

ALASKA LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMMITTEE/SUBJECT FILES 8672

2916 SCOMM 127 HOUSE SPEC.COMM.MILITARY & VET.AFFAIRS, 2001-02

- e. Initiate vehicle key control program and/or review existing program to ensure airport snow removal equipment and/or airport rescue and fire fighting equipment is properly secured to avoid unauthorized use.
- 4. Statutory changes for all state airports:
 - a. Revise Alaska Statutes 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for various infractions in addition to current criminal misdemeanor sanctions. Many minor breaches of routine security procedures are enforced by warnings or withdrawal of security access, but otherwise ignored by law enforcement due to lack of appropriate sanctions. A ticketing regime similar to that for traffic offenses would allow more tailored enforcement. More severe criminal sanctions may also be appropriate for certain intentional security violations. (Specific amendment to AS 02 will be needed, but will require significant thought, coordination and procedural formatting and are therefore not provided herein.)
 - b. Revise Alaska Statutes 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect security sensitive documents.
 - c. Revise Alaska Statutes 44.62.125 to exempt security sensitive airport security programs from regulations adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act
- 5. Long-term.
 - a. To meet security threats at both ANC and FAI the following should be implemented:
 - ☐ Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback
 - ☐ Review terminal configuration
 - ☐ Install new state-of-the-art access control systems (biometrics is suggested as a system that is more difficult to gain unauthorized access to the airport)
 - ☐ Establish access control for ANC general aviation areas
 - ☐ Relocate facilities that are not compatible with new security provisions
 - b. Long term needs for the rural airport system include:
 - ☐ Additional airport security and operational personnel
 - ☐ Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback
 - ☐ Additional municipal law enforcement officers
 - ☐ Complete perimeter fencing and automated gates with access control
 - ☐ Traffic barriers and blast deflection devices
 - ☐ Automated lock and key control
 - ☐ Reconfigure aprons to better separate large and small aircraft

V. MARINE

A. Introduction

Alaska has 33,000 miles of coastline and many port communities, all with a host of commercial and public facilities on their waterfronts. The state does not operate most ports; in fact, local municipalities operate the 12 largest and the only ports with substantial cargo activity. The state does, however, operate a wide-ranging ferry system along its Pacific coast.

The Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) operates nine roll-on, roll-off passenger ships and carries some 350,000 passengers and 105,000 vehicles, including commercial cargo vans, each year. AMHS routes extend from Bellingham, WA to Dutch Harbor, AK (3,000 miles), and include the Canadian border crossing at Prince Rupert, BC.

Visiting cruise ships originate in Vancouver and Seattle, but some passengers and crew change in several Alaskan ports. Cruise activity is highly seasonal, but there can be three to five cruise ships in a port at one time, carrying 1,200 to 2,000 passengers each, plus a very large crew. The crew is almost entirely foreign nationals. On September 10, 2001, for example, four large cruise ships visited Juneau, bringing 6,806 passengers and 2,845 crew, for a total of 9,651 visitors. Ketchikan, Juneau, Sitka and Seward host the largest numbers of cruise ships.

Alaska's commercial cargoes are primarily domestic, from Puget Sound to Anchorage via container ships and Puget Sound to coastal communities by container and open deck barge. Kodiak and Dutch Harbor also have container service from U.S. ports. Commercially important shipments of ore originate from the Red Dog mine on the Chukchi Sea and both liquefied natural gas and anhydrous ammonia are handled in the Cook Inlet area. Valdez is the only transshipment point at which North Slope crude oil transitions from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to crude oil tankers. There is some international export activity and some interchange through Canada, primarily wood chips.

Unimak Pass in the Aleutian Islands is a major transit point for international cargo shippers using the great circle route from the West Coast to Asia. While it is not likely a way could be found to block that pass, and it could be circumvented at some cost, it does represent a choke point and a "target rich" opportunity.

There are several hundreds small watercraft, both pleasure and commercial transiting from out of state, and many more in, around and between communities. Small boat harbors are found in larger coastal communities.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the lead federal agency for maritime operations, safety and security. They have identified at-risk marine facilities and activities for Alaska. In general, the Alyeska Oil Terminal in Valdez, the Port of Anchorage and the Nikiski Terminals in Cook Inlet are potential targets of high national interest and the USCG has allocated resources accordingly.

Under current statute and regulations, marine security is the responsibility of the USCG. This responsibility includes identification of risks, establishing security zones and security plans for vessels and cruise ship terminals. However, they normally do not conduct water-borne or landside patrols of harbors or perform any routine security functions with

their own personnel. Rather, they most often function as an oversight agency for private or state marine operations.

This assessment was conducted in consultation with the Commander, Seventeenth District, USCG, commercial cargo carriers, port operators, pilot associations, the Marine Exchange of Alaska, DOT & PF staff and many others. Their contribution has been substantial but does not necessarily imply an endorsement of the conclusions contained herein.

B. Current Security Measures and Policies

1. AMHS

There are at present no security measures in effect for the AMHS that remotely resemble those for air travel. There are, for example, no devices for screening passengers, baggage, or vehicles; no controls over passenger access to vehicles on the car deck and no security personnel at the terminals or aboard the ships. The AMHS has instituted a number of measures (e.g., verification of passenger ID/reservations, rejection of unaccompanied vehicles that have not been searched, local police presence at some terminals for some sailings) within its personnel and financial ability. But those measures are regarded as inadequate by contemporary standards.

Correction of these deficiencies will be both costly and lengthy. Correction will involve significant structural changes to terminal buildings and staging areas, ships and the connecting ramps. It will also require the recruitment and training of security personnel. All of these will take years to complete, especially if the physical improvements are competing for funding and contractor resources. Until security improvements are complete throughout the AMHS route system, equipment and/or personnel gaps will undermine traveler and employee security.

2. Ports, Cruise Ships and Commercial Shipping

Port and harbor security has similar objectives to other transportation modes; control access, control cargo, prevent sabotage. The USCG has taken on these missions throughout Alaska, but its resources are highly focused on a single mode (e.g., cruise ships) in many ports or, more often, on all operations in only a few ports (e.g., Valdez and Anchorage.)

a. Control access to the port, its installations and vessels (ref. CFR 33, Part 120 Subpart A, 120.100.)

Statutory authority exists for the USCG to establish procedures for vessel and terminal security. Vessel and Terminal Security Plans are in place for passenger vessels and terminal facilities servicing passenger vessels over 100 registered tons, carrying more than 12 passengers for hire, or making a voyage lasting more than 24 hours, any part of which is on the high seas.

Passenger cruise ships and terminals in Alaska have Vessel and Terminal Security Plans in place. They are security plans that specify actions based on a series of threat levels, low, medium and high. A typical dock for a cruise ship is nestled adjacent to public right of way. (Ketchikan, Juneau, Skagway, for examples.)

These security plans do not apply to AMHS ships holding USCG Certificates of Inspection endorsed for "Lakes, Bays, and Sounds," that transit international waters for only short periods of time, on frequent schedules.

The plans and the threat levels also do not apply to other maritime facilities and activities of lesser value or public interest.

With few exceptions, like the Alyeska Oil Terminal in Valdez, and the Port of Anchorage, most port and harbor facilities have limited security except a fence and signage. Many more have no evidence of security. Security is limited to private operators challenging unwanted visitors on private property or in unauthorized areas. Crime, property damage and liability avoidance are the primary risks motivating the security measures found.

The Valdez Oil Terminal is a high security area. Fences, gates and armed security personnel control access. The USCG has a long-established marine safety zone in place in Valdez. "Vessels not engaged in the movement and support of tank vessels at the Alyeska Marine Terminal are required to make non-stop transits between Valdez Narrows and the City of Valdez port facilities. Vessels are required to transit north of 61-06.8N when east of 146-32.0W. Vessels may not anchor, lay to, or loiter in this zone without COTP permission." (ref. *USCG Local Restrictions for Valdez*.)

b. Control access to cargo or passenger vessels while in port.

The Valdez Oil Terminal has full control of the product but not the surrounding environment, i.e., air space and sea space. The sea space around the terminal is under the control of the USCG, which is devoting increased assets to the maintenance of security in that port.

Control of passengers and baggage is the responsibility of the cruise industry in general with its own motivations to protect ships and passengers. The Vessel and Port Security Plans are implemented depending on the threat status; low, medium or high, based on intelligence information.

Container movement is controlled by the shippers and terminal security; however, the ability to put almost anything into a container and ship it anywhere in the world is not a controlled activity. It is estimated that less than 1% of foreign origin containers are inspected at the port of entry by U.S. customs. Internal movements are not necessarily inspected but depending on corporate policy, some containers are inspected to verify that the cargo matches the bill of lading. In addition, one shipper reported inspecting and sealing every empty container leaving Alaska. In general, control begins when the container enters the point of shipping and ends when the container exits the port compound. At Glacier Marine Transport on Channel Drive in Juneau, for example, the gate is always open and there are no fence or security personnel. This is typical in most of Alaska's port facilities and the perceived risk is very low.

c. Prevent sabotage to vessels calling at ports, to port installations, and businesses and trade information systems.

Preventing sabotage is the other dimension of security to control risk in all forms. The extent of sabotage possibilities is limited only by one's imagination. The measures previously discussed are part of the process.

Physical separation of activity is the most common measure. Separation provides the physical and visible barriers. Fences, flow control, and shrub clear zones enhance observation of all activity. Separation isolates activity for emergency response services. Port security planning entails evaluating these emergency response conditions.

The USCG has established security zones in many U.S. ports. Moving, temporary safety zones around vessels or fixed zones around port facilities is a common measure employed to enhance safety of marine operations but which may also enhance security. Other port security measures include prohibiting ship movements after dark, expanding notification requirements for ships entering and exiting, movement by Captain of the Port (COTP) permission only, mandatory vessel boarding by armed USCG escorts, and many other details specific to each port as determined by the COTP.

Sabotage in other forms, such as interrupting business activity, is not discussed here but should be evaluated in the context of other communication systems and processes.

C. Vulnerability Assessments

1. AMHS

The AMHS is the most vulnerable of all the State-conducted transportation operations. It offers a target with a large number of passengers, who, during voyage, are isolated from outside assistance. The ability to bring a vehicle aboard as a weapon, or containing weapons, is apparent to any observer. There are no personnel available to DOT & PF who have the training to inspect a vehicle (or a passenger) for any kind of contraband and none that have the authority to react to what they might find. AMHS ships would provide excellent targets for remote detonation of bombs, indiscriminate shooting, or for hijacking. The latter kind of attack would be particularly daunting. If the M/V Kennicott, for example, were hijacked, some 500 passengers of all ages would be at risk, aboard a ship which might remain under way for weeks, while the hijackers use their hostages to enforce their demands. If the seizure were timed properly, it might be as much as 37 hours before the ship failed to arrive at its next port and any authority ashore became aware of the event.

Within the ship, the long-standing regulations which have as their objective ease of movement for fire fighting and escape from damage situations appear to conflict with efforts to prevent unauthorized entry into secure areas. Significant compromises may have to be made in these areas. In the interest of getting early and valuable improvements in shipboard security, regulatory agencies, especially the USCG, may have to invest some effort in resolving those conflicts.

2. Port of Anchorage

The port is a unique and valuable asset. Through the port passes almost 100% of the food and commodities consumed in the interior of the state. It also is the

source of all of the jet fuel for Department of Defense services in the interior and all of the jet fuel at the Ted Stevens International Airport. A loss of this transportation connection would have very significant negative impact to the rail belt and communities down river on the Yukon. The single road access facilitates security efforts but might hinder response in the event of an emergency.

Whatever vulnerabilities may exist for individual operations, such as fuel handling facilities, a port is a diverse and challenging target. The most effective way to disrupt any port is to block the channel. Even this tactic would only be effective in those cases where the channels are few or navigationally restricted. Whether that tactic is available depends in part on the draft and maneuverability of the largest ships that normally use the port. In the case of Anchorage, sinking of a ship in order to block the channel is considered to be an effective tactic

3. Other Ports

Unique opportunities exist at other ports for terrorist activity. For example, Kodiak Island is dependent on its port facilities for virtually all its consumables. Interruption of the availability of those facilities would not only threaten the population but also the nationally significant missile launch facilities located there. Other, smaller communities are even more dependent on their ports but offer much less attractive targets. Many ports, including several that host cruise ships, have not yet developed port security plans.

The potential for blocking the entry/exit channel exists at several ports in Alaska, most notably Anchorage and Juneau. While such blockage might be inconvenient for larger ships and impede private operations such as cruise ships, it would not be a threat to the public. In most cases, barge shipments would be adequate to cope with consumable requirements. Home heating fuel, gasoline, and DOD fuel requirements might be more seriously impeded.

4. Details of Port Facility Layout

The detailed plans for such sensitive facilities as ports, oil terminals, and in fact every public building or other structure, are totally open to public scrutiny. Not only are paper copies of such plans available but they may often be accessed through the Internet. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) facilitates such scrutiny, both before and after construction. Some resolution of the conflicting demands of security versus an informed public may be required in this case.

5. Hazardous Substances

Ports in Alaska, as elsewhere, handle large amounts of hazardous chemicals which, in themselves, constitute potentially powerful weapons. A chlorine gas tank or tank truck, for example, can be extremely deadly in a population center. The transport of hazardous materials is addressed in the surface transportation section.

D. Security Priorities

The prioritization of security concerns requires consideration of the attractiveness of potential targets from the perpetrator's point of view and the relative difficulty of achieving the intended level of damage (recognizing security measures already in effect)

and the American social norms for public safety. Accordingly, protection of human life has been given the greatest priority.

1. High Priority

- a. Establish physical security conditions for Alaska Marine Highway operations that are equal to the highest standards in effect for any other transportation mode in the U.S.
- b. Designate a single federal agency to provide overall marine security, including grant funding for that purpose, and fund that agency at a level adequate to accomplish its mission.

2. Medium Priority

- a. Review the procedures by which plans for port facilities and other essential public infrastructure are made available to the public, with a view toward preventing access for criminal or terrorist activity.
- b. Review, in cooperation with the USCG, the measures currently in effect for the ports of Anchorage (including Nikiski) and Valdez, with the objective of identifying any state-responsible improvements required.
- c. Evaluate the feasibility and utility of establishing an ongoing marine security review process so that the marine security posture within the State of Alaska can receive the benefit of the experience of all users and operators of marine transportation.

3. Low Priority

- a. Create, within the DOT & PF planning and programming process, methods for evaluating physical security improvements in the marine transportation environment
- b. Examine the physical security conditions within each port visited by cruise ships in order to determine necessary improvements and identify security issues appropriate to the concern of public agencies.

