

ALASKA LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMMITTEE / SUBJECT FILES 8672

122 SCOMM 9: HOUSE SPEC. COMM. ON PERMANENT FUND 1977-78

and loan demand at the local level. See Table I, "Notes Payable," for the level of debt outstanding in recent years.

Income - B.C. Central derives between 80 and 85% of its income from interest payments on loans and returns on investments in securities. The split between loan interest and investment income varies from year to year, depending on loan demand from members. Other sources of income are service charges, fees for services to members and membership dues. Gross income has grown from \$4.9 million in 1971 to \$27.2 million in 1975.

### III. USES OF FUNDS/INVESTMENTS

Reserve Requirements - B.C. Central is required to maintain liquidity reserves in cash or short term assets equal to 20% of its deposits and commercial paper liabilities. In 1975, it held \$48.3 million in such assets; 23.5% of its deposits and market liabilities. See Table II.

Loans and Investments - B.C. Central's longer term uses of funds are concentrated in loans to members and investments in securities. The flow of loans to members varies from year to year, depending on demand. Interest rates are adjusted to B.C. Central's borrowing terms, and a spread of 1/2% is permitted by law.

B.C. Central invests primarily in high yield, short term notes of Canadian corporations. Other securities held include Canadian Governments, Canadian corporate bonds, bonds of co-operatives and shares in other credit unions and cooperatives.

Operating Expenses - All expenses involved in providing B.C. Central's many services--salaries, materials and rents--are paid out of B.C. Central's operating income. After-tax earnings, having subtracted financial and administrative expenses, came to \$2.29 million in 1975. Of this, \$1.87 million was distributed as dividends to members. (The current dividend on membership shares is 7%.) Retained earnings at the end of 1975 totaled slightly over \$3 million. See Table III for a complete breakdown of income and expenses. See Figure I for a schematic representation of the relationships described above.

#### IV. MANAGEMENT

The strategic management policies of B.C. Central are set by a 14-member Board of Directors elected by the member credit unions. Day-to-day management of the institution is handled by a managerial staff of 80 (total staff - 180) in three divisions: Administration and Finance, Services and Development.

Each division is headed by a manager and is further subdivided along functional lines.

#### V. ACCOUNTABILITY

B.C. Central is a privately owned institution and is subject to no special forms of government oversight or control. Its operations are inspected annually by the federal Superintendent of Insurance office. On the provincial level, Central's operations are monitored by the Department of Consumer Affairs to ensure that consumer and mortgage credit practices accord with department guidelines and provincial usury laws.

#### VI. EVALUATION

B.C. Central has performed its function of helping a system of small depository units operate effectively and grow in highly competitive and quickly changing local markets. The most remarkable feature of B.C. Central is that it invests primarily within the system from which it draws its funds. Of its \$173 million in loans and investments outstanding in 1975, 50% were directly in cooperatives and credit unions. Another 36% were held in very short term corporate notes for cash management purposes and could presumably be converted to cash should there be a sudden increase in membership loan demands. Thus,

virtually all credit union deposits remain within the system.

B.C. Central's importance as a promotional institution should also be noted. Competition for deposits demands timely and cost-efficient customer service as well as professional promotional activity and well-trained personnel. These are functions which all but the largest credit unions could not afford to undertake on their own.

#### VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes: B.C. Central, as noted in the July 11, 1977 report, is the best model of a cooperatively owned state central bank capable of providing deposit and lending services to those rural areas too small for full commercial banking services. It has the twin advantages of insuring local, cooperative ownerships sensitive to local needs on the one hand. On the other hand, it provides aggressive centralized capital and management services to ensure that each village receives the most sophisticated economic development assistance possible.

It is also important to note that British Columbia's economy, geography and demography is not unlike Alaska's.

Sources of Funds: B.C. Central's equity comes from the local member cooperative banks or credit unions. It is owned

and governed by local users. As noted in the July 11, 1977 report, the Permanent Fund could initially capitalize the state central bank, and then arrange to transfer ownership to the local cooperative banks. This could be along lines used to devolve ownership of the Farm Credit System from the Federal Government to local users. For a description of that procedure, see II.

#### Regionalization Models and Options in this Report

B.C. Central's debt is raised in international capital markets, based on its strong equity base and sound management. The Alaska Permanent Fund and its affiliated Alaska State Central Bank could do the same.

Uses of Funds: B.C. Central is a model of a strong central organization capable of raising international capital to support effective local economic development under effective local control.

Management: B.C. Central is governed by its local user institutions and attracts extremely able and aggressive central management.

Accountability: B.C. Central is fully accountable to its local member cooperative banks. The Alaska Permanent Fund could ensure that it is equally accountable to public purposes.

TABLE II  
Consolidated Balance Sheet  
1975

ASSETS

Cash and Demand Deposits	\$35,296,728
Short Term Deposits, due 1976-1979 (callable notice 1 - 15 days)	13,000,000
Investments	81,680,246
Loans	91,823,385
Mortgages Receivable	15,165,509
Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest	4,099,861
Land, Buildings and Equipment	2,224,522
	<hr/>
	<u>\$243,290,251</u>

LIABILITIES

Notes Payable and Deposit Balances	\$200,317,269
Accounts Payable, Accruals, and Outstanding Acceptances	6,495,372
Deferred Income Taxes	215,400
Provision for Dividends	1,875,595
Retained Earnings	3,086,610
Members' Shares	31,300,005
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	<u>\$243,290,251</u>

TABLE III  
Income and Expense Statement - 1975

INCOME	
Loan interest	\$ 7,745,411
Investment income	15,096,769
Service charges and sundry	1,340,040
Fees for services to members	2,643,521
Members dues	349,007
	<hr/>
	27,174,748
	<hr/>
DIRECT EXPENSES	
Interest on deposits	14,393,292
Interest on borrowings	4,123,399
Service charges and sundry	423,963
	<hr/>
	18,940,654
	<hr/>
INCOME LESS DIRECT EXPENSES	8,234,094
	<hr/>
ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES	5,803,650
	<hr/>
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES	2,430,444
Income taxes - deferred	131,609
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NET EARNINGS FOR THE YEAR	2,298,835
Retained earnings - beginning of year	2,659,631
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	4,958,466
Dividends	1,871,856
	<hr/>
RETAINED EARNINGS - END OF YEAR	\$ 3,086,610
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I. PURPOSES

The Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (German Cooperative's Bank or DG Bank) is the central reserve bank of the vast West German cooperative system. Founded as the Deutsche Genossenschaftskasse, a cooperatively-owned financial institution, shortly after World War II, it was reorganized as a corporation and renamed the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank in 1972.

DG Bank is the apex institution of a three-tiered system which holds 13% of all deposits in German financial institutions. The base of the system is composed of some 6,400 small banks and building societies which service the members of agricultural, industrial and trade cooperatives, as well as unaffiliated depositors. Ten regional cooperative banks provide liquidity management, auditing, check clearing and investment services to the base. DG Bank provides similar services to the regional banks. This system and DG Bank's place in it are described below.

Cooperatives in Germany

Structure of the Movement - After World War II, the German cooperative movement was organized into four sectors, each with its own credit system and network of regional and national unions.

The four sectors are agriculture, industry, consumers coops and non-profit housing finance societies.

By far the largest of these sectors is agriculture. In 1971, more than 1.8 million farmers were members of one or more of the 12,590 local societies. 1,650 marketing and supply cooperatives, 4,300 trade cooperatives and 12 centralized cooperatives with 1,500 branches or depots were engaged in the buying and selling of goods and achieved a total turnover of \$6.4 billion.\* In addition, there were in 1971, 4,780 specialized cooperatives with 29 affiliated regional federations. The agricultural credit coops take deposits from and finance the fixed and working capital requirements of their members.

The industrial and trade cooperatives perform similar functions, and are active primarily as central material purchasers for their members. They were serviced by 624 coop banks in 1971.

Consumer and non-profit housing coops (central purchasing agents for the residential construction industry) comprise a relatively small part of the system.

The breakdown of local financial institutions servicing these sectors in 1971 was as follows:

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\*All monetary figures in the text are given in dollars, converted from DM at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the figure was reported. This is done for ease of comprehension. Figures in Tables I and II are presented in DM, where a sense of proportion is more important than absolute totals.

Agriculture	5,680
Industry	668
Housing and Consumer	45
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Total	6,393


The system also includes 10 mortgage banks unaffiliated with cooperative societies.

Recent trends in total units and membership are illustrated in Figure I. Overall, the graphs show increasing membership and concentration, especially in the two most important sectors, agriculture and credit. Concentration has mostly been achieved through the merger of two units.


Despite these mergers at the local level, the cooperative system maintains the most extensive branching system of any sector of the German financial market, and its units are incredibly small. In 1971, there were 18,665 coop bank branches, compared to 14,506 for savings and 5,428 for commercial banks. In terms of aggregate balance sheet totals, the cooperatives are behind both the other sectors. The average balance sheet total for the banks serving industrial coops was \$23.3 million; for those servicing agricultural customers, only \$3.7 million.

