

ALASKA LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMMITTEE / SUBJECT FILE 8672

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a decidedly soothing tendency on the attitude of the working men. . . . It is to change their mental attitude on prohibition (quoted in Gordon 1943, p. 104). And Walter Lippman argued that "Beer is fighting off the mental depression induced by prohibition" (quoted in Gordon 1943, p. 104). In 1932, Matthew Josephson, a former Michigan Governor and a vocal opponent of the American government, argued for the repeal (Englemann 1979, p. 187).

It was engendered by the depression and the environment in which decisions about public policy were debated and ultimately made. Writers explicitly mentioned the effects of prohibition in the headline news. Most others just wanted to say too often or too often that alcohol would reduce discontent, but not to repeal it.

The National Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice played a significant role in the support and public legitimacy of prohibition. George Wickersham, the U.S. Attorney General under Woodrow Wilson and later Taft, the commission was composed of representatives including a former state Chief Justice, a former Judge, three practicing lawyers, a law school professor and the President of the American Bar Association. On January 20, 1931, Hoover announced with approval that "the majority, does not favor the repeal of prohibition. . . . I am in accord with this majority of conclusions signed by ten of the members. . . . I did, in fact, oppose repeal and

oppose legalizing beer and wine, or creating government beer monopolies. However, the report's conclusions also said that some commissioners "are not convinced that prohibition under the Eighteenth Amendment is enforceable."

In contradiction to the two-page summary, the report found widespread disobedience to prohibition and seemed to conclude that national prohibition could never be enforced. In their personal statements attached to the report, most of the commissioners also expressed little hope that the Eighteenth Amendment could be enforced. Two of them wanted immediate repeal and return of liquor control to the states. Four favored a government monopoly based on the Swedish example, as proposed by Henry Anderson. Two more favored Anderson's plan if further enforcement attempts failed. George Wickersham wanted the Eighteenth Amendment resubmitted, and if repealed he favored the Anderson plan. Only one commissioner seemed to still support prohibition in the hope that public support could eventually be generated.

The Wickersham Commission report was immediately attacked by newspapers and critics, who pointed out the contradictions between the facts described in the body of the report and the summary which Hoover signed. Walter Lippman charged that Hoover and the commission had evaded "a direct, explicit official confession that federal prohibition is a hopeless failure" (quoted in Kyvig 1979a, p. 114). A columnist in the *New York World* wrote an often-quoted satirical poem called "The Wickersham Report," summing up a common view of the report's conclusions:

Prohibition is an awful flop.
We like it.
It can't stop what it's meant to stop.
We like it.
It's left a trail of graft and slime
It don't prohibit worth a dime
It's filled our land with vice and crime,
Nevertheless, we're for it. (Quoted in Sinclair 1964, p. 336.)

The text of the commission's report focused on the issue of law obedience and enforcement, and it was indeed very critical of prohibition. The commission warned of "the injury to our legal and political institutions" resulting from disobedience to prohibition. Arguing that it is "axiomatic" that "a law will be observed and may be enforced only where and to the extent that it reflects or is an expression of the general opinion of the normally law-abiding elements of the community," the commission concluded: "It is therefore a serious impairment of the legal order to have a national law upon the books theoretically governing the whole land, and announcing a policy for the whole land which public opinion in many important centers will not enforce" (p. 49).

The commission also warned that the "widespread and scarcely or not at all concealed contempt for the policy of the National Prohibition Act" was having a serious, detrimental effect on the attitude and consciousness of the working class. Under the heading "other sources of resentment and irritation," the commission pointed out explicitly the class character of the resentment produced by prohibition:

In the nature of things it is easier to shut up the open drinking places and stop the sale of beer, which was drunk chiefly by working men, than to prevent the wealthy from having and using liquor in their homes and clubs. Naturally . . . laboring men resent the insistence of employers who drink that their employees be kept from temptation. Thus the law may be made to appear as aimed at and enforced against the insignificant while the wealthy enjoy immunity. This feeling is reinforced when it is seen that the wealthy are generally able to procure pure liquors, while those with less means may run the risk of poisoning. Moreover, searches of homes, especially under state laws, have necessarily seemed to bear more upon people of moderate means than upon those of wealth or influence (pp. 54-55).

In their individual statements, some of the commissioners expressed concern about the consequences if this condition should continue. The strongest personal statement on this point was from William S. Kenyon, who worried about the

report focused on the issue of enforcement, and it was indeed very serious. The commission warned of "the social institutions" resulting from prohibition. Arguing that it is "axiomatic" that law may be enforced only where there is respect or is an expression of the moral law-abiding elements of the community, it concluded: "It is therefore a necessary condition to have a national law governing the whole land, and the whole land which public opinion will not enforce" (p. 49).

It is evident that the "widespread and deep contempt for the policy of the government is having a serious, detrimental effect on the consciousness of the working class. Sources of resentment and irritation are being brought out explicitly the class characterized by prohibition:

It is easier to shut up the open drinking establishment, which was drunk chiefly by the wealthy from having and using money. Naturally . . . laboring men and women who drink that their employees are not law-abiding may be made to appear as insignificant while the wealthy are reinforced when it is seen that the law is against pure liquors, while those with money are poisoning. Moreover, searches of homes, have necessarily seemed to bear more heavily upon those of wealth or

And, some of the commissioners expressed their consequences if this condition continued. In a personal statement on this subject, Kenyon, who worried about the

effect on the general public of disobedience by "the 'upper crust' of society, meaning that portion of the very rich people of the nation constituting so-called fashionable society." Kenyon said:

It has been frankly stated before our commission that many of these people of great wealth and prominence will not obey the prohibition laws, do not intend to, and boast of that fact that they will not. . . . If that is to be the standard of law observance, our government will fail. The forger and the bank robber; the highwayman and the embezzler, do not believe in laws that restrain them. There is no more reason why what is termed the "upper crust" of society should choose the laws they will obey than the same privilege should extend to the "under crust" (p. 132).

In the midst of the depression, Kenyon explicitly reminded the wealthy that they need law obedience more than most people: "This government will continue to be a government of law" he said, "or it will cease to be a government at all." He continued: "The day may come in this country when representatives of great property interests will realize they need protection of the law for the properties they represent more than other people need it" (pp. 132-33). A year and a half later, in the worst year of the depression, as a tent city was created in Washington, D.C., by World War I veterans called the Bonus Marchers who were demanding their long-overdue bonus payment, and as scattered riots occurred throughout the country, one prominent member of the upper crust finally concluded that enough was enough.

*Rockefeller's
announcement*

On June 7, 1932, John D. Rockefeller Jr. made headline news across the country. On the eve of the Republican convention, Rockefeller released to the press a letter he had sent to Nicholas Murray Butler supporting repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. "I was born a teetotaler," wrote Rockefeller. "All my life I have been a teetotaler on principle. Neither my father nor his father ever tasted a drop of intoxicating liquor, nor have I." He also repeated the well-known fact that "with my father, I for years supported the Anti-Saloon League in both state and national work," contributing \$350,000 from

1900 to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919. He did not say, mainly because the extent of his contributions had become so controversial, that he and his father had contributed an additional \$487,000 between 1919 and 1929 (Memo to R. Fosdick, June 4, 1932, Box 52, Rockefeller Archives).³ After all these years of support, Rockefeller said that he had "slowly and reluctantly come to believe" that the benefits brought by prohibition "are more than outweighed by the evils that have developed and flourished since its adoption." Prohibition, therefore, should now be repealed.

Rockefeller's announcement was a bombshell. *The New York Times*, in one report from Washington, D.C., said that it "caused the greatest political sensation in the capital in years" (June 7, 1932, p. 1). Another *Times* article identified it "as perhaps the most dramatic single event bearing on the liquor question since the adoption of prohibition" (p. 12). Other stories reported "Drys are Resentful; Wet Chiefs Jubilant." The *Times* reported that "The wet forces generally accepted the conversion of Mr. Rockefeller as the greatest support that had been given to the repeal movement" (p. 1). *The New York Times*, like many other papers, carried the full text of the letter and for a number of days had major stories discussing reactions and consequences and quoting responses from other newspapers and prominent individuals around the country—most of which were extremely positive. Many people cited his courage and called on others to heed his advice. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt hailed Rockefeller's statement; William Randolph Hearst declared that "this letter will do more than any document which has appeared in the whole discussion of the prohibition question" (*New York Times*, June 8, 1932, p. 1). In a long article on "The Rise and Fall of Prohibition" in *Current History*, the political scientist Louis Hacker (1932, p. 672) summarized the impact of Rockefeller's announcement:

The statement by John D. Rockefeller Jr., practically on the eve of the meeting of the Republican National Convention appeared exactly at the right psychological moment. . . . There can be no

Eighteenth Amendment in 1919. To use the extent of his contributions as evidence, that he and his father had given \$487,000 between 1919 and 1929. On June 4, 1932, Box 52, Rockefeller wrote to his sons of support, Rockefeller said "I instantly come to believe" that the arguments "are more than outweighed by the evils that have developed and flourished since its enactment, and therefore, should now be repealed."

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question of the influence Mr. Rockefeller's declaration had on the American public; that it must have borne real weight with the Republican and Democratic platform makers it is also hard to doubt.

Rockefeller based his case against prohibition on the problem of "lawlessness." He claimed that drinking and drinking places had increased under prohibition, and that temperance had not been furthered. He did not, however, mention the tax revenues to be gained from legalizing liquor, nor the idea that a revived liquor industry would put men back to work and stimulate the economy. For Rockefeller, the central issue was lawlessness. "When the Eighteenth Amendment was passed," he wrote, "I earnestly hoped with a host of advocates of temperance, that it would be generally supported by public opinion." But, he explained:

This has not been the result, but rather . . . that a vast army of lawbreakers has been recruited and financed on a colossal scale; that many of our best citizens, piqued at what they regarded as an infringement of their private rights, have openly and unabashedly disregarded the Eighteenth Amendment; that as an inevitable result respect for all law has greatly lessened; that crime has increased to an unprecedented degree—I have slowly and reluctantly come to believe.

Rockefeller noted that he was not "unmindful" of the "benefits that have resulted" from prohibition. But, he warned darkly: "It is my profound conviction, however, that these benefits . . . are more than outweighed by the evils that have developed and flourished since its adoption, evils which unless promptly checked are likely to lead to conditions unspeakably worse than those which prevailed before." Although he did not discuss any alcohol control policies, he implied their importance by noting that repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment will not by itself "end all these evils and restore public respect for law." However, he concluded, "repeal is a prerequisite to the attainment of that goal."

The main thrust of Rockefeller's argument about lawlessness was well understood. *The New York Times*, under the heading "For Obedience to Law," quoted previous statements he had made on the topic. The *Times* linked these previous concerns of Rockefeller's with his announcement, by noting: "In conformity with this view, Mr. Rockefeller in his letter to Doctor Butler declared that while the Eighteenth Amendment remains upon the statute books it should be obeyed" (June 7, 1932, p. 1).

On June 8, the day following Rockefeller's announcement, *The New York Times'* headline read: "Leaders of 2,500,000 Wets Unite to Fight for Repeal; Spurred by Rockefeller." A new organization, The United Repeal Council, with Pierre du Pont as chairman, was created to lead the fight. The *Times* also reported on that day that E. W. Edwards, a Republican delegate and president of "one of the largest banks in the Middle West followed John D. Rockefeller Jr. today in changing his viewpoint on prohibition." Like Rockefeller, Edwards had concluded that "this experiment in moral legislation has done more evil than good" (*New York Times*, June 8, 1932, p. 1). On the day after that, the *Times'* headline announced that Dr. John Mott, the world head of the YMCA, had come out for resubmission of prohibition to the states. Mott said he had made his announcement out of respect to the " 'many good men' like John D. Rockefeller Jr. who have changed their opinions on the issue." Later in June, another long-time prohibitionist, Alfred P. Sloan Jr., the powerful head of General Motors, came out for repeal. "It is my belief," said Sloan, "that our whole social and economic structure will in this manner be greatly strengthened." Sloan was now convinced that "the road toward greater temperance with a resulting better standard of ethics in our country is through repeal" (quoted in Englemann 1979, p. 187).

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called a "wet-moist-dry" plank, favoring resubmission of prohibition to the states and, if repealed, retention of liquor control by the federal government. The Democratic party convention, meeting two weeks later, endorsed repeal and return of liquor control to the states. Franklin Roosevelt's backers had actually fought for a weaker statement, hoping not to alienate some dry supporters. But when Roosevelt made his acceptance speech he endorsed repeal. Roosevelt, however, did not make prohibition a major issue in the election; he campaigned on a relatively conservative program, promising to balance the budget and ensure fiscal integrity. There was during the campaign little hint of the dramatic changes Roosevelt would introduce and the hopefulness he would generate. In 1932 the U.S. was still in the absolute darkness of the depression.

In December 1932 the lame-duck Seventy-second Congress reconvened. Representatives of the AAPA and its women's affiliate, the Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform (WONPR), visited almost every senator, urging adoption of a repeal resolution. If Congress did not act now, they said, it would be a year until the new Congress convened. Further, over 40 state legislatures were still in session, but most of them would also not meet for a year or more. The leaders of the repeal forces argued that if a repeal resolution was submitted to the states by February, in time for the state legislatures to act, two years could be saved (Kyvig 1979a). On November 16, 1933, the Senate voted to submit the Twenty-first Amendment to state conventions for ratification. The House approved it on February 20.

Just the promise of repeal seemed to take people's minds off the depression. Roosevelt was sworn in as president on March 4, 1933. On March 13, he asked Congress to modify the Volstead Act to legalize 3.2 percent alcohol beer, stressing the need for additional tax revenue. Congress quickly responded and on April 7 beer was legal in most of the country.

"A shiny new beer truck bearing a huge sign, 'President Roosevelt, the first real beer is yours,' delivered two cases to the White House at 12:04 A.M. on the morning of the seventh while a crowd of eight hundred cheered outside the gates." This was a striking contrast to the scene ten months earlier, when the White House gates had been chained shut against the thousands of protesting Bonus Marchers. Now there were celebrations in cities and towns throughout the country. *The New York Times* reported that "Everywhere one went, in hotels, restaurants, clubs, homes, even in some speakeasies, people were drinking the new beer and smiling" (quotes from Kyvig 1979a, p. 177). In the middle of the depression it had begun to seem, as the campaign song had promised, that "Happy Days Are Here Again."

Michigan voted repeal on April 3, and by the end of June, 16 states had passed repeal. By the end of October, 14 more states ratified, including several traditional prohibition strongholds. On December 5, 1933, Utah became the thirty-sixth state to pass the Twenty-first Amendment. The Eighteenth Amendment was repealed.

II. Designing alcohol control: The Rockefeller reports

In the months preceding and following repeal, the question facing the political elite was: What types of political and economic structures should be established to replace the Eighteenth Amendment? In the years before prohibition in the U.S., there had never been systematic control of the liquor industry. And the Eighteenth Amendment has not eliminated the industry, of course, but rather had profoundly altered its shape and constitution. In 1933 a huge, sprawling, and illegal industry for producing and distributing alcoholic beverages already existed. Composed of uncountable numbers of small, independent distributors and producers, and

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some larger ones, for 14 years this industry had, as everyone noted, kept the U.S. well supplied with alcohol. It was precisely the mass patronage of this industry—and the political and economic implications of that patronage—that had convinced prominent supporters of prohibition like Rockefeller of the necessity of repeal. Prohibitionists had always argued that unlike other industries, the liquor business was inherently unregulatable. Now the task was to show that was not true and to create structures to make the industry yield taxes and obey laws. In short, repeal posed a massive problem in social engineering and control.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, the AAPA and other opponents of prohibition had cited Canada and certain European countries, especially Sweden and England, as examples of control systems that worked. Many systems relied on government monopolies over retail sale. The AAPA in a number of publications seemed to support some version of this, but the problem remained how to transplant these foreign systems into American free-enterprise soil. There was also the additional difficulty of not establishing a system so restrictive that it too invited disobedience. Americans, after all, were by now quite used to disobeying liquor laws. The task, as the catchall title for all alternatives to prohibition stated, was "liquor control"—in the fullest sense of the term.

Rockefeller plans a report

In January 1933, a month before Congress sent to the states the proposed Twenty-third Amendment, John D. Rockefeller Jr. made another important decision. Governor Lehman of New York asked Rockefeller to serve on a committee to plan liquor legislation in the event of repeal. After discussing the matter with advisors, Rockefeller decided not to participate because the committee might be, in his words, "more or less political, that it might have on it members representing brewers, etc." Rockefeller, however, came up with a better idea, as he wrote enthusiastically to Raymond Fosdick at the time:

I should myself undertake through various competent associates a thorough and complete study of the various methods which have been tried in various countries, looking toward the control of the use of alcoholic beverages, bring together this information in a printed volume, giving the points in favor of and against each method, and seeking in conclusion to offer certain concrete suggestions as to what might seem to be the wisest method to adopt (Letter to R. Fosdick, January 19, 1933, Rockefeller Archives).

