

ALASKA LEGISLATURE

1625

HOUSE and SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE FILES, 1997-1998

1 (1) the lessor may not make an assignment of the agreement unless the lessor  
2 first obtains the approval of the commissioner of administration; and

3 (2) when the lessor has made an assignment of the agreement,

4 (A) the lessee's obligation to pay rent is independent of any  
5 requirement of this section with respect to the design, construction, or operation of the  
6 correctional facility;

7 (B) the lessee's obligation is subject to failure by the state to  
8 appropriate money to make the payments required by the lease obligation;

9 (C) except as provided in (B) of this paragraph, the obligation of the  
10 lease is not subject to abatement, set-off, or reduction of any kind by reason of a  
11 requirement of this section or by reason of a breach, failure of performance, or  
12 another act or omission by the contractor, lessor, the state, or a state agency or officer;  
13 and

14 (D) the agreement may be modified for purposes of refunding it and  
15 any certificates of participation issued with respect to it."

16 Reletter the following subsection accordingly.

17 Page 6, line 30:

18 Delete "sec. 3"

19 Insert "sec. 4"

20 Page 7, following line 1:

21 Insert a new subsection to read:

22 "(i) Subsection (a) of this section constitutes the notice and approval required by  
23 AS 36.30.085."

24 Page 7, line 9:

25 Delete "sec. 4"

26 Insert "sec. 5"

## BUFFALO FLATS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

### Questions & Answers:

Q: *Why is Allvest going to own the prison when state funds are retiring the debt?*

A: Allvest will enter the transaction as the lessee-owner of the land and old Fort Greely structures that will be made into the prison. Allvest will then spend \$30 million of private money to construct the prison to standards required in the State lease. No landlord who takes all the risks of acquiring and developing real estate should be asked to deed the property over to his customer/tenants.

Q: *Are there other examples of this mechanism in state procurement of space and services?*

A: Dozens, if not hundreds. The state pays to use the prison in Arizona to house Alaska inmates, but will not own the facility when its debt is retired. The state contracts for use of thousands of square feet of office space in Juneau, Anchorage, Fairbanks, and elsewhere in the state. In Juneau alone, the state pays to use space in the Willoughby Building, the DEC building, the DOTPF Channel Drive Building, and many others. The state will not own these structures after the landlords pay them off. The state has paid off 12.5% of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, but has not acquired a 1/8<sup>th</sup> interest in this private enterprise.


Q: *Does the State get more or less benefit out of its Arizona prison contract than out of the Delta proposal?*

A: Much less. The Arizona contract sends not only inmates, but jobs and money out of state. The Delta proposal saves an Alaska community which would otherwise die, keeps several hundred construction and corrections jobs in Alaska rather than shipping them outside, and supports an Alaska business rather than an Arizona business. In addition to all these benefits, the direct cost to the state government to house inmates in Delta is competitive with the Arizona contract.


Q: *Why doesn't the City of Delta Junction finance and own the facility?*

A: The City of Delta Junction believes that risks of this type are best placed with the private sector. The city is not equipped to be a construction manager or prison manager, and wants no part of the large risks involved in developing and operating this project. The city believes that the Allvest proposal is an ideal Public/Private partnership as presently structured -- privatized risk and rewards, with substantial public benefits in the form of jobs and economic development.

### Contracts and Real Estate Interests



### Flow of Funds



# Corrections Compendium

Volume 23, Number 1

January 1998

The National Journal for Corrections

## The Private Prison Industry

### A Statistical and Historical Analysis of Privatization

By Alex Singal

For years, prison authorities at the federal, state and local levels have faced growing prison populations and increasingly crowded correctional facilities, due in part to mandatory sentencing guidelines and political pressure to incarcerate inmates for longer periods of time. According to the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1.18 million inmates were in the custody of state and federal prison authorities by year-end 1996, and .51 million inmates were held in local jails. A Bureau of Justice Statistics special report published in March 1997 estimated that 5.1 percent of all persons in the United States will be confined in a state or federal prison during their lifetime if present incarceration rates remain the same.

The adult jail and prison inmate populations more than doubled between 1985 and 1995, from 759,000 at the beginning of the period to more than 1.6 million 10 years later. Incarceration rates per 100,000 U.S. residents grew from 313 to 600 during the same period. The U.S. prison population is the largest in the world, with the rest of the world, excluding China, estimated to have a little more than 1 million inmates. China also is believed by industry observers to have 1 million inmates, suggesting an incarceration rate of approximately 120 per 100,000 residents based on an estimated Chinese population of 1.2 billion people.

The reasons for the dramatic increase in the U.S. inmate population and incarceration rates stem

from the growth in the violent crime rate, which began in the mid-1970s, with mounting pressure over the ensuing 20 years for politicians and the government to do something to keep convicted felons off the streets. Mandatory prison sentences, especially for drug- and gun-related crimes, have resulted in prison and jail crowding in many states and within the federal prison system.

Ironically, many jurisdictions free inmates who have served less than half their sentences to make room for new inmates. However, truth-in-sentencing laws and "three-strikes" legislation for three-time felons have limited the authorities' ability to alleviate crowding with shortened sentences, particularly since Congress passed the Crime Bill in 1994. Newspaper headlines about crimes committed by parolees add to the political pressure against reducing prison sentences for convicted felons. At the same time, sentence reduction programs used to create prison space for new offenders produce requirements for pre-release and pre-parole programs. According to Criminal Justice Institute statistics, prior felons accounted for 39 percent of inmates admitted to prison in 1995, while probation and parole violators accounted for approximately 17 percent of new inmates. More than three million people were on probation or parole in the United States at the end of 1995.

Studies from the Justice Department and the FBI show that the rate



Continued on page 2

**Private Prison Industry**  
Continued

Crime Bill by Congress in 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has been allocated approximately \$10 billion through FY2000 for the construction of new incarceration facilities. Grants are awarded to states on the condition that they implement truth-in-sentencing laws, which ensure that violent offenders serve substantial portions of their sentences. According to *Corrections Today*, top state spenders on completed construction projects for FY'95-96 included Virginia with \$337 million, Florida with \$267 million, Texas with \$220 million, New Jersey with \$216 million and Oregon with \$175 million. The geographic trend in new prison construction is moving to the eastern United States. This is a large leap from California, which, in 1995, was the country's most active builder, with 18 percent of all projects.

Within a span of three years, there has been a growing interest not only in the management of prisons by the private sector, but a significant move toward design, finance, construction and ownership by private companies. The increasing acceptance of prison privatization by state, local and federal governments has increased the willingness of private companies to invest their own capital to design, build and manage projects.


Other trends in new prison construction with participation by the private sector include:

- larger facilities that result in economies of scale in both construction and operations;
- fast-track contract awards and construction of new facilities, eliminating months from the previous start-up cycle; and
- the design of new facilities that are easily and readily expandable in a cost-effective manner by their operators.

**Who's Privatizing?**

While the growth of privately managed prison facilities and beds has been impressive, the private sector still has only scratched the surface with respect to potential opportunity for managing correctional facilities. Although recent growth

**Table 5**  
**Privately Managed Beds by State and Country**



**Bold-faced states:** First in-state contract awarded in 1996. Beds are by geographic location not by source of inmates.

Source: Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, University of Florida

Continued on page 20


(CCA). The company was awarded its first contract in 1983 with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to design, build and manage a 350-bed, minimum security detention facility in Houston. CCA's management of this facility became an early example of the private sector's ability to provide flexibility to government agencies in operating correctional facilities. In 1987, the use of this facility was split between the INS and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, although the facility today houses only INS detainees.

From this starting point, the private corrections industry ended the decade with 10,900 beds under contract. While this represents impressive growth in seven years, the U.S. jail and prison populations exploded during this period — the state and federal prison inmate population increased by almost 276,000 (a 63 percent increase), while the jail population increased by 183,000 (an 83 percent increase).

The 1980s were thus a formative period for the private corrections industry, during which it began to establish political and economic credibility with federal, state and local government officials and legislators. Although the industry still has opponents, particularly among some federal and state corrections officials, labor union officials and the media, prison privatization continues to gain bipartisan support from the legislative and administrative branches of government. In addition, new prisons have been used as a source of economic development in depressed areas, with local officials interested in the stable jobs and sources of commerce that prisons and jails bring to their communities.

Since 1990, the budgetary pressures faced by all levels of government, continued growth in incarceration rates and the emergence of well-capitalized, private-sector prison management companies have created an environment that has resulted in robust growth in beds contracted to the private sector. Table 3 sets forth the growth in secure adult beds under contract with the private sector. From the 10,900 beds under contract at the end of 1989, the industry's contract capacity grew almost eight-fold to 85,201 beds in 1996 (in 132 facilities, including 7,617 beds in 14 facilities outside the United States).

Table 2  
Expected Length of Stay in Federal Prison



Longer prison sentences reflect tougher legislative stance on gun-related crimes.

The industry's beds under contract could cross the 100,000 mark in 1997. The private sector was awarded contracts for 21,606 beds in 1996, a gain of 34 percent. Note that these numbers include only secure adult prison and jail beds — non-secure community corrections and juvenile correctional facilities are not included in these numbers.

## The 1980s were thus a formative period for the private corrections industry, during which it began to establish political and economic credibility with federal, state and local government officials and legislators.

Despite the accelerated level of penetration of private corrections over the last six years, beds currently in operation under private-sector management still account for only 2.9 percent of total U.S. adult secure beds. In addition, it is important to

note that the industry has historically been asked by the government to manage new capacity rather than take over existing facilities. As the concept of private prison management gains acceptance, however, there should be increasing opportunities for the private sector to take over management, and/or ownership, of existing secure correctional facilities. According to the University of Florida's Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, the number of adult secure beds under contract for private management is forecast to grow to 276,455 beds over the next five years, suggesting a compound annual growth rate of 26.5 percent from 1996 to 2001.

## Why Privatize?

The primary motivation for government agencies to contract with private firms for correctional services include:

- Upfront reduction in construction and capital costs, and faster response times in being able to build and begin operating an incarceration facility to the extent that both the design and construction of new facilities are outsourced;
- Reduced labor costs, which account for approximately two-thirds of a prison's operating expenses. (Private prison man-

Continued on page 17

January 1998

# OPINION

Sam Bishop, Opinion Page Editor; 459-7574; e-mail: letters@newsminer.com

1-20-98

FAIRBANKS

## Daily News - Miner

"Independent in All Things... Neutral in None"  
Established in 1903

CHARLES L. GRAY  
Publisher Emeritus

PAUL J. MASSEY  
Publisher

KELLY BOSTIAN  
Managing Editor

SAM BISHOP  
Editorial Page Editor

### Clear vote in Delta

The vote in Delta Junction couldn't have been much clearer. A vast majority of people there believe using Fort Greely for a prison is a good idea.