These changes at the primary level have affected the structure and operations of the regional cooperative banks. Each merger of two local units tends to reduce deposits with the regional banks, because the compensatory movements of


FIGURE I  
Cooperatives and Their Membership in the  
Federal Republic of Germany



Primary Cooperatives - Total




Cooperative Banks




Trade and Service Cooperatives

FIGURE I (continued)



Consumer Cooperatives




Cooperative Building Societies

FIGURE II

The German Cooperative Financial System (1971)

Figures in billions of dollars (US) at the  
then-prevailing exchange rate



liquid funds increasingly take place within the new unit, instead of passing through the central institution. The percentage of customers' deposits held by the local cooperative banks at their affiliated regional bank has therefore been declining. Also, larger local cooperative banks usually make heavier demands on their regional banks, on which they depend for long-term funds to finance expansion in the volume of lending.

This situation has led to the need for larger units at the regional level, capable of maintaining larger balances of loanable funds and providing services such as check clearing where economies of scale can be realized. Since 1968, the parallel regional systems of the various primary cooperative sectors have been in the process of consolidation, and the number of regional cooperative banks has fallen from 18 to 10. Of these, seven have reorganized as corporations able to sell shares to the general public. These regional banks, in turn, rely on DG Bank for depository, liquidity management and other essential services. The financial interrelationships of this system, from local depositors to DG Bank are shown schematically in Figure II.

Sources of Funds - The source of funds to the local system is the deposits of members. The local coops offer a full range of deposit accounts and instruments: checking and savings

accounts, negotiable and non-negotiable savings certificates. These last instruments are issued for terms of 7 years and their proceeds are earmarked for term lending to medium-sized firms.

Uses of Funds - Besides consumer, home mortgage and business loans to members, coop banks undertake a number of lending and investment activities. These include construction financing, term loans to other credit cooperatives and industrial customers and leasing.

DG Bank Operations - DG Bank provides financial and non-financial services to the regionals in order to help them facilitate these local activities. Such tasks performed jointly by DG Bank and the regionals include check clearing, centralized electronic transaction procession, property broking, secondary mortgage marketing, advertising, personal training, and the placement of reserve and surplus funds in investments outside the cooperative system. This last function is reserved primarily to DG Bank. They underwrite and market domestic and foreign corporate equities and securities of various governments and public authorities.

## II. SOURCES OF FUNDS/CAPITALIZATION

Equity - DG Bank is capitalized by the purchase of shares. Of the \$134.5 million in paid-in equity in 1975, some 75% was

held by the regional banks. The rest was held by corporate and institutional investors outside the cooperative system. The current dividend on shares is 8%.

Deposits - DG Bank's main source of deposits is the regional banks' reserve and surplus. Of the \$7.92 billion on deposit in 1975, \$5.36 billion was attributable to the regionals. Other banks and corporations provided the balance of the deposits. DG Bank pays interest on these deposits at prevailing rates, and these interest payments compose their largest financial expense. The volume of deposits in the entire system has risen rapidly in recent years.

Borrowings - When necessary to increase its base of loanable funds, DG Bank will raise money on the European bond market through issue of its own bonds. In 1975, it had \$832 million outstanding--down from recent years due to the simultaneous increase of deposits and decrease of loan demand within the coop system.

Income - Net interest payments on loans compose by far the largest portion of DG Bank's income, some 86% of the \$606.5 million in 1975 gross earnings. Other sources of income include that from investments and securities, commissions and fees and miscellaneous sources amounting to \$11.8 million.

### III. USES OF FUNDS/INVESTMENTS

Because loan demand in the sectors from which the cooperative system draws its deposits--agriculture, small business and middle-income individuals--has fallen in recent years, DG Bank has had to find uses for its investible funds outside the cooperative system. Some 57% of its \$7.5 billion in loans outstanding in 1975 were to banks outside the cooperative system. Another 26% were to non-bank, corporate customers, leaving 17% to be channeled back to the regional banks. Over 70% of these loans were for terms of less than four years.

Unlike American banks, German banks are not restricted from engaging in equity and underwriting transactions involving corporate securities, and they may own subsidiaries directly instead of through a holding company. All these activities figure prominently on DG Bank's balance sheet. Of the \$1.24 billion in investments held by the bank, 46% are in corporate bonds, many of which DG Bank underwrote. Three percent was held in other securities, mostly corporate equities, 12% in shares of subsidiaries and 39% in Treasury notes.

DG Bank's underwriting business is substantial. In 1975, it underwrote 17 large issues, mostly for German public authorities and political units. The Bank also participated

in 47 other issues as guarantors for various private and public entities.

DG Bank held equity interest in over 50 other financial institutions, including the seven regional banks reorganized as corporations. Among the Bank's wholly-owned subsidiaries is the Deutsche Genossenschafts-Hypothekenbank, one of Germany's largest mortgage banks, several closed-ended mutual funds and several foreign subsidiaries engaged in placing DG funds in investments abroad. DG Bank also owns 19 and 50%, respectively, of the shares of the two leasing firms whose services they broker to the regional banks.

Thus, using the very sparse information provided in DG Bank's annual reports and including accounts which may register holdings outside as well as within the cooperative system, it appears that only 18.6% of DG Bank's investments are in the cooperative system.

#### IV. MANAGEMENT

The top level of management is the Managing Board, composed of five members elected by representatives of the regional banks and cooperative unions. DG Bank does not report the breakdown of managerial responsibility between its various divisions. Nor do they present any overriding management policies besides

a commitment to helping local credit cooperatives achieve a greater market share.

#### V. ACCOUNTABILITY

DG Bank is a privately-owned corporation and thus enjoys almost total freedom in its investment and liability-generating policies. It is restricted only insofar as it must obey laws designed to protect depositors.

#### VI. EVALUATION

DG Bank's major purpose is to help the thousands of tiny financial units which compose the cooperative credit system remain competitive with other sectors of the German financial system characterized by larger units. Banks in these other sectors tend to deal in larger blocks of money and thus have lower unit transactions costs. DG Bank and its regional affiliates seem to do this job well. From 1973 to 1975, the share of deposits in all German banks held by cooperatives increased from 11 to slightly more than 13%.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of DG Bank's operations is the extent to which it invests outside the cooperative system, especially when compared to the British Columbia Central Credit Union. Such a comparison is misleading, however, in that the

real economic conditions in the two institutions' deposit markets may be entirely different. Young families are heavily represented among the British Columbian cooperatives' members. Their demand for large mortgage loans is high, and they tend to keep little in savings. Thus, their central bank must channel funds from outside the system to its member units if they are to continue to compete for loan business.

DG Bank is the lead institution of a complex system financing many types of economic activity. Its managers claim and behave as if loan demand is declining in these sectors. An analysis of these sectors and a critique of DG Bank's lending policy is impossible given the paucity of information on these activities available in secondary sources and the Bank's own tight-lipped reporting policies. Management may be doing its members a service by investing outside the system if that is where their funds can earn the greatest return.

However, one of the Bank's financial policies does seem to be a disservice to the member cooperatives. This is the selling of shares by both the regional banks and DG Bank to investors outside the cooperative system when liquidity appears to exist among the individual cooperatives to buy these shares. Thus, earnings on the deposits contributed by the units at the base of the system (and ultimately their members) are siphoned off

to outside investors through the payment of dividends. According to our own calculations based on information given in DG Bank's annual reports, these payments outside the system amounted to 18.9% of the Bank's net earnings in 1975.

#### VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes: DG Bank provides an important counterpoint to BC Central. It shows what happens to a similarly constituted cooperative development bank when it matures in a mature industrial economy.

Sources and Uses of Funds: DG Bank is no longer wholly owned by its users. It now is a net exporter of funds--not only out of local cooperatives, but out of Germany.

Management and Accountability: DG Bank is increasingly less accountable to its local cooperatives. It manages its funds similar to a large multi-national bank.

