

ALASKA LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMMITTEE / SUBJECT FILES 86 / 2

462 SCOMM13: JOINT COMM. ON GAS PIPELINE IMPACT 1974-76

leasing schedules be tied to changes in intra-state supply and demand? Can development be held until the State needs the resource? Here again revenue considerations and State desires regarding the optimum level of drilling and production activity must be weighed, but I suggest that one of Alaska's greatest strengths lies in its ownership of oil and gas bearing lands; thought should be given to the best use of that strength.

2. State taxing policies should be re-examined.

(a) The State presently provides for a production tax on natural gas of 4% of the gross value at the well; other producing states impose a much higher tax--for example, Texas exacts a severance tax of 7-1/2% of the market value of the gas when produced, and Louisiana imposes a basic severance tax of 7 cents/Mcf on natural gas. In considering whether revision of Alaska production taxes is appropriate, thought should be given to the Louisiana form: Louisiana's revenue levels are not controlled by the FPC, while Texas' are, at least to the extent that Texas gas is sold interstate. A further defect in the Texas structure lies in its requirement, in the final analysis, that Texas consumers bear a higher tax than out-of-state users; since the State tax is tied to value, intrastate sales at higher rates than interstate sales produce a higher tax bill for the intrastate producer than for the interstate producer.

(b) Alaska can consider the enactment of a franchise tax on interstate pipelines. Colonial Pipeline Company v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, decided April 28, 1975, upheld a Louisiana statute that imposed a franchise tax on a pipeline company that was admittedly engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.

In 1969, a Louisiana Court held that the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution was violated by a state tax "payable for the

privelege of carrying on or doing business... in this state." The Louisiana legislature then amended the offending provision by providing that the tax was levied upon "(t)he qualification to carry on or do business in this state in a corporate form". The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the tax as constitutional levy for priveleges enjoyed by corporations in the state carrying on business, interstate or local, in the corporate form. 289 So. 2d 93 (1974). The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court cited Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948), a case that sustained a similar franchise tax imposed by Mississippi on a foreign pipeline corporation exclusively engaged in interstate business. The Court quoted Justice Reed's opinion in the 1948 case: "This is a tax on activities for which the state, not the United States, gives protection and the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate business". The "activities for which the state gives protection" included "protection of... maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise manning the facilities of the system," the Court said.

Conclusion

As must be evident, it is my view that from the standpoint of legal consequence, the State should pursue an affirmative, aggressive course of enlightened self-interest if the present and future natural gas needs of the State are to be met. The State must decide what it wants, and then set out to achieve its goals.

My judgment is that the State may reasonably expect success in its negotiations. Consider the pressure points available to the State as bargaining levers:

1. Equity favors the State; it seeks nothing more than a share of the resources which it owns. Further, the State of Alaska alone bears a substantial environmental cost as North Slope resources are developed and transported; since this burden exists, an offsetting benefit should be made available to the people of Alaska.
2. The State has as-yet unused regulatory powers which can materially affect the flow of oil and gas.
3. The State has as-yet unused powers of ownership which can materially affect the flow of oil and gas.
4. The State has as-yet unused powers of taxation which can affect the price of oil and gas.
5. The State probably can retain some control of its royalty gas if the State takes effective action; by non-action the State stands to lose control of its royalty gas. The State's position on its royalty gas is of critical significance because it is doubtful that any North Slope transportation system can go forward without commitment of royalty gas to the system, either as part of system supply or as the subject of a continuing transportation agreement. The transportation system needs the royalty gas volumes to support claims of economic viability.

These factors lead me to believe that the State can bargain effectively.

I believe negotiations with both transportation groups are in order. The Arctic Gas proposal has encountered significant opposition, and the FPC staff has only recently concluded that the Arctic Gas group should consider an alternative routing to bring its line down the Alyeska corridor to Fairbanks, and then south eastward. This routing offers an opportunity for physical movement of North Slope gas to, or near, population centers through an Arctic Gas line, a possibility which did not exist so long as Arctic Gas proposed to move eastward out of the State while still within the Arctic Circle.

El Paso should obviously also be approached in definitive negotiations. It has historically supported the principal that a portion of the Alaska gas should be made available for Alaska usage and the El Paso proposal can serve State needs with fewer major revisions than Arctic Gas.


It is, therefore, appropriate for the State to open negotiations with both transportation proponents. It is time to ask, and obtain, positive answers to one basic question: How can Alaska retain the benefit of its natural gas resource under your proposal?

What must be made clear is that the Alaska Legislature and the State Administration, have affirmative duties to ensure, to the fullest possible extent, that the needs of Alaska are served. Others may, and should, consider private interests. But it must be unmistakably clear that Alaska will judge its present and future position on leasing, regulation, taxation, and royalty gas disposition with due regard to Alaska's present and future needs.

It seems to me that if Alaska can derive no benefit from natural gas produced within its borders in the sense of sharing in the use of the resource, then clearly Alaska can protect its citizen's rights only by looking to natural gas as a source of revenue. Every legitimate means of using gas to raise revenue should be explored. If, on the other hand, Alaska is permitted to share in the benefit of a secure and reliable source of natural gas for use as a non-polluting heat source and as a raw material feedstock, then Alaska need place less emphasis on direct revenue and more emphasis on cooperative development.

If men of good will make an intelligent effort at accommodation and understanding, there is no reason why the mutual problems of producer, transporter, and consumer cannot be solved in a manner which balances fairly their respective interests, and which also serves the interests of national and state government as well.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Rush Moody, Jr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Rush Moody, Jr.

RM/ap

E. d. and Frank

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
RELATING TO
NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION

Prepared for the Joint Gas Pipeline Impact Committee
of the Legislature of the State of Alaska

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP.....	1-39
A. Federal Regulation of Natural Gas.....	1-8
1. General Description of Federal Authority....	1
2. Detailed description of Federal regulation..	3
B. State Control of Natural Gas.....	9-39
1. State regulatory powers.....	9
2. State ownership rights.....	15
3. State powers of taxation.....	17
4. The power of the State to construct and operate a pipeline.....	30
II. SELECTED NATURAL GAS ISSUES-PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED STATE ACTIONS.....	40-100
1. The State may not embargo the movement of gas in interstate commerce through the exercise of conservation powers.....	43
2. The State may not establish a natural gas pricing structure for gas sold for resale in interstate commerce.....	45
3. The State may not accomplish by indirection that which is prohibited as direct action.....	48
4. The State may not effectively block construction of an interstate pipeline by denying permission to cross state lands.....	55
5. The State may not block construction of an interstate pipeline by assertions of police or zoning power.....	60
6. If the State initially elects to take its royalty in value rather than in kind, the State probably could not thereafter withdraw the royalty share from interstate commerce without FPC approval.....	64
7. While this issue is not free of doubt, the State probably may sell for resale or transport natural gas in interstate commerce without FPC authorization.....	73
8. While the issue is not free of doubt, it is arguable that the state may, in its capacity as the owner of natural gas, retain State-owned gas for in-state use through appropriate leasing provisions.....	79

9. The State may, for valid conservation reasons, protect oil and gas deposits from physical waste by prescribing reasonable regulations governing production, including regulations requiring gas re-injection or re-cycling for pressure maintenance or reservoir protection.....85
10. It is probable that the State is able to require that a producer of natural gas extract liquid hydrocarbons before the gas enters interstate commerce.....94

I.

THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP

A. Federal Regulation of Natural Gas

1. General Description of Federal Authority.

Federal regulatory authority over natural gas arises from the Constitutional grant to Congress of the exclusive power "To regulate Commerce. . . among the several States." U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8. Congressional exercise of its authority is reflected principally in the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717(a) et. seq.

The Natural Gas Act does not reflect Congressional intent to occupy the natural gas field to the full extent which the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would permit; rather, the Act contemplates only partial Federal regulation which is pre-emptive only within the limits of the Act. The Supreme Court, in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U.S. 507 (1947), has said:

[T]he essence of [appellant's] position, apart from standing directly on the commerce clause, is that Congress by enacting the Natural Gas Act has "occupied the field," i.e., the entire field open to federal regulation. . . .

"The exact opposite is the fact, Congress, it is true, occupied a field. But it was meticulous to take in only territories which this Court had held the states could not reach." 332 U.S. at 519 (footnote omitted).

The Court in Panhandle also emphasized that under Section 1(b) of the Gas Act:

"Three things and three only Congress drew within its own regulatory power, delegated by the Act to its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies in such transportation or sale." 332 U.S. at 516.

The Courts have on several occasions rejected non-legislative attempts to expand the jurisdiction of the FPC beyond the bounds fixed by the Gas Act. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, the FPC contended that it had jurisdiction over the sale of the royalty owner's interest in a natural gas stream sold in interstate commerce. The FPC argued that such jurisdiction was necessary to protect the consumer against unreasonable demands by the royalty owner. Rejecting that argument, the Court said:

"The FPC is to be commended for attempting to further that objective, but it is not sufficient justification upon which to base an expansion of the Act to activities clearly not within its term. Congress did not give the FPC carte blanche to take whatever action it might consider appropriate infurtherance of this purpose. The FPC is limited by the provision establishing its jurisdiction, and we do not find in that provision, rooted as it is in a sale in interstate commerce, any basis for reaching out to cover the landowner's lease or its royalty payments." 149 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 317, 463 F.2d 256, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).

The Court reached a similar conclusion as to the limits of the Gas Act in another case of the same name, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, involving the question of whether the FPC's jurisdiction over interstate transportation of natural gas gave it jurisdiction over the rate for transporting natural gas liquids. The Court said:

"The Commission cannot gain jurisdiction over an activity simply by characterizing it as a part of a "total transaction" of which another part happens to be subject to the FPC's control. The Commission has jurisdiction over sales of natural gas at the wellhead for resale in interstate commerce." 157 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 245, 483 F.2d 1238, 1248 (1973) (footnotes omitted).

Congress, by its limited grant of authority to the FPC under the Gas Act, undertook only to fill the hiatus created by lack of state authority constitutionally to regulate aspects of interstate sales and transportation of natural gas and did so with "unusual legislative precision." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 332 U.S. 507, 516, 517 (1947).

The legislative history of the Gas Act is explicit on this point:

"The States have, of course, for many years regulated sales of natural gas to consumers in intrastate transactions. The States have also been able to regulate sales to consumers even though such sales are in interstate commerce, such sales being considered local in character and in the absence of congressional prohibition subject to State regulation. . . There is no intention in enacting the present legislation to disturb the States in their exercise of such jurisdiction. . . The basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not act.

". . . The bill takes no authority from State commissions and is so drawn as to complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory authority." H.R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1937) (citations omitted).

2. Detailed Description of Federal Regulation.

The Commission's power to regulate interstate transportation, sales for resale in interstate commerce, and

persons engaged in such transportation or sales is exercised through five basic mechanisms:

1. Rate regulation pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act.
2. Service regulation pursuant to Section 7 of the Act.
3. Curtailment regulation pursuant to Sections 1, 4 and 5 of the Act.
4. Import and export regulation pursuant to Section 3 of the Act.
5. Reporting and accounting regulation pursuant to Sections 6, 8, 9, 10, and 14 of the Act.

For the purposes of this analysis, attention is centered upon the service and import/export areas.

a. Section 7--Control Over Service and Facilities.

It is through Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act that the FPC exercises its greatest degree of control over natural gas sales, transportation and marketing.

Through the language of Sec. 7(c), the Commission controls the following activities:

1. All sales for resale in interstate commerce;
2. All transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; and
3. All facilities needed to make a sale or effect a transportation.

This control is exercised through the power to grant, deny, or conditionally grant a "certificate of public convenience

and necessity" to one who proposes to engage in interstate sales or services. Without a certificate, the activity is unlawful.

Thus, before a producer may sell to an interstate pipeline, the producer must obtain a certificate from the Commission. Before an interstate pipeline may install facilities to receive gas from a producer, to transport gas, or to effect a sale to a customer, it must obtain a certificate from the Commission. Before an interstate pipeline may use its existing facilities to transport gas for someone else, it must obtain a certificate from the Commission. See, Atlantic Refining Company v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 378 (1959); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).

