


ALASKA LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMMITTEE/SUBJECT FILES 8672

2915 SCOMM 127: HOUSE SPEC.COMM.MILITARY & VET.AFFAIRS, 2001-02




Challenges



Coast Guard Ledges

- \$200 million annual infusion into Alaska economies in salaries and purchases





Coast Guard District 17

- 1,800 Active Duty & Civilian personnel
- Reserve and Auxiliary



Coast Guard District 17






Maritime Safety



Coast Guard Units in Alaska 42 Units





SEARCH AND RESCUE
 1992-1993

- Long range helicopters forward deployed during crab fisheries
 - Cold Bay
 - Saint Paul Island
- Bering Sea cutter deployed with helicopter



SEARCH AND RESCUE
 1992-1993



- SAR Cases: 920
- Lives Saved: 255
- Lives Assisted: 1255
- Southeast AK Medevacs: 53






- Most dangerous occupation in U.S.
- Coast Guard safety program:
 - Dockside Exams
 - At Sea Boardings
 - "Ready for Sea" Safety Program
- 1980's Alaska fishing deaths averaged 40 /yr
- 7 lives lost in 2000





Alaska Small Passenger Vessel Safety

- Over 2 million passengers annually embark vessels in Alaska
- Four "abandon ships" in '99
 - Alaska Small Passenger Vessel Task Force
 - 5 Star Safety Program for Charter Boats




Alaska Boating Safety

- AK boating safety law increased visibility & saved lives
- Prevention through outreach and education
- "Kids Don't Float"- Free loaner life jackets on docks
- Establishing CG Auxiliary detachment in Whittier






Patrol Boat in Alaska
1974-1975



Patrol Boat in Alaska
1974-1975

Major oil ports in Valdez and Cook Inlet





Working Both Ends of the Trans Alaska P'peline



Statewide "risk assessments" and
implementation of risk reduction
measures

- Inspect foreign vessels calling on
Alaska ports to ensure compliance with
U.S. and international safety and
environmental laws
- Periodic Oil Spill Response Exercises
- Respond to approx 600 oil spill and
chemical responses annually





Most closely regulated port in U.S.

- All tanker transits supervised by radar and Automated Identification System (AIS)
- Frequent exercises to ensure prepared to respond
- Recent scrutiny of Alyeska terminal safety



CG Federal On Scene Coordinator

- Buoytenders configured to recover oil
- Pre-positioned CG spill response equipment
- State "non tank vessel" legislation complements CG efforts





- Safety of Alaska cruise ships that carry over 600,000 passengers each year
- Addressing public concerns over environmental impacts
 - Garbage, oil, sewage and chemicals
- CG ensuring compliance with environmental laws through boardings, overflights and sampling



Increased overflights to detect discharges
Expanded environmental inspections
Sampling of overboard discharges
Implementing Murkowski's federal legislation





17th District Maritime Enforcement

- Largest allocation of CG resources
- High Seas Driftnet
- US/Russian Maritime Boundary Line
- Dixon Entrance
- Domestic Fisheries



17th District Domestic Fisheries Law Enforcement

- Over 200 time/area/species openers
- Largest Individual Fishing Quota fishery in world
- At sea boardings check fisheries and safety laws
- Surveillance of Stellar Sea Lion rookeries



DISTRIBUTION OF FISH

PINK, SOCKEYE
EAST KAMCHATKA
GULF OF ANADYR


CHUM SALMON
HOKKAIDO, JA



\$300 million of Alaska salmon grazing on high seas



- 9 May, Foreign Fishing Vessel ARCTIC WIND located by aircraft fishing with high seas drift net, boarded and seized
- Honduras flag, South Korean owner, Russian Master and Crew
- Approx 1 ton of salmon on board (Chum, Sockeye and Chinook)



Seattle, Washington





Maritime Safety


Deployment, maintenance and operation of over 1,300 Aids to Navigation

- Buoys
 - Fixed aids to navigation (shore lights)
 - LORAN Stations
 - Vessel Traffic Service (VTS Valdez)
- Mission to ensure safe, efficient and environmentally sound maritime operations



Maritime Safety

- Alaskan waterways are the major "highway"
- 1300+ buoys & lights maintained and LORAN





Anthony Petit






Pollock Fishery




Pollock Fishery Management

- Multi-national fleet targeting pollock
- Poor catch rates on Russian side
 - Push Boundary Line for higher catch rates
- Largest use of CG cutters and C-130 a/c patrol effort
- Focus of D17/RS Federal Border Service Engagement





15 Aug 2000 MBL Scatter Plot of Aircraft Sightings



Summary of LEEA Data

	1999	2000
Incursions Detected	90	26
Vessels Identified	24	22
Joint US/RS Boardings	0	4
Vessels Seized (including two by FBS)	0	6
Vessels Given Verbal Warnings	4	9





USCGC HAMILTON on Patrol



FF/V MING CHANG Seized



P/V ANTIAS on Patrol



FF/V SPITAK in Dutch Harbor



Date	Vessel Name	Distance Over MBL	Summary
31 Jul 00	SPITAK (RS)	800 YDS	Seized by US \$186K settlement
12 Aug 00	MING CHANG (PRC)	1200 YDS	Joint Boarding w/ FBS Fined \$15K by RS Seized by US \$1.5M bond. Case Pends
05 Sep 00	KUM KANG SAN (KS)	1000YDS	Seized by US \$300K settlement
21 Sep 00	GEMINI (RS)	1000 YDS	Joint Boarding w/ FBS Seized by RS Fined \$86K by RS
23 Sep 00	ORCHID (KS)	600 YDS	Joint Boarding w/ FBS Fined \$18K by RS Seized by US \$750K settlement
08 Oct 00	EKARMA-3 (RS)	400 YDS	Joint Boarding w/ FBS Seized by RS Case pends



Naval Activity



Naval Activity

Support of DOD Missions

- **Naval Activity Alaska**
- **Northern Edge 2001 in Ketchikan, March**






- Authority to establish and enforce maritime Safety and Security Zones to protect commercial and national interests



Readiness and Recapitalization

- Annual operating funds
- Spare parts
- C-130 availability 80%-60%
- Aging fleet
- Retaining trained personnel
- Replacement of aging infrastructure of ships and planes





Coast Guard in Alaska

Commitment to Excellence

- **Saving Lives**
- **Protecting the Environment**
- **Ensuring the Mobility of Waterways**

For All Alaskans



adn.com

Anchorage Daily News

*Coast Guard article provided to the House
Military & Veteran' Affairs Committee on
March 9, 2001 by Senator Alan Austerman.*

Ocean patrols sliced

COAST GUARD: Alaska rescue force maintained, but budget cuts limiting flights.

By Jonathan D. Salant
The Associated Press

(Published March 9, 2001)

Washington -- The Coast Guard, facing a \$91 million budget deficit, has reduced air and sea patrols by 10 percent.

Unless Congress comes up with the money to fill in the gap, the agency will have to scale back its patrols by around a third this summer, the Coast Guard's commandant, Adm. James Loy, told the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's subcommittee on the Coast Guard and maritime transportation.

"The angst that we live through is not the right way to run an airline," Loy said Thursday.

The Coast Guard is running in the red because of higher-than-expected energy costs and higher pay and benefits for the armed forces. Congress approved the higher armed forces benefits after passing the transportation spending bill, which includes the Coast Guard. As a result, the agency, unlike the armed services that fall under the Pentagon's budget, was not allocated the extra money to pay the higher salaries and other benefits.

In Alaska, with vastly more coastline to patrol than any other state, the Coast Guard will continue to maintain search and rescue operations, but law enforcement patrols are being cut back to save on fuel costs, said Lt. Cmdr. Ray Massey in Juneau. That means less patrol of commercial fishing grounds, of protected Steller sea lion rookeries, the maritime boundary separating Alaska and Russia, and the high seas where outlawed driftnetters sometimes operate, he said.

The Coast Guard's workhorse C-130 aircraft, operating out of Kodiak, will soon begin a 33 percent reduction in flight hours. "We normally fly six flights a week out of Kodiak," he said. Already, a voyage of the cutter Storis out of Kodiak was delayed by five days to save fuel money, meaning fewer fishing boats than normal were boarded, Massey said.

Loy's appearance in Congress came just a week after a six-day period that saw the Coast Guard seize 28,845 pounds of cocaine, about the same amount it captured in all of 1996. The Coast Guard found the drugs in the Atlantic, from Florida to the Caribbean, and the Pacific, from Mexico to Washington state.

Loy said the budget deficit has forced him to cut operations such as air and sea patrols -- saving on fuel costs -- after first reducing other parts of the Coast Guard budget, including travel and conferences.

Because of the 10 percent cut, Coast Guard patrols have already spent 3,000 fewer hours in the air and 4,800 fewer hours at sea than they would have had the agency not faced a deficit.

In addition, the Coast Guard has scaled back maintenance and is buying fewer spare parts. One of the Coast Guard's cutters was built in 1942 and was a command ship during World War II. Last November, nine men were dumped into the 36-degree Bering Sea after a 1,000-pound steel arm snapped off while lowering their small boat from the larger ship into the water. Maintenance had been reduced on the ship to save money.

Though the Coast Guard employs only as many people as it did in 1969 -- 35,000 -- Loy has had to reduce his recruitment efforts.

Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-N.J., the subcommittee chairman, endorsed Loy's call for more money, and said he hoped the funding would be included in a supplemental spending bill later this year. LoBiondo said he has talked to Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and top congressional Republicans to push for additional Coast Guard funding.

"I believe that a lack of adequate resources has seriously weakened the Coast Guard's ability to defend our borders against drug smugglers and our waterways from harm," LoBiondo said.

The Coast Guard spends millions of dollars annually to help people in distress and does not seek reimbursement from anyone, even those whose own risk-taking puts them in danger. Loy said he was opposed to imposing any fees on rescue operations, even though the money would help solve the Coast Guard's budget woes.

"Our raison d'etre is to find those people in distress," Loy said. "I would not go in that direction."

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy contributed to this story.

On the Net:

U.S. Coast Guard: www.uscg.mil

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee: www.house.gov/transportation

Close Window

SJR 10 -

Witness List

Tuesday, March 13, 2001

3:30 - 4:30

Senator Alan Austerman

465-2487

Cliff Stone (Sen. Austerman's staff)

465-2487

SCOMM

127:27

FURTHER REFERRALS:







SJR 27

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY IN JUNEAU

☐ attach amendments
☐ add new referral to _____ Committee
☐ Letter of Intent _____ Committee

[illegible][illegible]

<u>Signing with recommendations</u>		Printed Last Name	DP	DNP	NR	AM
		KOTT	✓			
		Green			✓	
		Hayes	✓			
		CISNA	✓			
Chair: 		Chevach	✓			
Chair:						



**Special Committee on Military & Veterans' Affairs
Representative Mike Chenault, Chair**

Committee Members

Representative Bev Masek
Representative Lisa Murkowski
Representative Joe Green
Representative Pete Kott
Representative Sharon Cissna
Representative Joe Hayes

Alaska State Capitol, Room 432
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Phone 907-465-3779
Fax 907-465-2833

AGENDA



May 2, 2001 3:00 – 3:30

Room 102

- I. Call to order
- II. Roll call
- III. Introductions
- IV. SJR 27 – Supporting a National Guard Armory in Juneau
- V. Next Meeting – No scheduled meetings until further notice
- VI. Adjournment



SENATOR KIM ELTON

MEMORANDUM

5/1/2001

To: Representative Mike Chenault, Chair
House Special Committee on Military & Veterans' Affairs

From: Senator Kim Elton

Re: Hearing Request for SJR 27

I respectfully request a hearing for SJR 27, supporting a new National Guard armory in Juneau. This resolution expresses the Alaska Legislature's support for the Guard and its mission in Southeast Alaska. The legislature has long proved itself a friend to men and women in uniform, and this resolution provides us with another opportunity to support their service.

I have met with a number of my constituents who are members of the Alaska National Guard on this issue. Support for a new armory is tremendous both in the guard and in the community at large, as evidenced by the City and Borough of Juneau's resolution, which I have attached.

It is important that the resolution pass the Legislature this session to have an impact on the federal project ranking process. I ask that you hear this resolution at your earliest convenience.

Attachments:
Sponsor Statement
Resolution

ALASKA SENATE

STATE CAPITOL • JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801-1182 • (907) 465-4947 • FAX (907) 465-2108

SENATOR_KIM_ELTON@LEGIS.STATE.AK.US



SENATOR KIM ELTON

SJR 27

Supporting a National Guard Armory in Juneau

Sponsor Statement

During the last several years, the Alaska Army National Guard and the University of Alaska Southeast have each sought ways to construct much-needed new facilities. The National Guard armory in Juneau no longer meets the Guard's needs, and must move from its present location because it sits on Mental Health Trust land. The university lacks a suitable student recreational facility. Today, the two institutions are working together to build a joint facility near Auke Bay. This proposed facility would provide a cost-efficient way to meet the needs of both organizations.

In 1998 the Mental Health Land Trust claimed the present site of the Juneau armory as part of a settlement agreement, and the state is currently renting the site at a cost of \$330,000 per year. The trust plans to redevelop the site for other uses, so a new Guard facility is essential.

Juneau is the battalion headquarters for the National Guard units in Southeast Alaska. As such, it serves as the nerve center for emergency readiness in the Alaska panhandle. Each region of Alaska poses its own unique characteristics and geographic challenges to emergency response and Guard readiness. The Juneau armory has for years provided the local knowledge and expertise so essential to accomplishing the Guard's mission.

