science and by virtue of political decision.

There also have been a number of other of these kinds of things. In the health field, two doctors made the breakthrough in tuberculosis following World War II here in Alaska. The highest incident rate in the world in the early 1950's of birth rate and death rate in rural Alaska---beat the Kalahari Desert in Africa and everywhere else--were brought down by science and technology. The application of money, in that sense, of the political decision to stamp out disease.

These things make aspirations. These things make needs that are not just driven by the common market place. I would suggest, in addition to the economics of capital investment and so on, there are at least three or four other items that are driving the need co-efficient and that is law and politics, which I put in despite Mr. Havelock's qualms, hand in glove, science and technology and perhaps a population expansion. These things are making change in Alaska. The need curve is escalating at a tremendous rate despite what happens in economics.

The aspirations of the Bush communities, where there are hundreds of them, have no water, no sewer, no schools. These aspirations are real. They are going to drive a demand for public expenditure funds to satisfy these problems. I would certainly agree with John Havelock that the Statehood Act called for the expenditure of tax revenues and so forth to support a burgeoning new state. I would also suggest to you that the Alaska Native Land Claims Act also had the same effect. The one thing that Alaska has not recognized, or several things it hasn't recognized, but one thing it hasn't recognized is that rural Alaska should not pay the price for the public services that everyone else in Alaska enjoys in the urban settings. Through their compensation dollars that came under the Native Land Claims Act, they are entitled to the

same public services as anyone else. I guess that's about enough.

GRUENING: Thank you, Dave. Would you mind remaining for a minute in case the economists or the legal field would like to responds.

BERGMAN: I'm the one that introduced the word and when you started talking, I instantly regretted it. Then I recall that I had put quotes around it. I actually agree with you that there is no such thing as absolute need. You can't take a certain desire and say this particular desire is a need and this particular desire is not a need. What I'm trying to point out here, though, is that if the population were to grow, just to maintain a certain level of services would require a growing trend of revenues, which is an entirely different point.

HICKOK: I think you're right. But regardless of that, the need curve, the demand curve, perhaps, of social aspiration, human aspiration, is escalating at a tremendous rate, regardless of the economics of the state. Because of broader expansion in health, in education, in other factors.

BERGMAN: Well, I think what you're saying is what some other

people have said--that perhaps it would be more reasonable to use the oil revenues for this kind of purpose. Use them all for this kind of purpose--setting up schools, setting up water supplies, setting up electrification plants, instead of either sending it to these much maligned New York brokers to be kept for future generations or perhaps for giving concessional loans to people of Anchorage. That, I think, is a matter of simply social policy. You've got to fight it out. That's not a matter of economics. That's a matter of what you can get the people of the state to spend their income on. I feel that the Supreme Court had said schooling had to be provided throughout the state in a more or less equal way. There's a famous California case on that.

HICKOK: Well, we had one here in Alaska too.

BERGMAN: So I don't quite understand the fact that it hasn't been done already.

MEEKINS: Doctor, are you saying that expectations or needs, whatever you want to call it, are not related to the economics?

HICKOK: I think they're related, but I think there are a number of external forces that make new aspirations.

Prior to the research on ionospheric scatter and so on, that made possible high altitude communication systems, there were no aspirations for it because nobody knew it could be done. There are a lot of these kinds of sayings. Before you could put a sanitation system in Arctic permafrost, you have to know how to do it. Then by virtue of it being able to be accomplished, there's aspiration for it.

MEEKINS: I think that's the common denominator between the two. Because when you have money, it's, therefore, possible to build things, it's, therefore, possible that weren't before. It's the possibilities that seem to feed the needs.

HICKOK: No, the possibility may fuel the need, but not necessarily money. In the case, for example, of the communication situation here in Alaska that wasn't a function of money.

MEEKINS: I'm not limiting it to money.

HICKOK: It's research of science and technology and a political decision to sell the Alaskan communication system away from the military and to put it into modern science.

MEEKINS: Just to clarify--I'm not limiting it to money.

I'm saying that things being possible is the common denominator between technology and economics in your scenario, because even if the technology made it possible to have telecommunications, if we didn't have the money, even if we had the political will, we wouldn't have it.

HICKOK: Then, I would to back to Tussing's scenario. I think what Tussing is saying is that the private sector, the private demand for these things is running, and we have a large sector of private money, by virtue of Native Land Claims and the growth of the Alaskan economy.