Common sense led most people to that conclusion. Several factors are converging to make the prison a viable proposal.

The fort will be shut down within a few years. That will leave an entire community of usable buildings empty. It will also leave Delta Junction with a huge hole in its economy.

At the same time, the state needs more prison space. We have hundreds more criminals in jail than the jails are supposed to hold. In Fairbanks, the jail is chronically in violation of the terms of a settlement agreement.

Obviously, there is an opportunity here.

Not everyone likes the opportunity, though. If given unlimited options for maintaining an economy, few people would choose a prison first. But Delta Junction has limited options, and, besides, this one isn't that bad. Occasional escapes occur in any prison or halfway house—we've had a few in Fairbanks over the years. However, the escapees usually try to leave town as quietly and quickly as possible. The incidents don't have a significant or long-term effect upon the quality of life in a community.

Despite its intuitive appeal, the Delta prison proposal raises a question. Is it good public policy to limit the state's options to one community?

If that's the only way to prevent the leveling of Fort Greely, the answer is probably yes. First, the state certainly has an interest in helping Delta avoid disaster. Second, as federal taxpayers, we will all pay a price if the buildings are simply torn down.



### Bed tax isn't for

Primary purpose  
—marketing—  
is being ignored

By BILL BUBBEL

History repeats itself and mankind makes the same mistakes because facts tend to be distorted to suit present needs. This problem applies to the present perception of the Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau's budget for the

structure of the ordinance levy a tax of 2 percent room rented, to be on those hotels located in and then paid to the city. The city would a percent of those funds FCVB and 10 percent of the ordinary fund to be all economic development non-profits having a contract. The city was to a portion of the FCVB budget to ensure expenses didn't exceed

## ON THE INSIDE

# STATE OF ALASKA

## DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

TONY KNOWLES, GOVERNOR

REPLY TO:

PO BOX 112000  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-2000  
PHONE (907) 465-3376

February 2, 1998

The Honorable Eldon Mulder  
Alaska House of Representatives  
State Capitol, Room 423  
Juneau, AK 99811-1182

Re: Release of Restricted Funds

Dear Representative Mulder,

As you will recall, federal funds were appropriated to the FY98 Out of State Contracts BRU, but expenditure were restricted by mutual agreement of the Department and the Legislature. The Department now proposes to expend the funds to purchase up to 95 additional beds from the Corrections Corporation of America's Central Arizona Detention facility in Florence, Arizona.

The Department needs to procure these additional beds as a means to reduce prison overcrowding which is, as of today, 20% over Clearly Emergency levels. In December 1997, 25 new beds were procured using the unrestricted federal funds from this BRU. The additional 95 inmates will be transferred incrementally with approximately 60 in February and 35 in March 1998. If the Department transfers 120 inmates, the per diem cost would be \$57.50 per day; less than 120, would be at the current rate of \$61.02 per day.

Thank you for your consideration and if you have any questions, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at 465-3339.

Sincerely,



Dwayne B. Peeples, Director  
Division of Administrative Services

CC: Margaret M. Pugh, Commissioner

**Delta/Greely Community Coalition**

P.O. Box 780

Delta Junction, Alaska 99737

Delta Junction City Council  
Delta/Greely School District  
Delta Chamber of Commerce  
Deltana Community Corporation  
Delta Chapter, Farm Bureau  
Retired Military/Civilian Representative  
Civil Service Representative



Jim Carlstrom, President  
Doris Fales, Vice-Pres.  
David Durham, Sec./Tres.  
Tel: 907-895-1081  
907-895-4091  
FAX: 907-895-4219

January 19, 1998

Representative Eldon Mulder  
Room 501  
State Capitol  
Juneau, AK 99801

Dear Representative Mulder,

As you are aware, the Delta Greely Community Coalition has received a proposal to establish an 800 bed medium security correctional facility on Fort Greely. This proposal provides the community with an opportunity to keep an economy in the Delta area. With the realignment of Fort Greely our economy will be devastated unless we are able to obtain a reuse of the base such as this proposal represents.

This proposal will not only be beneficial to the economy of the Delta area but would also solve a major problem for the State of Alaska, that of overcrowding in the correctional facilities. This proposal appears to be a very cost effective solution for both the State and Delta.

With the above information as background, we ask your assistance in convincing the Legislature to approve the request for a private medium security correctional facility at Fort Greely and any other possible help you can give us in making it become a reality.

Sincerely,

James L. Carlstrom, President



## 1. Propriety

Critics of private prisons often ask, rhetorically, whether it is "proper" for anyone but the state to deprive people of their freedom.[1]

That, however, is a loaded statement of the issue. Keepers do not take away anyone's freedom; catchers and convicts and sentencers do so. The pertinent question is whether duly authorized punishment is any more or less legitimate when administered by government employees, as opposed to contracted agents.

First, it should be noted that the government does not own the authority to punish.[2] That authority originates in the people and is delegated to government, which administers it in trust, on behalf of the people and subject to the rule of law. In a system characterized by rule of law, both state and private actors are bound by the law, and it is the law, not the civil status of the actor, that determines whether any particular exercise of force is legitimate.

Consider the case of a government-employed prison guard who engages in clear-cut and extreme brutality. We do not say that his act is authorized or legitimate, or even that he is acting at that moment as an agent of the state. In fact, we deny it, in spite of his uniform and all the other trappings of his position. We say that he has "overstepped his authority" and behaved in an unauthorized and unlawful fashion. There is, in effect, an implicit contract between the state and its agents, which makes the authority of the latter conditional on the proper performance of their roles. This conditional authority can be bestowed on contractual agents of the state just as it is on those who are salaried.

## 2. Cost

Harvard professor John Donahue, a prominent critic of privatization, argues that the scope for cost savings in corrections is very limited. Imprisonment is such a simple, basic arrangement, he says, that there is almost no room for improvements in efficiency.[3] If this argument were correct, there would be little room for variation in public prisons, either in performance or in cost. Since we know that there is variation (great variation) in both of these, it must be true that there is room for variation.

There are structural differences between the public and private sectors that affect efficiency and cost.

For example, contracting avoids cumbersome and rigid government procurement procedures; private vendors can purchase more quickly, maintain lower inventories, and negotiate better prices and values.

Contracting avoids civil service and other government (and sometimes union) restrictions that interfere with efficient personnel management (hiring, firing, promotion, and salary setting; assignment of duties, work schedules, vacations, and leaves; adequate staffing to avoid excessive overtime; delegation of authority; etc.).

Finally, the need to show a profit is a powerful incentive to reduce waste and increase productivity.

Newspaper stories comparing the cost of private vs. govt. facilities have made claims of savings ranging from 5 percent to 20, 30, or even 50 percent. Little weight should be given to most of these simple

comparisons, because they generally compare apples to oranges, and because they ignore the enormous problem of "hidden costs."

A realistic expectation of savings through contracting is probably in the range of five percent to fifteen percent. Support for that statement comes from a study for the National Institute of Justice, based on data provided by the County Auditor of Hamilton County, Tennessee. [4] Because a county auditor is in a good position to identify and estimate hidden costs, such as interagency or indirect costs, this study was unusually thorough.

When Corrections Corporation of America assumed management of the Hamilton County Penal Farm, a 350-bed minimum-to-medium security county prison located near Chattanooga, the facility was inherited in a state of deterioration and neglect and required extensive renovation by the contractor. In addition, that region of the country has relatively low correctional costs and the county was already spending less on its prison than other jurisdictions in the same region were spending on their facilities. Since the county was already among the lowest of the low spenders, this facility provides a fairly severe test of a private contractor's ability to lower costs still further while simultaneously renovating the physical plant, expanding capacity, and improving the quality of operations, all of which it did accomplish.

Consistently conservative assumptions were used to estimate all the direct and indirect costs the county would have incurred if it had retained, or if it resumed, operation of the facility itself. The assumptions were conservative in the sense that they were designed to err in the direction of underestimating the costs of county operation. These costs were then compared to the costs of contractual operation, which included not only the contractor's fee but all the direct and indirect county costs that continued to exist in addition to that fee, including the cost of contract administration and monitoring.

The study concluded that, over the three years examined, the county was cutting its costs of corrections by at least 4 percent to 8 percent per year, and more probably by 5 percent to 15 percent.

While that study deserves special attention because of the rigor of its methodology, a considerable and growing body of evidence indicates that privatization produces savings for corrections, just as it does for a wide variety of other governmental operations. Indeed, most contracts are--and all contracts should be--the result of site-specific comparisons between the costs of governmental and private operations. Some jurisdictions even require by law that privatization must achieve a certain level of savings, such as ten percent in Texas and seven percent in Florida. Tennessee law required one contract to demonstrate "at least the same quality of services as the state at a lower cost" or "services superior in quality to those provided by the state at essentially the same cost." A study by the state's Select Oversight Committee found the contract was in fact providing higher quality service at lower cost. [5]

### 3. Quality

If private prisons are cheaper, say the critics, that can only come at the cost of quality. Corner cutting will occur-- meaning poorer food and less of it, fewer services, and cheaper labor with lower professionalism and less training. [6]

Systematic evaluation studies conducted so far, however, have generally been quite positive. An evaluation of a privately contracted secure training school for delinquents produced mixed findings, including a list of 36 positive results and 22 negative results. [7] A survey of inmates at a privately run prison in Tennessee elicited 320 responses, of which 49% were positive, 21% were ambivalent, and 30% were negative. However, prisoners who were able to compare the private management with previous

# CORRECTION

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management by the county were overwhelmingly positive (24/28 comparison responses). [8] A third study compared the performances of private juvenile facilities in Massachusetts and of a private prison in Kentucky with matched governmental counterparts. On a substantial majority of performance indicators, the private facilities had at least a small advantage. "By and large, both staff and inmates gave better ratings to the services and programs at the privately-operated facilities; escape rates were lower; there were fewer disturbances by inmates; and in general, staff and offenders felt more comfortable at the privately-operated facilities." [9]

The most comprehensive and carefully structured study to date compared the performances of a private, a state, and a federal women's prison on 333 empirical indicators covering eight dimensions of the quality of confinement, including security, safety, order, care, activity, justice, living conditions, and management. While all three prisons were regarded as having been high in quality, the private prison outscored its two governmental counterparts on nearly every dimension, in some cases by quite substantial margins.