In 1997 and 1998, the legislature recognized the value of a new armory with appropriations totaling \$1.7 million for planning, design, and site preparation. Design is complete, and more than half of that funding remains available for future work. Today, as the Guard pursues a federal appropriation for the new joint facility, SJR 27 will show the legislature's official support. Through this resolution, we will demonstrate that the State of Alaska recognizes and supports the Guard and the good work it does in our state.

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
2001 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Fiscal Note Number: 1
 Bill Version: SJR 27
 (S) Publish Date: 4/27/01

Revision Date/Time (Note if correction): _____ Dept. Affected: _____
 Title: National Guard Armory in Juneau BRU: _____
 Sponsor: Senator Elton Component: _____
 Requester: State Affairs Committee Component Number: _____

Expenditures/Revenues (Thousands of Dollars)

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below.

OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007
Personal Services						
Travel						
Contractual						
Supplies						
Equipment						
Land & Structures						
Grants & Claims						
Miscellaneous						
TOTAL OPERATING	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES						
-----------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--

CHANGE IN REVENUES ()						
-------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--

FUND SOURCE (Thousands of Dollars)

1002 Federal Receipts						
1003 GF Match						
1004 GF						
1005 GF/Program Receipts						
1037 GF/Mental Health						
Other (Specify Type)						
TOTAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Estimate of any current year (FY2001) cost: 0.0


POSITIONS

Full-time						
Part-time						
Temporary						

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Prepared by: SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE Phone 465-4522

Senator: /s/ SENATOR THERIAULT Date 4/25/01
Committee Chair



CITY/BOROUGH OF JUNEAU
ALASKA'S CAPITAL CITY

elle

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

Telephone: (907) 586-5240;
Facsimile: (907) 586-5385
Sally Smith@ci.juneau.ak.us

March 23, 2001

The Honorable Kim Elton
Alaska State Senator
Mail Stop 3100
Juneau, AK 99801-1182

Subject: Resolution of the City & Borough of Juneau, Serial No. 2086
A Resolution Encouraging State and Federal Funding for the Relocation of the
Alaska National Guard Armory

Kim
Dear Senator Elton:

Enclosed is a copy of a resolution adopted at the March 19, 2001 meeting of the City and Borough of Juneau, Alaska Assembly, in support of relocation of the Alaska National Guard Armory.

The National Guard plays a vital role in the safety and welfare of Southeast Alaska during times of natural disasters and emergencies. The steep mountains, deep waters, open oceans and inland channels of Southeast Alaska provide for a challenging environment for emergency management, and it is imperative that rescue workers understand the climate, culture and coordinates of the area.

The men and women serving in the National Guard in Juneau are our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends, who give many hours of their busy lives perfecting their emergency readiness skills. We depend on their expertise in times of crisis, tragedy and loss. Those who serve, deserve modern training facilities to provide for their safety and education.

The City and Borough of Juneau unanimously supports the relocation and construction of a new National Guard Readiness Center in Juneau. Please lend your support to this effort. I would be happy to discuss this project with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Sally
Sally Smith
Mayor

Presented by: The Manager
Introduced: 03/19/2001
Drafted by: S. Gilbertson /
J. Corso

RESOLUTION OF THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA

Serial No. 2086

A Resolution Encouraging State and Federal Funding for the Relocation of the Alaska National Guard Armory.

WHEREAS, the Alaska National Guard has occupied an armory in downtown Juneau since 1960, and

WHEREAS, the property on which the armory is located is now owned by the Alaska Mental Health Trust, and

WHEREAS, the City and Borough of Juneau and the Mental Health Trust have worked together to provide a new site for a National Guard Readiness Center, and

WHEREAS, relocation of the facility will allow a significant area of the downtown waterfront to be redeveloped for a mixture of private and public uses, and

WHEREAS, the City and Borough of Juneau has donated ten acres of land for construction of a new National Guard Readiness Center, and

WHEREAS, the National Guard is also considering constructing a joint facility with the University of Alaska Southeast, and

WHEREAS, it is vitally important for the safety and welfare of Juneau residents that a National Guard facility be constructed to provide necessary assistance in times of natural disasters or other emergencies, and

WHEREAS, the National Guard facility will also serve the needs of other Southeast Alaska communities which have limited emergency services;

//


//

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA:

Section 1. That the Alaska Congressional delegation and the Governor of Alaska are respectfully requested to provide the federal and state funding necessary to construct a new National Guard Readiness Center in Juneau.


Section 2. Effective Date. This resolution shall be effective immediately upon adoption.

Adopted this 19th day of March, 2001.



Sally Smith, Mayor

Attest:



Laurie J. Sica, Clerk

SJR 27 – “National Guard Armory in Juneau”

List of Witnesses

Jessee Kiel, staff Sen. Elton	465-4947
Mac Metcalfe, 624 6th St. Juneau, Ak 99801	586-1534
Carol Carroll, Director DMVA	465-4730

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE OF ALASKA

**TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
REPORT TO GOVERNOR TONY KNOWLES**

CONFIDENTIAL

November 5, 2001

**Maj. Gen. Phillip Oates
Adjutant General / Commissioner
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs**

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFFAIRS DIVISION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

TONY KNOWLES, GOVERNOR

PO BOX 5750
FT. RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505-5750
PHONE: (907) 428-7000
FAX: (907) 428-7009
www.ak-prepared.com

December 11, 2001

Representative Mike Chenault
Chair, House Military and Veterans Affairs Committee
Alaska House of Representatives
145 Main Street Loop, Suite 221
Kenai, Alaska 99611

Dear Representative Chenault:


Enclosed is the "Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet Report to Governor Tony Knowles" you requested. The enclosure constitutes the entire report, exactly as it went to the Governor, to include the following four subgroup reports: Transportation Security, Information Technology/Telecommunications Security, Energy/Security and Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management.

Because of your position in the House, we understand your need for more details and specifics versus the "public" version released by the Governors Office. However, we emphatically request that you retain this information for your personal use only. As you can see the report contains sensitive information, that if released to the public, could compromise security. In addition, in the wrong hands, this version of the report could jeopardize the Governor's Homeland Security appropriations bill.

Thank you for your interest in the bill and for your understanding and commitment to keeping the enclosed version of the report confidential.

I'll be out of the State until December 22nd. If you have any immediate questions about the report please call Wayne Rush, my Homeland Security Coordinator (428-7032). In any case, I'll be glad to speak with you about the report upon my return.

Sincerely,



PHILLIP E. OATES, Commissioner
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

Enclosure: "Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet Report to Governor Tony Knowles"

Cc: Carol Carroll

peo:war:lvg

**** CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION ****

STATE OF ALASKA

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR from the TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

November 5, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.....	1
II. Key Assets/Potential Terrorist Targets	2
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IV. The Ability to Respond.....	4
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IX. Funding Considerations	8
X. Recommendations for Most Urgent Requirements	9
XI. Recommendations for the Longer-Term	10

Additional Information

Transportation Security Subgroup Report.....	Tab A
Information Technology/ Telecommunications Security Subgroup Report	Tab B
Energy/Security Subgroup Report	Tab C
Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Subgroup Report.....	Tab D
Key Assets	Tab E
Talking Paper on Office of Homeland Security	Tab F
Funding Requirements.....	Tab G

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW & SUMMARY

An analysis of the terrorism threat to Alaska, the State's current capability to meet that threat, the risks that result from lack of full capability in certain areas, and the actions the State needs to take to eliminate or reduce those risks.

The recommendations contained in this report, and any action taken on them by the State of Alaska, reflect an evaluation and weighing of safety, risk, and economic, budgetary, social, and other public policy factors. Preparedness for and response to terrorist threats and incidents cannot be reduced to a single set of guidelines, but inherently involves the exercise of discretion in decision making. Nothing in this report shall establish an actionable duty of care, standard of care, or liability of the state or any state official for claims arising out of the planning, implementation, preparedness, response, and other activities discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. The tragic events of September 11th have vaulted Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness over most other issues requiring immediate attention at all levels of government. The purpose of this report is to provide the Governor of the State of Alaska with the Disaster Policy Cabinet (DPC) assessment and recommendations concerning Terrorism/WMD policy, priorities and resources.
- B. At the request of the Governor, the Disaster Policy Cabinet met on September 26, 2001 to begin an assessment of Terrorism/WMD in Alaska. The following approach was established by the DPC and subsequently approved.
 1. The DPC, because of its experience in addressing all-hazard disaster response and recovery, is the appropriate State agency to review and forward Terrorism/WMD policy, priority and resource requirement recommendations to the Governor.
 2. Because of the complexity of Terrorism/WMD, the DPC established five ad hoc sub-cabinet groups to develop comprehensive reports and recommendations. The focus of four of the sub-cabinet groups was primarily on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The focus of the fifth was the response and recovery from such an attack. The subgroups and chairpersons are as follows:
 - a. Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Sub-cabinet: Co-chairs - Commissioners Jay Livey (DHSS) and Phillip Oates (DMVA)
 - b. Energy Security Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs - Deputy Commissioners Del Smith (DPS) and Marty Rutherford (DNR)
 - c. Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Glenn Godfrey (DPS)
 - d. Information Technology and Telecommunications Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Jim Duncan (DOA)
 - e. Transportation Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Deputy Commissioner Boyd Brownfield (DOT & PF)
 3. The DPC established the following principles to guide sub-cabinet efforts to establish priorities and recommendations:

- a. Strengthen existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives
 - b. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies
 - c. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide importance
 - d. Maintain continuity of government operations at all levels
 - e. Reinforce first responder capabilities
 - f. Use deployable resources to augment areas with inadequate capabilities
 - g. Maintain appropriate balance between security and individual freedom
 - h. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times
 - i. Maximize use of existing or anticipated Federal programs and grants
 - j. Share costs at all levels, both public and private
- C. The DPC met weekly to assess progress of the sub-cabinet group efforts to develop a report to the Governor in each subject area. In each case, the sub-cabinet groups compared the threat and the State's current capabilities to minimize or eliminate the threat. The vulnerabilities that emerged from these assessments became the basis for sub-cabinet recommendations. Because of many overlapping issues, the Energy and Security Sub-cabinet groups combined their reports. The four resulting reports, each accompanied by an executive summary of recommendations, are attached as follows:
- Tab A Transportation Security
 - Tab B Information Technology/Telecommunications Security
 - Tab C Energy/Security
 - Tab D Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management
- D. Section II of this Executive Summary provides information concerning the key assets in the state. Section III describes the Threat. Section IV assesses Alaska's fundamental ability to respond to terrorism. Section V outlines a proposal that could allow states to increase use of the National Guard. Section VI addresses local considerations. Section VII establishes general State priorities. Section VIII proposes legislative actions. Section IX highlights funding issues. Section X summarizes the Sub-cabinet recommendations for urgent and immediate action and Section XI summarizes the longer-term recommendations.

II. KEY ASSETS/POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS

A preliminary list of Alaska's key assets, which might become targets for terrorists, is contained at Tab E of this report. These assets are grouped geographically. Power plants and airports are considered critical in every region of the State. Elements of TAPS are, of course, on the list of key assets, as are military installations and State/Federal buildings. The list is not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive. It is presented to give a sense of the types of assets that must be considered.

III. THE THREAT

- A. In a free and open society, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence of terrorist activities and threats becomes increasingly important. That quality of

intelligence allows all levels of business and government to increase efforts to protect citizens and infrastructure during periods of increasing threats, assuming adequate resources, policies, and procedures are available.

- B. Inter-agency sharing of intelligence information and complementary efforts to analyze that information are key to our ability to establish appropriate threat levels and increase protective measures at the right places and at the right times. We are fortunate in Alaska because interagency cooperation is strong at all levels—local, state, and federal. Our strong interagency relationships in Alaska, however, cannot overcome many Federal statutes and policies that limit the exchange of information and intelligence with the Departments of Defense and Justice. Although these firewalls exist to protect information and intelligence sources, they also inhibit the ability of states and territories to fight terrorism. A comprehensive review at the national level is necessary to establish the changes that would retain essential safeguards yet would improve quick and timely access to critical information and intelligence by states and territories.
- C. We must also remember that even good coordination of inter-agency efforts and effective sharing of information will not allow a perfect assessment of the terrorist threat to Alaska. However, all current assessments by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies agree that there are no known groups in Alaska that have the objective of conducting a large-scale attack or the capability to conduct such an attack. Yet, we cannot discount the possibility that individuals—for a variety of personal, political, or religious motives—could independently attack a facility or concentration of people without warning. This could be done through various delivery means such as the mail.
- D. The 11 September disaster and subsequent events reveal that international terrorists are well funded, well organized and fully capable of attacking the United States. Therefore, we will assume that Alaska is a potential target. Alaska does have relatively large population centers and targets of national significance, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) being the most prominent. Our geographic isolation from the "lower 48" does not guarantee that these potential targets will have immunity from attack. It is also important to recognize another reality. As our nation improves its homeland security and targets become more difficult to attack, terrorists could well look to targets that are less protected. Alaska can reduce the chances of becoming a target by devoting the resources and efforts to improve our capability to identify, protect, and respond to those attacks.
- E. In the event of a terrorist attack, the State may have to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each event presents a different challenge and requires different resources for prevention, response, and protection. Since no state will ever have sufficient resources to respond to every possible contingency in every location where an attack might occur, threat and risk assessments are necessary.
 - 1. Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the capability of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given relatively lower priority than preparation for other threats.
 - 2. As recent events indicate, chemical/biological attacks are possible. Terrorists have the means to make the substances and deliver them. The State does have some capabilities to respond to these attacks, however, improvements are necessary. These

types of threats, because of the possibility of an attack and the potential consequences, are given a high priority for resources.

3. Other events, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the World Trade Center, highlight terrorist capabilities to employ high explosive/incendiary devices. For the largest-scale attacks, there are no jurisdictions in our country capable of a complete response. Strong public safety and law enforcement efforts, however, have proven effective in preventing these attacks. Since these attacks are possible, this area is also given a high priority for resources.