GRUENING: Thank you, Mr. Hickok. Okay, in the waning hours, are there any more questions? Sure, you're welcome to ask again, if there's anybody who hasn't had a chance to ask...

FISKE: I'm Lieutenant Colonel Fiske--Retired. I'd like to say first that I strongly support Dr. Lindauer's position on adequate investment of Permanent Fund in Alaska and for the lowerest, reasonable interest rates, and where present Alaskans can enjoy the benefits of employment, social amenities, health services, recreation, etc., etc., and etc.

I'm interested in providing something to occupy the leisure time of the many small communities, particularly during long

winter hours. Something that involves all ages, both sexes, from youth to octogenarian. Most of our rural communities have churches, bars, but many have little else to occupy the people when they're not busy at making a living or subsisting. It seems to me that an excellent way to use some of the earnings and possibly some of the Permanent Fund would be to develop a program to provide indoor recreation facilities--I'm referring to curling, skating, and I'd like to draw a comparison with what the Canadian government has done. Many, many of their small communities have been funded to build curling, skating facilities, which also provide a place for the community to assemble for all kinds of things. I believe that if the Permanent Fund and the native regional corporations get together, many of these small communities could be provided with something that would knit the communities together. Their needs, then, would be brought forth as a community requirement. I think, it would do much to knit the communities together throughout the state of Alaska. I would suggest that all of the other comments today have been primarily on what to do with the fund. I submit that this is just one idea that might be considered in providing for Alaskans who can enjoy it through all ages. Thank you.

GRUENING: Thank you. In bringing this to a close, I want to ask the audience once again if there's any questions they'd like to ask the panel?

HAVELOCK: I'd like to make a comment on that last statement. I think that if the Permanent Fund committee does adopt some sort of internal investment policy as part of the Permanent Fund, you should be careful at the same time to keep a count of the public costs that are going to be associated with that private investment. Perhaps, Dr. Gordon could comment on what kind of ratios those are. It's clear you're going to be giving money for loans for small business, that you are going to kick off at the same time a lot of pressure for public amenities to go with that. If you haven't taken proper account of that, you're going to create substantial social unrest.

GORDON: I can't really answer that. I would be very surprised, however, if you could make some generalization about that. If you subsidize investment on the private sector, it might entail a considerable amount of public spending outside of that. In other cases, perhaps a very much smaller amount. I think you'd have to investigate each on a case by case basis.

GRUENING: Mr. McCutcheon, you were going to ask the last question.

MCCUTCHEON: It will probably turn out to be a rhetorical question. There are several things here I'd like to state. Professor Gordon, you challenged Paul Fuchs's estimation of the greater return on investment of Prudhoe Bay. I don't necessarily share Mr. Fuchs's view of what should be done. I thought that you might possibly give us some idea of your estimation of the greater return on Prudhoe Bay, and maybe you could start with by getting to the size of the reservoir, the amount of recovery under current production practices, the amount left in the ground, the amount of additional recovery through secondary treatment, what will be the value of oil, price of oil on the West Coast, what will be the value of oil delivered at the West Coast, what is the value of the investment that's going to be happening? What are the profits contributable to tax relief, tax loopholes?

GRUENING: May I just interject here? These are very interesting questions. I think they, at least have some relevance to the Permanent Fund...

GORDON: I'd like to answer that. In the first place, nobody can rate that question. Anybody who thinks they can tell you the price of oil ten years hence, as has been suggested around here, is engaged in witchcraft. Let me explain one other thing. What I wanted to do was find out how this Prudhoe Bay figure came

out \$98 billion, and I happen to know that's the sum total of all American corporations from ma and pa ones up to Exxon--all over the whole world in any one year, after taxes.

RODEY: On behalf of the Senate Permanent Fund Committee and the chairman, Senator Hohman, I'd like to thank the House for putting this symposium on. This is the first in a series of meetings that the Senate and the House will be participating in. The House effort is more visible here in Anchorage because Chairman Gruening has done a very good job of getting the committee's work planned and accomplished. The Senate Committee's work is being done primarily in Juneau at this point; and we are trying to work in conjunction with the House to provide as much possible information on the Permanent Fund as we can before our January deadline of drawing up legislation. If there are questions or concerns, I know either the House or the Senate would be happy to address them.