

LEGISLATIVE FINANCE - HOUSE / SENATE FINANCE COMM. FILES 8879

SJR 1 cont. • SJR 5 1987 • 1988 • 568 159

Table 4
 Summary of Provisions of State Open Meeting and Information Access Laws

States Which Have no Public Meeting Requirement

Alabama Mississippi South Dakota

States Where Actions are Void if Open Meeting Law is not Followed

Alaska	Illinois	Michigan	Oklahoma
Arizona	Indiana	Montana	Oregon
Arkansas	Iowa	Nebraska	Pennsylvania
Colorado	Kansas	New Hampshire	Tennessee
Connecticut	Kentucky	New Jersey	Utah
Hawaii	Louisiana	New Mexico	Virginia
Florida	Maine	New York	West Virginia
Georgia	Maryland	North Dakota	Wisconsin
Idaho	Massachusetts	Ohio	Wyoming

States Where Working Papers and Records are not Open to the Public

Arkansas	Maine	Texas
California	Massachusetts	Vermont
Connecticut	Michigan	Virginia
Illinois	Oregon	Washington
Indiana	Rhode Island	West Virginia
Kansas	South Carolina	Wyoming
Kentucky		

States Where Correspondence of State Officials is not Open

Arkansas:	governor, legislators, supreme court justices, and attorney general
California:	governor and staff
Louisiana:	records in custody of governor
Minnesota:	correspondence between individual and elected official
Nebraska:	legislators
Rhode Island:	all elected officials
South Carolina:	general assembly and staff
Virginia:	legislators, governors, lieutenant governors, attorney general and chief executive officer of any political subdivision

States Where Preliminary Drafts of Audit Reports are Closed

Arizona Texas

STATE OF ALASKA
THE LEGISLATURE

POUCH Y STATE CAPITOL
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811
907 465 3800


LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY

MEMORANDUM

January 26, 1989

SUBJECT: Open meetings: the laws from other states
(SJR 1)

TO: Senator Arliss Sturgulewski

FROM: Richard A. Bradley
Legislative Counsel 

McKie Campbell asked me to provide you with a study that I did last year on the laws of the other states that have open meetings. I used in my review a listing of such laws that was initially prepared by the House Research Agency (that I regretfully seem unable to find a copy of; I assume one is available from them).

Initially, I reviewed the constitutions and laws of Oregon and California in some detail in the context of the question whether either state would void a law for a violation of open meeting requirements.

A brief summary of the provisions would be that neither state has any provision voiding laws for violations of the open meetings laws of those states.

Nor do the constitutions of those states lead to that result.

The California Constitution provides that the "proceedings of each house and the committees thereof shall be public except as provided by statute or concurrent resolution, when such resolution is adopted by two-thirds vote of the members of each house, . . ." Art. IV, sec. 7(c), California Constitution.

The enabling legislation at Secs. 11120 - 11131 of the California (Government) Code does not apply to the legislature but rather only to state executive branch agencies.

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 2
January 26, 1989

And I believe that no provision of that law provides that action taken in violation of it is void. The only remedies offered in those sections of the California law is the authorization of litigation seeking mandamus or injunctive relief (Sec. 11130), costs and attorney fees (Sec. 11130.5), and a provision making the conduct a misdemeanor (Sec. 11130.7).

California does, however, have an open meetings law specifically concerned with the legislature. See Secs. 9027 - 9031, California (Government) Code.

The legislative formulation of art. IV, sec. 7(c), quoted above, provides that all "meetings of the Assembly and Senate and the committees and subcommittees thereof, and any conference committee, shall be open and public and all the proceedings shall be conducted openly so that the public may remain informed, except as otherwise provided in this article. All meetings of any conference committee shall be open to press representatives accredited by the Joint Rules Committee." Sec. 9027.

Two sanctions are stated: (1) a knowing violation is a misdemeanor. Sec. 9030; and (2) a mandamus or injunctive action for declaratory relief may be filed. Sec. 9031.

The Oregon laws are consistent.

The Oregon Constitution provides that the "deliberations of each house, of committees of each house or joint committees and of committees of the whole, shall be open." Art. IV, sec. 14, Oregon Constitution. The section also directs each house to adopt rules to implement the section and both houses are directed to adopt joint rules relating to joint legislative activity.

ORS Secs. 192.610 - 192.690 are ambiguous as to whether they apply to legislative Acts or legislative proceedings. I can find no provision within these sections that uses terms to be expected in laws applying to the legislature. But I can find no specific provisions that do apply to the legislature; since we do not have access to the legislative rules, that may well be the the location of those provisions.

Sec. 192.680 establishes the policy that the court may order equitable relief as it considers appropriate. The law also provides that

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 3
January 26, 1989

A decision shall not be voided if other equitable relief is available. The court may order payment to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under this section of reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal, by the governing body, or public body of which it is a part or to which it reports. ORS, sec. 192.-680(1).

This remedy may be offered because it would be very unlikely that a plaintiff could prove "actual damages" for a violation of the law.

The law also provides that if the violation was a "result of wilful misconduct by any member or members of the governing body, that member or members shall be jointly and severally liable to the governing body . . . for the amount paid under subsection (1)."

Finally, the Oregon law provides that "the provisions of this section shall be the exclusive remedy for an alleged violation of ORS 192.610 - 192.690."

I believe it is accurate to note that neither California nor Oregon will void a legislative Act for a violation of their open meetings laws. The laws also suggest that sanctions against members whose conduct is wilful is a proper recourse.

In addition, I have reviewed about half of the laws of the other states. Since some kind of pattern appears in the laws of the states that I did review, I discontinued the review. Let me make some observations about the laws and then offer the individual analyses of the states from Alabama through Missouri.

First, and I think this is significant, I found no case where an Act of a legislature was avoided. It appears that no action was avoided (or challenged until Abood) where the violation was based only on the actions of a committee or subcommittee of the legislative body.

There is some logic to this point. While committee recommendations are useful, a member may vote for or against final passage based on or in spite of recommendations of a committee. What one committee does may be disregarded by a subsequent committee or used for entirely different reasons.

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 4
January 26, 1989

It should not follow that the action by a committee vitiates the final legislative action.

In probably every state, state constitutions will require votes on final enactment to be public. Whether a disregard of committee action that violates open meeting concepts (if final action is open) is a serious loophole or an unfortunate expectation may be debatable but it appears to explain why the application of open meeting concepts to legislative action does not result in the avoidance of the final legislative action. The legislature should have the power to cure the defects in legislation caused by a committee of the legislature.

While the senate and the house each seem to have their own different ideas about the amount of debate required for adoption, it is quite different for a court to order the legislature to engage in "substantial, de novo, independent and public reconsideration of those substantive matters previously discussed in private." That remedy was requested in Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska, 743 P.2d 333, 334 (Alaska 1987).

The amount of debate required to cure a violation is the kind of question that the courts would be required to address if a violation by a committee is permitted to taint the final legislative action fatally. If I am correct that only violations by the enacting body will cause action to be void, the cure for violations is not a problem since no violation by the legislature itself will (or can) occur.

Finally, an analysis of state laws. While it has been suggested (by the House Research Agency report) that each state has an open meeting law, it is far from true that the citations offered prove that the legislatures have uniformly subjected themselves to such laws. And let me note also that this study was done 10 months ago; it might be a little dated.

Alabama. I could find no laws at the citation suggested in the HR report. Title 13 has been repealed. No entries in the index for the topic.

Arizona. Sec. 38.431. Applies to the legislature. No case in annotation appears to have challenged legislative violations. Only applies when a quorum is present according to AG opinion. Court may impose a fine of not to exceed \$500.

Sec. 431.07. Public body may not expend public money to defend action under certain circumstances. Sec. 431.07. Either house of legislature may exempt itself by adoption of rule or procedure. Sec. 431.08(B). Does not apply to conference committees of legislature or any caucus. Sec. 431.08(A); conference committees shall nonetheless be open.

Arkansas. Citation incorrect: see A.C.A. 25.19.101 et seq. Open meetings section does not apply to the legislature. Sec. 25.19.106. Misdemeanor penalty for violations of \$200 or 30 days (sec. 25.29.104). Action taken not void unless adopted at a public meeting. Sec. 25.19.106.

California. Citation given (sec. 11120 et seq., Cal. Gov't Code) applies only to executive branch agencies. See above for comments on sections applicable to the legislature.

Colorado. C.R.S. sec. 24.6.401 et seq. Applies to the legislature. Sec. 24.6.402. Does not apply to "chance meeting or social gathering at which discussion of public business is not the central purpose." Sec. 24.6.402(2.1). Provisions on invalidity may not apply to the legislature: "(4) No resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of a board, committee, commission, or other policy-making or rule-making body shall be valid unless taken or made at a meeting that meets the requirements . . ." Note that while it applies to a committee in the legislature, a committee is not a policy making body.

Connecticut. G.S.C. sec. 1.21. Appears to apply to the legislature. Sec. 1.21(a). Establishes notice; has no provision explicitly establishing application to the legislature or providing for the implications of violations (even as to executive branch agencies).

Delaware. 29 D.C.A. sec. 1000i et seq. Includes legislature. Sec. 10002. "Any action taken at a meeting in violation of this chapter may be voided by the Court of Chancery" within 60 days of notice of the action but not more than 6 months from the action. Sec. 10005(a). No annotations regarding violations by the legislature.

Florida. Ch. 286, F.S. at 011. Does not apply to the legislature. Sec. 286.011(1). Did not determine whether other law applies to the legislature.