TABLE I  
Balance Sheet - 1975

	DM Million
<b>ASSETS</b>	
Cash and Bills Receivable	627.4
Due from Regional Cooperative Banks	3,198.3
Due from Other Banks	
Less Than Four Banks	9,852.9
Four Years and Over	909.5
Treasury Bonds	1,313.1
Bonds and Notes	1,625.5
Other Securities	117.8
Loans and Advances to Non-Bank Customers	
Less Than Four Years	3,324.9
Four Years and Over	1,459.6
Due from Public Authorities - Equalization Claims	86.9
Own Bonds Held for Trading Account	38.0
Fiduciary Transactions	165.2
Investments in Subsidiaries and Affiliates	413.0
Premises and Equipment	45.1
Other Assets	107.6
<b>Total Assets</b>	<u>23,284.8</u>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>	
Deposits of Regional Cooperative Banks	13,381.9
Deposits of Other Banks	
Less Than Four Years	3,528.4
Four Years and Over	1,683.9
Deposits of Non-Bank Customers	1,192.5
Bonds and Notes Issued	2,302.1
Fiduciary Transactions	165.2
Other Liabilities	283.5
Capital Stock	366.6
Reserves	355.0
Profit After Transfer to Reserves	25.7
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<u>23,284.8</u>
Endorsement Liabilities	417.8
Guarantees	1,694.7

TABLE II  
Income and Expenses - 1975

	DM '000
INCOME	
Interest Earned	1,305,936.6
Income from Securities and Investments	159,911.1
Commissions and Fees	18,741.5
Other Income Including Adjustment of Special Reserves	29,471.3
Total Income	<u>1,514,060.5</u>
EXPENSES	
Interest Expense	1,272,019.7
Commissions	1,813.7
Depreciation, Provisions, Transfer to Special Reserves	32,048.8
Staff Expenses	34,542.4
Other Operating Expenses	23,918.2
Taxes	19,192.4
Other Expenses	4,852.5
Total Expenses	<u>1,388,387.7</u>
NET INCOME	125,672.8
Transfer to Reserves	100,000.0
PROFIT AFTER TRANSFER TO RESERVES	<u>25,672.8</u>

## II. REGIONAL MODELS AND OPTIONS

REGIONAL MODELS  
Discussion Draft

September 14, 1977  
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### International and Domestic Patterns

International development banking provides a pattern for regionalizing the Alaska Permanent Fund which is strikingly paralleled in a number of publicly-sponsored American development finance systems. In each instance a three-tiered arrangement has evolved with these common elements:

First, a government-sponsored development bank or fund which oversees the whole system.

In the middle, regional development banks or corporations which are more sensitive to local differences and act as a bridge between local needs and national or state resources.

At the bottom, local development corporations or banks with a great deal of autonomy and flexibility to respond to local needs and differences.

This essential three-tiered pattern is found in the international development banking system headed by the World Bank, in sophisticated national development banking systems in Third World countries such as those of Brazil, Mexico and India, and in regional development banking systems of developed countries of Europe such as France or Italy. The same pattern is followed in publicly-sponsored American credit systems such as the Farm Credit system and the Federal Home Loan bank system.

It is no coincidence that this pattern repeats itself in such a range of settings. The advantages of this pattern are elementary, sensible, and obvious.

In each instance, the system is publicly-sponsored and accountable but independently operated by an experienced, career-minded professional staff. Both capital and management are organized on a long-term basis and initial public investment is used to generate larger amounts of private capital from the private capital market.

Just as international and domestic experience provides us with important parallels, each gives us a better understanding of different aspects of the overall structure and organization which could help define the Alaska Permanent Fund as a development bank capable of supporting the quite different regional economic needs of different areas of Alaska.

For instance, international development banking systems are superior to American development finance systems in the provision of infrastructure financing and venture capital. By definition two major American credit systems, the Farm Credit system and the Federal Home Loan bank system, do not provide either long-term infrastructure finance or essential venture capital to new enterprise. Venture capital is essential to the development of rural regions of Alaska and lower-income

communities in those regions, as it is in Africa, Asia or Latin America.

Just as the international development banking systems help us understand the basic capital formation instruments for development banking systems, particular American experience in structuring financial institutions gives us a set of basic guidelines for constructing the regional units of the Alaska Permanent Fund. After looking at the evolution of international experience, it is worth taking a close look at the specific legal, financial and organizational mechanisms used by successful American development finance systems.

#### International Models

One of the most appropriate transferable lessons from international development banking experience is that a network is necessary in order to support regional economic development--not a single, monolithic institution. This is especially true where regional and ethnic distances are great, where infrastructure is inadequate, and where sensitivity to local needs must be particularly acute.

The evolution of the international development banking system into a geographically decentralized and functionally differentiated worldwide system was neither wholly planned nor

conscious. It simply evolved to fit the rising needs of various developing countries and regions of the globe.

For instance, early on, the World Bank began to recognize the value of working through local intermediary development banks, since they were much more sensitive to local practices and, in many cases, more likely to make sound financial judgments about loans and investments. The World Bank group began to work with existing national development banks and to sponsor the creation of a worldwide network of national private development finance corporations in a host of Third World countries.

Second, in large and complex countries with large geographic areas and significant regional differences, we can observe a tendency to complement this international decentralization with an intranational regional decentralization to subnational institutions. In one study of 209 development banks, nearly 40 percent were located in 10 countries--Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, and Venezuela--each of which has developed extensive, decentralized and regionalized development banking systems.

Third, this pattern repeats itself once again in the sophisticated and elaborate regional development banking systems which have been organized in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

At the base of each system is the fundamental unit--the local development bank or corporation which serves to broker the risk between the local entrepreneur and the outside sources of capital. Between the local development corporation and the apex of the system there is often a regional development bank or corporation which mobilizes its own capital for local use and may be required to broker-finance between the local and the top institutions. At the higher levels in any event there is also a careful elaboration of different infrastructure and equity "windows" to provide more discrete forms of capital for specialized purposes. Figure 1 provides a highly abstract and stylized version of the institutional relationships among the World Bank, multinational regional development banks, and local national institutions on the one hand, and national development banking institutions, regional and local development corporations on the other hand.

An American Parallel: The Farm Credit System

The Farm Credit system has evolved as a highly sophisticated, publicly-sponsored but user-owned development finance system like the international development banking network. It has unfolded gradually since its establishment in 1916, assuming new functions and becoming more decentralized in response to

the credit needs of farmers. Today the federal Farm Credit Board and the Farm Credit administration operate at the financial level, while twelve district Farm Credit Boards at the regional level serve hundreds of constituent associations and cooperatives at the local level. The functional diversity of this system is reflected in twelve federal Land Banks serving 594 constituent Federal Land Bank Associations, twelve Federal Intermediate Credit Banks working with 442 local production credit associations, and twelve banks for cooperatives serving constituent farmers in cooperatives. This arrangement provides three different functional "windows" of credit to member farmers and ranchers in each of the twelve regional Farm Credit Boards.

The Farm Credit grid system, then, parallels the international development banking patterns both in its geographic decentralization of decision making and its separation of different functions. The pattern of geographic decentralization is repeated again in other American financial networks such as the Federal Home Loan bank system and, of course, the Federal Reserve system. These important domestic parallels not only confirm international experience; they also provide us with proven, workable, legal, financial and organizational precedents for a regionalized Alaska Permanent Fund.

The Farm Credit system has, for example, developed two structural attributes worth noting and using in constructing a regionalized Alaska Permanent Fund. In a characteristically American fashion, on December 31, 1968, the Farm Credit system became 100 percent user-owned with retirement of the original federal government capital investment in the system. Part of each farmer's loan purchases stock ownership in the capital structure of the banks and associations. Member farmers elect the Board of Directors of the Federal Land Bank Association, production credit associations, and cooperatives; the Boards of the associations and cooperatives in turn elect the District Farm Credit Board and make nominations to the President for the federal Farm Credit Board (see attached Figure 2).

The local users govern the system by electing or nominating each governing board in the system. The local users eventually repurchase the ownership of the system from the federal government with a small percentage of the proceeds received from the system. This user governance and eventual user ownership is a critical precedent for establishing local cooperative banking institutions in communities in the state too small to properly support a full-service bank.

Second, the private capital market finances the \$8 billion debt of the Farm Credit system through the sale in the bond

market of consolidated federal Farm Loan bonds. "Consolidated" is primarily what they are: thousands of individual farm mortgages, crop loans and farm equipment loans which have been put together by the Farm Credit system for resale in the private capital market. The private capital market supplies the bulk of the funds used, not the Treasury. On the other hand, the Treasury's standby credit is assurance to the market that the government stands behind the obligation, even though there is no direct government guarantee. I similarly feel that with the huge paid-in capital base of the Alaska Permanent Fund it will similarly be possible to sell many such packaged private obligations in consolidated bonds in the marketplace with the standby backing of the Alaska Permanent Fund itself.

Unlike virtually all international development banking systems, the Farm Credit system has not developed an affiliated venture capital corporation. As a result, the Farm Credit system is precisely that--a 100 percent debt financing system which is no longer able to respond adequately to the needs of those low-income farmers and lesser-developed regions of the country which it was originally set up in the 1920's to serve. Nor has it been able to be effective in its original purpose of seeking to end farm tenancy by making landowners out of sharecroppers. Credit does not make owners, only debtors. The

banks for cooperatives, for example, usually limit facility loans to not more than 60 to 40 percent of the value of the security offered by the cooperative, and expect the balance to be financed by the association's permanent or long-term capital. This is fine for a wealthy cooperative that has built up sizable membership equity, but it is not very helpful to low-income cooperatives whose members by definition have no equity and, therefore, whose cooperative is ineligible for a loan from the bank for cooperatives.

It is for this reason that I have argued strongly in my memorandum to the committee of July 11, 1977 that the community development provisions of the Alaska Permanent Fund legislation should provide for equity investment as well as debt and guarantees, just as with productive private enterprise.