The Commission's powers of certification are not exercised through strict application of readily determinable rules; while Commission action must not be arbitrary, and must have support in substantial evidence, "public convenience and necessity" is a shifting standard which has meaning only in terms of the incumbent commissioners' perception of the public interest. The Commission's actions in the certification area are largely discretionary. See, California Gas Producer's Association v. FPC, 383 F.2d 645 (C.A. 9, 1967); International Paper Co., v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (C.A.N.Y., 1971) cert. denied 404 U.S. 827.

In this connection, the discussion in Henry v. FPC, 513 F.2d 395 (C.A.D.C., 1975) is particularly significant. In that

case the Court reviewed a Commission order which disclaimed jurisdiction over a coal gasification facility, but which asserted jurisdiction under Sec. 7 to certificate the movement of commingled artificial and natural gas. The court noted:

"Of particular and almost paramount significance for the subject under discussion is FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 435, 5 L.Ed.2d 377 (1961), where the Court expressly held that the Commission's power under § 7 to consider matters of the public interest when deciding whether to issue a certificate for jurisdictional facilities extends generally to a consideration of "all factors bearing on the public interest," and specifically extends to matters that are excluded from the direct regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. That case involved an application for the certification of the transportation by an interstate pipeline of gas to be sold directly by a Texas producer to a New York purchaser for use under boilers for the production of steam. The Court held that § 7(e) of the Act embraces FPC consideration, when passing on an application for certification, first, of the end use of the gas to be transported and its possible preemption of reserves to the detriment of domestic consumers--though the FPC has neither general allocation authority nor jurisdiction to regulate direct sales to industrial consumers once the facilities are certificated; and second, of the prospect that the high price of the sale would be an upward lever on natural gas prices in general--even though the Commission had no jurisdiction over the underlying sale or any authority to regulate its price.

"Although Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Stewart, dissented from another feature of the decision, he joined in the ruling now under discussion, and indeed put the matter so succinctly as to merit quotation. See 365 U.S. at 36-37, 81 S.Ct. at 453-454 (footnotes omitted):

"Basically, I think it was open to the Commission to decide whether the particular transportation service before it would tend to waste gas, unduly preempt pipeline capacity, or raise field prices. I think the Commission can properly assert this

more limited power as an incident of its transportation certificating powers. It is quite true of course that Consolidated Edison need not have resorted to the Federal Power Commission if the purchase transaction had been possible without the interstate transportation of the gas in jurisdictional pipelines, since this was not a purchase of natural gas for resale.

"However, it does not follow that the Commission had to blind itself to the effects of the purchase and use of the gas when its authority to certificate the transportation of the gas was invoked. To recognize that the transaction was, as a practical matter, impossible without the use of jurisdictional facilities for the interstate transportation of the purchased gas is to acknowledge that this transportation is an integral a part of the transaction as was the sale itself. Whether the adverse effect of the transaction be a waste of a scarce resource, or pre-emption of pipeline capacity, or a substantial boosting of field prices, the transportation is as responsible for the effects as is the original sale. I see no reason why the Commission must certify, as in accord with the "public convenience and necessity," transportation which tends materially to further such undesirable results which are within the area of the Commission's legitimate concern when it is considering the public convenience and necessity of certificating a jurisdictional sale.' (Emphasis added.)"

The Commission's powers under Sec. 7 of the Natural Gas Act do not end with the mere issuance or denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Of perhaps equal significance are the provisions of Sec. 7(b) and 7(e) of the Act.

Under Sec. 7(e), the Commission can attach any conditions to a certificate that it finds are required by "the public convenience and necessity", and under Sec. 7(b), the Commission may require the continuance of a certificated

service until it determines that "the public convenience and necessity" will permit abandonment.

The conditioning power, and the abandonment power, each operate to supplant private contractual arrangements between producer and pipeline, and pipeline and customer.

Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission of N. Y.,

360 U.S. 378 (1959); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,

364 U.S. 137 (1960); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385

U.S. 83 (1966).

b. Section 3--Imports and Exports of Natural Gas.

Under Sec. 3 of the Act, Commission approval must be obtained for any natural gas import into or export from the United States. The Commission is to approve such import and export applications unless it finds that the proposal "will not be consistent with the public interest." The Commission is empowered to prescribe terms and conditions to any import or export if such are found to be "necessary or appropriate."

The generalities of Sec. 3 have seldom been construed and applied by the Commission or the Courts, but it is reasonable to conclude at this time that the Commission has the power, and probably the inclination, to treat import/export cases substantially the same as Sec. 7 certification cases.

Distrigas Corp. v. FPC, 495 F.2d 1057 (C.A.D.C. 1974).

Accordingly, the discussion under subsection (a) immediately above is applicable to the import/export power and need not be restated.

B. State Control of Natural Gas

1. State Regulatory Powers

Since the earliest days of oil and gas production the states have promulgated conservation legislation designed to regulate the production of oil and gas. There have been innumerable court challenges to such legislation; however, the courts have generally approved conservation legislation on one of three theories: (a) it is within the police power of the state to pass legislation protecting the correlative rights of owners of land within a common source of supply of oil and gas; (b) it is within the police power of the state to safeguard the public interest in oil and gas by preventing waste of such natural resources of the state; and (c) the state may exercise its police power to prevent or abate surface nuisances resulting from the production of oil and gas. The states have adopted a broad variety of conservation statutes generally granting a state agency the authority to regulate such matters as well spacing, proration of production, plugging of abandoned wells, and compulsory pooling and unitization. See e.g., Summers, Oil and Gas § 106; Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, §§ 940-948.

The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that state conservation legislation is a valid exercise of the state's police power even though the oil or gas is intended

to be, or is in fact, immediately placed into interstate commerce:

"Plaintiff contends that the Act and proration orders operate to burden interstate commerce in crude oil and its products in violation of the commerce clause. It is clear that the regulations prescribed and authorized by the Act and the proration established by the commission apply only to production and not to sales or transportation of crude oil or its products. Such production is essentially a mining operation and therefore is not a part of interstate commerce even though the product obtained is intended to be and in fact is immediately shipped in such commerce. Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178. Hope Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284, 288. Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfof, supra. No violation of the commerce clause is shown."

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). See also Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 77 (1937).

It may be helpful to note the types of conservation statutes and administrative orders which have been upheld by the courts as valid exercises of State power to prevent waste and protect correlative rights:

(a) Well Spacing: see, Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, motion for reh. overr'd. 126 Tex. 314, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83, app. dismd., 305 U.S. 376 (1939); Hawkins v. Texas Co., 146 Tex. 511, 209 S.W.2d. 338 (1948); Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Producing Co., 22 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.); cert. den. 277 U.S. 585 (1928).

(b) Proration of Production: see, Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284 (1937).

(c) Plugging of Abandoned Wells: see, Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 Ky. 34, 77 S.W. 390 (1903); Gant v. Oklahoma, 150 Okla. 86, 6 P.2d 1065, app. dismiss'd, 284 U.S. 594 (1932); Guffey v. Stroud, 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Comm.App. 1929, opinion adopted) Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W.Va. 707, 79 S.E. 647 (1913); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862, 255 P. 3 (1927); Clarke v. Blue Licks Springs Co., 184 Ky. 827, 213 S.W. 222 (1919).

(d) Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: see, Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495, app. dismiss'd, 320 U.S. 222 (1943); Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So.2d 229 (1946); Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So.2d 85, error overr'd, 59 So.2d 844 (1952); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997, app. dismiss'd, 343 U.S. 390 (1952).

(e) Restrictions on Use: Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra; Henderson Co. v. Thompson, supra; Herkness v. Irion, 278 U.S. 92 (1928); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., supra, Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.; supra.

(f) Secondary Recovery and Gas Recycle: Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm., supra; Railroad Comm'n of Texas

v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Sup.Ct. 1962); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); Syverson v. North Dakota State Industrial Comm'n, 111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D.Sup.Ct. 1961); Jackson v. State Corp. Comm'n, 186 Kan. 6, 348 P.2d 613 (Kan.Sup.Ct. 1960). See, Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, supra; Brown v. Humble Oil Refining Co., supra; Henderson Co. v. Thompson, supra; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra; Commonwealth v. Trent, supra; Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Co., 51 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1931).

The question of whether state oil and gas conservation statutes and regulations can be applied to leases of Federal lands has been decided in the affirmative by Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 277 F.Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla.); aff'd, 406 F.2d 1303, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 829 (1969). Plaintiffs owned oil and gas leases on Federal lands in Oklahoma, which leases were executed pursuant to the Federal Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. By way of request to quiet title, plaintiffs sought to challenge an order of the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma whereby the reservoir underlying plaintiffs' leases were forced into a pool for purposes of production.

In holding that the leases were subject to regulation by the State of Oklahoma, the Court explained as follows:

"Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides:

'Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;***.'

"This clause does not place the exclusive control of the federal public domain in the United States Government. It only confers this power on Congress and leaves to Congress the determination of when and where and to what extent this power will be exercised. *United States v. Hatahley*, (10 Cir. 1955). 220 F.2d 666, reversed on other grounds, 351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956). Therefore, we must look to the acts of Congress and specifically those relied upon by the Plaintiffs as above set out to ascertain if the Congress has undertaken to exercise exclusive control over federal lands which have been leased by the Government for oil and gas mining purposes.

"Nothing in these cited statutes (nor the entire Act itself) specifically indicates that Congress has undertaken to reserve unto itself exclusive control over federal lands leased for oil and gas development to the exclusion of the States.

"Section 187 does provide that no lease issued under the said Act shall be assigned or sublet except with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate rules for the prevention of undue waste and that the lease shall contain a provision that such shall be observed. However, said Section further provides at the end thereof that: 'None of such provisions shall be in conflict with the laws of the state in which the leased property is situated.' This language is not aimed at putting the lands under the exclusive control of the Federal Government to the exclusion of the States. Contrary to the position of the Plaintiffs, the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, seems to leave to the States the power to exercise State police power over Federal oil and gas leases. For instance, Title 30, United States Code, Section 189 of said Act provides:

'Nothing in said sections shall be construed or held to affect the rights of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights which they may have, including the

right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lease of the United States.'

"Furthermore, the authorities treating with the matter of exclusive control of federal lands by the Federal Government clearly and definitely hold that State law and the State police power extends over the federal public domain unless and until Congress has determined to deal exclusively with the subject. *State of Colorado v. Toll*, 268 U.S. 228, 45 S.Ct. 505, 69 L.Ed. 927 (1925); *McKelvey v. United States*, 260 U.S. 353, 43 S.Ct. 132, 67 L.Ed. 301 (1922); *International Bridge Company v. People of the State of New York*, 254 U.S. 126, 41 S.Ct. 56, 65 L.Ed. 176 (1920); *Omachearria v. State of Idaho*, 246 U.S. 343 38 S.Ct. 323, 62 L.Ed. 763 (1918); *United States v. Hatahley*, *supra*.

"But whereas the Congress may not desire to assume exclusive control over the federal lands it may desire to prescribe certain limited controls. From an examination of the said Federal Mineral Leasing Act the Court concludes that the Congress has not undertaken to assume exclusive control of federal mineral lands under the Act but it has imposed two significant controls which must be satisfied before the State police power in the area of conservation may ultimately attach. One is that a federal mineral lessee may not assign his lease without the consent of the Federal Government. 30 U.S.C. § 187. Another is that a pooling or communitization agreement involving federal and non-federal lands must be approved by the Federal Government. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j). . . ." *Id.*, pp. 368-369.

The result in Texas Oil and Gas Corp. is consistent with Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum, 384 U.S. 63 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court ruled that state law governs transactions between private parties with respect to an oil and gas lease validly issued under the Mineral Leasing Act. The Mineral Leasing Act is, of course, generally applicable to

federal lands in the State of Alaska. Cf., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Standard Oil Co. of California v. Hick, 317 F.Supp. 1192 (D. Alaska); aff'd 450 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1971).