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 6
January 26, 1989

Georgia. O.C.G. sec 50-14-1 et seq. Not applicable to the legislature.

Hawaii. H.R.S. sec. 92.3. Does not apply to the legislature. Sec. 92.10; rather, will be subject to rules adopted by the legislature (I have not found such rules). Executive action voidable on "proof of willful violation." Sec. 92.-11.

Idaho. I.C. sec. 67-2340 et seq. General sections do not apply to the legislature. Sec. 2341. Open legislative meetings required. Sec. 2346. Curiously, there is no statutory authorization for any executive session by legislative committees: "All meeting . . . shall be open at all times"; I suggest the section cannot be taken seriously. Action taken at a meeting that violates the sections is null and void. No cases construing statute in context of suit against legislature for its violation.

Illinois. 102 Ill. A.S. sec. 41 et seq. Includes "legislative . . . bodies of the state . . . except the General Assembly and committees or commissions thereof." Sec. 41.02. Did not find any specific sections applying to the legislature.

Indiana. B.I.S.A. sec. 5-15-1.5-1. Appears to apply to the legislature. Sec. 5-14-1.5-2(a). Notice requirement do not apply to the legislature. Sec. 5-14-1.5-5(g). Citizen may enjoin action taken at an executive session or to declare void action in violation of notice requirements (not applicable to legislature). Sec. 5-14-1.5-7(a). Court may award costs and attorney fees if action was knowing and intentional. Sec. 5-14 - 1.5-7(f).

Iowa. The correct citation is chapter 21 in the 1987 code. The chapter does not apply to the legislature. Remedies include assessment of fines of \$100 to \$500 for participants; ~~no~~ fines for a person who voted against the violating meeting or acted in good faith or in reliance of legal advice. Sec. 21.6(3). Costs and attorney fees for prevailing party who establishes the violation. Sec. 21.6(3). Voids the action taken in violation if the case is brought within six months of the action on a determination that the public interest in the enforcement of the open meeting policy outweighs the public interest in sustaining the validity of the action taken; doesn't apply to an action regarding the issuance of bonds or other indebtedness of a governmental body

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 7
January 26, 1989

if a public hearing, election, or public sale has been held. The court may remove an individual who has engaged in two prior violations in which damages were assessed during the member's term. May issue a mandatory injunction punishable by civil contempt. Ignorance is no defense.

Kansas. 75 K.S.A. sec. 4317 et seq. Appears to apply to the legislature. Sec. 4318. Violators subject to a \$500 civil penalty. Any binding action taken in violation is voidable in an action brought by the attorney general or county attorney. Sec. 4320. Court may award costs and attorney fees. Exceptions for impeachment are made. Sec. 4318. One annotation says that there was no "authority for private individual to bring action to void acts performed in violation of open meetings law. Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 678 P.2d 153 (Kansas 1984). Unannounced gathering prior to official meeting violates the law. Coggins v. Public Employee Relations Board, 581 P.2d 817.

Kentucky. KRS 61.805. Appears to apply to the legislature. Sec. 61.805(2), but with some "exceptions": "committees of the general assembly other than standing committees". Sec. 61.810(9). Courts may enforce by injunction. Sec. 61.845. Curiously, though there are pages of annotations of opinions of the attorney general as well as court decisions, no case involves the legislature.

Louisiana. RS 42.5 is the law; a 1981 amendment deleted the language that exempted the legislature in those words but the words now used do not include the legislature. Sec. 42.4.2(2). A specific section authorizes closed or executive sessions of legislative houses and committees. Sec. 42.6.2. The law also exempts "chance meetings, social gatherings, or other gatherings at which only presentations are made to members of the legislature or members of either house thereof or of any committee or subcommittee if no vote or other action, including formal or informal polling of members, is taken." Sec. 42.6.2(C). The legislature is exempted from requirement applicable to executive agency that meetings for the year be announced at the beginning of the year. Sec. 42.7. Suits to void action must be filed within 60 days of the action.

Maine. 1 MRSA sec. 401 et seq. Applies to the legislature. Sec. 402.2. For violations of the policy: "If any body or agency approves any ordinances, orders, rules, resolutions, regulations, contracts, appointments or other official

action in an executive session, this action shall be illegal and the officials responsible shall be subject to the penalties hereinafter provided". I note that "Acts" are not included. The penalty is a class E crime, probably a misdemeanor. No case examines a challenge to a legislative enactment.

Maryland. 76A A.C.M., sec. 7 et seq., reorganized as 10 A.C.M., 501 et seq. in the 1984 edition. Regarding enforcement, the law says: . . . the court may declare void any final action taken at a meeting held in wilful violation of [the law] if the court finds no other remedy would be adequate under the circumstances. However, the action of a public body may not be voided because of the violation . . . by any other public body." Sec. 10- 510(a)(2); sec. 10-510(e) authorizes injunctions or other appropriate relief. The section specifically excludes actions appropriating public funds, levying taxes, or providing for the issuance of bonds, notes, or evidences of public obligation from the authority of the court to void actions. Sec. 10-510(a). No case examines a challenge to a legislative enactment.

Massachusetts. 30A M.G.L.A. sec. 11A. Does not apply to the general court (legislature) or the committees or recess committees of the general court. Sec. 11A.

Michigan. Michigan has a constitutional provision requiring open meeting unless the public welfare requires otherwise. Art. 4, sec. 20. The current citation to the general law is 15 M.C.L.A. sec 261 et seq. "Public body" is defined as "any state . . . legislative . . . body, including a . . . committee, subcommittee . . . empowered by the state constitution . . . to exercise governmental . . . authority . . ." Sec. 15.262(a); under 15.262(d), "decision" includes a "vote . . . upon a . . . bill . . ." Attorney General opinions are consistent that committee action is covered. A reenactment complying with the act cures a prior enactment that was deficient; the effective date is on the reenactment. Sec. 15.270. No case addresses a challenge to a legislative enactment.

Minnesota. M.S. 471.705. Does not apply to the legislature.

Mississippi. Not reviewed.

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Page 9
January 26, 1989

Missouri. M.R.S., sec. 610.010 et seq. Applies to the legislature. Sec. 610.010(2). Violations include injunctive relief. Sec. 610.027(1). Civil fines of not more than \$100 are authorized. Sec. 610.027(3). Actions may void the action on evidence that the governmental body violated the section "if the court finds under the facts of the particular case that the public interest in the enforcement of the policy . . . outweighs the public interest in sustaining the validity of the action taken at the closed meeting, record, or vote." Sec. 610.027(4). Injunctive relief is authorized. Sec. 610.030. No annotation applies a challenge to a legislative enactment.

If I may be of further assistance, please advise.

RAB:gc
G6/049

SUR

3

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT

FURTHER

3/29/89

DATE TURNED INTO OFFICE

4/4/89

Mr. President:

Finance

Committee considered

SUR 3

amending the Constitution of the state of Alaska relating to repeal of regulations by the legislature

and recommended

- replace with _____ CS ~~SUR 3 (Ind)~~) same title
- or adopt _____ CS SUR 3 (Ind)) new title
- attached amendment(s) and technical title change (HB only)
- Finance letter of intent adopted

do pass

do not pass

no recommendation

individual recommendations

further referral to _____

- FISCAL NOTE(S) ^(SA) zero fiscal impact appropriation no FN
- new updated previous
- same as previous fiscal note(s) published _____

MEMBERS SIGNING DO PASS

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

[Handwritten signatures]

1501 Conner

Paul Frisk

Rich Uley

Rich Uley (DO PASS)

Chairman signature and recommendation

Committee Backup attached



Official Business

Alaska State Legislature

Senate

Committee on Finance


Pouch V
State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811

LETTER OF INTENT

FOR

CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3 (JUDICIARY)

It is the intent of the Legislature that the Division of Elections publish in the elections pamphlet the statements supporting the proposition as drafted by the prime sponsor of the resolution.



Senator Rick Uehling
Co-chair
April 4, 1989

FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: 3/29/89
Title: Repeal of regulations by the
Legislature
Sponsor: Coghill
Requestor: Coghill

Agency Affected: Office of the Governor
BRU: Division of Elections
Components: II-Elections
Primary & General Elections

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL	-0-	-0-	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	-0-	-0-	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-

CAPITAL						
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REVENUE						
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FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND	-0-	-0-	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	-0-	-0-	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

* Costs included cover 2 to 3 pages in each Official Election Pamphlet for printing and typesetting, and costs estimated to cover computer programming requirements for vote (Continued)

Prepared by: Linda Edgeworth Phone: 465-4611
Division: Elections Date: _____

Approved by Commissioner: *Linda Edgeworth* Date: 3/29/89
Agency: Division of Elections

Distribution (by preparer):
Legislative Finance
Legislative Sponsor
Requestor
Office of Management and Budget
Impacted Agency(ies)

CONTINUATION of FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

For Bill/Resolution No. CSSJR 3 (StAff)

counting purposes. However, these costs are based on the assumption that all candidates and issues will fit on three ballot cards, which is the norm. It should be noted, however that should the inclusion of this issue require a 4th ballot to be printed, the cost increase would have to be calculated at 16 cents per ballot x approximately 320,000 voters. The total cost of printing the additional ballot card would be \$51.2.

Under these circumstances the fiscal note would be:

53.4

Original sponsors: Coghill, Kelly,
Kerttula, et al.