Private facilities are often required by contract to be certified as meeting the standards of the American Correctional Association. Except for the Bureau of Prisons and a few state systems, such as Florida, this is a rare condition among government facilities. Certification does not guarantee quality, but its requirement is evidence that private prisons are expected to meet high standards, and their high rate of certification is evidence that they do.

Other evidence of quality is indirect, such as the fact that contracts are regularly renewed by satisfied government agencies, and the fact that no state is under court orders to rectify poor conditions caused by private operations, while the majority of American states are under such orders as the result of governmental failures. [10]

## 4. Quantity

Many critics, especially members of the ACLU, are opposed to private prisons largely because they are opposed to prisons generally. If, through efficiency, more prisons are built (argue the critics) they will be filled because they are there. [11]

For over three decades, prison reform groups have advocated a moratorium on all new prison construction, believing that capacity drives use, and hoping that lack of capacity would curtail use. That strategy has backfired, and increasing numbers of prisoners are paying the price in terms of overcrowding and deteriorating physical conditions.

Critics also fear that private prison companies will become powerful lobbyists for harsher punishment, in an attempt to artificially stimulate demand for their product.

Commercial enterprises survive and prosper in the long run not by artificially stimulating a spurious demand for their products, but by accurately anticipating and responding to shifts in real demand. Right now, there is a big overhang of genuine, unmet demand for imprisonment. However, if there is also a demand for alternatives to prison, or if that should grow, commercial companies will be able and willing to respond rapidly to that demand as well. For example, some detention contractors also provide, and aggressively market, electronic monitoring and other alternatives to jail.

One irony must be noted regarding the critics' fear of lobbying. The largest contributor to Pete Wilson's gubernatorial campaign was the California correctional officers union. It wasn't a corporation, but a

public employee union, that most strongly backed Wilson in promoting the largest prison expansion program in the country. A study of New York state government found that the great bulk of campaign contributions and lobbying came from the state teachers union, other public employee unions, regulated industry groups such as medical and banking associations, school boards, and the Conference of Mayors. In short, the biggest lobbyist of government is government itself, along with the "nomenklatura" of the government class. [12]

## 5. Flexibility

Critics of contracting argue that it is impossible to write a contract that is as broad and flexible as the mission of a public agency needs to be. Contractors may be reluctant to depart from the provisions of their contracts. Renegotiating and changing contracts is time-consuming and terminating a contract is often very difficult. Thus, it may be hard for the government, under contracting, to order and control marginal changes.

This is one of the weaker objections to contracting. It is one of the most widely acknowledged strengths of private prisons that their greater management flexibility and more rapid speed of response promote both minor innovations and major program changes, including initiation, expansion, contraction, or termination.

In any case, if a particular contract turns out to be too costly or unsatisfactory, it is always possible to terminate it or fail to renew it. In contrast, how feasible is it to replace or halt the activities of government agencies, staffed by tenured and unionized civil servants, whose services are found to be unsatisfactory? It may not always be easy to terminate a contract, but experience has shown that it is nearly impossible to terminate a government agency, even one supposedly made mortal by a sunset law. [13]

## 6. Security

What happens in the case of a riot, or a strike? Many times, I have heard critics of private prisons ask this question, then move on to other issues as if it were unanswerable, or required no answer. The answer, however, is about the same as for a government-run prison.

It may be unclear whether or not contracted prison guards would have the right to strike, but the absence of such a right has not prevented public guards from engaging in strikes, sickouts, and other job actions. At one point, in a coordinated action, prison guards in Rhode Island and at six penal institutions in Ohio walked off their jobs. In another case, almost all the guards at New York's 33 correctional facilities went out on a strike that lasted 17 days. The Governor called in the National Guard, who were met with violence and property damage by the striking prison guards. [14]

Unemployment as the result of a strike may be a more credible threat to private than to public guards, because a strike or other disruption would allow the government to terminate a contract.

Prison contracts typically include contingency plans to deal with emergencies or disruptions, such as strikes, riots, or bankruptcy. State police and the National Guard provide the ultimate backup for prison staff, whether private or public. A performance bond can be used to defray the government's cost if it has to take control of a contracted facility.

In terms of escapes, the experience of private jails and prisons has been no worse than that of their

government-run counterparts. None of the privates, however, has been as lax in its security as the District of Columbia's government-run Oak Hill Youth Center, a high security detention facility for juveniles in Laurel, MD, where a journalist's check of the official log showed that 30 percent of the 197 detainees were missing and listed as escapees, [15] or the Prince George's County (MD) Jail--much celebrated for its New Generation design--which 11 times during its first year released the wrong prisoners under mistaken identities. [16]

## 7. Liability

Critics warn that governments will not escape liability by contracting the administration of their prisons, as some advocates supposedly claim.

To some extent, this is a strawman argument, since I do not know of any private vendor who claims that contracting can immunize the government from legal liability. Prisoners in private facilities have at least as many avenues of civil redress as do their fellows in government-run prisons. Total liability, in other words, is not decreased.

However, it is possible that contracting could reduce government's actual liability exposure, as opposed to its legal liability potential. That is, the financial damages likely to be suffered by government as a result of its legal liabilities can be reduced. Liability exposure can be reduced in several ways:

1. by running prisons better, and thus avoiding lawsuits;
2. by achieving certification, which greatly enhances the defense against lawsuits;
3. by carrying adequate insurance;
4. by agreements in which the contractor defends the government in court and indemnifies it against legal damages;
5. by developing extensive legal expertise and resources, both for preventing and for fighting lawsuits; and
6. by settling quickly out of court, which is easier for private firms than for public agencies.

## 8. Accountability

Critics claim that contracting reduces accountability because private actors are insulated from the public and not subject to the same political controls as are government actors. Also, the critics charge, contracting diffuses responsibility; government and private actors can each blame the other when something goes wrong.

Proponents reply that contracting increases accountability because the government is more willing to monitor and control a contractor than it is to monitor and control itself. Contractors -- just like their governmental counterparts -- are accountable to the law, to governmental supervisors, and ultimately, to the voting public, through the political system. In addition, they are accountable, through a competitive market, to certain forces not faced by government agencies. They are answerable to insurers, investors, stockholders, and competitors. As a mechanism of accountability and control, the force of market competition is unmatched.

The most obvious form of accountability in corrections, however, is legal accountability. If the Rule of Law can limit and constrain the power of the state, then surely it can hold a private firm at least equally

accountable. Constitutional standards, for example, will apply equally to all prisons, whether run by government employees or by contractors.

## 9. Corruption

Critics contend that contracting invites corruption, in the form of favoritism, bid-rigging, conflict of interest, bribes, kickbacks, etc.. They point to contemporary examples in other areas of contracting, and to historical examples of corruption in contracting for inmate labor.

The historical abuses came at a time when corruption and abuse was much more prevalent in the criminal justice system generally. For example, some states ran their prisons as profit-making enterprises just as ruthlessly and exploitatively without the aid of private contractors as others did with them. In today's political and legal environment, such extreme and flagrant corruption and abuse are very unlikely.

Political corruption is a corollary of government, not just of government contracting. The ingredient common to all instances of corruption is not private ownership, but public power. Payroll padding, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, bribery, payoffs, featherbedding, dishonest budget inflation, conflicts of interest, misuse of public funds, links to organized crime, and many other kinds of corruption also occur within public employee unions and within governmental units that provide services directly, rather than through contracts

## 10. Dependency

Critics worry that contractors will engage in "lowballing," in which they obtain contracts by making unrealistically low bids. Then, when government becomes dependent, the contractor will be free to jack up prices. Worse yet, the contractor may go bankrupt, leaving the government without any correctional capacity.

Market entry costs for single, especially low-security, facilities are well within reach of small businesses or groups of investors. As a new corporation, CCA was able to site, finance, build, and open a 350 bed prison within 7 months, for \$5 million. The U.S. Corrections Corporation, founded by two men with an initial investment of \$1.9 million, opened its first facility at a seminary purchased for \$695,000. If this is all it takes to enter the market, it is well within the resources of numerous potential competitors.<sup>[17]</sup>

Public agencies can guard against lowballing by evaluating proposed budgets for their realism, rather than just looking for the lowest bidder. Also, regular rebidding of contracts can make lowballing a strategy too costly to pursue. No private company can raise its fees very high above a reasonable profit margin without inviting exposure and opposition by competitors. Competing contractors have the information, motivation, and organizational resources to control each others' prices to a much greater degree than the information, motivation, and resources of taxpayers to control government costs.

The issue of dependence, as an objection to private prisons, has a self-defeating character. If dependence is a real problem, will the problem be solved if there are no private vendors? If a public service can only be supplied by government employees, organized into unions, is that not also a form of dependence? To argue that private suppliers of a public service will not be sufficiently competitive is not a very good argument for public monopoly.

## Conclusion

By way of summary, let me list just the six most prominent areas in which I see potential advantages in the private operation of prisons and jails:

1. Cost containment
2. Speed and flexibility in expanding (or contracting) both physical capacity and programs
3. Effects on standards, expectations, and quality of operations
4. Indemnification and other protections against liability
5. Enhancement of justice by allowing supply to respond to demand, instead of vice versa
6. The enhancement of accountability and due process through additional monitoring and independent review

Perhaps their most important function of all is that private prisons provide a comparative yardstick against which to measure performance. How do we know if the government is running our prisons in the most humane, effective, and efficient manner possible? As with any service, the best test, and the best guarantee, of quality is competition and comparison.

**Contents**

# Charles H. Logan, Professional Biography

Dr. Charles H. Logan is a Professor and Associate Head of Sociology at the University of Connecticut, where he has taught since 1970. He has published widely on many criminal justice issues and is a leading authority on privatization in corrections. He served as a professional staff member on the President's Commission on Privatization, for whose Report he wrote the chapter on the contract operation of prisons. He has been a Visiting Fellow at several agencies within the U.S. Department of Justice, and has received support for his research from the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the National Institute of Corrections.

Among Professor Logan's publications on privatization are: Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (Oxford University Press, 1990); "The Development, Present Status, and Future Potential of Correctional Privatization in America," (with Charles W. Thomas) in Bowman, Hakim, and Seidenstat, Privatizing Correctional Institutions (1993); "Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons," in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1992); "Comparing Costs of Public and Private Prisons," (with Bill W. McGriff) in NIJ Reports (1989); "Proprietary Prisons" in Goodstein and MacKenzie, The American Prison (1989); "The Propriety of Proprietary Prisons," in Federal Probation (1987); "Competition in the Prison Business," in The Freeman (1985); "Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise Prisons," (with Sharla P. Rausch) in Justice Quarterly (1985).