IV. THE ABILITY TO RESPOND

- A. Alaska is fortunate in that its constitution provides a strong Office of the Governor that has unified and singular authority over the Executive Branch. This structure is proving to have many advantages over other models of State governments in dealing with terrorism. In addition, the policies and procedures established in Alaska over the last ten years—because of oil spills, natural disasters at the state and federal level, and Y2K efforts—have produced integrated and effective emergency management and inter-agency procedures.
- B. The Federal Response Plan provides an appropriate and effective foundation for response and recovery from emergencies and disasters in the nation. It also outlines the procedures to quickly provide resources from federal and state levels to augment and assist efforts by first responders at the local level. Alaska's frequent natural disasters have served to improve emergency management and response at and between local, state and federal levels
- C. The procedures listed below have also made Alaska more capable of responding to any emergency or disaster, including terrorism and the threat from an attack with weapons of mass destruction.
 1. Disaster Policy Cabinet that provides coordinated, timely, and appropriate policy and resource recommendations to the Governor
 2. State Emergency Operations Plan that delineates agency and departmental responsibilities
 3. State Emergency Coordination Center that operates 24/7/365
 4. State Emergency Response Commission that focuses on planning, preparing, and training for emergencies and disasters
 5. Local Emergency Planning Committees throughout the state that have an all-hazards charter
 6. Incident Command System that is modeled on the National Interagency Incident Management System
- D. Alaska is also one of 22 states where the Adjutant General and Commander of the National Guard is also a Cabinet member responsible for state emergency management. This arrangement helps encourage unification and synergy of efforts while facilitating inter- and intra-agency coordination and assistance at local, state, and federal levels. The recent addition of a 24/7/365 State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) capability in Alaska adds yet another advantage. We are now one of some 19 states that have a

more rapid means to react, respond, and provide resources to a WMD or other emergency event where the time, efficiency, and effectiveness of that response are critical for success.

- E. Since 1996, the State has had a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) working group developing a Level A capability for chemical response. The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) provides the chair for this group that meets periodically to inventory and update a list of HAZMAT capabilities in Alaska and develop statewide standard operating procedures.
 - 1. With the consensus of the work group, DEC has built upon the core HAZMAT capability for the two largest fire departments— Anchorage and Fairbanks. Both now have 24-hour Level A capability, with 40 responders in Anchorage and 24-30 in Fairbanks. Agreements with Anchorage and Fairbanks allow deployment of these teams anywhere in the state at the direction of the State On Scene Coordinator. Under these agreements, the State reimburses the cost of response and relieves the communities of liability, indemnification, and worker's compensation responsibilities.
 - 2. A chart of all available HAZMAT resources from industry, federal agencies, and fire departments is maintained and available from DEC or the SECC. There are also 33 local response agreements with local communities to increase HAZMAT training, funding, and response throughout Alaska. Training is routinely available by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DEC, and the National Guard. To date, there are 1,895 trained personnel in Alaskan communities (a total that includes 786 trained National Guard members).
 - 3. There are three immediate needs. The first is to have the core HAZMAT teams equipped and trained to deal with biological threats. The second is to establish additional core regional HAZMAT capabilities in other areas of the state, particularly the Southeast. The third is to ensure that the National Guard 103rd Civil Support Team is fully equipped and certified to respond to any nuclear, biological, or chemical incident.
- F. The greatest national shortages in capabilities and resources to respond and react to WMD events are in the areas of public health and medical response. Alaska is no exception to these shortages. To deal with a mass casualty event, our nation and State must make the increase in public health and medical capabilities, and the ability to deploy these resources, very high priorities.
- G. There are changes to programs and policies in Alaska that will allow us to be even more effective in responding to terrorism while providing better protection to our citizens and key assets. The following changes will significantly improve the capability of Alaska's Emergency Management System to address events of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
 - 1. Actions are necessary to improve rapid and timely notification to medical personnel at all levels both private and public about any sickness or disease that may be a result of a terrorist attack. Notifications relying on the right individuals reading a fax or electronic mail message will not be sufficient for WMD events.

2. Plans must be completed and approved to receive and distribute the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Alaskan Pharmaceutical Cache.
 3. A database should be established of retired and non-active licensed health care providers, veterinarians, and dentists to assist in mass casualty situations.
 4. Plans, protocols, and procedures should be refined and strengthened to ensure continuity of government operations and continuous communications at all times—before, during, and after an event.
 5. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Management System should address and outline specific policies, procedures, actions, responsibilities, and training for WMD events.
 6. Formal and permanent procedures should be developed to obtain, analyze, and disseminate threat information.
 7. Standing Incident Management Teams should be established for WMD events.
 8. Greater efforts should be made to identify, plan, and exercise urban search and rescue teams, state disaster medical teams, and mortuary teams.
- H. In every disaster response over the past few years, after action reviews reveal that the lack of interoperable communications is always at the top of significant issues. Emergency responders from different response units are unable to communicate by radio even when they are only a few yards apart. The Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) could virtually eliminate this long-standing problem. ALMRS will improve the State's ability to respond to all disasters not just WMD events.

V. THE NATIONAL GUARD

- A. The Alaska Army National Guard is uniquely structured to accomplish homeland security. The basic mission of the Scout Group is reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of critical sites while operating in hazardous environments. The Scout Group has aviation capabilities—both rotary and fixed wing—to perform other tasks that are important in a homeland security role. These tasks include combat search and rescue, troop and equipment movement, and medical evacuation. The recent addition of a 22-member deployable team to the Alaska Army National Guard—the 103rd Civil Support Team—also provides a significant ability to accomplish rapid assessment, testing, identification, and detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents and limited decontamination operations and communication support while giving expert on-scene advice to first responders.
- B. Federal statutory and policy changes are now possible that could permit greater use of the National Guard on a daily basis in a homeland security role. This is because of the recent and more liberal legal interpretation of "other duties" in 32 USC 112 that allowed federally funded National Guard forces to perform airport security roles, while remaining under a Governor's control. The Alaska National Guard is already one of several states that have another program that fits this new model. This program provides federally funded National Guard personnel and equipment for inter-agency support of drug demand reduction and counter drug activities under the direction of the Governor.
- C. Another change that is seen as desirable would be to give Governors, through their Adjutant Generals, coordination authority over all military forces in the state that are

providing military support to civil authorities. This would provide Governors, who already have broad powers in emergency situations, the ability to coordinate all the actions of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces that are providing support to their states.

VI. LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This report focuses on statewide needs rather than on individual analyses of each community's needs. However, the recommendations in this report assist and broadly supplement local capabilities, either directly or on a regional basis. For example, adding State Troopers, providing first responder training and completing the Health Alert Network are actions in direct support of communities. Expanding the State's public and environmental health capabilities, creating additional Level A HAZMAT Teams, improving security at airports and planning for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile improve the State's capabilities to support communities on a regional basis. When it is recommended that a resource be placed in a specific jurisdiction (e.g., an additional HAZMAT Team), it is to serve as a regional resource, not just a local asset. This regional approach is consistent with the DPC's guiding principles. For high cost, high maintenance and training intensive items, this approach provides efficiency and effectiveness.

VII. GENERAL STATE OF ALASKA PRIORITIES

The review of capabilities and vulnerabilities in Alaska revealed the following five general requirements, listed in highest priority order, that should guide counter terrorism resources during the coming years.

- A. Expand public safety capabilities with an emphasis on emergency response and security of communications, transportation, Trans-Alaska Pipeline and public utilities infrastructure
- B. Expand public health capabilities to detect and respond to biological or chemical terrorism
- C. Establish additional and deployable medical response capabilities
- D. Establish training for first responders and a deployable capability to operate in a contaminated environment
- E. Secure Alaska's communications infrastructure and provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System for local, state, federal and private entities.

The State should immediately establish an Office of Homeland Security to implement these priorities and the other specific recommendations in this report.

VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

Although Alaska has developed a strong system of emergency management, some legislative or regulatory changes could improve these capabilities. The following areas should have further legal analysis and policy review.

- A. Revise Alaska statutes to allow the State to become a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (a national disaster response mutual aid agreement among the states).

- B. Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.
- C. Revise laws (e.g. AS 18.50.230; 7AAC 05.400) to facilitate the issuance of death certificates in mass casualty situations where recovery of bodies may not be possible or recovery will take an extended period of time.
- D. Change AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the definition of "disaster," and by adding the ability to allocate or redistribute pharmaceutical supplies to the Governor's powers under conditions of a disaster emergency.
- E. Change AS 26.20 (Civil Defense Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the policy and purpose paragraph to insure this contingency is covered by the act.
- F. Modify AAC Title 17 as necessary to accommodate accomplishment of short-term security improvements to the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).
- G. Revise AS 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for security infractions involving airport security.
- H. Revise AS 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect sensitive security documents.
- I. Revise AS 44.62.125 to exempt sensitive airport security programs from regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
- J. Establish legislation to ensure National Guard members who are also state employees do not lose state employment benefits or increases in seniority or retirement when they are mobilized for state or federal active duty.
- K. Review the definition of disaster contained in AS 26.20 to determine if the recent legislative changes to that statute adversely impact on the State's ability to respond to WMD events.

IX. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

- A. Many of the security tasks related to transportation are dictated by federal mandates such as from the Federal Aviation Agency. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the State will request waivers where appropriate. However, failure to adequately follow mandates that are not waived may result in unacceptable financial or operational sanctions by the federal government. Because of possible sanctions, it is important that security related funding issues be addressed expeditiously.
- B. Many of the recommendations in this report require financial investments over the next 18 months. Some of these activities can be handled internally by shifting work activities. But many are well beyond the scope of existing budgets. The Priority/Cost Breakdown spreadsheet in Tab G of this report shows both one-time and recurring costs of the DPC's priority recommendations.
- C. The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. The funding spreadsheet indicates some areas where federal funds might be available to either replace or supplement state support. The federal support might come in any one of several forms: supplemental federal agency budgets, an economic stimulus package, next year's federal budget, etc. However, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal

government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. There are also some costs which may be most appropriately handled by local governments (e.g. their own planning work) or the private sector (e.g. pipeline security).

X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOST URGENT REQUIREMENTS

- A. Begin monitoring access to the Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge by establishing a checkpoint south of the bridge. The bridge, in addition to being the critical feature on the Dalton Highway, also carries TAPS. Positive control of vehicles and personnel at a checkpoint could free up some of the security elements that currently patrol the northern section of the highway. These security elements would be available to provide a greater presence at the most critical and vulnerable areas of the pipeline where damage is much more difficult to repair.
- B. Develop procedures to expand the opportunities to use National Guard personnel under Title 32 for WMD emergencies to accomplish State and Federal requirements. This keeps command and control under the Governor but allows Federal funding for National Guard personnel and equipment.
- C. Review the statutory and regulatory changes in Section VIII for possible introduction to the Legislature or administrative action.
- D. Open the Fox Weigh Station on a 24-hour-per-day, seven days per week basis, to monitor trucks and cargo on the Dalton Highway.
- E. Establish pipeline defense drills and formal response and resource procedures for all emergencies.
- F. Increase ground and air patrols along the pipeline.
- G. Initiate an immediate study of Alaska Marine Highway System physical security requirements for ashore and afloat.
- H. Increase the presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at primary airports and implement a variety of other airport security measures.
- I. Develop a list of essential bridges and require maintenance personnel to check these bridges on a daily basis.
- J. Establish a Transportation Security Officer in DOT/PF to coordinate security of state facilities and disaster preparedness.
- K. Meet with key telecommunication providers to ensure disaster recovery planning is adequate to maintain continuity of operations and state government communications.
- L. Establish redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.
- M. Fund and implement the North Zone Pilot of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System.
- N. Establish an Enterprise Data/Network Security Manager Position.
- O. Identify telecommunications sites that need added security and take the necessary protective measures.
- P. Hire and train four additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams to improve response capabilities for various regions of the state.

- Q. Train and equip a Level A Hazardous Materials Team for Juneau to provide regional coverage for Southeast Alaska.
- R. Improve the State's preparedness for chemical/biological/radiological and high-explosive/incendiary events with State plans for WMD, (including plans for transportation of mass casualties, receipt and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and a plan for the detection of and response to biological terrorism); an improved intelligence system for the Alaska State Troopers; personnel and equipment decontamination sets; WMD training for first responders and emergency managers; protective equipment for first responders; additional Alaska State Troopers; completion of the Division of Public Health HealthAlert Network; equipment for the 103d Civil Support Team (WMD); improvements to the State Public Health Lab; increased public and environmental health surveillance and testing capabilities; and implementation of a statewide WMD exercise program.
- S. Establish an Office of Homeland Security to ensure intensive preparations for countering terrorism in Alaska. This office would mirror the effort at the national level for the Office of Homeland Security recently established by the President. A full description of Alaska's Office of Homeland Security, to include recommended duties and staffing requirements, is found at Tab F.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONGER-TERM

- A. Complete and fund Phases I and II of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (recommended by every Sub-cabinet group).
- B. Hire additional State Troopers over a two-year period.
- C. Develop contingency plans for the State's critical bridges and stockpile moveable temporary bridge spans.
- D. Continue to improve security of Ted Stevens Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports.
- E. Ensure the physical security of critical IT/Telecom sites.
- F. Continue to improve the State's Public Health and Environmental Health bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities.
- G. Train and equip three additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams for more comprehensive statewide rapid response.
- H. Continue to provide first responder protective equipment.
- I. Continue to provide WMD training and conduct WMD exercises.
- J. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center - a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW & SUMMARY ALASKA'S TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

An analysis of the terrorism threat to Alaska, the State's current capability to meet that threat, the risks that result from lack of full capability in certain areas, and the actions the State needs to take to eliminate or reduce those risks.

