

SCOMM

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Alaska State Legislature

House of Representatives

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Representative Al Vezey


HJR 54

SPONSOR STATEMENT

The purpose of HJR 54 is to encourage the federal government to begin a dialog with Canada over the disputed maritime boundaries between Canada and Alaska.

The federal government established a maritime boundary with Canada between Maine and Nova Scotia fourteen years ago. The only solution to the ongoing disputes over fishing rights, mineral rights, transportation rights and other rights of Alaskans, Canadians, and the federal government is the establishment of a maritime boundary.

HJR 54 also clarifies that the sovereignty, territory, jurisdiction, and property rights of Alaska must be protected. It resolves that any negotiations on a maritime boundary with Canada must include participation of representatives of State of Alaska.



Alaska Trollers Association

130 Seward St., No. 505
Juneau, Alaska 99801
(907) 586-9400
(907) 586-4473 Fax

December 2, 1997

Secretary Madeline Albright
U.S. State Department
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Albright:

I am writing to inform you about the concerns of commercial fishermen operating in the disputed waters between Alaska and Canada. Our association has requested relief on this issue since the late 1970s. Since that time, the U.S. and Canada have come no closer to resolving the maritime boundary dispute. The Alaska troll fleet has essentially been forced out of U.S. waters in Dixon Entrance, due to harassment by Canadian fishermen and enforcement officials. The Alaska Trollers Association (ATA) remains deeply concerned about the safety of Alaska fishermen who operate in Dixon Entrance and requests your assistance to ensure our boats can freely conduct their business.

This summer, at least one sport and four commercial fishermen were harassed by Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans Enforcement (DFO) while fishing legally in the disputed area of Dixon Entrance. DFO's conduct underscores the failure of reciprocal flag state enforcement, as agreed to by the U.S. and Canada in the 1978 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes.

Since signing the Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement with Canada in 1977, the U.S. has allowed Canadian vessels to operate within its EEZ at Dixon Entrance, in contravention of Section 307(2) of the Stevens-Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. This agreement and the subsequent exchange of diplomatic notes on June 2, 1978, provided for reciprocal flag state enforcement at Dixon Entrance. Simply put, Canada is to enforce fisheries regulations only on its fishing vessels and the United States is to enforce only on U.S. vessels fishing in the disputed area. However, by both its stated policy and enforcement conduct, Canada has clearly demonstrated its disregard for flag state enforcement in the disputed area.

DFO claims the Alaska troll fishery is not a "traditional" fishery subject to flag state enforcement. This is absurd. Our 120 year old troll fishery is neither new, nor should its "traditional" status be a matter of debate in this case, as is clearly pointed out in former Secretary Alexander Haig's July 13, 1981 memo to the U.S. Coast Guard. While the 1977 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement included a provision on "traditional" fisheries, the more recent set of diplomatic notes includes only one element of that agreement, Article IX Reciprocal Flag State Enforcement.

ATA believes the U.S. must reaffirm its commitment to reciprocal flag state enforcement, by stating its expectation that Canada return to reciprocal procedures by January 1, 1998. In addition, the U.S. should insist that Canada recognize all U.S. fisheries presently operating in the disputed area. If Canada refuses to recognize the Alaska troll fleet, the U.S. should, in turn, consider the Canadian troll fleet to be illegally operating in Dixon Entrance and take appropriate enforcement action.

Furthermore, Canada should be reminded that the parties agreed to flag state enforcement only as an interim measure, *pending the resolution of questions pertaining to the delimitation of areas subject to the respective fisheries jurisdiction of each party*. In its own 1978 diplomatic note Canada stated it, *"reaffirms its commitment to pursue negotiations on maritime boundaries"*. It was on the basis of this commitment that the U.S. agreed in its responding diplomatic note to continue reciprocal flag state enforcement. Accordingly, in October 1985, Secretary Schultz suggested to Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark that the two countries attempt to resolve the boundary dispute. Late in 1986, Minister Clark informed the Secretary that it was not an opportune time for Canada to negotiate. To date, Canada has consistently refused to begin negotiations with the U.S. and remains unwilling to submit the matter to the World Court for resolution. Unless Canada honors its commitments to flag state enforcement and negotiation of the maritime boundary, the U.S. should not hesitate to enforce its EEZ in Dixon Entrance, as it deems appropriate.