#### Other Domestic Models

The pattern for establishing and operating the Farm Credit system is paralleled in other major American financing systems such as the Federal Home Loan bank system. In each instance there is one initial large public capital stock purchase by the Treasury, which starts the system. After that the system pays its own way except for relatively small periodic appropriations to cover non-recoverable infrastructure and social overhead

capital costs. Eventually the Treasury stock is repaid and completely replaced by user-owned stock. For example, the initial \$75 million of Treasury stock that started the Federal Home Loan bank system in 1933 was fully retired by 1950, just as was the Farm Credit system.

With strong debt to equity ratios most of these same systems have been able to raise the substantial body of their capital on the private market through secondary marketing operations with strong paid-in equity capital backup.

FIGURE 1.





FIGURE 2


THE FEDERAL CREDIT SYSTEM

CENTRAL



Appoints


CENTRAL



← 12 appointed by Pres. from nominee of each district, one by Secretary of Agriculture

REGIONAL  
GEOGRAPHIC

(1 for each of 12 Districts)



↖ 2 elected from each "avenue", one appointed by FCS governor

REGIONAL  
FUNCTION

FEDERAL  
LAND  
BANK




FEDERAL  
INTERMEDIATE  
CREDIT BANK

BANK  
FOR  
COOPS




Policy ↙

Policy ↓

Policy ↘



LOCAL  
FUNCTION



"First Ave." "Second Ave." "Third Ave."



The Boards of Directors of the Federal Land Bank Associations, Production Credit Associations, and Cooperations are elected by member farmers.

In Summary: A Range of Options for Regionalization Available  
to the Alaska Permanent Fund

The experience of domestic and international development banks points out that the Alaska Permanent Fund has a number of specific options that might be used for purposes of regionalization. Specifically, the Alaska Permanent Fund might make local regionalized investments through: independent regional or local development banks or corporations; affiliates; subsidiaries; user-owned local institutions; branches; or some flexible combination of the above developed on an ad hoc basis. Each of these will be briefly referred to below.

Independent regional or local development banks or corporations: The World Bank and the European Investment Bank are both examples of institutions which primarily operate by making loans to and through independent regional and local intermediaries. Analogously, the Alaska Permanent Fund might make all regional investments to or through Alaskan regional and local community development corporations.

Affiliates: The French Crédit National finances its regional development through affiliated Regional Development Corporations. It has a substantial although not controlling stock interest in each of these SDRs. The predominant equity interest is held by local financial and development institutions with a greater sensitivity to local needs and conditions.

Subsidiaries: To the best of our knowledge, no development banks within the United States or overseas operate through their regional development programs through wholly-owned subsidiaries. On the other hand, many development banks, including the World Bank and the D.G. Bank, do use wholly-owned subsidiaries in order to undertake specialized functional financing activities such as equity investment.

User-owned local development banks or corporations: As we have extensively documented, the Farm Credit System, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the British Columbia Central Credit Union, and the D.G. Bank are all institutions which are user-owned at both the regional and central level by local, cooperatively-owned development banks.

Branches: The Federal Reserve System and the British Finance for Industry are two central financial institutions which operate their regional activities through branches.

A flexible, ad hoc approach: The National Enterprise Board and the Canada Development Corporation are two large national development banks which have taken a needs-oriented ad hoc approach to regionalization. The National Enterprise Board, for instance, has recently established branches in Liverpool and Newcastle in order to get a better sense for how they could intervene in regional economic development. The Canada Development

Corporation has a sole branch in Vancouver in order to be more responsive to the regional economic development needs of western Canada and is undertaking its venture capital program through investments in affiliated privately-owned venture capital companies.

Our purpose in this regionalization paper, as in each of the sections of this second report, is to suggest a number of options which can then begin to be tailored to fit the specific purposes, needs and political economy of Alaska in designing the Alaska Permanent Fund. Based on the response of the legislature, this paper may also raise a number of follow-up questions which deserve further attention.

V. 166 - mini-polit. process - build in users  
11-175 - Findings → goals → procedures  
11-177-181 - Reporting  
4/B-11-180+1

181-  
11-177

### III. THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY

#### AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE

The question of assuring the accountability of the Permanent Fund management to the electorate, legislature and executive to carry out its public purposes is probably the single most important issue before the Special Permanent Fund Committee. In this final section of the report, we begin to suggest some measures by which the management of public enterprises such as the Alaska Permanent Fund may be held accountable for their performance. Because this is such a central issue, our aim in this section is simply to introduce the problem and begin to suggest some of the options available to ensure public accountability. We will detail some of the tradeoffs involved and cite specific cases from domestic and international experience.

It is important to point out at the beginning that the record is generally not a good one. In more cases than not, public accountability has been sacrificed for market efficiency. The task of overseeing the Permanent Fund to ensure that its public purposes are carried out will not be an easy one. Our sense is that this introductory discussion will raise many more questions that the Committee will want to consider between now and December 31, 1977. By "accountability" we mean the effectiveness

of the mechanisms by which the government seeks to assure that the managers of a public enterprise invest public resources in order to maximize the benefits to the ultimate providers of the funds. In the case of the Permanent Fund, those providers are the people of Alaska.

In some respects, the position of Alaskans in this enterprise is analogous to that of an investor in a private firm. The active investor gathers as much information as possible about the firm in which he invests. Using this information, he forms an independent judgment on appropriate management policies. He then seeks to have these judgments acknowledged and effected by participating in shareholders' meetings and by voting his shares. If, after these measures are exhausted, he is dissatisfied with managerial performance, he will seek to impose sanctions on the firm's operations by voting out management or, more likely, by withdrawing his money from the firm. In all these activities he is motivated by the principle of maximizing his benefit from the investment--his short-run money profit.

The benefit Alaskans expect from the Permanent Fund, however, is a good deal more complicated and long-lived than that sought by the private capitalist. Certainly, short-run financial results must be considered, but the idea behind the Alaska Permanent Fund is to convert non-renewable mineral resources into renewable

capital resources which benefit the Alaskan economy and Alaskans. These investments could generate many types of public costs and benefits. A small sample of costs Alaskans would seek to avoid includes degradation of the environment and social dislocation caused by the boom-bust nature of certain enterprises. Benefits might include wider participation of Alaskans in the management and wealth generated by business enterprises and the improvement of human services.

Experience has demonstrated that publicly-capitalized investment banks tend to operate solely under commercial profit-maximization criteria unless they are compelled to do otherwise through various forms of government direction and control. Our basic problems, then, are: 1) How is the substance of these directions to be determined? and 2) How are they to be enforced?

It is likely that no stable consensus can be reached on the proper mix of objectives for the Permanent Fund. Rather the Fund has many constituencies, each with different and often conflicting economic interests and with differential access to the political and economic means by which to have these interests effected.

To design the institutions surrounding the Permanent Fund as if the consensus mentioned above existed, as if it were the Fund's only task to interpret these objectives in its investment policy, may be virtually impossible, based on the experience of others.

Terry! Rather, the design of the Permanent Fund must provide a forum in which conflicts of interest can be aired and resolved on a continuing basis.

These conflicts are likely to arise at two points in the continuing operation of the Permanent Fund: first in the formulation of investment criteria and then in the application of those criteria. Those affected by these processes must have a chance to influence each of these sets of decisions. They must then have the means by which to review how these decisions are implemented.

In our investigations of the institutions profiled in Section I and other public enterprises we shall note, we have identified four stages in the accountability process. Two may be classified as forums in which the decisions mentioned above are made, two as means by which these decisions are implemented. In practice, these processes are carried on simultaneously.

Specifically, these stages are:

1) Setting of Goals and Priorities: The essential questions here are: Who sets the goals and how are they phrased in legislation, statutory directives, or guidelines?

2) Formulation of Measurement and Reporting Procedures: Goals are given operational substance by the establishment of measures to evaluate management performance. The issues here are: the relevance and quality of the measurements, the form in which

this information is presented, and who gets the information?

3) Governance: Public Inputs into Operating Decisions:

In most public enterprises, the elected government usually has a variety of formal and informal means of influencing day-to-day operating decisions. The enterprise's various constituencies also have such means. The important issues here are: Whose interests are made known to the Board? How and at what point in the decision-making process are they made known? What influence do they actually exert on the institution's operating decisions?

4) Operating Sanctions: What can an elected government do if it is dissatisfied with the results the management of a publicly-capitalized enterprise achieves? The most frequently available formal sanctions are the replacement of management and the withholding of funds from the agency. There are informal sanctions as well, such as publicity of mismanagement.

In the case of dismissal of management, the issues are: How and for what reasons can management be removed?

In the case of control of funds, some of the issues are: The source of funds and the conditions on which they are provided, who controls the funds once they are pooled for agency use, and the conditions under which the sanction of withholding funds can be exercised?

At each of the four stages, democratic elements of the

process must be traded off against the operating requirements of an efficient investment bank, i.e., the ability to make independent investment decisions and effect those decisions in a timely and flexible manner.