The thoughts and recommendations contained in this report, and any action taken on them by the State of Alaska, reflect an evaluation and weighing of safety, risk, and economic, budgetary, social, and other public policy factors. Preparedness for and response to terrorist threats and incidents cannot be reduced to a single set of guidelines, but inherently involves the exercise of discretion in decision-making. Nothing in this report shall establish an actionable duty of care, standard of care, or liability of the state or any state official for claims arising out of the planning, implementation, preparedness, response, and other activities discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. The tragic events of September 11th have vaulted Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness over most other issues requiring immediate attention at all levels of government. This executive overview provides a public summary of the comprehensive report prepared by the Disaster Policy Cabinet (DPC) for the Governor of the State of Alaska concerning Terrorism/WMD policy, priorities and resources.
- B. The Disaster Policy Cabinet, chaired by Major General Phillip E. Oates, met on September 26, 2001, to begin an assessment of Terrorism/WMD in Alaska. The following approach was established by consensus of the DPC members.
 1. The DPC, with its experience in addressing all-hazard disaster response and recovery, was the appropriate State agency to review and forward Terrorism/WMD policy, priority and resource requirement recommendations to the Governor.
 2. Because of the complexity of Terrorism/WMD, the DPC established five sub-cabinet groups to develop comprehensive reports and recommendations. The focus of four of the sub-cabinet groups was primarily on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The focus of the fifth was the response and recovery from such an attack. The following sub-cabinet groups and chairpersons were established to complete this task.
 - a. Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs - Commissioners Jay Livey (DHSS) and Phillip Oates (DMVA)
 - b. Energy Security Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs - Deputy Commissioners Del Smith (DPS) and Marty Rutherford (DNR)
 - c. Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Glenn Godfrey (DPS)
 - d. Information Technology and Telecommunications Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Jim Duncan (DOA)
 - e. Transportation Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Deputy Commissioner Boyd Brownfield (DOT & PF)

3. The DPC established the following principles that guided sub-cabinet efforts to establish priorities and recommendations:
 - a. Strengthen existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives
 - b. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies
 - c. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide importance
 - d. Maintain continuity of government operations at all levels
 - e. Reinforce first responder capabilities
 - f. Use deployable resources to augment areas with inadequate capabilities
 - g. Maintain appropriate balance between security and individual freedom
 - h. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times
 - i. Maximize use of existing or anticipated Federal programs and grants
 - j. Share costs at all levels, both public and private
- C. Weekly DPC meetings were held to review the progress of sub-cabinet efforts. Each sub-cabinet compared the threat and the State's capabilities to minimize or eliminate the threat. The vulnerabilities that emerged from these assessments became the basis for sub-cabinet recommendations. Because of many overlapping issues, the Energy and Security Sub-cabinet groups combined their findings and produced a single report. Their combined report and the other three sub-cabinet reports (Domestic Preparedness and Consequence Management, Information Technology and Telecommunications, and Transportation) were included as attachments to the full report of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet. Additionally, the full report included other attachments that described a State Office of Homeland Security, listed key assets in the State, and outlined the costs and timelines for recommendations.
- D. Section II of this document provides information concerning the key assets in the state. Section III describes the Threat. Section IV assesses Alaska's fundamental ability to respond to terrorism. Section V outlines a proposal that could allow states to increase use of the National Guard. Section VI addresses local considerations. Section VII establishes general State priorities. Section VIII proposes legislative actions. Section IX highlights funding considerations. Sections X, XI, and XII contain immediate recommendations, longer-term recommendations and a conclusion.
- E. This executive overview and summary has been written to protect sensitive information while providing essential information to the public about the process, findings, recommendations and conclusions of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet.

II. KEY ASSETS/POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS

A list of Alaska's key assets that could be targets for terrorists was part of the full report. The assets were grouped geographically. Power plants and airports were considered critical in every region of the State. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) and the Port of Valdez were on the list of key assets, as were military installations and State/Federal buildings. The list was not intended to be fully comprehensive or exhaustive. It was presented to portray the types of assets that must be considered and protected in Alaska.

III. THE THREAT

- A. In a free and open society, accurate and timely intelligence of terrorist activities and threats becomes increasingly important. That quality of information will allow all levels of business and government to increase protection of citizens and key assets during periods of increasing threats, assuming adequate resources, policies, and procedures are available. Inter-agency sharing of intelligence information and complementary efforts to analyze information are key to the ability to establish appropriate threat levels and increase protective measures at the right places and at the right times.
- B. We are fortunate in Alaska—interagency cooperation is strong at and between all levels of government. Our strong interagency relationships, however, cannot overcome the many Federal statutes and policies that inhibit the exchange of information and intelligence with the Departments of Defense and Justice. Although firewalls exist to protect information and intelligence sources, they also inhibit the ability of states and territories to fight terrorism. A comprehensive national review should be undertaken to establish the changes to statutes and policies that are needed to allow states and territories to better protect their citizens. This will be a challenging task. We will need to retain the most essential safeguards while balancing the protection of our freedoms with the need for timely access to critical information and intelligence by states and territories.
- C. All current assessments by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies agree that there are no known groups in Alaska that have the objective of conducting a large-scale attack or the capability to conduct such an attack. Yet, we cannot discount the possibility that individuals—for a variety of personal, political, or religious motives—could independently attack a facility or concentration of people without warning. This could be done through various delivery means such as the mail. We must always keep in mind that even the best coordination of inter-agency efforts and sharing of information will not allow a perfect assessment of the terrorist threat to Alaska.
- D. The September 11th disaster and subsequent events reveal that international terrorists are well funded, well organized and fully capable of attacking the United States. Therefore, we will assume that Alaska is a potential target. Alaska does have relatively large population centers and targets of national significance. Our geographic isolation from the "lower 48" does not guarantee that these potential targets will have immunity from attack. It is also important to recognize another reality—as our nation improves its homeland security and targets become more difficult to attack—terrorists could well look to targets that are less protected. Alaska can reduce the chances of becoming a target by devoting resources and efforts that improve the ability to identify, protect, and respond to those attacks.
- E. In the event of a terrorist attack, the State may have to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each event presents a different challenge and requires different resources for prevention, response, and protection. Since no state will ever have sufficient resources to respond to every possible contingency in every location where an attack might occur, accurate threat and risk assessments are necessary.
 - 1. Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the current capabilities of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given

the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given a lower priority than preparation for other types of threats.

2. As recent events indicate, chemical or biological attacks are indeed possible. Terrorists have increasing opportunities to purchase or manufacture these weapons and the ability to use them. Alaska has some capacity to respond to these types of attacks because of increasing efforts over the past five years to develop greater hazardous material (HAZMAT) capabilities. Improvements, however, are necessary because of the enormous consequences of any attack with chemical or biological weapons. These threats, because of a greater probability of occurrence and greater potential consequences, are given a high priority for resources.
3. Other events, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the World Trade Center, highlight terrorist capabilities to employ high explosive or incendiary devices. Since these types of weapons are relatively easy to manufacture or obtain, additional resources are necessary to decrease the likelihood of these types of attacks from occurring. Strong public safety capabilities and a comprehensive law enforcement presence will help identify and prevent these attacks and will help maintain law and order if a high explosive attack does occur.

IV. THE ABILITY TO RESPOND

- A. Alaska's constitution provides a strong Office of the Governor with unified and singular authority over the Executive Branch. This structure is proving to have many advantages over other models of state governments in dealing with terrorism. In addition, the policies and procedures established in Alaska over the last ten years—because of natural disasters, oil spills, and Y2K efforts—have produced integrated and effective emergency management and inter-agency procedures at all levels.
- B. The Federal Response Plan provides an appropriate and effective foundation for response and recovery from emergencies and disasters in the nation. It also outlines the procedures that make resources available from federal and state agencies to augment and assist efforts by first responders. The State's significant supporting plans, programs, and procedures are listed below.
 1. Disaster Policy Cabinet that provides coordinated, timely, and appropriate policy and resource recommendations to the Governor
 2. State Emergency Operations Plan that delineates agency and departmental responsibilities
 3. State Emergency Coordination Center that operates 24/7/365
 4. State Emergency Response Commission that focuses on planning, preparing, and training for emergencies and disasters
 5. Local Emergency Planning Committees throughout the state that have an all-hazards charter
 6. Incident Command System that is modeled on the National Interagency Incident Management System
 7. Hazardous Material working group

- C. Alaska is one of 22 states where the Adjutant General and Commander of the National Guard is also a Cabinet member who is responsible for state emergency management. This arrangement encourages a single and strong focus for state emergency response while facilitating inter- and intra-agency coordination and cooperation at local, state, and federal levels. The recent addition of a 24/7/365 State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) capability in Alaska adds yet another advantage. We are now one of some 19 states that have a more rapid means to react, respond, and provide resources to a WMD incident or other emergency event where the time, efficiency, and effectiveness of that response are critical for success.
- D. Since 1996, the State has had a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) working group that has been developing a Level A capability for chemical response. The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) provides the chair for this group. Meetings are held periodically to inventory and update a list of HAZMAT capabilities in Alaska and develop statewide standard operating procedures.
 - 1. With the consensus of the work group, DEC has built upon the core HAZMAT capability for the two largest fire departments— Anchorage and Fairbanks. Both now have 24-hour Level A capability, with 40 responders in Anchorage and 24-30 in Fairbanks. Agreements between State and local governments permit deployment of these teams anywhere in Alaska at the direction of the State On Scene Coordinator. The State reimburses the costs of these responses and relieves the communities of liability, indemnification, and worker's compensation responsibilities.
 - 2. There are also local response agreements with local communities to increase HAZMAT training, funding, and response throughout Alaska. Training is routinely available by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DEC, and the National Guard. To date, there are 1,895 trained personnel in Alaskan communities (a total that includes 786 trained National Guard members).
 - 3. There are three immediate needs. The first is to have the core HAZMAT teams equipped and trained to deal with biological threats. The second is to establish additional core regional HAZMAT capabilities in other areas of the state, particularly the Southeast. The third is to ensure that the National Guard 103rd Civil Support Team is fully equipped and certified to respond to any nuclear, biological, or chemical incident.
- E. The greatest national shortages in capabilities and resources to respond and react to WMD events are in the areas of public health and medical response. Alaska is no exception to these shortages. To deal with a mass casualty event, our nation and State must make the increase in public health and medical capabilities, and the ability to deploy these resources, very high priorities.
- F. There are changes to programs and policies in Alaska that will allow us to be even more effective in responding to terrorism while providing better protection to our citizens and key assets. The following changes will significantly improve the capability of Alaska's Emergency Management System to address events of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
 - 1. Actions are necessary to improve rapid and timely notification to medical personnel at all levels, both private and public, about any sickness or disease that may be a

result of a terrorist attack. Notifications relying on individuals to read a FAX or electronic mail message will not be sufficient for some WMD events.

2. Plans must be completed and approved regarding the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Alaskan Pharmaceutical Cache.
 3. A database should be established of retired and non-active licensed health care providers, veterinarians, and dentists who could assist in mass casualty situations.
 4. Plans, protocols, and procedures should be refined and strengthened to ensure continuity of government operations and continuous communications at all times—before, during, and after an event.
 5. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Management System should address and outline specific policies, procedures, actions, responsibilities, and training for WMD events.
 6. Formal and permanent procedures should be developed to obtain, analyze, and disseminate threat information.
 7. Standing Incident Management Teams should be established for WMD events.
 8. Greater efforts should be made to identify, plan, and exercise urban search and rescue teams, state disaster medical teams, and mortuary teams.
- G. In every disaster response over the past few years, after action reviews reveal that the lack of interoperable communications is always at the top of significant issues. Emergency responders from different response units are frequently unable to communicate by radio even when they are only a few yards apart. The Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) would virtually eliminate this long-standing problem. Completion of ALMRS will significantly improve the State's ability to respond to all disasters, including WMD events.

V. THE NATIONAL GUARD

- A. The Alaska Army National Guard is uniquely structured to accomplish homeland security. The basic mission of the Scout Group is reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of critical sites while operating in hazardous environments. The Scout Group has aviation capabilities—both rotary and fixed wing—to perform many tasks that are important in a homeland security role. These tasks include combat search and rescue, troop and equipment movement, and medical evacuation. The recent addition of a 22-member deployable team to the Alaska Army National Guard—the 103rd Civil Support Team—also provides a significant ability to accomplish rapid assessment, testing, identification, and detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents and limited decontamination operations and communication support while giving expert on-scene advice to first responders.
- B. Federal statutory and policy changes are now possible that could permit greater use of the National Guard on a daily basis in a homeland security role. This is because of the recent and more liberal legal interpretation of "other duties" in 32 USC 112 that allowed federally funded National Guard forces to perform airport security roles, while remaining under a Governor's control. The Alaska National Guard is already one of several states that have another program that fits this new model. This program provides

federally funded National Guard personnel and equipment for inter-agency support of drug demand reduction and counter drug activities under the direction of the Governor.

- C. Another recommended change would be to give governors, through their Adjutant Generals, coordination authority over all military forces in the state— active, reserve, and National Guard—that are providing military support to civil authorities. This would significantly enhance a governor's ability to ensure appropriate protection to the citizens of the state. It is also a change that is complementary and supportive of the broad powers that governors already have in an emergency or disaster.