E. Recommendations

1. Security Measures

Implement a number of immediate, short-term (less than six months) and long-term (greater than six months) actions, steps and initiatives to increase protection of transportation assets.

a. Short-term

- Establish, at the earliest possible date, a security force in all AMHS ships. In order to compensate in the short term for those physical improvements that will require more time to complete, this force should be in place not later than 1 June 2002.
- Designate the USCG as the federal agency responsible for provision of all marine security functions within the U.S. Staff and fund that agency accordingly. (This designation must explicitly task the USCG with

- providing a detachment of security personnel for each passenger ship operated by a public agency.)
- Alternatively, designate the Alaska State Troopers to assume the mission of providing security aboard all AMHS ships.
 - Alternatively, organize, train, and equip a Transportation Security Division within the DOT & PF with the mission of providing security personnel for all DOT & PF-operated transportation modes.
 - Initiate a security study of AMHS operations in order to establish those modifications that may be necessary ashore and afloat and to evaluate their impact on the AMHS' ability to carry out its mission.
 - Complete, and obtain USCG approval for, port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships (no later than the 2002 cruise ship season.)
 - Begin the process of installing in AMHS ships measures to improve their security. Develop plans for continual improvements.
 - Issue such modifications to the Alaska Administrative Code Title 17 as are necessary to meet the security procedure improvements that can be implemented in the short run.
- b. Long-term - Establish an AMHS operations center capable of communicating with all ships, maintaining accurate position information and responding to all emergencies.
- Review the process by which plans for port facilities are made available to the public and with make recommendations for modifications to that process which will improve public security.
 - Establish in the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program a process a method for receiving and evaluating physical security improvement projects. Designate the Project Evaluation Board to review and approve such submissions.

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STATE OF ALASKA
TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2001

October 26, 2001

2:00 p.m.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP REPORT

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Short-Term IT/Telecomm Recommendations

1. ITG should meet with all key telecomm providers to insure Disaster Recovery (DR) plans are adequate for the State's needs.
2. ITG should identify resources or services to allow for redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.
3. ITG and the Division of Emergency Services should identify the State communications sites that require added security and establish or recommend action that will improve the overall level of protection.
4. The State should survey physical security of critical telecommunication sites and determine the resources required to improve security.
5. The State should complete the Security Policy process and establish a Security Manager position and staff to help agencies implement the actions and procedures necessary to implement the policy.
6. The State should continue to implement the ALMRS Northzone Pilot Project with 500 subscriber units.

B. Long-Term Information Technology/Telecommunications Security Recommendations

1. The State should acquire the service of a Disaster Recovery expert and conduct a DR Planning process.
2. The State should accelerate the implementation of Phase 1 and 2 of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) project from 2002 through 2004.
3. The State's public/private information policies should be reviewed by each Department.
4. The State should fund and design, build, or acquire an image base map to help plan preparedness and response geographically to emergency situations. The base map could be acquired and hosted on an enterprise server for around \$2.5m.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objective: To prepare recommendations regarding steps to take to provide security on our state network and physical sites. Recommendations will be presented to the Disaster Policy Cabinet for forwarding to the Governor by 27 October.

B. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:

ACS.....Alaska Communications Systems
AKPAY.....Alaska State Payroll System
ALMR.....Alaska Land Mobile Radio
ATT.....American Telephone and Telegraph Company
BLM.....Bureau of Land Management
DES.....Division of Emergency Services
DoD.....United States Department of Defense
DNR.....Department of Natural Resources
DOT.....Department of Transportation
DR.....Disaster Recovery
DMVA.....Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
FAA.....Federal Aviation Administration
GCI.....General Communication, Inc.
ITG.....Information Technology Group
LMR.....Land Mobile Radio project
TIC.....Telecommunications Information Council

II. DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING

- A. Alaska has a Disaster Recovery (DR) mainframe hot site contract with Weyerhaeuser. It is about to expire. It is for mainframe services only.
- B. A hot site drill was conducted during the first week of October 2001. DOA/Division of Finance successfully tested the online portion of the State payroll system (AKPAY) at the drill.
- C. Agencies are invited to attend the drills but they have only been marginally participating.
- D. No voice communication, mid-tier or open system disaster plan exists for the state, although the State's enterprise email systems in Juneau and Anchorage can back each

other up. Additional resources are needed to develop these processes and to conduct tests and drills. Key systems need to be inventoried as part of the DR Plan.

- E. Agencies with different mail systems, for example DMVA's First Class system, may or may not be able to communicate with the rest of the state's mail systems, in the event of a disaster. These issues need to be evaluated in the DR plan. Redundancy and standardization are tightly coupled.
- F. Key provider's DR Plans need to be reviewed in conjunction with the state's planning process.
- G. DR Planning needs to be a part of the statewide enterprise IT Plan. A RFP for a consultant to put the IT planning process together is about to be released.
- H. Recommendations:
 - 1. Immediately, ITG should meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their DR plans are adequate for the State's needs.
 - 2. Immediately, ITG should identify resources or services to allow for redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.
 - 3. Longer Term, the State acquire the service of a DR expert and conduct a DR Planning process that would involve all mission critical systems, data and IT services of the state, dovetailed into the IT Plan being conducted by ITG.

III. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

- A. Email is critical for emergency communications. What will it take for state's e-mail systems to operate in an emergency situation and to allow messaging to continue?
- B. The Land Mobile Radio project (LMR) is an existing, ongoing project designed to deliver inter-agency communications for emergency and for normal operations. Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) is a system that delivers inter-agency communications for emergency and for normal operations. A project is currently underway to implement new LMR technology with initial phases coming online during the summer/fall of 2002. This system is being built as a joint initiative with Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal non-DoD agencies, such as BLM, FAA, DOT as well as Municipal governments and state agencies. This system is critical not only to state government, but during the time of disaster it will allow all responding agencies from federal, state and local agencies to communicate effectively and seamlessly with one another. LMR funding received to date is \$1.638m GF, \$1.389 ISF and \$15.243m in authority to collect federal receipts. Federal funding has not yet been identified. LMR Funding requirements are:
 - 1. State of Alaska component
 - ☐ Phase 1 and Phase 2 Infrastructure- \$17.4m
 - ☐ Phase 3 and Phase 4 Infrastructure (Southeast and Remote Areas) - \$20.9m
 - ☐ Subscriber units - \$12.0m
 - 2. Federal component
 - ☐ Phase 1 and Phase 2 Infrastructure- \$13.6m

- ☐ Phase 3 and Phase 4 Infrastructure (Southeast and Remote Areas) - \$6.0m
 - ☐ Subscriber units - \$43.0m
- 3. Local component:
 - ☐ Subscriber units - \$29.4m
- C. Recommend that the State: continue to prioritize and accelerate the implementation of Phase 1 and 2 of the project from 2002 through 2004. Funding for these phases has not been secured to date, however is being sought at the federal level in grants and appropriations. LMR system should be classified as a critical system and included in the State's Disaster Recovery Plan (for physical sites and equipment, software and hardware).

IV. PHYSICAL SECURITY

- A. ITG needs to work with the DMVA/Division of Emergency Services (DES) and the telecomm providers (ATT, GCI and ACS) to update the state's critical IT/Telecomm sites for added security in the event of a threat and to mitigate disasters associated with these sites. These sites should also be evaluated for access security (fencing, alarms, and surveillance) requirements and limitations. Additional resources will be needed to improve the security and will be identified in the DR Plan.
- B. Recommendations:
 - 1. Short term, that ITG & DES quickly identifies the sites that require added security in the event of a threat and take necessary precautions necessary to protect them as needed.
 - 2. Long term, the State identifies physical security of critical sites and the resources required to correct the deficiencies in their security as part of the DR Plan.

V. SECURITY PLANNING

- A. TIC Policy has already endorsed the need for a statewide Security Policy and a committee is formed and working toward that end.
- B. Recommend that the State complete the Security Policy process and fund the planning process, a Security Manager position with staff to help agencies implement the tools and procedures necessary to implement the policy.

VI. PUBLIC/PRIVATE INFORMATION

- A. State's Privacy Policies need to be maintained during emergencies and recoveries.
- B. Many State's are reviewing their public information policies (web information) to minimize the threat to critical systems, like water supplies. Does Alaska have too much sensitive information on the Web?
- C. Does Alaska have the information it needs to quickly identify geographically critical site and location information?

D. Recommendations:

1. The State's public/private information policies need to be reviewed, by each Department, for appropriateness in light of new security perspectives.
2. The State needs to fund, design/build or acquire an image base map to help plan preparedness and response to emergency situations geographically. This base map database can be built in phases with the most critical sites added first and would provide image information on access roads, trails, communities, utility corridors, etc. to a 5 meter resolution. DNR estimates the base map could be acquired and hosted on an enterprise server for around \$2.5m.

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STATE OF ALASKA
TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2001

October 26, 2001

1:30 p.m.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP REPORT

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ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- A. Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS)
 - 1. Establish a vehicle checkpoint south of the Yukon River Bridge on the Dalton Highway.
 - 2. Increase ground patrols along the pipeline.
 - 3. Formalize methods for sharing resource information for response to a TAPS incident.
 - 4. Continue to practice and expand TAPS defense drills.
 - 5. Consider satellite monitoring of TAPS.
 - 6. Continue site hardening and ground security at the VMT.
 - 7. Develop procedures to quickly deploy military resources to the Valdez area.
 - 8. Increase Alaska State Trooper presence in the Valdez area.
 - 9. Review the capacity of oil producers to store oil on the North Slope.
 - 10. Increase State security at the Deadhorse Airport.
- B. Other Energy Production Sites
 - 1. Increase security by producers at on-shore facilities.
 - 2. Increase monitoring by local, private and State law enforcement agencies of refinery infrastructure.
 - 3. Fence the entire perimeter of the refinery in Valdez and limit access with a security gate check.
- C. Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). Implement security measures necessary to protect APSIN data and conform to NCIC security policies.
- D. Border Crossings. Provide border crossings with access to Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN) and NCIC.
- E. State Facilities. Each agency responsible for operation of a State office building should have procedures in place to notify employees immediately of hazardous situations and evacuation plans for those situations.
- F. Miscellaneous Security Issues
 - 1. The State of Alaska should move forward aggressively to fund and install the State's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS).
 - 2. The State needs additional troopers for enhanced information gathering and analysis capability.

3. Because security of water supply systems and air intake systems on large buildings is not feasible, routine testing should be conducted for water supplies and building air handling systems. Consider improving drinking water security where possible.
4. If Alaska State Trooper staff was expanded by 105 personnel over three years, requests for Troopers to handle increased security requirements could be accommodated.

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GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Current Situation

In the State there is currently only one national energy asset, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS). This includes the Prudhoe Bay Oil Fields and the Shipping Terminal in Valdez at the terminus of the Pipeline.

While there are many other energy-related infrastructure facilities in state, the loss of any of those individual facilities does not affect the national interest in the same way as TAPS.

It should be noted that besides the obvious energy assets, such as oil refineries and TAPS, there are many pieces of our energy infrastructure that must be considered in an overall security and response package. These include power plants statewide, (some of these are extremely large and service large population centers) the larger power substations, oil refineries on the Kenai Peninsula, at Valdez, and in Fairbanks. Most of our port facilities provide, in some manner, shipping and receiving of energy sources to our rural communities. The Alaska Railroad provides movement of coal and fuel from the Interior to Southcentral Alaska. *Attachment A* is an overview of key assets of all types that must be considered in overall security/energy responses.

It also should be noted from a security standpoint, the concept of preventing a "suicide bomber" from disrupting any of the energy facilities is not possible from a pure "hardening" of the site itself. It has been long determined and established that prevention through intelligence and interception of individuals involved in potential criminal terrorist activities is the only adequate intervention possibility.

This should not be taken to mean that every means to harden sites and enhance security whenever possible shouldn't be taken, because those actions certainly can prevent the less organized or less dedicated individual working toward a criminal terrorist act. Additionally, such actions provide opportunity to mitigate events, prevent total success, improve chances of identifying and apprehending the perpetrator(s) and allow for successful and timely recovery. This is true for both the organized and less organized individuals or groups.

B. Critical Infrastructure

The most critical infrastructure identified and agreed upon is TAPS including the Prudhoe Bay oilfields, the Pipeline and the Valdez terminal.

II. THE ALASKA PIPELINE

A. Current Situation

Security for the Pipeline has been substantially increased from the level that existed prior to September 11. The security coverage over the 800-mile Pipeline is inadequate for the terrorist threat potential that currently exists. Alyeska security resources are at or near capacity. Although the recent incident near Livengood did not involve any planned effort

to disrupt the Pipeline, it clearly points out the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure. Access to the Pipeline is easily accomplished on much of the 420 miles of aboveground segments within the 800-mile route. The line is extremely vulnerable to long-term damage in some locations. Security efforts are focused at the most vulnerable locations along the entire pipeline. At this time, the pipeline is receiving only intermittent air and ground surveillance, due in large part to the vast size. As evidenced by the incident near Livengood, a single individual, let alone an organized effort, could cause great harm and potentially stop production and delivery of oil to the terminus in Valdez. These have obvious state and national implications as well as the potential for long-term damage to the Prudhoe Bay Oil Fields if pumping at some of the marginal wells ceases. It is clear from briefings by the oil industry that loss of some wells would occur if those wells have to shut down. Experts currently disagree on the cold start-up ability of the Pipeline after it has to be shut down for an extended period of time, especially during winter months.

B. What We Have

Alyeska currently has security officers providing stationary and mobile security patrols along the length of the Pipeline, including the terminal in Valdez. Pipeline right-of-way access gates have been closed and locked, but this does not prevent access to the roads to someone even marginally determined to pass around the gate.

Regular, but limited, helicopter flights are being conducted on the Alyeska right-of-way. These flights are limited by weather conditions as well as the vast distances the flights must cover. Troopers are also monitoring access to the right-of-way gates and the visible portions of the Pipeline from the Yukon River Bridge south to Valdez as time permits in their routine patrols.

C. What We Need

It has been the recommendation of Alyeska security, the North Slope Producers, as well as the Committee, that at a minimum a checkpoint south of the Yukon River Bridge be established to monitor access to the Dalton Highway and Pipeline north of the river and ultimately into the Prudhoe Bay oilfields. Monitoring access to the area north of the river will allow Alyeska more flexibility in managing their limited security resources. Staffing for a checkpoint and additional ground and air patrols within Pipeline corridor are necessary for prevention and rapid response to events. The amount of staffing and cost involved will be dictated by the type and detail of the restriction to travel the Dalton Highway. The access can be restricted to permitted commercial traffic or local residents only on one end of the closure scale, to a simple checkpoint where people would provide identification prior to being allowed to proceed up the Dalton Highway north of Pump Station 6.