At each stage, outside control can range from zero to a level at which the operations of the agency are totally disrupted. Each level of control is characterized by a set of costs and benefits. In reviewing the four stages outlined above, we will present examples of mechanisms which have been used. They will be ranked from lowest to highest by the degree to which they effect management's deviation from standard commercial investment criteria. Finally, we will begin to suggest the nature and incidence of the costs and benefits of each strategy examined.

#### A. Setting of Goals and Priorities

Historically, the determination of goals and their definition in legislation has been the least important element in the accountability structure of public enterprise. In terms of enabling legislation itself, provisions for capitalization, organizational powers and management selection have had a much greater impact on the performance of these enterprises. The outcome of informal political and economic power struggles among the enterprises' various constituencies and principals has been more important to the active operation of development banks.

The goals of public banks are found in the opening sections of their enabling legislation. Seldom, however, do they represent the results of legislative deliberation. Bills are generally drafted by individuals who have some interest in the successful and continuing operation of the entity they are creating, and legislative attention is usually directed toward the operational aspects of the draft. In a few cases, the goals and objectives of development banks have been publicly debated, but, as in the case of the Canada Development Corporation, this does not assure that the public interest will be served.

The legislated purposes of most public enterprises tend to be more exhortatory than directive, legalisms intended to justify the use of public funds. In the case of authorities producing a good or service, the purpose is to do so efficiently; in the case of a public investment bank, it is to encourage the development of productive enterprise in the jurisdiction.

There are good reasons for leaving the statement of purpose vague, which have to do mainly with the legislative process: It is easier to build legislative consensus, easier to change operational direction to fit changing economic conditions, and harder to make small changes in language as the bill proceeds to enactment which substantially changes the intent.

Still, attempts have been made to formulate goals so that

they are useful as guideposts to management and criteria for managerial performance. Usually this entails relating goals to specific measurable achievements and administrative procedures in the legislation.

In most cases, the legislated goals of public enterprises or banks have had little bearing on their actual operations. This condition breaks down into two sets of conceptually separable experiences: In the first, management has found it convenient as well as legally and politically possible to evade its statement of purpose, undertaking operations for which the institution was not designed or refusing to undertake mandated functions. In the second, the statement of purpose has been so vague or founded on faulty analysis that the management has effectively been given a free hand.

Examples of the first type of experience occur most frequently in public authorities providing a good or service. Instances of selective adherence to statement of purpose arise in the history of the Port of New York Authority (PNYA). Established in 1921, the PNYA was charged with "developing terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce." After a decade of unsuccessfully and unprofitably attempting to rationalize rail-sea connections, the Authority was allowed to acquire three motor vehicle bridges and the Holland Tunnel from other authorities.

These facilities were highly successful financially, and the Authority justified their continuing ownership of the bridges by claiming the revenues they generated were necessary to meet Authority bond contracts.

The PNYA used this same tactic in reverse in the Fifties and Sixties to resist public pressure to assume the ownership and management of the region's undercapitalized and unprofitable commuter rail system. Maintaining that the projected deficits of such operations would prevent them from executing bond contracts in good faith, the Authority's management withstood this pressure to undertake its mandated purpose for over a decade. A compromise was reached in the late Sixties when the Authority took over the most heavily-used portion of the commuter network in return for the approval of the Governor of New Jersey to use PNYA funds to build the World Trade Center. Many analysts view the Center as a speculative real estate transaction only peripherally related to the Authority's purposes. The commitment of substantial funds to the Center has in turn precluded the Authority's taking a significant role in the rail lines.

A similar instance can be found in the now-infamous case of Robert Moses' Triborough Bridge Authority. Its legislated purposes were solely to construct and operate the Triborough Bridge until it was paid off. However, through the imaginative use of

bonding power, bond contract drafting and the subtle use of clauses in the powers sections, the Authority's life and latitude in operations were enormously extended.

The statement of purpose for most public development banks fall into the second category outlined above: they are too inclusive to effectively direct managerial policy. The Canada Development Corporation is a prime case in point. In the CDC profile we noted how management's interpretation of the Corporation's goals threatened the achievement of the public purposes of the institution. This interpretation was permitted, however, by the CDC Act's statement of corporation objectives. These read:

"The objects of the company are:

- a) to assist in the creation or development of businesses, resources, properties and industries of Canada;
- b) to expand, widen and develop opportunities for Canadians to participate in the economic development of Canada through the application of their skills and capital;
- c) to invest in the shares or securities of any corporation owning property or carrying on business related to the economic interests of Canada; and
- d) to invest in ventures or enterprises including the acquisition of property likely to benefit Canada;

and shall be carried out in anticipation of profit and in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole."

These objects permit virtually any investment activity so long as it is profitable. They offer no priorities. More

importantly, only in the case of expanding investment opportunities do they provide an occasion for the application of quantitative measurements to some recognized standard of achievement. CDC's financial participation has led to the creation of only one new enterprise so far and has done little to open up investment opportunities for the greater number of Canadians. Yet this result is perfectly compatible with the Corporation's goals.

The British National Enterprise Board's statutory purposes, while broadly stated, are more amenable to measurement than CDC's and could thus become the basis of an accountability process. The purposes of the Board, as listed in the Industry Act of 1975, are:

- "a) to develop or assist the economy of the UK (or any part of the UK),
- b) to promote industrial efficiency and international competitiveness; and
- c) to provide, maintain or safeguard productive employment."

The first purpose is so broad as to accommodate any action the Board wishes to take within its extensive powers. The second two, however, are expressions of economic phenomena for which accepted empirical measurements exist. Industrial efficiency can be measured by cross-national comparisons of costs within sectors and the changes in profitability of individual firms; international

competitiveness by changes in the volume of export sales. The provision or maintenance of employment is similarly measurable, with differing degrees of sophistication.

The Community Development Finance Corporation Act goes one step beyond providing measurable goals by relating the goals to a specific set of problems described in the Act. Thus, the bill performs a clarifying function usually reserved to committee reports, and reduces the possibility of misinterpreting the goals in their implementation. The essential elements of the findings preceding the statement of purpose are:

- 1) that a substantial and persistently low level of employment and economic activity exists within certain areas of the state;
- 2) that it is beyond the ability of the government to correct these conditions solely through the exercise of regulatory power;
- 3) that it is beyond the ability of the private sector to counter these tendencies without capital assistance;
- 4) that Community Development Corporations have made substantial improvements in these areas, but cannot continue to do so without public provision of investment funds.

These findings all point directly to the purpose of the institution, which is to "increase the number of development projects in decadent substandard and blighted areas" through the agency of CDCs. The findings also militate against any alternative reading of the Act which might permit evasion of the administrative procedures outlined in the Act.

Such a specific set of findings, tied to specific objectives,

administrative procedures and reporting requirements, is one way of making the legislation statement of goals more meaningful.

F. Formulation of Measurement and Reporting Procedures

Public accounting is an essential element of governmental control over the activities of a public enterprise. This exposure forces management to keep operations in line with what is expected of them, and this pressure can work in anticipation of government censure as well as retrospectively.

Overseers of the Alaska Permanent Fund are interested in the social as well as financial achievements of the institution. On the financial side, public enterprise must be held to the highest standards of financial disclosure now universally applied to private enterprise. On the other hand, universally recognized measurement and reporting procedures have not yet been developed for social impacts. Many of the items presented for consideration by Singer and Mollenkopf in "After the Oil is Gone" are not amenable to quantification or comparison with unlike outcomes. This problem is treated in that useful paper, and we will not discuss it further here. Rather, we will note some practices used by some development banks to measure non-financial results, and comment on their appropriateness to the Permanent Fund.

Finally, accounts are inherently incomplete in that they

show only what has already happened--and not always very accurately. If an institution is expending public money, it should be concerned with the social choices it faces and present these choices to its overseers. We will look at some of the attempts public investment banks have used to address this problem through cost-benefit analysis and various other types of projection techniques and discuss their applicability to contemplated Permanent Fund operations.

#### Financial Reporting

Given the geographic and cultural distance from the institutions we have noted, it is difficult to evaluate the accuracy or fairness with which they represent their performance in annual reports. It must be noted, however, that management of public as well as private firms is motivated to present its accomplishments in the most favorable light.

What, then, is presented besides the usual balance sheet, income and expense statement, and report of changes in capital? One of the most important and useful parts of the annual report, usually required by national corporation laws, is separate reports on the activities of subsidiaries, major loan recipients or sub-divisions. Consolidated financial records may conceal cross-subsidations, multiple accounting of depreciation of a given

asset and, most importantly, the true cause of poor performance, whatever it may be. This has been the case with the Small Business Administration's loan guarantee program. For years, the high loss rate of this program had been attributed by the SBA to instability in the small business sector. Investigation of the program by the General Accounting Office, however, revealed that poor administration and intentional disregard of program guidelines were responsible for a large percentage of loan losses.