2. State Ownership Rights

The rights of a State as an owner of property should be no less than the rights of the Federal government as an owner of property; in this contest, the Supreme Court has held:

"The power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States 'is vested in Congress without limitation'. . . 'For it must be borne in mind that Congress not only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein. Congress may deal with such lands precisely as an ordinary individual may deal with. . . property. It may sell or withhold them from sale.' Article 4, Section 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.' The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. And it is not for the Courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine."

Alabam v. Texas, Rhode Island v. Louisiana, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) at 273-274, citations omitted.

The Supreme Court of California has said:

"In the absence of Constitutional limitations, and there is none here, the Legislature is free to dispose of the state's. . . lands in any way deemed by it from time to time to be for the public interest."

South San Joaquin Irrig. Dist. v. Neumiller, 42 P.2d 64 (1935). See also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

State powers arising from property ownership are probably thus more extensive than State regulatory powers. While the latter are subject to Constitutional limitations relating to the supremacy of Federal law, and control of interstate commerce, ownership powers are arguably not so limited. See U.S. v. California, 281 F.2d 726 (C.A. 9, 1960), where the Court said:

"If the State had seen fit to impose conditions upon issuance or upon transfer of property it has wholly created, that is the state's prerogative so long as its demands are not arbitrary or discriminatory. The federal government has no power to command the state in this area. It has no power to direct that property be created by the state for the purpose of federal seizure." 281 F.2d at 728, emphasis supplied.

I would not imply that State ownership powers are totally without limits. In the Neumiller opinion, supra, it was said that the State's actions must not be "arbitrary" or "discriminatory." I would judge that the Courts may well proceed substantially in accord with the Ashwander discussion.

"The constitutional provision [Art., 4, Sec. 3, Cl.2] is silent as to the method of disposing of property belonging to the United States. That method, of course, must be an appropriate means of disposition according to the nature of the property, it must be one adopted in the public interest as distinguished from private or personal ends, and one may assume it must be consistent with the foundation principles of our dual system of government and must not be contrived to govern the concerns reserved to the States."

297 u.s., at 388. Language such as this may be construed to mean that a State may not exercise its ownership to "contrive" to "govern the concerns reserved" to the Federal government; that is to say that Federal supremacy may still be a controlling doctrine when aligned against State ownership actions repugnant to a Federal interest.

3. State Powers of Taxation

A brief summary of certain generally accepted principles of state taxation may serve as parameters for discussion of specific issues:

(a) The taxing power may be exercised solely for public purposes.

(b) Uniformity and equality of rates and valuation between similarly situated parties is generally required by state law although distinctions based upon classification of property rights, business endeavors and the like, are permissible if not palpably arbitrary or capricious.

(c) Extreme flexibility in state taxation is the rule, but due process, equal protection and other federal constitutional rights or prerogatives can be effective limitations.

(d) Taxing schemes that burden (by discrimination or otherwise) interstate commerce, or have even incidental regulatory effects, are suspect.

(e) Tax structures that on their face conflict with federal constitutional interests or areas of federal preemption will nearly always be invalidated, but a similar and constitutionally valid effect might be achieved indirectly.

(f) Since the invalidation of a taxing statute results in total and irrevocable loss of several years' revenues, a conservative approach is preferable.

(g) Tax statutes are strictly construed against the taxing authority.

(h) The current trend in public policy is to permit state and local tax jurisdictions greater latitude in the face of spiraling local fiscal needs.

The specific tax questions which we have considered are as follows:

A. What are the limits of the power of a state to impose severance taxes?

1. Amount: The only apparent limitations on the amount of a tax are the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. However, even these limitations may be questioned in light of Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934), wherein a state tax on oleomargarine, which had a destructive effect on the oleomargarine industry, was upheld against due process attacks.

"Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause...is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution...and no reason exists for applying a different rule against a state...That clause is applicable to a taxing state...only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitute in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as for example, the confiscation of property...Nor may a tax within the lawful power of the state be judicially stricken down under the due process clause simply because its enforcement may or will result in restricting or even destroying particular occupations

or businesses...unless....its necessary interpretation and effect be such as to plainly demonstrate that the form of taxation was adopted as a mere disguise, under which there was exercised, inreality, another and different power denied by the Federal constitution to the State."

292 U.S. at 44-45.

See also, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869); Lehnhausen v. Lake Sho e Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).

2. Property Ownership considerations:

a. Generally, a state may levy a tax upon the severance of natural resources regardless of the ownership of the fee to the realty. There are, however, several special situations in which ownership by the United States or ownership or production by Indians could impose a ban to certain applications of such a tax.

b. No severance tax may be levied in a state where the property from which the minerals are severed is considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government by virtue of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution. Humble Pipeline Co. v. Waggoner, 376 U.S. 369 (1964). Such lands are those purchased from

a state for certain purposes (for example, military bases): "Purchase" has been held to include acquisition by gift, Humble Pipeline Co. v. Waggoner, supra, and Mississippi Power Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F. 2d 929 (1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1014 (1968). The determinative factors are: (i) acquisition from a state; (ii) for specific purposes; (iii) by purchase or gift. Indeed, absent special waiver or prior reservation by the state of power to tax a state may levy only income or gross receipts taxes with respect to these lands. 4 U. S. C. A. §104 - 110 (the "Buck Act").

Most federal lands including national forests and Indian lands, are generally not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction; therefore, private lessees may be subjected to severance taxes. International Paper Co. v.

County of Siskiyou, 515 F. 2d 285 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946).

c. Severance taxes apparently may not be levied where Indians are producing gas from Indian lands. In Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F. 2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973), the Court, in construing 28 U.S.C.A. §1341, said, "The United States has a special interest in its ward Indians, with respect to which the government 'has charged itself with moral obligations of highest responsibility and trust' Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 310 (1942). This 'special interest' has manifested itself in the form of a federal policy to protect Indians and Indian property from state taxation... 'State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that state law shall apply. It follows that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to state taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the state by act of Congress." McCalanhan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). (See also, cases collected in footnote 5 to text of Agua Caliente Ban of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F. 2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 901 (1972), where Indian lands are said to be federal instrumentalities).

Under these rules, Indian producers from Indian lands should be exempt from severance taxes. It has been held, however, that non-Indian lessees of Indian property may be subjected to state taxes since such taxation is not a tax upon Indian property per se, United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). Note, however, that the view has been expressed that the prohibition of a direct tax also bars an indirect tax. See, Dissenting opinion, Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, supra.

3. Federal Instrumentalities: A state-imposed severance tax would be invalid if applied to property, instrumentalities, or agents of the United States, and clearly the tax could not be assessed against the federal government as a mineral lessee or producer. McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); United States v. Detroit, supra.

4. Taxes levied only on natural gas: A state is not required to tax the severance of all minerals equally. A tax levied only upon the severance of natural gas, or levied upon natural gas at a rate different from that imposed upon the severance of other natural resources, will usually be free of federal constitutional problems, Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945).

B. Can a very high severance tax be imposed, coupled with some form of rebate or tax credit to Alaskan users, or would such be struck down as a burden to interstate commerce?

1. Direct Rebates or Credits: Any plan under which a producer is given severance tax rebate for sales of reserves to intrastate users, where interstate commitments do not entitle the producer to substantially similar rebates, will be struck down as clearly discriminatory against interstate commerce. "In each case, it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce." Best and Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-456 (1940). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). A tax levied only upon lessees of federal lands would of course be discriminatory and palpably arbitrary. International Paper Co. v. County of Siskiyou, supra; Phillips Chemical Co. v. Amos Independent School District, 361 U.S. 376 (1960) rehearing denied, 362 U.S. 937 (1960).

2. Indirect rebates or credits: A taxing statute under which deductions or credits for the cost of the severance tax are allowed against unrelated taxes that are born primarily by Alaskan residents, will probably be valid

if carefully constructed. Even if such tax credit should be held invalid, the severance tax itself ought not be affected. Thus the effect of invalidation would be to increase the burden on Alaskan residents and increase revenues.

Example: Alaska could grant a deduction or credit against its state income tax for expenses of a consumer of natural gas which are attributable to "passed-on" severance taxes. The producer would pay the severance tax to the state. The consumer would in effect reimburse the producer through a commensurate increase in the purchase price of the gas, perhaps being billed separately for the cost to the producer of the severance tax. The consumer would be made "whole" by the credit against the state income for the cost to him of ultimately bearing the severance tax. If the Alaskan income tax liabilities of the producers/consumers for interstate sales were such that a deduction or credit for "passed-on" severance taxes would be of small value, then, in effect, only interstate gas would bear the cost of severance taxes.

A simpler approach would be to lower by the amount of the anticipated revenues from the severance tax the rate of an unrelated tax which is now borne primarily by Alaskan residents. The overall effect of such reduction would be to lower the burden of residents.

C. How, and in what forms, can a state tax an interstate pipeline?

1. Franchise taxes: It is clear that a state may levy and collect franchise taxes even on a purely interstate pipeline, if such taxes are reasonable and non-discriminatory, i.e. payable by all corporations of the same legally valid classification (see subparagraph 111. (d) below) doing business in the state. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 10 (1975); Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). The tax must be properly apportioned, or based solely on in-state pipeline property (and not on commodities actually in commerce; i.e., the gas being transported), in order to be reasonable and non-discriminatory. Methods of apportionment and valuation are not within the scope of this memorandum. However, the primary consideration is that Alaska tax only that portion of the pipeline's activities which are attributable to endeavors within the state.

2. Ad Valorem taxes: It is equally clear that the pipeline and accompanying right-of-way may be subject to a property tax, even though the pipeline carries gas in purely interstate commerce.

3. Income taxes: The state income tax may also be imposed upon an interstate business, provided that a proper allocation formula is employed, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

4. Separate classification for tax purposes of natural gas pipeline: While a state may subject an interstate gas pipeline operating within its borders to its general tax laws as indicated above, the state may wish to place a separate tax on such business which is not applicable to other businesses within the state. A separate tax will be valid as long as its purpose is to regulate the business, and the amount of the tax is reasonably limited to the costs of such regulation. However, where the purpose of the tax is to produce revenue, the classification of the business into a separate category from all other businesses must be justified both under state law requirements that taxation be equal and uniform and under equal protection clause of the federal constitution.

As far as the equal protection clause of the federal constitution is concerned, the Supreme Court has displayed a consistently lenient attitude toward the states' powers to single out specific types of businesses for separate taxation. See, e.g. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Schule, 331 U.S. 70 (1946) (upholding annual franchise or license tax applicable only to commercial storage facilities, where only one such facility existed in the taxing municipality); New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938) (Upholding taxation of public utilities at higher rate than was imposed upon business generally); Illinois Cent. R. Co. V Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940) (gross receipts tax levied on railroads but not other business).

Thus a tax should have a reasonable chance of surviving an attack on Constitutional grounds as long as it is applicable generally to all corporations similarly situated throughout the state (e.g., all corporations doing business in the state whose business consists of operating a natural gas pipeline) even if, at the time in question, there is only one corporation in the state which falls within the category of corporations subject to the tax. See Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Schule, supra. However, we have found no decision in which not only was a single corporation subject to the statute, but that corporation was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. It may be that the combination of the classification of the single business along with the effect on interstate commerce would cause a court to invalidate such a tax. If such a tax were upheld a court might find that the amount thereof must bear some reasonable relationship to the value of the privilege being granted, and that the principles of Magnano Co. V. Hamilton, supra Part 1 (a), which did not involve a taxpayer involved solely in interstate commerce, are not applicable.

On balance, we believe that such a tax would probably withstand constitutional attacks, but that a more reliable subject of a high tax rate is the severance tax.

D. If gas reserves are contractually committed to an interstate pipeline, and dedicated to interstate service through an FPC certificate, can the value of the reserves be taxed as an asset of the pipeline?