Rockefeller wrote to Fosdick (who was in Europe) to ask him to head up this study. "I am enthusiastic about this matter," said Rockefeller. "That I should sponsor something of this kind, following my letter to President Butler last spring, seems natural and to be expected, and the least that I can do to help make effective for good the outcome which that letter advocated." In fact, when Rockefeller came out for repeal, the strongest criticism he had received was that he had offered no plan to replace prohibition. He was now about to remedy that.

The man Rockefeller turned to, Raymond Fosdick, was tailor-made for the job. He was an attorney with a long interest in government policy. As a student of Woodrow Wilson at Princeton, he had been influenced by Wilson's progressivist vision of public administration working closely with business. Fosdick met Rockefeller in 1915 as a staff member of a prostitution study of which Rockefeller was a board member. Rockefeller then commissioned Fosdick to research European police systems and to write two books showing what the United States could learn from them. Fosdick's books, still classics and recently reprinted, compared the sloppy and politically controlled American police to the trained professional European police. Fosdick then helped design and administer the American boot camps for soldiers during the First World War—a major problem of social planning and control. During the 1920s, Fosdick regularly advised Rockefeller on his donations and relations to prohibitionists, and he probably drafted the famous letter to Nicholas Murray Butler. By 1933, Fosdick was on the

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boards of several Rockefeller family organizations; he was soon to become the head of the Rockefeller Foundation, a position he would hold for many years; and he would eventually write both the history of the Rockefeller Foundation and what is still the only biography of John D. Rockefeller Jr. Raymond Fosdick was truly Rockefeller's trusted advisor.

Fosdick himself immediately asked Luther Gulick, the head of the Institute for Public Administration (IPA), to help *him*. The IPA, a Progressive-era research organization, had been short of funds in the 1920s and Fosdick, who was on the board of directors, had convinced Rockefeller to endow it. Luther Gulick, in part because of his relationship with Fosdick, was also tailor-made for the job. Gulick was soon to become a major figure in the field of public administration. Dwight Waldo, the intellectual historian of the field of public administration, has called Gulick's approach "the classic theory" of public administration. Waldo summarized it as "the theory that, taking efficiency as the objective, views administration as a technical problem concerned basically with the division of labor and the specialization of function." Writing about the classic theory, Waldo (1966) said that since its major statement in 1937,

a generation of young students have demolished the classical theory, again and again; they have uprooted it, thrashed it, thrown most of it away. By and large, the criticisms of the new generation have been well-founded. In many ways the classic theory was crude, presumptuous, incomplete, wrong in some of its conclusions, naive in its scientific methodology, parochial in its outlook. In many ways it was the end of a movement, not the foundation for a science. Nevertheless, not only is the classical theory still today the formal working theory of large numbers of persons technically concerned with administrative-organizational matters, both in the public and the private spheres, but I expect that it will be around a long, long, time (p. 37).

This conception of public administration, which Gulick wrote, which Fosdick supported, and which Rockefeller

financed, was the one which shaped contemporary alcohol control policy.

Gulick assigned two IPA staff members, Leonard Harrison and Elizabeth Laine, to research liquor control. Rockefeller also asked Albert Scott, an engineer and a friend who had worked with him on a large missionary project, to head the study along with Fosdick. This constituted the core of what was called The Liquor Study Committee.

*Toward Liquor
Control*

In the summer of 1933, the group assembled near the Rockefeller summer retreat in Maine to draft the report. Gulick, who came up late, explained what happened.

I soon sized up the situation. *The Committee had already arrived at its conclusion before the study was started; the research was mostly window dressing to prove its case; what was needed was a good solid program to set up a new national system of liquor control to take the place of prohibition, and a report presenting the next steps in a clear and convincing form.* [Emphasis added.]

The first draft "had to be done by one man, with staff help at some minor points of course," felt Gulick.

Fosdick naturally agreed and asked me to undertake the job. Of course, I had to say yes, but did so only with a promise from him to really put some time himself on the final task after I had a skeleton in hand.

So I drew up first a set of major program points based on my talks with Fosdick, Scott, Harrison and Miss Laine. . . . Next I designed a "report" using pieces from various staff memoranda.

This framework was approved by Scott and RBF. Harrison, Laine, and I then went to work writing up the result. Finally, RBF went off by himself for a week and with a good deal of material which he then wrote, gave the report in its final form and life. The real style of the document and its statesmanlike quality is due to him. (Letter from Luther Gulick to Richard S. Childs, May 2, 1977, Rockefeller Archives.)

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nouncing the release of *Toward Liquor Control* by Raymond Fosdick and Albert Scott. That day's press release contained the full text of Rockefeller's introduction to the book.

Rockefeller's statement began by reiterating his belief that total abstinence was best for the individual and society, and his conclusion that the attempt to enforce abstinence through the Eighteenth Amendment had been a "regrettable failure." Because of that failure, said Rockefeller, "*an evil even greater than intemperance resulted—namely, a nation-wide disregard for the law, with all the attendant abuses that followed in its train.*" As a result, Rockefeller's judgment was "[t]hat this intolerable situation should be done away with" and this task was "even more important for the moment than the promotion of temperance." He reminded people that "It was for that reason that I took a position more than a year ago in favor of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment." But repeal was only the first step in dealing with the problem. Therefore, he had commissioned Fosdick and Scott to study the question in order to develop "carefully laid plans of control." Rockefeller explained: "Rightly, *the first objective is the abolition of lawlessness.* Any program offered in lieu of the Eighteenth Amendment must make that its chief aim, *even if—and I weigh carefully what I say—the immediate result is temporarily away from temperance.* [Emphasis added.]" In his preface, Rockefeller stressed that generating respect for and obedience to the law should be the overwhelming concern of alcohol policy. "Men cannot be made good by force," he said. "In the end, intelligent lawmaking rests on the knowledge or estimate of what will be obeyed."

As Rockefeller indicated, the text of *Toward Liquor Control* made law obedience the central issue. In their recommendations, the authors declared that the first agenda was to rid the country of "the defiance of law that has grown up in the last fourteen years, the hypocrisy, the break-down in government machinery, the demoralization in public and private life, . . .

[and to] reestablish the integrity and dignity of the law" (p. 15). The introduction and conclusion to the book, both probably written by Fosdick, analyzed in some detail the issues involved in maintaining the legitimacy of the law. Under the heading, "The Limitations of the Law," it was observed:

Law does not enforce itself. Its machinery must be set in motion and kept in motion by human beings. As Dean Pound of Harvard has pointed out, there must be something more than the abstract content of the legal precept to move human beings to act. Certainly the only standard which the law has any hope of enforcing is the standard prevailing in the community as a whole. . . . In brief, to use the blunt phrase of "Golden Rule" Jones, former Mayor of Toledo: "Law in America is what the people will back up." Its authority is social acquiescence. Its life is in its enforcement. Victorious upon paper, it is powerless elsewhere. The test of its validity is the strength of the social reaction which supports it (p. 8).

The last pages of the book warned that law must be continually adjusted to the changing demands and customs of the population which it regulates and controls. "We need to be on our guard against any system of control that has outlived its usefulness and that no longer represents the prevalent ideas and attitudes of the community," wrote Fosdick and Scott.

In the last analysis, there is but one fundamental rule to be followed—and all other rules are corollaries: If the new system is not rooted in what the people of each state sincerely desire at this moment, it makes no difference how logical and complete it may appear as a statute—it cannot succeed (p. 152).

Though few at the time recognized it, *Toward Liquor Control* had taken as its central conclusions virtually all of the central policy recommendations made by the Committee of Fifty 30 years before. The Committee of Fifty's summary volume and the Rockefeller report both asserted that the legitimacy of the law must be of primary concern in liquor regulation. The reports agreed that the specific content of the

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cognized it, *Toward Liquor* ral conclusions virtually all of ations made by the Committee Committee of Fifty's summary report both asserted that the of primary concern in liquor that the specific content of the

law mattered less—far less—than that it be obeyed. Both reports urged that alcohol regulators adopt a flexible system, continually monitored and adjusted. And both reports advised that, if at all possible, government take over the selling of alcoholic beverages. Fosdick and probably the other study members had read the Committee of Fifty's books. The Committee was quoted at length on the corruption and lawlessness resulting from prohibition, now dramatically confirmed by national prohibition, and was listed seven times in the index, more than almost any other single item.

The specific plan for liquor control suggested by Fosdick and Scott, and their most controversial proposal, was that each state take over as a public monopoly the retail sale for off-premises consumption of spirits, fortified wine, and beer above 3.2 percent alcohol. "The primary task of the Authority would be the establishment of a chain of its own retail stores for the sale of the heavier alcoholic beverages by package only." The government-run outlets of Quebec and other Canadian provinces, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the Carlisle State Management Scheme in England were cited as working examples of such a plan. This quickly became known as the "Monopoly plan" and was usually called the "Rockefeller plan."

For those states not willing to establish government liquor stores, Fosdick and Scott proposed a parallel system: "regulation by license." England was cited as the best example of a working license system. A single, nonpartisan board appointed by the governor would have statewide authority to issue liquor licenses and regulate the industry. There would be no "tied house" permitted, that is, no retail establishment owned directly by a distiller or brewer or under exclusive contract.

For both plans, *Toward Liquor Control* outlined a detailed set of matters over which the state agency would have jurisdiction. These included the power to acquire real estate

and other capital by purchase, lease, or condemnation; determine and change prices at will; establish a system of personal identification of purchasers; issue permits for and regulate the use of beer and wine for off-premises consumption and for on-premises consumption in "hotels, restaurants, clubs, railway dining cars, and passenger boats"; require alcohol manufacturers and importers to report on quantities; regulate or eliminate alcoholic beverage advertising; determine the internal design, visibility from the street, hours and days of sale, number, and locations of alcohol outlets.

Although it described guidelines for a licensing plan, *Toward Liquor Control* favored the monopoly plan over private businesses. The possibility of increasing profits, they said, would encourage private businesses to sell more alcohol, buy political influence and lax enforcement, and violate laws. The chief advantage of government-owned liquor stores was explained by Rockefeller in his foreword. "Only as the profit motive is eliminated," Rockefeller wrote, "is there any hope of controlling the liquor traffic in the interest of a decent society. To approach the problem from any other angle is only to tinker with it and to insure failure. This point cannot be too heavily stressed." The irony of a Rockefeller speaking about the dangers of the profit motive was not lost on observers at the time. Like others, Rockefeller and his associates had concluded, probably correctly, that government ownership of retail sale brought greater powers to regulate and control behavior, and ensure obedience to the law.

The sophisticated public relations operation run by Ivy Lee, which handled other Rockefeller announcements and projects, made sure that the report received maximum attention. After the October 6 announcement, the book was released in regular portions and sent out to newspapers and magazines as major press releases. Many newspapers, like *The New York Times*, published each portion of the book as it arrived.

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Two and a half weeks later, the last installment was released, the book was officially issued, and thousands of copies were sent out to the press, state legislators, policy makers, and influential citizens.

Not surprisingly, the response to *Toward Liquor Control* was very favorable. *The Chicago Daily News* told its readers that the book's conclusions "are well worthy of careful study by law makers. They are the conclusions of enlightened and liberal minds and are based on common sense." *The New York World Telegram* said that it contained "excellent general reminders and guides," and *The Baltimore Sun* reported that "The Rockefeller report has done a service to the country and to the cause of temperance." (All quoted in *Literary Digest*, October 28, 1933.) *The Nation* praised it twice. On November 8, in a full-page, signed editorial, the editor of *The Nation* declared: "John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Does a Fine Job." Rockefeller, he said, had "rendered a public service of great value in sponsoring the book," and "nobody should be allowed to discuss the problem hereafter unless he perused the volume." Two weeks later (on November 22), another article in *The Nation* urged that *Toward Liquor Control* "be placed immediately in the hands of all who will participate in liquor control legislation," and commended Rockefeller, "perhaps the outstanding pillar of the profit system," for recommending that the profit motive be removed from the liquor business. *The Commonwealth* said in November that "few, if any, more timely practically useful acts of public service have ever been performed in the field of social research than the study sponsored by John D. Rockefeller, Jr."

Rockefeller himself received a great deal of mail thanking him for the report. Edgar Allan Poe, Jr., one of the leaders of an antiprohibition organization, the Crusaders, told him that he intended to draw upon it "extensively in some speeches I have been asked to make in the City with relation to our Liquor Control Bill." The governor of Virginia wrote

to Rockefeller twice, first to praise him, and then to say he had asked Fosdick and Scott to consult with him about setting up Virginia's liquor control. (All letters are in the Rockefeller Archives.)

The most pertinent letter Rockefeller received (from the point of view of this article) was from Francis Peabody, the former secretary of the Committee of Fifty. Thirty years earlier, in 1904, Peabody had edited *The Liquor Problem*, the summary volume of the committee's conclusions. Now, Peabody, a personal acquaintance of Rockefeller, wrote to express his approval and to say "how much satisfaction I have found in the Report of your agents." Peabody said that he agreed completely with the plan for a government monopoly, and that he thought that the Fosdick and Scott report concurred with the aims of the group that "some thirty years ago I had the privilege of organizing." Peabody had every reason to be gratified: the Committee of Fifty's views had finally triumphed, validated in the most prestigious way imaginable.

The report also received some criticism. The *New York Daily News*, for instance, dismissed it, observing that Rockefeller's "contribution to the Anti-Saloon League did a lot to foist Prohibition on us." The *News* argued that "the people can solve their liquor problems better than John or any other reformed Prohibitionist can" (quoted in *Literary Digest*, October 28, 1933, p. 10). Perhaps the most trenchant criticism of the book was a review in *Christian Century* (November 11, 1933), titled "Fitting the Law to the Lawless," by a moderate prohibitionist (W. E. Garrison). "It seems fair to say," said the reviewer, "that the guiding principle in the report is the desire to construct a system which will be satisfactory to the people who want to buy and drink liquor that they will not find the legal hindrances annoying." While the author did not argue with that point, he did draw out some of its broader implications:

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In the very foreground of the Rockefeller report's argument is the wish to "reestablish the integrity and dignity of the law." Yet the assumption is that the people who want to drink alcoholic beverages have firmly determined that they will not respect any law which conflicts with their desire. . . . I find in all its pages not one glimmer of hope that anybody will obey, or ought to be expected to obey, any law that does not tell him to do what he was going to do anyway. The authors may be right. I am not arguing the point except to say that adjusting the law to the wishes of those who have shown themselves despisers of law (meaning patrons of the bootleggers) does not seem to me a procedure well calculated to "reestablish the integrity and dignity of the law." There is a story, so old that it may have been forgotten, of a man who orders his dog to go outdoors. Instead, the dog slunk under the bed. "Very well," he said sternly, "go under the bed. I will be obeyed."

This reviewer had correctly seen that the Rockefeller Commission's plan for alcohol control was concerned with creating the immediate *illusion* of authority and control. What he had not understood, however, was the importance of that illusion in the short- and long-term process of developing and maintaining real authority and control over the alcohol industry, and over the larger society. The legitimacy and authority of all law required that this alcohol law appear to be effective. For the sake of the whole system of state regulation, as well as the possibility of any future workable alcohol regulation, alcohol law did indeed have to be "fitted" around those who were willing to violate it. It had to be made to seem as if the masses of people were obeying the law.

Alcohol control laws

Fosdick decided that *Toward Liquor Control* would contain detailed guidelines but would not propose model laws. He understood that it was an important task, and he assigned Luther Gulick to write the sample law. Gulick, who eventually became something of an expert in drafting model laws, turned to another progressivist organization, The National Municipal League, to draft a model liquor control law. Gulick gathered what he called "a dozen close friends and members of our IPA board" with ex-governor Frank O. Lowden as chairman, and formed The Committee of Liquor

Control Legislation of the National Municipal League. Gulick served as secretary of the committee. On November 11, 1933, a month before repeal went into effect, at the National Municipal League convention, the committee endorsed the Rockefeller report and the Liquor Authority plan.

The National Municipal League Convention also heard an address on the principles of liquor control legislation by Pierre du Pont. As head of the AAPA, du Pont represented the only powerful group speaking on the topic of alcohol control. Besides having led the fight for repeal, the directors of the AAPA were the top executives and board members of many major corporations. Clearly, what they thought about alcohol control would be important. Without explicitly saying so, du Pont overwhelmingly supported the conclusions of *Toward Liquor Control*. In his address he listed what he called "the fundamentals of satisfactory liquor control," and the first two points he listed were the central conclusions of the Rockefeller report. First, he declared, "All operations concerning the manufacture, sale, transportation and use of alcoholic liquors must be brought into legal and honorable channels as quickly as possible *in order to restore respect for law* and respect for a national morale that has suffered much under prohibition." And second, he recommended, "The places and time for sale of alcoholic beverages must conform to popular demand, even though we may deplore the existence of this demand and may be tempted to turn to prohibitory law and forceful methods for its regulation or suppression." In short, du Pont ringingly seconded the general principles of alcohol control outlined by Fosdick and Scott.

The statement of the committee, the draft of the Model Law for a State Alcohol Authority, and the speeches were published in a supplement to the *National Municipal Review* in January 1934, the first month of Repeal, and widely circulated to legislators throughout the country. State legislators faced with difficult political choices, and with little

National Municipal League. the committee. On November repeal went into effect, at the convention, the committee endorsed the Liquor Authority plan.