A member of the American Society of Criminology, Dr. Logan has served as an Associate Editor of the journal Criminology and as a Consulting Editor for the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. He is a member of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section's Corrections and Sentencing Committee, is a former member of the Board of Directors of the Connecticut Bar Foundation, and serves on the advisory board of the Yankee Institute. In addition to privatization, he has published widely on many other criminal justice issues, including the deterrent effects of arrest and imprisonment, evaluation of correctional programs, the effects of parole, juvenile justice, jury selection, and prison performance measures.

January 27, 1998

Dear Representative James:

I would like to thank your legislative aide, Myrna McGhie, for the response to my email message. Please rest assured that I fully understand the impossibility of you responding to each piece of correspondence personally.

The concerns of many of the residences of the Delta community about the proposed prison at Ft. Greely basically fall into the following categories:

- The prison will endanger the children at Ft. Greely School.
- Delta will become known as a "prison town".
- Relatives of prisoners will move to Delta thus causing an increase in crime.
- Delta residents will be in greater danger because of the prisoners.

I will try to address each of these concerns. I will readily admit that I am no better nor am I any smarter than the people who have voiced these and other concerns; nor am I making light of any of these concerns. I will just try to address them in as logical manner as I can.

1. I teach at the school at Ft. Greely. I have known the majority of the children that I teach since they were born. I have known many of their parents and grandparents my entire life. I am not a hero. I like to think of myself as something more than a fool. I do not think it is my right to endanger the lives of people, especially the lives of the young men and women I teach. If I thought that the proposed prison posed a realistic threat to those kids I would be the first one to demand that this threat be removed. The reality is that these children are in greater danger from each other than they would be from a prison.

2. Seward has a prison, Palmer has a prison. I have yet to find one person that says: "I won't go to Seward or Palmer, those are prison towns." I can't say anymore about this concern.

3. I find the notion that relatives of people that are in prison are somehow inherently "bad" or "undesirable" as blatantly unrealistic and discriminatory as can be. The relatives did not commit the crimes. More people than would like to admit have a relative that is or has been in jail or in prison. Because prisoners are moved around fairly frequently it would not be a wise thing to do to play tag. Sure, some may come. They are as welcome as the next person. I will judge them by their actions, not by the actions of a relative.


4. In the seven day period from the first public meeting on January 8th, to the second public meeting on January 15th, to discuss the proposed prison there were three cases of domestic violence, one arrest of a Delta resident for parole violations from Missouri, and the sentence of two years with eighteen months suspended for burglary handed down to Delta resident. We have met the criminals and they are us! People do not like to face the reality that they do not live in a utopia. There is crime enough for everyone in Delta; all they have to do is look in the local paper or talk to their neighbors. I do not fear the people in prison. I do not worry about the car that is broke down on the side of the road with a couple of flat tires, I worry about those cars that are moving.

Representative James, I was brought to Delta in December of 1952 at the age of nine months. I have lived the vast majority of my life here. Call me nuts, but I love my life here. When Ft. Greely is totally "realigned" the Delta area will be devastated if there is no viable replacement for the jobs at Ft. Greely. Quality of life can mean many things to many people, but quality of life can never be a reality if fear prevents a person or a community from moving forward to meet the future. One ex-

remely important ingredient to a quality life is a stable economy that allows people to plan and dream, and then make those dreams and plans happen.

I hope that I have been of assistance. If I may be of further assistance please ask.

Respectfully,



Michael O. McCowan  
HC 60 Box 4120  
Delta Jct., AK 99737  
email: dfmn@dgsd.k12.ak.us

# Fort Greely prison makes sense for town, state

By JIM CARLSTROM

Last week, the Daily News ran two front-page articles about Delta Junction and our decision to consider converting part of Fort Greely into a medium-security prison. While we appreciate the Anchorage Daily News' coverage, we think it important for ADN readers to understand why we think this project is so important.

First, the benefit to the state is substantial. The combined operating and construction cost per day, per bed, will be less than half of the cost of a facility built and operated by the state and in the same range as the state spends to house Alaska prisoners in Arizona. Given the devastating effect of the base realignment on our local economy, the benefit to Delta Junction is obvious. We will be able to restore 250 to 300 permanent jobs that would otherwise be lost through the realignment of Fort Greely.

Delta Junction is less than a two-hour drive from Alaska's second-largest population base. It is on a main highway linking Interior and Southcentral Alaska and boasts a modern, 7,000-foot, paved airfield. Considering that every day prison-

## COMPASS

ers are transported by land and air between communities in Southeast, Southcentral, Western and Interior Alaska, we do not understand why state corrections officials voice concern that Fort Greely is too remote for a prison. In fact, Fort Greely is more accessible than most existing state-operated jails and prisons. And certainly closer than Arizona.

The ADN also quoted concerned state employee union officials and a Florida University professor who said the facilities were not designed to be used as a prison. They contend that it would be too expensive to convert Fort Greely to that use. Neither the professor nor the union has set foot there. If they had, they would have seen facilities that are well suited for prison use. It is also important to know that the state took over 2 military barracks at Wildwood and converted it to a prison. It continues to be used for that purpose. Why would it

*In partnership with the private sector, we propose to build and operate a prison to the highest standards of the corrections industry. The prison would provide career opportunities for our young people, jobs for area residents to replace those that will be lost by the base realignment, and savings to the state while providing badly needed relief from prison crowding.*

make sense for the state to do that, but not for a private corrections company?

National planning consultants for the Delta/Greely Community Coalition have identified a prison as among the highest and best uses for the base facilities. They emphasized that such a use would form a stable job base in a growth industry and would result in the greatest long-term economic benefit to the region. Those findings have been reinforced by independent engineering, architectural and security consultants who have found the facilities well suited for conversion to a prison.

Today, all 15 state-operated prisons and jails are operating beyond

their emergency capacities. State corrections officials predict a need for more than 1,300 new prison beds by the year 2000 and the system is growing at an annual rate of 8 to 10 percent. The state houses 270 prisoners in Arizona and is planning to transport another 100 in the near future, and by so doing will export several million dollars as well. Why shouldn't Alaska money be used to hire Alaskans in a community that is on the verge of economic ruin; especially if it can be done for about the same price?

In partnership with the private sector, we propose to build and operate a prison to the highest standards of the corrections industry. The prison would provide career

opportunities for our young people, jobs for area residents to replace those that will be lost by the base realignment, and savings to the state while providing badly needed relief from prison crowding.

We can bring those beds on line within a year. Any state prison is several years away.

What we propose makes economic and common sense. And given our community's bleak future with the realignment of Fort Greely, it also makes sense for Alaskans to be good neighbors by supporting us as we try to help ourselves.

Jim Carlstrom is president of the Delta Greely Community Coalition.

# B • R • A • C

## Fort Greely Base Realignment and Closure Cleanup Team

### SM-1A Pipeline Removal Fort Greely, Alaska

**The Job:** Remediation of a deactivated waste pipeline from the decommissioned SM-1A nuclear reactor power plant at Fort Greely. The project included establishing cleanup-level criteria, performing radiological field screening, excavating and removing the pipe and contaminated soil, clean up confirmation sampling and analysis, containerizing the pipe and waste soil, and disposing of the waste materials.

**Primary Contaminants of Potential Concern:**  
Cesium-137 and Strontium-90 radionuclides

**Value:** \$2.1 million

**Performance Period:** 1997—1998

**BRAC Cleanup Team Points of Contact:**

**Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)**

Ken Spiers (907) 353-6323

**U.S. Army Engineering District, Alaska (USAED)**

David Williams (907) 753-2865

**U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)**

Matt Wilkening (206) 553-1284

**Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation**

(ADEC) Ronan Short (907) 753-5791

**Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.**

Chris Dillon (907) 563-3322

### Project Overview:

As a result of the BRAC 95 Commission's realignment of the cold regions test center operations at Fort Greely, the post is to be significantly downsized and the number of properties to be retained under U.S. Army control reduced. The BRAC environmental restoration program was implemented to provide information regarding the environmental condition of the eligible BRAC properties for reuse and provide cleanup as necessary of land subject to transfer or lease under the BRAC process.

The Delta/Greely Community Coalition (DGCC), a local authority organized to evaluate and select potential properties for reuse, has prioritized areas for reuse.

A 1-inch diameter steel pipeline carried low-level radioactive waste water in the early 1960s along a one-mile corridor from the SM-1A nuclear power plant to a dilution station; and diluted effluent was discharged to Jarvis Creek. The former nuclear waste pipeline was removed and its corridor radiologically cleared to ensure safe reuse of properties under consideration by DGCC.



*Excavation and removal of the SM-1A pipeline and contaminated soil.*

Under the Total Environmental Restoration Contract (TERC) program, USAED and Jacobs Engineering prepared a comprehensive engineering plan for removing the pipeline and remediating the pipeline corridor. The work was performed efficiently and in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local requirements.

**SUCCESS FACTORS:** The success of the Fort Greely pipeline remediation can be attributed to partnering, the TERC contracting vehicle, and cooperative technical planning.

**Partnering:** The success of project planning and field activities directly resulted from partnering between the U.S. Army, EPA, ADEC, USAED, DGCC, and Jacobs Engineering. Partnering fostered technical innovation,

# CORRECTION

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT(S)  
HAVE BEEN REFILMED TO  
ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR PAGINATION



Rev. 6/98

Central Microfilm Services  
Department of Education  
State of Alaska

# B • R • A • C

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**Partnering:** The success of project planning and field activities directly resulted from partnering between the U.S. Army, EPA, ADEC, USAED, DGCC, and Jacobs Engineering. Partnering fostered technical innovation,

facilitated quality improvements, built trust and cooperation within the BRAC Cleanup Team, and developed consensus among all stakeholders during the decision-making process.

**TERC Contracting:** With provisions for design-build, the TERC contracting vehicle allowed for investigation, design, and remediation to occur during a single field season. Through a general scope that identified an end objective, the project could refine design criteria from real time field data during remedial activities. With cost control on a reimbursable basis, the project was able to achieve significant savings in time and money compared to traditional sequential fixed-price subcontracting.