1 IN THE SENATE BY THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
2 CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3 (Judiciary)
3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
4 SIXTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

5 Proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
6 tion of the State of Alaska relating to
7 repeal of regulations by the legisla-
8 ture.

9 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

10 * Section 1. Article II, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amend-
11 ed by adding a new section to read:

12 SECTION 22. REPEAL OF REGULATIONS. The legislature may repeal a
13 regulation adopted by a state department or agency when the regulation
14 does not reflect the intent of the law passed by the legislature. The
15 repeal of the regulation is effective thirty days after the passage of
16 a joint resolution by a majority vote of the membership of each house
17 unless the joint resolution specifies a different effective date.

18 * Sec. 2. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (a) The legislature in proposing this
19 constitutional amendment to the people is seeking the ability to repeal, by
20 joint resolution, administrative regulations that do not reflect the intent
21 of the legislature. Administrative regulations are adopted by the state
22 administration to implement laws passed by the legislature by at least a
23 majority vote. Under the existing provisions of the state constitution, if
24 the legislature believes that the regulation does not properly implement
25 the legislative intent, the legislature can overturn the regulation only by
26 passing a bill. Each bill passed by the legislature is subject to veto by
27 the chief administrator, who is the governor. When a bill other than an
28 appropriation bill is vetoed, the legislature may override that veto only
29 during a joint session of both legislative houses by an affirmative vote of

1 two-thirds of the membership. The difficulty in achieving the necessary
2 two-thirds veto override vote in opposition to the governor and the gover-
3 nor's administration, the expense of special legislative sessions to
4 address vetoes that occur after the adjournment of regular legislative
5 sessions, and the force of law that regulations enjoy, have resulted in
6 adverse effects on the public and thus have led the legislature to propose
7 this amendment.

8 (b) In the preparation of its neutral summary under AS 15.58.-
9 020(6)(C), the Legislative Affairs Agency shall consider the statement of
10 legislative intent contained in (a) of this section.

11 (c) In the preparation of the true and impartial summary of the
12 amendment under AS 15.50.020, the lieutenant governor or the director of
13 elections shall consider the statement of legislative intent contained in
14 (a) of this section.

15 * Sec. 3. The amendment proposed by this resolution shall be placed
16 before the voters of the state at the next general election in conformity
17 with art. XIII, sec. 1, Constitution of the State of Alaska, and the elec-
18 tion laws of the state.



Alaska State Legislature

SENATE

Official Business

P.O. Box V
State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811

MEMORANDUM

To: Senator Rick Uehling
Co-Chairman
Senate Finance Committee

From: Senator Jack Coghill

Re: Backup for SJR 3; Legislative Repeal of Administrative Regulations.

Date: April 3, 1989

Intent: The intent of this proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska, is to provide a mechanism for the legislature, as representatives of the people from which we derive our legislative authority, to oversee the rule making power granted the executive branch as a result of enacted legislation.

Background: This proposal has been placed on the ballot on three previous occasions. Each time it failed. The following chart is provided for your consideration.

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1988</u>
Yea's	58,808	N/A	91,174	65,176	N/A
Nay's	82,010	N/A	98,856	94,299	N/A
Total Proposition Votes	140,818	N/A	190,030	159,475	N/A
Total Election Vote Cast	162,653	199,358	213,173	182,526	203,433
Total Reg. Voters	258,742	266,224	305,262	292,274	292,441
Proposition Failure %	16.0%	N/A	4.0%	18.2%	N/A
% Voter Turn Out	63%	75%	70%	62%	70%

From this chart it is interesting to note the difference between the total number of votes cast on the proposition and the total number of votes cast in the election. For 1980 this number is 21,835; for 1984 it is 23,147; and for 1986 the difference is 23,143. It appears that each time this ballot measure has been brought up, between 11 percent (1984) and 13 percent (1980 and 1986) of the electorate did not know what they were voting for.

The Administration has always opposed this resolution. This is to be expected.

Attachments

1. Ballot Proposition No. 1, 1980.
2. Ballot Proposition No. 1, 1984.
3. Ballot Proposition No. 2, 1986.
4. Letter from the Department of Law,
to Representative M. Mike Miller, Dated May 8, 1986.

Rational: I have resurrected this issue of legislative oversight of the policy setting ability of the executive branch, because the Constitution established the Legislature as the policy branch of government.

We have seen increasing numbers of administrative regulations promulgated to implement legislative policy, as established in the legislation we pass, that either ignores the legislative directive or goes beyond the limits of what the Legislature intended.

As an example, in 1985 the Legislature passed a bill that allowed "work commitments" on certain oil and gas leases to be extended by the Department of Natural Resources. The bill was half a page long and very direct. The intent as I recall was to retain the nearly 30% royalty rate that would result from production on these lease and to give the lease holder relief from the crashing oil market. The DNR wrote 14 pages of regulations to implement this policy. The result was that the lease holder lost his leases, the state put them up in another lease sale, and the leases were sold at 12 3/4 percent royalty.

Another example is the regulations established by the State Board of Dental Examiners regarding licensure of new dentists by credentials. It is obvious that the intent of the Statute (AS 08.36.234) was to allow the Board to establish criteria where dentists could gain access to Alaska patients based on their track record in other states. The Board simply wrote a regulation prohibiting licensure by credential. And to further exemplify the need for this resolution, the proposal to change this situation, SB 126, is a one word change, from "may" to "shall".

You might think this is a simple policy change, however, in public hearings we have learned that this is substantial. The Board should promulgate regulations that address the intent of the law, and not the purview of the Board.

There are other examples from resource industries, and labor training programs to motor vehicle regulations. The broader issue however, and the complaint I receive most from my constituents, is that it is becoming increasingly evident that administrative agencies are using regulations to perpetuate their bureaucratic empires. The problem is that this was never intended by the Constitution.

Recommendation: I recommend you move the SJR 3 from committee, with "do pass" recommendations.

BALLOT PROPOSITION NO. 1

LEGISLATIVE ANNULMENT OF REGULATIONS Constitutional Amendment

(Committee Substitute for House Joint Resolution No. 82 Amended)

SUMMARY

(As it will appear on the November 4, 1980 General Election Ballot)

This proposal would permit the legislature to annul, by adopting a resolution; regulations adopted by state agencies. Annulment of regulations by resolution was authorized by the First State Legislature in 1959; however, in 1980 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the constitution permits the legislature to annul a regulation only by passing a bill, which requires three readings of the bill and a roll call vote which is recorded. The procedures for adopting resolutions are governed by legislative rules and require only the approval of the resolution by voice vote of a majority of both houses. A bill passed by the legislature annulling a regulation could be vetoed by the governor or repealed by referendum. A resolution annulling a regulation could not.

BALLOT FORM:

A vote "FOR" adopts the amendment.

A vote "AGAINST" rejects the amendment.

FOR
AGAINST

VOTE CAST BY MEMBERS OF 11TH STATE LEGISLATURE ON FINAL PASSAGE

Senate	(20 members):	Yeas <u>18</u>	Nays <u>0</u>	Absent or Not Voting <u>2</u>
House	(40 members):	Yeas <u>36</u>	Nays <u>0</u>	Absent or Not Voting <u>4</u>

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY SUMMARY

(As required by law)

This proposal would add a new section, section 22, to Article II of the state constitution. If adopted, the proposal would authorize the legislature to annul or set aside a regulation which has been adopted by a state department or agency. In order to annul a regulation, the legislature could adopt a concurrent resolution by approval of the resolution by majority vote of the membership of each house of the legislature. The resolution specifies the date on which the annulment of a regulation would take effect.

FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

SECTION 22. ANNULMENT OF REGULATIONS. The legislature by a concurrent resolution approved by a majority vote of the membership of each house may annul a regulation adopted by a state department or agency. The annulment of the regulation is effective on the date the concurrent resolution is approved by both houses unless the concurrent resolution specifies a different date.

- SEN. COGHILL ATTACHMENT 1. -
3/14/89

STATEMENT IN FAVOR OF BALLOT PROPOSITION NO. 1

The legislature, when it writes a law, cannot foresee all of the possible details involved in carrying it out. The appropriate administrative agency is therefore allowed to write regulations which spell out who does what, when, where, and how. If the agency does no more than this no problem is created.

Unfortunately agency regulations are not always consistent with the intent the legislature had in passing the law. Sometimes an agency will get carried away and put out regulations that cause an unnecessary burden for the citizens. The First State Legislature realized this and provided a simple solution. The legislature could, by a concurrent resolution passed by a majority of each house, annul an administrative regulation. Such a resolution is not subject to the governor's veto.

The Alaska Supreme Court recently held, in a 3-2 decision, that the legislature must use a bill rather than a resolution to annul administrative regulations. But a bill is subject to

the governor's veto. The governor can hardly be expected to approve a bill overruling his subordinates, who put out the regulation in the first place. The present governor has already vetoed one such bill.

The court ruling gives agency regulations equal standing with laws, *even though no single person elected by the voters has approved them.*

Our government is wisely based on dividing power among the three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. The current situation gives entirely too much power to the executive branch. Your approval of this constitutional amendment will restore the better balance under which the state operated from 1961 to 1980.

— Charles H. Parr
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee
Alaska State Legislature

STATEMENT AGAINST BALLOT PROPOSITION NO. 1

This is still another proposal by the legislature to free itself from the checks and balances of our constitution. Under the constitution, the legislature has all the power it needs to make laws and annul administrative regulations. This proposal does not aid the public in any way. What it does is allow the legislature to exercise its power to annul regulations in disregard of the constitutional requirements that each bill have a single subject, that each bill have three readings in each house, and that there be a recorded vote of the ayes and nays on final passage. It would also free the legislature from the executive veto and it would allow it to ignore the prohibition against special and local legislation.