For the most part, the degree of detail in the reports varies by who gets them. Usually the funding source has privileged access. For example, the report of agency financial operations in Connecticut Development Authority bond prospectuses are much more thorough and scrupulous than the report which goes to the Commissioner of Commerce. Similarly, the British Cabinet Secretary overseeing the operations of the National Enterprise Board may requisition all operating records. Generally, the legislature and the public must accept annual reports prepared by the enterprise and occasional ad hoc investigative reports as their sole sources of information on the financial activities of the enterprise. In the institutions we have noted, these vary greatly in the detail and usefulness of disclosure--from vague accounts for CDC, to quite detailed accounts for NEB.

### Social Reporting

Few of the investment banks reviewed make any use of social performance accounting. CDC, NEB, and EIB make no specific provisions for reporting even easily measurable social indices such as total employment of the firms in which they invest. NEB lists environmental impact and encouragement of worker participation in management as criteria for investment, but they provide no benchmarks, measurements or reporting schedule by which to evaluate projects, prospectively or retrospectively, along these dimensions. The Connecticut Development Authority reports total employment of the firms it finances, but this is an utterly inadequate measure of its performance in creating or maintaining jobs. As with all expenditures of publicly-raised funds, it is the marginal addition to some stock (such as employment) rather than the gross size of that stock which is the barometer of performance. Proposed CDFC economic impact indices, described in that institution's profile, are somewhat more sophisticated but still do not address the "with/without" problem in evaluating the benefits of social programs. In other words, would any of the benefits have been realized anyway even if CDFC had not made the investment?

### Projections

Projections are necessary to evaluate investment projects,

especially when there are several competing for the same pool of funds. CDFC is contemplating a simple projection procedure: applying its social accounting procedures to the business plan projections of investment applicants. Thus CDFC will have a two-track set of projections--for both financial and social returns, both of which will be subject to post audit.

#### Cost-Benefit Analysis

More elaborate methods of project evaluation have been developed by the World Bank and its national affiliates. These address the divergence of market and social valuations of the costs and benefits which can be anticipated from various large-scale capital investment projects. These divergences are usually caused by such factors as monopoly domination of markets, state regulations and externalities. The method is essentially one of cost-benefit analysis in which all quantities are reduced to monetary terms, as described in John Mollenkopf's paper.

These types of analysis are expensive due to their enormous requirements for data and skilled analysis. Therefore, they are usually applied only to large projects such as capital-intensive industrial plants or infrastructure which require massive fixed investments. There are some institutional benefits to offset these expenses. Such studies are usually carried out by consultants

in cooperation with local officials and managers. Thus, some permanent, resident expertise in this kind of analysis can be developed. Also, data developed for one study may be used to analyze subsequent projects.

In summary, again, the record to date of detailed financial reporting by development banks is mixed, at best, and social indices are virtually nonexistent.

C. Governance: Public Inputs into Operating Decisions

The most important factors affecting the results achieved by public enterprises have been the structure and dynamics of the day-to-day decision-making. For each institution reviewed, there has been a complex web of attachments, interests and attitudes which are brought to bear on each type of operating decision. For each institution these circumstances are different.

We can begin to analyze this experience by identifying the groups of players involved in the operation of all public enterprises and the nature of the relationships between the groups. We will then explore examples of these relationships, focusing on elements of democratic or at least pluralistic control.

The four basic groups with whom we are concerned are:

- 1) Elected officials and their appointed ministers or secretaries: This group is usually (but not always) statutorily

responsible for the oversight of the public enterprise. Their degree of involvement in day-to-day activities of the enterprise is slight--generally by design. After all, the enterprise's very existence is premised on its carrying out social purposes without the full expenditure of effort by the government itself. Elected and appointed officials are lumped together here because their tenures tend to be coterminous.

2) The Board of Directors is usually the ultimate authority for all decisions concerning the sources and uses of funds and setting the overall strategy for the enterprise. They generally serve finite, overlapping terms which may or may not be renewable.

3) The Professional Staff carries out the policies of the Board, policies which they generally propose to the Board. Their initiative in promotion and competence in administration has the single greatest impact on the overall performance of the enterprise. Generally, they prepare the analyses on which the Board makes its decisions. Their attachments to the enterprise tend to be of longer standing than any of the other groups, a situation which enhances their power considerably. Also, they are closest to the enterprise's constituencies at all levels of decision.

4) Constituents: By constituents we mean those groups in the general public which have organized, regular dealings with the enterprise. These groups include firms which do business

with the enterprise either as clients or as providers of goods and services, citizen action groups, community development corporations, labor unions, etc.

The important relationships among these groups are:

a) Elected Government to the Board: Who appoints the Board? How is the tenure of the Board related to that of government officials? Are there government officials with voting power on the Board? Are there required consultations between members of the government and the Board?

b) Constituents to the Board: How are the interests of constituents represented to or on the Board?

c) Professional Staff to Board and Constituents: Whose interests does the staff tend to promote? Are they under effective control by anyone?

#### Relationship of the Government to the Board

With the comic exception of some of Robert Moses' one-member authorities, the Boards of public enterprises are appointed by the Chief Executives of the political jurisdictions in which they operate. The Chairman, if he is designated as such by the Chief Executive, generally serves at that official's pleasure and is often a cabinet member. Such is the case with most state development authorities. As pointed out in the CDA profile, this

situation carries costs as well as benefits. In addition to the benefits of coordination of Authority activity with executive promotional and overall economic policy, staff may be pressured to undertake loans which are politically useful, but financially unsound. In Maine, for instance, the Commissioner of Commerce, as Chairman of the Main Guarantee Authority, pushed through the approval of a guarantee on a \$12 million loan to a sugar beet processing factory. This enterprise quickly went bankrupt, and the state was able to recover only 15 percent of its money through liquidation. It was later discovered that the Commissioner of Commerce had financial connections to the project.

This situation (of top staff being subordinated to the Board) is reversed at the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which services the metropolitan Boston area. There, the five-man Board is chaired by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who serves at the pleasure of the Governor. The other four directors serve simultaneous four-year terms coterminous with the Governor's. Their powers are limited and mostly advisory. Massachusetts' Secretary of Transportation, who framed these regulations, justified the authority structure by claiming it was necessary to provide "a stronger basis for holding the Commonwealth's chief executive accountable to the legislature and the people of the region and state for the use of the state funds for

the MBTA." This provision does make the CEO an easy target in times of crises. On the other hand, it tends to strengthen the Governor's ability to direct the agency when public attention is not directed towards it.

In Europe, especially in France, government representatives on the boards of public and mixed enterprises are generally granted veto power over Board decisions involving the raising or expenditure of capital. This power has usually been used to delay the implementation of controversial decisions until they can be worked out between the management of the enterprise and its supervising Ministry.

The relationship between the government and the public enterprise can take other forms. For instance, these might consist of required consultations for various types of transactions or activities, the submission of reports and auditing by some agency within the government designed specifically for that purpose. In general, these controls are seldom exercised. They do not play an important role in the operations of any of the institutions reviewed except the NEB. The relationship between NEB and the Secretary of State for Industry is described extensively in that institution's profile.

Relationship of Constituencies to the Board

The interests of an enterprise's constituencies are most effectively represented to the Board by direct membership on it. Frequently, the distribution of directors among constituencies is dictated by the enabling legislation. This is not the case with CDC, and all 19 of its voting members are business executives. Certainly this provides no counterbalance to the profit-maximizing policies of that institution's management.

The distribution of Board membership is usually designed to accommodate political conflicts which are anticipated to arise in the operation of the enterprise. Thus the NEB, which is charged with making nationalized industries more efficient, is composed of six representatives of business firms, three representatives of labor unions, and an economic consultant. Similarly, the Board of CDFC is composed of three cabinet secretaries, two financiers, three representatives of community development corporations, and a representative of organized labor.

While such an approach to Board composition seems to be a logical strategy for dealing with political conflict, the record of this strategy has been ambiguous or worse. In Yugoslavia, where workers, union officials, management and consumers' representatives sit on the Boards of industrial enterprises, most observers report that management practices have not changed signif-

icantly in the directions desired by the workers. In Germany, the similar Mitbestimmung system has long been recognized as an instrument for the cooptation of labor. The record to date of non-expert representation on the Boards of development banks is, unfortunately, filled with more hope than effect.

#### The Role of Staff

The staff of a public enterprise generally outlasts its directors. Like most bureaucracies, it tends to operate in its own best interest. This is an area of public affairs which is virtually undocumented, but Jameson Doig's article on the PNYA provides some substance for the average social scientist's suspicions.

The Authority's top management is appointed by the Board and can serve indefinite terms. During the Sixties, the average length of company experience among the top staff officers was 30 years.

Realizing the threat to PNYA solvency posed by public pressure to acquire commuter lines, Doig reports that the staff orchestrated an elaborate resistance which included lobbying of the state legislatures, both directly and through favored contractors, wide-scale publicity campaigns and influencing a purportedly independent study committee formed by the state legislature to investigate the problem.