While a state, under the strictures of Article 1, Section 10 of paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution, may not levy a tax on an item of property by reason of its exportation, a tax levied generally upon all property is nevertheless valid unless the property is "in commerce". See 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, Sections 117-121 and the authorities discussed therein. Moreover, it is believed that gas would not be "in commerce" until it begins to move in commerce and that a contractual right to withdraw could never be deemed "in commerce". See Kosydas v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974); Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904).

A state may classify property in multiple categories for taxation purposes and such classification will be upheld absent a finding of "palpable arbitrariness". Alaska might provide that an FPC certificate creates a separate property interest in real property or minerals, which interest would then be subject to an ad valorem tax. For an example of a separate estate in non-severed resources, see, International Paper Co. v. County of Siskiyou, supra (standing timber. By attributing taxable value to the con-

tractual right to the reserves, it seems likely that value of the reserves to the holders of the legal title thereof would be commensurately reduced. If both interests in the reserves are considered as separate estates in the real property, it will probably be necessary to tax them at the same rate. If, however, the pipeline's contractual right to purchase the reserves can be considered an "intangible" property right under Alaskan law, it may be possible to tax such right at a higher rate, since there is authority which approves of differing tax rates for tangibles and intangibles. See Randolph v. Simpson, 410 F. 2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1969) (Intangibles taxed at lower rate than tangibles).

It seems clear that such intangibles would have a "situs" in Alaska within the rule of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936), that intangibles may be taxed at other than the owner's domicile if such intangibles have become an integral part of some "local business".

E. Can a State require payment of a tax in any form other than money? For example, could a state impose a 4% tax on severed minerals and require delivery of 4% production in kind?

No; see 31 U.S.C.A. §392, (Supp. 1965), the predecessor of which was held constitutional in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939).

Section 392 reads in relevant part as follows:

"All coins and currencies of the United States...
shall be legal tender for all debts, public and
private, public charges, taxes...." (emphasis added)

4. The power of the State to construct and operate a pipeline.

(a) May the State of Alaska create a State instrumentality to (1) purchase North Slope gas, (2) transport such gas by pipeline to Southern Alaska, (3) make resales of gas along the route and at the southern terminus to intrastate users, and resell the surplus for delivery in interstate commerce?

(b) If such were done, which aspects, if any, would be subject to Federal regulation, by whom, and to what extent?

(c) Could such a state-owned entity obtain rights-of-way over Federal lands, by condemnation or otherwise?

A. Power of a State to Own and Operate a Pipeline System.

There are no apparent legal impediments precluding enactment of legislation authorizing the creation of a State instrumentality to purchase, transport and resell North Slope gas.

The texts often describe a general rule that states have no power to authorize municipal corporations to engage in business of a private nature. 12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §36.01 et seq. (1970 Revised Vol.); 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, etc. §210 (1971) 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §1842 (1950). This "rule" is based upon a series of 19th Century cases which apply the doctrine that the power of taxation possessed by governmental bodies is limited to taxation for a public purpose. See e.g. Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655 (1874), Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1882) (bonds issued to encourage establishment of manufacturing plants held invalid). However, even in the Topeka case the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that a municipality could engage in such activities if funds were available from a non-tax source.

"If these municipal corporations, which are in fact subdivisions of the State, and which for many reasons are vested with quasi legislative powers, have a fund or other property out of which they can pay debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within the power of the legislature of the

State to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly private or personal but which would in a secondary manner contribute to the public good."

Over the years, the "rule" that municipal corporations may not engage in business of a private nature, as a result of everbroadening concepts of public purpose. For example, by 1937, public programs to assist in the establishment of manufacturing plants was found to be sufficiently related to the public interest to withstand constitutional challenges. Albritton v. Winona, 178 So 799, (Miss., 1938), app. dismissed 303 U.S. 627 (1938). Similarly, the public ownership of a yard for the sale of wood, coal and other fuels which, during the 19th century, was private business in which municipalities were not permitted to engage, In Re Opinion of Justices, 30 N.E. 1142 (Mass., 1892), was, by 1917, a public purpose for which taxes could be levied without violating the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. Jones et al. v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).

The question of what is a "public purpose" has long been recognized as a question which is susceptible to local differences. The Supreme Court has indicated that in considering such matters great deference must be given to legislative and state court determinations. Jones et al. v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); and Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 307 U.S. 495 (1937).

The question of Constitutional authority for a state-owned natural gas pipeline system should be easily resolved. There can be little doubt that natural gas pipelines perform a public purpose. Indeed, the grant to privately-owned pipeline companies of the power of eminent domain must necessarily be grounded upon their public nature. The authority of municipalities to own and operate electric utilities and gas distributions systems, absent state statutory or constitutional restrictions, has long been clear. See e.g. 12 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed. (1970) §35.04. The authority of the Federal Government to own and operate wholesale power systems has similarly been sustained. Tennessee Electric Power Company v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) Aswander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

The statutes of at least two states authorize state-owned natural gas pipeline systems. La. Rev. Statutes §30.557 et seq.; Miss. Code 1942 Annotated §5950.

The nature of the Alaskan project is such that it is feasible to construct only a single facility to bring North Slope gas to market. Since the deliverability required to make the line feasible will far exceed anticipated intrastate demand, it is inevitable that the bulk of the gas delivered through the system will be sold interstate. The question this suggests is whether, assuming the state ownership of a pipeline facility is generally permissible, such

ownership is permissible where the vast majority of the gas is destined for ultimate consumption outside of the state. No reported case addresses this issue. However, if the State can argue that its ownership of the facilities is necessary to assure service to its citizens, it should be able to argue that the service to interstate markets is merely incidental to the performance of services for its citizens.

B. Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies.

Federal regulation of natural gas pipeline companies is accomplished primarily under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq. and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §1671 et seq. Under the Natural Gas Act the Federal Power Commission has plenary jurisdiction to regulate natural gas pipeline companies which transport or sell for resale gas in interstate commerce. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act provides for the establishment and enforcement of Federal minimum safety standards for natural gas pipelines.

As discussed in greater detail in Part II of this analysis, the construction and operation of pipeline facilities by a state instrumentality would probably be exempt from regulation by the FPC under the Natural Gas Act. As noted in that discussion, the operative sections of the Natural Gas Act are phrased in terms of regulation of "natural gas companies". The relevant terms under the Natural Gas Act,

i.e. "natural gas company", "person", "corporation", and "municipality" when read together would seem to exclude state-owned pipeline systems from the definition of "natural gas company" and thus from FPC regulation. 15 U.S.C. §717a, but see, FPC v. Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, 362 F.Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd 415 U.S. 961 (1974).

Although a literal reading of the Natural Gas Act would seem to preclude FPC jurisdiction over state-owned pipeline facilities, the assertion of such jurisdiction cannot be ruled out. Indeed, in view of (1) the willingness of the Court in the Oklahoma case essentially to ignore the definitions, in order to find that the Corporation Commission was a "person" which could be sued by the FPC under the Natural Gas Act, (2) the existence of two competing applications before the FPC at this time to construct pipeline facilities to bring North Slope gas to the United States, including one application involving a line through the State of Alaska, presumably along or close to the route which a State system would traverse, (3) the natural inclination of regulatory agencies to attempt to protect their own jurisdiction, and (4) the economic interest of the pipelines proposing to build systems to attach North Slope gas, it seems unlikely that the State would be able to construct and operate its facilities without litigating the issue of FPC jurisdiction.

Assuming that the FPC does not have jurisdiction over the facilities, the most significant Federal regulation would be pursuant to the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §1671 et seq. Under the Act, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to establish minimum Federal safety standards for the transportation of gas and for pipeline facilities. The standards apply to the design, installation, inspection, testing, construction, operation, extension, replacement and maintenance of such facilities and are set out at 40 C.F.R. §190.1 et seq. Each person engaging in the transportation of gas or who owns or operates pipeline facilities is required to comply with the applicable safety standards and to file and comply with a plan of inspection and maintenance. 49 U.S.C. §1677. Unlike the Natural Gas and Mail Act, the term "person" in the Pipeline Safety Act specifically includes states and municipalities. 49 U.S.C. §1671. The Act provides an exemption for certain pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas not subject to FPC jurisdiction. To qualify however the safety standards and practices applicable to the facilities must be regulated on essentially the same basis as under the Act. The state agency must submit an annual certification that (1) it has regulatory jurisdiction over the pipeline facilities or transportation, (2) has adopted and is enforcing each of the Federal safety standards applicable to such facilities and transportation (3) has the authority to require record maintenance reporting an

inspection substantially as provided under the Pipeline Safety Act, and (4) that state law provides for the enforcement of safety standards by way of injunctive and monetary sanctions substantially the same as provided under the Pipeline Safety Act. The Pipeline Safety Act provides both civil penalties (not to exceed \$1,000 per day for each violation or \$200,000 for a related series of violations) and the authority to obtain injunctive relief to restrain violations of the Act including the restraint of transportation of gas or the operation of a pipeline facility. 49 U.S.C. §1678, 1679. States are authorized to establish a more stringent safety standard applicable to intrastate facilities but are precluded from doing so with respect to interstate transmission facilities. 49 U.S.C. §1672. United Gas Pipe Line Company v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 319 F.Supp. 1138 (D.C. La. 1970) aff'd 445 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1971).

Unless Alaska creates an agency with jurisdiction to regulate and enforce safety standards for the transportation of natural gas within the state, which agency would have the authority over the proposed state-owned pipeline, the pipeline would be subject to regulation by the Secretary of Transportation. If the State adopts such a regulatory scheme, the regulatory authority of the Secretary of Transportation would probably be ousted.

C. Methods by Which the State Could Obtain Rights-of-Way Over Federal Lands.

As an initial matter, it should be noted that the law seems clear that the rights of a state to obtain property by condemnation could not be used to obtain such rights-of-way over federal land. In Utah Power and Light Co. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389 (1917) the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Federal Government has the full power under the Constitution "to protect its lands, to control their use and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights in them". 243 U.S.C. 404. The Court went on to state that:

"state laws, including those relating to the exercise of eminent domain, have no bearing upon a controversy such as is here present, save as they may have been adopted or made applicable by Congress."

I have found no indication that Congress has authorized the condemnation of Federal lands by states for pipeline rights-of-way. If the State determines to construct its own pipeline system, it could probably obtain right-of-way over Federal lands under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act, and several other Federal Statutes.

The basic statutory provisions authorizing rights-of-way for pipeline through Federal lands are contained in the Mineral Leasing Act 30 U.S.C. §185. Under the Act

"Rights-of-way through any Federal lands may be granted by the Secretary of the Interior or appropriate agency head for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels, or any refined product produced therefrom to any applicant possessing

the qualifications provided in Section 181 of this title in accordance with this section. 30 U.S.C. §185(a).

Although it is not clear that a State agency would be "an applicant possessing the qualifications provided in Section 181" it seems unlikely that the right to acquire rights-of-way would be denied to it. Section 181 provides that rights-of-way may be granted to

" . . . citizens of the United States, or to associations of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, or in the case of coal, oil, oil shale, or gas, to municipalities. Citizens of another country, the laws, customs or regulations of which deny similar or like privileges to citizens, or corporations of this country, shall not by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control, own any interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this chapter."

Under the Act, a right-of-way may be obtained through all lands owned by the United States except those "lands in the National Park System, lands held in trust for an Indian or Indian Tribe, and lands on the Outer Continental Shelf".

30 U.S.C. §185(b)(1). It should be noted that there is separate statutory authorization for oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way through National Wildlife Refuges. 16 U.S.C. §668(d), and Indian Reservations 25 U.S.C. §321. General provisions authorizing the grant of oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way through national parks, are not apparent, nor do the specific statutory provisions relating to the National Parks within Alaska authorize such rights-of-way. If the proposed pipeline must cross national park lands,

separate congressional authorization of the rights-of-way would be required.

II.

PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED STATE ACTIONS

As we have seen in Section I, certain aspects of natural gas production, transportation, and marketing are subject to Federal control, while others lie within the sphere of State control. What happens when Federal and State interests conflict? The potential for conflict is well illustrated in FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961), where it was said:

"When Congress initially enacted the Natural Gas Act in 1938, all the indications were that Congress intended the States to be the primary arbiters of conservation problems. The 1938 Act was based on a 1936 report rendered by the Federal Trade Commission and the section in that report devoted to conservation stresses the powers of state bodies to adopt corrective measures. The final recommendation of the Federal Trade Commission in regard to conservation contemplated primary state authority, with federal agencies being relegated to a reporting function. This recommendation formed the basis for § 11 of the Act as ultimately passed and that section reveals a secondary role for the Commission in this regard.

"However, in 1940, the Commission reported its dissatisfaction with the limited scope of § 7. The 1938 version of § 7 restricted the Commission's jurisdiction to certification of transportation into areas where the market was already being served by another natural gas company; if a pipeline wished to extend service into virgin territory, the Commission had no power to act. The Commission felt that this limitation barred it from considering "the broad social and economic effect of the use of various fuels" in a § 7 proceeding, Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 57, and, in its 1940 Annual Report, the Commission urged that the restriction be deleted in order that conservation considerations might be weighed.

The Commission implemented its recommendation by submitting to Congress a proposed amendment to § 7 with the restrictive language eliminated, and an amendment substantially similar to the one drafted by the Commission was enacted in 1942.

" . . .

"There is a broader principle here which also stands in opposition to respondents' contentions. When Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, it was motivated by a desire 'to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.' *Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., v. Federal Power Commission*, 364 U.S. 137, 147, 80 S.Ct. 1392, 1398, 4 L.Ed.2d. 1623. To that end, Congress 'meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme.' *Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission*, 332 U.S. 507, 520, 68 S.Ct. 190, 197, 92 L.Ed. 128. See *Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co.*, 317 U.S. 456, 467, 63 S.Ct. 369, 375, 87 L.Ed. 396. It is true, of course, that Congress did not desire comprehensive federal regulation; much authority was reserved for the States. But, it is equally clear that Congress did not desire that an important aspect of this field be left unregulated. See *Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission*, supra. Therefore, when a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a 'no-man's land' will be created. Compare *Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board*, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 603, 1 L.Ed.2d 601. That is to say, in a borderline case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.

In this case, the dispute is over the "economic" waste of gas which has been committed to transportation in interstate commerce outside the producing State. The Commission has not attempted to exert its influence over such "physically" wasteful practices as improper well spacing and the flaring of unused gas which result in the entire loss of gas and are properly of concern to the producing State; nor has the Commission attempted to regulate the "economic" aspects of gas used within the producing State. Respondents contend that, even in this posture, the Commission has usurped the functions of state regulating bodies but we cannot agree.

In the 1936 Federal Trade Commission Report, upon which respondents so heavily rely, there was some mention of control of the end use of gas and, as we have said, this report was strongly oriented towards state regulation. However, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, the primary emphasis was on physical waste of gas within the producing State and the reference to end use probably contemplated the use of gas in gasoline extraction and the manufacture of carbon black. 271 F.2d at page 947. There is no indication that the Federal Trade Commission or Congress was thinking in terms of state-controlled "economic" conservation of gas committed to interstate commerce. Moreover, it is questionable whether any State could be expected to take the initiative in enforcing this type of "economic" conservation. A producing State might wish to prolong its gas reserves for as long as possible but producing States have no control over the use to which gas is put in another State. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 74 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed. 583, Com. of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117; State of Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed. 716. Consuming States may control the end use of gas, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 329, 71 S.Ct. 777, 95 L.Ed. 993, but the deficiencies of this system in the present context are apparent--unless all States cooperate in enforcing a common regulation, the producer may pick a State which is sufficiently anxious for this scarce resource that it will take gas irrespective of the use. Therefore, it appears that, consistent with the congressional purpose of leaving no "attractive gap" in regulation, we must conclude that the "end-use" factor was properly of concern to the Commission.

We have, therefore, a system of dual regulation but one which the Court recognizes has no hard and fast lines of demarcation. Since the areas of present and future Federal-State conflict cannot be mapped with precision, it would perhaps be instructive to look at a number of specific issues to see which State actions may be permissible, and which State actions are probably prohibited.

1. The State may not embargo the movement of gas in interstate commerce through the exercise of conservation powers. The Supreme Court has consistently struck down state legislation designed to prohibit or limit the exportation of oil and gas to other states even where the state alleges that the supply of gas is no longer sufficient to meet the state's needs and that the legislation is necessary to conserve the resources of the state:

"We turn now to the principal issue, whether a State wherein natural gas is produced and is a recognized subject of commercial dealings may require that in its sales and disposal consumers in that State shall be accorded a preferred right of purchase over consumers in other States, -- when the requirement necessarily will operate to withdraw a large volume of the gas from an established interstate current whereby it is supplied in other States to consumers there. Of course, in the last analysis, the question is whether the enforced withdrawal for the benefit of local consumers is such an interference with interstate commerce as is forbidden to a State by the Constitution. The question is an important one; for what one State may do others may, and there are ten States from which natural gas is exported for consumption in other States. Besides, what may be done with one natural product may be done with others, and there are several States in which the earth yields products of great value which are carried into other States and there used. But, notwithstanding the importance of the question, its solution is not difficult. The controlling principles have been settled by many adjudications, -- some so closely in point that the discussion here may be relatively brief.

"By the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the power to regulate interstate commerce is expressly committed to Congress and therefore impliedly forbidden to the States. The purpose in this is to protect commercial intercourse

from invidious restraints, to prevent interference through conflicting or hostile state laws and to insure uniformity in regulation. It means that in the matter of interstate commerce we are a single nation -- one and the same people. All the States have assented to it, all are alike bound by it and all are equally protected by it. Even their power to lay and collect taxes, comprehensive and necessary as that power is, cannot be exerted in a way which involves a discrimination against such commerce. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350; Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 525-526; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 442-443; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 498.

"Natural gas is a lawful article of commerce and its transmission from one State to another for sale and consumption in the latter is interstate commerce. A state law, whether of the State where the gas is produced or that where it is to be sold, which by its necessary operation prevents, obstructs or burdens such transmission is a regulation of interstate commerce, -- a prohibited interference. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229; Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-291; Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78. The West Virginia act is such a law. Its provisions and the conditions which must surround its operation are such that it necessarily and directly will compel the diversion to local consumers of a large and increasing part of the gas heretofore and now going to consumers in the complainant States, and therefore will work a serious interference with that commerce."

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 595-597 (1923); and see Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U.S. 217 (1912); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).

2. The State may not establish a natural gas pricing structure for gas sold for resale in interstate commerce. Any attempt by a State to establish minimum or maximum prices for gas produced in the State but sold in interstate commerce would be invalidated by the courts. The decision in F.P.C. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 362 F.Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd 415 U.S. 961 (1974), establishes beyond question that the States cannot directly or indirectly affect the price of gas sold in interstate commerce:

"The State has no authority, either directly or indirectly, to fix the price at which natural gas is sold in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court stated in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 1963, 372 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 646, 9 L.Ed.2d 601 that:

...[O]ur inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms with prices or volumes of purchases, cf. Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478, 44 S.Ct. 169, 172, 68 L.Ed. 388. The Natural Gas Act precludes not merely direct regulation by the States of such contractual matters...

The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44, 75 S.Ct. 576, 99 L.Ed. 866, or for state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result. pp. 90-91, 83 S.Ct. p. 650.

"In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, it was argued that Peerless and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 1950, 340 U.S. 190, 71 S.Ct. 221,

95 L.Ed. 204, established that the states could regulate interstate sales, and, therefore, such sales were not within the gap which the Natural Gas Act was intended to fill. The Supreme Court, however, was of a different view:

Those cases upheld as constitutional state minimum price orders, justified as conservation measures, applying to sales of natural gas in interstate commerce. But it is well settled that the gap referred to is that thought to exist at the time the Natural Gas Act was passed, and the jurisdiction of the Commission is not affected by subsequent decisions of this Court which have somewhat loosened the constitutional restrictions on state activities affecting interstate commerce, in the absence of conflicting federal regulation. [Citation omitted] The Federal Power Commission did not participate in the Cities Service and Phillips Petroleum cases, the appellants there did not assert a possible conflict with federal authority under the Natural Gas Act, and consequently we expressly refused to consider at that time 'whether the Gas Act authorizes the Power Commission to set field prices on sales by independent producers, or leaves that function to the states...'

"Shortly after the decision in Phillips the Supreme Court was called upon in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corporation, 1955, 349 U.S. 44, 75 S.Ct. 576, 99 L.Ed. 866 to review the validity of certain minimum price orders of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had affirmed the orders, reasoning that they were primarily conservation measures, rather than pricing regulations, and that it was immaterial that they would have an incidental effect on prices. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Commission, et al., 1954, Okl. 272 P.2d 425. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case was controlled by Phillips, supra. Holding essentially that Peerless was no longer authority for states to regulate interstate natural gas prices, the High Court stated:

We disagree with the contention of the appellees that Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil

and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71 S.Ct. 215, 95 L.Ed. 190, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190, 71 S.Ct. 221, 95 L.Ed. 204, are applicable here. In those cases we were dealing with constitutional questions and not the construction of the Natural Gas Act. The latter question was specifically not passed upon in those cases. p. 45, 75 S.Ct. p. 576.

"In Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 1961, 365 U.S. 1, 9-20, 81 S.Ct. 435, 5 L.Ed.2d 377, it was held that the Federal Power Commission, through its certification power, could prevent the waste of gas committed to its jurisdiction. In so holding, the Court noted a distinction between 'economic waste' and 'physically wasteful practices'. The former involves a general monitoring of natural gas supply through manipulations of rate structure and determinations of gas use priorities, while the latter involves such matters as improper well spacing and the flaring of unused gas. The regulation of 'economic waste' is properly within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, leaving the state authority to regulate 'physically wasteful practices,' so long as such do not interfere with Federal jurisdiction.

"In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 1965, 372 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 646, 9 L.Ed.2d 601, the Kansas Corporation Commission had issued orders which required an interstate pipeline company to purchase natural gas ratably from all wells connecting to its pipeline system. The United States Supreme Court reversed an affirmance of the order by the Kansas Supreme Court. In so doing, the High Court held that a purpose, 'however legitimate to conserve natural resources, does not warrant direct [or indirect] interference by the States with the price[s] of natural gas wholesales in interstate commerce.' [Italics ours] The orders were struck down because they necessarily impaired the ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas and to achieve the uniformity of regulation which was the objective of the Natural Gas Act.

"The problem in Northern Natural, supra, as here, was:

...not as to the existence or even the scope of a State's power to conserve its natural

resources; the problem is only whether the Constitution sanctions the particular means chosen by...[the state] to exercise the conceded power if those means threaten effectuation of the federal regulatory scheme.
[Emphasis supplied]

"The Defendant also relies upon Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b), which states in part that the provisions of the Act 'shall not apply...to the production and gathering of natural gas.' Accordingly, Order No. 93,381, paragraph 19, states that:

All we do is prohibit the production of gas under circumstances which we find will produce waste; and to prevent that waste, we will order wells to be shut in. Our Order and our regulatory action is complete before any sale takes place.

"The state courts, which were reversed in Panama and Cities Service, had relied upon identical rationale in upholding state minimum price orders. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had observed in affirmance that 'the sale is made before any movement of any kind starts and before any thing in the nature of interstate commerce occurs.' supra, 272 P.2d at 431. Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court had observed the order of the Kansas Commission 'fixed a minimum price to be paid for gas before cessation of production.' 180 Kan. 454, 304 P.2d 528 at 535.

"In the case at bar, the Defendant seeks to do precisely what the United States Supreme Court held that the Kansas Corporation Commission could not do. Here, as there, a certain price level must be satisfied as a condition precedent to production. The High Court said in the Northern, supra, case, 'It has been consistently held that 'production' and 'gathering' are terms narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution.' The Defendant is not concerned herein with the mere physical problem of production; it is concerned with the price of the sale." Id., pp. 538-540.