The importance of this issue to U.S. fishermen should not be under-estimated. What effectively forced the U.S. fleet out of Dixon Entrance is not just the sporadic harassment of a few fishermen by DFO, but daily harassment by the Canadian fishing fleet. Canada's troll fleet did not have a large presence in the area until after the U.S. claimed its 200 mile limit. Since that time, the Canadian fleet has grown to the detriment of U.S. fishermen. The majority of the Canadian boats are large, efficient processor/trollers operations, fishing six lines of gear (U.S. trollers are limited to only 2 or 4 lines, depending on permit type). They target U.S. origin salmon to, redress "equity imbalances", as stated by Canada in Pacific Salmon Treaty negotiations. Apparently, some Canadian fishermen have come to believe that these waters are sovereign Canadian waters, and that U.S. vessels are fishing there illegally. The Canadian fishermen are not at all shy about taking matters into their own hands when it comes to driving out U.S. boats. We cannot expect the U.S. Coast Guard to referee chronic right of way skirmishes, nor can we expect U.S. trollers to subject themselves to intimidation in order to fish U.S. waters.

Management of the coastwide salmon resource has been confounded by Canada's unwillingness to provide timely and meaningful harvest and coded wire tag data from its boundary area fleet. This is particularly galling to U.S. fisherman, who must often release chinook salmon to rebuild runs, while the Canadian fisherman fishing next to him continues to catch chinook all summer long. Also disturbing is when U.S. fishermen are stopped from fishing to conserve weak coho salmon runs in both countries, as they were in 1997, and Canada continues to fish our waters for the same fish. In contrast, Alaska closed

part of its troll fishery this year to protect coho stocks, and voluntarily managed both the seine and gillnet fisheries to assist in the conservation of salmon stocks bound for the Nass River in Canada.


Not only does the presence of the Canadian fleet in Dixon Entrance violate the Stevens-Magnuson Act, it also poses an enforcement dilemma for the State of Alaska. By catching and transporting unprocessed fish within state waters, and by failing to report information about any processed catch aboard, Canadian fishermen operate in violation of Alaska's statutes and regulations. Furthermore, a U.S. Customs policy permits these vessels to bypass clearance at a port of entry and routinely anchor in U.S. harbors. This creates a safety threat for U.S. fishermen who must compete for scarce anchorages, particularly during foul weather. In addition, Canadians use our harbors as staging areas for their fishing operations, which is illegal under both federal and state law.

Finally, tension over this issue contributes to our inability to effectively engage Canada in discussions in important fisheries management forums, such as the Pacific Salmon Commission.

It is the hope of our members that you will assist us by finally bringing resolution to this long-standing disagreement. Our hope is that timely resolution will assist in securing long-term goodwill between the two countries.

Thank you in advance for considering the perspective of ATA. If I can provide additional information on this or other issues of concern to our industry, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dale A. Kelley".

Dale A. Kelley
Executive Director

Page 1, Line 3: Would read better as follows: "Whereas the United States and Canada have extensive maritime boundaries, including in the Dixon Entrance and in the Beaufort Sea;"

Page 1, Lines 7-8: Would read better as follows: "Whereas the extension of fisheries jurisdiction by the United States and Canada out to 200 nautical miles in the

1970's created the need for the establishment of agreed maritime boundaries between the two nations;"

Page 1, Lines 15-17: Would read better as follows: "Whereas the maritime boundaries between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea, in the Dixon Entrance, seaward of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and in certain areas of the Gulf of Maine have not been agreed;"

Page 2, Line 1: Insert "agreed" before "maritime boundaries"


Page 2, Line 4: Replace "federal government" with "United States". Insert "agreed" before "maritime boundaries"

Page 2, Lines 7-9: Would read better as follows: "Whereas in 1984 the International Court of Justice delimited the maritime boundary between the United States and Canada in most areas of the Gulf of Maine;

Page 2, Lines 10-12: Would read better as follows: "Whereas the Government of Canada has repeatedly declined proposals by the Government of the United States to resolve the maritime boundaries in dispute between the nations;"

Page 2, Line 18: Insert "agreed" before "maritime boundaries". Replace "with Alaska" with "in the Dixon Entrance and in the Beaufort Sea."

Canada/Dixon Entrance/Dixon Issues 2-20-98.doc



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
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