Restriction of airspace along the entire Pipeline and all of the pump stations, as is currently in place at the Valdez terminal. This should include a "no flight zone" over all the pump stations (five-mile radius) and the Pipeline, except when crossing. This would require FAA action.

Formalize the methods to share information on resources available to respond to a TAPS incident.

Continue to practice and expand Pipeline defense drills to validate existing security and response measures and identify opportunities for improvement. (These have been

ongoing between Alyeska security, the FBI, BATF, ALCOM, local police, emergency response agencies, and the Alaska State Troopers. These exercises should be expanded to include other response agencies, such as DNR, DEC, DOT and the Alaska National Guard.)

Consideration of satellite monitoring of the TAPS to detect temperature changes should be discussed with the military and national security agencies.

III. THE TAPS TERMINAL IN VALDEZ

A. Current Situation

The Valdez Oil Terminal is currently serviced by Alyeska security through contract and is a limited enclosed area with restricted access to the facility. Access controls include use of the natural barriers that are complemented by site hardening technology and physical barriers. The Valdez Police Department is the primary response law enforcement agency in the region. The Valdez Police Department has been dealing with security issues with the terminal and within the city limits since the completion of the Pipeline. It is a small agency that depends on outside support in the event of a large incident. Currently, there is only one Alaska State Trooper assigned to the Fish & Wildlife Division stationed in Valdez. Additional Trooper resources come from the Glennallen area for support.

B. Threat

The terminal is vulnerable to attack by air, sea and ground and is potentially one of the most critical assets in the Pipeline system. It is imperative for the storage and transportation of oil in order that the continued pumping of wells in Prudhoe Bay can take place.

C. What We Have

Alyeska security has personnel in place at the terminal, one Alaska State Trooper in the FWP Division, and the Valdez Police Department. Prior to 9/11, the primary law enforcement responder for on-water events was the Valdez Police Department and the Fish & Wildlife Troopers, generally using the FWP vessel. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has dramatically increased its law enforcement presence and contingencies for protecting the Valdez terminal assets, the Valdez harbor and Prince William Sound. Because Valdez is situated in a bay surrounded by high mountains, access to the airport is generally by small aircraft (less than 60 people). Other than the Coast Guard, there are no military assets in the Valdez area that would be able to currently enforce a "no fly" zone, and even with response from Anchorage, which is relatively quick with current military assets, it is difficult for those assets to operate at low levels in the confined areas around Valdez.

D. What We Need

Additional site hardening and ground security of the Valdez Terminal are taking place and should continue. Military assets necessary to detect the airspace violations by organized groups will have to be stationed in Valdez if airspace security were ever to be maintained. At a minimum, the infrastructure for deployment of aircrews into Valdez during high-risk times should be accomplished. An increase in the presence of the Alaska State Troopers in the Valdez area would not only help response to the terminus, they would provide

patrol and response capabilities in the area of the Pipeline through Thompson Pass. Key personnel routinely working in and around the Valdez Terminal are required to have pre-employment background checks. This process is being expanded to cover the majority of TAPS workers, per the Joint Pipeline Office. Tanker crews and other key personnel should have comprehensive background checks.

IV. PRUDHOE BAY PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Current Situation

Producers on the North Slope currently control access to the area with patrol checkpoints. This currently does not take place until people reach the Prudhoe Bay area where the Dalton Highway terminates on the north end. There is no current protection against individuals and illicit cargo being transported up the Dalton Highway.

Security at the Deadhorse Airport is now being handled by oil company security contractors. Threat at the Prudhoe Bay oilfields is less than that of the TAPS or the Valdez Oil Terminal. At this time logistics even for air travel, other than scheduled flights into the Prudhoe Bay and North Slope area is limited. Any individual asset compromised in Prudhoe Bay, except for Pump Station # 1 may not necessarily mean the shutdown of the rest of the field. Pump Station # 1 is the central gathering site and metering for oil shipped down the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and is one of the most critical infrastructures on the North Slope.

B. What We Have

Currently there are no state law enforcement personnel assigned to the North Slope. Law enforcement is handled by the North Slope Borough with two officers assigned to the Greater Prudhoe Bay - North Slope area. These officers have been augmented as necessary from the North Slope Borough out of Barrow, and by Alaska State Troopers and the Troopers' tactical teams several times in recent years when environmental groups have attempted to disrupt construction on the North Slope.

There has been an increase in contract security through Alyeska, British Petroleum and Arco to allow the Deadhorse Airport to meet the FAA requirements. Private industry has agreed to handle security at the state airport up to this point to keep their personnel and cargo moving via aircraft.

C. What We Need

A review of the capacity of the producers to store oil on the North Slope should be undertaken by the Joint Pipeline Office. This would include the feasibility of long-term oil storage of up to 60 days.

Increased state security at the Deadhorse Airport to alleviate Alyeska resources that are currently doing airport security mandated by the FAA.

V. OTHER ENERGY PRODUCTION SITES

A. Cook Inlet Production Facilities

1. Current Situation

Currently, there are 16 offshore oil and gas platforms, including sub-sea pipelines, and two processing facilities on both sides of Cook Inlet. There are also on-shore oil and gas fields and pipelines, docks, and liquified natural gas facilities. All the on-shore facilities on the Kenai Peninsula side of this production are accessible by road in North Kenai. Any of the oil platforms are potentially vulnerable to water or air assault. Some of the facilities are highly explosive. Disruption of supplies from these facilities would have impacts on Anchorage and the Kenai areas. The facilities are low national security risks. These facilities also have a relatively low profile internationally.

2. What We Have

There is little or no formal security on the Cook Inlet platforms. Security takes place on-shore during access to the facilities by helicopter from the North Kenai area. Helicopters are used to resupply and relieve crews.

3. What We Need

Increased security by the producers at their air access on-shore facilities is recommended.

B. Petroleum Facilities

Currently there are petroleum refinery facilities in North Kenai (Tesoro), North Pole out of Fairbanks (Williams), and Valdez (PetroStar). Each refinery produces products that impacts separate segments of Alaska's population. These will be addressed separately. All facilities are similar in their security needs, in that they are normally closed facilities with 24 hour-gated security.

C. Tesoro, North Kenai

1. Current Situation

The Tesoro facility provides gas and oil products for the Kenai Peninsula as well as Anchorage. The facility is a closed facility that is fenced and has basic security 24 hours a day.

2. Threat

The Tesoro Facility is on the Kenai Spur Highway and is accessible immediately off the roadway by vehicles. It could also be a potential air target. Immediately surrounding the area within a five-mile radius are residential areas as well as schools. The Kenai Peninsula Borough has one of the State's most comprehensive emergency response plans and the Tesoro personnel are a part of the Local Area Planning Commission for response to disasters and releases from their facility.

D. Williams Refinery, Fairbanks

1. Current Situation

The Williams Refinery is a gated and secure facility with 24-hour contract security coverage. This facility produces fuel for Golden Valley Electric, and jet fuel for the military; and local heating oil. It also ships refined products to the Anchorage area. This could be disrupted if it could not extract crude oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

2. Threat

The Williams Refinery is again a low-level threat. Damage or shutdown would impact primarily local resources and infrastructure and the military. The Refinery is the primary distributor for jet fuel to all Alaska military and for refuel of commercial air carriers. Arrangements would have to be made through other means to ship military fuel to the Fairbanks area.

3. What We Have

Activities that are associated with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline security, Williams' security, local North Pole police presence and Alaska State Trooper presence. There is also some limited park ranger presence.

4. What We Need

Increased monitoring by private, local and state law enforcement agencies would produce the best results for increases to the security situation.

E. PetroStar, Valdez

1. Current Situation

PetroStar is an oil production facility near the Valdez Pipeline Terminal. It primarily produces marine and aviation fuels as well as diesel fuel for generating plants. The facility currently has no contract security. It is not a closed facility. There is a fence with open gates on the front side but the sides and the back, which is on the water, are not secure or enclosed. The facility primarily ships fuels north out of Valdez as well as ships from Valdez via the marine terminal.

2. Threat

This facility is a much lower level threat than the TAPS terminal in Valdez. It is a stand-alone facility, but is in close proximity to the TAPS facility. A significant event at the PetroStar facility has the potential of closing the road to the TAPS terminal.

3. What We Have

On land, Alyeska security has personnel in place at the terminal, one Alaska State Trooper in the FWP Division, and the Valdez Police Department. On the water there is a site of the Valdez operation, the Coast Guard presence is the primary law enforcement responder. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has dramatically increased its presence and contingencies for the Valdez terminal assets.

4. What We Need

The PetroStar plant recommendation would be to secure its entire perimeter with fence and to provide at least limited access via a security gate check in to the facility.

VI. STATE FACILITIES

A. Current Situation/Threat

The level of threat to state court buildings, office buildings, and other facilities from terrorist related activities is considered low at this time. However, all occupants of the buildings should be advised to monitor access to their facility and immediately report

unusual suspicious activity and/or behavior by persons in or near the building or facility. This vigilance is necessary as individuals may inspire to take action against a state facility with the thought it will be blamed on others. In light of the most recent incidents of anthrax threats and false anthrax calls similar to a false bomb threat rate, a higher degree of diligence is necessary.

In addition, capitol building and other major state facilities in our capital are for the most part without security.

B. What We Have

The court buildings, other state buildings/facilities around the state have limited to non-existent security in place.

C. What We Need

Additional security measures as a specific response to current terrorism situation would appear to be a lower priority at this time. However, each agency is responsible for operation of the individual state owned/operated buildings needs to have in-place systems for notification of all employees of emergency situations and a plan in place to conduct evacuation if necessary. Buildings and facilities need to have in place a method to notify employees immediately of hazardous situations and evacuation plans.

VII. ALASKA PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION NETWORK (APSIN) SECURITY

A. What Alaska Has

1. DPS operates the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). APSIN provides access to state criminal history records, which can be used to screen people for sensitive positions, as well as driving, vehicle, wants/warrants, and other law enforcement records relied upon every day for officer safety and public protection.
2. DPS provides connection to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) through APSIN. As the state's "Control Terminal Agency" DPS is responsible for ensuring compliance with security standards set by the FBI.

B. What Alaska Needs

1. Before the terrorist attack on September 11, the Division of Administrative Services was already planning APSIN enhancements to comply with technical security guidelines issued by the FBI. These "NCIC 2000" security requirements speak directly to the needs of law enforcement to protect against terrorism as well as to respond to a terrorist attack. They are designed to protect criminal justice information from unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction.
2. DPS needs the following tools, or some combination of them, to meet FBI requirements: "smart cards" or other physical tokens that must be combined with passwords, biometric validation of user identity (e.g., fingerprints or facial scanning), encryption of data, and implementation of a "virtual private network" (VPN).
3. The first step is a concise cost/benefit analysis of the options by someone familiar with the FBI standards as well as Alaska's unique geography, political structure, and resources; cost \$15,000.00.

4. Based on the cost benefit analysis, DPS must select the best solution and implement it by July 2002; cost \$1,300,000.

VIII. BORDER CROSSINGS

A. What Alaska Has

1. DPS operates the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). APSIN provides access to state criminal history records, which can be used to screen individual travelers for entry to Alaska and the US. APSIN includes driving, vehicle, wants/warrants and other law enforcement records relied upon every day for officer safety and public protection.
2. The APSIN system provides connection to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) for law enforcement agencies throughout the state.

B. What Alaska Needs

1. Access to APSIN and NCIC (via APSIN) is provided at cost to all approved law enforcement agencies. The cost of access to APSIN is directly related to the cost of providing the required communications technology. In general, the further from a metropolitan area an agency is located, the more costly the technology.
2. There are four (4) US border crossings on the interconnected Alaska/Canadian road systems. Currently, only one of these locations has even intermittent access to the APSIN/NCIC system.
3. Alaska needs the following tools to provide the communications technologies that will allow these four (4) border crossings reliable access to APSIN and NCIC, with a total cost of \$360,000.
 - a. Installation of T1 lines, DSUs and Routers; cost \$40,000.
 - b. Computer Terminals and Printers; cost \$32,000
 - c. Annual Line costs and device dees (5 years); \$288,000

IX. MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY ISSUES

A. Communications

The State of Alaska needs to move forward aggressively to finalize plans for funding, for obtaining and installation of appropriate equipment for the State's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (VHF), narrow band, digital, trunked system. This system involves the Department of Defense, (DoD), non-DoD federal agencies, State of Alaska and local agencies and would allow these agencies to communicate effectively in emergency situations.

B. Law Enforcement Intelligence Gathering

1. Current Situation

Currently the Alaska State Troopers oversee the criminal intelligence gathering for the State of Alaska. They are co-located with the FBI and run a joint intelligence facility with the FBI. This is the only state in the nation that coexists with and routinely shares unclassified intelligence that the FBI has access to. As stated earlier,

the gathering of criminal intelligence has the potential for preventing terrorist acts, both internally and externally, and is the most valuable asset from a law enforcement perspective.

2. What We Have

There is one Alaska State Trooper overseeing four civilian intelligence personnel and several National Guard resources through the National Guard's Drug Interdiction program.

3. What We Need

Currently the Alaska State Troopers, like several of the federal agencies, have analysis capabilities of intelligence but little field intelligence access other than what is provided by patrol troopers and local law enforcement. This unit should be increased to include additional analysts and the capability for the Alaska State Troopers to operate covert surveillance in the field. This would be an addition of ten troopers for this unit, which would provide intelligence on criminal and environmental issues.

C. Miscellaneous Energy Production

In addition to the previously discussed energy facilities, there are several facilities in and around the area of the Tesoro Refinery in North Kenai that have consequences if disrupted.

1. Phillips' Gas-to-Liquid Plant

This facility has full time 24-hour security, is fenced, and has regular perimeter patrols. This facility ships liquid natural gas from Alaska, primarily to the Orient and is located along the same stretch of beach in North Kenai as several other facilities for shipping purposes.

2. Kenai Pipeline

This facility is also secured. Its primary purpose is storage of fuels for Tesoro and other producers. This facility appears to be part of the Tesoro Plant, but is owned and operated separately from the Tesoro Plant. Security is provided 24 hours a day.

3. Agrium Plant

This plant produces urea fertilizers. It has 24-hour security and is patrolled routinely.

4. Current Situation

All of these facilities are located in proximity of each other in the Nikiski/North Kenai area. The highway passes near all of these facilities, and their security is acceptable under normal circumstances. All of the facilities have a potential environmental/economic consequence to the State of Alaska if disrupted.

D. Public Water Supply

There is a concern that a relatively small amount of a chemical or biological agent could heavily contaminate a large city water system. It would actually take a very large amount of contaminants to threaten a city water system, which reduces the likelihood of a

successful attack. A surface water source, such as a lake or stream, would be a much easier target to access than a secure closed-loop system, like a well.