The Alaska Supreme Court has recently ruled that the legislature must abide by the constitution's checks and balances on its power whenever it exercises that power, including when it acts to annul regulations. This amendment is intended to overrule the court's decision and erode the constitution's safeguards. It aids legislators, not the public, and it should be rejected.

— Katherine D. Nordale
Delegate to the Alaska
Constitutional Convention,
1955-1956

BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1

Constitutional Amendment

LEGISLATIVE ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

(1983 Legislative Resolve No. 15 (SCS HJR 5{Jud}))

SUMMARY

(As it will appear on the November 6, 1984 General Election Ballot)

This amendment of the Alaska Constitution would permit the legislature to annul executive-branch regulations by passing a resolution. The annulment would become effective 30 days after passage by the legislature, unless the resolution sets a different date. The resolution must have three readings in each house on separate days, except that it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by a three-fourths vote of the house considering it. The resolution must receive approval of a majority of the membership of each house. The yeas and nays on final passage must be entered in the legislative journals. The resolution is not subject to veto by the governor, and it is not subject to repeal by referendum.

BALLOT FORM:

A vote "FOR" adopts the amendment.
A vote "AGAINST" rejects the amendment.

FOR
AGAINST

VOTES CAST BY MEMBERS OF THE 13TH STATE LEGISLATURE ON FINAL PASSAGE

Senate	(20 members):	Yeas 19	Nays 0	Absent or Not Voting 1
House	(40 members):	Yeas 34	Nays 2	Absent or Not Voting 4

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY SUMMARY

(As required by law)

This proposal for a constitutional amendment would allow the legislature to annul a regulation adopted by a state department or agency by concurrent resolution. The annulment is effective thirty days after the date the concurrent resolution is approved by both houses unless the resolution specifies a different date. Adoption requires three readings in each house on three separate days except it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by concurrence of three fourths of the membership of the house considering it. Adoption requires approval by a majority vote of the membership of each house. The vote on final passage must be entered into the journal.

FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

(This amendment would add the following section to article II of the Alaska Constitution.)

SECTION 22. ANNULMENT OF REGULATIONS. The legislature by concurrent resolution may annul a regulation adopted by a state department or agency. The annulment of the regulation is effective thirty days after the date the concurrent resolution is approved by both houses unless the concurrent resolution specifies a different date. The concurrent resolution requires three readings in each house on three separate days, except that it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by concurrence of three-fourths of the house considering it, and approval by a majority vote of the membership of each house. The yeas and nays on final passage shall be entered into the journal.

- SEN. COGILL ATTACHMENT 2 -
3/14/84

STATEMENT IN FAVOR OF BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1

Voters who have ever experienced irritation or anger as a result of a problem they have had with state regulations should vote in favor of Ballot Measure No. 1. While many regulations do conform to and support state laws, there are occasionally regulations which are imposed that go beyond the intent of the law and cause undue hardship on our citizens. These regulations often make no sense at all, state agency people are often at a loss to explain the meaning or sense of the regulations, and yet the state agencies involved continue to enforce them, and voters are powerless to change them.

The Alaska Constitution, patterned essentially upon the Constitution of the United States and the experience of the other states, provides a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government, and further entitles the people to their own checks and balances through the voting booth, the initiative process, and final authority over amendments to the constitution. The one major area of government that is currently not directly accessible to the people's checks and balances is the very considerable volume of administrative regulations which are written by the state agencies in the executive branch of government.

These regulations deal with every aspect of government and our lives: fish and game, education, health and social services, traffic, land development, utilities, taxes; the list is endless. And once the regulations go into effect, they have all the force of law. The problem is, that unlike the situation that occurs with laws, the agency people who make and enforce regulations are not subject to voter approval at election time; they are either appointed by the governor or by his commissioners.

While the legislature is often made aware of foolish bureaucratic requirements by unhappy constituents, it is almost powerless to do anything about them. Currently, to annul a regulation, the legislature must pass a new bill which is then subject to veto by the governor. This puts the governor in the powerful position of being able to stop a bill that would overturn a regulation made by his own subordinates.

It was never intended by the framers of our State Constitution that any governmental body except the legislature have the power to make laws. Yet, bad regulations have been written, on occasion by state agencies, which go beyond the letter and intent of the law as passed by the legislature and in effect create law on their own.

This measure would provide a reasonable avenue for annulment of bad regulations. It would allow your elected representatives in the legislature, through a majority vote of both houses, to annul regulations in the same way they pass any legislative bill, except it would not be subject to veto by the governor, who clearly has a biased position in the matter.

The House Joint Resolution which created the ballot measure had bi-partisan sponsorship during the last legislative session, and was passed with near-unanimous support by both houses of the legislature.

—Mike Szymanski,
State Representative

STATEMENT OPPOSING BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1

This proposed amendment to the Alaska Constitution is very similar to the one proposed in 1980 and rejected by the voters 82,010 to 58,808. Although the present version includes some improvements over the 1980 version, it is another attempt by the legislature to concentrate governmental power in its own hands.

Under the current constitution and statutes, the legislature has all the power it needs to make laws and to limit or guide the adoption of administrative regulations. The regulations are adopted to implement statutes. This proposal would enable legislators to use a law-making procedure that is not subject to veto by the governor or repeal by referendum, and that could be used to ignore the prohibition against special and local legislation.

The constitution now provides for a balance of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. This balance requires a blending or sharing, as well as a dividing, of governmental responsibilities. If this constitutional amendment were to be approved by the voters, it would enable the legislature not only to write the laws, as has traditionally been the legislature's function, but it would also enable the legislature to act in place of the courts in deciding whether the executive has lawfully executed the laws when adopting a regulation; and it would empower the legislature to act in place of the executive by nullifying a specific executive-branch decision.

The annulment is like a repeal. In using this expedited procedure to annul a regulation, the legislature would act only in a negative way. It would not be providing the sort of policy guidance and direction that is appropriate to its law-making function. And it would not be providing the thoughtful analysis necessary to solve a problem. The legislature would be saying to the agency "your decision to adopt that regulation is wrong". But it would not be telling the agency what would be right. This is especially troublesome when dealing with a complex subject. Without any guidance beyond the statute that the executive branch agency was trying to implement in the first place, the agency is left with only the option to guess again. That is neither an efficient nor an appropriate way to run the government.

The Alaska Supreme Court has ruled that the legislature must abide by the Constitution's checks and balances on its power when it exercises that power, including when it acts to annul regulations. The present proposal is intended to overrule the court's decision. As argued four years ago, when the voters rejected the 1980 proposal, this amendment would aid legislators, not the public, and it should be rejected.

—Katherine D. Nordale,
Delegate to the Alaska Constitutional Convention, 1955-1956

BALLOT MEASURE NO. 2

Constitutional Amendment Legislative Annulment of Administrative Regulations (1986 Legislative Resolve No. 60 HCS SJR 40 [Jud] am H)

BALLOT LANGUAGE

(As it will appear on the November 4, 1986, General Election Ballot)

This amendment of the Alaska Constitution would permit the legislature to annul executive branch regulations by passing a resolution that is not subject to veto by the governor or repeal by referendum. The annulment would become effective 30 days after passage by the legislature, unless the resolution sets a different date. The resolution must have three readings in each house on separate days, except that it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by a three-fourths vote of the house considering it. The resolution must receive approval of a majority of the membership of each house. The yeas and nays on final passage must be entered in the legislative journals.

A vote "FOR" adopts the amendment. FOR

A vote "AGAINST" rejects the amendment. AGAINST

VOTES CAST BY MEMBERS OF THE 14TH ALASKA LEGISLATURE ON FINAL PASSAGE

House:	Yeas	31
	Nays	4
	Absent or Not Voting	5
Senate:	Yeas	17
	Nays	0
	Absent or Not Voting	3

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY SUMMARY

(HCS SJR 40 (Jud) am H)

This proposal for a constitutional amendment would allow the legislature to annul a regulation adopted by a state department or agency by its adoption of a concurrent resolution. Under the present provisions of the constitution, the legislature may annul a regulation only by the enactment of a bill that is subject to the veto of the governor; if the governor vetoes the bill, the constitution now requires a two-thirds affirmative vote of the legislature assembled in joint session to override the veto.

If the legislature adopts a concurrent resolution to annul a regulation under the authority proposed here, the annulment would be effective thirty days after the date the concurrent resolution is approved by both houses unless the resolution specified a different date. The concurrent resolution would not be subject to the veto of the governor. Adoption would require three readings in each house on three separate days except that it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by the concurrence of three-fourths of the membership of the house considering it. Adoption would require approval by a majority vote of each membership of each house. The vote on final passage must be entered into the journal.

FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

(This amendment would add the following section to article II of the Alaska Constitution.)

SECTION 22. ANNULMENT OF REGULATIONS. The legislature by concurrent resolution may annul a regulation adopted by a state department or agency. The annulment of the regulation is effective thirty days after the date the concurrent resolution is approved by both houses unless the concurrent resolution specifies a different date. The concurrent resolution requires three readings in each house on three separate days, except that it may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by concurrence of three-fourths of the house considering it, and approval by a majority vote of the membership of each house. The yeas and nays on final passage shall be entered into the journal.

1986 election

BALLOT MEASURE NO. 2

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF BALLOT MEASURE NO. 2

The issue is basically simple: should bureaucrats or the Legislature be the ultimate lawmaking authority?