3. A State may not accomplish by indirection that which is prohibited through direct action. The courts have not been hesitant to disregard a state contention that a statute

or regulation was designed to promote conservation where the court determines that the state's real intent was otherwise. A good example of this is the attempt by the State of Texas to force interstate pipelines to purchase ratably from all producers in a field. The Common Purchaser Act of 1931 compelled the purchase of gas from all producers in the field, and was held unconstitutional in Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 59 F.2d 750 (W.D.Tex. 1932).

The State of Texas then attempted to accomplish the same goal by indirection through the issuance of proration orders.

Proration orders designed to prevent waste have been held to be a constitutional exercise of the state's police power.

In this instance, the interstate pipelines owned their own gas wells and were able to satisfy the needs of the pipeline through their own production. The result of the proration orders was to so decrease the amount of production from all wells, including the pipeline-owned wells, that the pipeline was forced to purchase from other producers in order to fill the pipeline. The State contended that the action was necessary to prevent correlative rights of owners in a common reservoir -- approximately 20% of the gas in the reservoir was owned by persons who had no market other than the interstate pipelines, and the only way these owners could prevent drainage would be to produce oil and gas for which there was no market. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the State's action was an impermissible interference with interstate

commerce:

"...We assume that the prohibition of any wasteful conduct, whether primarily in behalf of other owners of gas in the common reservoir, or because of the public interests involved, is consistent with the Constitution of Texas and that of the United States, and that to prevent waste production may be prorated. We assume, also, that the State may constitutionally prorate production in order to undue drainage of gas from the reserves of well owners lacking pipe line connections. If proration were lawfully applied for any such purposes, the fact that thereby other private persons would incidentally and gratuitously obtain important benefits would present no constitutional obstacle. And the fact that plaintiffs' gas is to be sold in interstate commerce would not preclude such exercise of the State's power. Compare Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235.

"But the sole purpose of the limitation which the order imposes upon the plaintiffs' production is to compel those who may legally produce, because they have market outlets for permitted uses, to purchase gas from potential producers whom the statute prohibits from producing because they lack such a market for their possible product. Plaintiffs' operations are neither causing nor threatening any overground or underground waste. Every well owner in the field is free to produce the gas, provided he does as appears, physically free to provide himself with a market and with transportation and marketing facilities. There is no basis for a claim that his right, or opportunity, will be interfered with by a disproportionate taking by any one of those who may legally produce."

Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., supra, at pp. 76-77. (Footnotes omitted).

The prohibition on attempted State direct action which conflicts with the Federal regulatory scheme is also reflected in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm., 372 U.S. 84 (1963), where the Supreme Court ruled invalid an order of the Kansas State Corporation Commission requiring

an interstate pipeline to purchase gas ratably from all wells in each field within the State where the pipeline's facilities were located. The Court held that while the proration of production was a legitimate exercise of the State's police power, the means chosen conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme:

"The danger of interference with the federal regulatory scheme arises because these orders are unmistakably and unambiguously directed at purchasers who take gas in Kansas for resale after transportation in interstate commerce. In effect, these orders shift to the shoulders of interstate purchasers the burden of performing the complex task of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells within the State, cf. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 - a task which would otherwise presumably be the State Commission's. Moreover, any readjustment of purchasing patterns which such orders might require of purchasers who previously took unratably could seriously impair the Federal Commission's authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the purchasers' cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States. This relationship is a matter with respect to which Congress has given the Federal Power Commission paramount and exclusive authority. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610. The prospect of interference with the federal regulatory power in this area is made even more acute by the fact that criminal sanctions imposed by state statute for noncompliance fall upon such purchasers and not upon the local producers. Therefore, although collision between the State and federal regulation may not be an inevitable consequence, there lurks such imminent possibility of collision in orders purposely directed at interstate wholesale purchasers that the orders must be declared a nullity in order to assure the effectuation of the comprehensive federal regulation ordained by Congress."

Justice Harlan, dissenting with two other Justices, noted that enforcement of proration orders through the pipelines was the most efficient way to accomplish the State's

purpose, and argued that any threat to federal regulation from such an order was no different than that resulting from other valid conservation measures. Justice Harlan also argued that all conservation legislation constituted an interference with interstate commerce; therefore, the ultimate effect of the majority's ruling would be to invalidate all conservation powers of the states.

"The ratable take orders here were intended as conservation measures -- to protect the correlative rights of producers taking gas from a common source of supply by preventing drainage from underproduced wells to overproduced wells. It has always been recognized that the States possess the power to conserve scarce resources such as natural gas and to prevent unfair and discriminatory production of this resource by some wells at the expense of others. See, e.g., Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190. It is difficult to imagine any exercise of this conservation power that would not carry with it the possibility of affecting the costs incurred by those who purchase gas from producers. Regulations requiring the casing of wells, prohibiting the use of pumps, restricting production to a certain percent of a well's 'open flow,' imposing a particular gas-oil ratio, controlling drilling operations and pipeline pressure, prescribing the permissible spacing of wells, and enforcing pooling or unitization may reduce the amount of gas available for sale by a particular producer (at least in the short run) and thus force a purchaser to buy from it or someone else probably at greater cost. Yet it has never been suggested that such state measures are for the reason invalid.

"Indeed, the most direct interference with the availability of gas for interstate sale is the 'allowable' order. It places a ceiling on the amount of gas that may be produced by a particular well during a given period of time and inevitably makes pipelines

spread their demand among many wells. Obviously its possible effect on cost is precisely the same as that which may be caused by a ratable take order, for the two orders are merely variations of the same regulatory measure; both are designed to prevent the disproportionate taking of gas from some wells to the disadvantage of others.

"In Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), this Court sustained, against a challenge under the Commerce Clause, a state allowable order. Since the States had the power to issue such an order at the time the Natural Gas Act was passed, nothing in that Act can now be considered to withdraw it. This is so because it is beyond dispute that when Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act in 1938 it did not intend to deprive the States of any regulatory powers they were then deemed to possess under the Constitution. Rather, the Act was intended only to fill the 'gap . . . thought to exist at the time the Natural Gas Act was passed' by providing for federal regulation of those aspects of the natural gas business that the States were at that time believed to be constitutionally-incapable of regulating. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 684, 685-687. As was specifically stated in the House Committee Report, the Act 'takes no authority from State commissions, and is so drawn as to complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory authority.' H.R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.

"If an allowable order is now valid, what is the distinction between such an order and the ratable take orders in the present case? The Court points to no difference in terms of effect on cost structure, but only to the fact that the orders here are directed at purchasers and not producers. For reasons already discussed, supra, pp. 100-102, this difference is illusory.

"Quite apart from the absence of any significant difference between the possible general cost ramifications of an allowable and a ratable take order, the very facts of the case before us demonstrate the folly of determining whether or not the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission has been invaded on the basis of general possibilities unsupported by specific data. Appellant is paying a higher price for gas to Republic than to any other producer in the Kansas Hugoton Field. If appellant could reduce its take from Republic wells without contractual liability, the over-all cost of its

gas purchases would in all likelihood decrease. Surely such a beneficial effect on appellant's cost structure is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Natural Gas Act. And we have no way of knowing the extent to which the same is true of other Kansas purchasers. The lurking danger of collision with federal regulation that the Court fears may be completely nonexistent. Yet on this insecure foundation the Court builds a rule that, if consistently applied, may well destroy the conservation powers of the States. And this "in the name of an Act expressly intended to preserve existing state powers." Id., pp. 103-106. (Footnotes omitted).

The most important aspect of Justice Harlan's pessimistic outlook for the future is his recognition that the states' traditional control over conservation can be eroded under the preemption doctrine. While a particular conservation statute or regulation may not be held unconstitutional as an interference with interstate commerce, that same statute or regulation may be invalid if it conflicts with an area preempted by the Federal government. This is illustrated again by reference to F.P.C. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, supra, wherein the District Court discusses the fact that state regulations establishing minimum prices for the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce were originally upheld by the Supreme Court as valid conservation matters. However, in the wake of the Phillips case wherein the Court determined that the FPC had jurisdiction over producers the attempts by the states to set minimum prices were held invalid in light of conflicting federal regulation. Thus, it must be concluded that Congress could act to preempt any state control over production and that such legislation would probably be constitutional.

4. The State May Not Effectively Block Construction of an Interstate Pipeline by Denying Permission to Cross State Lands.

The power of eminent domain granted to an interstate natural gas pipeline is found in Sec. 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(f), which is as follows:

"When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or equipment necessary to the proper operation of such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be, with the practice and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated: Provided, that the United States district courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the owner of the property to be condemned exceeds \$3,000."

As can be seen from the foregoing quote, Sec. 7(h) makes no reference to public or state owned lands; moreover, there appear to be no reported cases which specifically address the issue of whether Sec. 7(h) provides the authority to condemn state owned lands.

It has been determined that the power of eminent domain under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 814, includes

the power to condemn state owned property. In State of Missouri ex rel. v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 42 F.2d 692 (C.D. Mo. 1930), 'the State of Missouri brought an action to enjoin construction of a hydroelectric project which had been approved by the FPC. The State alleged that construction of the project would result in the accumulation of a large body of water which would submerge "both public and private property, including the courthouse and the jail in the village of Linn Creek, a large number of school districts, and at sundry points inundate the public highways." In response to the State's allegation that the utility company could not appropriate land already dedicated to public use the Court stated as follows:

"9. While it is well settled that the Legislature may authorize the taking of property already devoted to a public use, it is equally well established that a general delegation of the power of eminent domain does not authorize the taking of property already devoted to a public use, 'unless it can clearly be inferred from the nature of the improvements authorized or from the impracticability of constructing them without encroaching upon such property that the legislature intended to authorize such a taking.' 10 R.C.L. § 169; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., et al., 195 U.S. 540, 25 S.Ct. 133, 49 L.Ed. 312, 1 Ann. Cas. 517. In this connection it cannot be questioned but that the Congress had the power to confer the right of eminent domain upon the defendant Union Electric Light & Power Company. 10 R.C.L. § 167.

"In the instant case the Congress must have contemplated this identical situation; hence the requirement of notice. Moreover, the proposed improvements could not be accomplished, except through the exercise, if necessary, of eminent domain against property already

dedicated to public use. To deny the right of eminent domain as against this public property would not only defeat the functions of the national government, but would run contrary to the obvious intent of the Congress as expressed in the Water Power Act. *Stockton, Attorney General v. Baltimore & New York R.R. Co.* (C.C.) 32 F.9; 20 C.J. § 90, P. 602; *Vermont Hydro-Electric Corporation v. Dunn et al.*, 95 Vt. 144, 112 A. 223, 12 A.L.R. 1495; *Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne*, 104 Tex. 395, 138 S.W. 575, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 322." *Id.*, at p. 698.

While this case appears to be the only one to have ever addressed the issue at hand, it is clearly consistent with other cases holding that the federal government can condemn state lands:

"The power of eminent domain is essential to a sovereign government. If the United States has determined its need for certain land for a public use that it is within its federal sovereign powers, it must have the right to appropriate that land. Otherwise, the owner of the land, by refusing to sell it or by consenting to do so only at an unreasonably high price, is enabled to subordinate the constitutional powers of Congress to his personal will. The Fifth Amendment, in turn, provides him with important protection against abuse of the power of eminent domain by the Federal Government.

"While in its early days the Federal Government filed its condemnation cases in the state courts, this Court, in *Kohl v. United States*, 91 U.S. 367, disposed of the idea that this was necessary. In that case, which has become the leading case on the federal power of eminent domain, Mr. Justice Strong also said:

'It has not been seriously contended during the argument that the United States government is without power to appropriate lands or other property within the States for its own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an authority is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved

if the obstinacy of a private person, or if any other authority, can prevent the acquisition of the means of instruments by which alone governmental functions can be performed. The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States..." United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236-237 (1946).