In some cases, surface water sources are owned by the State of Alaska and used by a water utility. The State is typically responsible for public use of the watershed, and the water system owners/operators are ultimately responsible to ensure safe water is provided to the public. Water utilities can take actions to increase security and restrict access to water system components by locking doors to well houses, vaults, and treatment plants, securing other access points to a distribution system, installing alarm systems, posting signs in restricted areas, and increasing employee awareness of security issues. Restricting physical access to all parts of a city water system is not practical.

A specific monitoring program would be a more feasible approach to providing assurance that safe drinking water is reaching the tap. The State of Alaska is ready to respond to an attack on a public drinking water system with assistance and guidance in water sample collection, laboratory analysis, and recovery efforts. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has technical experts and federal laboratories available for immediate assistance.

Although controls on public use and access to public water supply watersheds may be impractical or undesirable, increased surveillance and monitoring of users by state land managers may provide added protection. Additionally, there may be particular areas where public access is provided where traffic design and passive barriers could be installed to prevent direct access to public water supplies. Both of these actions might be particularly feasible and should be considered on state lands such as Chugach State Park, which constitutes much of the public drinking water watershed for Anchorage, where public access occurs and where existing state management personnel could be readily supplemented.

E. United States Customs Border Crossings (Personnel)

There are five primary potential border crossings in Alaska, i.e. the main crossing at the Alaska-Canada Highway, Canada into Haines, Canada into Skagway, the Stewart-Hyder crossing, (which may be diminished as the Ferry goes back into B.C. so that it requires Customs clearance in conjunction with the Ferry trip). The fifth and most unprotected is the border crossing from Dawson at the Canadian border and through Boundary over the Taylor Highway. There are no Troopers assigned in Skagway, and two Troopers assigned in Haines - one each from the Fish & Wildlife Division and the Division of Alaska State Troopers. There is no longer a Trooper stationed at the Alaska-Canada border crossing - the closest Trooper is in the Northway area. There are no Troopers in the Eagle or Boundary area. U.S. Customs has increased container inspection and has attempted to increase their security alert at the border crossings that they man.

F. Alaska State Troopers

During several of the subcommittee conferences, as well as discussion with the Governor's staff, there have been repeated requests for the Alaska State Troopers to handle aspects of security from Prudhoe Bay to the Ferry system. Many of the specifics are outlined in other subcommittee reports, i.e. Transportation, consequence management, etc.

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The Division of Alaska Troopers would be the best agency to handle many of these mandates. It will take an expansion of one hundred (100) Troopers to provide the necessary personnel to handle these tasks.

CORRECTION

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STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP REPORT

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DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

These recommendations are the Sub-committee's number one (first) priority recommendations. They are grouped by time period (short-term, mid-term, long-term). The recommendations assigned a lesser priority (2 or 3) can be found in the Priority/Cost Breakdown Spreadsheet which contains all the Sub-committee's recommendations, in priority and grouped by time period.

A. Short-term recommendations (accomplish by 12/30/01).

1. Complete a State management plan for management of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and feasibility study for Alaska Pharmaceutical Cache.
2. Disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities.
3. Establish a recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government and plan for continuity of government and continuity of operations.
4. Hire a Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner.
5. Hire an Analyst/Programmer to support the Health Alert Network.
6. Hire a Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network.
7. Hire a contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises.
8. Develop a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State.
9. Develop a Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) kits for emergency medical service providers statewide.
10. Build a state-of-the-art 103d CST (WMD) facility—funded but not yet under construction.
11. Acquire a Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST (WMD)—federally funded and awaiting delivery.
12. Acquire 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary—federally funded and awaiting delivery.
13. Procure Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD).
14. Conduct a feasibility study regarding Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in-State).

B. Mid-term recommendations (accomplish by 06/30/02).

1. Hire 38 Alaska State Troopers (AST) (Phase 1 of 3) to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide (see Energy/Security recommendations).
2. Develop and publish a WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan

3. Develop and publish a comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP.
4. Develop a small community WMD Annex to the Community Model Disaster Response Plan.
5. Develop and publish a medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood.
6. Develop a State plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism.
7. Hire three Emergency Management Specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises.
8. Establish a Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) (four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations).
9. Hire a pharmacist to manage the State pharmaceutical cache.
10. Hire six additional staff for the DEC response corps to maintain alert status on a 24-hour per day basis.
11. Hire two microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab (Anchorage) to handle additional testing requirements.
12. Hire a Microcomputer Tech/Network Specialist/Program Analyst to support the Medical Examiner's Office and the State Public Health Lab.
13. Hire two Microcomputer Technicians to support State Public Health Centers.
14. Complete the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems.
15. Upgrade computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information.
16. Produce canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events.
17. Procure training, trucks and equipment for a Level A HAZMAT team in Juneau.
18. Procure equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and food and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation).
19. Procure 480 Modified Level B suits for State and local law enforcement personnel (Phase 1 of 3).
20. Establish hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) including training.
21. Pre-position decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak and nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai,

Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer, two each in Fairbanks) and six deployable decontamination sets (Phase 1 of 2).

22. Pre-position personal privacy kits (Phase 1 of 2).
23. Procure test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements (Phase 1 of 2).
24. Conduct WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team.
25. Conduct training in managing WMD incidents for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders.
26. Conduct WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school and public works employees and local elected officials.
27. Conduct WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide.
28. Provide First Class e-mail training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders.
29. Conduct robust WMD exercises that encompass all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors (Phase 1 of 4).

C. Long-range (accomplish in SFY 2003 or after).

1. Develop WMD annexes for jurisdictions without them.
2. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center - a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.
3. Purchase Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment.
4. Obtain equipment and a mouse colony for the Anchorage Public Health Lab so it can have a botulism diagnosis capability.
5. Obtain test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements (Phase 2 of 2).
6. Continue a robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors.
7. Complete WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel Statewide.
8. Construct and operate the State Seafood and Safety Laboratory.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS / CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The objectives of this report are:

1. To have plans in place that will ensure a coordinated response to WMD events at all levels of government.
2. To have enough personnel, with the appropriate skills, so that State and local government can effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
3. To have a reliable, interagency, State-wide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
4. To provide State agencies, local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the equipment, materials and assets they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
5. To provide State agencies, local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the training and exercise they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

B. The Threat

In the event of a terrorist attack, the State has to be prepared to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each presents a different challenge to the State. However, it is not feasible for the State to be prepared to respond to all equally; there just aren't enough resources.

Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the capability of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given relatively lower priority than preparation for other threats.

As recent events indicate, chemical/biological attacks are possible. Terrorists have the means to make the substances and deliver them. And although the State is marginally prepared to respond to these events, its posture needs improvement.

Again, recent events highlight the terrorist abilities to employ high explosive/incendiary devices. There are no jurisdictions in our country capable of effective initial responses to an event like the destruction of the World Trade Center. But, local first responders are fairly well prepared to handle lesser events. To some degree they do so on a daily basis.

In terms of the State's focus on types of threats this Subgroup believes that the State's first priority should be for chemical/biological events, secondly to high explosive/incendiary events and lastly to nuclear/radiological events.

- C. These assumptions are specific to this report. They are supplemental to the assumptions contained in the State Emergency Operations Plan.
1. In the event of a catastrophic WMD attack, similar competing events in the Lower 48 and/or poor weather conditions, the arrival of national assets will delay (beyond the 12-hour planning figure).
 2. Whatever the total cost of implementing some or all of the measures contained in this report, the annual recurring costs will amount to 25-33% of the total startup cost.
- D. This report does not attempt to cover long-term recovery because we can never see far enough ahead to anticipate the long-term recovery requirements. They are highly specific to each disaster and are best planned for during the response phase of an actual event.
- E. Despite the assumption made above there is a considerable array of national assets available to the State though FEMA. The most significant are:
1. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (one in Alaska);
 2. Disaster Mortuary Teams;
 3. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile;
 4. Heavy Urban Search and Rescue Teams;
 5. Prime Power; and
 6. Type I Incident Management Teams (one in Alaska).
- F. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:
- AICC.....Alaska Interagency Coordination Center
- CBNRE.....Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, Explosive
- CHEMS.....Community Health and Emergency Medical Services
- 103d CST (WMD).....103d Civil Support Team (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
- DES.....Division of Emergency Services
- EMS.....Emergency Medical Services
- EOC.....Emergency Operations Center
- EOP.....Emergency Operations Plan
- FNSB.....Fairbanks North Star Borough
- HAZMAT.....Hazardous Materials
- LMRS.....Land Mobile Radio System
- MOA.....Municipality of Anchorage
- NPS.....National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
- PH.....Public Health
- SAR.....Search and Rescue
- SECC.....State Emergency Coordination Center

USAR..... Urban Search and Rescue
WMD..... Weapons of Mass Destruction

II. SUMMARY

- A. Part IV of the report lists the State's current capabilities and requirements, in general terms, with regard to core emergency management functions (i.e., Direction and Control, Human Services, etc.). That is, Part IV describes what the State can do now in response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack and what it needs to be able to do to provide the optimal response. In Part III the general response and recovery functions from Part IV are translated into the specific: plans; personnel; communications; equipment, material and assets; and training and exercises the State must have to mount the optimal response.
- B. In part III costs are shown for most of the required elements. In some cases these costs are precise and in others they are rough estimates. The costs of WMD specific equipment changes constantly and varies widely depending on the vendors consulted. In a few cases the cost is unknown at this time and is so described. Cost totals are shown in Part III for the five major Preparation and Mitigation categories.
- C. The Subgroup prioritized the lists of plans; personnel; communications; materials, assets and facilities; and training and exercises. For Part III, the criteria used are:
- ~ Does the item support response to a chemical, biological or high explosive/incendiary event?
 - ~ Does the item directly support response to a major population center or provide support to local communication on a regional basis?
 - ~ Does the item support the core emergency management functions of Human Services, Public Safety, Communications and/or Direction and Control?
 - ~ Does the item give the State a capability where it had none at all, or does it improve an existing capability?
- D. The Subgroup assigned each item a priority ranking from one (the highest) to four (the lowest). Then the members determined how quickly the item could be accomplished: 3 months or less; 3 to 6 months; 6 months to 1 year; 1 year to two years; 2 years to 3 years; or long-term (more than 3 years). The result is the listing at Annex A. Each item is assigned a priority and a timeline for accomplishment. This list below summarizes the number one ranked items by time period.
1. 3-Month Priorities:
- | | |
|---|----------|
| ☐ State management plan for management of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and feasibility study for Alaska Pharmaceutical Cache: | \$75,000 |
| ☐ State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD): funded but not yet under construction. | \$0 |
| ☐ Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for | \$0 |

103d CST (WMD): federally funded; awaiting delivery.	
☐ 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary: federally funded; awaiting delivery.	\$0
☐ Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD):	\$150,000
☐ Dissemination of building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities:	\$0
☐ A recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government:	\$0
☐ Contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises:	\$60,000
☐ Development of a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State:	\$0
☐ Simple Treatment and Rapid Transportation (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide:	\$15,000
☐ System security software for State Public Health Lab LAN:	\$10,000
☐ Feasibility study re: Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in- state):	\$100,000
☐ Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner:	\$74,000
☐ Analyst/programmer to support the Health Alert Network:	\$67,000
☐ Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network:	\$38,000
Total Cost 3-Month Priorities:	\$589,000

2. 6-Month Priorities:

☐ A WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan; included in Division of Emergency Services' (DES) budget:	\$0
☐ A comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP:	\$0
☐ A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood:	\$20,000
☐ State plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism:	\$25,000

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| □ Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems: | \$213,000 |
| □ Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events: | \$0 |
| □ Three hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) (including training): | \$60,000 |
| □ Modified Level B suits for 1200 State and local law enforcement personnel- Phase 1: | \$394,000 |
| □ Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: | \$100,000 |
| □ 1.5 rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches: | \$500,000 |
| □ First Class E-mail training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders: | \$20,000 |

Total Cost 6-Month Priorities: \$1,332,000

3. 1-Year Priorities:

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| □ 33 Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to complete Phase 1 to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: | \$5,500,000 |
| □ Two microbiologists or the State Public Health Lab (Anchorage {to provide a redundant capability}) to handle additional testing requirements: | \$135,000 |
| □ Two Microcomputer Techs to support State Public Health Centers | \$106,000 |
| □ Computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information: | \$200,000 |
| □ Trucks and equipment for HAZMAT teams in Kodiak, Juneau, Kenai and Valdez: | \$1,200,000 |
| □ Equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation): | \$100,000 |
| □ Training for four Level A HAZMAT teams (Kenai, Valdez, Juneau, Kodiak): | \$500,000 |
| □ WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team: | \$40,000 |
| □ Managing WMD Incidents Training for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders: | \$80,000 |
| □ WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials: | \$100,000 |

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| ☐ WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide: | \$515,000 |
| ☐ Pre-positioned decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak: Nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai, Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer; two each in Fairbanks). Six fly-a-way decontamination sets: | \$528,000 |
| ☐ Pre-positioned personal privacy kits: | \$90,000 |
| ☐ A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors: | \$125,000 |
| ☐ 1.5 rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches (final phase): | \$500,000 |

Total Cost 1-Year Priorities: \$9,719,000

4. 2-Year Priorities:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| ☐ Implementation of Phases 1 and 2 of the State portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS). Funding for these phases will provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. It will give agencies the capability to operate on a narrow-band, FM digital architecture with internet protocol address capability and a full feature set of mobile communications. The backbone coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the major population centers of the State. The participants in the recent (September 21) Interagency Security Meeting agreed unanimously that interoperable communications was the single most important factor in coordinating a successful response to a terrorist incident. State of Alaska component: | \$17,400,000 |
| ☐ An alternate State Emergency Coordination Center - a mobile center that can be moved out of harms way and that can be used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system: | \$1,200,000 |
| ☐ Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment: | \$210,000 |
| ☐ WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel: | \$150,000 |
| ☐ 33 Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: | \$5,500,000 |
| ☐ Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: | \$200,000 |
| ☐ A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels | \$125,000 |

	of government and the private and volunteer sectors:	
	☐ Anchorage Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colony for botulism diagnosis:	\$110,000
	Total Cost 2-Year Priorities:	\$24,895,000
5.	3-Year Priorities:	
	☐ 33 Alaska State Troopers' (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide:	\$5,500,000
	☐ A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors:	\$125,000
	Total Cost 3-Year Priorities:	\$5,625,000
6.	Long-Term Priorities:	
	☐ A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors:	\$125,000
	Total Cost Long-Term Priorities:	\$125,000
	Grand Total First Ranked Priorities	\$42,285,000
7.	Second Ranked Priorities Total:	\$23,901,000
8.	Third Ranked Priorities Total:	\$20,372,000
9.	Fourth Ranked Priorities Total:	\$8,164,000
10.	Municipality of Anchorage Total:	\$11,196,000

III. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS - PREPARATION AND MITIGATION

A. Plans

1. Objective: To have plans in place that will ensure a coordinated response to WMD events at all levels of government.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ State of Alaska Emergency Operations Plan. published 1994.
 - ☐ Alaska Inter-agency Fire Management Plan.
 - ☐ Local, all-hazard EOPs. some with WMD annexes.
 - ☐ A Community Model Disaster Response Plan with a WMD Annex.
 - ☐ A State mandated incident management system, the Incident Command System (ICS).
 - ☐ Signatory to the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement (a disaster mutual aid compact).
 - ☐ State of Alaska "Mental Health Disaster/Emergency Response Plan."