**Cooperative Technical Planning:** With work groups formed during the design phase, coordination of site investigations by the Army Reactor Office, Army CRREL, Jacobs Engineering, and others allowed for the rapid transmission of data and avoided expensive duplication of effort. Consensus on cleanup criteria was achieved through coordination with radiation specialists at the Army Reactor Office, USAED, EPA, ADEC, and Jacobs Engineering.

## Major Accomplishments:

**BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) Performance:** Interaction within the BCT allowed an expedited work plan review process, radiological cleanup-level criteria development, and field screening technical approach development, thus saving considerable time for field work to be accomplished in 1997.

**Property Clearance:** Radiological clearance of 3,500 feet of pipeline corridor was achieved for future reuse. Nine additional hot spots have been identified in adjacent areas for future actions. Remedial accomplishments include:

- Removal of 2,500 linear feet of contaminated pipe.
- Removal of 600 cubic yards of low-level radioactively contaminated soil.

- Compilation of 25,000 field screening and laboratory data points.
- Completion of fixed laboratory clearance confirmation sampling.

**Expedited Schedule Process:** The planning and field work was expedited to remain in step with the BRAC schedule. A compressed schedule for development and approval of the work plan allowed for a significant portion of the field activities to be completed during the 1997 field season. Modifications to a POL station within the pipeline corridor were "piggy-backed" to remedial actions through the TERC in order to achieve regulatory compliance on schedule with ADEC requirements for underground storage tanks.

**Perfect Safety Record:** The combination of good planning and attention to safety in the field is credited with achieving an accident-free project totaling 12,600 field hours.



*Excavation of a hot spot and containerization of soils.*

**Future Actions:** Remediation of additional hot spots will occur as funding becomes available. Prior to shipment offsite, a waste minimization program will be implemented to remove the portion of those soils which are not contaminated. Waste minimization will result in a significant cost savings for disposal.

## BRAC Cleanup Team Mission Statement

To expedite and improve environmental response actions in order to facilitate the disposal and reuse of BRAC properties, while protecting human health and the environment.



®

**James F. Watford**

P O Box 214  
Delta Junction, AK 99737-0964  
Home Phone 907-895-4311  
February 03, 1998

Subject: HB-53 LEASE-PURCHASE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY  
(FT. GREELY PRISON)


TO:HOUSE FINANCE Committtee;

This will inform you of my complete opposition to the HB-53  
LEASE-PURCHASE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, (Ft.Greely Prison).

The Delta Junction area does not in anyway need more trouble  
in this area. We have sufficent dope peddlers and law breakers  
without adding to it.

The Delta Junction Citizens do not need to become the  
finical gocket book for Allvest Co.. I do not believe the state  
of Alaska needs thal.

Sincerely,



Your name goes here



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee on HB 53, dated Feb 3 1998  
 committee name  
 bill/ subject

Delta Junction area residents were not adequately informed prior to the "unofficial" vote. Outlying areas check their mail less frequently. I check mine only once per week in most cases. Notification of the vote was via the mail only three days prior.

The fear tactics applied by the coalition and their side were unfair and rushed people to vote before thinking this matter through. I would predict that a legal vote would result in a much higher voter turn out. Possibly 1600 people. The more rural residents are less inclined to be favorable to a prison because they are less dependant on Delta Junction economically. For example wount the dry Creek turnout! Or Healy Lake!

The real issue, however; Are private prisons good for Alaska? How can the high calling of justice be entrusted to low payed corrections officers? Once privatization of the justice system occurs, its purpose will become corrupted.

The responsibility of criminal justice clearly rests on the government. Please see US constitution, State Constitution, and Romans Chapter 13 of The Holy Bible.

If HB 53 passes this trend could end with private courts in years to come.

This is not good for Alaska.

Signed:

Patrick Anthony Dalton

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

PO Box 1413 Delta Junction AK 99737

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the FINANCE  
 committee on HB 53, dated 3 Feb 98 committee name  
 bill/ subject

There are two perspectives to look at in this proposal. The large scale is the current penalties and housing of prisoners outside Alaska because of over crowding. The privatization of a new prison is the most economical for the state.

At the local level we will loose 250 government jobs, nearly 330 military and 480 family members. Also, half of the teachers in the local schools will loose their jobs, which is the second largest employer in the area.

Only one college has said, <sup>in writing</sup> they will stay after Greely closes, and that is cavitated by the prison coming in and making the operation economically feasible - 62% of one of the highest voter participation voted

Signed:

Kevin Kell  
 Testifier yes  
self & Central Texas College  
 Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 412 Delta Junction AK 99737  
 Address  
907-895-4334 (H) 907-869-3301 (w)  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee on HB 53, dated Feb. 3, 1998  
bill/ subject committee name

UNIVERSITY FACULTY  
 BUSINESS MEMBER

My name is Donna GARLAND, A DELTA RESIDENT, management consultant AND VOLUNTEER toward economic development since the BRAC announcement. Typically, a STATE OR CITY Agency must base procurements on a competitive bid basis (SECTION 33.30.031 (c)). IF the legislature DECIDES that a contract with DELTA Junction is in the best interest of the state, then I believe the legislature should consider a requirement that DELTA Junction hold a competitive process to identify the "best value" provider of correctional services. Allvest has never operated a medium security correctional facility. I believe the competitive process, by definition + nature of the process, would yield better value to the state + the community. Without such requirement, Allvest would be a sole source procurement. If this happens, be assured that the Coaction Board has formed a negotiation committee, reviewed Allvest's proposed agreement + pencilled over 50 changes AT FIRST REVIEW. Conveyance issues ARE SERIOUS ones with great community implications AND will NOT be considered lightly UNLESS WE CAN be successful in negotiations with proper legal + management approval.

Signed: Donna Garland  
 Testifier

A contract will NOT be signed with ALLVEST.

Representing (Optional)  
Box 1026 DELTA 99737

Address  
895-4786 FAX 895-4777

Phone No. 2mail donna@kniwi.net

Thank you.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated February 3, 1998.  
 bill/ subject

People ~~to~~ say that there was not enough time (notification) prior to the opinion vote ~~and~~ January 17, 1998. If over 1200 Delta City and Big Delta Voting Areas got the word and made it to make their opinion known then it would appear that enough notification was given. For those out of town or state; registered voters could mail or fax in their opinion ballots.

In my Jr. High classes I held a secret opinion vote of Friday, January 16<sup>th</sup>. 94 kids voted the results were 76 yes votes, 18 no votes. "Kids Voting" has demonstrated that the results of Kids Voting very closely mirrors the adult vote; 62% for, 38% no.

I completely support the proposed prison. I also completely support the members of the Delta/Beeky Community Coalition.

I know some people fear change, but change must come. Nothing created by humans is perfect, but we should never let our fears stop us from moving forward.

At least is not the federal government, it can not pay federal government inflated wages. Expectations must be realistic.

I urge each member of this committee to support HB53. It is good for Alaska and Delta.

Signed: Michael D. McCowan

Testifier

Self

Representing (Optional)

HC 60 Box 4120 Delta Jct. AK 99737

Address

Delta Jct 907-895-4133

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance

committee on HB 53, dated 2/3/98 committee name

bill/ subject

I am against the prison proposal. I am concerned about Alvest as a corporation - wanting to run a private prison. ~~add~~ I think things are going too quickly. The Coalition seems to be pushing this without fully informing the public. They are negotiating with Alvest currently - but will not disclose what they are negotiating.

I'm concerned about Alvest wanting 300 housing units from Ft. Greely - BUT MOSTLY I am concerned about a prison so close to the Ft. Greely Elementary school + Jr. High. I will not allow my 3 children to attend school next to a prison.

Signed:

Testifier

Self

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 731

Delta Jct

Address

895-5128

Phone No.

*AW*



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE  
 committee on HR. 53, dated 2-3-98  
 committee name  
 bill/ subject

HONORABLE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

THE UNELECTED MEMBERS OF THE COALITION MADE THIS AGREEMENT IN ALL MOST COMPLETE SECRECY AND WAS STILL DENYING IT UNTIL THEY DISCOVERED SOME PEOPLE HAD SEEN PAPERWORK ON IT.

ONLY THEN DID THEY ADMIT IT, AND THEN THEY DISTRIBUTED PAPERWORK STATING MOST JOBS WOULD PAY OVER \$16 PER HOUR.

THEN THEY HAD A FRAUDULANT VOTE BEFORE THE COMMUNITY HAD A CHANCE TO FIND OUT THE TRUTH.

THERE ARE MORE AND MORE PEOPLE EVERY DAY CHANGING THEIR MINDS ABOUT ALLVEST AND THEIR PRISON.

PLEASE DO NOT USE THAT FALSE VOTE COUNT TO THINK THE MAJORITY OF DELTA CITIZENS WANT THE ALLVEST PRISON.

THANK YOU  
 R. C. Bouch

Signed:

R. C. Bouch  
 Testifier  
SELF  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 2 DELTA JCT, AK 99737  
 Address  
895-4448  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE.  
 committee on DELTA PRISON, dated 2/3/98.  
 committee name  
 bill/ subject

I AM OPPOSED TO THE PLAN TO TURN FT. GREELEY INTO A MEDIUM SECURITY PRISON AS THE PLAN NOW STANDS. THE COMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE AND DISCUSS THE ISSUE ADEQUATELY AND IN FACT HAS BEEN BOMBARDED WITH THIS INFORMATION AND PUSHED TO MAKE A SNAP DECISION. WE ALSO DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT ALLVEST, WHO ~~THESE~~ SEEM TO HAVE A VERY MIXED REPUTATION. THE "COALITION" IS NOT AN ELECTED BOARD, AND THE "ELECTION" WAS NOT A LEGAL VOTE AND THOSE OPPOSED TO THIS PROPOSAL ARE VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN HANDLED SO FAR.

Signed:

David Wright

Testifier

SELR

Representing (Optional)

P.O. BOX 225, DELTA JCT, AK. 99737

Address

(907) 895-4179

Phone No.

02/03/98  
14:03:59

LEGISLATIVE TELECONFERENCE NETWORK SYSTEM  
PARTICIPANT LIST (TESTIFIERS ONLY)  
TCN:80203 SCHEDULED FOR:02/03/98 13:30 TO 15:30  
PUBLIC HEARING HOUSE FINANCE

2/3/98  
LTN1150  
BY:JNU  
FOR:ALL

LOCATION: DELTA JCT.