All 60 members of the Legislature (40 House and 20 Senate) are elected by the people. They are all voted into, and out of, office by individual voters. The Alaska Constitution says, "The legislative (i.e., lawmaking) power of the State is vested in a Legislature consisting of a Senate...and a House of Representatives..." The Legislature proposes, considers, and enacts laws, known collectively as the Alaska Statutes (if general and permanent) or as the Session Laws of Alaska (if specific and temporary).

All bureaucrats who promulgate (i.e., enact and enforce) regulations (theoretically, to put laws into effect) are in the Executive Branch, headed by the Governor. Bureaucrats are not voted into office and thus cannot be removed by the people. Instead, bureaucrats are hired by the Governor or by his/her appointees, and thus can only be removed from office by the Governor or by somebody answerable to him/her. However, the regulations promulgated by the bureaucrats, known collectively as the Alaska Administrative Code, have the force of law and affect all of us, sometimes adversely.

What can be done about a law that's bad? It can be repealed by the Legislature or, in some cases, by the people directly via an initiative petition.

What about a regulation that's bad? It can only be repealed by the bureaucrats who promulgated it, up to and including the Governor. If the Legislature tries to repeal a regulation by passing a bill, the Governor will almost certainly (and always has, in the past) veto the bill so that the bad regulation stays in full force and effect.

Now, if the Legislature had the power to repeal regulations by passing a concurrent resolution (instead of a bill), then the resolution could not be vetoed by the Governor. Thus, the Legislature would be able to get rid of bad regulations, which in effect it cannot do now.

Would this give the Legislature too much power? Not hardly. Since the Legislature already has full power to enact laws, why shouldn't it have full power to repeal all laws, including regulations?

Why do Governors and bureaucrats oppose giving the Legislature such regulatory repeal power? Because Governors and their handpicked bureaucrats, which are answerable only to the Governor (and cannot be removed by the people, which can remove Legislators), don't want to lose the power they now have to promulgate and enforce any regulation they want. It's that simple.

If you feel that the Legislature should have the power to repeal regulations via concurrent resolution (not vetoable by the Governor), vote FOR the ballot measure. If you feel that bureaucrats should be the ultimate lawmaking authority, vote otherwise.

I recommend that you vote FOR. Only in this way will we realistically be able to get rid of bad regulations.

Andre Marrou
State Representative

STATEMENT OPPOSING BALLOT MEASURE NO. 2

For the third time in six years, the legislature insists on confronting the voters with a proposed constitutional amendment giving the legislature a short-cut to law-making—another attempt by the legislature to concentrate governmental power in its own hands. The voters rejected a similar proposal in 1980 and the identical proposal in 1984. It should be rejected again.

Under the current constitution and statutes, the legislature has all the power it needs to make laws and to limit or guide the adoption of administrative regulations. Regulations are adopted to implement statutes. They have the force of law. Annuling them changes the law. This proposal would enable legislators to use a law-making procedure that is not subject to veto by the governor or repeal by referendum, and that would be used to ignore the prohibition against special and local legislation.

The constitution now provides for a balance of power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. This balance requires a blending or sharing, as well as a dividing, of governmental responsibilities. If this constitutional amendment were to be approved by the voters, it would enable the legislature not only to write the laws, as has traditionally been the legislature's function, but it would also enable the legislature to act in place of the courts in deciding whether the executive has lawfully executed the laws when adopting a regulation, and it would empower the legislature to act in place of the executive by reversing a specific executive-branch decision.

In its intent statement accompanying this proposal, the legislature admitted that the "difficulty in achieving [the two-thirds] majority [to override a veto] in opposition to the governor and the governor's administration has led the legislature to propose this amendment." In other words, the fear that the governor might veto a bill and that not enough legislators would agree to override that veto prompted this short-cut approach to law-making. That fear overlooks the governor's accountability to the voters throughout the state.

The annulment is like a repeal. The legislature would act only in a negative way. It would not be providing the sort of policy guidance and direction that is appropriate to its law-making function. The legislature would be saying to the agency "your decision to adopt that regulation is wrong." But it would not be telling the agency what would be right. This is especially troublesome when dealing with a complex subject. Without any guidance beyond the statute that the executive-branch agency was trying to implement in the first place, the agency is left with only the option to guess again. That is neither an efficient nor appropriate way to run the government.

The Alaska Supreme Court has ruled that the legislature must abide by the constitution's checks and balances on its power, including when it acts to annul regulations. The present proposal is intended to overrule the court's decision. As mentioned when the voters rejected the 1980 and 1984 proposals, this amendment would aid legislators, not the public, and it should be rejected.

Katherine D. Nordale
Delegate to the Alaska
Constitutional Convention, 1955-1956

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

POUCH K - STATE CAPITOL
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811
PHONE: (907) 465-3600

May 8, 1986

Honorable M. Mike Miller
Chairman
House Judiciary Committee
Alaska State Legislature
P. O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Re: SJR 40 (constitutional
amendment on annulment of
regulations)
Our file: 66-3-86-0493

Dear Representative Miller:

I understand that Senate Joint Resolution No. 40, proposing an amendment to the Alaska Constitution, is on your committee's agenda for tomorrow. This letter is to express the Department of Law's opposition to that resolution. If the resolution is passed, that proposed amendment would hit the voters for the third time in six years.

BRIEF STATEMENT

Essentially, the Department of Law's position is that:

1. In 1980, the voters rejected a virtually identical constitutional amendment by a substantial margin -- 82,010 to 58,808. In 1984, they even rejected an improved version (improved in terms of accountability to the public). We should assume that the voters knew what they were doing.
2. The legislature does not need this shortcut method to perform its proper oversight function.
 - (A) The Alaska Administrative Procedure Act includes provisions giving multiple notice to the legislature and enabling legislators to participate in the regulations-adoption process.
 - (B) If an executive-branch agency, in adopting a regulation, goes in a direction that is not supported by the current legislature, the legislature may legislate further -- enact guidelines,

limitations, prohibitions.

3. A concurrent resolution, the vehicle proposed by this resolution to annul administrative regulations, is not covered by the constitutional and other provisions applicable to bills, which provisions tend to assure protection of and accountability to the public.

4. An annulment resolution's bare negative statement does not afford the executive-branch agency responsible for executing the law any guidance in performing its constitutionally mandated duties.

DISCUSSION

The amendment proposed by SJR 40 is virtually identical to the Eleventh Legislature's CSHJR 82 am (1980 Legislative Resolve No. 5). That amendment was rejected by the voters on November 4, 1980 by a vote of 82,010 to 58,808. That is a substantial margin, and we should assume that the voters knew what they were doing. They again rejected the amendment in 1984 -- in the form of the Thirteenth Legislature's SCS HJR 5(Jud) (1983 Legislative Resolve No. 15) -- even though it contained provisions for a deferred effective date, three readings on separate days, and recording in the journal the yeas and nays on final passage. The voters should not be repeatedly subjected to the same ballot issue.

As you know, these proposals for constitutional amendments are intended to reverse the effect of the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in State of Alaska v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (1980). The essence of that court decision, which held invalid the statute (AS 44.62.320(a)) that provided for legislative annulment of administrative regulations by concurrent resolution, is that (1) procedurally and substantively valid regulations have the force of law, (2) an "annulment" of a regulation has the effect of changing the law, and (3) when the legislature changes the law, it must do so by following the constitutional procedures for law-making. Since AS 44.62.320(a)'s concurrent resolutions did not follow the procedures for law-making, the court held that that statute was invalid.

As the court pointed out in Plumley v. Hale, 594 P.2d 497, 500 (Alaska 1979), the various constitutional provisions specifying the mechanics of legislating are "designed to engender a responsible legislative process worthy of the public trust." Those provisions are "to ensure deliberation prior to passage, to ensure that the requisite majority of each house affirmatively

votes to enact a bill into law, and to provide a public record of the vote cast by each legislator." Id. Those procedures include, for example

- the single subject rule of art. II, sec. 13;
- the descriptive title rule of art. II, sec. 13;
- the requirement of separate readings on separate days, under art. II, sec. 14;
- the requirement that the ayes and nays on final passage be recorded in the legislative journal, under art. II, sec. 14;
- the provisions on gubernatorial veto, under art. II, secs. 15 and 16; and
- the deferred effective date, under art. II, sec. 18.

Those provisions provide for public accountability, public notice, and an opportunity for the public to prepare for the application of new law. Regulations adopted under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act take effect only after the required public notice, opportunity for public comment, legal review by the Department of Law, and a deferred effective date. Curiously, the current version of this proposed constitutional amendment omits the improvements contained in 1983 LR 15. Neither the constitutional protections nor the corresponding Administrative Procedure Act protections would be applicable to a concurrent resolution's annulment of an administrative regulation.

The proposed constitutional amendment before you is not a "mere adjustment" or technical correction of the constitution. It proposes a substantial realignment of the constitutionally specified powers. Although the adoption of administrative regulations by an administrative agency is considered a "quasi-legislative function," it is an essential part of the executive branch's execution or implementation of a statute. The proposed amendment, by providing for legislative annulment by means of a concurrent resolution, provides for the legislature to make what can be considered executive-branch decisions -- executing a program created by statute. This concentration of power in the legislative branch -- both enacting the program statute and then participating in executing it -- does not reflect a sound policy in the face of the separation-of-powers doctrine as expressed in the Federalist Papers and other writings. That doctrine, of

course, involves a blending or sharing of powers. The purpose is to avoid an inappropriate concentration of power.