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personal expertise in the subtle question of liquor regulation, turned to the authoritative and virtually unchallenged plans of the Rockefeller commission and the National Municipal League. Gulick estimated that the monopoly law was taken almost verbatim by 15 states, and the licensing law served as the text or draft for many more (Letter from Luther Gulick to Richard S. Childs, May 2, 1977, Rockefeller Archives).

After Repeal

In 1936, a second volume of the Rockefeller-sponsored Liquor Study Committee was issued. Written by Leonard Harrison and Elizabeth Laine, staff researchers on the first book, it included an introduction by Luther Gulick. The book, *After Repeal: A Study of Liquor Control Administration*, analyzed the results of liquor control after "a two year trial," and described the most important changes and innovations in liquor administration instituted since repeal.⁴

The overall thrust of the report was that, with some understandable exceptions, alcohol control worked extremely well. Still, the last pages of the book emphasized what the authors regarded as the central issue:

In a very real sense the whole administrative task of liquor control is one of law enforcement. . . . Two decades ago, the public believed that the evils connected with the liquor traffic would not or could not be corrected by public officials and that prohibition was the only remedy. A national revulsion against the breakdown of law enforcement was what caused prohibition's repeal. The liquor issues of the future will be decided, as always before, on the basis of success or failure in enforcement of whatever kind of control is attempted. [Emphasis added.]

III. Regulating daily life: the order of alcohol control

The two Progressive-era liquor reforms, prohibition and alcohol control, shared a common political and economic agenda. Both sought to alter the entire terrain of alcohol production, distribution, and consumption. They agreed that the state and law were appropriate mechanisms for doing

that. Both sought centrally directed efforts at transforming the industry and social life associated with drinking. The Anti-Saloon League, on the one hand, and the Committee of Fifty and the Rockefeller reports, on the other hand, rejected laissez-faire models of the state. Unlike the general thrust of nineteenth-century temperance and prohibition crusades which saw social change arising from a broad reformation of the character and morals of the American people as a whole, the Progressive-era efforts sought to impose laws primarily because of people's flawed characters and morals. In Gusfield's terms (1963), whereas the nineteenth-century reformers sought "assimilative" reform, the twentieth-century approach was "coercive" reform.

Because alcohol control has seemed so much more "permissive" than prohibition, alcohol control's coercive and interventionist character has been largely unnoticed—it has seemed "natural" and unproblematic. For example, in his recent study of the AAPA, David Kyvig (1979a) has argued that what really motivated the wealthy men who led the fight for repeal—in addition to reducing taxes and concern for lack of respect for the law—was a deeply felt conservative libertarianism: they were appalled by the intrusion of government, especially the federal government, into so personal a matter of daily life as drinking alcohol. Kyvig argues that the heads of the AAPA, including du Pont, Raskob, Sabin, and others, were motivated by a fear that government was, in effect, becoming an intrusive "big brother" interfering with all aspects of social and economic life. Kyvig's argument makes a certain amount of sense: these wealthy industrialists and bankers strongly disliked some kinds of government regulation. In the 1930s, after winning the fight for repeal, they constituted the core of the big business opposition to Roosevelt. Reorganizing themselves as the Liberty League, they opposed Roosevelt's programs for Social Security, the WPA, and other welfare and social service programs—they even opposed child labor laws (Wolfskill 1962; Kyvig 1979b). However, the leaders and board of the AAPA clearly were

directed efforts at transforming the association with drinking. The one hand, and the Committee of ports, on the other hand, rejected state. Unlike the general thrust of temperance and prohibition crusades arising from a broad reformation of the American people as a whole, temperance sought to impose laws primarily on characters and morals. In contrast to the nineteenth-century reformers, the twentieth-century ap-

seemed so much more "permissive" control's coercive and intervention largely unnoticed—it has been problematic. For example, in his book David Kyvig (1979a) has argued that the wealthy men who led the fight against reducing taxes and concern for the government was a deeply felt conservative fear that government was, in effect, a "big brother" interfering with economic life. Kyvig's argument is that these wealthy industrialists, some kinds of government winning the fight for repeal, the big business opposition to themselves as the Liberty League, programs for Social Security, the social service programs—they (Volfskill 1962; Kyvig 1979b). of the AAPA clearly were

not against all government regulation. They were much more class-conscious and self-interested than Kyvig implies, and they sometimes found government intervention useful when it served their interests.

Alcohol control was not, in fact, the diminution of government control over daily life, and it aimed not to reduce government involvement in the production and distribution of alcohol. Rather, alcohol control aimed to substantially strengthen and enhance government power and involvement. The advocates of liquor control proposed to construct and administer a system of regulation far more pervasive, intrusive, and effective than anything before established in the United States. The leaders of the AAPA did not shy away from such government involvement—they welcomed it and encouraged it. After repeal, for example, Pierre du Pont sat on the Liquor Control Board of Delaware for a number of years, as did other leaders of the AAPA and its sister organization, WONPR, in other states. Some of the control systems they advocated, the Swedish model in particular, were remarkably intrusive. The Swedish system, usually known as the Bratt plan, required that each citizen be issued a passbook which would be stamped every time he or she bought alcohol, and each person would be rationed a specific amount each month.

A historical parallel helps to pinpoint the issue. Michel Foucault (1979) has observed that penal reformers at the end of the eighteenth century who sought to eliminate torture as a means of punishment are usually pictured as humanitarians seeking to eliminate the excesses and inhumanities of torture. They were, says Foucault, concerned with these things, but they were concerned with more. The reformers had become convinced that torture no longer worked as a system of control. Its excesses and arbitrariness enraged the very population it was meant to intimidate. Instead of standing in awe in front of the scaffold, angry mobs tore it down. Foucault argues that the penal reformers, middle-class fol-

lowers of the Enlightenment, had not only a negative aim, the elimination of the excesses and brutalities of torture, but also a positive aim, punishment and correction that really worked. In Foucault's words: "They sought to insert the power to punish deeper into the body politic." Similarly, I am suggesting that the advocates of alcohol control wanted more than the elimination of the problems created by the Eighteenth Amendment. The advocates of alcohol control also sought greater and more effective regulation of the alcohol industry as a way of further controlling a range of everyday behaviors, experiences, and thoughts associated with drinking. They sought to insert the power to regulate deeper into everyday life by intervening into every aspect of the production and distribution of alcoholic drink.

During Prohibition, the liquor business was wide open. Speakeasies closed when they wished or not at all; they sold whatever they wanted, to whomever they wanted, at whatever price they wanted. They decorated as they wished, provided whatever food or entertainment they wished. Producers made alcohol in any strength they wanted, in any way they wanted, using whatever products they wanted. Neither producers nor distributors paid any taxes (except for payments to police and politicians) and they were not regulated by any government agency. During Prohibition the liquor industry was probably the freest big business in American society.

Alcohol control, on the contrary, was premised on massive government intervention into every aspect of the liquor business. Controversial issues, such as whether food must be served, women admitted, music and games banned, bars and barstools allowed, all had to be settled. The number, types, and locations of on-premises and off-premises outlets, and their hours of sale, had to be determined. Producers had to be regulated to ensure that products were safe and of a uniform alcohol content. In order to eliminate untrustworthy or disreputable persons, both producers and distributors had

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history, was premised on massive regulation of every aspect of the liquor industry, such as whether food must be served and games banned, bars and restaurants settled. The number, types, and locations of off-premises outlets, and the hours were determined. Producers had to ensure their products were safe and of a certain quality to eliminate untrustworthy producers and distributors had

to be screened and licensed, and they had to be made to pay taxes. Moreover, this all had to be done so as not to upset the abstaining portion of the population—about half the adults. And it had to be done without making regulation so tight, or taxes so high, that drinkers preferred to patronize their bootlegger or speakeasy—to return to patterns of law disregard. Constructing alcohol control, in fact, involved issues of government regulation so large as to make some of the classic Progressive-era concerns—regulating meat-packing, for example—seem paltry in comparison. Except for national prohibition, alcohol control is probably the most striking twentieth-century example of government force used to fundamentally reshape an entire industry and the way its products are consumed.

Transformations

Postrepeal regulation transformed the alcohol beverage production industry. Other nations, notably Finland, had nationalized production of spirits, but such proposals were not seriously discussed in the United States. Instead, production was monopolized by a relatively few corporations. Alcohol control transformed production even more dramatically than had prohibition. Before the Eighteenth Amendment, liquor was produced by many small distillers and a number of larger ones. During Prohibition, the distilling industry was further divided: many more small and individual distillers operated profitably. However, within four or five years of repeal, 75 to 90 percent of all distilled liquor in the United States was manufactured by only four corporations (Culver and Thomas 1940). The beer industry, while more diverse nationally because beer required local and quick distribution, was monopolized by region or area. Both federal and state regulatory agencies preferred to deal with a few large corporations—they were easier to police, to make agreements with, and more likely to be concerned with keeping the image of the industry clean and respectable. This pattern of monopolization was not unique, of course: most major American industries—steel, automobiles, soft drinks, chemicals, for example—were increasingly dominated by three or four

corporations. Alcohol production was exceptional only in the speed of monopolization.

While production was monopolized, distribution was splintered and scattered. Perhaps the most important long-term innovation in post-Prohibition alcohol regulation was that it distributed the legal selling of alcohol to a wide variety of sites. Before Prohibition the saloon had been a single, all-purpose institution—there one drank beer, wine, or spirits, and there one purchased for off-premises consumption a bottle of spirits or a bucket of beer (beer canning and bottling had not yet developed on a large scale; most pre-Prohibition and Prohibition-era beer was keg beer). After repeal, alcohol control created several different types of establishments to sell alcoholic beverages. In most states special stores were created to sell only distilled liquor—often they could not sell any food at all, or even cigarettes. Beer, on the other hand, was made relatively widely available in bottles and cans—grocery stores and small markets were licensed to sell it. In other words, after Prohibition, alcohol was increasingly separated from the public drinking place; drinking became increasingly privatized. Whether alone or with others, drinking became something more commonly done at home. By 1941, off-premises consumption accounted for the majority of alcohol sales (Kyvig 1979a, p. 189). Finally, distribution was severed from production: “tied house” laws in most states banned or restricted economic connections between producers and retailers.

The character of public drinking was significantly altered by these legal and regulatory changes. A new class of licenses for on-premises consumption of beer only, or of beer and wine, was established and liberally issued to restaurants, diners, cafeterias, and greasy spoons. This separated out the bar-room selling distilled liquor and beer as a distinct institution. Many state alcohol control laws made provision for a local option whereby a county government could prohibit specific kinds of liquor selling within its borders. This option has

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been widely exercised. As late as 1973, of the 3,073 counties in the United States, 672 prohibited sales of distilled liquor by the drink for on-premises consumption, and 545 totally prohibited sales of distilled spirits (Joint Committee of the States 1973).

Under alcohol control, all establishments for on-premises consumption of spirits were specifically restricted and shaped in a multitude of ways. In some areas, spirit sales were limited to bona fide restaurants with laws specifying how many feet of kitchen space and how many food preparation workers there must be. All or most states have restrictions on the following: the number of entrances and their locations—back entrances are usually prohibited; the times of day and days of the week a place selling alcohol may be open; what decorations are prohibited; the degree of visibility of the interior from the street; the numbers and uses of other rooms; distance of the establishment from churches, schools, and other alcohol outlets; whether customers may sit at a long bar—a counter with a foot railing—or whether they must sit at tables; the ratio of chair seating to bar seating. Many states prohibit dancing or live music except under special license. Most gambling or betting is prohibited, and other games are restricted as well—for many years, New York and other states did not allow barrooms to have pinball machines. Many states specifically ban the use of the word "saloon," others the use of the word "bar," and some prohibit all words to indicate a drinking place. In California until recently the only sign allowed other than the name was a symbol, a tilted glass with a stirrer.

The effect of all these changes was to eliminate the saloon as *it had been*. For the Committee of Fifty, the most noxious feature of the saloon was not that it sold drink, but that it was the center of working-class social life—the "workingman's club." From this stemmed its subversive character. As the committee explained, "liquor dealers are not the proper persons to have charge of the social life of our

American working people." Because it was the saloon's "social functions" and not its beverages which were most problematic, the committee did not call for prohibition. Rather, the committee sought what it called bluntly "the legislative repression of the social side of saloon life." This agenda was shared by prohibitionists, of course: in 1933 wets as well as dries agreed that suppression of the traditional working-class saloon was one of prohibition's truly valuable achievements. Alcohol control has extended and made permanent the transformation begun during Prohibition. The barroom is no longer *the center* of (male) working-class social life, and working-class leisure has been systematically integrated into traditional middle-class patterns, especially into homelife. New amusements and activities, many of which include drinking, have become "substitutes for the saloon" as the Committee of Fifty proposed. The barroom has ceased to be the primary meeting place for union organizers and leftists, and mainstream politicians no longer find it a major recruiting agency. One does not go there to get a job or help from a politician. In certain carefully controlled forms, the working-class *drinking* place remains, but it exists in an entirely different context from the old saloon, and with none of its political and economic functions.

From a pre-Prohibition or Prohibition-era perspective, there are two other surprising characteristics of postrepeal alcohol control. First, virtually all laws and regulations are obeyed. Drinking places, for example, scrupulously stop serving and collect glasses at the required hours; and they observe the regulations about tables, dancing, decorations, signs, entrances, and so on. Overwhelmingly, alcohol law is obeyed.⁵ Second, postrepeal alcohol regulation is usually not perceived as especially restrictive by customers. The many laws and restrictions are rarely noticed or are completely taken for granted.

A third, less surprising characteristic of postrepeal alcohol control is that policy is not aimed at maximizing what

" Because it was the saloon's its beverages which were most e did not call for prohibition. ght what it called bluntly "the social side of saloon life." This itionists, of course: in 1933 wets t suppression of the traditional ie of prohibition's truly valuable rol has extended and made per- begun during Prohibition. The center of (male) working-class s leisure has been systematically middle-class patterns, especially ments and activities, many of ve become "substitutes for the of Fifty proposed. The barroom nary meeting place for union nainstream politicians no longer ncy. One does not go there to get n. In certain carefully controlled icking place remains, but it exists xt from the old saloon, and with ionic functions.

rohibition-era perspective, there acteristics of postrepeal alcohol ws and regulations are obeyed. , scrupulously stop serving and d hours; and they observe the ncing, decorations, signs, en- mingly, alcohol law is obeyed.' regulation is usually not per- by customers. The many laws ced or are completely taken for

acteristic of postrepeal alcohol t aimed at maximizing what

nineteenth-century and Progressive-era reformers called "temperance"—meaning, above all, reducing habitual drunkenness or repeated heavy drinking as a way of reducing other social problems, especially poverty, crime, individual failure, family dissolution, violence, and illness. Those are not the aims of alcohol control. In his preface to *Toward Liquor Control*, Rockefeller maintained that such things could not be the concerns of liquor regulation—they would have to be taken up by other agencies and incorporated as part of broader educational efforts. In effect, alcohol control carved out a separate space or a distinct series of tasks, apart from the issue of liquor regulation, for public education and health. And since repeal these tasks have been taken up by a number of independent and government groups, notably Alcoholics Anonymous and the National Council on Alcoholism, various state alcoholism agencies, and in 1970 a federal agency—the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Alcohol control is concerned with public order and not public health.⁶

For nearly 50 years, alcohol control has smoothly, quietly, and effectively organized and managed not only the production, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages, but also much of the social life associated with drinking. What once seemed impossible was actually achieved very quickly and efficiently. It is a coercive system, but one designed in a particular way—as *Christian Century* (Garrison 1933) noted: to some extent regulation has been shaped around the preferences of drinkers and the desires of the alcohol beverage industry. As the Committee of Fifty recommended, alcohol regulation has been concerned above all with promoting "order, quiet, and outward decency" and has sought "all external, visible improvements." It has successfully done this by working to keep friction and conflict between individuals and the system to a minimum. The social environment of drinking—how it is sold, where, when, in what kinds of places—all this has been subject to intense manipulation. Yet unlike the situation under contemporary marijuana prohibi-

tion, for example, individual consumers are rarely cited for violating liquor laws: they do not come in conflict with the state; normally they do not even feel it impinge. Alcohol regulation is not a part of everyday consciousness and therefore it does not raise any broader political questions about law or government.

A general, comprehensive set of principles has been articulated from the Committee of Fifty, to both Rockefeller-sponsored books, to the most recent report by the organization of alcohol control administrators (Joint Committee of the States 1973). Since the early twentieth century, all authorities have agreed that the regulation of this particular area of daily life requires minimizing political, ideological, and cultural resistance to the regulatory system while maximizing social control and order. The system is organized so that the task of administrators is to maintain social order and discipline by flexibly using the powers contained in a battery of potential interventions. The image and example of "lawless" unregulated prohibition are available as a sort of rhetorical and ideological resource, and are cited even in present-day publications: "We don't want to bring back the situation of prohibition when there was no law or regulation" is the warning. The alcohol beverage industry now has much to lose by disorder; the handful of corporations which monopolize production have a major stake in keeping the system functioning without resistance. The underlying logic of alcohol control has become institutionally, ideologically, and administratively hegemonic: the most important tasks are maintaining orderliness, obedience to law, and the acceptance of the broader government system of regulating daily life.