Such overreaching may be countered by the imposition of civil service or other personnel and conduct regulations on the staff. This tactic has its costs, since sufficiently skilled personnel will not be attracted by civil service salary scales and may be put off by complicated hiring procedures. The Connecticut Development Authority has experienced this difficulty. So has SBA in much more severe fashion. The real power in SBA resides in the regional officer positions, which are appointive. The regional financial officers may override loan decisions made at lower levels. Lately, there have been several documented cases of political uses of SBA funds by persons in the regional offices over the objections of the district level loan officers.

Professional staff competence is the most important element in determining the performance, financial and otherwise, of all the development banks reviewed for this report. For the most part, the top staff consists of men experienced in banking who have been able to transfer their experience and judgment to the public sector with considerable financial success. In general, they tend to reject the idea of being bound by the social consequences of their investments, claiming the institution will accomplish nothing unless it maintains its financial credibility. Statements to this effect have been made publicly and privately by the executive directors of CDC and CDA. The directors of EIB

and NEB have explicitly pledged themselves to the accomplishment of social goals, such as the rationalizing of industry and the provision of employment opportunities. So far, however, they have not discovered a framework for bending their organization's energies to those purposes.

D. Operating Sanctions

There are essentially two types of operating sanctions which can be imposed on the management of a public enterprise. One is the removal of responsible personnel; the other is the control of the flow of funds to the enterprise. These sanctions are imposed only after an enterprise's problems have reached crisis proportions.

Removal of Personnel

In public enterprises, the government can remove Directors only, usually only for cause. Where such action has been taken or threatened, it has usually been in response to evidence of financial failure or personal abuse of corporate power on the part of Directors. This is the case with current investigations of the private use of Authority facilities by Directors of the PNYA. Edward King, former Chairman of the Board of the Massachusetts Port Authority, was removed by Governor Dukakus for policy reasons. King had been openly antagonistic towards citizens' groups seeking

a noise-prevention curfew on Logan Airport, which was one of the key factors. This is, however, the exception that proves the rule.

### Control of Funds

There are two basic types of capitalization for public enterprises. One is essentially private. Investment funds are raised through the sale of securities backed by the revenues of the bank and often guaranteed or leveraged by the tax revenues of the political unit of which it is a subdivision. The second is the direct provision of tax revenues to the enterprise under various conditions set by the government. Our investigation provides no clear indication of which type of financing is the most effective in holding an enterprise financially or socially accountable. However, we will review the evidence before us for each type.

RISK and going to J-U to K MKTS - Benefit is not "Test!"

### Private Market Finance

The experience of PNYA and the commuter lines has demonstrated that reliance on the bond market--even the claim of such a reliance--can be used by an Authority to delay or refuse action on a potentially desirable and widely demanded social project.

On the other hand, recent experience of public authorities has discredited the frequently-heard claim that dependence on the

bond market imposes "market discipline" on the management of public enterprise. For example, by the time the New York state legislature refused to bail out the Urban Development Corporation in February of 1975, the agency had run up over a billion dollars in debt it could not cover from operating revenue. It was estimated that the state would have to put up \$240 to \$320 million simply to complete projects UDC had left unfinished. Investors had counted on the political power of UDC's management and had largely ignored its internal finances once the Corporation had been cleared by the rating agencies. The arbitrariness of this particular system is well-documented by John Peterson in The Rating Game.

Still, the use of bonds can work and can effectively redistribute capital if the institution is prudently managed. This is the case of the European Investment Bank and B.C. Central, whose financial operations are described in the profiles section. CDA's Umbrella Bond Program is another good example of the redistributive possibilities of using private market finance. Here, the Authority performs the function of evaluating the prospective risk and return of lending to small- and medium-sized firms for institutional and individual investors in market securities. It has thus opened up a hitherto untapped source of funds for its borrowers. Ultimately, the market discipline of this system is under-

mined by the extensive backing the state offers the program. Its success to date has been due primarily to high-quality management.

#### Financing Through Tax Revenues

Control over the provision of state revenues to public investment banks ranges from nil to finicky. At the bottom of the scale is CDC, to whom the Canadian government has provided a block initial capitalization of nearly \$300 million. This policy has assured CDC's virtual freedom from any type of control or accountability.

At the upper end of the scale, NEB's investment funds are provided on an annual basis, and their release must be justified to the Secretary by three-year plans covering both financial and non-financial aspects of the firms designated to receive funds. So far, the Secretary's office has shown little regard for the social aspects of NEB-financed enterprise.

The Small Business Administration relies on periodic Congressional appropriations to finance its lending and guarantee operations. This method of funding imposes costs in that it is cumbersome and time-consuming. Theoretically, it should yield benefits in terms of increased oversight of agency operations. However, the sheer number of loans SBA makes and the complexity of the decentralized administration of the program have made

Congressional oversight impossible. As we have noted, as late as 1974 it was assumed by the SBA's observers that its high loss rate on guaranteed loans was due to chronic instability in the small business sectors. A 1975 study of a large sample of SBA loan records revealed that many guarantees were made for reasons other than to finance the expansion of small business facilities. Over 20 percent of the loans guaranteed were used to pay off existing debt, and of these about one-quarter were to firms which did not meet minimum standards of creditworthiness.

Contrasting the NEB and SBA experiences, one might reasonably conclude that executive oversight may be more rigorous than legislative oversight.

CDFC's capitalization demonstrates a compromise between the lack of control inherent in CDC's capitalization and the complex, potentially disruptive day-to-day supervision of NEB's flow of investment funds. CDFC has been granted a modest, non-renewable sum of \$10 million which it may use as it sees fit within the administrative process laid out in the legislation. The legislature, in providing this form of capitalization, has essentially recognized the experimental nature of the program. If this experiment turns out to be successful, on financial, political, or social terms, the state legislature may choose to augment the original capitalization. The technical details and consequences of CDFC's capitalization are fully explained in its profile.

The problem with most financial sanctions is that they come into play only after the damage of mismanagement has been done. Continuous governmental control over an enterprise's flow of funds imposes costs in terms of limiting public bank's investing flexibility. The benefits, in terms of use of funds which corresponds to government policy or statutory mandate, have not yet materialized in practice.

E. Conclusion

The problem of holding public enterprises accountable for their performance is largely unsolved. Total accountability is neither possible nor efficient; public supervision itself is costly, and it can damage as well as promote performance in the public interest. The contribution of specific institutional structures and prescribed administrative procedures is largely unpredictable.

The workings of accountability systems is further complicated by the fact that public enterprises themselves control information on plans and operations. Past experience has shown that concerned officials have had to undertake extraordinary measures to get enough information to understand what is really going on in these enterprises. If this kind of vigilance were constantly maintained, the purpose of having the public enterprise

would be undermined. Generally, public enterprises are set up to relieve the government of a portion of the costs of administering some area of responsibility which, like assistance to productive economic activity, should generate enough surplus to finance the institutions set up to pursue this purpose.

On the financial side, the success of public banks has depended for the most part on the honesty and competence of their staff. Most public financial institutions rank high on these dimensions when compared to state-owned industrial or service firms. A set of acknowledged reporting conventions and simple criteria of success exist for the financial operations of public banks. These have been developed in the private sector and transferred intact, through the importation of management, to the operations of public financial institutions. As assets and profits mount, management's position becomes more secure, its decisions less open to question and influence by the government and its various constituencies.

On the other hand, public banks have been relatively unsuccessful in taking the social consequences of their activity into account. It must be said that they face substantial problems in doing so even if they are committed to the effort. First, reporting conventions and performance criteria are at a primitive stage of development and are subject to a great deal of controversy.

Second, management tends to be unfamiliar with what has been done in the field.

Social costs and benefits generated by an enterprise are distinguished from the phenomena that show up in its balance sheets mostly because they are not given a money value in the market. Still, the realization of these benefits or the minimization of costs requires that money be spent or that certain income-generating activities be restricted. This is a form of redistribution of the economic product of the enterprise which requires a political decision on the form the benefits and costs are to take and how they are to be distributed.

Therefore, the Permanent Fund must provide a forum in which the range of choices can be exposed and conflicting interests heard. It must then provide a means by which to assure that the decisions reached are carried out, especially when this implies a deviation from conventional commercial practice. Here the record of public enterprise is, to date, unfortunately quite uninformative. In such an enterprise, the framers of the Alaska Permanent Fund must follow their state's tradition; they must be pioneers.