In addition, when the legislature makes a simple negative statement by merely annulling a regulation, it interferes with the executive-branch's execution of the statute and offers nothing in its place. For example, the regulation involved in the A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary case was a Department of Revenue regulation dealing with permits for such things as lotteries. It contained several elements: a dollar limitation, a time limitation, and a provision for the cumulative effect of the value of individual prizes in reaching the dollar limitation. When the legislature annuls a provision such as that, is the agency to interpret the annulment as meaning that the dollar limitation is not appropriate, or that the time period is not appropriate, or that the cumulative effect is not appropriate? If the agency concluded that the legislature must have been primarily concerned about the dollar limitation, and adopted a new regulation specifying a different dollar amount, would it be guessing right?

I do not believe that anyone questions the legislature's right to review the executive-branch's execution of the statutes. Nor does anyone question the legislature's right to enact statutes setting guidelines and imposing limitations or prohibitions. We may disagree as to the merit of a particular guideline or prohibition, but not as to the right of the legislature to enact it (subject, in some circumstances, to the applicability of other constitutional provisions).

The Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62) provides a carefully structured system with many opportunities for legislator involvement in the adoption of administrative regulations. If one of those opportunities was missed, or proved otherwise unavailing in some circumstance, further legislation might be appropriate. Such legislation would, of course, supersede the offending regulation.

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 77 L.Ed.2d 317, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983), affirming Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), the United States Supreme Court held invalid what has become known as the "legislative veto." The U.S. Supreme Court's decision is consistent with our state supreme court's decision in A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary. Your committee might also find helpful the discussion in the official commentary to the 1981 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws; see, especially, the art. III introductory comments

Hon. M. Mike Miller
House Judiciary Committee

May 8, 1986
Page 5

which discuss the legislative/executive/public interrelationship regarding administrative regulations.


In a nutshell, the problem is that once the legislature passes a statute creating a program or function it is then up to the executive to execute that statute and up to the court system to determine whether the executive has exceeded its authority or otherwise violated the law. This proposed amendment would alter that balance by injecting the legislature into the execution stage of the system.

As the voters have done twice before, your committee should reject this proposed constitutional amendment.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment. I would be happy to discuss the matter further with you at your convenience.

Yours truly,

HAROLD M. BROWN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: 
Arthur H. Peterson
Assistant Attorney General

AHP:md

cc: Hon. Paul Fischer
Alaska State Senate

Jim Ayers, Director
Legislative Relations
Governor's Office

17

ALPS

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT

FURTHER

2/3/89

DATE TURNED INTO OFFICE 4/21/90

Mr. President:

FINANCE Committee considered SJR 4

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to the individual right to keep and bear arms.

and recommended

- replace with _____ CS _____) same title
- or adopt _____ CS _____) new title
- attached amendment(s) and technical title change (HB only)
- _____ letter of intent adopted

do pass

do not pass

no recommendation

individual recommendations

further referral to _____

FISCAL NOTE(S) zero fiscal impact appropriation no FN
 new updated 22 Cov. previous
 same as previous fiscal note(s) published _____

MEMBERS SIGNING DO PASS

[Signature]

~~[Signature]~~

~~[Signature]~~

~~[Signature]~~

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

[Signature] - No Rec
[Signature] - No Rec

[Signature] No Rec

[Signature] (NO REC)

[Signature] No Rec.

Chairman signature and recommendation

Committee Backup attached

FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: 12/8/89
 Title: Const. Amend. - Right
to keep and Bear Arms
 Sponsor: Rodey
 Requestor: Rodey

Agency Affected: Office of the Governor
 BRU: Division of Elections
 Components: II Elections
Primary & General Elections

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

CAPITAL						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

REVENUE						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

* Costs included cover 2 to 3 pages in each Official Elections Pamphlet, for printing and typesetting, and costs estimated to cover computer programming requirements for vote counting purposes. (Continued)

Prepared by: Linda Edgeworth Phone: 465-4611
 Division: Division of Elections Date: 12/8/89

Approved by Commissioner: [Signature] (Acting) Date: 12.11.89
 Agency: Division of Elections

Distribution (by preparer):

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)

CONTINUATION OF FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

For Bill/Resolution No. SJR 4

However, these costs are based on the assumption that all candidates and issues will fit on three ballot cards, which is the norm. It should be noted, however that should the inclusion of this issue require a 4th ballot to be printed, the cost increase would have to be calculated at 16 cents per ballot x approximately 320,000 voters. The total cost of printing the additional ballot card would be \$51.2

Under these circumstances the fiscal note would be:

53.4

BY RODEY, KELLY, SZYMANSKI,
STURGULEWSKI, FISCHER,
HALFORD, KERTULA, PEARCE
AND FRANK

1 IN THE SENATE

2

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 4

3

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

4

SIXTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

5

Proposing an amendment to the Constitu-

6

tion of the State of Alaska relating to

7

the individual right to keep and bear

8

arms.

9 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

10 * Section 1. Article I, sec. 19, Constitution of the State of Alaska,
11 is amended to read:

12 SECTION 19. RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS. The individual [A
13 WELL-REGULATED MILITIA BEING NECESSARY TO THE SECURITY OF A FREE
14 STATE, THE] right [OF THE PEOPLE] to keep and bear arms shall not be
15 denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the
16 state.

17 * Sec. 2. The amendment proposed by this resolution shall be placed
18 before the voters of the state at the next general election in conformity
19 with art. XIII, sec. 1, Constitution of the State of Alaska, and the
20 election laws of the state.

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

CRIMINAL DIVISION

STEVE COWPER, GOVERNOR

REPLY TO:

CRIMINAL DIVISION CENTRAL OFFICE
P.O. BOX KC
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-0310
PHONE: (907) 465-3428

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROSECUTIONS
AND APPEALS
1031 WEST 4TH AVENUE, SUITE 318
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501-5993
PHONE: (907) 279-7424

February 12, 1989

Commissioner William G. Demmert
Department of Education
P.O. Box F
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Commissioner Demmert:

You have asked whether school districts will be able to prohibit the possession of weapons on school property if the Alaska constitution is amended as set out SJR 4. It is our opinion that the proposed amendment could present a constitutional impediment to adoption of laws that infringe on the right to keep or bear arms, including regulation of weapons on school grounds.

As set out more fully in the attached letter to Senator Jan Faiks, to support a finding of constitutionality in the face of a challenge based on the proposed amendment, each law infringing on the right to keep and bear arms must be based on a compelling state interest. Although we believe that a compelling state interest can be shown for prohibiting young children from having weapons, we are concerned that the new amendment could limit the prohibiting of adults, or older students, from having weapons on school property.

We must emphasize that the legal effects of the proposed constitutional amendment can not be predicted with any degree of certainty. However, based on the broad reading the Alaska court gives to the provisions of our constitution, and the lack of any language in the amendment giving the legislature the authority to regulate the exercise of the constitutional right, it is much more likely than at present that laws regulating firearms will be declared unconstitutional.

The constitutional hurdle could easily be avoided if the legislature amends the language of SJR 4 to specifically reserve the right to reasonably regulate arms. Language that would accomplish this result is set out at page 37 of the attached

Commissioner William G. Demmert
Right to Bear Arms Amendment

February 12, 1989
Page Two

letter, as well as in the attached document entitled "Alternative Methods of Reserving the Right of the Legislature to Reasonably Regulate Arms in SJR 4."

Please let us know if you have any remaining questions about this important issue.

Very truly yours,

GRACE BERG SCHAIBLE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: 

Laurie H. Otto
Assistant Attorney General

Attachments: Letter to Senator Faiks, January 29, 1989
"Alternative Methods of Reserving the Right of the
Legislature to Reasonably Regulate Arms in SJR4"

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

CRIMINAL DIVISION

STEVE COWPER, GOVERNOR

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January 29, 1989

The Honorable Jan Faiks
Alaska State Senator
P.O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Senator Faiks:

Thank you for the opportunity to review SJR 4, relating to a proposed amendment to the constitutional right to bear arms in Alaska. After considerable research regarding the law in Alaska and other states on this issue, it is our opinion that the existing constitutional provision protecting the right to bear arms should not be, nor does it need to be, amended.

In summary, our analysis is:

1. In Alaska, the right of the people to bear arms for legitimate purposes has never been infringed. In the absence of a specific need to amend the constitution, it may be wise to follow the adage "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

2. In a wide variety of contexts, the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted individual rights under the state constitution more broadly than the federal constitution, and there is no reason to believe the court would not interpret the existing right to bear arms provision in an equally broad manner.

3. The legal effects of the proposed constitutional amendment can not be predicted with any degree of certainty. The recent experiences of West Virginia illustrate the unreliability of political statements made by proponents of this type of amendment.

4. The only effect of the amendment that can be stated with certainty is that it transfers power currently in the hands of the legislature to the judiciary. A similar and well-known example of such a power transfer occurred when the constitution was amended to specifically mention the right of privacy. The legislature is still struggling with the resulting supreme court opinion which recognized a constitutional right to use marijuana.

5. Based on the broad reading the Alaska court gives to the provisions of our constitution, and the lack of any language in the amendment giving the legislature the authority to regulate the exercise of the constitutional right, it is more likely that portions of Alaska's statutes regulating firearms will be declared unconstitutional. Case authority exists as legal precedent for invalidating, or seriously weakening, both the state statute prohibiting all felons from having firearms, and the Anchorage municipal ordinance against carrying concealed weapons in automobiles.