Despite frequent claims to the contrary, alcohol control has of course sought to legislate morality—not the morality of the nineteenth-century Victorian middle class, but the morality of the new business and professional middle class, of the corporate elite, and to some extent of the twentieth-century working class. Production has been monopolized, distribu-

al consumers are rarely cited for not coming in conflict with the law, even feel it impinge. Alcohol is part of everyday consciousness and raises any broader political questions

of principles has been articulated. Fifty, to both Rockefeller-sponsored report by the organization of the Joint Committee of the Twentieth Century, all authorities on this particular area of daily life, political, ideological, and cultural system while maximizing social order is organized so that the task of maintaining social order and discipline by a battery of potential examples of "lawless" unregulated behavior as a sort of rhetorical and cited even in present-day publications to bring back the situation of "no law or regulation" is the reason the liquor industry now has much to lose. The underlying logic of alcohol control is that the most important tasks are to maintain obedience to law, and the accepted system of regulating daily

life. In contrast, alcohol control has been a morality—not the morality of the middle class, but the morality of the professional middle class, of the extent of the twentieth-century economy has been monopolized, distribu-

tion scattered, and the working-class "saloon" stripped of its political and economic functions. Unlike other "vices" or "pleasures"—prostitution, gambling, marijuana, heroin, or cocaine—alcohol is not an outlawed industry in the hands of independent entrepreneurs paying off police and government officials. The heads of the major alcohol-producing corporations are members of the economic establishment with an investment in maintaining order and obedience to law. All of this happened, I am suggesting in this article, not because people voted for it, or because it was "natural," but for specific historical and sociological reasons.

IV. Conclusion

The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment was not inevitable, nor was the creation of alcohol control when and in the form it was instituted. National prohibition would not have been enacted without a mass movement organized around the idea that alcohol was a destructive and demonic substance. But the existence of that movement, and of the public support it gathered, was not enough to pass an amendment to the Constitution. Many issues with a majority of public support—the recent Equal Rights Amendment, for example—do not get written into the Constitution. The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified in part because no significant elements of the corporate elite opposed it, and a number of important corporations and individuals supported it. Wealthy businessmen supported prohibition because they thought it would reduce crime and other social problems; make workers more efficient, productive, and disciplined; and eliminate the saloon as a center for working-class social and political life. To many businessmen at the time, prohibition seemed like a good deal.

However, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act created new problems that members of the corporate elite came to regard as detrimental and threatening to their economic and political interests. Some, notably the leaders of

the AAPA, believed that prohibition was costing them a great deal of money because of lost liquor tax revenue. They and others also believed that prohibition was turning the working class and much of the middle class against the government and law. Prohibitionists in the 1920s were the first to argue that mass disobedience to prohibition was creating disrespect for all law, including property rights, and helping the cause of Communists and radicals. Increasing numbers of those opposed to prohibition became convinced of that during the 1920s, but it took the upheavals and devastation of the Great Depression to fully make the threat of mass revolt seem real to significant elements of the political and economic elite.

Respect for capitalism and the legal order it required did indeed appear to be coming undone in the 1930s. To many people, law and government in the United States no longer seemed to be concerned with the interests or the welfare of most people. The Great Depression created the most serious crisis of the legitimacy of the state and of law in twentieth-century America, and most establishment observers concluded that prohibition was making things worse. The Wickersham Commission found that prohibition was inducing law disobedience, undermining respect for law and government, and fostering resentment among the working class. During the 1930s, a number of wealthy businessmen who had originally supported prohibition turned against it because they became convinced that the lack of respect for law generated by prohibition, coupled with the conditions of the depression, had created an explosive situation. As Sinclair (1964) has pointed out:

This lawlessness, spawned by prohibition, now threatened to spread with mass unemployment, and shake the roots of society. The same employers who had supported the Eighteenth Amendment a decade earlier to benefit themselves and their workers now advocated repeal to protect themselves from their workers. They hoped that legal beer would relieve some of the social tensions of the time and lessen class hatred (p. 384).

prohibition was costing them a great deal of lost liquor tax revenue. They and prohibition was turning the working middle class against the government in the 1920s were the first to argue prohibition was creating disrespect for property rights, and helping the cause of criminals. Increasing numbers of those who became convinced of that during the hardships and devastation of the Great Depression, the threat of mass revolt seemed real to the political and economic elite.

And the legal order it required did not seem undone in the 1930s. To many in the United States no longer aligned with the interests or the welfare of the country, the depression created the most serious crisis of the state and of law in twentieth-century history. Most establishment observers concluded that prohibition was making things worse. The fact that prohibition was undermining respect for law and law, and resentment among the working class, and a number of wealthy businessmen had turned prohibition against it convinced that the lack of respect for law, coupled with the conditions of the depression, had created an explosive situation. As Sin-

cey prohibition, now threatened to undermine the roots of society. It supported the Eighteenth Amendment and it themselves and their workers now turned away from their workers. They believed some of the social tensions of the time (p. 384).

Nineteen thirty-two was probably the worst year of the depression. There seemed to be nothing that anyone could do to affect the economy: the presidential campaign produced no new economic proposals or program—Roosevelt campaigned on fiscal conservatism and balancing the budget. But significant elements of the elite had concluded that at least something could be done to remove one major source of public resentment. The Repeal Amendment was speeded through Congress and then the states—it was made available for people to vote on—because Rockefeller and the directors of the AAPA, and those they represented, were convinced that something had to be done to restore some degree of public confidence in law and government and to reduce public resentment of government.

The state policy for regulating liquor which was established at that time sought to carve out an area of social life where law was obeyed, where the system worked. As late as 1931, repeal had still seemed impossible. As a result many people, especially representatives of labor, proposed not repeal but modification of the Volstead Act to allow for legal sale of beer and wine. This was unacceptable to Rockefeller and the AAPA because it still left a large area of drinking behavior illegal and thus did not speak to the central issue of developing respect for law. Only by creating a situation where every aspect of drinking could be legal would a fully "lawful" environment be established. And the alcohol control policy which was established did help to affirm the legitimacy of the state and its law. The rebelliousness and discontent associated with liquor restriction were eliminated almost immediately: the taxes were collected and the laws obeyed.

It is important to recognize, however, that the institutionalization of alcohol control was by no means a complete victory for the corporate elite. Many of them, perhaps most, had supported prohibition and only reluctantly gave up on it. Those like Rockefeller who changed their minds in the 1930s had repeal forced upon them by the very population they

sought to control. Unable to end the depression, and unwilling to make significant economic changes, they felt obliged to make symbolic and cultural changes—to make it cheaper and easier for working people to drink. Legal sale of alcohol did not, of course, quell riot and revolt. That was largely accomplished by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the symbolic and real measures of the New Deal. But elite and upper-class support for repeal, set in motion before Roosevelt took office, was the first and perhaps final unified response to the depression of nearly the whole capitalist class.

The often-cited lesson of prohibition—that one cannot legislate morality—is actually a way of addressing in a kind of shorthand code a more complicated problem. It is what Rockefeller and Fosdick spoke to directly in *Toward Liquor Control*: the problem of how an elite can regulate society in its interests while obtaining the consent of the governed. Rockefeller and Fosdick were acutely aware that they were attempting to use the state to control a volatile population which could nullify, by individual and collective action, *any law*—not just alcohol prohibition. However, even during the depression the upper class was not willing to alter fundamental property laws or even change the distribution of wealth. These were the essentials which had to be preserved. But if necessary, concessions could be made on lifestyle and cultural issues.

Alcohol control was a compromise made by the political and economic elite: they found it necessary and desirable to make concessions partly because so many people were willing to engage in “lawless” behavior. The presumed costs of increased alcohol consumption were no longer as important to them as increases in tax revenue, the continued legitimacy of law and government, and working-class good will. Perhaps the largest specific concession to the working class was making beer widely available—in groceries, delicatessens, and markets of all sorts, as well as in inexpensive restaurants, diners, and cafes. In most places where workers bought food

to end the depression, and unwilling economic changes, they felt obliged to make cultural changes—to make it cheaper for people to drink. Legal sale of alcohol was a riot and revolt. That was largely the work of Roosevelt and the symbolic and the Deal. But elite and upper-class opposition before Roosevelt took perhaps final unified response to the role of the capitalist class.

Prohibition—that one cannot legislate a way of addressing in a kind of complicated problem. It is what we have to do directly in *Toward Liquor* how an elite can regulate society in the absence of the consent of the governed. They were acutely aware that they were unable to control a volatile population through individual and collective action, any prohibition. However, even during the 1920s, they were not willing to alter fundamentally the distribution of wealth. The status quo had to be preserved. But if change had to be made on lifestyle and cultural

promise made by the political and economic elite was necessary and desirable to make sure that so many people were willing to support it. The presumed costs of income tax were no longer as important to the elite. In the end, the continued legitimacy of the working-class good will. Perhaps the main reason for opposition to the working class was the promise—in groceries, delicatessens, and in inexpensive restaurants, places where workers bought food

they could buy beer. (It is worth noting that the class politics of beer have not changed much since then: in 1982 the Reagan administration, searching desperately for new tax sources, considered and then abandoned the idea of raising taxes on beer—the White House concluded that beer was still the “workingman’s drink” and Reagan did not want to further alienate workers. Fifty years earlier, beer was even more the worker’s drink.) But at least some workers were also whiskey drinkers and besides making off-premises consumption legitimate, most large and medium-sized cities were obliged to legalize the whiskey barroom. After repeal, some places with substantial numbers of industrial workers tried to outlaw on-premises spirits consumption. Most, like Connecticut and San Francisco, for example, when confronted with continued “lawlessness” abandoned the attempt almost immediately.

In short, the political and economic elite’s concern with maintaining the appearance and illusion of voluntary law compliance meant that working-class men and women, in conjunction with the increasing numbers of middle-class drinkers, were able to force the authorities to make alcohol far more available than would otherwise have been the case. Alcohol control laws and regulations were, in effect, codifications of the political, economic, and cultural struggles between the elite and the people they sought to control.

Notes

1. Virtually every commentator at the time and since has pointed out the importance of the economic argument in winning support for repeal. Davis, writing in 1933, noted that “government is going to need a great deal of money in the next few years,” and that “one of the most powerful arguments in the repeal campaign was the possibility of substituting liquor taxes for others that have proved more burdensome” (p. 284). In an article called “Wall Street Cheers Repeal,” *Business Week* claimed in 1933 that “the promise of tax revenue more than anything else turned the country toward repeal,” and concluded that “there is dancing and singing in The Street.” Hacker (1932) noted the “widely expressed belief that the revival of liquor manufacturing under proper restraints would provide the

necessary new opportunities for the investment of capital and the employment of labor" and that "liquor would provide new sources of tax revenue." Jones (1961) concluded that in the thirties, "government finances and respect for the law, either singly or in combination, became the pervasive arguments for repeal" (p. 275). In this article, I have concentrated on the concern with lawlessness, as I say in the text, because the economic argument has been mentioned frequently, because the concern with law legitimacy was neglected or misinterpreted, and because the concern about lawlessness was absolutely central to the construction of alcohol control policy. For discussion of the economic arguments for repeal and the economic interests in it, see Dobyns (1974); Jones (1961); Englemann (1979); and Gordon (1943).

2. From the mid-1920s on, the leaders of the AAPA had argued that liquor taxes could virtually replace personal and corporate income taxes. The AAPA issued and widely distributed pamphlets arguing that liquor taxes could generate one billion dollars a year and could, for example, pay the entire federal deficit. In the 1930s they found a new constituency for their economic arguments. State and local elected officials, among others, faced with severe drops in tax revenue, and huge demands for services, found the economic arguments very attractive. Further, during the depression many people claimed that the revived liquor industry would put men back to work and stimulate the economy.
3. This and other correspondence to and from John D. Rockefeller Jr., his father, and his close advisors, cited or drawn upon for this article, is from the Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Center, New York.
4. *After Repeal* reported that "Chief among these" postprohibition regulatory innovations were:
 - "1) the generally adopted practice of separating the package sale of liquor from sale for consumption on the premises,
 - 2) the arrangement for the sale of nonintoxicating beer on a different basis from that governing the sale of wines and spirits,
 - 3) the provision that the on-premises sale of the heavier alcoholic beverages be limited to bona fide restaurants and hotels,
 - 4) the requirement that licensed places be open to the view of the public without the screening devices common to the saloons of preprohibition days and to the speak-easies which later took their place,
 - 5) the recognition of the state's responsibility for supervising the sale of liquor as contrasted to the earlier practice of placing the entire responsibility in the hands of municipal and county officials."
 In addition, they reported that 15 states had already adopted public monopolies for the sale of liquor, and another 25 had established central licensing and regulating authorities.

the investment of capital and the liquor would provide new sources of revenue. It was concluded that in the thirties, "government law, either singly or in combinations for repeal" (p. 275). In this concern with lawlessness, as I say, the argument has been mentioned with law legitimacy was neglected or the concern about lawlessness was the main concern of alcohol control policy. For arguments for repeal and the economic impact; Jones (1961); Englemann (1979);

Members of the AAPA had argued that the liquor industry would provide personal and corporate income. They widely distributed pamphlets arguing that the industry would provide one billion dollars a year and could, in fact, eliminate the federal deficit. In the 1930s they found a number of economic arguments. State and local governments, faced with severe drops in tax revenues for services, found the economic arguments. Further, during the depression many in the liquor industry would put men back to work.

and from John D. Rockefeller Jr., who was cited or drawn upon for this study. Family Archives, Rockefeller Center,

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responsibility for supervising the sale of liquor. The earlier practice of placing the entire responsibility on municipal and county officials."

5 states had already adopted public control, and another 25 had established local authorities.

5. By and large, this is achieved through careful policing coupled with the power to revoke or suspend licenses. Operating a liquor-selling business is usually quite profitable, compared to other kinds of retail establishments, and owners guard their money-making licenses carefully. The one obvious, flagrant exception to the usual successful enforcement of and obedience to liquor regulation is on minimum drinking age laws—which, it should be noted, are one of the remaining forms of prohibition.
6. Though some state alcohol control laws composed around 1934 paid lip service to furthering "temperance," alcohol control systems have never pursued such an aim. Indeed, it is not even clear whether state alcoholic beverage control agencies (ABCs) are capable of incorporating public health concerns in any way but as an issue of business regulation. The system turns all questions into administrative matters with a focus on public order. The Rockefeller reports discouraged earmarking any alcohol tax revenues for educational or public health purposes, especially alcohol-related ones, and nearly all state legislatures took the advice. Further, the alcohol beverage industry, led by the corporate manufacturers which support the trade organizations, exercises substantial power in state governments and in Washington. Thus, for example, the industry has been able to stop all efforts to place warnings on bottles, or even to get producers to list ingredients.

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Children of Alcoholics
Facts and Recommendations
compiled by
Cindy Scales and Joyce Schwettman

FACTS

The following facts about Children of Alcoholics (COA's) have been established:

- One out of four children in every classroom has at least one parent with a drinking problem.* (1, 2)
- One out of every eight americans is the offspring of a parent who has a problem with alcohol. Nearly seven million of these people are children under 18.* (3)
- Native students drop out of high school at a higher rate due to family alcoholism. (4)
- 95 out of 100 children of alcoholics never receive professional help. (5, 6)
- 36% of the children of alcoholic families are heavy abusers of alcohol. In families who had serious problems other than alcoholism, only 16% of the children were inclined to abuse alcohol. (7)
- 50% of today's alcoholics are the children of alcoholics. (8)
- In 1982 the Gallop poll found that 40% of young people between 18 and 24 had a family member with an alcohol problem. (9)
- In up to 90% of child abuse cases, alcohol is a significant factor. (10)
- In the 1970's an estimated 28 million Americans had at least one alcoholic parent. (11)
- One of three families currently reports alcohol abuse by a family member. (12)
- The majority of people served by Employee Assistance Programs are Adult Children of Alcoholics. (13)
- Children of alcoholics are at the highest risk of developing alcoholism themselves or marrying someone who becomes alcoholic. (14)

*Note the difference between these two figures are due to families where alcoholics have more than one child.

- Children of alcoholics are frequently victims of incest, child neglect, and other forms of violence and exploitation. (15)
- Medical research has shown that children born to alcoholics are at the highest risk of developing attention deficit disorders, stress-related medical problems, fetal alcohol syndrome, and other alcoholic-related birth defects. (16)
- Children of alcoholics are prone to experience a range of psychological difficulties, including learning disabilities, anxiety, attempted and completed suicide, eating disorders and compulsive achieving. (17)
- The problems of most COA's remain invisible because their coping behavior tends to be approval seeking and socially acceptable. However, a disproportionate number of those entering the juvenile justice system, courts, and prisons, mental health facilities, and referred to school authorities are COA's. (18)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- A safe place in every community for children to go when home life is unbearable.
- Support groups in schools so transportation is not a problem.
- Special programs on alcohol/drug and life skills education.
- All adults caring for COA's, be their physicians, nurses, preschool workers, teachers, or neighbors, must be taught to identify and help these children of alcoholics.