VI. LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This report focuses on statewide needs rather than the individual analyses of each community's needs. However, the recommendations in this report assist and broadly supplement local capabilities, either directly or on a regional basis. For example, adding State Troopers, providing first responder training and completing the Health Alert Network are actions in direct support of communities. Expanding the State's public and environmental health capabilities, creating additional Level A HAZMAT Teams, improving security at airports and planning for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile improve the State's capabilities to support communities on a regional basis. When it is recommended that a resource be placed in a specific jurisdiction (e.g., an additional HAZMAT Team), it is to serve as a regional resource, not just a local asset. This regional approach is consistent with the DPC's guiding principles. For high cost, high maintenance and training intensive items, this approach provides efficiency and effectiveness.

VII. GENERAL STATE OF ALASKA PRIORITIES

This review of capabilities and vulnerabilities in Alaska led to the following five general requirements, listed from highest priority, as a guide for the expenditure of resources for counter-terrorism.

- A. Expand public safety capabilities with an emphasis on community safety, emergency response and security of communications, transportation, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and public utilities infrastructure
- B. Expand public health capabilities to detect and respond to biological or chemical incidents or attacks
- C. Establish additional and deployable medical response capabilities
- D. Increase HAZMAT and WMD response training for first responders and develop a greater deployable capability for conducting operations in a contaminated environment anywhere in Alaska
- E. Secure Alaska's communications infrastructure and provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System for local, state, federal and private entities.

The State should immediately establish an Office of Homeland Security to implement these priorities and the other specific recommendations in this report.

VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

Alaska has developed a strong system of emergency management, but legislative or regulatory changes are possible that could assist effort to improve the State's procedures for dealing with terrorism. Although a comprehensive review is necessary, a preliminary assessment indicates that the following legal analyses and policy reviews should occur.

- A. Revise Alaska statutes to allow the State to become a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (a national disaster response mutual aid agreement among the states).
- B. Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.
- C. Revise laws (e.g. AS 18.50.230; 7AAC 05.400) to facilitate the issuance of death certificates in mass casualty situations where recovery of bodies may not be possible or recovery will take an extended period.
- D. Change AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the definition of "disaster," and by adding the ability to allocate or redistribute pharmaceutical supplies to the Governor's powers under conditions of a disaster emergency.
- E. Change AS 26.20 (Civil Defense Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the policy and purpose paragraph to insure this contingency is covered by the act.
- F. Modify AAC Title 17 as necessary to accommodate accomplishment of security improvements to the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).
- G. Revise AS 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for security infractions involving airport security.
- H. Revise AS 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect sensitive security documents.
- I. Revise AS 44.62.125 to exempt sensitive airport security programs from regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
- J. Establish legislation to ensure National Guard members who are also state employees do not lose state employment benefits or increases in seniority or retirement when they are mobilized for state or federal active duty.
- K. Review the definition of disaster contained in AS 26.20 to determine if the recent legislative changes to that statute adversely impact the State's ability to respond to a WMD event.

IX. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

- A. Many of the security tasks related to transportation are dictated by federal mandates such as those from the Federal Aviation Agency. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the State will request waivers where appropriate. However, failure to adequately follow mandates that are not waived may result in unacceptable financial or operational sanctions by the federal government. Because of possible sanctions, it is important that security related funding issues be addressed expeditiously.

- B. Many of the recommendations in this report require financial investments over the next 18 months. Some of these activities can be handled internally by shifting work activities. But many are well beyond the scope of existing budgets.
- C. The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. There are indications that some federal funds may become available to either replace or supplement state support. The federal support might come in any one of several forms: supplemental federal agency budgets, an economic stimulus package, next year's federal budget, etc. However, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. There are also some costs that are more appropriately handled by local governments (e.g. their own planning work) or the private sector (e.g. pipeline security).

X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOST URGENT REQUIREMENTS

- A. Begin monitoring access to the Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge by establishing a checkpoint south of the bridge. The bridge, in addition to being the critical feature on the Dalton Highway, also carries TAPS. Positive control of vehicles and personnel at a checkpoint could free up some of the security elements that currently patrol the northern section of the highway. These security elements would be available to provide a greater presence at the most critical and vulnerable areas of the pipeline where damage is much more difficult to repair.
- B. Develop procedures to expand the opportunities to use National Guard personnel under Title 32 for WMD emergencies to accomplish State and Federal requirements. This keeps command and control under the Governor but allows Federal funding for National Guard personnel and equipment.
- C. Review the statutory and regulatory changes in Section VIII for possible introduction to the Legislature or administrative action.
- D. Open the Fox Weigh Station on a 24-hour-per-day, seven days per week basis, to monitor trucks and cargo on the Dalton Highway.
- E. Establish pipeline defense drills and formal response and resource procedures for all emergencies.
- F. Increase ground and air patrols along the pipeline.
- G. Initiate an immediate study of Alaska Marine Highway System physical security requirements for ashore and afloat.
- H. Increase the presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at primary airports and implement a variety of other airport security measures.
- I. Develop a list of essential bridges and require maintenance personnel to check these bridges on a daily basis.
- J. Establish a Transportation Security Officer in DOT/PF to coordinate security of state facilities and disaster preparedness.
- K. Meet with key telecommunication providers to ensure disaster recovery planning is adequate to maintain continuity of operations and state government communications.

- L. Establish redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.
- M. Fund and implement the North Zone Pilot of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System.
- N. Establish an Enterprise Data/Network Security Manager Position.
- O. Identify telecommunications sites that need added security and take the necessary protective measures.
- P. Hire and train four additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams to improve response capabilities for various regions of the state.
- Q. Train and equip a Level A Hazardous Materials Team for Juneau to provide regional coverage for Southeast Alaska.
- R. Improve the State's preparedness for chemical/biological/radiological and high-explosive/incendiary events with State plans for WMD, (including plans for transportation of mass casualties, receipt and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and a plan for the detection of and response to biological terrorism); an improved intelligence system for the Alaska State Troopers; personnel and equipment decontamination sets; WMD training for first responders and emergency managers; protective equipment for first responders; additional Alaska State Troopers; completion of the Division of Public Health HealthAlert Network; equipment for the 103d Civil Support Team (WMD); improvements to the State Public Health Lab; increased public and environmental health surveillance and testing capabilities; and implementation of a statewide WMD exercise program.
- S. Establish an Office of Homeland Security to ensure intensive preparations for countering terrorism in Alaska. This office would mirror the effort at the national level for the Office of Homeland Security recently established by the President. A full description of Alaska's Office of Homeland Security, to include recommended duties and staffing requirements, was part of the full report given to the Governor.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONGER-TERM

- A. Complete and fund Phases I and II of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (recommended by every Sub-cabinet group).
- B. Hire additional State Troopers over a two-year period.
- C. Develop contingency plans for the State's critical bridges and stockpile moveable temporary bridge spans.
- D. Continue to improve security of Ted Stevens Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports.
- E. Ensure the physical security of critical IT/Telecom sites.
- F. Continue to improve the State's Public Health and Environmental Health bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities.
- G. Train and equip three additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams for statewide rapid response.
- H. Continue to provide first responder protective equipment.
- I. Continue to provide WMD training and conduct WMD exercises.

- J. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center - a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

XII. CONCLUSION

- A. No community, state or nation will ever have the wealth to meet all responsibilities of government while building a stand-alone system that focuses solely on the protection from terrorism. It is important, therefore, to focus on strengthening existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives while improving capabilities for responding to all emergencies. Since full capabilities and a complete level of preparedness will never be possible in every locale, we must also have the ability to move resources quickly around the State. Another essential element of any response will revolve around the ability to communicate—on a continuous and comprehensive inter-agency network of telephone devices, computers, and radios.
- B. We must maximize the use of existing programs and grants at the local, state and federal levels to establish the broadest possible basis for the significant funding requirements. The cost of dealing with terrorism must be shared at all levels—government, business, charities, and the private sector.
- C. Alaska's constitutional framework, its strong Office of the Governor, and the emergency response policies and procedures that have evolved over the last ten years have given the State a superior ability to coordinate inter-agency efforts and accomplish emergency management. This structure provides an essential foundation for preventing, responding, and reacting to the threats of terrorism and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

STATE OF ALASKA
TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY SUBGROUP
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUBGROUP REPORT

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- A. Surface Transportation (highways, bridges, public transit systems, Alaska Railroad).
1. Recommendations for Specific Critical Facilities of Surface Transportation
 - a. Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge. This facility has the highest priority for protection within the State's surface transportation system. In the short-term (immediately) establish a checkpoint on the south side of the bridge. Long-term - establish two checkpoints, one at each end of the bridge, and implement a system of tracking commercial vehicles.
 - b. Whittier Tunnel. In the short-term provide 24-hour on-site security personnel. In the long-term establish checkpoints on both sides of the tunnel to check for explosives and combustibles.
 - c. Port of Anchorage Access Road (a State road). The State should continue to work with the Port of Anchorage and the US Coast Guard to increase control of road access to the port.
 - d. Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage and Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge. Trained maintenance personnel should periodically check bridges for explosive charges and local police and State Troopers should increase patrols in these areas.
 - e. Fort Richardson Detour Routing. In the short-term, lane crossovers and temporary interconnects should be added to the Fort Richardson road network south of the highway. Traffic control devices should be procured and stored near the site. Traffic control plans should be developed for the detour. Long-term - construct extensions to detour routes to establish an interconnect directly with existing highway interchanges.
 - f. Key Bridges. Develop a list of essential bridges and have maintenance personnel check these bridges on a daily basis. Barricades should be placed to block access to roads under the bridges.
 - g. Transportation Security Director's Office. Establish a Transportation Security Director's Office within DOT/PF.
 2. General, Long-Term Recommendations for Surface Transportation
 - a. Emergency Evacuation. Identify and mark emergency evacuation routes around the State.
 - b. Personnel Security. Improve personnel security (background checks for commercial driver's license operators and selected DOT/PF positions).
 - c. Security of Transportation Assets. Evaluate transportation operators' inventory and security measures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous materials, etc.

- d. Contingency Roads. Evaluate the feasibility of keeping the Denali Highway and Independence Mine Roads open year round as alternate routes between Anchorage and Fairbanks.
- e. Training. Establish a transportation security training program.
- f. Contingency Planning. Develop contingency plans and have materials in place to re-establish DOT/PF services.
- g. Highway Bridges. Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges and purchase and stockpile Bailey Bridge spans in Fairbanks.
- h. Land Mobile Radio System. Complete the purchase and installation of an integrated network system to provide inter-agency, statewide communications.
- i. Intelligent Transportation System. Expand the project design to incorporate security as an objective.
- j. Implement Alaska Railroad security measures.

B. Aviation

1. Short-Term Aviation Recommendations

- a. Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports
 - (1) Enhance presence and visibility of law enforcement officers.
 - (2) Seek additional baggage explosive detection machines.
 - (3) Review access control as well as employee training.
 - (4) Establish temporary gates and check points.
 - (5) Respond immediately to unauthorized vehicles at curbside and restricted areas.
 - (6) Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles.
 - (7) Establish controls for Anchorage International aircraft taxiing from general aviation areas to SIDA.
 - (8) Purchase War Risk Insurance.
- b. Rural Airports
 - (1) Authorize all local law enforcement officers to enforce state or federal laws.
 - (2) Authorize State airport employees to enforce selected safety and security regulations currently in force.
- c. Expand the use of National Guard soldiers when they are not needed at security screening points.
- d. Work with air carriers to achieve strict adherence to one carry-on bag coupled with thorough pre-board carry-on and passenger screening.

- e. Initiate or review vehicle key control programs to ensure airport safety equipment is properly secured.
 - f. Statutory changes for all state airports
 - g. Revise Alaska Statutes 02 to establish civil penalties for infractions that are additions to current criminal misdemeanor sanctions.
 - h. Revise Alaska Statutes 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect security sensitive documents.
 - i. Revise Alaska Statutes 44.62.125 to exempt security sensitive airport security programs from the regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act.
 - j. Purchase War Risk Insurance.
2. Long-Term Aviation Recommendations
- a. Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports
 - (1) Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback.
 - (2) Review terminal configuration.
 - (3) Install new state-of-the-art access control systems.
 - (4) Establish access control for Anchorage International general aviation areas.
 - (5) Relocate facilities that are not compatible with new security provisions.
 - b. Rural Airports
 - (1) Require additional airport security and operational personnel.
 - (2) Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback.
 - (3) Increase municipal law enforcement officers.
 - (4) Complete construction of perimeter fencing with automated gates for access control.
 - (5) Install traffic barriers and blast deflection devices.
 - (6) Install automated lock and key control.
 - (7) Reconfigure aprons for better separation of large and small aircraft.

C. Marine

- 1. Short-Term Marine Recommendations
 - a. Establish, immediately, a security force in all AMHS ships.
 - b. Designate the USCG as the lead federal agency to provide and fund all marine security functions within the US.

- c. Initiate a security study of AMHS operations.
 - d. Complete port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships.
 - e. Begin the process of installing security measures in AMHS ships.
 - f. Modify AAC, Title 17 to allow for security procedure improvements.
- 2. Long-Term Marine Recommendations
 - a. Establish an AMHS operations center.
 - b. Make security improvement recommendations part of the process where plans for port facilities are made available to the public.
 - c. Establish a process for the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program to receive and evaluate physical security improvement projects.
- D. For all transportation modes complete the Statewide Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Work Group HAZMAT Commodity Study to identify chemicals transported by surface, air and marine modes. Also, develop strategies to prevent and respond to incidents.