It is noteworthy that the Natural Gas Act did not provide interstate pipelines with the power of eminent domain until the Act was amended in 1947 to add Section 7(h). The legislative history of the 1947 amendment makes it clear that Congress intended to confer on interstate pipelines the same power of eminent domain as contained in the Federal Power Act:

"In some States the right of eminent domain is expressly denied to companies which may have qualified under the Natural Gas Act. For instance, in the State of Arkansas the State constitution provides that a foreign corporation shall not have the power to condemn private property- (Constitution of Arkansas 1874, as amended, art. 12, sec. 11). The State of Wisconsin grants the right of eminent domain to only those gas companies which are Wisconsin corporations. (Wisconsin Statutes, 1945, ch. 32.02(6)). Nebraska grants the right of eminent domain to gas pipe line companies distributing gas within the State (Nebraska Rev. Stat., 1943, ____).

"Therefore, the Congress of the United States in carrying out its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce should correct this deficiency and omission in the Natural Gas Act by the passage of Senate bill 1028 which confers the right of eminent domain upon those natural gas companies which have qualified under the Natural Gas Act to carry out and perform the terms of any certificate of public convenience and necessity acquired from the Federal Power Commission under the act.

* * *

"It has also been suggested that the granting of the right of eminent domain is a matter peculiarly within the

legislative and constitutional purview of the States and that it is proper that such rights should rest with the States in order that the States may therefore be in a position to require a natural-gas pipeline company entering the State to serve the people of that State as a condition to obtaining the right of eminent domain. This argument defeats the very objectives of the Natural Gas Act. Under the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Commission is given exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale. The Commission, through its certificate power, is authorized to grant certificates of convenience and necessity for the construction of interstate natural-gas pipe lines from points of supply to certain defined and limited markets. If a State may require such interstate natural-gas pipe lines to serve markets within that State as a condition to exercising the right of eminent domain, then it is obvious that the orders of the Federal Power Commission may be nullified.

"As stated above, it is within the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. In the performance of that constitutional authority, it is proper for the Congress to furnish proper and necessary protection of the free flow of interstate commerce. S. 1028 is designed for that purpose with respect to the movement of natural gas in interstate commerce and the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption, and is identical to congressional protection granted under the Federal Power Act with respect to licensees under that act for the construction, maintenance, or operation of any dam, reservoir, diversion structure, or the works appurtenant or necessary thereto.

"S. 1028 does not invade or interfere with the right of the States to impose any proper regulation upon intrastate activities, since its application is limited to exclusive interstate operations with respect to which the States may not constitutionally legislate." Roach and Gallagher, *Natural Gas Act Legislative History*, Part II, pp. 886-888. (Emphasis added.) And see, Nichols on Eminent Domain, *supra*, pp. 5-272; Doggett "Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain As Authorized By the Natural Gas Act," 1969 Eminent Domain Inst. 33, 38.

It must be assumed that Congress was aware of the State of Missouri v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., supra, when it amended the Natural Gas Act to give interstate pipelines the same power of eminent domain as contained in the Federal Power Act:

"It is interesting to note that the procedural and jurisdictional portions of the new subsection were copied verbatim (with minor insignificant exceptions) from the section of the Federal Power Act which grants to hydro-electric licensees the power to condemn property for dams and related facilities. The importance of the similarity of language lies in the fact that the pertinent section of the Power Act had been on the statute books since 1920 and had been interpreted numerous times by the courts. Under well-recognized rules of construction, by adopting substantially the same language at a later time, Congress must be presumed to have put its stamp of approval on the prior decisions. It cannot be denied that Congress was aware of the similarity of language, because the House Committee Report contained a letter from the chairman of the Federal Power Commission specifically calling attention to the fact." Doggett, supra, pp. 37-38 (Footnotes omitted).

Consequently, one must conclude that an interstate pipeline would have the power to condemn state lands if necessary to fulfill the obligations of its certificate of public convenience and necessity.

5. The State May Not Block Construction of an Interstate Pipeline by Assertions of Police or Zoning Powers.

The courts have determined that § 717f(h) is a constitutional exercise of congressional power. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Thatcher, 180 F.2d 644, cert. denied 340 U.S. 829 (1950). Moreover, the courts have consistently

enjoined municipalities from enforcing zoning ordinances which prohibit the construction of interstate pipelines within the city limits. After concluding that the Natural Gas Act had not totally preempted the states' exercise of police power over natural gas pipelines, the court in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Borough of Milltown, 93 F.Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1950), concluded that the municipality's zoning ordinance could be sustained only if reasonable, justifiable and not an undue burden on interstate commerce. The municipality argued, to no avail, that the ordinance was reasonable because the pipeline could be rerouted around the town:

"The defendant stands only upon the suggestion of its mayor that other routes are available, which is corroborated by another witness. Neither is qualified to testify as to the engineering feasibility of the transportation of natural gas with relation to the installation of the pipe line or the maintenance and operation thereof. The only efficacy of this testimony rests in the statements that the pipe line could be otherwise routed. This is almost axiomatic for as one of the defendant's witnesses on cross examination admitted a pipe line can be laid practically anywhere, including the side of the Empire State Building if expense is of no consideration.

"On the other hand the plaintiff has shown logical, efficient and economical reasons for following the right-of-way of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company in this particular congested industrial portion of this state. By doing so it insures a minimum of inconvenience to, and destruction of, property of others.

"In a somewhat similar situation dealing with the condemnation of land for pipe line purposes the court in the case of Williams v. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp., supra, stated:

'The claim is merely that, in the exercise of its rights, the defendant should have run its line across the property of some one else, or crossed petitioners' property at a different place.

'It is obvious that such a contention must fail. If a landowner, merely by showing that it would be possible for a utility line or highway to avoid crossing his property, could compel the condemnor to relocate its line, no power line, railroad, pipe line, or highway could ever be located properly to serve the public. The determination of what property is needed to accomplish the public purpose for which the right of eminent domain is given must of necessity rest primarily with the agency charged with carrying out the public work. There may be cases where the condemnor so abuses its discretion or acts in such bad faith in locating its line that the court would be justified in intervening; but usually no Judge would take upon himself the burden of deciding the best location for a utility line.' 89 F.Supp. 488-489.

"This reasoning is equally applicable to this plaintiff, although it was not necessary for it to exercise its right of eminent domain in the instance under question here. The fact remains that the mere claim by defendant that its ordinance requires plaintiff to locate its pipe line in an alternative route, suggested as available, does not fortify it with power to impede the plaintiff in the prosecution of its legal objective in the field of interstate commerce. Such an attempt to obstruct interstate commerce under guise of an assertion of exercise of the police power must fail." Id., p. 295. (Footnotes omitted)

Nor can the State assert, successfully, a supervening interest in public safety; the State has no power to control safety standards for interstate natural gas pipelines. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq., provides that:

"§ 1672(a) * * *

(b) Not later than twenty-four months after August 12, 1968, and from time to time thereafter, the Secretary

shall, by order, establish minimum Federal safety standards for the transportation of gas and pipeline facilities. Such standards may apply to the design, installation, inspection, testing, construction, extension, operation, replacement, and maintenance of pipeline facilities. ~~Standards affecting the design, installation, construction, initial inspection, and initial testing shall not be applicable to pipeline facilities in existence on the date such standards are adopted.~~ Whenever the Secretary shall find a particular facility to be hazardous to life or property, he shall be empowered to require the person operating such facility to take such steps necessary to remove such hazards. Such Federal safety standards shall be practicable and designed to meet the need for pipeline safety. In prescribing such standards, the Secretary shall consider -

- (1) relevant available pipeline safety data;
- (2) whether such standards are appropriate for the particular type of pipeline transportation;
- (3) the reasonableness of any proposed standards;
- and (4) the extent to which such standards will contribute to public safety.

Any State agency may adopt such additional or more stringent standards for pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act as are not incompatible with the Federal minimum standards, but may not adopt or continue in force after the minimum Federal safety standards referred to in this subsection become effective any such standards applicable to interstate transmission facilities."

The act has been construed as preempting any state or local control over pipeline safety regulations with respect to interstate natural gas pipelines. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 319 F.Supp. 1138 (D.C.La.), affirmed 445 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1971).

6. If the State Initially Elects to Take Its Royalty in Value Rather Than In Kind, The State Probably Could Not Thereafter Withdraw the Royalty Share From Interstate Commerce Without FPC Approval. Section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act provides as follows:

(b) No natural-gas company shall abandon all or portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permits such abandonment.
15 U.S.C. §717 (b)

Under this language, once a producer or pipeline commences jurisdictional service, it cannot thereafter terminate the service, without abandonment authorization from the Commission. United Gas Pipe Line Company v. FPC, 385 U.S. 83 (1966). This is true whether or not there are valid contractual agreements with respect to the service.

Unless and until the State has exercised its right to take gas in kind, the producer owns and is legally entitled to dispose of all gas in interstate commerce. His obligation to the State is to pay royalties in value, such being calculated on the basis of a percentage of the value of the production obtained from the lease. In at least the conventional situation where royalty is paid in value, the

payment of royalty has been held by the Courts to be a non-jurisdictional transaction. Mobil Oil Corporation v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In that case the Court stated that an economic interest in the proceeds of sale unaccompanied by authority to determine the incidents of sale does not make one a seller. 463 F.2d at 262.

If the producer undertakes to sell all of the gas produced from the lease and is issued a certificate authorizing the sale of all of the gas from the lease, the producer may not be able to thereafter release the royalty gas for a taking in kind. Superior Oil Company, Docket No. CI71-879 (Letter Order issued 6/13/75). In Superior, the State of Texas had the right under its leases to take its royalty gas in kind. Initially the gas was sold by Superior Oil Company under Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Federal Power Commission. When the State decided to commence taking its royalty gas in kind, it notified the Federal Power Commission asserting, among other things, that an FPC Order issued February 11, 1975 in Docket G-5354, et al, had authorized the State to take its gas in kind. The Commission responded that "the February 11, 1975, Order did not authorize either Superior or the State of Texas to divert natural gas from interstate commerce" and advised the State that:

"before any natural gas produced from the leases dedicated under Superior's contract dated May 7, 1971, as amended June 25, 1974, with Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America can be diverted from interstate commerce Superior must file for and receive abandonment authorization from this Commission in accordance with requirements from Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act and the Commission's regulations thereunder. Any action by the State of Texas which would require Superior to take action inconsistent with said Act and regulations would be in violation of the Supremacy Clause Doctrine (Northern Natural Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84)."

While it is therefore clear that the Commission will take the position that abandonment authorization is required before a State can exercise its right to take royalty gas in kind after delivery of the full gas stream in interstate commerce has once commenced, the validity of the Commission's assertions has not yet been ruled upon by a Court. The issues involved are: (1) the extent to which the certification and abandonment requirements of Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act can be construed as permitting, or indeed requiring, a natural gas company to continue to dispose of property where it has no contractual or legal rights (other than such rights as may be created by the Natural Gas Act) to do so; and (2) the extent to which a royalty owner may be bound by agreements made and actions taken by its lessee. Similar issues are, however, before the Courts at this time. See e.g., Southland Royalty Company, et al. v. FPC (5th Cir. Case No. _____, filed July __, 1975).

The first case to present these issues to the Commission was El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Perry R. Bass,

et al., 48 FPC 1269, Opinion No. 638 (1972). In that case Bass had farmed out certain acreage to Shell Oil Company retaining a 1/8th overriding royalty convertible to a 50% working interest on payout. The agreement expressly provided that during any period that both parties had working interests either party could take its gas in kind and that nothing contained in the agreements could be construed as giving Shell the right to sell or otherwise dispose of Bass' share of the gas without express authorization to do so. Shell entered into agreements to sell gas from the properties to El Paso. During the period prior to payout all of the gas from the lease was, in fact, sold to El Paso pursuant to certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission. On discovering that payout had occurred, Bass exercised its right to convert its overriding royalty to a working interest, and entered into agreements for the sale of its gas to Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America. El Paso filed a complaint and sought a Declaratory Order requiring Bass to obtain Section 7(b) abandonment authorization before diverting any gas to Natural. The Commission concluded that El Paso's right to purchase gas from the lease could rise no higher than Shell's right to sell. Since the lease agreements precluded Shell from selling gas attributable to Bass' working interest without permission and Shell had only purported to sell "gas from its properties" the Commission

concluded that neither party could be heard to say that the contract between Shell and El Paso impaired the pre-existing rights of Bass to take and dispose of its gas.