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State of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse
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COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER HEALTH PROBLEMS: ALCOHOL PROHIBITION IN A CANADIAN INUIT VILLAGE

JOHN D. O'NEIL

In this paper I will describe the process whereby a Canadian Inuit community brought about alcohol prohibition and its general effects on the community over a four-year period. The paper is based on ethnographic research carried out during two years: the first in 1978 when the village voted to prohibit alcohol and the second in 1982. Standard epidemiological methods were considered inappropriate due to the small size of the community and the very low incidence rates for health indicators such as suicide, accidental deaths, and family violence. In-depth interviewing with community leaders, elders, and administrators provided a descriptive social history of processes leading up to prohibition and the general response of both non-drinkers and drinkers to the new restriction. Participant-observation with both White and Inuit illegal drinkers provided an understanding of changing drinking styles, associated health problems, and community reaction to bylaw violations. The paper concludes that alcohol prohibition contributed to an increase in family integrity and respect between genders and generations, an increase in youthful interest in traditional values and lifestyles, a decrease in abuse of other destructive substances, and an increase in hostility between Inuit and White ethnic groups where Whites were perceived as flagrant violators of a locally constituted bylaw.

While many observers have noted the alarming rise of alcohol-related health problems among Canadian Inuit, there have as yet been no evaluations made of the primary Inuit initiative to control alcohol abuse, namely, prohibition. Prohibition for most Westerners conjures up many negative and offensive images. As I have argued elsewhere, however, prohibition in Canadian Inuit villages is a regulatory option made available by the territorial government, and its selection and support by Inuit in the villages is a product of decidedly Inuit negotiations occurring within locally controlled institutions such as the Hamlet Council and churches (1). It has not been forced onto Inuit by Whites (as was the case with prohibition on Canadian Indian reserves) and in fact, most Whites in the "alcohol abuse business" would probably prefer a less authoritarian alternative (2). Since 8 of 25 Inuit villages with populations of between 200 and 1,000 now prohibit alcohol completely (all since 1978), research into the effects of prohibition on community life should be a high priority. This paper represents a preliminary attempt

to evaluate this tactic for the primary prevention of alcohol abuse.

Prior to the shift to a sedentary village society, alcohol use was unknown among Inuit in the central Canadian Arctic. Although a trading post and religious missions had been active in the area since 1930, it was not until 1965, with the opening of the public school and the start of the Northern Rental Housing Program, that settled life began on a year-round basis. The first residents came from a quite diverse range of "tribal" backgrounds covering a large geographic region; as a result, there was little initial sense of community. As subsistence strategies changed to include wage labor, families competed for access to these scarce new resources. Jealousy, envy, and suspicion increased. The new religious institutions created factional conflict which overlay traditional band rivalry. Problems and conflicts had been traditionally resolved within extended family groups and since indigenous procedures for dealing with community-wide problems were non-existent, authority was largely assumed by Whites (3,4). For a people who considered self-reliance and individual autonomy as paramount virtues, these new conditions were intolerable. When alcohol was introduced by Whites and Inuit from other regions into these stressful conditions, problems were exacerbated. Inuit feel that by brooding or worrying about a problem, a person can make himself ill. Emotional management is an important preventive health strategy; by avoiding "bad feelings" or depression, sadness, or guilt, a person also avoids physical illness. Many Inuit indicated that they initially thought of alcohol as a medicine. Village life seemed to provide more sources of worry, and alcohol seemed to provide an antidote similar to other White remedies for other new diseases.

Other anthropologists have written about Canadian Inuit alcohol use during the late 1960s and early 1970s (5,6,7). They argue for an approach that recognizes variation in the role and effects of drinking and situates alcohol use within Inuit and understandings of social structure and kinship obligations. Brody (7) warns that if economic development in the North continues without meaningful Inuit involvement, more and more Inuit communities will become "skid rows."

By the late 1970s, Brody's warning had been realized in some of the larger Inuit communities particularly. Health statistics since the mid 1970s have shown an

alarming increase in alcohol-related morbidity and mortality. Many Inuit have expressed concern for this growing problem and a variety of solutions have been discussed. The first attempt to control the problem was in Frobisher Bay in 1976 when the liquor store was closed. Since then, 8 Inuit communities have voted for total prohibition, 2 have a system of interdiction for problem drinkers, 2 have rationing system, 2 have closed their liquor outlets, and 10 have set up alcohol committees and hired counsellors.

The perception of alcohol abuse as a local problem was determined largely by the village elders and religious leaders. Various informants in 1977 expressed concerns that alcohol was contributing to a drastic increase in family violence and a breakdown in moral codes for behavior. Although the number of individuals involved was low, extended families were often called in to mediate conflicts. Cases were cited where brothers fought with each other, husbands beat their wives, adulterous behavior increased, and children were afraid to go home. For those who found these situations abhorrent, but who were nonetheless involved when mediation was required, alcohol abuse seemed to constitute a major threat to community life.

The incidence rate for alcohol-related problems remained low in comparison to other settlements in the North. Whites and Inuit alike commented that this village was friendly, peaceful and quiet. Many local Inuit expressed concern about visiting or travelling through other towns and villages where alcohol use was more widespread and violence more prevalent. Nonetheless, people expressed concern that they were losing control over their own lives and the future of their community. Old people argued that alcohol made a person lose his reason. They worried that if adults continued to act like children, their very survival would be compromised.

To deal with the problem, the community had to reach consensus on a new level of decision-making. Creating a community out of the groups of previously separate family groups occurred largely through the efforts of Inuit leaders in the Anglican and Catholic church. Both churches had been administered since the early 1970s by Inuit lay preachers and elders, and they had attracted large congregations. While there had been some factional rivalry between the two congregations earlier in the village's history, by the mid-1970s relations were less strained. Traditional messages of morality and ethics were reinterpreted through Christian doctrine and people were looking increasingly to the churches for moral guidance.

The village council, established in 1970 and initially an advisory body to White bureaucrats, eventually became the village's main political force. Councillors were elected largely from the leadership in the two churches and council activities expanded quickly beyond routine municipal affairs to include both inter- and intrafamilial conflict resolution. Together, these two institutions have been the major forums for the generation of communal values and supra-familial obligations; ideas foreign to the emphasis on seniority and kindred loyalty which characterized traditional Inuit society.

Another important historical factor was the absence of a police detachment in the village. Consequently, instead of directing aggression towards this symbol of White society, social offenses such as theft and vandalism continued to be understood as internal transgressions rather than acts against a foreign institution.

Several alcohol-related violent deaths involving young people sparked the movement which culminated in prohibition. Church leaders had been warning the community that continued adulterous behavior and intra-familial squabbles under the influence of alcohol would not go unpunished, and they were now able to invoke supernatural retribution as a factor in these accidental deaths. People began to accept the interpretation that drunkenness was akin to possession by an evil spirit. While this explanation absolved individuals from responsibility for their actions, it also fueled the religious arguments to banish alcohol from the community.

These arguments preceded the awareness that prohibition was a legal possibility. Church sermons advocated prohibition months before the council was advised regarding appropriate strategies for holding a plebiscite. White advisors from the various health, social, and corrective service agencies usually argued against prohibition and for a research and education solution at council meetings. However, when the plebiscite was finally held, there was an 83% voter turnout and a 96% vote in favor of prohibition, at a time when roughly a third of local Inuit were drinking alcohol regularly. Many individuals who enjoyed drinking indicated that they voted in favor of prohibition because they felt it was in the best interests of their children and in the long-term interests of the community.

When prohibition came into effect, two families decided to move to wet towns; their decision to move in part related to their desire to continue drinking. One of these families has since returned, and reported that they were unable to endure the alcohol-related problems in the other village.

In the spring of 1982, nine new families from wet villages relocated to the dry town, despite its reputation for high unemployment and a heavy welfare load. No one moved away, although several middle-aged men indicate they make occasional trips to wet villages in order to "party."

For a year or so immediately after prohibition, alcohol consumption virtually disappeared. Now, illegal drinking does occur, but offenses are rare and drinkers take care to camouflage their activities. During the three years of prohibition, there have been five charges brought against people for illegal possession of alcohol in a restricted area, four of them arising from the same incident in 1981. In each of these cases, the offenders provided alcohol to other local people and the parties became public knowledge.

These arrests, however, do not represent the total incidence of drinking that actually occurs. Most illegal drinking takes place in the company of one or two trusted friends (who may or may not be related) and rarely progresses beyond moderate use. Clandestine drinking is complicated by the patterns of Inuit visiting which make it difficult to lock doors or drink unobserved by non-drinkers in the village. Visitors often walk in unannounced and must be soberly offered tea. Aggressive behavior has virtually disappeared. Despite these attempts by drinkers to disguise their drinking, most people in town are generally aware of who is drinking illegally. There seems to be a tacit agreement in the community that as long as drinkers keep their activity private and do not cause public disruptions, no action will be taken. The prevalence of illegal drinking is difficult to estimate but my guess is that about 10 Inuit households (out of approximately 80) and 4 White households (out of 14) are involved. For Inuit, however, supplies are difficult to obtain and even the "heaviest" drinkers rarely consume more than three or four 40 oz. bottles in a year.

Illegal drinking in the White community has as yet gone unpunished. Whites are very adept at camouflaging their drinking activities. They are able to lock their doors to visitors and spend entire weekends isolated from the community. Knowledge within the White community of who is drinking is widespread, but those who do not drink protect those who do. Whites find it much easier to secure supplies from sympathetic colleagues visiting from wet towns who will exchange a bottle for hospitality. White heavy drinkers are sometimes drunk every weekend.

Because of the concern for anonymity and fear of the consequences of exposure (for Whites, probably dismissal from their jobs), inter-ethnic drinking has virtually

disappeared. As a result, White involvement in underage drinking and sexual exploitation, a major problem in the early 1970s, has also largely disappeared, and contributed to a slight reduction in inter-ethnic tension.

Enforcement of the prohibition bylaw has relied primarily on community pressure. For the reasons described above, it is very difficult to drink unobserved, and those who risk it are fully aware that the penalty may be social ostracism. The threat of police action is reserved for those who flagrantly disregard community standards. (In the arrest cases mentioned above, the council requested the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to come to the village and charge the offenders.) Whites however, stand outside this system by avoiding any alcohol-related social interaction with Inuit. However, Inuit generally know which Whites are drinking and many resent their disregard for a local bylaw. The young Inuit bylaw officer, whose task it was to report liquor infractions to Council, was advised by one local White that he ran the risk of libel action if he made any unsubstantiated allegations (i.e., no empty bottles with fingerprints).

Aside from these general changes in drinking patterns, what specific effects has prohibition had on the town's youth, the group most at risk in situations of high substance abuse? Young people in this dry town appear to be better off than their counterparts in wet villages. They are generally in superb physical condition, emotional problems are minimal, and they are relatively well-integrated into the social life of the community. Those people who do experience difficulty are not pushed to the extremes that so often end in tragedy elsewhere.

Although most young people are familiar with "getting high," few youth now show any exaggerated interest in drinking or the use of other drugs. Many expressed views that they felt fortunate to be living in a dry town. On two occasions, I travelled with a group of teenagers to wet towns, and was surprised at how many avoided parties and showed no interest in drinking. In several instances, young men selectively chose to stay with relatives known to be abstainers when visiting wet towns. Many also indicated they got homesick easily for their own village's quiet, peaceful atmosphere, and had little interest in going elsewhere for education or employment.

The absence of alcohol also seems to decrease the opportunities and temptation to use other substances; a finding in contrast to some professional expectations that abuse of more dangerous substances may increase if alcohol is not available. Most youth indicated that although they had experimented with marijuana when the town was wet,

both it and gasoline sniffing, which was once fairly prevalent among young teenagers, had virtually disappeared. Where use of these substances did occur, it was almost always provoked by teenagers visiting from other towns. It seemed that without the adult example of "getting high," using other substances had little appeal.

For those people in their late teens and twenties who once had drinking problems (as indicated by arrest records, alienated families, etc.), prohibition has had a profound impact. In wet contexts, the continual round of parties leads to fighting and bouts of depression. Although problem drinkers talked about parties and about ways to smuggle booze into the village, in actuality they rarely drank and in fact avoided travel to wet villages. Many admitted that they were happy to live in a dry town because they considered it the best way to control their drinking.

To conclude, I have described a situation where the prohibition of alcohol was initiated by the Inuit leaders in a community to cope with the locally perceived problem of alcohol abuse. It has "worked" extremely well in the sense that alcohol-related problems have virtually disappeared. It has been successful in part because enforcement of the by-law is through local social pressure without reliance on White law enforcement officers. For particularly stressed groups such as youth, the dry town provides an environment where young people can cope constructively with other problems with more confidence and self-assurance. How long these effects will last can be expressed best in the words of one of the town's elders:

Before White people came into the North we knew nothing about alcohol. We had good lives and were happy without alcohol. Our ancestors survived for many, many years without alcohol. What use is alcohol then? It has only caused problems.

Our lives are better now that we no longer have alcohol to worry about. I hope we never have alcohol here in the future. I would like to see alcohol banned forever.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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The Prevention of Alcoholism: Epidemiological Studies of the Effects of Government Control Measures*

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Abstract

Widely used control measures such as the monopoly system and restrictions on the number and type of alcoholic beverage outlets, and on hours of sale appear to be much less powerful determinants of regional and temporal variation in the prevalence of alcoholism than taxation policy. It is found that where or when the price of beverage alcohol relative to average disposable (real) income is high, indices of alcohol consumption and alcoholism are usually low, and vice versa. Differential taxation (involving a disproportionately high tax on spirituous liquors) appears to be effective temporarily, but to result ultimately in the substitution of another beverage source with an increase in consumption and alcohol problems. This is consistent with other evidence which indicates that the overall level of alcohol consumption in a population, regardless of beverage source, determines the prevalence of hazardous consumers and of alcohol-related organic pathologies. The nature of a taxation policy which might be expected to prevent increases, and perhaps achieve a reduction in prevalence is outlined. However, an appropriate program of public education would probably be required in most jurisdictions to render the implementation of the policy fully effective and politically feasible.

Over the years a substantial part of the research endeavour of the Addiction Research Foundation of Ontario has been concerned with the causes of regional and temporal variation in the prevalence of alcohol consumption and alcoholism. Among the possible contributing factors which have been studied, special attention has been given to certain legislative and other governmental measures intended to prevent the problems of alcohol. Our purpose is to review this aspect of the work and discuss its practical implications. However, it should be stated at once that none of our results to date suggest any means of prevention in the absolute sense of the term. But they do indicate how—at least in theory—further increases in prevalence might be prevented, and even a limited reduction brought about.

The Primary Data

From an epidemiological standpoint, the initial task was to establish that there was, in fact, substantial variation in rates of alcohol problems or alcoholism from one place or period to another. For this purpose suitable indices were required since the prevalence of alcoholism is not regularly reported as such by any jurisdiction. Following the lead of earlier workers—especially E. M. Jellinek²²—we began by gathering and evaluating statistics of alcoholic beverage sales, arrests for drunkenness

*From the Addiction Research Foundation of Ontario, 33 Russell Street, Toronto, Canada. This paper is a revision of a presentation to the Symposium on Law and Drinking Behavior, Chapel Hill, N.C. 1970. A more detailed examination of the topic will appear in the proceedings of the Symposium to be published under the editorship of J. A. Ewing and B. A. Rouse by Nelson-Hall, Chicago 1975.

and other alcohol-related offences, hospital admissions for alcoholic conditions, mortality from causes associated with heavy alcohol use such as liver cirrhosis, and various other regularly reported alcohol-associated events. We did this for many countries and parts of countries, and for as many years back in time as we could, in each case.^{9,54}

Considerable work was done with these data but for present purposes just two results are important:

(1) We satisfied ourselves that, despite certain shortcomings, several of these statistics could be employed as valid indicators of the magnitude of alcohol problems in an area. Most particularly, reported liver cirrhosis mortality proved to vary in close association with variations in the prevalence of alcoholism. This association was assumed by Jellinek in order to develop an alcoholism prevalence estimation formula;¹⁷ it has been verified since through case-finding surveys and other methods in Ontario and elsewhere.⁵⁸

(2) We found very considerable differences in the indicators from one area to another, and in most jurisdictions there was also substantial variation through time. This variation was not due primarily to errors in the indices but presumably to real variation in the amount of alcohol consumed and in the prevalence of alcohol problems.⁴²

The Monopoly System, Outlets and Hours of Sale

The next task was to examine certain control measures widely believed to affect the prevalence of alcohol problems. For this purpose, jurisdictions having a government-controlled monopoly system were compared with those in which liquor sales were in the hands of private enterprise; the old questions of hours of sale and outlet rates (i.e., the number of stores and public drinking places per unit of population) were studied; and we looked at the effect of diversification of licensed drinking places, notably, the introduction of cocktail and dining lounges in Ontario.