- ❑ CHEMS "Mass Casualty Response: A Workbook for Emergency Medical Responders in Alaska."
 - ❑ CHEMS "Alaska Bioterrorism Resource Guide."
 - ❑ Radiation monitoring plan for airborne contaminants.
 - ❑ Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (Unified Plan).
 - ❑ Ten Federal/State Sub-area Plans for Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills and Releases (Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Kodiak Island, Aleutians, Bristol Bay, Western Alaska, Northwest Arctic, North Slope, and Interior Alaska).
 - ❑ Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide for Oil and Hazardous Substance Response.
 - ❑ States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Mutual Aid Agreement.
 - ❑ Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA).
 - ❑ Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB).
 - ❑ Numerous Regulated Industry Contingency Plans for Oil Spills from Facilities and Vessels.
 - ❑ Member of the Northwest Compact for disposal of low level radioactive material at a disposal site in Pasco, WA.
3. General requirements (what we need):
- ❑ A WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan; included in Division of Emergency Services' (DES) budget: \$0
 - ❑ A comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP: \$0
 - ❑ A small community WMD Annex to the Community Model Disaster Response Plan; included in DES budget: \$0
 - ❑ WMD plans/annexes for jurisdictions without them: \$250,000
 - ❑ A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, \$20,000

using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood:

- ☐ State management plan for Alaska pharmaceutical cache: \$25,000
- ☐ State management plan for National Pharmaceutical Stockpile: \$50,000
- ☐ Community Technical Assistance Teams (TAT) (for medical response and communications planning): \$50,000
- ☐ Dissemination of building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities: \$0
- ☐ Legislative approval to become signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact: \$0
- ☐ A review of Alaska statutes to determine their adequacy for WMD response (AS 26.20; AS 26.23; AS 46.03.865; AS 18.60.505): \$0
- ☐ A recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government: \$0
- ☐ Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency: \$0
- ☐ Update laws and regulations (e.g. AS 18.50.230, 7AAC 05.400) concerning the issuance of death certificates: \$0
- ☐ Revised Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan for the Municipality of Anchorage (including WMD): \$120,000

4. Special Requirements:

a. *Chemical:*

b. *Biological:*

- ☐ State public health plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism: \$25,000

c. *Nuclear:*

d. *Radiological:*

- ☐ A State WMD radiological response plan (integrated - DEC & DHSS), including a plan for collection, containment, storage and transportation of nuclear and radioactive waste: \$150,000

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

Total cost for Plans: \$690,000

B. Personnel

1. Objective: To have enough personnel, with the appropriate skills, so State and local government can effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - Trained SECC staff (10) at the State facility on Fort Richardson.
 - The Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet.
 - An Alaska Type I Interagency Incident Management Team.
 - Two, Type II Incident Management Teams.
 - Trained personnel in the Alaska Interagency Coordination Center in Fairbanks.
 - Twenty-two highly trained WMD response personnel in the 103d CST (WMD) at Fort Richardson.
 - A State Section of Epidemiology nine-member surveillance and outbreak investigation team.
 - An Alaska Disaster Medical Assistance Team.
 - One hundred forty public health nurses.
 - A Statewide EMS system including 100 certified ground ambulance services, 84 first responder units and 14 aeromedical services.
 - 110 registered fire departments; 80-100 fire response organizations.
 - 330 commissioned officers in the Alaska State Troopers.
 - Eighty-five Village Public Safety Officers.
 - Fifty police departments.
 - Several certified peace officers in Division of State Parks (also trained in SAR).
 - Two Level A HAZMAT Response Teams.
 - 35 DEC primary spill responders (incident management personnel).
 - HAZMAT Response Teams at Eielson and Elmendorf Air Force Bases (available via mutual aid agreements).
 - The 210th Rescue Squadron (Alaska Air National Guard).
 - Sixteen volunteer search and rescue groups statewide (approximately 70 personnel).
 - Seventy-three trained wild land fire fighting crews.

- Four "hot shot" fire fighting crews.
 - Nineteen Local Emergency Planning Committees, most of which are "all-hazard."
 - Eighteen designated local Emergency Managers.
 - Two full-time radiological engineers (DEC); one full-time radiological specialist (DHSS).
- 3. General requirements (what we need):
 - Three emergency management specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises: \$225,000
 - Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner: \$74,000
 - Analyst/programmer to support the Health Alert Network: \$67,000
 - Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network: \$38,000
 - Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) (four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations): \$20,000
 - CHEMS Public Health Specialist to work with communities on planning: \$67,000
 - CHEMS Publication Specialist to develop public information materials: \$60,000
 - Pharmacist to manage the State pharmaceutical cache: \$74,000
 - One hundred Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: \$16,500,000
 - Three additional State fire training staff to accommodate increased demands created by the WMD threat: \$300,000
 - Personnel for Municipality of Anchorage (air and water quality monitoring, health emergency preparedness officer, bomb squad, support to Office of Emergency Management, overtime to train first responders): \$1,946,000
- 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. Chemical:
 - Six additional staff to DEC response corps to maintain alert status on a 24-hour per day basis: \$240,000
 - b. Biological:
 - Contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises: \$60,000
 - Four microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab (2 Anchorage and 2 Fairbanks {to provide a redundant capability}) to handle additional testing requirements: \$270,000

□	Microcomputer Technician for the Fairbanks Public Health Lab:	\$54,000
□	Microcomputer Tech/Network Specialist/Program Analyst to support Medical Examiner and Anchorage Public Health Lab:	\$60,000
□	Two Microcomputer Techs to support State Public Health Centers:	\$106,000
□	Microcomputer Tech to support detection and surveillance in the State Epidemiology Section:	\$54,000
c	<i>Nudem:</i>	
d	<i>Radiological:</i>	
□	Two additional radiological health specialists (DHSS):	\$175,000
e	<i>High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:</i>	
Total cost for Personnel:		\$20,390,000

C. Communication (internal and external)

1. Objective: To have a reliable, interagency, statewide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - An emergency telecommunications network based on a combination of the State of Alaska Telecommunications System (SATS) (a microwave system) and commercial telephone lines. SATS supports local law enforcement agencies, DHSS, DPS, DOF, DOT, DEC and ARRC.
 - The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 29 communities and State and Federal agencies.
 - An E-mail system that reaches virtually all the emergency management points-of-contact in the state.
 - A State of Alaska Wide Area Network that connects 38 communities and 14,000 users.
 - Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
 - Division of Forestry radio caches and trained communications unit leaders.
 - DEC communications (17 permanent and 6 portable VHF repeaters, 5 portable base stations, repeater extenders, satellite phones and 166 portable radios { 130 VHF and 36 UHF }).

- ❑ A National Guard HF radio net that reaches many rural communities in the State.
- ❑ 103d CST (WMD) secure satellite communications suite.
- ❑ A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding WMD events (50% complete).
- ❑ SECC telephone, HF/VHF/UHF radio, satellite phone and First Class Email communications capabilities.
- ❑ Alaska Interagency Coordination Center communications capabilities.
- ❑ The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 16 communities.
- ❑ The Emergency Alerting System that reaches most communities in Alaska.
- ❑ The Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS) provides broadcast services to rural communities.
- ❑ The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center that issues tsunami watches and warnings via the NAWAS.
- ❑ The Alaska Volcano Observatory provides volcano watches and warnings statewide.
- ❑ Siren systems in some communities.
- ❑ The National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather watches and warnings and can provide some plume modeling support.
- ❑ NWS supports the NOAA Weather Radio program.

3. General requirements (what we need):

- ❑ Implementation of Phases 1 and 2 of the State portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS). Funding for these phases will provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. It will give agencies the capability to operate on a narrow-band, FM digital architecture with internet protocol address capability and a full feature set of mobile communications. The backbone coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the major population centers of the State. The participants in the recent (September 21) Interagency Security Meeting agreed unanimously that interoperable communications was the single most important factor in coordinating a successful response to a terrorist incident. State of Alaska component: \$17,400,000
- ❑ An improved statewide all-hazard warning system - \$7,500,000

AlaskaAlert Network:

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| ☐ Review, plan, design and build an enterprise wide security system to protect the State's critical information and communications resources: | \$500,000 |
| ☐ Integration of all Fairbanks North Star Borough volunteer emergency services organizations into the Alaska LMRS: | \$2,500,000 |
| ☐ Improved statewide communications coverage and command communications for DEC, which would also serve DHSS and DPS: | \$1,300,000 |
| ☐ A two-way radio communications system to support spill response, public safety and human services operations along the Trans-Alaska Pipeline: | \$2,000,000 |
| ☐ Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems (systems that link the health care community statewide): | \$213,000 |
| ☐ Backup communications for key public health personnel: | \$12,000 |
| ☐ Cell phones (8) for public health nurse managers: | \$6,000 |
| ☐ Satellite phones (50) for public health and EMS regions and ambulance services: | \$75,000 |
| ☐ Public Health Offices cable connections to support distance learning: | \$8,000 |
| ☐ Public Health Offices (Matanuska-Susitna and Kenai Peninsula Borough) satellite dishes to support distance learning: | \$30,000 |
| ☐ Development of a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State: | \$0 |
| ☐ High-speed, leased-line communications link between the Fairbanks and Anchorage State Public Health Labs: | unknown |
| ☐ Configure the Anchorage Public Health Lab to support 100MB network communications: | unknown |
| ☐ Develop database management and communications capabilities for State Medical Examiners Office: | unknown |
| ☐ Computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information: | \$200,000 |
| ☐ Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events: | \$0 |
| ☐ Portable, interoperable supplementary and backup radios for MOA first responders: | \$300,000 |

4. Special Requirements:

- a. Chemical:
- b. Biological:
- c. Nuclear:
- d. Radiological:
- e. High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:

Total cost for Communications: \$32,044,000

D. Equipment, Materials and Assets

1. Objective: To provide State agencies local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the equipment, materials and assets they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ The SECC facility located on Fort Richardson (24-hour per day operations, 365 days per year).
 - ☐ The MOA dedicated EOC facility.
 - ☐ The Alaska Interagency Coordination Center facility on Fort Wainwright.
 - ☐ One DEC command trailer with response equipment trailer.
 - ☐ 30 DEC spill response equipment conexes located in communities throughout the State.
 - ☐ State Public Health Laboratories in Anchorage and Fairbanks (Anchorage facility capable of on-site testing for some biological agents).
 - ☐ Rural clinics staffed by a variety of health care professionals (150 staffed by Community Health Aides, 19 staffed by Practitioners, 7 staffed by Physicians) that treat minor injuries and routine medical conditions and stabilize the severely ill and injured.
 - ☐ Fourteen rural hospitals that serve as regional hubs to the rural clinics. Some of these hospitals lack surgical capabilities and intensive care units (ICU) and all have extremely limited bed space.
 - ☐ Eight urban hospitals that have ICU beds and surgical suites. However, most of them are full to near full capacity during normal circumstances.
 - ☐ Division of Forestry equipment caches (Fairbanks and Palmer).

- ❑ Permitted municipal solid waste disposal facilities for non-contaminated debris.
- ❑ Private sector contractors that can collect and transport non-contaminated debris.
- ❑ Private sector businesses that dispose of commercially generated hazardous waste.
- ❑ Nine radiation monitoring stations, eight health care facilities with radiation detection instruments, and other survey and sampling equipment.
- ❑ DEC Food Safety and Seafood Laboratory in Palmer cultures and identifies enteric pathogens along with vibrio staphylococcus, and listeria in food and water.
- ❑ DEC Chemistry laboratory in Juneau tests for the presence or absence of most chemical warfare compounds.
- ❑ DEC State Veterinarian in Palmer.