8	HB 53	MR.	ART	GRISWOLD	TESTIFY
	<del>HB 53</del>	<del>MS.</del>	<del>PATRICIA</del>	<del>GRISWOLD</del>	<del>TESTIFY</del>
9	HB 53	MR.	MICHAEL	MCCOWAN	TESTIFY
10	HB 53	MS.	DONNA	GARDINO	TESTIFY
11	HB 53	MR.	KEVIN	KELLY	TESTIFY
12	HB 53	MR.	DAVID	WRIGHT	TESTIFY
13	HB 53	MR.	BILL	JOHNSON	TESTIFY
15	HB 53	MS.	SHELLIE	MATHEWS	TESTIFY
16	HB 53	MR.	PATRICK	SCHLICHTING	TESTIFY
17	HB 53	MR.	PATRICK	DALTON	TESTIFY
	<del>HB 53</del>	<del>MR.</del>	<del>ROY</del>	<del>BOWDRE</del>	<del>TESTIFY</del>
18	HB 53	MR.	ROBERT	BRADLEY	TESTIFY
19	HB 53	MR.	DANIEL	LUCAS	TESTIFY
20	HB 53	MR.	DAN	BECK	TESTIFY

LOCATION: FAIRBANKS

14	HB 53	MR.	HUGH	DOOGAN	TESTIFY
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LOCATION: KENAI LIO

LOCATION: MATSU

①



Dave Anderson  
(testimony avail)  
Lt Col. US Army

②1 Writta Schooley - Newspaper

②2 Sam Dighton

23 Frank Gold - Fairbanks



# House Finance Committee

SUBJECT OF MEETING:

HB 53  
HJR 36

DATE: Feb 3, 98

PLACE: Capital 519

NAME	REPRESENTING	BUSINESS/PERSONAL MAILING ADDRESS	ZIP	(H) PHONE	(W) PHONE	DO YOU WANT TO TESTIFY?	WHAT SUBJECT/ WHICH BILL?
K LESLIE KIRK	CONCERNED CITIZENS OF DELTA JUNCTION	PO BOX 261 DELTA JUNCTION, AK <del>99717</del>	99737	(907) 895-4047		(Y) N	HB 53
Margie Vander	Dept of Law	AG				(Y) N	HB 53
Bill Parker	DEPT CORRECTIONS	DOC				(Y) N	HB 53
Gary Damon	PSEA	P.O. BOX 772592 EAGLE RIVER, AK 99577				(Y) N	HB 53
Forrest Browne	DOR	11th - 50B			465-3250	(Y) N	HB 53
DUGAN PETTY	DEPT OF ADMIN	STATE OFFICE BLDG			465-5687	(Y) N	HB 53
Glen Wright	MAYOR					(Y) N	
JAMES CARLSTROM	DELTA GREEN	COMMUNITY COAZITION				(Y) N	
FRANK PREWITT		ALVEST				(Y) N	
Tom Livingston	Allvest	3900 Arctic Blvd ARIC AK Livingston Stone Archts	99503	562.2058		(Y) N	
Klebsch	ALVEST	4270 GLACIERWAY 99801				(Y) N	

JANET



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE,  
 committee on DELTA PRISON, dated 2/3/99.  
 bill/ subject

I AM OPPOSED TO THE PLAN TO TURN FT. GREELY INTO A MEDIUM SECURITY PRISON AS THE PLAN NOW STANDS. THE COMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE AND DISCUSS THE ISSUE ADEQUATELY AND IN FACT HAS BEEN BOMBARDED WITH THIS INFORMATION AND PUSHED TO MAKE A SNAP DECISION. WE ALSO DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT ALVEST, WHO ~~THESE~~ SEEM TO HAVE A VERY MIXED REPUTATION. THE "COALITION" IS NOT AN ELECTED BOARD, AND THE "ELECTION" WAS NOT A LEGAL VOTE AND THOSE OPPOSED TO THIS PROPOSAL ARE VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN HANDLED SO FAR.

Signed:

David Wright

Testifier

SELF

Representing (Optional)

P.O. BOX 225, DELTA JCT, AK. 99737

Address

(907) 895-4179

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE  
committee on HR 53, dated 2-3-98  
bill/ subject committee name

HONORABLE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

THE UNELECTED MEMBERS OF THE COALITION MADE THIS AGREEMENT IN ALL MOST COMPLETE SECRECY, AND WAS STILL DENYING IT UNTIL THEY DISCOVERED SOME PEOPLE HAD SEEN PAPERWORK ON IT.

ONLY THEN DID THEY ADMIT IT, AND THEN THEY DISTRIBUTED PAPERWORK STATING MOST JOBS WOULD PAY OVER \$16 PER HOUR.

THEN THEY HAD A FRAUDULANT VOTE BEFORE THE COMMUNITY HAD A CHANCE TO FIND OUT THE TRUTH.

THERE ARE MORE AND MORE PEOPLE EVERY DAY CHANGING THEIR MINDS ABOUT ALLVEST AND THEIR PRISONS.

PLEASE DO NOT USE THAT FALSE VOTE COUNT TO THINK THE MAJORITY OF DELTA CITIZENS WANT THE ALLVEST PRISON.

THANK YOU  
R. C. Bowler

Signed:

R. C. Bowler

Testifier

SELF

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 2 DELTA ALASKA 99737

Address

895-4448

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/3/98  
 bill/ subject committee name

I am against the prison proposal. I am concerned about Alvest as a corporation - wanting to run a private prison. ~~about~~ I think things are going too quickly. The Coalition seems to be pushing this without fully informing the public. They are negotiating with Alvest currently - but will not disclose what they are negotiating.

I'm concerned about Alvest wanting 300 housing units from Ft. Greely - But MOSTLY I am concerned about a prison so close to the Ft. Greely Elementary school + Jr. High. I will not allow my <sup>3</sup> children to attend school next to a prison.

Signed:

Testifier

self

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 731

Delta jet

Address

895-5128

Phone No.

*Handwritten initials*



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated February 3, 1998.  
 bill/ subject

People ~~to say~~ that there was not enough time (notification) prior to the opinion vote ~~and~~ January 17, 1998. If over 1200 Delta City and Big Delta Voting Areas got the word and made it to make their opinion known then it would appear that enough notification was given. For those out of town or stat.; registered voters could mail or fax in their opinion ballots.

In my Jr. High classes I held a secret opinion vote of Friday, January 16<sup>th</sup>. 94 kids voted the results were 76 yes votes, 18 no votes. "Kids Voting" has demonstrated that the results of Kids Voting very closely mirrors the adult vote; 62% for, 38% no.

I completely support the proposed prison. I also completely support the members of the Delta/Grady Community Coalition.

I know some people fear change, but change must come. Nothing created by humans is perfect, but we should never let our fears stop us from moving forward.

Alaska is not the federal government, it cannot pay federal government inflated wages. Expectations must be realistic.

I urge each member of this committee to support HB 53. It is good for Alaska and Delta.

Signed: Michael O. McCowan  
 Testifier  
Self  
 Representing (Optional)  
HC 60 Box 4120 Delta Jct, AK 99737  
 Address  
Delta Jct. 907-895-4133  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee on HB 53, dated Feb 3, 1998.  
bill/ subject committee name

Delta Junction area residents were not adequately informed prior to the "unofficial" vote. Outlying areas check their mail less frequently. I check mine only once per week in most cases. Notification of the vote was via the mail only three days prior.

The fear tactics applied by the coalition and their side were unfair and rushed people to vote before thinking this matter through. I would predict that a legal vote would result in a much higher voter turn out. Possibly 1600 people. The more rural residents are less inclined to be favorable to a prison because they are less dependant on Delta Junction economically. For example count the Dry Creek turnout! Or Healy Lake!

The real issue, however, are private prisons good for Alaska? How can the high calling of justice be entrusted to low payed corrections officers? Once privatization of the justice system occurs, its purpose will become corrupted.

The responsibility of criminal justice clearly rests on the government. Please see US constitution, state constitution, and Romans Chapter 13 of The Holy Bible.

If HB 53 passes, this trend could end with private courts in years to come.  
This is not good for Alaska.

Signed: Patrick Anthony Dalton  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 1413 Delta Junction AK 99737  
Address

Phone No.

**James F. Watford**

P O Box 214

Delta Junction, AK 99737-0964

Home Phone 907-895-4311

February 03, 1998

Subject: HB-53 LEASE-PURCHASE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY  
(FT. GREELY PRISON)


TO:HOUSE FINANCE Committtee;

This will inform you of my complete opposition to the HB-53 LEASE-PURCHASE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, (Ft.Greely Prison).

The Delta Junction area does not in anyway need more trouble in this area. We have sufficent dope peddlers and law breakers without adding to it.

The Delta Junction Citizens do not need to become the finical pocket book for Allvest Co.. I do not believe the state of Alaska needs that.

Sincerely,



Your name goes here



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the FINANCE committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 3 Feb 98  
 bill/ subject

There are two perspectives to look at in this proposal. The large scale is the current penalties and housing of prisoners outside Alaska because of over crowding. The privatization of a new prison is the most economical for the state.

At the local level we will loose 250 government jobs, nearly 330 military and 480 family members. Also, half of the teachers in the local schools will loose their jobs, which is the second largest employer in the area.

Only one college has said, <sup>in writing</sup> they will stay after Greely closes, and that is cavitated by the prison coming in and making the operation economically feasible.

- 62% of one of the highest voter participation voted

Signed:

KEVIN KELLY  
 Testifier  
self & CENTRAL TEXAS College  
 Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 40 Delta Junction AK 99737  
 Address  
907-895-4334 (H) 907-869-3301 (W)  
 Phone No.

yes



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee on HB 53, dated Feb. 3, 1998  
bill/ subject committee name

UNIVERSITY  
business faculty  
member,

My name is Donna Gardino, A DELTA RESIDENT, management consultant AND VOLUNTEER toward economic development since the ERAC announcement. Typically, a STATE OR CITY AGENCY must base procurements on a competitive bid basis (SECTION 33.30.031 (c)). IF the legislature DECIDES that a contract with DELTA Junction is in the best interest of the state, then I believe the legislature should consider a requirement that DELTA Junction hold a competitive process to identify the "best value" provider of correctional services. Allvest has never operated a medium security correctional facility. I believe the competitive process, by definition + nature of the process, would yield better value to the state + the community. Without such requirement, Allvest would be a sole source procurement. If this happens, be assured that the Coalition Board has formed a negotiation committee, reviewed Allvest's proposed agreement + pencilled over 50 changes AT FIRST REVIEW. Conveyance issues ARE SERIOUS ones with great community implications AND will NOT be considered lightly. UNLESS WE CAN be successful in negotiations with proper legal + management approval,

A contract will NOT be signed with Allvest.