Generally, these variables did not seem to be related in any important degree to the indicators of alcohol problems employed. As shown in Table 1, the monopoly states of the U.S.A. (about one third) did not differ significantly from the license states in level of consumption or liver cirrhosis mortality.*

Similar findings have been reported by Simon⁷³ with respect to per capita consumption under each system, and by Jellinek²² who analyzed trends over the period 1930 to 1945. The latter could find no evidence of an effect on "rate of inebriety", and in the case of consumption trends concluded that "the monopoly system did not prevent fairly large increases; nor did the license system lack small increases" (p.16). However, it is well to stress that in contrasting monopoly and license states, we are not comparing "control" with "no control". There are many important differences in the administration of the monopoly system among the states which have adopted it.^{5 30 73} And there is evidence that in countries with a government monopoly which has emphasized vigorous control rather than maximization of revenue, a substantial decrease in alcohol consumption and attendant

* The slightly larger values for the license states may reflect the differences in urbanism between the two groups. This factor is well known to be associated with variations in alcohol consumption and alcoholism;⁷⁰ but its influence may depend primarily on the higher income levels prevailing in more urban areas.^{53, 57}

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problems may be achieved.¹³ But in these cases, the question is whether or not the particular controls which proved effective could not have been exercised as well under a licensing system as under state ownership.

Table 1. Mean Apparent Alcohol Consumption in Spirits, Wine and Beer, Liver Cirrhosis Mortality and Index of Urbanism for Monopoly and License States of the U.S.A. 1964.

	Monopoly States (17)	License States (30)	t-test
Spirits Consumption*	3.45 ± 1.22	4.03 ± 1.63	N.S.
Wine Consumption†	0.59 ± 0.29	0.83 ± 0.44	N.S.
Beer Consumption‡	4.04 ± 1.21	4.17 ± 1.25	N.S.
Total Alcohol§			
Consumption	8.08 ± 2.28	9.07 ± 2.93	N.S.
Liver Cirrhosis¶			
Mortality Rates	15.5 ± 3.92	18.6 ± 6.34	N.S.
Index of Urbanism**	26.41 ± 13.13	35.00 ± 16.25	N.S.

*Based on data in: Apparent Consumption of Distilled Spirits, 1964, Distilled Spirits Institute, Washington, D.C.

†Based on data in: Wine Institute Bulletin, 1964, Wine Advisory Board, San Francisco, Calif. California, which is a license state, has been omitted in the case of wine consumption. When included the t-test shows a significant difference at the 5% probability level.

‡Based on data in: Brewers Almanac, 1964, New York, N.Y.

§All consumption figures are expressed as litres of absolute alcohol per capita of population aged 18 and older.

¶Based on data in: Liver Cirrhosis Death Rate of Population 21 Years and Older, 1964, U.S. Dept. Health Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

**From Schmidt and Bronetto.⁶⁴

Hours of sale in both package stores and public drinking places are now, and have been for many years widely regulated in the belief that this is an effective control measure. In Toronto, an apparent correlation with tavern closing hours was found in the pattern of arrests for drunkenness exhibited between 8.00 a.m. Monday and 8.00 a.m. the following Sunday. However, when arrests were plotted for each hour from 8.00 a.m. Sunday to 8.00 a.m. Monday morning—during which time all taverns were closed—an almost identical pattern emerged.⁵⁶ This would suggest that hours of sale reflect the drinking habits of the community rather than the reverse. On the other hand, the closing hours which prevailed at the time of the study had been in force for many years, and originally may have shaped the characteristic pattern observed.

The effects of hours of sale deserve further research, preferably utilizing jurisdictions in which there have been substantial changes, and for which statistical indicators of drinking and alcohol problems are available for long periods before and after. Certainly in the United Kingdom, where closing hours have been deliberately manipulated in an effort to control insobriety, there is some conviction that this is an effective approach. For example, Shadwell⁷¹ contends that measures such as "shorter hours and higher taxation . . . have proved really efficacious, while others—particularly State ownership and control, the reduction [in number] of licensed houses, alteration of premises, disinterested management and supply of food—have failed to exert any perceptible influences on sobriety and public order" (p. 150).

Over the centuries governments have frequently sought to minimize the prevalence of insobriety by reducing the number of sales outlets, especially those for on-premise consumption. The assumption appears to be that the more places there are for people to drink, the more they will consume and the more drunkenness there will be. The available data for Canada did not support this assumption.^{52, 54, 56} Indeed, for the provinces and major cities, the highest drunkenness rates tended to occur where there were fewest outlets per unit of population. In Ontario, prior to Prohibition in 1916, alcohol consumption, liver cirrhosis mortality and drunkenness conviction rates were all comparatively high; so also were tavern rates. But following the re-introduction of on-premise outlets in 1934, the number of such establishments per 100,000 has remained very much below pre-Prohibition rates. Yet the indicators mentioned have all achieved levels during the last 20 years markedly higher than in any previous period for which figures are available.

The results of a correlation analysis of data for England and the United States are shown in Table 2. All four coefficients are non-significant, and those for England again suggest a slightly inverse relationship. This has also been reported by Mass Observation⁴⁵ for a different series.

Table 2. *Correlations between outlet rates and indicators of Alcohol Problems in England and the United States*

Series	No.	Variables	Linear Coef.
English county boroughs	84	Convictions for drunkenness & on-premise licenses per 10,000 population*	-0.18
English counties (excl. boroughs)	52	Ditto*	-0.19
States of the U.S.A. (incl. D.C.)	49	Taverns per 100,000 & alcohol consumption per cap. aged 15 & older†	+0.16
States of the U.S.A. (incl. D.C.)	49	Taverns per 100,000 & alcoholics per 100,000 aged 20 and older†	-0.01

*Based on data in: Home Office Licensing Statistics 1938, H.M. Stat. Off., London 1939, Tables H & J.

†Based on population and tavern data in: Beverage Distilling Industry: Facts and Figures 1934-1945, Lic. Bev. Ind., New York 1946, p. 164 et seq., and on consumption and alcoholism rates in: Jellinek,²² Tables 10 & 17.

A closely related question concerns the consequences of tavern diversification. Beginning in 1947, cocktail and dining lounges were permitted in Ontario. Essentially, this meant a slight increase in outlet rates, the sale of spirituous liquors for on-premise consumption, and higher standards of décor for the establishments licensed to sell such beverages. Pre-existing outlets catered primarily to the Working Classes; the new establishments were intended to attract a Middle Class patronage.

In a preliminary attempt to study the effects of these innovations, changes in consumption, drunkenness and alcoholism rates before and after 1947 were examined. Trends in the adjacent Province of Manitoba—where no significant

changes in liquor legislation had occurred over the period—were included by way of control data. The results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Comparison of Changes in Consumption, Drunkenness and Alcoholism Rates in Ontario and Manitoba before and after the Diversification of Taverns in Ontario 1947*

Year	Alcohol Consumption†		Drunkenness Convictions‡		Alcoholism Rate§	
	Ontario	Manitoba	Ontario	Manitoba	Ontario	Manitoba
1939	3.55	2.09	650	185	1095	930
1946	5.82	4.27	962	502	1150	970
1947	6.30	5.27	996	463	1290	925
1954	7.73	6.00	1070	672	1860	1460
% Change						
1939-1946	+64	+104	+48	+171	+5	+4
% Change						
1947-1954	+19	+14	+7	+45	+44	+58

*All of the data used are tabulated in Popham and Schmidt⁵⁴ where primary sources are cited in detail.

†Litres of absolute alcohol per capita aged 15 and older.

‡Per 100,000 persons aged 15 and older.

§Estimated by means of the Jellinek Formula adapted to Canadian data⁵⁵ and expressed as alcoholics per 100,000 aged 20 and older.

The more rural character of Manitoba and its lower average income level are reflected in lower rates throughout than in Ontario. However, with the exception of alcoholism rates, the percentage increases were much greater in both provinces before than after 1947. From 1947 to 1954 consumption increased somewhat more in Ontario than in Manitoba, but drunkenness and alcoholism rates showed greater increases in Manitoba.

Findings similar to the foregoing have been reported by others. Thus, Bryant¹¹ could find no evidence that increases in consumption or alcohol-related offences could be attributed to the introduction of "liquor by the drink" in the State of Washington. With respect to the reduction of outlet rates, we have already alluded to work in the U.K. In the United States, Entine¹⁶ concluded that limiting the number of package stores did not reduce off-premises consumption. On the other hand, Simon⁷³ found per capita consumption to be related positively to outlet rates, but felt, on further analysis, that this variable was "more likely to respond to consumption, rather than be a cause of consumption" (p. 193).

Finally, a word should be said about the case of extremely low accessibility. The variation in outlets with which we have been concerned ranges from situations where they are ubiquitous to those where some customers are mildly inconvenienced. In certain areas, such as parts of northern Canada, the nearest outlet to some communities may take a costly day to reach. Under these circumstances, the introduction of new outlets may have an appreciable effect on consumption. Indeed, the results of Pekka Kuusi's famous sales experiment in rural Finland would seem to support this conclusion.²⁹ At the same time, there was little evidence of an increase in alcohol problems, and some evidence of a compensatory decline in illicit production.

The Effect of Relative Price

At first the failure to find a clear and positive relationship between outlet rates and our indicators of alcohol problems was rather puzzling. As previously noted, regulation of the number of outlets as a measure to reduce consumption and inebriety is often encountered in the history of alcohol legislation. And among members of the public there is a very widespread notion that this aspect of accessibility is an important factor in alcohol problems. It is instructive to observe, however, that local opinion is divided on the topic: some cite the "forbidden fruit" concept and argue that if alcohol were everywhere available man would not desire it so much and would drink in a moderate and civilized manner. Others argue that an increase in accessibility would simply increase his temptation to drink and so there would be more "abuse".^{12, 83}

We came to feel that the problem lay in the assumption underlying both of these views, notably an assumption, fostered especially by the Temperance Movement in this and other countries, that the demand for alcoholic beverages is qualitatively different from that for other commodities and consequently not subject to the same factors as affect the demand for other consumer goods. For example, probably no one would expect an increase in the number of television stores to increase the prevalence of television sets. Actually, if there are too few stores some customers simply will be inconvenienced, and if there are too many some stores will go out of business. We think the situation is about the same in the case of alcoholic beverage outlets (at least, within certain limits: the effect of total Prohibition or extreme rarity are special cases). On the other hand, just as one would expect sales of television sets to be influenced by their cost, so also this would seem a likely, if not obvious determinant in the case of alcoholic beverage consumption.

Certainly governments have recognized for centuries that the taxation of alcoholic beverages is a lucrative source of revenue. And there are probably few, if any jurisdictions today (where such beverages are legally sold at all) in which there is not some tax imposed upon them. However, it is now rather uncommon to find price control through taxation justified as a means to reduce consumption and inebriety. In older statutes and government reports this was quite frequently done. To give one local example, in the Third Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario for the year 1929, the following assertions are made: "economic conditions, rather than laws, influence the gross sale of liquor Beyond all doubt consumption increases with low prices, and decreases with high prices". And with reference to decreased drunkenness in the U.K., despite the comparatively large number of outlets, it is said: "While propaganda has been carried on against drunkenness, the best informed workers and observers are generally of the opinion that the higher cost of spirits coupled with industrial conditions and unemployment largely contribute to the decreased consumption". (p.10).

With a few notable exceptions e.g.,^{21, 47, 69, 79} contemporary students of alcohol problems have given little or no attention to the effects of price variation. There have been several econometric studies, but these have been concerned mainly with methodological and theoretical questions, and consider only per capita consumption as a dependent variable.^{48, 72} Accordingly, it seemed to us worthwhile to extend Seeley's earlier work on the topic,⁶⁹ and attempt to deal with the principal issues raised by the results.

The important variable, as Seeley had noted,⁶⁹ was not absolute price, but price relative to income, i.e., the apparent ability to buy. Hence, this index was used throughout: the average price of a given quantity of alcohol expressed as a fraction of average disposable income.


Table 4. Consumption of Alcohol, Relative Price of Alcohol and Deaths from Liver Cirrhosis, Ontario 1928-1967

Year	Alcohol Consumption*	Relative Price†	Deaths from Liver Cirrhosis‡
1928	2.81	0.102	4.4
1929	3.09	0.099	4.1
1930	3.00	0.101	3.8
1931	2.64	0.112	4.0
1932	2.05	0.148	4.2
1933	1.77	0.153	4.2
1934	2.09	0.137	4.2
1935	2.41	0.112	4.2
1936	3.05	0.097	4.2
1937	3.36	0.086	4.5
1938	3.68	0.085	5.0
1939	3.55	0.082	5.2
1940	3.64	0.074	5.0
1941	4.00	0.068	4.9
1942	4.73	0.063	5.0
1943	4.91	0.064	4.8
1944	4.46	0.069	4.6
1945	4.86	0.064	4.9
1946	5.82	0.069	5.4
1947	6.50	0.065	6.0
1948	7.09	0.057	6.5
1949	7.18	0.058	7.2
1950	7.23	0.055	7.7
1951	7.23	0.052	7.5
1952	7.32	0.051	7.7
1953	7.64	0.055	8.3
1954	7.73	0.056	8.7
1955	7.55	0.047	8.8
1956	7.91	0.045	9.4
1957	7.86	0.044	10.3
1958	7.96	0.043	11.0
1959	7.77	0.043	11.5
1960	8.14	0.043	11.8
1961	8.14	0.043	11.6
1962	8.23	0.041	11.3
1963	8.46	0.040	11.4
1964	8.73	0.039	11.9
1965	8.77	0.038	12.6
1966	9.18	0.039	12.9
1967	8.91	0.035	13.2

*Litres of absolute alcohol per capita aged 15 and older.

†Average price of 10 litres of absolute alcohol divided by personal disposable income.

‡Centered two-year moving averages of deaths from liver cirrhosis per 100,000 age 20 and older, corrected to allow for the effects of the Sixth Revision of the I.L.D.C.D. All sources of primary data for this table are listed in Popham and Schmidt.⁵⁴



The role of relative price was examined in virtually every jurisdiction for which the relevant data were available: both regionally and, where possible, through time.^{8, 36} *Almost universally relative price was found to be very closely associated with indices of consumption and alcoholism: where relative price was high, consumption and liver cirrhosis mortality were low and vice versa.* In Figure 1, the remarkably close association of these variables is shown graphically for a period of 40 years in Ontario. The data upon which the graph was based are provided in Table 4.

Thirty years ago, Jolliffe and Jellinek²⁵ argued that the death rate from liver cirrhosis was closely related to alcohol consumption rates. Since then a very substantial body of epidemiological evidence has been accumulated to support this contention.^{10, 32, 58} Nevertheless, a criticism still commonly heard is that a chronic disease cannot be expected to respond so quickly to transitory changes in the etiological factor. However, as Terris⁷⁷ has pointed out, in the case of liver cirrhosis: "This phenomenon is consistent with the clinical course of the disease. In many cases the cirrhotic process can be halted and decompensation prevented by avoiding

further use of alcohol. Conversely, resumption of heavy alcohol use after a period of abstinence can decompensate a previously injured liver in a relatively short period of time". (p. 2078). In practice, one would expect a slight lag in the mortality trend since advanced cases probably will die prematurely even in the absence of drinking. Such a lag is quite evident in the Ontario trend.

A further illustration of the role of relative price is provided by the international data in Table 5. In countries where alcoholic beverages are relatively cheap, the per capita consumption is usually high. However, the association is certainly not perfect and such exceptions as The Netherlands are especially noteworthy. This point will be considered in the discussion section below.

Table 5. Cost of Beverage Alcohol Consumption and Liver Cirrhosis Mortality in Various Countries

Country	Alcohol Consumption*	Relative Price†	Deaths from Liver Cirrhosis‡
France	24.66	0.016	51.7
Italy	18.00	0.027	30.5
Portugal	17.57	0.023	48.0
Austria	14.47	0.025	38.5
W. Germany	13.63	0.026	29.0
Australia	10.71	0.029	7.8
Czechoslovakia	10.27	0.080	14.8
Canada	8.95	0.029	11.6
Belgium	8.42	0.022	14.2
United Kingdom	7.66	0.057	4.1
Rep. Ireland	7.64	0.092	5.0
Denmark	7.50	0.069	11.6
Netherlands	6.19	0.028	5.7
Finland	4.16	0.117	5.4


*Litres of absolute alcohol per capita aged 15 and older (years 1966 or 1967). For sources see de Lint and Schmidt.⁴²

†The cost of 10 litres of absolute alcohol as contained in the least expensive beverage available to the consumer divided by personal disposable income. Data were obtained through personal communications with the appropriate government departments in each country.

‡Per 100,000 aged 20 and older. Data were obtained from the: Demographic Yearbook 1966, United Nations, N.Y., 1967.