3. General requirements (what we need):

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| ❑ A dedicated EOC for Fairbanks North Star Borough: | \$5,000,000 |
| ❑ A dedicated EOC for City and Borough of Juneau: | \$1,000,000 |
| ❑ An alternate State Emergency Coordination Center - a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system: | \$1,200,000 |
| ❑ A fully outfitted State ferry (Kennicott) that can be used as an alternate Emergency Coordination Center in Southeast Alaska: | \$500,000 |
| ❑ An improved local siren warning system in Juneau: | \$200,000 |
| ❑ Trucks and equipment for HAZMAT teams in Kodiak, Juneau, Kenai and Valdez: | \$1,200,000 |
| ❑ Limited emergency blood testing capability at the two State Public Health Labs: | \$90,000 |
| ❑ Office equipment for Public Health Nurses (including computers and servers to support WMD activities): | \$100,000 |
| ❑ Funds for Phase II of EMS Code Blue Project (EMS equipment: | \$300,000 |
| ❑ Simple Treatment and Rapid Transportation (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide: | \$15,000 |
| ❑ New workstation computers for State Public Health Lab staff: | \$60,000 |
| ❑ System security software for State Public Health Lab LAN: | \$10,000 |

- Computer software upgrades for Public Health Centers: \$75,000
 - Specialized equipment to assist in evacuating persons with disabilities from multi-story buildings: \$10,000
 - Equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation): \$100,000
 - State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD): funded but not yet under construction. *federally funded*
 - Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST (WMD): federally funded; awaiting delivery. *federally funded*
 - 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary: federally funded; awaiting delivery. *federally funded*
 - Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD): \$150,000
 - Three rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches: \$1,000,000
 - Fairbanks North Star Borough Civil Defense Equipment: \$425,000
 - Shelter preparation, letters of agreement, equipment caches and training statewide - American Red Cross: \$4,100,000
 - For Municipality of Anchorage - Equipment and supplies (USAR, WMD equipment storage building, mass decontamination, bomb squad, mass shelter, biomedical monitoring of WMD victims, air and water quality monitoring, EOC upgrades, etc.): \$7,000,000
- 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical:*
 - Detection equipment for fire departments in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Kodiak, Valdez, and Kenai: \$500,000
 - Level C suits for 150 ambulance and first responder units, 14 aeromedical services and 22 non-military hospitals (1000 people): \$250,000
 - Modified Level B suits for 1200 State and local law enforcement personnel: \$985,000
 - Turnout clothing and SCBA for 1500 volunteer fire fighters: \$3,750,000
 - Three hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) (including training): \$60,000
 - Pre-positioned decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak: Nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai,

Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer; two each in Fairbanks).
Six fly-a-way decontamination sets:

- ☐ Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment: \$210,000
- ☐ Pre-positioned personal privacy kits: \$180,000
- ☐ Protective equipment for search and rescue personnel statewide: \$70,000
- a. *Biological:*
 - ☐ Lab equipment to give Fairbanks State Public Health Lab an all threat agent testing capability: \$315,000
 - ☐ Specialized equipment for the State Medical Examiner's staff: \$274,000
 - ☐ Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in-state): \$9,400,000
 - ☐ Enhanced rapid infectious agent detection using molecular methods: \$30,000
 - ☐ Anchorage Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colony for botulism diagnosis: \$110,000
 - ☐ Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: \$300,000
- c. *Nuclear:*
- d. *Radiological:*
 - ☐ Replace and upgrade current radiological monitoring system (NE WNET) and to provide Statewide coverage: \$1,200,000
 - ☐ Laboratory for in-state gamma and alpha particle analysis: \$2,500,000
 - ☐ Detection, identification and decontamination equipment for DHSS staff: \$240,000
 - ☐ Detection and identification equipment for DEC staff: \$300,000
 - ☐ Radiation monitoring equipment for local fire departments: \$120,000
- e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*
 - ☐ Three USAR simulators (Juneau, Fairbanks, Anchorage) and associated props to be used for USAR training: \$2,500,000
 - ☐ Equipment and training for Fairbanks North Star Borough Advanced Urban Search and Rescue Team: \$350,000

Total cost for Equipment, Materials and Assets: \$47,169,000

E. Training and Exercises

1. Objective: To provide State agencies: local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the training and exercises they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

2. General situation (what we have):

- ☐ Many fire departments throughout the State have received introductory WMD response training.
- ☐ Level A trained HAZMAT teams in Anchorage and Fairbanks.
- ☐ 103d CST (WMD) a highly trained, highly mobile WMD response organization capable of agent detection and identification, communication with a wide variety of agencies in all locations and capable of providing technical advice to local on-scene commanders.
- ☐ Forty-five WMD trained responders in Anchorage Fire Department.
- ☐ Elmendorf Air Force Base has 53 trained WMD response personnel.
- ☐ Fairbanks North Star Borough has 20 trained volunteer WMD response personnel.
- ☐ Eielson Air Force Base has 20 WMD trained personnel.
- ☐ Two DEC staff trained in radiation detection; three DHSS staff trained in radiological response procedures.

3. General requirements (what we need):

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| ☐ Training for four Level A HAZMAT teams (Kenai, Valdez, Juneau, Kodiak): | \$500,000 |
| ☐ WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team: | \$40,000 |
| ☐ Two trained HAZMAT technicians per borough/LEPC: | \$20,000 |
| ☐ Hazardous Materials Technician Training for 200 first responders statewide: | \$200,000 |
| ☐ Managing WMD Incidents Training for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders: | \$80,000 |
| ☐ WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials: | \$100,000 |
| ☐ WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide: | \$515,000 |
| ☐ WMD Awareness Training for search and rescue personnel statewide: | \$30,000 |

☐	Completion of command staff training for local fire organizations:	\$500,000
☐	EMT training to increase the number of available responders throughout the State:	\$300,000
☐	First Class Email training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders:	\$20,000
☐	University of Alaska satellite broadcasts for distance training of public health workers:	\$40,000
☐	Satellite dish access for distance training of public health workers in Juneau:	<i>unknown</i>
☐	Training of State Public Health Lab IT and lab staff on the new Laboratory Information System (LIS):	\$100,000
☐	A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors:	\$500,000
☐	Training in procedures for evacuating people with disabilities from multi-story buildings:	\$10,000
☐	WMD Awareness Training for 200 ATC-20 (building damage assessment) trained personnel:	\$100,000
☐	Training to ensure proper monitoring of worker safety at the attack site:	\$0
☐	Municipality of Anchorage training (bomb squad, USAR, air and water quality monitoring, public education, etc.):	\$1,950,000
4.	Special Requirements:	
a.	<i>Chemical:</i>	
☐	Chem-Bio decontamination training for hospital personnel:	\$100,000
☐	Chem-Bio response training for EMS responders:	\$150,000
☐	Mass fatality management and Chem-Bio decontamination training for the State Medical Examiner's Office:	\$40,000
☐	Ongoing education of workers to provide a safer workplace in the event of a chemical or biological attack:	\$0
b.	<i>Biological:</i>	
	<i>(see above)</i>	
c.	<i>Nuclear:</i>	
d.	<i>Radiological:</i>	
☐	WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel:	\$150,000

e High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:

- ☐ Light USAR training for selected groups statewide: \$120,000
- ☐ Explosive training for HAZMAT team personnel: \$60,000

Total cost for Training and Exercises: \$5,625,000

IV. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT - RESPONSE AND SHORT-TERM RECOVERY

A. Direction and Control

1. Objective: To have the facilities, plans and organizations in place to effectively manage response to Terrorist/WMD incidents at all levels of government in the State of Alaska.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ Twenty-four hour per day, 7 days per week SECC located in Anchorage.
 - ☐ The Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet.
 - ☐ Legislation (AS26.23, The Alaska Disaster Act) that gives the Governor extraordinary powers during a declared disaster and activates the Disaster Relief Fund.
 - ☐ Legislation (AS 26.20, the Alaska Civil Defense Act) giving DMVA broad authority to undertake civil defense planning and operational functions. Also giving the Governor extraordinary powers during a declared emergency, but only "in the event of an actual enemy attack against the state." The laws are dated, enacted in 1951.
 - ☐ Legislation (AS 46.03.865) giving DEC extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an actual or imminent discharge of a hazardous substance or low level radioactive materials poses an immediate threat to the public health or welfare or the environment.
 - ☐ Legislation (AS 18.60.505) giving DHSS extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect the public health or welfare from radiation.
 - ☐ Legislation (AS 46.03.865) giving DEC extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an actual or imminent discharge of a hazardous substance or low level radioactive materials poses an immediate threat to the public health or welfare or the environment.
 - ☐ The Municipality of Anchorage has a dedicated Emergency Operations Center facility.
 - ☐ A Statewide incident management system, the Incident Command System.
 - ☐ A State Emergency Operations Plan.
 - ☐ Alaska Inter-agency Fire Management Plan.
 - ☐ A Community Model Disaster Response Plan.
 - ☐ Local, all-hazard emergency operations plans, some with WMD annexes.

- ❑ Signatory to the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement.
- ❑ Alaska Type I Interagency Incident Management Team.
- ❑ Two Type II Incident Management Teams in Alaska.
- ❑ Division of Forestry resource ordering system.
- ❑ Alaska Interagency Coordination Center in Fairbanks.
- ❑ 103d CST (WMD) capability to provide CBNRE information, advice and communications support to the local Incident Commander.
- ❑ Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (Unified Plan).
- ❑ Ten Federal/State Sub-area Plans for Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills and Releases (Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Kodiak Island, Aleutians, Bristol Bay, Western Alaska, Northwest Arctic, North Slope, and Interior Alaska).
- ❑ Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide for Oil and Hazardous Substance Response.
- ❑ States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Mutual Aid Agreement.
- ❑ Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA).
- ❑ Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB).
- ❑ Numerous Regulated Industry Contingency Plans for Oil Spills from Facilities and Vessels.

3. General requirements (what we need):

- ❑ Pre-designated alternate State Emergency Coordination Center facilities.
- ❑ A WMD annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan.
- ❑ WMD annexes to local Emergency Operations Plans.
- ❑ Participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
- ❑ Information/data protection.
- ❑ Dedicated EOCs in the larger communities in Alaska.

4. Special Requirements:

- a. *Chemical:*
- b. *Biological:*
- c. *Nuclear:*
- d. *Radiological:*
- e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

B. Detection and Surveillance

1. Objective: To be able to detect and monitor WMD events that occur in Alaska, and the ability to monitor WMD events that affect Alaska, regardless of origin.
 2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ A well-developed wild land fire detection and monitoring system.
 - ☐ An atmospheric radiation monitoring system (personnel, equipment and plan).
 - ☐ 103d CST (WMD) with the capability to detect and identify CBNRE substances and accomplish plume modeling.
 - ☐ A State Section of Epidemiology nine-member surveillance and outbreak investigation team.
 - ☐ A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding indicators of potential WMD events (50% complete).
 3. General requirements (what we need):
 - ☐ An improved drinking water monitoring capability.
 - ☐ State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD).
 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical*: Detection capability in selected communities.
 - b. *Biological*:
 - ☐ Ongoing education of private health care providers to recognize indicators of biological attack.
 - ☐ Electronic reporting of notifiable pathogens by laboratories that process Alaska clinical specimens.
 - c. *Nuclear*.
 - d. *Radiological*:
 - ☐ An improved atmospheric radiation monitoring system.
 - ☐ A radiation monitoring response plan.
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma*.
- C. Communications (internal and external)
1. Objective: To have a reliable, interagency, statewide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
 2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ An emergency telecommunications network based on a combination of the State of Alaska Telecommunications System (SATS) (a microwave system) and commercial telephone lines. SATS supports local law enforcement agencies, DHSS, DPS, DOF, DOT, DEC and ARRC two radio systems.

- ☐ The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 29 communities and State and Federal agencies.
 - ☐ An E-mail system that reaches virtually all the emergency management points-of-contact in the state.
 - ☐ A State of Alaska Wide Area Network, connecting 38 communities and 14,000 users.
 - ☐ DEC radios, satellite phones and repeaters.
 - ☐ Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
 - ☐ Division of Forestry radio caches and trained communications unit leaders.
 - ☐ A statewide Health Alert Network.
 - ☐ A National Guard HF radio net that reaches many rural communities in the State.
 - ☐ 103d CST (WMD) secure satellite communications suite.
 - ☐ A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding WMD events (50% complete).
3. General requirements (what we need):
- ☐ Digital, narrow-band, integrated, first responder emergency communications at all levels of government.
 - ☐ A comprehensive State emergency communications plan.
 - ☐ Improved communications along the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
4. Special Requirements:
- a. *Chemical:*
 - b. *Biological:*
 - c. *Nuclear:*
 - d. *Radiological:*
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

D. Warning and Notification

1. Objective: To be able to warn the State's population, or selected portions of the population, about threatened WMD events on a timely basis, and to provide information/instructions to the population about WMD events after they happen.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 16 communities.
 - ☐ The Emergency Alerting System that reaches most communities in Alaska.
 - ☐ The Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS) provides broadcast services to rural communities.

- ☐ The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center that issues tsunami watches and warning via the NAWAS.
 - ☐ The Alaska Volcano Observatory provides volcano watches and warnings statewide.
 - ☐ Twenty-four hour per day, 7 days per week State Emergency Coordination Center located in Anchorage.
 - ☐ A statewide Health Alert Network.
 - ☐ Siren systems in some communities.
 - ☐ The National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather watches and warnings and can provide some plume modeling support.
 - ☐ NWS supports the NOAA Weather Radio program.
 - ☐ A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid dissemination of information to health care providers regarding indicators WMD events (50% complete).
3. General requirements (what we need):
- ☐ A comprehensive State emergency communications plan.
 - ☐ A reliable statewide warning system.
 - ☐ A recall system for every agency of the executive branch of State government.
 - ☐ Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events.
4. Special Requirements:
- a. *Chemical:*
 - b. *Biological:*
 - c. *Nuclear:*
 - d. *Radiological:*
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*
- E. Human Services (categories: Public Health {including hospitals and labs}, EMS)
1. Objective: To prevent illness and injury before and after a WMD event occurs, and to save lives and prevent suffering after an event.
2. General situation (what we have):
- ☐ Alaska Disaster Medical Assistance Team.
 - ☐ Statewide emergency medical services backbone radio system, including repeaters.
 - ☐ Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems, but only 50% complete.
 - ☐ Public health laboratories in Anchorage and Fairbanks.

- ❑ DEC Food Safety and Seafood laboratory in Palmer can culture and identify enteric pathogens along with vibrio, staphylococcus, and listeria in food and water.
 - ❑ DEC Chemistry laboratory in Juneau can run tests for the presence or absence of most chemical warfare compounds.
 - ❑ DEC State Veterinarian in Palmer.
 - ❑ One hundred forty public health nurses.
 - ❑ Rural clinics staffed by a variety of health care professionals (Community Health Aides, Nurse Practitioners, Physicians Assistants) that treat minor injuries, routine medical conditions and stabilize the severely ill and injured.
 - ❑ Rural hospitals serve as regional hubs to the rural clinics. Some of these hospitals lack surgical capabilities and intensive care units (ICU) and all have extremely limited bed space.
 - ❑ Urban hospitals have ICU beds and surgical suites. However, most of them are full to near full capacity during normal circumstances.
 - ❑ A Statewide Emergency Medical Services system, including 100 certified ground ambulance services, 8+ first responder units and 1+ aeromedical services.
 - ❑ CHEMS "Mass Casualty Response: A Workbook for Emergency Medical Responders in Alaska."
 - ❑ State of Alaska "Mental Health Disaster/Emergency Response Plan" and 10 Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) teams.
 - ❑ CHEMS "Alaska Bioterrorism Resource Guide"
3. General requirements (what we need):
- ❑ Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.
 - ❑ Update laws and regulations (e.g. AS 18.50.230, 7 AAC 05.400) concerning the issuance of death certificates.
 - ❑ Improved communications for emergency medical services statewide.
 - ❑ Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems.
 - ❑ Emergency medical services equipment, disaster caches and Simple Triage and Rapid Transportation kits for emergency medical services.
 - ❑ Emergency blood testing capability at the two State Public Health Labs.
 - ❑ A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and

supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood.

- ☐ Pre-designated medical subject matter experts to provide liaison to the SECC regarding WMD and mass casualty events when they occur.
- ☐ A plan to replenish in-State medical supplies, blood and medical personnel from the Lower 48.
- ☐ Accommodations to help people with disabilities evacuate multi-story buildings.