Thank you.

Signed: Donna Gardino  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
BOX 1026 DELTA 99737  
Address

Phone No. 395-4786 FAX 395-4777

Email dgardino@KNID.NET



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

Please do not approve HB53. If private prisons are not acceptable for the whole state, why make Delta an exception? The vote presented to you was not an actual reflection of the whole town's feelings. People were advised by the coalition to vote yes even if they were unsure so the coalition could continue to work with Allvest. The coalition led the public to believe it was not a done deal and the public would have the final say on the prison. Now the coalition refuses to commit to a final **LEGAL** vote by our citizens!

Another concern many of us have is, does Delta have the ability to handle a possible escape? We have only three Troopers (who work in shifts) in our community. The nearest assistance for them is 100 miles away! What would be the cost to the state to provide assistance for these three individuals? What would be the justification for the state if a single life was lost (either Trooper or private citizen) because of inadequate protection in the event of an escape?

Thank you,  
 Nanci Ruthschild-Kennedy

Signed: Nanci Ruthschild-Kennedy  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 1333 Delta Junction, AK 99737  
 Address  
895-11408  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the H Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated Feb 10, 98.  
bill/ subject

Dear Senators and Representatives,

I oppose a prison in Delta Junction because back east where I lived before had prisons. My sister at age 3 was kidnapped, raped, molested and put in a river with a rock on her head. The killer was an escaped convict. He was not caught until he died of a heart attack, where police found evidence of many other children that he murdered. Another incident happened when I was working at an apple plant, a drug addict that just got out of jail shot 2 men in the head. For \$60 he shot one man stole the other guys car, 2 Days later held up a convenient store killed more people, finally got shot by police. I don't want this to happen here in Delta, Delta is a small town and prisoners are likely to hit houses. If a vote is important for a decision maybe Delta can conduct a proper vote now that people know more information about the facts. If there's any way to stop this please let me know. Thank you Annette.

Signed:

Annette Hannan  
Testifier  
Opposing a prison in Delta  
Representing (Optional)  
HC60 Box 3105 Delta Jct, Ak, 99737  
Address  
(907) 895-4284  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
 committee on HB 53 , dated 2/10/98  
 bill/ subject committee name

A windfall for select businesses, construction for Loretta Schooley, rentals for Cleta Banger and fuel contracts for Jim Carlstrom, are not solutions to prison overcrowding for this state.

Why ~~should~~ would a representative for Anchorage's concerns continue to promote a bad bill?

NO to HB 53

Signed:

Charles E. Abbott  
 Testifier  
P.O. Box 1434  
 Representing (Optional)  
Delta Jct, Alaska  
 Address  
895-1098  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE  
committee on HR 53, dated 2-10-98.  
committee name  
bill/ subject

DEAR HONORABLE COMMITTEE MEMBERS.

180 OF THE PROPOSED JOBS FROM ALLUEST  
WILL HAVE A TOP PAY OF \$12 PER HOUR

A PERSON ABSOLUTELY CAN NOT SUPPORT  
A FAMILY IN DELTA ON THAT PAY.

REMEMBER, THAT IS THE TOP PAY,  
NOT STARTING PAY.

MANY JOBS TOP OUT AT LESS THAN \$10  
PER HOUR.

THIS WILL NOT BE AN ECONOMIC BENEFIT  
FOR DELTA, BUT JUST THE OPPOSITE.

PLEASE KILL HR53 FOR THIS AND MANY  
MORE REASONS. THANK YOU

Signed: Fr C Rowden

Testifier

SELF

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 2 DELTA JCT, AK 99737

Address

895-4448

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I AM NOT IN FAVOR OF THE EARLY PRISON OR ANY PRISON WHERE THE STATE OF ALASKA HAS TO GUARANTEE THE BONUS, BENS AND 20 YEARS CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION STRICTLY FOR THEIR PRIVATE FINANCIAL GAIN. THE STATE OF ALASKA WOULD BE FOOLISH TO GUARANTEE ANYTHING LIKE THAT OR ANYTHING FOR 20 YEARS, THE STATE CANT EVEN GUARANTEE WHAT OIL PRICES ARE GOING TO BE.

NEXT ALVEST WILL WANT TO ATTACH THE PERMANENT FUND IF THIS WAS SUCH A GOOD PROJECT ALVEST COULD DO IT ON THEIR OWN!

Signed: John Whitley  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 248, Delta Jct. Alaska 99737  
Address  
895-5247  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
 bill/ subject committee name

I object to fast track and semi legal voting techniques used to gain public support for the prison proposal.

This same technique of, bending rules and laws instead of following the intent of the Law, seems to be continuing. From the previous Finance Committee teleconferences, I have learned that there are serious legal concerns about this proposal. Why must our Legislators be so obsessed with getting around the Law. If it is illegal for the State to contract out without a competitive bidding process, why proceed?

Delta is merely a conduit for State money. Another way of saying this is; Delta Junction will be used to do what would be illegal otherwise.

Furthermore private prisons are a bad idea. It is the State government's responsibility not the private sector. No private company should be entrusted with a monopoly on the penal system.

The Legislators also have a responsibility. Our Lawmakers should be examples to us of proper ethical and moral conduct. This bill is ~~not the proper use of~~ does not look good.

Signed: Patrick Anthony Dalton  
 Testifier  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Representing (Optional)  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

TO: All members House Finance Committee,

Please support HB-53, which could provide  
 'ECONOMIC SECURITY' for my community.

Having personally researched the effects of such  
 projects, as the Ken Ross Center, (formerly Kinchloe AFB, MI.),  
 and others, I confidently support a medium security  
 correctional center reuse for the soon to be closed  
 Fort Greely.

I do not agree with our honorable Governor's plan  
 for expanding existing facilities. The price tag for  
 which is simply GROSS OVERSPENDING!  
 and should not be allowed. Thank-You

Signed:

Joseph P. Clark Joseph P. Clark

Testifier

SELF / Ft. Greely Employee

Representing (Optional)

P.O. BOX # 1350 DELTA JCT, AK. 99737

Address

(907) 895-4454

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance

committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject committee name

Prison or NO PRISON I  
want what I WAS Promised  
year 2001, or MY Full Retirement  
From Civil Service

Signed:

*Donna George*  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO BOX 187 DELTA JCT 99737  
Address  
873-3180  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

TO HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE

I would like to THANK you FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY OPINION ON BILL HB 53 I AM FOR THE FUNDING FOR A MEDICINE SECURITY PRISON HERE AT FORT GREELY. PLEASE CONSIDER US WERE AN PASS THIS BILL THANKY you SO VERY MUCH  
 Pastor Curtis Jaylen

Signed: Pastor Curtis L Jaylen  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO BOX 956 Delta AK 99737  
 Address  
907-8955279  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53 dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

BEFORE ANY ACTION IS TAKEN THE PEOPLE NEED  
 TO KNOW ALL THERE OPTIONS AND GET ALL THE FACTS.  
 MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THE BAC TIME LINE  
 BE HEARD TO

Signed:

Kenn R MILLER  
 Testifier SELF  
 Representing (Optional)  
3055 MILLIONS RD  
 Address DELTA  
 Phone No. 495-50016

TOTAL P.01

TOTAL P.11



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

*I am against any acceleration of timeline as to the  
 time from here at Ft. Greely.*

*Also I am against almost taking over any part of Ft. Greely  
 for the purpose of putting in a prison system here!*

Signed:

*Alida R. Chaffin*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Testifier

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Representing (Optional)

Address

*P.O. Box 712 Delta, AK 99829-0712*  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Phone No. *878-4402 - work.*

*Home - 895-4672*



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I would like to go on record saying that if the prison is needed now why won't it be needed just as bad in 2001? If it becomes operational in January 2000 then the current BRAC time line would be moved up. Some of the functions of the buildings being requested by Allvest could be moved but not all. Even though I have heard time and again jobs and people would still be here, I have gone through a RIF and if a function goes away, that is always followed by a RIF. That means the time line we were told about is no longer in effect. The workforce at Fort Greely can deal with the re-alignment and uncertain future but it is not fair to keep changing the proposed time-line. I would support the prison in a heart beat if the time-line that we were told about in 1995 were held up.

**IF IT IS AN ACCELERATED TIME LINE, I CANNOT SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL.**

Signed:

Lucille Lassek

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

Box 1045, Delta Jct, AK 99837

Address

907-895-4597

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the HOUSE FINANCE  
committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/subject committee name

Prison or NO PRISON I  
won't what I WAS Promised  
year 2001, of my full Retirement  
From Civil Service

Signed:

[Signature]  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 187 Delta JCT 99757

Address  
873-3180  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

My opinion is THAT PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF A PRISON IS OUT OF PLACE. I THINK THE DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS TESTIMONY OF LAST FRIDAY (FEB. 6) WAS VERY VALID. WHERE PRIVATE ~~OWNERSHIP~~ <sup>OWNERSHIP</sup> IS WORKING FOR PROFIT, IT WILL BE FORCED TO KEEP AS MANY BEDS FULL AS POSSIBLE AT ANY COST, WHETHER IT IS AT THE COST OF EMPLOYEES OR PRISONERS.

I PERSONALLY DON'T TRUST ALVEST (THERE'S TOO MUCH UNKNOWN ABOUT THEM), AND I DON'T THINK THE DELTA COALITION HAS CONSIDERED ALL THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PRISON AND THE NEEDS OF THE EMPLOYEE FAMILY MEMBERS THAT WILL COME. THE ARMY HAS MANY SUPPORT PROGRAMS AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR ITS FAMILY MEMBERS. THESE WILL ALL BE GONE.

FURTHERMORE THE TALK OF SHORTENING THE BRAC TIMELINE WILL HURT MANY PEOPLE.

THANKS FOR LISTENING,

Signed:

William J. Lappant  
 Testifier

P.O. Box 45 Delta Junction, Alaska 99757-0045  
Representing (Optional)  
 Address  
W.K.N. 907-873-4482  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53 dated 2/10/98  
bill/subject

I am not in favor of a prison on Ft. Greely.  
 I believe it (Prison) will change the way we  
 live here. I don't believe there are people  
 here who are qualified to run a prison. Their-  
 for that means more people, and fewer or no  
 new jobs for the people that live here now.