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GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. The assets and components of surface, aviation and marine transportation in Alaska have the potential to become terrorist targets. The number of primary targets is limited. The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the assets, security currently in place, vulnerabilities, security priorities and recommendations for increasing protection of the transportation system.
- B. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:
- AMHS..... Alaska Marine Highway System
 - ANC..... Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport
 - ASP..... Airport Security Program
 - CFR..... Code of Federal Regulations
 - COTP..... Captain of the Port
 - CVISN..... Commercial Vehicles Information Systems and Networks
 - DOT & PF..... Department of Transportation and Public Facilities
 - FAI..... Fairbanks International Airport
 - ITS..... Intelligent Transportation Systems
 - LMRS..... Land Mobile Radio System
 - NEPA..... National Environmental Policy Act
 - SIDA..... Security Identification Display Area
 - USCG..... United States Coast Guard

II. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION

The evaluation of surface transportation systems includes:

- ☐ Highways
- ☐ Bridges
- ☐ Public transit systems
- ☐ Alaska Railroad

The Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT & PF) with the input and assistance of the Alaska Railroad prepared this summary. Representatives from the Department of Law, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Public Safety and Department of Environmental Conservation reviewed a draft.

- A. Current Security Measures and Policies: The current security measures for surface transportation systems are:
1. *Yukon River Bridge*. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has posted security guards on both sides of the bridge. These guards are monitoring traffic.
 2. *DOT & PF*. Regional maintenance staff has not implemented any security measures for protecting highway and bridges. They continue to drive the highway system daily performing routine inspections of transportation facilities.
 3. *Transit Systems*. Managers across the state have not changed their operation or increased security.
 4. *Port of Anchorage*. The port, working in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and DOT & PF, has significantly increased security measures relating to vehicle and pedestrian access to port facilities. The port's security checkpoint has been moved to a more strategic location along Ocean Dock Road, which is part of the state's road system. DOT & PF assisted in the layout of the checkpoint, installing additional signing and paving a vehicle turn around and associated road.
 5. *Ft. Richardson Detour Routing*. In the past, during serious traffic accidents on this section of the Glenn Highway, police often routed traffic through portions of Ft. Richardson north of the highway. Following the events of September 11, the Army no longer will allow that detour routing to be used. Instead, an alternative detour south of the highway will be used that passes through areas of low risk on Ft. Richardson property.
 6. *Whittier Tunnel*. Security measures provide monitoring to "count" vehicle traffic, monitor vehicle progress and provide visual confirmation of traffic/incidents throughout the tunnel and key points in the staging areas. The control center and tollbooths are manned only during hours the tunnel is open to vehicles (two shifts in summer, one in winter.) Maintenance and emergency response personnel are also onsite during normal operating hours. Vehicle inspections are limited in scope, checking for size and overweight restrictions and hazardous cargo.
 7. *Statewide Highways/Bridges*. There are no additional security measures in place for protecting any bridges other than the Yukon River Bridge.
 8. *Motor Carrier Watch*. Division of Measurement Standards and Commercial Vehicle Enforcement inspectors are assisting Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration special agents conducting security visits to hazardous materials carriers. These visits are not safety compliance reviews, nor enforcement visits. A broad sweep of these carriers is being made nationwide. The object is to heighten the sensitivity of carriers to be alert and report suspicious behavior from drivers, shippers, consignees or the public. Priority is given to carriers who transport bulk explosives, anhydrous ammonia, petroleum products, poison gas etc. These activities are consistent with the FMCSA alert.
 9. *Physical Security of Transportation Equipment and Facilities*. Most transportation companies secure their transportation equipment and cargo warehouses with locks. Some fence their equipment. Not all DOT & PF facilities are fenced.

B. Vulnerability Assessments: Surface transportation networks are vulnerable to disruption by terrorist attacks by destroying bridges or roadway segments, or the deliberate release of landslides in confined canyons or avalanches. Because of Alaska's remote location and small population, the threat to the highway system is perceived to be low at this time. However, these are considered possible targets:

1. *Dalton Highway, Fairbanks to the North Slope*. The Yukon River Bridge carries the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The above ground sections of the pipeline parallel the Dalton highway in most locations. The pipeline has the greatest national significance and is the most vulnerable surface transportation element. As such, increased security is needed for these segments of the Dalton and the bridge.
2. *Port of Anchorage Access Road*. With the recent checkpoint location change, security has improved significantly. There are, however, additional concerns regarding jet fuel pipelines to Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport, Elmendorf Air Force Base and the fuel storage tank farms located in the vicinity of the port. There is also the issue of controlling water borne access and the Alaska Railroad facilities. The port is currently working on these issues with the USCG, the military and the railroad.
3. *Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage*. Several bridges are vulnerable along this section of highway. The highway itself is not considered to be susceptible to damage that could not be repaired in a reasonably short timeframe. The key bridges include four (two in each direction) over the Kink River and two at Eagle River. There are also several smaller bridges at various locations that, although vulnerable, would be easier to bypass or repair. Security protection for any of these bridges would be very difficult and require 24-hour surveillance and security checkpoints to search vehicles for explosives.
4. *Ft. Richardson Detour routing*. Routing detour traffic through the secure section of Ft. Richardson poses an obvious and high-level security risk. The new alternate routing to the south, although on Ft Richardson property, passes through areas of low security risk.
5. *Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge*. The Bridge is the most vulnerable location on this highway. Like other major bridges, explosives could render this bridge inoperable for an extended period. Although there are numerous other bridges along the highway that are also vulnerable, they are considerably shorter in length and would be easier to bypass or repair.
6. *Whittier Tunnel*. Damage to the tunnel, control center or ventilation system could render the tunnel unusable for weeks or months. There is also a second "utility tunnel" which houses commercial natural gas supply and electrical service to Whittier. This utility tunnel also contains fiber optic cables that provide the primary fiber optic links between Anchorage and the Lower 48. Although access to the utility tunnel is locked, damage by explosives or physical tampering would be relatively easy and take the utilities out of service for an extended duration.
7. *Richardson Highway, Valdez to Glennallen*. Bridges within this segment, if destroyed, would eliminate surface access to the Alyeska Pipeline Terminal. This segment of

highway generally parallels the pipeline corridor and there is no detour route south of Glennallen.

8. *Alaska & Richardson Highways, Tanana River Bridges.* The Alaska Highway segment east of Tok is the only highway link into the state. The Tanana River crossing at MP 1303 of the Alaska Highway, if lost, would be difficult to re-establish and there is no detour route. The bridge at MP 275 of the Richardson Highway is in close proximity to the pipeline crossing and providing temporary crossing would be difficult. A 300-mile detour is available. These sections of road are also important defense routes.
9. *Parks Highway, Bridges.* This important transportation corridor contains long span bridge structures and crossings with severe terrain. Providing temporary access would be difficult. The Alaska Railroad and long detours are available.
10. *Explosive and Ammo Storage Magazines.* Located at Atigun and Thompson passes, these magazines are vulnerable to theft.
11. *Southeast Region.* Due to its remote location, unconnected highways, and low population, Southeast Alaska presents few surface transportation targets of perceived value to terrorists. Highways could easily be cut, thus isolating some communities from road access. Most vulnerable is the Moore Creek Bridge in Skagway. The exception to low vulnerability in southeast is tourism, which brings large numbers of people to the area. All facets of tourists' visit are vulnerable. Tour ships are clustered while docked and tourists are concentrated in large groups while shopping, sightseeing and touring shoreside attractions.
12. *Misc Highway Bridges.* Destruction of bridges is the simplest way to disrupt normal highway operations. The relative importance of the state's highway routes and related bridges are summarized in Bridge Design's seismic retrofit prioritization. Rather than focus on ways to further prioritize numerous bridges along various routes and attempt to protect them from possible terrorist attacks, the state's initial priority should be to develop a plan for rapid deployment of materials and crews to construct temporary replacement bridges.
13. *Transit Services.* Transit systems vulnerability is perceived by their managers to be minimal. The systems are small and the number of passenger relatively low compared to national figures. If there was a disruption the systems would recover quickly.

C. Security Priorities:

1. *Dalton Highway & Yukon River Bridge.* This section of highway and structure are the highest protection priorities in the surface transportation network because of the pipeline system's national significance. The Pipeline Coordinator's office can brief policy makers on operational requirements and associated actions necessary to upgrade the system's security.
2. *Port of Anchorage Access Road.* The port serves as the primary supply line for Anchorage and much of the state and is vital to the state's overall economy. Maintaining port operations is a very high priority. With respect to road access, the vulnerability and security aspects are lessened with the recent implemented changes. It is unlikely that Ocean Dock Road, the access road into and out of the port; could

be rendered inoperable for an extended period of time. It is conceivable that the A-C couplet overpass, which is the primary access route to Ocean Dock Road, could be destroyed, however, in such an event; there are alternate routes through the Ship Creek basin that could be used to access Ocean Dock Road.

3. *Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage.* This section of the highway is the most heavily traveled roadway in the state. It is important to residents of the area, and is also a vital surface transportation link between the Port of Anchorage, Ted Stevens International Airport, military bases and numerous businesses providing services and supplies to much of the state. Security for this highway really translates into protecting the key bridges - four (two in each direction) over the Kink River and two at Eagle River.
4. The relative importance of security for the bridges becomes a function of alternatives in the event the bridges are taken out of service. For the Knik River Bridges, there is a detour route available using the Old Glenn Highway. For the Eagle River bridges there are two possible alternate routes: the Briggs Bridge connecting with Hiland Drive, and a military road crossing the river within the boundaries of Ft. Richardson. Although such detours would be very inconvenient and would result in significant traffic problems, vital links could be maintained.
5. *Ft. Richardson Detour Routing.* This section of the Glenn Highway experiences a relatively high level of accidents resulting in extreme traffic delays. The Anchorage Police Department and/or Alaska State Troopers will implement the newest detour routing plan and deploy traffic control devices as needed. Ft. Richardson Provost Marshall will provide the "on base" security along the detour route.
6. *Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge.* This highway is the second most heavily traveled road in the state and is the only highway link for the Kenai Peninsula to Anchorage and the rest of the state. Although Canyon Creek Bridge would be difficult to repair, there are several temporary bridge options available. The original bridge is still in place and is part of a separated trail system. Re-routing traffic into a single lane configuration onto the bike path could be accomplished relatively quickly. Large trucks could have some difficulty using this detour routing due to clearances under the new bridge. A second alternative would be the installation of a short-span temporary bridge located in the bottom of the canyon similar to the one used during construction. The access road on the south side of the creek already exists, and the north side access road could be re-established within a couple days.
7. *Whittier Tunnel.* Volumes of vehicle traffic to Whittier are relatively low. Although important to local residents and commercial traffic for access to the highway system and supplies, from an economic perspective the tunnel is probable more critical to the Alaska Railroad for barge freight operations. Similarly, the utility tunnel is important for general utility service to Whittier, but even more critical for its fiber optics link to the Lower 48.
8. *Richardson Highway, Valdez to Glennallen.* As the single highway route between Valdez (Alyeska Terminal) and the remaining surface transportation system, several bridges are high security priorities to maintain access through the adjacent pipeline corridor. If temporary bridge components were available, individual short spans could be

restored within one week. If multiple spans were lost, access could be eliminated for extended periods.

9. *Alaska Highway, Tanana River Bridge (MP 1303)*. Providing the only surface transportation link to the state, this section between Tok and the Border is critical for defense route access and the movement of commerce through the remaining road system. Bridge # 505 over the Tanana River is 946' long with single spans up to 430'. Providing temporary access would be difficult and no detour route is available. The ports of Seward, Anchorage and Valdez would become the keys to moving commerce into the state.
10. *Richardson Highway, Tanana River Bridge (MP 275)*. With an intermediate span of 400', temporary access would be difficult to establish. Key access to defense installations and close proximity to the pipeline-crossing make this structure a security priority. A detour route is available, adding 300 miles from Delta to Fairbanks via the Denali Highway. The Denali is not maintained in the winter.
11. *Parks Highway Bridges, Tanana River at Nenana, Hurricane Gulch, Nenana River at Rex and Mochy*. These long span bridges along with terrain constraints would preclude timely temporary access. Detours of considerable length are available. The Alaska Railroad can also provide access through the Parks highway corridor.
12. *Explosive and Ammo Storage Magazines*. Though not a significant loss if destroyed, these storage facilities near Atigun Pass on the Dalton Highway and Thompson Pass on the Richardson Highway are potential theft liabilities.

D. Recommendations:

1. Security Actions.

Implement a number of short-term (less than four months) and long-term (greater than four months) security actions to increase protection of transportation assets.

Funding has not been determined on most of the measures and could come from a variety of sources. The ability to implement some of these actions will depend on additional funding being identified.

a. Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge.

- *Short-term* Take immediate action to establish a checkpoint on the Dalton Highway as recommended by the Energy and Security committee. While details need to be worked out, DOT & PF could establish the checkpoint within a day. Manning should be coordinated between the Department of Public Safety, the National Guard, and DOT & PF. The urgency to step up security for the bridge and highway is recommended as the highest priority.

- *Long-term* Establish two checkpoints, one at each end of the bridge. The Division of Measurement Standards & Commercial Vehicle Enforcement has developed a concept for the structure of a checkpoint for tracking commercial vehicles.