Specific Beverage Consumption

We felt that before relative price control could be accepted as a potential means to reduce the prevalence of alcoholism, there were two further questions in particular which would have to be answered. The first was the validity of the common assertion that the different types of alcoholic beverage are not equally to blame for pathological drinking. Frequently this view reduces to the contention that beer is the drink of moderation and spirituous liquor is the real culprit. It is a view which has often been embodied in reports and briefs to government on the liquor question; and a few students of alcohol problems have argued in a similar vein e.g.^{24, 47, 80} If true, then



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Again we examined the literature and documentary statistics for many different jurisdictions but this time taking into account the class of alcoholic beverage favoured: beer, wine or spirits. On an international basis we failed to find evidence to indict any one class of beverage over another;^{39, 42} in some areas beer was the exclusive beverage of choice of many pathological drinkers, e.g., Australia,⁸² Czechoslovakia,⁷⁵ and southern Germany;^{33, 35} nor was the prevalence of alcoholism by any means low in these areas. In our own clinical alcoholic population, in Ontario, beer was very commonly the principal beverage used by the patients.^{38, 63} And in the medical literature generally, there was a substantial body of evidence implicating heavy beer consumption in ailments such as liver cirrhosis and myocardial disease e.g.^{1, 2, 18, 35, 46, 74} Wallgren⁸¹ has recently reviewed some of the experimental and clinical data bearing on this question, and concluded that type of beverage is largely irrelevant; total alcohol consumed being the significant variable.

In Table 6, it may be seen that when consumption is held constant by pairing countries with a similar per drinker rate, liver cirrhosis death rates show little relationship to the contribution of spirituous liquors.

Table 6. *Liver Cirrhosis Mortality, and the Contribution of Spirituous Liquors to Total Consumption in Countries with Similar Per Drinking Consumption Rates*

Country	Per Drinker Consumption*	% Contribution of Spirituous Liquors to Total Consumption	Liver Cirrhosis Mortality†
Austria	16.0	18.2	38.5
W. Germany	16.0	21.2	29.0
Luxembourg	12.5	13.0	37.2
Hungary	12.5	21.8	14.4
United Kingdom	10.9	14.2	4.1
Rep. Ireland	10.9	34.4	5.0
Denmark	9.4	17.2	11.6
Belgium	9.3	15.0	14.2
Finland	5.9	46.7	5.4
Norway	5.9	45.8	5.3

*Consumption data were obtained from: Dutch Distillers Association Annual Report for 1968, Schiedam, April 1969. The percentage of users among persons aged 15 and older was estimated from available survey data for each country.

†Per 100,000 aged 20 and older. Data were obtained from the: Demographic Yearbook 1966, United Nations, N.Y., 1967.

Of special interest are the figures for Belgium and Denmark. In these countries large increases in the cost of spirituous liquors led initially to a considerable decline in overall consumption.^{47, 60} Moreover, in Denmark at least, this was apparently responsible for a sharp drop in the prevalence of delirium tremens.⁴⁷ It may well be that the frequency of certain acute alcoholic states can be affected through a reduction in access to spirituous liquors. It would seem, however, that the increased cost of spirits induced a compensatory shift to beer, and in the long run, a substantial prevalence of alcoholism was again achieved.

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We conclude that there is no "beverage of moderation" or for that matter, a "beverage of excess". Any one of the three types of beverage may be used without a greater or lesser risk of becoming a pathological drinker. Conversely, a dependence on alcohol can be maintained as well on beer or wine as on spirits. Indeed, the beverage of choice of an alcoholic seems to roughly reflect the beverage preference dominant in his socio-cultural milieu, with a distinct tendency towards the cheaper source of alcohol depending upon his financial resources.^{15, 43, 44, 49, 61, 72}

With respect to the last point, it is of interest that a detailed analysis of data for the United States showed that the best index of liver cirrhosis mortality was per capita wine consumption.⁶⁴ The reason appeared to be that a larger proportion of all wine sold than of spirits and beer was consumed by alcoholics. The most likely planation for the attraction of wine to these drinkers was its relatively low cost. This interpretation was in accord with the results of a direct study of alcohol buying in Ontario.^{37, 40} There too, certain domestic dessert wines were the cheapest source of alcohol (on a cost per ounce of pure alcohol basis) of any beverage.* The vast majority of consumers of such wines were found to be chronic drunkenness offenders, skid-row alcoholics, and other impoverished pathological drinkers. Thus we were brought back to the relative price of alcohol, regardless of its beverage source, as the significant factor.


The Distribution of Consumption


There was a second important question to be settled before the practical implications of the role of cost in alcohol problems were pursued further. This concerned the relation between general drinking and drinking by alcoholics in a given population. To the old-time Temperance worker it would be obvious that there was a close connection between the two. For him *alcohol* was the cause of alcoholism: man was basically weak and subject to temptations which would lead him astray. Accordingly, it was only necessary to avoid drawing his attention to alcohol, preferably to make it totally unavailable to him, and there would be no alcoholism. But with the rise of the disease concept of alcoholism—stimulated not a little by the teachings of Alcoholics Anonymous—a rather different view as to the causes of alcoholism has emerged²³. Alcohol has become merely the material cause of alcoholism as the motor vehicle is the material cause of traffic accidents. The real or efficient cause lies in the person of the alcoholic; he is somehow unique—different either in his physical or mental make-up—and by virtue of the difference, is driven to use alcohol to excess and be labelled as suffering from a disease. Thus the drinking itself is commonly seen as symptomatic, as a *consequence* rather than a cause of an underlying disease process.†

Now from the standpoint of this conception of alcoholism, it follows that the intake of alcohol of those suffering from the disease will be quite different from that of the non-alcoholic population. As they are allegedly unique in personality or biological characteristics so, it is assumed, will they be unique in their drinking.

* In Ontario as of May 1973, the cheapest alcohol obtainable through a distilled liquor cost 55 per cent more than the cheapest in wine. The cost of alcohol in beer fell between these two.

† For an enlightening statement of the ramifications of the "disease concept" see: Powell v. Texas, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 405—October Term, 1967.





This conception, common among workers in the field, implies a bimodal distribution of alcohol consumption in the population as a whole; the alcoholics constituting a small group off by themselves. This view is depicted graphically in Figure 2.

If the distribution were in fact bimodal, then it would be difficult to see why control measures designed to reduce overall per capita consumption should necessarily affect the alcoholic, other than to put him to a little more trouble to meet his abnormal craving than before. In other words, one would not expect the prevalence of alcoholism to respond to the same factors as influenced the consumption of other drinkers. However, a prodigious amount of work with the beverage sales slips for five. Ontario communities revealed that the distribution in that province at least, was not at all bimodal.⁴¹ The data were fully described by the Ledermann curve (a model of the log normal type), as shown in Figure 3.

Since then, the curve has been found to give a reasonable fit to the distribution of blood alcohol levels in a large sample of non-accident drivers in Michigan.⁷⁶ Prior to these investigations, the same curve had been demonstrated by its inventor³² to hold for drinking in Finland, France, Sweden and one sample in the United States. This means that it applies equally well to populations which differ greatly from one another in attitudes towards drinking, beverage preferences, drinking habits, and most important, in attempts to prevent alcoholism through legislative controls and educational efforts. Our conclusion is that, for practical purpose the essential character of the distribution is unalterable and *the prevalence of consumption by those we label "alcoholic" is inextricably linked to general consumption.**

The more darkly shaded area in the tail of the curve in Figure 3 comprises those who, in 1968, consumed an average of 15 centilitres of alcohol daily or more. This level of consumption agrees well with the reported intake of alcoholics in clinical samples in Ontario,⁶³ France,⁵¹ West Germany,³⁴ and Australia.⁸² Furthermore, the number of such consumers indicated by the distribution—about 125,000—differs little from alcoholism prevalence estimates based on mortality data.⁶⁷ A second level has been indicated on the curve at 10 cl. daily (about 9 oz. of whisky or 66 oz. of 5% beer). We have tentatively designated consumption at or above this level as "hazardous". Our justification lies in data on the alcohol intake of persons suffering from liver cirrhosis. In particular, Péquignot's study indicates a significantly elevated risk of the disease at this point.⁵¹

In view of these findings, it seems to us that the only feasible approach to the reduction of hazardous drinking and alcoholism is to effect a decrease in the level of consumption of the population as a whole. This would mean shifting the distribution to the left which would not change its log normal character. But the result would be a decline in the number of persons in the tail end, i.e., in the number of hazardous consumers and alcoholics. We believe that one factor which can cause such a shift is an increase in relative price.

* The finding that alcohol consumption is distributed unimodally is consistent with the view that the alcoholic suffers from a non-specific behavioural disorder. The latter in turn, is in accord with the results of recent biological research respecting the nature of physical dependence on alcohol,²⁶ and with the essentially negative results of the search for an 'alcoholic personality'.^{31, 55}

Discussion and Conclusions

We do not contend that the relative price of alcohol is the only important variable responsible for differences in alcoholism prevalence. However, it seems to be one of the most powerful, statistically speaking, and the one which, in theory, is most easily manipulated. Certainly, a strong effect on indicators of alcoholism is also exerted by the level of acceptance of drinking in a society, although the two factors are probably not strictly independent. Thus, indices such as proportion of total abstainers, responses to attitude surveys on drinking, and voting behavior on alcohol control issues have been shown to vary with alcoholism rates.^{23, 55, 70}

It is probable that some of the international variation shown in our Table 5 is attributable to this factor. For example, The Netherlands appears as a notable exception because consumption is low despite a low relative price. In that country there is comparatively little tolerance for drunkenness²³ and, although there are marked differences between Catholic and Protestant levels of acceptance,¹⁹ the strongly disapproving Calvinists of the rural north keep the consumption of the country as a whole at a low level.

On the other hand, there appear to be no instances of high consumption in the presence of a high relative price.* Nor is this solely because acceptance and price may be negatively correlated in some degree. Southern Ireland, for example, may be safely designated a high acceptance area.⁴ But contrary to a common belief among both the lay public and students in the field, consumption and alcoholism rates are very low.⁶ This is in accord with the high price of alcohol relative to the average income level of the Irish.

The example of Ireland raises another matter of relevance: the tendency to confuse problems of acute intoxication (or in Jellinek's terms²³—"occasional excess") with problems of alcoholism. In the case of Ireland, it would seem that undue emphasis has been placed on the deleterious consequences of the occasional massive intake as evidence of a high frequency of alcoholism.⁴ In contrast, both Italy and France are often cited as models of "civilized drinking", i.e., by implication, widespread drinking but few alcohol problems. In fact, both countries have very high rates of alcoholism as reflected in mortality and other statistics,^{7, 32} although obvious drunkenness is comparatively rare. Also instructive is the situation in Finland where the alcoholism rate is low, as would be expected from consumption and relative price data.¹⁰ But, as Kuusi pointed out many years ago, whatever is consumed tends to be concentrated in a short period rather than taken in small quantities over several days.²⁸ The result is a problem of "explosive intoxication" or in other words, violent behavior as a consequence of acute intoxication.^{29, 62}

The confusion of these problems may account in part for the persistent interest in differential taxation favoring beverages of low alcohol content. As noted in a previous section, the introduction of a heavy tax on spirituous liquors probably does lead to a reduction in certain problems of severe intoxication. But so far as chronic heavy intake of alcohol is concerned, beer or wine will serve as well. Therefore, in the long run the deterioration to health is apt to be as serious a problem as

* Presumably, this is very unlikely to occur on a country-wide basis. The issue raised by some critics of price control is rather that it may occur *within* a country, i.e., among the rich.

before. It is the possibility of minimizing the latter with which we are concerned in this paper.*

In our view, a price system aimed at prevention and in accord with the evidence presented would involve:

(1) A price structure such that the cost of any given quantity of alcohol was the same for the cheapest source of alcohol in each class of beverage: beer, wine and spirits. Prices would then be scaled upward in each class depending upon the producers' values for different brands. Probably the cost of alcohol in the cheapest spirituous liquor would ordinarily be taken as the base figure. If so, implementation in Ontario would mean increasing the current price (May 1973) of the cheapest fortified wines by 55 per cent, and of most beers by about 22 per cent.

(2) Adjustment of prices as often as required to maintain a constant relationship between the cost of beverage alcohol so established and average disposable income.

(3) The ultimate establishment of an optimum relative price level in an effort to minimize the prevalence of hazardous consumption and alcoholism. Liver cirrhosis mortality rates might be employed as one index of achievement in this regard. For Ontario, Seeley concluded that these rates would be at a minimum if the relative price were about three times as high as the level at the time of his analysis.⁶⁹ However, his conclusion was reached on purely technical grounds, namely the results of a regression analysis of time trends. The optimum level would have to be determined for each jurisdiction, and in addition to research findings, would need to take account of various practical, ethical and political factors. Some of these are touched upon in the discussion which follows.

We are fully aware that in many jurisdictions, there would be strong resistance to the utilization of this mode of control. Such resistance is apt to be especially stubborn where social acceptance of drinking is high. Among the objections which have been raised to the suggestion in Ontario are three which deserve comment here.

First, it is argued that elevated prices would lead to widespread illicit production which would negate the effect sought. This consequence is probably exaggerated, since even during the later years of Prohibition in North America, and the allegedly ubiquitous bootlegger and speakeasy, liver cirrhosis death rates were lower than before or since.^{25, 53} If enforcement is reasonably vigorous, it can be anticipated that the relative price of illicit alcohol will be high, to compensate for the risks involved in its production and distribution. Accordingly, a practical consideration in the establishment of an optimum relative price level would be to find a point high enough to hold down consumption but low enough to avoid a substantial illicit trade.

In any case, the objection rests in part on a misunderstanding of what is being suggested in the way of price manipulation. It is not proposed that legal alcohol be rendered virtually inaccessible through cost. This, like Prohibition, would ignore the many benefits—social and psychological—which undoubtedly accrue to the

* It is clear that the two types of problem overlap to a considerable degree. For example, it was estimated that in Ontario, at least 28% of alcohol-impaired drivers in traffic accidents were alcoholics in the clinical sense of the term.⁶⁵ And in any case, alcoholism in most countries characteristically involves a history of drunkenness with attendant personal and social problems. Accordingly, it is all but inconceivable that a measure which reduced the prevalence of alcoholism would fail to reduce problems of intoxication.

moderate use of alcohol. We believe that personal adaptations to higher price levels could be made without serious sacrifice of such benefits. For example, the regular tavern patron might simply reduce his drinking speed, and the "cocktail hour" might involve one-ounce instead of two-ounce drinks. The main point is that an ethical question is involved: How much harm are we willing to tolerate in return for how much benefit? In our judgment, substantial improvements in the health status of many jurisdictions could be achieved through suitable price increases and without undue loss of the rewards associated with drinking.

A second objection is that price control will not affect the alcoholic; he will simply turn to illicit sources, non-beverage alcohols, or crime to raise the price for a legal supply. In part, this objection is simply contradicted by a wealth of evidence. Liver cirrhosis mortality has been shown to be a good index of the number of alcoholics in a population (whether or not they happen to suffer from the disease); and the frequency of this cause of death is in fact highly sensitive to the effect of relative price on general consumption. Nevertheless, these findings do raise a question respecting the current conception of the alcoholic, and it is this which underlies the objection.

We do not doubt that most of those persons now labelled 'alcoholic' are clinically ill—by virtue of the consequences of long-term heavy consumption, and sometimes also because of pre-existing physical, mental or social problems. However, we are not aware of any compelling evidence that there is a unique predisposing factor or an irreversible change due to chronic intake, which renders the individual permanently incapable of controlling his alcohol consumption. Indeed the notion of permanent loss of control has been challenged on clinical grounds,^{14, 50} and there is now experimental evidence that physical dependence on alcohol is reversible.^{20, 26, 31} In any event, the principal aim of a preventive measure is to affect the incidence (new cases) rather than the prevalence of a condition. Since the death rate of alcoholics (from all causes) is more than double that of the general population,^{66, 68} natural attrition alone would rapidly diminish prevalence if the inflow of new cases could be prevented. It is here that relative price control might be expected to have its most significant effect.

The third objection again takes us out of the realm of science and into those of ethics and political philosophy. It is that an increase in relative price would penalize the poor man and leave the rich man unaffected. One can but agree that an increase would hurt the poor man more, as presumably do all forms of taxation. However, a benefit would not necessarily be conferred on the rich. In the United Kingdom, where relative price is high, liver cirrhosis seems to have become largely a rich man's disease.⁵⁹ We would also question the assumption that the rich man is unaffected by price increases. This will depend on his attitude towards money, and on just how rich he is. In Canada at least, the number who theoretically might be quite unaffected (on financial grounds) by a substantial price increase comprises a very small fraction of the population.

It seems to us that this objection also raises an ethical question: should legislation ever be employed to protect public health? If so, then it is simply a matter of how

* For a detailed discussion of this issue with reference to the control of alcohol and drug use, see the recent book by H. and O. J. Kalant.²⁷

many will be helped and not of class discrimination. We suspect that objections such as this would seldom be heard if relative price control were seen as a valid health measure. At present it is not likely to be viewed in this light in most North American areas, and consequently, will not be politically feasible to implement.

Our general conclusion is that in the manipulation of the relative price of alcohol, governments theoretically have at their disposal a powerful instrument to control the prevalence of hazardous drinking and alcoholism. However, at the present time there are apt to be formidable political and emotional obstacles to the use of this instrument. The most practical approach to their removal would appear to be a vigorous educational program designed to generate public recognition of the hazards of heavy consumption, and the preventive value of this mode of control. Price increases would have to be seen as having a protective function and not as just another device of government to increase its revenue.