Signed: Robert M. Lee  
 Testifier


Representing (Optional)  
H.C. 60. Box 3140 Delta Jct. Alaska 99737  
 Address  
1-907-4895-4159  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

I do not support the reuse of Fort Greely as a private prison. The Alvest proposal is very good business, but only for Alvest. I would not contest a state run prison here if the majority of Deltoids wanted it. I believe the present Brac time line should be adhered to in any case. Many families would be adversely affected with any change in the Brac time line. This would provide the necessary time for a more informed decision by our recently awakened population!

Signed: PA. Bray   
Testifier

PO Box 533 Delta Jct. AK. 99737  
Address  
645-4930  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I am opposed to this bill following  
 the proposed timelines.

The community needs time to prepare  
 and give existing government employees  
 time to evaluate the situation. Fast track  
 also removes 300 civilian and about  
 350 military jobs. The community needs  
 the existing jobs rather than a layoff  
 and the resulting low paid jobs.

The State of Alaska is committing itself  
 to do business w/ At least exclusively. I  
 don't like this. Put a state run &  
 operated jail here in 2001?

Signed: [Signature]  
 Testifier  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Representing (Optional)  
Box 468  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address  
Dark Vol AK 99237  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I am in opposition to a prison at Ft. Greely  
 I think the Alvest, proposal is only good for Alvest,  
 and will do very little for Delta. \* I would like to  
 see the present BRAC time lines adhered  
 to. This will affect many families in our area.

Signed:

Russell Beardsley  
 Testifier  
Self  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 1048  
 Address  
(907) 895-4328  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

I am opposed to the Allvest proposal of placing a prison at Ft. Greely. I do not believe it will provide a viable replacement of the downsizing of Ft. Greely.

I believe the Department of the Army needs to be held to the BRAC timelines to allow current employees the time to prepare for what the future holds for them. The wages Allvest proposes to pay cannot begin to replace the current wages, health benefits, and retirement plan that the employees now receive.

Signed:

Charles P. Stewart  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 612 Delta Jct. Ak. 99757  
 Address  
895-4498  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

THE GUIDE LINES WERE SET, BY B.R.A.C. AND THE LEGISLATION. JUST LET IT GO TO 2001.

THIS WHOLE SITUATION SEEMS TO BE TRAVELING DOWN A ROAD OF THE UN-KNOWN. AND, IT'S GOING TO NEED THIS TIME TO COME UP WITH A CONTRACT, FOR ALL INVOLVED. ALSO, I'M OPPOSED TO ALLVAST BED AT A PRISON HERE.

THANK-you

Signed:

Terrance Dean  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 805 DELTA JCT. ALASKA 99737  
 Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

I AM A CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE AT FT. GREEELY.  
 I FEEL THE STATE LEGISLATURE  
 SHOULD SUPPORT THE DELTA JCT/  
 ALLVEST PROPOSAL WHEN THE FT.  
 GREEELY REALIGNMENT HAS OCCURRED  
 IN 2001.                      THANKYOU

Signed:

JOSEPH CRANDALL  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 1007 Delta Jct

Address 895 4045

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I am opposed to the Allvest proposal of placing a prison at Ft. Greely. I do not believe it will provide a viable replacement of the downsizing of Ft. Greely.

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Signed:

Charles P. Stewart  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 612 Delta Jct. Ak. 99757  
 Address  
895-4498  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
 committee on HB 53 dated 2/10/98  
 bill/ subject committee name

THE GUIDE LINES WERE SET, BY B.R.A.C. AND THE LEGISLATION. JUST LET IT GO TO 2001.

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THANK-YOU

Signed:

Tennant Dean  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 205 DELTA JCT. ALASKA 99737  
 Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53 , dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I AM A CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE AT FT. GREELY.  
 I FEEL THE STATE LEGISLATURE  
 SHOULD SUPPORT THE DELTA JCT/  
 ALLUEST PROPOSAL WHEN THE FT.  
 GREELY REALIGNMENT HAS OCCURED  
 IN 2001. THANK YOU

Signed:

JOSEPH CRANDALL

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

PO Box 1007 Delta Jct

Address

895 40-15

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

As a concerned citizen it is my belief that the timeline for realignment / reuse 8 ~~to~~ Fort Greely be left as originally stated by BRAC. The ~~reason~~ <sup>Basis</sup> for the timelines were established for a ~~specific reason~~ specific reasons. these reasons have not changed. I urge you to consider these facts while you are formulating your decision.

Signed:

Henry Muth  
 Testifier  
MUSE  
 Representing (Optional)  
701 902 736  
 Address  
Delta Jct AK 99737  
 Phone No.  
895-4220



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I am against the Allvest proposal based on the existing information available to me. And I am also against the elevated time line that would enter for with the original time set by the ~~Delta~~ BRAC <sup>etc</sup> committee on the Fort Greely draw down

Signed:

Ron Roden  
 Testifier

HC 60 Box 4460 Delta Jct., AK. 99737  
 Representing (Optional)  
 Address

Home: (907) 895-4981 - work 823-3101  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/subject committee name

Prison or no Prison I  
won't what I was promised  
year 2001, or my full Retirement  
from Civil Service

Signed:

[Signature]  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 87 Delta JCT 99737  
Address  
813-3180  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

My opinion is THAT PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF A PRISON IS OUT OF PLACE. I THINK THE DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS TESTIMONY OF LAST FRIDAY (FEB. 6) WAS VERY VALID. WHERE PRIVATE ~~INDUSTRY~~ <sup>OWNERSHIP</sup> IS WORKING FOR PROFIT, IT WILL BE FORCED TO KEEP AS MANY BEDS FULL AS POSSIBLE AT ANY COST, WHETHER IT IS AT THE COST OF EMPLOYEES OR PRISONERS.

I PERSONALLY DON'T TRUST ALVEST (THERE'S TOO MUCH UNKNOWN ABOUT THEM), AND I DON'T THINK THE DELTA COALITION HAS CONSIDERED ALL THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PRISON AND THE NEEDS OF THE EMPLOYEE FAMILY MEMBERS THAT WILL COME. THE ARMY HAS MANY SUPPORT PROGRAMS AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR ITS FAMILY MEMBERS. THESE WILL ALL BE GONE.

FURTHERMORE THE TALK OF SHORTENING THE BRAC TIMELINE WILL HURT MANY PEOPLE.

THANKS FOR LISTENING,

Signed:

William L. Lappart  
 Testifier

P.O. Box 45 Delta Junction, Alaska  
Representing (Optional)  
 Address  
99757-0045  
907-873-4482  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name

committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/subject

I am not in favor of a Prison on Ft. Greely.  
I believe it (Prison) will change the way we  
live here. I don't believe there are people  
here who are qualified to run a prison. Their  
for that means more people, and few or no  
new jobs for the people that live here now.

Signed:

Robert M. Lee  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
H.C. 60 Box 3140 Delta Jct. Alaska 99737  
Address  
1-907-895-4159  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I do not support the reuse of Fort Greedy as a private prison. The Alvest proposal is very good business, but only for Alvest. I would not contest a state run prison here if the majority of Deltonids wanted it. I believe the present Brae time line should be adhered to in any case. Many families would be adversely affected with any change in the Brae time line. This would provide the necessary time for a more informed decision by our recently awakened population!

Signed: PA. Brae [Signature]  
 Testifier

Presenting (Optional)  
P.O. Box 533 Delta Jct. AK. 99737  
 Address  
907-4930  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
 committee on HB 53 , dated 2/10/98  
 bill/ subject committee name

I am opposed to this bill following  
 the proposed timelines.

The community needs time to prepare  
 and give existing government employees  
 time to evaluate the situation. Fast track  
 also removes 300 civilian and about  
 350 military jobs. The community needs  
 the existing jobs rather than a layoff  
 and the resulting low paid jobs.

The State of Alaska is committing itself  
 to do business w/ Allwest exclusively. I  
 don't like this. Put a state run &  
 operated jail here in 2001 P.B

Signed: [Signature]  
 Testifier  
 Representing (Optional)  
Box 468  
 Address  
Dark Vol AK 99237  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

I am in opposition to a prison at Ft. Greely  
 I think the Allvest, proposal is only good for Allvest,  
 and will do very little for DELTA. \* I would like to  
 see the present BRAC time lines adhered  
 to. This will affect many families in our area.

Signed:

Russell Baender  
Testifier  
541E  
Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 1048  
Address  
(907) 895-4328  
Phone No.





# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

As a registered voter and TAX payer,  
 I am adamantly opposed to putting a prison  
 in Delta, where we lack adequate law  
 enforcement to protect my community from  
 potencial escaped prisoner(s).

I would suggest to you that a prison  
 on Adak Naval Base would solve your  
 over crowding problems without placing  
Any communities of Alaska at risk.

I am willing to pay a lot more money  
 to keep Alaskans safe, rather than saving  
 money and leaving citizens at greater than  
 nessacary risk.

Signed:

Shirley T. Lee-Rogers  
 Testifier

my family

Representing (Optional)  
P.O. B. 1356, Delta Jct, AK 99737

Address  
(907) 895-6203

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98.  
bill/ subject

*I do not support any movement or bill which would change or adopt the BRAC timetable. Our lives have already been impacted by this latest proposal and I feel that we should not hurry into any agreement.*

Signed:

*Frank S. ...*  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

*PO Box 447 Delta AK*  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Address

*cell. 843 4494*  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Phone No.





# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53 dated 2/10/78  
bill/ subject

NO I am not willing to give up my job  
 early to Arnie in a prison. We were  
 promised the year 2001.

Signed:

Mary L Brown  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 711 Delta

Address  
873-3702

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House FINANCE  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53, dated 2/10/98  
bill/ subject

I am not willing to give  
 up my job early so the  
 pension can come to St. Greeley.

Signed: Diana Berham  
Testifier  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. BOX 1378 DELTA  
Address  
895-4607  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Finance  
committee name  
 committee on HB 53 dated 2/10/98  
bill/subject

To whom it MAU CONCERN - House of Rep. JUNEAU.

I urge all house members to NOT support  
 HB 52. It serves a very narrow interest group  
 CONCERNING construction, ownership, and operation.  
 The facilities proposed would be entrusted to  
 a fledgling company with NO PRISON experience.  
 It would surpass in size any existing state owned  
 and operated prison only to be staffed by personnel  
 making a fraction of the pay.

More than bottom line and a sea of yet to be  
 announced price per bed per day are at stake.

As for the economic future of Delta Jct. the pros-  
 pects are as bright with out the prison. Maybe -

Signed: PATRICK Schlichting Brighter  
 Testifier Self  
 Representing (Optional) He 60 Box 3050 - Delta Jct  
 Address 1-907-295-4896  
 Phone No.