The Joint Pipeline Office has drafted a similar proposal and forwarded it to Department of Interior in Washington DC

b. Whittier Tunnel

- ☐ *Short-term* Provide 24-hour onsite security personnel to monitor the site.
 - ☐ *Long-term* Implement a vehicle security inspection program at the tollbooths to check for possible explosives and combustibles. Construct and staff a similar security checkpoint on the Whittier side of the tunnel.
- c. Port of Anchorage Access Road
 - ☐ *Short-term* Continue to work with the port and the Coast Guard on any additional security measures they believe necessary to control highway access to the port.
 - ☐ *Long-term* No specific needs or recommendations identified at this time.
- d. Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage
 - ☐ *Short-term* Have trained maintenance personnel periodically check bridge structures for explosive charges. Increase police patrols along this section of highway.
 - ☐ *Long-term* No specific recommendations at this time. If threat seems likely, establish checkpoints and surveillance.
- e. Ft. Richardson Detour Routing
 - ☐ *Short-term* Construct lane crossovers and temporary interconnects to Ft. Richardson road network south of the highway. Formalize traffic control plan for implementation of the detour. Procure and store necessary traffic control devices near the site.
 - ☐ *Long-term* Construct extensions to detour routes to interconnect directly with existing highway interchanges.
- f. Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge
 - ☐ *Short-term* Establish routine inspections of critical bridges for explosive charges. Increase State Trooper patrols along the highway.
 - ☐ *Long-term* No specific recommendations. If threats seem likely, establish checkpoints and increase surveillance.
- g. Key Bridges. Develop a list of essential bridges and have maintenance personnel check these bridges on a daily basis. Barricades should be placed to block access roads under bridges.
- h. Long-Term Items.
 - ☐ *Emergency evacuation* routes around the state should be identified and become a part of the emergency response plan. These routes should be marked and the public educated on their use.
 - ☐ *Personnel security* All organizations that hire CDL operators must ensure proper background checks are completed. Install safeguards against impersonation of DOT & PF maintenance/bridge crews or construction contractors. Identify DOT & PF employment positions warranting background checks.

- *Security of transportation assets.* Transportation operators must ensure their equipment is safe from theft/hijacking and their cargo and fuel storage areas are secured from unauthorized entry. Evaluate security and inventory procedures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous chemicals, nuclear sources, etc.
- *Regulations.* Establish emergency regulations to implement travel permit system on the Dalton Highway. Establish no parking regulations on or within 30' of a bridge through emergency regulations.
- *Contingency Roads.* Evaluate highways which would be essential as an alternate route to link Fairbanks and Anchorage. As examples, keeping the Denali Highway and the Independence Mines Road open during the winter would allow essential travel around destroyed structures. These are highways, which the department usually allows to be snowed in. It could take over a week to open these routes in case of an emergency.
- *Transportation Security Director's Office.* Establish a transportation security element within the Commissioner's office. This function would be staffed adequately to address all modes of transportation, i.e. surface, air and water. This new function would establish security as a department priority.

2. Training.

Establish and implement a transportation security training program.

- The DOT & PF maintenance staff traveling the highways on a daily basis should receive immediate training that includes procedures for reporting suspicious activity and contact numbers for law enforcement and investigative agencies. Training materials should be requested from Department of Public Safety, FBI or other security agency.
- The program should include training for personnel to required to check bridge structures for explosive charges and establish appropriate response protocol.
- Federal Motor Carrier Security Administration should present security briefings to all transportation organizations that employ CDL drivers in Southeast Alaska. Short-term (4-6 months) cost probably born by FMCSA.

Find as a STIP project using FHWA training monies.

3. Preparedness and Contingency Planning.

- a. DOT & PF should develop contingency plans and have materials in place to re-establish services.
 - Develop contingency plans, train staff and implement an Incident Command Structure management system for emergency responses. This system is in place in several state agencies and is consistent with state emergency response plans.

- Establish an agreement with the Alaska Railroad for a detour route using their bridges. The plan should include a secure method to load/unload commercial vehicles.
- Security for the Alaska Highway should be explored and coordinated with Canada and a program of mutual assistance established and implemented.

b. Highway Bridges.

Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges and purchase and stockpile Bailey bridge spans in Fairbanks.

The initial step needed is development of a comprehensive list of bridge materials available in the state. This inventory should include state, municipal, military and private resources. The Preconstruction Division should develop several designs for temporary bridges utilizing available materials for various bridge/span lengths and potential foundation types.

Contingency plans should cover at least the three scenarios. Bailey bridges can be launched from one end of a span with an appropriate "launching nose." Span length is critical, not bridge length. DOT & PF has a very limited stockpile in Fairbanks for a 70' to 80' bridge but no launching nose. Nationally the inventory is in New Jersey. It might be possible to borrow materials from the State of Oregon. Because of shipment time, it is recommended that these sections be staged in Alaska.

Options for spans greater than 250' such as floating or ice bridges, "Flexifloat" bridges or ferries should be evaluated. The plan should look at areas that would require detours such as Hurricane Gulch. Another necessary component of the contingency plan should be transporting materials to sites.

DOT & PF should procure Bailey Bridge sections sufficient to construct temporary bridges that could span two "typical" longest bridge locations. This should include launching platforms or other materials essential for rapid deployment. These materials should be stored at a central location within the state. Identify available materials and location of pontoons necessary to span locations where construction of intermediate piers would be problematic. Develop typical designs for both types of bridges.

Funding estimate undetermined for these recommendations. Possible STIP project.

4. Land Mobile Radio System/ Complete the purchase and installation of an integrated network system to provide inter-agency and statewide communications.

The Land Mobile Radio System (LMRS) is part of a statewide plan being implemented in conjunction with the Department of Defense, municipal and local governments to create a command and control communication network. The proposed system under consideration applies to several aspects of data communications, including protocols for data objects, data transport standards such as Ethernet, modems, PPP and the like. In the case of LMRS, the project is not focused on a particular ITS application or type of data. Instead, it is a wireless mechanism for transmitting data.

Phase 1 of LMRS consists of deploying mobile and portable radios at strategically located maintenance stations along the National and State Highway Systems. This command and control ability will give DOT & PF better response options. The improved communications and data collected will be shared with partner agencies and provided to the public via the Internet. Phase 2 of this project provides base station radios with data link to complete the statewide network. Statewide LMRS coverage is dependent on the Department of Defense completing the repeater installation project.

Cost estimate for DOT & PF's network is \$ 2.9 million.

5. Intelligent Transportation System.

Expand project design to incorporate security as an objective, goal and enhancement to current system plans.

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) across the US have been focused on public safety, efficiency and operational improvements. The events of September 11th have given a new and important reason for ITS - transportation security. Fortunately, these systems can be adapted and modified to serve the role of security, in some cases rather easily. US DOT officials confirm that national policy will quickly emerge identifying ITS as an important facet of transportation security for the nation.

Of all the potential security applications which ITS can serve, perhaps none is more germane than the national CVISN (commercial vehicles information systems and networks) program. CVISN is a voluntary program currently installed in about 35 states. Alaska has a project underway to install CVISN technology, initially in the Anchorage area. While focused on improving operations for the state and commercial vehicle industry, along with safety benefits, there is no doubt that CVISN can rapidly ramp-up to provide security benefits. A recent meeting in Seattle addressed multi-state issues involving commercial vehicles. The four west-coast states and British Columbia participated along with US DOT and US Customs. The focus was establishing a consortium to share CVISN data to enhance transportation security.

Fund as STIP project using FHWA - ITS project monies.

III. ALASKA RAILROAD

- A. Security Assessment - A complete independent third party review of ARRC current security systems with recommendations on improvements in light of current events and new FRA and FTA regulations. Estimated cost \$150,000.
- B. Switch Locks - Tamper-proof switch locks estimated cost \$300,000 (Derail Prevention). ARRC has experienced several switch lock tamperings in the past year. A high security lock would make it much more difficult to access the switches. An open switch would allow a train to move unexpectedly from one track to the other, which could easily derail the train if it were above the proper speed.
- C. Security Cameras - Whittier and Seward docks handle passengers from cruise vessels in large numbers. Estimated cost \$500,000.

In addition, fuel off-loading located at the Port of Anchorage and Anchorage and Fairbanks yards (including fuel racks) move large volumes of hazardous materials that need monitoring.

- D. Lighting - Luminated areas have been a successful intrusion deterrent and can assist video detection. Estimated cost \$1 million.
- E. Fuel Rack Remote Monitoring - Fuel racks at ARRC are not attended. Remote monitoring would allow the dispatch center to be alerted when unusual flow of fuel is detected. Estimated cost \$250,000.
- F. Track Integrity Circuits - Most of the Alaska Railroad is non-signalized. On signalized track, rail is checked for continuity and the signals are designed to detect broken rails or other hazards. Presently, a railroad employee must physically inspect to detect broken rail and open switch points. Automatic reporting equipment would monitor the status of switches, track circuits and switch point locks and would provide information regarding track integrity to the dispatch system before a train encounters a potential problem. Estimated cost \$5 Million.
- G. ARRC Building Security Systems (card readers, cameras) - Secure and log access to all of ARRC facilities including train control dispatch, depot baggage areas, and food preparation areas. Estimated cost \$1 Million.
- H. Fencing - Many key locations do not have fencing to protect ARRC assets, allowing unlimited access. Estimated cost \$1 Million.
- I. Intermodal Facility Entry Control Points for Rail Yards - Currently, any private vehicle can have access to an entire yard facility. Propose fencing and manned control entry points, to control access to trains, equipment and loaded railcars in yards. Estimated cost \$3 Million.
- J. Detection of Bridge Faults - Propose installation of track alignment remote monitoring technology to allow checking of bridge integrity. Estimated cost \$2 Million.
- K. Passenger Baggage Handling - New procedures being proposed by FAA and Coast Guard will require implementation of new level of security for baggage handling. Ensure that no one is boarding trains with inappropriate items such as guns, knives, etc.; metal detectors and x-ray equipment will be required. All depots will need to be equipped with metal detectors. Additionally, ensure that checked baggage is secured once checked. Estimated cost \$4 Million.
- L. Operational Support - Provide background investigations on new employees and contractors. Photo ID system for ARRC employees. Train employees in security awareness. Provide for additional Special Agent and Investigative assistance support. The ARRC is over 500 miles in length and has been experiencing steady increase in passenger traffic. Estimated cost \$250,000 annual increase.
- M. Seward Cruise Ship Dock - Provide for security fencing, controlled gate access and ticket passenger access. Estimated cost \$1 Million.
- N. Security Monitoring Center - Provide for a center where all sensitive and controlled areas along the rail belt can be monitored. Estimated cost \$ (In progress).

- O. Airport Security Improvements - Heightened FAA security requirements tentatively include blast proof glass for the ARRC rail depot. Undercarriage inspections will be required. Estimated cost \$2 Million.

** Note: The heightened airport security measures were the result of a meeting between the Alaska Railroad, Anchorage Airport and the FAA (11/01/01) wherein the FAA verbally informed both the airport and the railroad that new security measures would most likely include "blast proof" glass in the airport terminal.*

IV. AVIATION

Airports in the U.S. that receive service by aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats must have a security program under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107. There are currently 21 airports in Alaska that have FAA mandated security programs. Ted Stevens Anchorage International (ANC) and Fairbanks International (FAI) are the largest state operated airports and have the most sophisticated security programs due to larger numbers of screened passengers. The 16 other airports operated by the DOT & PF with FAA required and approved security programs include: Barrow, Bethel, Cold Bay, Cordova, Deadhorse, Dillingham, Gustavus, King Salmon, Kodiak, Kotzebue, Nome, Petersburg, Sitka, Unalaska, Wrangell, and Yakutat. Three municipally operated airports are also in this category: Adak, Ketchikan and Juneau. The airport in Valdez does not receive aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats. However, DOT & PF has elected to implement an airport security program in the interest of public safety because of the proximity of the airport to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Terminal.

The remaining 266 state or municipally owned airports are not served by large enough passenger aircraft to be required to have a FAA approved security plan. The airport operator or municipality, on an individual basis, addresses security issues as it deems necessary. In addition, private aircraft are based at numerous private airstrips and summer float-plane/winter ski-plane lakes with little if any security.

A. Current Security Measures and Policies

Each airport that receives aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats must develop an Airport Security Program (ASP) to comply with 14 CFR Part 107. Each ASP is a specific security plan tailored to the needs of the respective airport. It defines how airport security is conducted and typically identifies the following security features: fencing, either total or partial perimeter fencing with controlled gate access; gates at critical locations around the airport; badging of airport workers; security sweeps of the airport; and law enforcement officer support at passenger screening areas.

The airports administer the security programs while the FAA Civil Aviation Security Division provides regulatory oversight. The FAA routinely reviews the airport programs with on site inspections. The FAA holds the airport operator responsible for compliance with the airport's security program, including responsibility for ensuring compliance by badged personnel. Thus, the airport operator must have the enforcement tools to compel compliance by all employees of the various airlines, ground handlers and others who must access restricted areas in the performance of private business operations.

The ASP is a strictly controlled document under the terms of 14 CFR Part 191. Persons who receive airport identification and access badges are provided training specific to their access authority. Copies of the full ASP, however, are provided only to key airport management and the FAA Security Division.

The air carriers that fly aircraft with more than 60-passenger seat configuration also have security responsibilities. Passenger screening using magnetometer devices and baggage checks by either x-ray or visual checks is the responsibility of the airlines. Airlines may elect to carry out passenger screening and baggage checks for aircraft with less than 60 passenger seats, but this action is not required by current FAA regulations.

Security measures at the remaining airports in depend on each airport's location relative to vital interests and the decision of the airport manager. For instance, Merrill Field, is two minutes or less flying time away from both Elmendorf Air Force Base and 20 story buildings in downtown Anchorage, including hotels, oil company headquarters, and the state owned Arwood Building. The decision whether Merrill Field should have a formal security program is up to the Municipality of Anchorage. Currently, Merrill Field is patrolled by the Anchorage Police Department and has partial fencing and controlled gates. Only a few of Alaska's smaller airports have any fencing. Generally, it is safety fencing to prevent inadvertent access to the runways rather than as security fencing. Most airports in Alaska, except for the notable exception of the 21 airports operated under 14 CFR Part 107, as described above, have few and no formal security measures but respond to any security issues on an 'as needed' basis.