In Bass, the Commission seemed to recognize that sales of gas by a producer under the Natural Gas Act would not destroy pre-existing rights of other parties to the gas. With respect to rights to gas acquired after a producer has commenced jurisdictional sales, the Commission in a series of cases has made clear that those rights may be subject to and restricted by the abandonment provisions of the Natural Gas Act. See, for example, Blair-Vreeland, ____ FPC ____, Opinion No. 724 (March 18, 1975) reh. denied, Opinion No. 724-A (May 14, 1975); Mitchell Energy Corporation, ____ FPC ____, Opinion No. 733 (June 11, 1975); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Billy J. McCombs, et al., ____ FPC ____, Opinion No. 740 (August 20, 1975) reh. denied, Opinion No. 740-A (November 7, 1975). In each of those cases, the new interest owner acquired his rights from a producer which had previously made jurisdictional sales from the properties. Since, in each case, the rights were acquired after the property had become dedicated to interstate commerce, the conclusion that the property remained dedicated in the hands of the new owners is not necessarily inconsistent with the holding in Bass.

There is one recent case, however, which is clearly inconsistent with Bass; See El Paso Natural Gas Co., et al.,

____ FPC _____, Opinion No. 737 (July 11, 1975) reh. denied, Opinion No. 737-A (September 3, 1975), on appeal sub nom, Southland Royalties Co. vs. FPC, 5th Cir. Case No. ____ filed July __, 1975, referred to here as the "Southland" case. Southland involved the question of the rights of certain mineral interest owners to dispose of gas after termination of leases. In 1925, Gulf Oil Corporation had acquired a fifty-year lease to the properties. Gulf developed oil and gas reserves on the property and sold gas produced from the properties to El Paso in transactions subject to FPC jurisdiction. On July 14, 1975 Gulf's lease expired. The question of the right of the mineral interest owners to possession of the properties was adjudicated in State court proceedings. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 496 S.W.2d 547 (1973). The mineral interest owners who, on expiration of the lease, were entitled to possession of the property and all gas produced therefrom, agreed to sell that gas to an intrastate pipeline company.

In response to petitions for declaratory order filed by El Paso and Texaco, Inc., the Commission concluded that all gas produced from the properties remained dedicated to interstate commerce notwithstanding the termination of the leases. The Commission held that the leasees, owners, and the operators of the plant in which the gas was processed, all must obtain abandonment authorization prior to disposing of the gas to other purchasers. The Commission stated

"Because of the termination of the fifty-year leases the leaseholders, Gulf et al., lose their leases and their rights pass to Southland, et al. in one case and to Goldsmith, et al. and Texaco in the other case. Of course we have determined that gas may not be withdrawn from interstate commerce by the assignment of leases from one lessee to another." Cumberland Natural Gas Company, 34 FPC 132 (1965); Blair-Vreeland, FPC _____, Opinion No. 724, Docket No. CI 74-331, March 18, 1975. But we do not rest our conclusion on these cases, but on the principle established by Section 7(b) that 'service' may not be abandoned without our permission. Thus it makes no difference whether a lease is transferred or terminates, the obligation of service imposed upon the dedicated gas continues. As said in Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 342 (C.A.5, 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515 (1964), the duty to continue to serve is like an ancient covenant running with the land." Opinion 737 mimeo at 6.

On rehearing, the Commission stated that

"Here, however, we are solely concerned with the service commenced by Gulf to El Paso in interstate commerce. Under Section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act this service may not be abandoned without the permission of the Commission. Nor, as we said in Opinion No. 737, can this service be discontinued by transfer to a successor interest. For the practical purposes of the Act it makes no difference whether the successors happen to be assignees, purchasers or reversionary interests. While the contractual right to control and sell the reserves herein involved has passed from Gulf to the various mineral interests, this does not mean that under the Natural Gas Act the gas flowing in interstate commerce may be diverted to the intrastate market. As said in Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550, 558 (C.A. 3, 1956), Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce in natural gas includes authority to regulate abandonment of sales." Opinion 737-A mimeo at 2.

In its initial opinion in Southland, the Commission distinguished the Bass case describing the latter as involving a situation in which only a part of the interest (i.e., Shell's

interest) in the property was dedicated to interstate commerce. By contrast, it concluded that Gulf had dedicated all of the reserves from the properties. On rehearing, the Commission again attempted to distinguish Bass, emphasizing that in Bass, the sale agreement "pointedly made it clear that Shell was only selling gas from its interests in the properties involved". Opinion 737-A mimeo at _____. However, to the extent that Bass might not be distinguishable, the Commission stated:

"To the extent, however, that Bass can be said to stand for the proposition that the service initiated by the leaseholder based upon certain gas reserves covered by the lease can be terminated without Commission approval, it is overruled. It should be noted that Bass did not involve the shift of gas reserves from interstate to intrastate commerce and did involve the public interest in the encouragement of farmouts, and these circumstances, in part, explain the result in Bass." Opinion 737-A mimeo at 3.

In responding to arguments that the Commission's holding unconstitutionally deprived the mineral interest owners of property without due process of law, the Commission responded that since the leases contemplated that the lessors would develop and sell oil and gas produced from the properties, the lessees were bound by the legal consequences of such sales.

". . . the essence of the argument appears to be that we are in error in holding that the leaseholders, Gulf, et al., had power to encumber the property with the result that the mineral leaseholders are forced to enter into an interstate sale against their will. We assume that in 1925, when the leases were made the lease owners did not contemplate that the Natural Gas Act would

be enacted with a provision that service might not be abandoned without approval of the Commission. They clearly did contemplate that the leaseholders would drill for oil and gas and sell oil and gas to outside parties, and there was no reason that these sales could not be in interstate commerce, and may have had a duty to do so under the facts in law at that time. After the Natural Gas Act was enacted in 1938 and the Phillips case was decided in 1954 the interstate sales of gas became subject to FPC jurisdiction. The leaseholders who had a duty to exploit the wells were the appropriate parties to seek FPC certification. Upon the commencement of interstate sales under FPC certification, the sales became imbued with the public interest. The law of Texas preserved for the leaseowners their property interests, and we do not change this, but Section 7(b) of the Act will not permit the abandonment of interstate sales without our authority once such sales have commenced. The mineral lease owners who entered into a lease that permitted the leaseholders to make interstate sales are not deprived of this property by being required to permit such sales to continue, and they will be compensated under the just and reasonable rates promulgated under the Natural Gas Act." Opinion 747 mimeo at 4.

In view of the Commission letter order in Superior Oil, supra and its decision in Southland, it seems most probable that the FPC will assert that abandonment authorization must be obtained if the State of Alaska allows lessees of state property to commence sales of gas in interstate commerce and thereafter seeks to take a portion of the gas in kind. It is conceivable that the agreements between the producer and the purchaser could be structured to bring the transaction within the rationale of the Bass decision, but in view of the Commission's recent arguments and holding in Southland, it seems likely that Bass has been

overruled and that the Commission will require the producer to obtain abandonment authorization notwithstanding such agreements.

7. While the issue is not free of doubt, the State probably may sell for resale or transport natural gas in interstate commerce without F.P.C. authorization. The operating sections of the Natural Gas Act by their terms apply to the regulation of transactions involving natural gas companies. For example, Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act which requires certification of any transportation or sale provides as follows:

"(c) No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations: . . . 15 U.S.C. §717f(c). (emphasis added)

Similarly, Section 7(b) of the Act provides that

"no natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained. . . . " 15 U.S.C. §717f(b).

Similarly, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act which provide for regulation of rates charged for jurisdictional sales and

services, are by their terms applicable to rates and charges of "natural-gas companies".

The term "natural-gas companies" is defined in Section 2 of the Natural Gas Act to mean a "person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale". 15 U.S.C. §717a(6). The term "person" is defined to include "an individual or a corporation". The term individual is not defined in the Act, however, "corporation" is defined as including "any corporation, joint stock company, partnership, association, business trust, organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not, receiver or receivers, trustee or trustees of any of the foregoing, but shall not include municipalities as hereinafter defined". 15 U.S.C. §616a(2) Municipality is then defined to mean "a city, county, or other political subdivision or agency of a State". 15 U.S.C. §717a(3)

This series of definitions leads to the conclusion that the sale of gas by a state agency (if not by the State itself) is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. In the only reported case of which we are aware, the Commission after reviewing the above-quoted series of definitions stated

"[f]rom this it is clear that municipalities cannot be 'natural-gas companies' as that term is used by the Act. We are not, therefore, vested with jurisdiction to regulate municipalities, even though they are engaged in the

sale of natural gas to interstate pipeline companies." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. City of Rolla, Kansas, 26 FPC 736 (1961).

In that case, the issue involved was the rate which should be paid by Panhandle to Rolla for gas produced from natural gas units in which the townsite of Rolla was included.

Panhandle was the operator of the unit and under the unitization agreement was obligated to pay Rolla a "proportionate share of the runs from said well at the minimum price established by order of the Kansas Corporation for natural gas in the Hugoton Field of Kansas" 26 FPC at 737 (emphasis in original).

The language of the Act and the Commission's holding in Panhandle suggests that one alternative under which the State could allow interstate sales to commence without precluding later diversion of the gas to intrastate markets if circumstances then demanded would be for the State to exercise its right to take gas in kind, ab initio. Even if the State sold the gas initially to an interstate pipeline company, under the language above-discussed, the sale would appear to be nonjurisdictional and abandonment authorization would not be a precondition to later diversion of the gas to an intrastate market. The agreements between the state and the interstate pipeline company would, of course, have to permit such diversion. It must be remembered, however, that the pipeline would still require FPC certificates for

necessary facilities, and FPC certificate authority to perform interstate transportation services. Thus the Commission would be in a position of exercising indirect control of State transactions cf. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).

Despite the apparent clarity of the definitions, and the holding in Panhandle, there is no assurance that the Commission would not assert jurisdiction over the transactions particularly if it viewed such jurisdiction as necessary to prevent diversion of gas from the interstate to the intrastate market. In one case, the Courts have concluded that a state agency is a "person" within the meaning of at least one section of the Natural Gas Act. Federal Power Commission v. Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, 362 F.Supp. 522 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1973) aff'd 415 U.S. 961 (1974). That case involved the validity of a minimum price order issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission relating to the wellhead price of natural gas. The Federal Power Commission contended that the orders impinged upon the FPC's jurisdiction, and were an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and used to enjoin enforcement of the order. Under Section 20 of the Natural Gas Act the Commission is authorized to bring suit

"whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions

of this Act, or of any rule, regulations, or order thereunder. . . to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this Act or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder. . . " 15 U.S.C. §717s(a).

The Oklahoma Commission argued, among other things, that as an agency of the state it is immune from suit under Section 20. The Court concluded that the Oklahoma Commission's orders were unconstitutional, and that the Oklahoma Commission was not immune from suit. To accomplish this result, the Court emphasized the difference between the use of the words "means" and "includes" in defining terms under the Natural Gas Act. It viewed the word "means" as a verb of limitation and the terms "includes" as a verb of enlargement. Since the term "person" is defined as including an individual or a corporation, it reasoned that the term is not limited to individuals and corporations. Thus it argued that

"an 'agency of the state' is excluded from the definition of 'corporation' but is not excluded from the word 'person' . . . Whether the defendant Oklahoma Corporation Commission is a non-individual 'person' against which the Plaintiff may proceed, is to be determined by the 'legislative environment'." 362 F.Supp. 544.

The Court then reviewed two cases, one involving taxes on "persons" selling intoxicating liquors, the other involving the meaning of a "person" entitled to sue under Section 7 of the Sherman Act. The Court made no attempt to discuss the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act.