MKT DEKS  
K flow to rr - other  
"invest" flows

~~Call Herb @ water~~  
~~CA dev.~~  
reg. impacts

~~Bill Simon~~  
~~1/11/75~~  
~~1/27~~

~~call Doris Sanford~~

should lower ~~per~~ dev.  
be paid - ~~dev~~ - 7-19

RRE  
7-16 - work w/  
Dunbar  
invest in ~~trans~~ - 7-21

THINKING ABOUT THE ALASKAN PERMANENT FUND:  
A CAUTIOUS APPROACH FOR ALASKAN POLICYMAKERS

July 11, 1977

Specifics - 7/66

Belden Hull Daniels  
Department of City and Regional Planning  
Harvard University

Beldan Daniel's Insights - Structures ↔ Goals

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THINKING ABOUT THE ALASKAN PERMANENT FUND:  
A CAUTIOUS APPROACH FOR ALASKAN POLICYMAKERS

July 11, 1977

INTRODUCTION: A Sense of Limits

The Chinese character for the word "crisis" is a combination of two other characters--"danger" and "opportunity." This could well be the symbol for the Alaskan Permanent Fund. As an outsider to Alaska who has worked for the last eighteen years in development banking and for the last thirteen in community and regional economic development, I am awed by both the opportunity and the danger posed to Alaskans by the Prudhoe Bay oil revenues and the challenge of creating an Alaskan Permanent Fund. I agree with Arlon Tussing that this is "an absolutely unique situation," different from any with which I have previously dealt in Asia, Europe, or the United States.

This leads me, as an outsider, to be doubly careful: first, in a short period of time I can only begin to understand the Alaskan political economy; second, I do not want to be precipitous in proposing specific solutions for the Alaskan economy based on experience in quite different settings.

In this initial memorandum to you, therefore, it seems most appropriate for me to limit my observations to three matters:

First, I would like to suggest a way in which you as Alaskan

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policymakers might approach the problem of thinking about the uses of the Permanent Fund as one aspect of an overall Alaskan Economic Development Plan designed to prepare for the day when the Prudhoe Bay oil reserves are no longer contributing so handsomely to the Alaskan treasury.

Second, I would like to suggest for your consideration some general principles concerning the structure of the Permanent Fund as a development bank in terms of its purposes and powers, legal organization, management and capital structure, which have a general applicability irrespective of your particular goals for the Alaskan economy over the next twenty years.

Third, I would like to suggest a few specific ideas concerning the especially difficult tasks of community and regional economic development, based on the experiences of others.

In making these observations, I am mindful of your unparalleled opportunity to use these resources to build a strong, permanent economy through investments which produce both a reasonable internal rate of return on investment to the Permanent Fund, and a reasonable external rate of return to the economy as a whole and to the treasury of the state. On the other hand, I am equally mindful of the parallel danger that these resources could either be wasted through improper management or improperly employed in ways which create far greater distortions to the

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Alaskan economic base or to some of its specific sectors, regions and communities.

It is important for all of us to realize that the dangers of economic distortion are particularly acute in development banking. I realize that the use of the Permanent Fund as a development bank is only one alternative which you are considering. However, since development banking is my professional field it is the only alternative upon which I will comment.

Because development banking is a somewhat "trendy" idea these days, there is the very real danger of creating a development banking institution which is not sufficiently thought out. Some of the specific dangers include designing a development bank with conflicting goals, or with a capital structure which is ill-suited to carry out those goals, and/or with a management likely either to be inefficient or else unaccountable to public policy governance by the executive or the legislature. Even more serious, there is the danger of proposing a development bank to solve a problem which is not a financial one--that is, one in which the solution does not lie in either reducing the cost or increasing the availability of capital. If, however, the problem is in fact a financial markets problem, it may well be that it is caused by some existing form of governmental intervention which is seriously dislocating the financial marketplace. The least expensive

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solution in that case would be to remove the governmental regulation, rather than to create one more governmental development banking "gimmick."

Finally, there is a tendency to disregard or to misapply the vast body of multinational and national development finance experience that has accumulated in Third World countries and in Europe and Canada. It is my understanding that Price Waterhouse and White, Weld have given the state a systematic analysis of that experience.

When it comes right down to it, development banking is the most direct, aggressive, and high-risk form of public economic intervention. This suggests that it should be used with great caution. Your own experience with some thirteen state revolving loan funds would seem to confirm the fact that development funds created with high hopes often do not achieve the goals for which they were intended. What is called for, therefore, is a careful, step by step analysis of the nature of the specific economic problem before you. Then, after carefully weighing the relative costs and benefits of different options, you should select the most efficient, cost-effective solution--a solution specifically tailored to stimulate real economic development in Alaska.

As an outsider, I cannot determine what your economic goals should be. On the other hand, I can, perhaps, suggest a way of

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looking at the limited aspects in which the Alaskan Permanent Fund, as a development bank, can be a part of your overall effort to use the full resources of the Alaskan state government to help create a sound, balanced, broadly-based economy.

The following outline proceeds step by step through a series of questions which may help you review your design of the Alaskan Permanent Fund in terms of your economic goals over the next twenty years. These questions are divided into three units:

- \* First, what is the nature of real economic activity in Alaska and Alaskan financial markets, and what is the current impact of federal and state governmental intervention on both real economic activity and financial markets?
- \* Second, what are the different mechanisms which the Alaskan state government can use either to stimulate or retard the overall direction of the economy and the state's financial markets?
- \* Finally, what are the limited ways in which the Alaskan Permanent Fund can be a part of such an overall economic development effort by the Alaskan state government?

Throughout this discussion, there is an emphasis on limits: the limits of any state government to affect overall state economic development; the limits of development banking to contribute

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to that overall economic development effort. If these limits are recognized and accepted, the likelihood of a soundly conceived and soundly implemented Alaskan Permanent Fund is much greater.

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I. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE ALASKAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN  
WHICH RECOGNIZES THE LIMITS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY  
AND THE APPROPRIATE USES OF A DEVELOPMENT BANK

First Principles

Before we begin to propose any specific form and function for the Alaskan Permanent Fund as one mechanism to help stimulate economic development, we need to have a conception of what is actually happening in both the Alaskan goods market and financial markets and what the present consequences of federal and state intervention are on both real economic activity and the flow of capital in the state. In order to do this on a current and ongoing basis, the Alaskan state government needs to establish a permanent economic development planning process which makes full use of the capabilities of both the public and private sector and the universities, and which develops a reasonable consensus about the forces at work in the Alaskan economy.

I would like to emphasize that there is nothing unAmerican about such a comprehensive, ongoing planning process. I am simply suggesting that the state of Alaska undertake the same kind of careful planning with regard to the husbanding of its capital assets as any American Fortune 500 corporation would do in order to profitably employ its resources. The tools have been admirably

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developed in the private marketplace; they are there, ready to be incorporated by a state willing to look upon itself as a public enterprise.

This planning process needs to be realistic about the limited capability of the state to affect either worldwide market forces or federal policy. These plans must also incorporate an understanding of the limited capability of any financial intermediary to affect the course of real economic activity.

Financial markets operate only on the supply side of the economic question. They cannot, by themselves, create a demand for economic activity that is not there. A critical question Alaskan policymakers will have to face and answer is: What is the capability of the Alaskan economy to absorb the capital supplied by the Alaskan Permanent Fund? Although I am not in a position to answer that question, I suspect that it will be some time before the Alaskan economy has the capability to absorb anywhere near the amounts of capital available to the Permanent Fund.

Moreover, the cost of capital represents only a very small portion of the cost of doing business. Other worldwide market forces and federal governmental actions far more profoundly affect the cost of production than the cost of money does. It is these worldwide market forces and governmental actions which we must attend to first. Two corollaries to this point deserve careful note:

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First, in very few instances is the cost of capital a serious impediment to sound economic development. There are, however, occasional circumstances where the scale of economic activity, or the location of that economic activity, or the relative risks and rewards of the economic activity, make the availability of capital for that activity virtually nonexistent from a private market standpoint. It is in these circumstances that public intervention in capital markets is appropriate, if stimulating that economic activity would significantly benefit the state economy and treasury. Since the question is one of 'availability rather than cost, in very few circumstances are below-market interest rates either necessary or appropriate for a public development bank. Examples of the kinds of economic activity which may be of real economic benefit to the Alaskan economy and treasury, but for which there may be insufficient available capital include: rural industrial and commercial development, housing development, the development of new technologies which reduce the cost of production in Alaska for either refining or adding value to Alaska's renewable and nonrenewable resources, and scales of enterprise which are either too small or too large for the private market to finance with a sufficient return coincident with risk. These examples will be analyzed in greater detail in sections below.

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A second consequence of the fact that this cost of money is not an important cost of production is this: seldom will lowering the cost of money on the supply side compensate for high costs of production in the marketplace. For example, a petrochemical industry in Alaska is apparently not now financially feasible because of the high costs of production. This problem cannot be solved by lowering the cost of money for petrochemicals through an Alaskan Permanent Fund.

However, lowering the cost of capital can encourage short-run economic activity which is in the long run essentially unsound--and which has a high likelihood of eventual failure.

In summary, a long-term Alaskan state economic planning process must filter out the large number of cases in which development is not dependent on the cost and supply of capital, and in which other public policies are less costly and more appropriate to the solution of the problem. Conversely, the planning process needs to define more precisely those situations in which the economic problem is indeed a financial market problem amenable to solution by Permanent Fund investment. Obviously, these tasks are two sides of the same coin.

In undertaking an overall economic analysis of Alaska and the limited ways in which the Alaskan Permanent Fund can affect overall economic development, I would like to suggest four key