4. Special Requirements:

a. *Chemical:* Plans for treatment of larger numbers of patients from chemical events to include decontamination.

b. *Biological:*

- ☐ Biological agent training for hospital personnel.
- ☐ Plans for treatment of larger numbers of patients from chemical events to include decontamination.
- ☐ Plan for receipt of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and creation of a mini-stockpile in Alaska.
- ☐ Improved State Laboratory capability to include enhanced rapid infectious agent detection using molecular methods, redundancy of critical lab resources in Fairbanks, stockpile of decontamination materials and investigative equipment and body bags for the State Medical Examiner's office. (Note: The Fairbanks Public Health Laboratory does not currently have the space or equipment to handle state lab needs in the event the Anchorage Lab was rendered unusable. Cost of complete repair/renovation or replacement is unknown at this time.).
- ☐ Community technical assistance teams, mass casualty protocols, and comprehensive public health and emergency medical services weapons of mass destruction web page.
- ☐ Technical and support personnel to develop public education materials, maintain medical stockpiles/caches and help install the new Laboratory Information System.

c. *Nuclear:*

d. *Radiological:*

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

F. Sheltering

1. Objective: To provide temporary shelter and food for those whose homes are rendered unusable by a WMD event.
2. General situation (what we have): A well-developed shelter training program run by the American Red Cross.

3. General requirements (what we need): Additional shelters, shelter training and equipment and supply caches.
 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical:*
 - b. *Biological:*
 - c. *Nuclear:*
 - d. *Radiological:*
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*
- G. Public Safety (categories: fire, hazardous materials, urban search and rescue, mass decontamination and law enforcement)
1. Objective: To provide public safety support to local government to save lives, prevent further injuries and property damage, locate missing people, maintain law and order and support the other emergency management functions when a WMD event occurs.
 2. General situation (what we have):
 - 110 fire departments: 80-100 fire response organizations.
 - Many fire departments throughout the state have received introductory WMD response training.
 - 330 commissioned officers in the Alaska State Troopers.
 - Eighty-five Village Public Safety Officers.
 - Fifty police departments.
 - Certified peace officers employed in Division of State Parks (also trained in SAR).
 - Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
 - Two level A hazardous materials response teams.
 - 35 DEC primary spill responders.
 - One team trained specifically for CBRNE operations; the 103d Civil Support Team (CST) (WMD) at Fort Richardson.
 - Hazardous Materials Response Teams at Eielson and Elmendorf Air Force Bases (available via mutual aid agreements).
 - The 210th Air Rescue Squadron.
 - Sixteen volunteer search and rescue groups statewide (approximately 70 personnel).
 - Seventy-three trained wildland firefighting crews in Alaska.
 - Four "hot-shot" firefighting crews.
 - Division of Forestry equipment caches (warehouses).

- ☐ 30 DEC spill response equipment conexes in communities throughout the State.
 - ☐ One DEC command trailer with response equipment trailer.
 - ☐ Personnel decontamination capability using soap and water and/or swimming pools and car washes.
 - ☐ Concept plan for light USAR.
3. General requirements (what we need):
- ☐ Additional Level A hazardous materials response teams located in major population centers.
 - ☐ Protective clothing for State and local law enforcement, fire and EMS personnel.
 - ☐ WMD training for law enforcement officers.
 - ☐ Introductory and follow-on WMD response training for fire department personnel throughout the state.
 - ☐ WMD training for command staff and general staff of local fire organizations.
 - ☐ WMD awareness training for volunteer search and rescue groups.
 - ☐ An equipment and property decontamination capability positioned in selected population centers.
 - ☐ Portable decontamination systems (equipment and property) for deployment to communities without a capability.
 - ☐ An improved intelligence information management system for law enforcement agencies.
 - ☐ Current manning level in Alaska State Troopers does not allow for 24-hour per day operations in most posts and stations. Troopers need a 24-hour per day capability to simultaneously monitor the situation effectively, gather and analyze intelligence, respond to disasters including WMD events and conduct routine law enforcement functions.
 - ☐ Light USAR training for selected groups.
 - ☐ Additional State fire training staff.
4. Special Requirements:
- a. *Chemical:*
 - ☐ Specialized detection equipment for fire organizations.
 - ☐ A DEC response corps 24-hour per day capability.
 - b. *Biological:*
 - c. *Nuclear:*
 - d. *Radiological:* Specialized detection equipment for fire organizations.

- e *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma*: An in-state Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) capability.

H. Public works

1. Objective: To effect the maintenance and emergency repair of essential facilities, utilities and other public works when a WMD event occurs.
2. General situation (what we have):
3. General requirements (what we need): WMD awareness training for selected public works personnel.
4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical*:
 - b. *Biological*:
 - c. *Nuclear*:
 - d. *Radiological*:
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma*:

I. Damage assessment

1. Objective: To rapidly and accurately assess WMD caused property damage.
2. General situation (what we have): A robust building damage assessment program developed by the Applied Technology Council (ATC-20), funded by the State and conducted by Municipality of Anchorage personnel. Over 200 people trained in-State.
3. General requirements (what we need): WMD training for the people who have been trained.
4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical*:
 - b. *Biological*:
 - c. *Nuclear*:
 - d. *Radiological*:
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma*:

J. Debris removal

1. Objective: To safely collect, contain and store WMD generated hazardous waste and debris.
2. General situation (what we have):
 - Numerous statewide permitted municipal solid waste disposal facilities for the disposal of non-contaminated debris.
 - Numerous private sector contractors with adequate heavy equipment for the collection and transport of non-contaminated debris.

- ☐ Industry hygienists and safety consultants that are available to assist businesses in training workers for debris removal safe practices.
- 3. General requirements (what we need):
- 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical:*
 - ☐ Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
 - b. *Biological:*
 - ☐ Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
 - c. *Nuclear:*
 - d. *Radiological:*
 - ☐ Trained and certified personnel for the collection and containerizing of radioactive waste material.
 - ☐ Appropriate containers for radioactive waste material, to be stockpiled in major population centers.
 - ☐ Secured, segregated storage space for radioactive waste containers awaiting shipment to lower 48 disposal site.
 - e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

K. Hazardous waste disposal

- 1. Objective: To safely and properly dispose of WMD generated hazardous waste.
- 2. General situation (what we have):
 - ☐ Industrial hygienists and safety consultants that are available to assist businesses in training workers for debris removal safe practices.
 - ☐ Private sector businesses that dispose of commercially generated hazardous waste.
 - ☐ Member of the Northwest Compact for disposal of low level radioactive material at a disposal site in Pasco, WA.
- 3. General requirements (what we need):
 - ☐ Pre-disaster approved permits for treating biological and chemical hazardous waste on site.
 - ☐ Plan to remove contaminated waste from the State.
 - ☐ Identify contractors to do hazardous waste clean-up.
- 4. Special Requirements:
 - a. *Chemical:*
 - ☐ Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
 - b. *Biological:*
 - ☐ Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.

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- c *Nuclear:*
- d *Radiological:* A nuclear and radioactive material removal and disposal plan.
- e *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

TALKING PAPER
ON
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Purpose:

The purpose of this paper is to forward to Governor Knowles a proposal on an organizational structure for a State of Alaska Office of Homeland Security.

Mission:

The mission of the Office of Homeland Security shall be to develop and coordinate the state's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks in coordination with local, educational, private, business, federal and military agencies, while improving overall emergency management capabilities in the State of Alaska.

Core Duties:

- Assist assessment and analysis of intelligence across agencies (federal, state, local and private)
- Maintain a threat assessment for Alaska
- Develop protocols among federal, state, local and private entities to respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction events
- Work with the National Office of Homeland Security and other states to increase preparedness
- Provide the Governor with an expert advisor on Homeland Security
- Coordinate planning, training and exercises for departments and agencies
- Develop program budgets and manage anti-terrorism grants
- Provide a single channel of communications for Homeland Security issues
- Review and develop legislative actions and proposals

Supporting Elements to the Office of Homeland Security

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| - Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet | - State Emergency Response Commission |
| - ADES (SECC) | - Rescue Coordination Center |
| - Alaska State Trooper Ops. Center | - Municipal Emergency Operations Centers |
| - Army National Guard (POMSO and CST) | - Alaska State Defense Force |
| - Navy Militia | - Air National Guard |
| - Anti-Terrorism Working Group | - Business Partners |
| - Federal Agencies | |

Office of Homeland Security Staff Requirements:

To ensure a consistent level of effort and expertise the Office of Homeland Security should be staffed by representatives from across state departments and agencies. The following departments should be assigned to the Office of Homeland Security:

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------|
| - DMVA/DES (1) | - DPS (1) |
| - DEC (1) | - DOT/PF (1) |
| - DNR (1) | - DOA/ITG (1) |
| - DHSS (1) | - Admin. Staff (1) |

Leadership Options:

It is recommended the Office of Homeland Security be led by a Deputy Commissioner due to the level of interest identified at both the national and state level.

The Office could be led by either an Assistant Chief of Staff or Director. Both options were considered but eliminated due to existing state command relationships and authorities and the Director level may not present the appropriate level of management when dealing with agencies outside the state departments and agencies.

Office Location:

It is recommended the Office of Homeland Security be located within the Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs at the National Guard Armory on Fort Richardson. This location provides the benefit of cost saving by using the existing infrastructure in the Division of Emergency Services and Division of Administrative Support to support the Office of Homeland Security.

POSSIBLE KEY ASSETS IN ALASKA

South Central

Power Plants:

- Beluga Power Plant
- Beluga Undersea Cables
- Anchorage Extra High Voltage Substation
- Other Critical Power Plants

Refineries/Fuel Related:

- Nikiski-Tesoro
- Valdez-Petrolstar
- ANC International Airport Fuel Storage
- Fuel Manifolding Port of ANC

Oil Industry:

- Valdez Terminal/Port

Communication:

- ALASCOM Gov't. Hill
- ANC FAA Regional ARTCC
- Eagle River Earth Station
- GCI Switch Center

Transportation:

- Airports (ANC, etc.)
- Whittier Port/Dock
- Ferry Terminals (SWD, etc.)

Military:

- Fort Richardson
- Elmendorf AFB
- Kulis ANGB
- Coast Guard Base (KOD)

Other:

- Federal Building (ANC)
- FBI Building (ANC)
- BP/Phillips Buildings (ANC)
- City Halls (ANC/Other)
- State Emergency Coordination Center
- ANC Hillside (Fire)
- Kodiak Launch Facility

Northwest

Power Plants

- Early Warning Sites
- Airports (NOME, KOTZ, etc.)

Southwest (YK Delta)

Power Plants

- Early Warning Sites
- Airports (Bethel, etc.)

Interior

Power Plants:

- Fairbanks Power Plant
- North Pole Power Plant
- Healy Power Plant
- Other Power Plants

Refineries:

- North Pole-MAPCO

Oil Industry:

- Pump Stations 1-12 (-)
- Yukon River Bridge

Transportation:

- Airports (FAI, etc.)
- Hurricane Gulch RR Bridge

Military:

- Fort Wainwright
- Elson AFB
- Fort Greely
- Galena AFS

Other:

- UAF Poker Flats/Computer

North Slope

Power Plants

- Early Warning Sites
- Airports (Barrow, etc.)

Southeast

Power Plants

- Ferry Terminals
- Capitol Building (JNU)
- Airports (JNU, etc.)

Aleutians

Power Plants

- Early Warning Sites
- Airports (Cold Bay, etc.)
- Eareckson AFS

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Many of the recommendations made by the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet require financial investments over the next 18 months – the remainder of FY2002 and FY2003. Some expenses had to be incurred immediately, such as increased security to allow reopening of airports and provide additional protection for the pipeline. Some activities can be handled by shifting work priorities. But most recommendations either require capital investment or are well beyond existing financial and state resources.

Potential Federal Support

The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. Most states agree that the task is well beyond their financial resources. The governor is communicating Alaska's needs directly to the state's congressional delegation, the White House and appropriate federal agencies such as FEMA. The Administration is also participating in the National Governor's Association work to document and lobby for federal financial support for state needs.

While reimbursement of costs such as the first several months of increased airport security have been promised by federal agencies, there are conflicting indications about the availability of federal funds to replace or supplement state costs for the longer term and in areas other than airport security. Financial support could come in supplemental federal agency budgets, existing agency grant programs, a national economic stimulus package, or next year's federal budget. Nevertheless, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. Certain activities are more appropriately paid for by states (e.g. staff at the State Emergency Coordination Center), local governments (e.g. community preparedness planning) or the private sector (e.g. commercial facility security).

Cost estimates and state-federal funding allocations will be updated as federal agencies modify their mandates and Congress takes action on appropriations bills.

Timing for Action

Because of the urgency of implementing the recommendations for increased state preparedness and response, the Administration will present a separate appropriations bill to the Legislature in November so public hearings and discussion of the recommendations could begin even before the Legislature reconvenes on January 14th. Action on the bill will be requested in the first two weeks of the session.

The attached spreadsheet (and the Homeland appropriations bill to be submitted) cover both the rest of FY2002 and all of FY2003 to allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of the recommendations and because many of them are for on-going action. For instance, it would not make sense to begin certain activities in FY2002 without knowing they are also funded for FY2003 – e.g. hiring two troopers for Valdez because of the strategic importance of the pipeline and marine terminal.

Many of the transportation requirements are dictated by federal mandates, particularly from the Federal Aviation Agency. Unacceptable federal operating restrictions (such as closure of certain airports) or financial penalties may result if these requirements are not met in a timely manner. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the state will seek waivers wherever appropriate. (Possible waiver situations are noted separately at the end of the spreadsheet.) If waivers cannot be obtained, these federal mandates will have to be addressed expeditiously during the session.

Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet **Cost Estimates for Highest Priority Recommendations**

(all dollars shown in thousands)

Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
Admin	Accelerate funding of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Pilot so it will be ready for testing in July, 2002	2,700.0		2,700.0	already have state match	2,700.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match
Admin	Acquire the services of a Disaster Recovery (DR) expert and to help conduct a DR planning process		500.0	500.0	500.0			
Admin	Analyst/Programmer for changes to drivers license system (ALVIN)		113.0	113.0	113.0			
Admin	Conduct an enterprise-wide information technology (IT) security planning process	500.0		500.0	500.0			
Admin	Add security equipment identified in the IT security plan	500.0		500.0	500.0			Very rough estimate
Admin	Establish redundancy between state enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau	400.0		400.0	400.0			
Admin	Hire a state information technology security manager		60.0	120.0	180.0			
Admin	Identify telecommunications sites that require added security	100.0		100.0	100.0			Capital costs will depend on results of site survey
Admin	Correct any deficiencies in security at high priority communication sites	3,000.0		3,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	Estimate assumes 50 sites @ 60.0 each; potential 1/3 each GF, Fed, & private
Admin & Health & Social	Develop and disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities			depts will do within budgets				
Admin	Implement Phases 1 and 2 of the state's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) to provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. Coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the state's major population centers.	17,400.0		17,400.0	1,740.0	15,660.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match
Admin	Implement security measures to protect criminal history (APSIH) data and conform to NCIC security policies	1,300.0		1,300.0	1,300.0			Operational costs begin in FY2004
Admin	Meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their disaster recovery plans are adequate for state needs	to be determined		0.0				Unknown whether state will need additional protections
Admin	Review all state public/private information policies in each department to see if changes are needed for security purposes			do within existing budgets				May require legislation

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes		
4	Health & Social	Buy test kits and lab medium to handle		100.0	200.0	300.0	300.0				
5		surge testing requirements at the Public									
36		Health Lab									
37	Health & Social	Central Vaccine Depot	126.5		126.5		126.5				
38	Health & Social	Complete the Health Alert Network/Public	213.0		213.0		213.0				
38		Health Alert Systems									
39	Health & Social	Create a Medical Crisis Action Team		10.0	20.0	30.0	30.0				
		(MCAT) with four physicians on standby to									
		provide medical response									
		recommendations									
39	Health & Social	Develop a secure Internet communication			dept will do w/in						
		system for physicians, nurse practitioners			budget						
		and physician assistants throughout the									
40		state									
40	Health & Social	Develop the state plan for using the	75.0		75.0	75.0					
		National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and do									
		a feasibility study for a pharmaceutical									
41		cache in Alaska									
41	Health & Social	Do a feasibility study for a Biosafety Level	100.0		100.0		100.0			Study will include estimate of	
		III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public								cost of construction	
		Health Lab to provide in-state redundant									
		capability									
42	Health & Social	Engage a contractor to develop	60.0		60.0	60.0					
43		bioterrorism drills and exercises									
44	Health & Social	Epidemiologist and nurse epidemiologist,		258.0	258.0	258.0					
		and training travel									
44	Health & Social	Establish a medical plan for transportation	20.0		20.0	20.0					
		of mass casualty victims (including many									
		trauma and burn victims) and backhauling									
		medical personnel, supplies and blood									
45											
45	Health & Social	Field EMS Operations Upgrade: Training		330.0	330.0	330.0					
46		for regional EMS centers									
46	Health & Social	Hire a Health Alert Network		37.0	74.0	111.0	111.0				
47		telecommunications planner									
47	Health & Social	Hire a pharmacist to manage the state		30.8	74.0	104.8	104.8				
48		pharmaceutical cache									
48	Health & Social	Hire an analyst/programmer and data		52.5	105.0	157.5	157.5				
		entry clerk to support the Health Alert									
49		Network									
49	Health & Social	On-going bioterrorism response capacity		608.0	608.0	608.0					
		including training, travel to training, lab									
		supplies, and salary/overtime									
50		costs/vacancy reduction									
50	Health & Social	Produce public service announcements	do within		0.0	0.0					
		that tell the public how to react to specific	existing								
51		WMD events	budget								

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Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03		Total Cost		General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
Military & Vets	Establish a mobile State Emergency Coordination Center that can be moved out of harms way and used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system	1,200.0			1,200.0			1,200.0		
Military & Vets	Establish notification procedures and evacuation plans so each state office is ready for immediate action in hazardous situations				depts to do w/in budgets		0.0			
Military & Vets	Establish WMD plans and procedures annexes for jurisdictions without them	250.0			500.0		250.0	125.0	125.0	Assumes 20 communities need plans
Military & Vets	National Guard coordination in rural areas		200.0		200.0		200.0			
Military & Vets	Provide Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST(WMD)	150.0			150.0		150.0			
Military & Vets	Provide training in managing WMD incidents to local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders	80.0			80.0		80.0			
Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for a Level A HAZMAT team in Juneau to serve Southeast (Phase 1 of 3)	425.0			425.0		425.0			
Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for Level A HAZMAT team in Valdez (Phase 2 of 3)	425.0			425.0			425.0		
Military & Vets	Provide WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks HazMat team	40.0			40.0			40.0		
Military & Vets	Provide WMD awareness training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials	100.0			100.0		100.0			
Military & Vets	Provide WMD response training for 1,200 law enforcement personnel statewide	515.0			515.0			515.0		
Military & Vets	Reconfigure the State Emergency Coordination Center for increased operational efficiency	190.0			190.0		190.0			
Military & Vets	Response training for 60-100 initial survey assessing personnel and 25 response staff in DEC and DHSS	150.0			150.0		150.0			
Military & Vets	Secure trauma equipment and medical formulary for the 103d Civilian Support Team for Weapons of Mass Destruction (CST-WMD) -- federally funded, awaiting delivery.				already federally funded			already funded		
Military & Vets	State Emergency Coordination Center Computer Replacement	25.0			25.0		25.0			

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	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03		Total Cost		General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
5	Public Safety	Purchase computer hardware and software for an expanded intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information		200.0 60.0		260.0		260.0			FY2002 purchase of equipment; FY2003 annual line costs
99	Transportation	Add a Low Earth Orbital communication system	See Note	101.4 174.0		275.4		275.4			Annual operating costs, capital costs incurred by provider
100	Transportation	Add municipal law enforcement officers for rural airports to meet FAA's mandatory 15 minute response time		1,292.0 1,550.0		2,842.0		2,842.0			
101	Transportation	Conduct engineering blast assessment at Anc and Fbx airports and construct deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback	6,800.0			6,800.0			3,400.0	3,400.0	Internal'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
102	Transportation	Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges; purchase and stockpile moveable, temporary bridge spans in Fairbanks	3,500.0			3,500.0			3,500.0		FHWA
103	Transportation	Establish a Transportation Security Office within DOT/PF		274.9 400.0		674.9		674.9			
104	Transportation	Establish a transportation security training program		150.0 150.0		300.0			300.0		FHWA
105	Transportation	Evaluate transportation operators' inventory and increase security measures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous materials	350.0			350.0		350.0		private costs unknown	consider containers also
106	Transportation	Expand Fox weigh station hours to 24/7		242.5 416.0		658.5		658.5			Being done on interim, emergency basis May have training costs
107	Transportation	Have DOT/PF maintenance personnel check key bridges on a daily basis and block access to roads under bridges				dept to do w/in budget					
108	Transportation	Help communities complete port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships				0.0					Would be funded by local port or possibly with federal funds May require legislation
109	Transportation	Improve personnel security (background checks) for commercial driver's license operators and selected DOT/PF positions		35.0 35.0		70.0		70.0			
110	Transportation	Establish temporary gates and check points at Anchorage and Fairbanks airports		690.0 690.0		1,380.0				1,380.0	Internal'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
111	Transportation	Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles at Anc and Fbx airports		13.0 15.0		28.0				28.0	Internal'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
112	Transportation	Increase presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at Anc and Fbx airports		2,158.2 2,590.0		4,748.2			2,374.1	2,374.1	Internal'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
113											

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A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On- Going FY02 FY03		Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes	
Transportation	Install rural airport traffic barriers and blast deflection devices if no federal waiver received	15,000.0			15,000.0	1,500.0	13,500.0		Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate	
Transportation	Establish rural airport automated lock and key control systems if no federal waiver received	300.0			300.0	30.0	270.0			
TOTAL POTENTIAL FAA WAIVERS		29,350.0	2,417.0	7,250.0	39,017.0	13,282.0	25,735.0	0.0		
FOR INFORMATION ONLY - FY2004 PHASES OF MULTI YEAR EFFORTS										
Admin	Implement Phases 3 and 4 of the state portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS): full infrastructure and backbone for Southeast Alaska and rural communities.	20,900.0			20,900.0	2,090.0	18,810.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match	
Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for two regional Level A HAZMAT teams to be located in Kodiak and Kenai (Phase 3 of 3)	850.0			850.0	850.0			Operational costs begin in FY2004 or 2005	
Military & Vets	Conduct robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors				125.0		125.0			
Public Safety	Add 34 State Troopers and 19 civilians to handle increased security requirements (Phase 3 of 3)				6,940.0	6,940.0				

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1			Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet								
2			Cost Estimates for Highest Priority Recommendations								
3											(all dollars shown in thousands)
4			One-Time	On-Going	On-Going	Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
6	Admin & Health & Social	Develop and disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities				depts will do within budgets					
7	Admin	Accelerate funding of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Pilot so it will be ready for testing in July, 2002	2,700.0			2,700.0		already have state match	2,700.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match
8	Admin	Acquire the services of a Disaster Recovery (DR) expert and to help conduct a DR planning process			500.0	500.0		500.0			
9	Admin	Analyst/Programmer for changes to drivers license system (ALVIN)			113.0	113.0		113.0			
10	Admin	Conduct an enterprise-wide information technology (IT) security planning process	500.0			500.0		500.0			
11	Admin	Add security equipment identified in the IT security plan	500.0			500.0		500.0			Very rough estimate
12	Admin	Establish redundance between state enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau	400.0			400.0		400.0			
13	Admin	Hire a state information technology security manager		60.0	120.0	180.0		180.0			
14	Admin	Identify telecommunications sites that require added security	100.0			100.0		100.0			Capital costs will depend on results of site survey
15	Admin	Correct any deficiencies in security at high priority communication sites	2,000.0			2,000.0		1,000.0	1,000.0	Private Costs est. 1,000.0	Estimate assumes 50 sites @ 60.0 each; potential 1/3 each GF, Fed, & private
16	Admin	Implement Phases 1 and 2 of the state's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) to provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. Coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the state's major population centers.	17,400.0			17,400.0		1,740.0	15,660.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match Operational costs begin in FY2004
17	Admin	Implement security measures to protect criminal history (APSIN) data and conform to NCIC security policies	1,300.0			1,300.0		1,300.0			
18	Admin	Meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their disaster recovery plans are adequate for state needs	to be determined			0.0					Unknown whether state will need additional protections
19	Admin	Review all state public/private information policies in each department to see if changes are needed for security purposes				do within existing budgets					May require legislation
20	Admin	Increased costs for insurance such as Casualty, Aviation, Marine, Property, etc.			492.9	492.9		492.9			Various departments affected
21	Admin	Assess on-going need for Risk of War insurance, impact on bond ratings, etc. and purchase policies if needed			cost to be determined	0.0		cost to be determined		cost to be determined	Various departments affected, some costs would be borne by Intntl Airports
22	Admin Total		24,900.0	60.0	1,225.9	26,185.9		6,825.9	19,360.0	0.0	
23											

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03	Total Cost			General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
5	Environ Cons	Construct the new DEC Environmental Health Laboratory for food safety, seafood, and water testing	Bond Bill for 13M	no debt in FY02	no debt in FY03	0.0		none in FY02 or 03			Requires legislation to authorize Certificates of Participation
24	Environ Cons	Increase DEC emergency alert status to 24 hours per day with six additional response corps staff	100.0	250.0	600.0	950.0		950.0			
25	Environ Cons	Locate personnel decontamination equipment in key locations.	300.0			300.0		90.0	210.0		Could be funded by local or federal government
26	Environ Cons	Pre-position decontamination foam and trailers in six cities to serve regions throughout the state and obtain six fly-a-way decontamination sets	528.0			528.0		264.0	264.0		
27	Environ Cons	Provide equipment and training for improved ability to sample and test drinking water and monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation)	180.0			180.0			180.0		
28											
29	Environ Cons Total		1,108.0	250.0	600.0	1,958.0		1,304.0	654.0	0.0	
30											
31	Health & Social	Add a computer network specialist/program analyst to support Medical Examiner and Anchorage Public Health Lab		25.0	60.0	85.0		85.0			
32	Health & Social	Add Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colonies for diagnosing botulism	110.0			110.0			110.0		
33	Health & Social	Add two microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab to handle additional testing requirements		56.3	135.0	191.3		191.3			
34	Health & Social	Add two microcomputer techs to support state Public Health Centers		44.2	106.0	150.2		150.2			
35	Health & Social	Bioterrorism coordinator and support staff and training travel			134.0	134.0		134.0			
36	Health & Social	Buy regional hospital decontamination systems for Juneau and Fairbanks and provide necessary training	60.0			60.0		60.0			
37	Health & Social	Buy test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements at the Public Health Lab		100.0	200.0	300.0		300.0			
38	Health & Social	Central Vaccine Depot	126.5			126.5			126.5		
39	Health & Social	Complete the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems	213.0			213.0			213.0		
40	Health & Social	Create a Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) with four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations		10.0	20.0	30.0		30.0			
41	Health & Social	Develop a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the state				dept will do w/in budget					
42	Health & Social	Develop the state plan for using the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and do a feasibility study for a pharmaceutical cache in Alaska	75.0			75.0		75.0			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02 FY03		Total Cost		General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
43	Health & Social	Do a feasibility study for a Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab to provide in-state redundant capability	100.0			100.0			100.0		Study will include estimate of cost of construction
44	Health & Social	Engage a contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises	60.0			60.0		60.0			
45	Health & Social	Epidemiologist and nurse epidemiologist, and training travel			258.0	258.0		258.0			
46	Health & Social	Establish a medical plan for transportation of mass casualty victims (including many trauma and burn victims) and backhauling medical personnel, supplies and blood	20.0			20.0		20.0			
47	Health & Social	Field EMS Operations Upgrade: Training for regional EMS centers			330.0	330.0		330.0			
48	Health & Social	Hire a Health Alert Network telecommunications planner		37.0	74.0	111.0		111.0			
49	Health & Social	Hire a pharmacist to manage the state pharmaceutical cache		30.8	74.0	104.8		104.8			
50	Health & Social	Hire an analyst/programmer and data entry clerk to support the Health Alert Network		52.5	105.0	157.5		157.5			
51	Health & Social	On-going bioterrorism response capacity including training, travel to training, lab supplies, and salary/overtime costs/vacancy reduction			608.0	608.0		608.0			
52	Health & Social	Produce public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			
53	Health & Social	Provide Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide	20.0			20.0		20.0			at \$70.00 per kit
54	Health & Social	Public Health and Epidemiology increases needed to address bioterrorism cases			690.0	690.0		690.0			
55	Health & Social	Public Health nursing positions			450.0	450.0		450.0			
56	Health & Social	Train public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders in the First Class email system		dept to do w/in budget		0.0		0.0			
57	Health & Social Total		784.5	355.8	3,244.0	4,384.3		3,834.8	549.5	0.0	
59	Military & Vets	24-hour State Emergency Coordination Center additional support			100.0	100.0		100.0			
60	Military & Vets	Acquire the Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST(WMD) -- federally funded; awaiting delivery				already federally funded			already funded		
61	Military & Vets	Add three emergency management specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises	12.0	98.8	213.0	323.8		323.8			
62	Military & Vets	Build a state-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD) -- federally funded but not yet under construction				already federally funded			already funded		
63	Military & Vets	Develop a comprehensive emergency communications annex to the state Emergency Operations Procedures (EOP)	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			