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Three points are agreed upon by Students of law
'drinking behavior' "1) highly restrictive controls on
accessibility lead to lower consumption and fewer alcohol
problems; 2) such controls are unlikely to be implemented
in the absence of substantial public support and 3) such
controls are apt to involve costs which will eventually
will be perceived to outweigh their benefits."

S. 317

It is also increasingly recognized that the
corollary of these conclusions is true: "liberalizing
the system leads to an increase in consumption,
and an increase in consumption leads to
complications."

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL
MEASURES IN THE PREVENTION
OF ALCOHOL PROBLEMS

by

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and

Wolfgang Schmidt

Alcoholism-Drug Addiction Research Foundation
Toronto, Canada

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See pg 18-19.
re. view on prohibition
and arguments that
education is only answer

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL MEASURES IN THE PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL PROBLEMS*

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this review is to assess the evidence bearing on the effectiveness of legal measures believed to have some primary preventive value with respect to the incidence of alcohol problems. Not considered are laws concerned solely with such special segments of the drinking population as incorrigible alcoholics, public inebriates and impaired drivers. The focus is on legislation and derivative measures aimed at the whole population of consumers (or potential consumers) of alcohol, and intended to prevent the occurrence of alcohol problems through regulation of the amount or character of alcohol consumption.

There is a vast literature on the topic. In addition to the assessments of historians, physicians, clergymen, jurists, journalists and others, there are many official government reports. For example, in England there have been enquiries roughly once every 20 years since the Select Committee published its findings in 1834. In Canada and the U. S. A. there are reports of federally instigated enquiries, and of countless provincial or state bodies concerned with the merits and demerits of the control systems in their jurisdictions. While some of this literature contains data worthy of further analysis, most of it contributes little of value to the present concern. Typically, the conclusions are based on the personal tastes or beliefs of the authors, on ex cathedra arguments, or on the weight of

* From the Addiction Research Foundation, 33 Russell Street, Toronto, Canada. Prepared for discussion by the Working Group on Alcohol Control Policies and Public Health at the final meeting of the Group in Toronto. August 1975.

opinion of persons with little or no direct knowledge of the matters at issue. In short, scientifically acceptable attempts to evaluate the effects of particular control measures are rare.

There are probably many reasons for a dearth of scientific studies, perhaps not least among them, the formidable methodological difficulties involved (Room 1971). However, a factor of particular importance has been the rise of the 'disease concept' of alcoholism. The view that normal drinkers and alcoholics comprise two quite separate groups within the population - which this notion has meant to many workers - has rendered meaningless or at least of low priority the consideration of measures intended to affect the prevalence of alcoholism through the general regulation of alcohol consumption. The drinking of the alcoholic is seen to be independent of other drinking: a symptom of pathological factors peculiar to him, and therefore, not amenable to change by measures which would affect the normal drinker.

In recent years, evidence has been accumulating which casts serious doubt on the validity of so narrow a concept of alcoholism. Moreover, it has been shown that the overall level of consumption in a population may well play a crucial role in the prevalence of hazardous drinking (Popham et al. 1975a). As a consequence, the possible preventive value of legal measures has again become an important issue, and the current status of knowledge respecting their effectiveness, worthy of review.

CONTROL OF OUTLET FREQUENCY

Perhaps no single control measure has been more frequently and widely employed over the centuries than the regulation of the number of places in which alcoholic

beverages may be purchased (King 1947; Krout 1925; Shadwell 1915). Outlets for on-premise consumption have been particular targets, and the immediate aim most commonly has been to reduce their frequency. While from time to time those who influenced the legislators had objectives in mind other than the prevention of inebriety (Lee 1944; Lemert 1962; Odegard 1928; Popham 1962), the latter has been typically the stated justification.

In an attempt to evaluate the probable consequences of alterations in outlet frequency, Popham et al. (1975a) studied the covariation of outlet rates and various indices of the prevalence of alcohol problems. These investigators reported that, among the provinces and certain larger cities in Canada, higher rates of arrest or conviction for drunkenness seemed to occur where there were fewest public drinking places per unit of population. Trends through time in Ontario also suggested something of an inverse relationship (Popham 1962). A possible explanation is that where or when there are fewer taverns - particularly of those catering to drinkers of the lower social strata - there will be fewer places to become drunk unobserved by the police, and a greater likelihood of heavy drinking in public areas (Ahlström-Laakso 1971). An apparently negative association between drunkenness charges and outlet rates was also reported for the United Kingdom (Mass Observation 1943). However, Popham et al. (1975a) ran a linear correlation analysis on two other U.K. series: figures for 84 county boroughs and for 52 counties excluding boroughs. The coefficients of correlation, although negative, were very small and not significantly different from zero.

Equally extensive legal statistics on drunkenness have not been studied for the U. S. A. However, coefficients of correlation between tavern rates and per capita

alcohol sales, and tavern rates and alcoholism prevalence estimates (in effect, liver cirrhosis death rates) for 49 states proved readily attributable to chance (Ibid 1975a). With respect to other types of outlet in the U. S. A. , Entine (1963) concluded that limiting the number of package stores did not reduce off-premise consumption. On the other hand, Simon (1966a) found per capita sales to be related positively to the frequency of such stores, but felt on further analysis that this variable was more likely to be dependent on sales than the reverse.

It would seem clear that in the populations examined, variations in indicators of the prevalence of alcohol problems were not dependent on outlet frequency. It is important to emphasize, however, that the variations considered ranged from situations where outlets were ubiquitous to those where some customers may have been mildly inconvenienced.

Rather different results emerge when the effects of control measures which create or alter situations of extremely low accessibility are considered. The classic instance on one side of the question is Prohibition when, in several countries, the frequency of legal outlets was reduced virtually to zero. There can be little doubt that during the first few years of Prohibition in Canada (Popham 1956), Finland (Bruun et al. 1960), and the U. S. A. (Jolliffe and Jellinek 1941; Warburton 1932) all indicators of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems reached the lowest level yet achieved in any period for which there are relevant data. It is also clear that in later years - say roughly 1923-1933 in the U. S. A. - as an illegal trade became well established and the speakeasy and other clandestine outlets made their appearance - consumption increased substantially (Warburton 1932).

At the opposite extreme is the effect of a change in control policy which renders

alcoholic beverages readily accessible to a population previously isolated from a legal supply. The outcome of Kuusi's experimental introduction of outlets to 'dry' areas in rural Finland, or of Amundsen's study of a similar change in Norway suggests that, under these circumstances, there is an appreciable effect on consumption (Amundsen 1965; Kuusi 1957). However, the increase observed in the Finnish experiment was apparently offset in part by a decline in the consumption of illicit alcohol.

Mäkelä (1971a) has reported a more dramatic effect in Finland following a very considerable and rapid rise in number of outlets, many of which were established in previously 'dry' areas. In 1969 medium strength beer was released for unrestricted retail distribution, and shortly thereafter, apparent alcohol consumption in the country increased by 48%. Beer accounted for most of the increase. Although effects on other indicators of the prevalence of alcohol problems have not been reported as yet, Mäkelä (1971b) showed that the increase tended to be spread over the drinking population in a manner which inevitably brought about an increase in the proportion of heavy consumers.

REGULATION OF TYPE OF OUTLET

This area of control, which has been a subject of much debate and legislative action over the years, concerns such matters as the physical arrangements, mode of sale, class of beverage, and amenities which should be allowed in outlets for on- or off-premise consumption. Generally, the objective of control has been either to minimize the attractions of alcoholic beverage outlets, or to produce exactly the opposite effect: in both cases apparently in the belief that excessive consumption would be discouraged (Popham et al. 1975b).

An example of legislation intended to increase the attractiveness of on-premise outlets is found in Ontario when, in 1947, the sale of wine and distilled spirits by the glass, dancing, professional entertainment and other innovations were permitted. Previously, public drinking places had been confined to the sale of beer and very few recreational facilities were allowed. Popham et al. (1975a) analyzed trends in alcohol statistics for eight-year periods before and after these changes. By way of control data, the trends were compared with those in an adjacent province, where no significant changes in policy had occurred. It was found that, with the exception of liver cirrhosis mortality rates, the percentage increases were much greater in both provinces before than after 1947. From 1947 to 1954, alcohol sales increased slightly more in Ontario than in the control province, but drunkenness conviction and liver cirrhosis death rates showed greater increases in the latter.

Bryant (1954) examined the consequences of a similar change in the State of Washington, but could find no evidence to attribute increases in consumption or alcohol-related offences to the change in control policy. And in Saskatchewan, Dewar and Sommer (1962) were also unable to discern significant effects in a before-and-after study of a small community in which a "beer parlor" for men only was replaced by a beer and wine tavern catering to both sexes.

To date, the only study of the effect of differences in type of package outlet appears to be that of Smart (1974a) who compared self-service and clerk-service stores in Toronto. In the former, all beverages offered for sale were displayed; in the latter, a selection had to be made from a list and the choice obtained through a clerk. The self-service type had more customers, and they were observed to

buy more than the customers of the clerk-service store. When interviewed, the clientele of the former more often reported unplanned purchases or "impulse buying", and those who did so, also reported a higher average consumption of alcohol during the preceding week.

It would appear from the few studies available that limited diversification of on-premise outlets may have little or no effect on trends in consumption or alcohol problems. On the other hand, if the results of a single study in one locality can be considered indicative, the application of "supermarket techniques" to the package retailing of alcoholic beverages may lead to greater consumption.

CONTROL OF HOURS OF SALE

The opening hours of alcoholic beverage outlets - especially those for on-premise consumption - have been almost as common a target of regulatory measure through the ages as their frequency (King 1947; Shadwell 1915). In the past, the legislation has commonly provided for a reduction in hours of sale with the stated intent of combatting the problems of insobriety. Shadwell (1923) considered this to have been a more effective approach in the United Kingdom than reductions in outlet frequency. However, despite long-standing beliefs in the efficacy of the measure, there have been exceedingly few attempts to put the matter to test.

Popham (1962) found an apparent correlation between the opening hours of on-premise outlets in Toronto and the hourly pattern of arrests for drunkenness exhibited between 8.00 a.m. Monday and 8.00 a.m. the following Sunday. However, when arrests were plotted for the period 8.00 a.m. Sunday to 8.00 a.m. Monday morning - during which time all beverage outlets were closed - an almost identical pattern emerged. This might be taken to indicate that the hours of sale reflected

the drinking pattern of at least one segment of the community rather than the reverse. On the other hand, the opening hours which prevailed at the time of the study had been in force for many years, and originally may have shaped the characteristic circadian pattern observed.

The results of a study in Victoria, Australia would suggest the latter to be the more probable relationship. There, Raymond (1969) examined the effects on motor vehicle accidents of an extension in the closing time of on-premise outlets from 6.00 to 10.00 p.m. She found no change in the overall total of personal injury accidents, but there was a marked change in the hourly pattern. After the extension of closing time, the previous accident peak between 6.00 and 7.00 p.m. altogether disappeared, and was replaced by a new peak between 10.00 and 11.00 p.m. From the results of this study, one would conclude that changes in closing hours can have a significant effect on pattern of consumption. But the total consumption or, at least, the frequency with which patrons consume impairing amounts may remain unaffected.

LIMITATIONS OF DRINKING AGE

Most jurisdictions have sought through legislation to limit or prevent the use of alcohol by persons below a specified age. As in the case of other restrictions discussed, there are divergent opinions respecting the desirability and effects of age limits, and very little objective data upon which to base a rational judgment. Some consider that the law should seek to postpone the introduction to alcohol as long as possible. Others feel that age limits (especially when high) encourage clandestine drinking by the young, and reduce the likelihood that healthy attitudes towards alcohol use will be learned (Wilkinson 1970).

By way of a preliminary examination of the effects of a change in age limit, Schmidt and Kornaczewski (1975) studied trends in alcohol sales and motor vehicle accidents before and after a reduction in the minimum age in Ontario from 21 to 18 years. It was found that the reduction in age limit was followed by a substantial rise in the consumption level of the 18 to 20 age group. There was also a distinct increase in the involvement of the age group in alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents; nor could this be attributed to an alteration in enforcement practice. A similar consequence of a reduction in legal drinking age has been reported for several states in the U. S. A. (Douglass et al. 1974).

It would be important to extend the period so far covered by these studies to determine whether or not the new levels of consumption and accident involvement persist. But in any case, the findings cast doubt on the contention that age limits do not exercise a restraining influence, or that their reduction may lead to a decline in alcohol problems.

PRICE CONTROL

Measures affecting the price of alcoholic beverages have been among the earliest forms of control imposed by law. However, the original objectives were to prevent over-charging rather than over-drinking, and most particularly, to secure revenue for government (Catlin 1931; Krout 1925). It was not until the rise of substantial Temperance agitation, especially during the early years of the present century, that heavy taxation was often justified as an effective way to combat insobriety and protect the health, morals and stability of society (Shadwell 1923).

Today there are probably no jurisdictions, where alcoholic beverages are legally sold, which do not impose some tax upon them. This has continued to be seen as

a lucrative source of revenue for the state. But taxation is now rarely justified as a protective measure, and indeed, in many jurisdictions tax increases have lagged behind income levels so that, in effect, the economic accessibility of beverage alcohol has been steadily increased (Popham et al. 1975a).

Recently, Lau (1975) reviewed the evidence of an association between the price of beverage alcohol and apparent consumption. He found that, despite some methodological differences and shortcomings, econometric studies for a variety of countries have consistently shown price to be a significant predictor of the demand for alcohol. With respect to the association between price and the prevalence of alcohol problems, the evidence is also persuasive. In the first place, such an association would be expected as a logical extension of the established co-variation of liver cirrhosis death rates and per capita alcohol sales (Popham 1970). Secondly, confirming evidence has been obtained through direct studies of the interrelations of the three variables. Thus, Seeley (1960) analyzed temporal data for Ontario and found a strong inverse relationship between a measure of price and both per capita alcohol sales and liver cirrhosis death rates. With few exceptions, a similar relationship was found by Popham et al. (1975a) in an extension of Seeley's analysis to regional and temporal data for several North American and European jurisdictions.

This is not to say that economic accessibility fully accounts for the observed variation in indices of consumption and alcohol problems. It seems to be a powerful determinant, statistically speaking, and one with clear implications for the development of effective preventive measures. However, the level of acceptance of drinking also appears to exert a strong effect on the indicators mentioned (Jellinek 1960; Seeley 1962). It is probable that the two factors are to some extent interdependent:

where there is a high level of acceptance, there is apt to be a high degree of economic accessibility, and conversely low accessibility may be associated with low acceptance. On the other hand, this is certainly not always the case. For example, the Republic of Ireland is clearly a high acceptance area (Bales 1946). Nevertheless, the apparent consumption level and the prevalence of alcohol problems are estimated to be relatively low (Blaney 1967; Lynn and Hampson 1970). This is in accord with the high price of beverage alcohol relative to the average income level of the Irish (Walsh and Walsh 1970).

Finally, there is the important question as to whether or not the inference of a cause-effect relationship from correlational data is justified. This is often likely to present a difficulty in the type of epidemiological study which has been reviewed. Definitive experiments will seldom be possible for practical, political and ethical reasons. However, if the associations are consistently encountered in both regional and temporal series for different populations, if the range of variation in the indices is substantial, if trends through time have been in both directions, and if the character of the relationship is in accord with expectation based on established knowledge, then the circumstantial case is a very strong one. This would seem to apply reasonably well to the evidence of economic accessibility as a determinant of rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems.

DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION

Traditional beliefs that alcoholic beverages differ in their effects on behaviour - by implication for reasons other than the amount of alcohol involved - are widely encountered, with variations in detail from one culture to another. Probably the most influential, with respect to control measures, has been the belief that beer is

a drink of moderation and that the problems of alcohol can be attributed mainly to the use of distilled spirits. This has been the explicit justification in many jurisdictions for the imposition of substantially higher taxes on distilled beverages than on any other class (Jellinek 1963).

Currently, the arguments most frequently used in support of a tax differential favoring beer relate to acute effects potentially relevant to accident causation, and rest on the early work of Goldberg and his associates. Their experiments demonstrated that a higher peak blood alcohol level, and correspondingly greater psychophysical impairment were achieved after the ingestion of distilled spirits than after ingestion of the same quantity of alcohol in beer (Isaksson, 1957). However, Kalant et al. (1975) showed that, under more realistic experimental conditions which included progressive drinking, these inter-beverage differences altogether disappeared. In any event, no direct evidence has been obtained as yet to implicate one beverage over another in accidental injury or death.

Takala et al. (1957), in an experiment conducted in Finland, found that subjects were more prone to violence when the same blood alcohol level was reached through drinking spirits than when reached through beer. Since in Finnish culture there is a well-known pattern of explosive intoxication associated with the concentrated consumption of spirits (Kuusi 1948; Sariola 1956), their results may have been a function of a difference anticipated by their subjects. If so, this would not make the difference any less real, but it would tend to shift the etiological focus from pharmacological action to variables in culture and personality.

Turning to the evidence of chronic ill-effects, cross-national epidemiological studies have failed to find convincing evidence to indict any one class of beverage