6. If the Legislature decides to approve a constitutional amendment modifying the right to bear arms in Alaska, the language of the amendment should affirmatively state

that the legislature continues to have the authority to reasonably regulate firearms by law.

1. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Alaska

The Alaska Constitution addresses the right of the people to keep and bear arms at Article I, Section 19. It provides: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Although this section of the constitution has never been interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court, existing law grants Alaskans broad and relatively unrestricted rights to keep and bear arms.

Alaska's right to bear arms provision is virtually identical to language found in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, as noted by Legislative Counsel Tamara Brandt Cook in her memorandum to Senator Rodey dated April 14, 1983, "the [United States] Supreme Court has never directly considered whether the Second Amendment provides any protection to the private ownership of arms for lawful purposes." There is ample legal authority for the proposition that protection of the individual right to bear arms is provided by the language of both the Second Amendment and Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.

For example, in one scholarly article,¹ the author demonstrated that the amendments guarantee the individual right to keep and bear arms for the following purposes: (1) to enable the individual to perform militia duties; (2) to deter governmental oppression; (3) to maintain public order; and (4) to enable the individual to exercise the right to self-defense. The author concluded his analysis by clearly stating that, under language identical to the Alaska Constitution, common and traditional users of private firearms are protected and that it would be unconstitutional to enact

(1) any law that infringes the right of the people (excepting those people who fall into a traditional high-risk category, such as felons, the mentally deficient, and infants) to keep any arms commonly used for personal protection or any of the modern equivalent of arms that were fairly commonly possessed by the people at the adoption of the Constitution, or
(2) any law that infringes the right to bear those arms for traditional lawful purposes.²

¹Dowlut, "The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?," 36 Oklahoma Law Review 65 (1983).

²Id. at 101. The following articles have been cited as authority for the proposition that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms: S.P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (Univ. of N. Mex. Press 1984); Dowlut, "The Current Relevancy of Keeping and Bearing Arms," 15 U. Balt. L. F. 32 (1984); Kates, "Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment," 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983); Malcolm, "The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition," 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 285 (1983); Caplan, "The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend," 1982 Detroit Col. L. Rev. 789; Shalhope, "The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment," 69 J. Am. History 599 (1982); Halbrook, "To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791," 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 13 (1982); Gardiner, "To Preserve Liberty--A Look at The Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 63 (1982); Halbrook, "The

An analysis of the constitutional right to bear arms in Alaska must of necessity consider the history of gun regulation in the state.³ The right of the people to bear arms for legitimate purposes is widely recognized in Alaska, and has never been

Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments," 4 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 1 (1981); Cantrell, "The Right to Bear Arms," 53 Wis. Bar Bull. 21 (Oct. 1980); Caplan, "Handgun Control: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?," 10 N.C. Central L. J. 53 (1978); Caplan, "Restoring The Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited," 5 Fordham Urban L.J. 31 (1976); Whisker, "Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 171 (1976); Weiss, "A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law," 52 Jour. Urban Law 577 (1974); Hardy & Stompoly, "Of Arms and the Law," 51 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 62 (1974); McClure, "Firearms and Federalism," 7 Idaho L. Rev. 197 (1970); Levine & Saxe, "The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms," 7 Houston L. Rev. 1 (1969); Olds, "The Second Amendment and The Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 46 Mich. St. Bar. J. 15 (Oct. 1967); Comment, "The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Necessary Constitutional Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights?," 31 Albany L. Rev. 74 (1967); Sprecher, "The Lost Amendment," 51 Am. Bar Assn. J. 554 and 665 (1965); and Hays, "The Right to Bear Arms: A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation," 2 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 381 (1960).

³See, e.g., Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System, 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 1975): "In determining the scope of a constitutional right, the focus of the court's inquiry is not, however, on the question of whether there is a burden on the exercise of that right. We must look to the intent of the framers of the constitution concerning the nature of the right itself, the problems which they were addressing and the remedies they sought. While prior practice and the framers' purposes are not necessarily conclusive, an historical perspective is essential to an enlightened contemporary interpretation of our constitution."

infringed.⁴ Alaska and Vermont share the distinction of having the least restrictive firearms laws in United States.⁵

Proponents of the amendment indicate it is not proposed to rectify a current injustice nor to overturn existing guns laws or regulations, but to protect the rights of individuals to keep and bear arms against the caprice of an irresponsible legislature. We believe the protection of the existing constitution and the respect and restraint historically shown by the Alaska legislature and courts for the people's right to bear arms renders the proposed amendment unnecessary, and worse, the amendment interjects the uncertainty of judicial interpretation into a new and uncharted area.

2. Constitutional Interpretation in Alaska

It is often difficult to predict how a court will interpret the scope and effect of a new constitutional amendment, and how the power of the legislature will thereafter be limited. This unpredictability is very familiar to Alaskans. In 1972, the

⁴In previous years, a 1983 informal Attorney General's opinion has been cited as proof of the need for a constitutional amendment. The opinion addressed whether a landlord could prohibit a tenant from having firearms. This analysis of the right to bear arms, rendered in the context of a contractual relationship between private parties, did not comprehensively address the issue of governmental regulation of arms.

⁵Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, State Laws and Published Ordinances: Firearms (18th Ed. 1988).

people explicitly recognized the right to privacy in Alaska by approving a constitutional amendment. In the first major case interpreting the privacy amendment, the Alaska Supreme Court in Ravin v. State,⁶ struck down the law that criminalized possession of marijuana in the home for personal use. The legislature has been struggling for many years to deal with this unique interpretation of our constitution.⁷

Ravin is only one example of the propensity of the state supreme court to interpret the Alaska constitution as giving broader protection to individual rights than similar constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions. As a result, the judicial decisions of other states interpreting individual rights cannot be

⁶537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).

⁷Although other states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington, have adopted similar constitutional provisions recognizing the right to privacy, the Alaska court stands alone in its conclusion that the right to privacy protects the right to possess marijuana in the home.

heavily relied upon in predicting what will happen when the Alaska courts are asked to analyze identical issues.⁸

With respect to the actions of individual citizens, Alaska court decisions frequently rely on the privacy amendment to justify constitutional interpretations that are significantly broader than those reached by other courts. Our court has repeatedly determined that the effect of the right of privacy is to amplify the protections afforded by other constitutional rights. The complexity of anticipating the court's interpretation of a right to bear arms is compounded by the potentially augmenting effect of the explicit right to privacy.

For example, the Alaska constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is held to be broader in scope than identical guarantees under the federal constitution, in part because of the right to privacy.⁹ Despite considerable authority

⁸In addition to the cases discussed below, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the Alaska Constitution provides greater protection in areas ranging from the free exercise of one's religious beliefs, Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (defendant entitled to exemption from fish and game regulations on account of his religious beliefs even though the charges against defendant would have been upheld under the federal constitution) to the right to counsel, Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) ("the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution is more expansive than the corresponding right under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.").

⁹Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979). In this case, the court reversed a conviction for possession of heroin. The defendant had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a correctional officer discovered the heroin inside a balloon in

to the contrary in other jurisdictions, the Alaska court has held that the state constitution prohibits warrantless administrative inspections of private business premises.¹⁰ The warrantless monitoring of private conversations with the consent of one participant, acceptable under federal constitutional standards, is held in Alaska to be an unreasonable search and seizure in light of the combined effect of the Alaska constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Alaska constitutional right of privacy.¹¹

The Alaska court has also forged new legal ground in interpreting the equal protection clause of the state constitution. This amendment provides additional protection for the exercise of constitutional rights such as the right to bear arms because it is used by the court in evaluating whether legislation is

the defendant's pocket. Although it was permissible for the officer to take the balloon away from the defendant before he was booked into the jail, the court held that the defendant's right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the officer looked inside the balloon.

¹⁰Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).

¹¹In the cases of Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1978) (court reversed conviction of marijuana dealer); Aldridge v. State, 584 P.2d 1105 (Alaska 1978) (court reversed conviction of heroin dealer); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (court agreed charges against heroin dealer should be dismissed), the decisions were based on the court's broad interpretation of Alaska's constitutional rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Federal courts faced with the same issues have interpreted similar federal constitutional guarantees relating to searches and seizures differently, and would have upheld the convictions.

constitutional. In developing its own equal protection analysis, our court rejected the deferential test applied by the United States Supreme Court, holding instead that the Alaska Constitution requires social and economic legislation to pass a more rigorous test.¹²

In Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair v. DOT, 754 P.2d 1111 (1988), the court explained its expansive equal protection analysis as follows:

In reviewing equal protection claims under the Alaska constitution ... the minimum burden that the state must meet when defending legislation challenged on equal protection grounds under the Alaska constitution is greater than that required under the United States Constitution. The burden on the state increases in proportion to the primacy of the interest involved. Eventually this burden reaches the functional equivalent of the federal compelling state interest test in those cases where fundamental rights and suspect categories are at issue.¹³

Another liberal interpretation of Alaska's constitution was set out in Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982). In this case the court invalidated statutes relating to ballot access by

¹²Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).