B. Vulnerability Assessments

Understanding the vulnerability of Alaska's airports and aircraft has changed significantly and must now be reexamined in light of the suicidal attitude of terrorists. Security must be addressed in ways never before imagined. The likelihood that a person would commandeer an aircraft and fly it into a building--whether as an act of international terrorism, or as a copy-cat act of violence as an alternative to the type previously carried out with an automatic weapon in a public place--increased exponentially on September 11.

Based upon the September 11 attacks, it might seem that terrorists would be interested only in national landmarks and the potential for high casualties. However, other past attacks against such targets as embassies, military barracks, and a naval vessel have involved smaller federal targets. The plot against Los Angeles World Airport targeted a high profile municipal facility, and key transportation hub. Heightened security over more prominent sites could result in targeting less prominent sites. Alaska has targets of potential interest in close proximity to the airports. The likelihood of a terrorist cell targeting Alaska is unknown; however, the state must be prepared for the possibility.

Previously aircraft had been targets of destruction only. Now, we must recognize them as potential weapons. Any size or type of aircraft could be a potential target. Large aircraft may be the most prized targets as potential weapons due to their on board fuel load, high speed and large mass with its resultant kinetic energy. Small aircraft, such as the Cessna 208 Caravan for example, carries only 370 gallons of fuel, with a maximum gross weight of 8,000 pounds. Small aircraft could cause damage only on a relatively small scale, since they carry less fuel and have significantly less kinetic energy than large aircraft. The ability of terrorists to gain access to large and small aircraft is variable across the state due to the different levels of airport security. At airports with security programs, procedures are in place for authorized personnel to challenge any person in a location or engaged in conduct not in accord with the ASP or otherwise acting suspiciously or out of place in the secure areas. Even though all other airports without ASP's may have sporadic

inspections by local police or DOT & PF personnel, neither aircraft nor passengers are generally under surveillance.

Terrorist actions involving aircraft might range from stationary attacks on individual aircraft to hijacking. A stationary attack could involve a vehicle colliding with an aircraft either on an airport apron or runway. Such an act would probably only disable the aircraft unless (1) the aircraft were moving at high speed in the act of takeoff or landing, or (2) the vehicle were rigged with explosives. Although such an attack is not seen as a high probability due to the minimal damage that would likely be inflicted on a stationary aircraft and the difficulty of "accurately" timing contact with an aircraft moving at high speed, the risk cannot completely be discounted. Especially at ANC and FAI, large cargo freighters and a few passenger aircraft, fuel-up daily for long-haul international flights. Even domestic passenger carriers fuel up for long domestic routes, including summer routes as far as Atlanta. The September 11 horror showed all too tragically the explosive capacity of a large aircraft's fully loaded jet-fuel tanks. Though it may be difficult to engineer a ground attack that would rupture and ignite fuel as explosively as a full-throttle mid-air collision, any fully fueled large aircraft contains tremendous energy.

Fortunately, the same airports that serve the largest aircraft are also those at which the FAA regulations require the most comprehensive security programs. Some of the airports not served by the larger passenger jets, and not required to have ASPs, however, have fuel, both gasoline and diesel, flown in by specially outfitted cargo aircraft. These aircraft, while nowhere near as large as wide-body jetliners, carry an unusually large fuel payload, and may also be considered a threat.

"Hijacking" of an aircraft for use as a missile has a higher potential payback for a terrorist. There are a few targets of national interest within close proximity to our larger communities and even on the major air routes for all north and south bound traffic to the Lower 48. We have no way to assess the likelihood that an aircraft in Alaska might be targeted for hijacking. Targets of national interest include military installations, Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the Alyeska Pipeline Company's marine terminal in Valdez, and even fully loaded oil tankers en route to the Lower 48. The oil facilities or tankers would arguably make prime targets in terms of sheer explosive and environmental destructive potential, as well as the potential for raw economic damage. Whether terrorists who would like to see less U.S. interest in Middle Eastern oil are likely to select a target that could have the opposite result is beyond the expertise of the aviation subcommittee. A large cruise ship crossing the Gulf of Alaska might also make a prime target for maximum terror. The great distances and associated travel time and jet-fuel consumption may limit the desirability of Alaska as a location from which a terrorist might hijack an aircraft to attack significant targets in the Lower 48.

Airport maintenance vehicles are also a potential terrorist target. The large size and power of some pieces of airport maintenance equipment make them potential weapons for destruction of aircraft, buildings and facilities on and near airports.

Vulnerable stationary targets at ANC and FAI are of similar types, although in each case, the facility at ANC is larger. Both airports have terminal buildings that are frequently occupied by large numbers of people. Each airport has a FAA air traffic control tower, and each airport has an aircraft fuel tank farm. ANC has a public parking garage, a large

U.S. Post Office facility, a major Federal Express facility and numerous other airline and cargo-related facilities.

These two airports are also relatively close to other important facilities. ANC is near Elmendorf AFB, important oil company regional headquarter office buildings and other office buildings, hotels and hospitals. The Beluga natural gas field and Chugach Electric's nearby power generation facility, the refinery at Nikiski, and oil platforms in Cook Inlet all seem less likely targets. FAI is near the Williams refinery at North Pole and Eielson AFB and not terribly far by air from a number of Trans-Alaska Pipeline pump stations. Jet aircraft routes very quickly pass the Valdez marine terminal and oil tanker shipping lanes from either airport.

The Juneau International Airport is a potential target due to its proximity to the State capital and the Snettisham hydropower facility, which supplies power to the Juneau area. In addition, the airport has a terminal, a FAA air traffic control tower, and a fuel tank farm for refueling aircraft. Other targets may include cruise ships visiting the port of Juneau. Up to five large vessels are in port on any given summer day.

Vehicle-transported explosive devices (car or truck bombs) are tools available to terrorists within Alaska's larger cities but seem far less likely in more rural communities, if only because there are fewer facilities to destroy and their destruction would have relatively little national impact. To destroy a terminal at ANC or FAI would seriously disrupt aviation at that location and regionally, but would not significantly disrupt aviation on a national level. It seems, therefore, that the threat is greater from a local malcontent wanting to make a local statement, than from international terrorism. Maintaining a vehicle setback at ANC and FAI is warranted, however it is hard to judge how valuable it is, other than for preventing local threats.

The air traffic control towers, radar systems and fuel tank farms face a similar threat. Destruction of the fuel farm at either airport, for example, would hurt the Alaskan economy but would probably not hurt the US economy, assuming aircraft would simply divert to other U.S. airports for refueling. The controls already in place are considered a reasonable response to this level of threat.

As noted above, the air carriers are responsible for baggage screening. Variation in the capability and capacity of baggage screening equipment, even among the international airport terminals, however, poses some concern. If a machine is not capable of screening all baggage enplaned at the airport, only a portion of baggage may be screened comprehensively according to the air carrier's approved security program. Likewise, some baggage enplaned at a rural airport and that transfers at ANC or FAI, may be screened less thoroughly than others.

The parking garage at ANC is a potential target, however, the threat is considered to be low. Destroying or damaging this structure would temporarily disrupt aviation at ANC, but would not cause large-scale disruption of the aviation system.

Most of the rural airport terminal buildings have parking lots that are close to the terminal structures, so located because of inclement weather. These structures are theoretically vulnerable to a vehicle-transported explosive device. However the probability seems very low. In most of the communities there is no source of ammonium nitrate based fertilizer in quantities to build explosives. Likewise, in most communities

there is no source of high explosive, with the exception of some mining districts. Although explosives could be brought to a rural airport, they would have to pass through more likely targets on the way. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that a vehicle bomb would be assembled and used in these communities. We conclude that the current 300-foot FAA mandated setback of vehicles from a passenger terminal is not warranted at our rural communities.

The vulnerability of aircraft at rural airports may be higher than at ANC and FAI, but lower risk levels result in a lower threat as a practical matter. The aircraft at rural airports are relatively smaller, slower and carry less fuel, and would not be particularly potent weapons.

The highest probability of attack at rural airports would be for a perpetrator to try taking a weapon through a rural security screening point or explosives through the baggage checkpoint, to be transported for use elsewhere against a more prominent target, such as a major population center. The rural airports do not have sophisticated checked bag screening (hand check only of suspect baggage) and while most have carry-on-screening devices to x-ray for weapons, locally trained screeners may or may not be capable of spotting a threat. The probability of a passenger placing explosives in checked baggage is generally considered low due to the lack of availability of explosives in most originating rural communities, however, it is certainly possible.

A vulnerability assessment of the security at ANC is currently underway. The study will be a multi-step process designed to address the security vulnerability of the existing terminal and airfield configuration with the objective of enhancing the existing security at ANC, both from a procedural and facility standpoint.

The initial phase included on site review of the existing security program with respect to airport configuration and procedures. The second phase will include a comprehensive review of the architectural drawings and specifications for new Concourse C, currently under construction. The emphasis will be on the security aspects of the current design and the impacts of the new security "rules". Expediting this work will be critical since the building's steel structure has been erected. Thus, any potential physical changes to the existing design must be done with an awareness that the building's shell is fixed.

This assessment will address the building's interior spaces, curbside and associated aircraft apron, with particular attention being paid to the baggage system, passenger security checkpoints and employee access to the aircraft apron, commonly referred to as the "Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)". Any modifications to the terminal construction for enhance security will likely increase the cost of the project. The potential cost increase project is unknown. The assessment will prepare a detailed cost analysis.

The main thrust of this assessment will be to establish how successful, or not, ANC's security measures and procedures will be to detect, assess, intercept and neutralize each threat.

Other points that will be addressed include, but are not limited to:

- ☐ Definition of perceived threats at ANC.
- ☐ Price differentials between various access control technologies.
- ☐ Reduction of existing vehicle access points on the Airport.

- ☐ Fingerprinting of foreigners desiring work at the Airport.
- ☐ General Aviation activity vis a vis overall security.
- ☐ Baggage from tour operators.
- ☐ Drug interdiction versus current personnel levels.

C. Security Priorities

The security priority at all of the airports is public safety and to comply with FAA security directives and amendments. Compliance has changed and is continuing to change the way business is done. These changes require airport management to spend more money than was budgeted for this fiscal year. Airport personnel are now required along with law enforcement agencies, to perform more security inspections and to provide a more visible security presence. For the DOT & PF-operated airports this means prematurely expending personnel services budgets resulting in the need to seek a midyear increment from the legislature. The DOT & PF will also seek federal assistance, where available, to cover these FAA mandated security measures. Municipal airports will also need to seek funding increases from their governing boards. The final dollar amount needed has not yet been determined, as the FAA is still mandating changes. For the remainder of the state fiscal year, the DOT & PF estimates that ANC will spend an additional \$1.55 million, FAI will spend \$0.43 million, and the rural airport system will expend about \$4.8 million. Estimates from the municipal airports are unavailable.

All airports need relief from the FAA-imposed 30' vehicle parking setback from the airport passenger terminal. The DOT & PF believes the threat of a suicide car bombing is very low. Relief from this requirement, especially in Alaska's smaller communities is vital. The monetary impact, to both Fairbanks and Juneau airports, has been quite significant since a large portion of their parking lots and subsequent revenue is unavailable. Rural airports are expending valuable resources enforcing this requirement, and it causes hardship for passengers (especially for older persons, families and the disabled) who must park farther from the terminal and walk through inclement weather to reach the terminal building.

All airports need additional personnel, both for the airport staff and for the airport screener/local law enforcement agencies. At the rural airports, DOT & PF has not historically had adequate numbers of personnel to perform normal duties as well as security patrols required by current FAA regulations. This is especially so during the winter months, when DOT & PF airport staff works overtime just keeping the snow clear from the runways.

At most rural airports, local law enforcement agencies are contracted with to provide law enforcement. Likewise, many of these agencies are not staffed to provide officers as now required by the FAA on an ongoing basis. In addition, several communities have no local law enforcement agency. If additional security or law enforcement staffing is required beyond the current standards, the level of air service at these communities will be restricted to smaller aircraft unless the state or local governments can provide adequate law enforcement.

D. Recommendations

1. Security Actions

Implement a number of immediate, short-term (less than four months) and long-term (greater than four months) security actions, steps and initiatives to increase protection of vulnerable transportation assets.

Funding has not been determined on most of the measures, and could come from a variety of sources. The ability to implement some of these steps will depend on additional funding being identified.

Short-term - To meet the security requirements set by the FAA the following should be enacted.

2. ANC and FAI:

- a. Enhance presence and visibility of law enforcement officers
- b. Seek additional baggage explosive detection machines for installation at both ANC and FAI for use by air carriers
- c. Review access control as well as employee training and updating
- d. Establish temporary gates and check points
- e. Immediate response to unauthorized vehicles at curbside and restricted areas
- f. Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles
- g. Establish controls for ANC aircraft taxiing from general aviation areas to SIDA

3. Rural airports:

- a. All local law enforcement officers should be authorized to enforce state or federal laws. Some local police are currently not authorized and trained in this area.
- b. State airport employees need to have authority to take specific limited actions to enforce the safety and security regulations currently in force. DOT & PF currently relies on the State Troopers or local law enforcement. Employees should have authority to issue tickets and summons for minor infractions. Not all security oriented personnel meet FAA "Law Enforcement Officer" (LEO) criteria (meeting a stringent training protocol and having arrest and detention powers).
- c. The National Guard troops currently supplementing airport security on a short-term basis are currently restricted to screening point duties only. Use of these troops needs to be expanded when they are not needed at security screening points. Additional communications equipment is also needed so the guard staff is in contact with airport and airline screening staff.
- d. Work with air carriers to achieve strict adherence to one carry-on bag coupled with thorough pre-board carry-on and passenger screening. On-line transfer of checked bags should continue with consideration of diverting selected checked baggage, identified by profiling or other means, through the explosive detection machine in ANC.