¹³754 P.2d at 1114. The court in Herrick also pointed to an additional burden placed on the state in defending against an equal protection challenge. "[T]he rational basis test articulated by the Supreme Court allows a court to 'hypothesize' facts. Under that test, a party challenging legislation on equal protection grounds, cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). In Alaska, the court will not hypothesize facts.

candidates of small parties. The court relied on the free speech and equal protection provisions of the Alaska constitution, and acknowledged that the statutes would have been upheld under the interpretation the federal courts have given to identical provisions of the United States constitution. The court declared that Alaska restrictions on the right to associate in pursuit of political beliefs are permissible only where the government is able to show that the restrictions are justified by compelling governmental interests. Further, the restrictions must be no broader than needed to accomplish the governmental interests which justify them.¹⁴

Thus, any effort to predict the interpretation of any amendment relating to an individual right in the Alaska court must be mindful of the court's tendency to interpret individual rights broadly, in often unexpected contexts, and the court's frequent insistence that regulatory schemes satisfy a compelling state interest test.

3. The West Virginia Experience

Despite Alaska's unique constitution and the willingness of our court to adopt novel legal interpretations, we have also considered the experience of other states with right to bear arms amendments. For example, based on its newly-enacted right to bear

¹⁴651 P.2d at 5.

arms amendment, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently struck down a statute that prohibited carrying dangerous or deadly weapons without a license.

Proponents of the amendment had argued during legislative hearings that existing laws would not be affected by the amendment, but when an existing law was challenged, the proponents switched positions and argued for the unconstitutionality of the West Virginia law. This case shows the dangers that arise when a legislature approves a constitutional amendment that does not spell out in plain language its precise intent. A detailed description of what happened in West Virginia is therefore important because many of the same issues are currently being discussed in the context of your consideration of SJR4.

a. Legislative History

In 1986, West Virginia amended its constitution to expand the right to keep and bear arms. The new constitutional provision stated, "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreation use."

Despite the popularity of the right to keep and bear arms amendment in the West Virginia legislature, the legislative process "failed to give the amendment's language any real definition beyond

a general sense that passage of the amendment would leave undisturbed current law and constitutionalize existing state law prohibiting municipal governments from banning the ownership of weapons or ammunition. The very popularity of the concept seemed to insulate the proposed amendment from the 'hard look' analysis appropriate for amendments to a constitution."¹⁵

No significant statement of legislative intent was prepared by any of the committees that considered the proposal, nor was any substantive research done by the legislative committees that recommended the measure for passage. As a result, there was little in the legislative history to assist the court in fixing any specific meaning to the words, phrases, or the intent of the amendment. In researching the legislative history, McNeely concluded, "All that can be said without question was that legislative proponents consistently took the position that the amendment, if adopted, would not change existing laws, and that legislative opponents consistently attempted, with no ultimate success, to amend the measure to assure that the state would retain its ability to maintain the existing state of the law."¹⁶

¹⁵McNeely, "The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where - West Virginia's Firearms Law v. The Right-To-Bear-Arms Amendment," 89 West Virginia Law Review 1125 (1987) at 1160.

¹⁶McNeely at 1152.

In an analysis provided to the West Virginia legislature by the National Rifle Association, the proponents argued that under the amendment the bearing of constitutionally-protected arms "may be regulated." The analysis described the various statutes that the NRA believed would be upheld if the proposed amendment were adopted, and specifically stated that "a license may be required to carry a pistol away from one's home, place of business, or land."¹⁷

In attempting to predict the effect the court would give to the amendment, McNeely predicted that,

Given the legislature's failure to provide clear legislative intent in any formal sense, it shall be up to the judicial branch of the state to interpret the amendment consistent with its language and demonstrated intent. With that interpretation, the court may continue the state's traditional legal attitude toward firearms by finding the amendment consistent with state law, or it may embark the state on an uncharted course of repeal and revision of long-standing statutes and case law ... It is, perhaps, ironic that such a lack of legislative research and formal legislative findings, coupled with the broad, unqualified

¹⁷The National Rifle Association "Analysis of Proposed West Virginia Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" is set out as Appendix H to the McNeely article at 1176-78. It is virtually identical to the "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" contained in the Senate Judiciary file for SJR4.

In addition, at least one advertisement by the NRA for the amendment in West Virginia contained "a prominent statement that no existing federal or state law would be repealed by passage, with the statement reading 'Amendment 1 keeps Federal and State firearms laws the law.'" McNeely at 1148.

language of Amendment No. 1, have combined to place the future of firearms regulation, heretofore primarily a legislative activity, in the hands of the judicial branch of state government.¹⁸

b. Princeton v. Buckner

The case of Princeton v. Buckner¹⁹ began when a police officer searched a drunk driver who had been placed under arrest, and found a .22 caliber automatic pistol concealed in the driver's pocket. Under existing West Virginia law, a license was required to carry a concealed weapon. Although the drunk driver did not have a license, the magistrate refused to issue charges for illegally carrying a firearm because he concluded that the licensing law was unconstitutional under the newly-enacted right to bear arms amendment to the West Virginia Constitution.

Despite the assertions during the legislative and public debates that existing West Virginia firearms laws would not be affected, the challengers to the law in Buckner lost little time in proving the non-binding nature of such statements.²⁰ In their analysis of legislative intent, the challengers pointed to the

¹⁸McNeely at 1162.

¹⁹Case No. CC972, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, July 1, 1988, reconsideration denied December 20, 1988.

²⁰The National Rifle Association filed an amicus brief in the Buckner case on behalf of its West Virginia members, which concluded: "... the licensing statute is unconstitutional because it frustrates rather than regulates the right to bear arms."

legislature's refusal to modify the amendment to specifically state that the legislature retained the power to regulate firearms.

For example, in his brief to the Supreme Court, Buckner argued as follows:

The State, in its brief, concludes that "it is clear that the Right to Keep and Bear [Arms] Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution was not meant to nullify existing laws." This conclusion is without factual support or logic. Had the efforts of Delegate McNeely to add the word "lawful" and had the efforts of Delegate Knight to make the amendment subject to the "police power" of the State, or either of these efforts, been successful, then the argument of the State might bear some logic. The fact that both of these efforts were specifically turned down by the Legislature indicates clearly that the Legislature had no such intent as stated by the State. Had that been the clear intent of the Legislature in passing the resolution, it could have simply added language to that effect, or adopted one of the amendments referred to. (emphasis added) Brief of Respondent Buckner at 4.

The basis of the argument of the State is that the proponents took the position that the right to bear arms amendment did not change existing laws. The fact of the matter is that the opponents of the amendment took the position that it would, in fact, change existing law and the Legislature refused, although given opportunity to do so, to word the amendment in such a fashion so as to deal with that question. (emphasis added) Brief of Respondent Buckner at 5.

In addition to pointing out that the legislature refused to address the extent to which it retained the power to pass firearms legislation, the challengers concluded that the

legislature and the people must have wanted to place restraints on the legislature. At page 6 of his brief, Buckner argued that if the constitutional amendment "means anything, it has to mean that the people of the State wanted to change the law in existence at the time, and place restraints upon the Legislature. Any other conclusion is illogical and would render the act of the Legislature and the people in adopting the constitutional provision an exercise in futility." In other words, it doesn't matter what the supporters of the bill said; it only mattered what the legislature itself said in the language of the amendment.

The West Virginia Supreme Court accepted the arguments presented by the challengers, and held that a "constitutional amendment will supersede any inconsistent portions of antecedent constitutional or statutory provisions, as 'the latest expression of the will of the people.'"²¹ The court rejected the position taken by the state that "West Virginia's licensing statute evinces an intent to control, but not prohibit, carrying weapons, such as handguns, which are both easily concealable and deadly."²²

²¹Princeton v. Buckner, at page 10.

²²Brief of Petitioner State of West Virginia, at 15.

On December 20, 1988, the West Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that the statute was unconstitutional. The opinion did not isolate the specific provisions of this statute, or the related licensing requirements, which rendered the statute violative of the right to keep and bear arms amendment. Instead, the court declared that the prohibition against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon for defensive purposes without a license or other statutory authorization was overly broad.

c. Current Status of West Virginia Gun Law

Similar to the current situation in Alaska where the legislature is trying to pass a constitutional statute prohibiting people from possessing marijuana in their homes, the West Virginia legislature is now working on developing a constitutional statute relating to the carrying of deadly and dangerous weapons.²³ In the meantime, unless a person commits a separate criminal offense with a firearm, West Virginia law enforcement authorities are prohibited from arresting persons for, or protecting persons from, carrying concealed weapons, regardless of whether the offender is carrying the weapon for defensive or other purposes. (Source--West Virginia Department of Public Safety)²⁴

Although the court acknowledged that the legislature "may, through the valid exercise of its police power, reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep and bear arms in order to promote the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of this State, provided that the restrictions or regulations imposed do not frustrate the constitutional freedoms guaranteed by...the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment," the court recognized that each statute regulating firearms would need to be evaluated in light of the new constitutional provisions. The court cautioned that "a governmental purpose to control or prohibit certain activities, which may be constitutionally subject to state regulation under the police power, may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the realm of protected freedoms, such as the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by our State Constitution." (emphasis added)

²³Telephone conversation, Steve Hernden, West Virginia Assistant Attorney General.

²⁴Petition for Reconsideration of Remedy filed by the State of West Virginia at pages 1-2.

4. The Proposed Alaska Amendment

The proposed amendment to the Alaska constitution states that "The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state."

The first and most significant effect of the constitutional amendment proposed in SJR4 is to limit the legislative authority to regulate the right to bear arms. The amendment takes authority away from the people's elected representatives as to what policies the state will follow concerning the right to keep and bear arms and, shifts to the courts the ultimate authority to decide state policy through the uncertain course of constitutional interpretation.

The sweeping but ambiguous language of the proposed amendment means that, if passed, it can be expected to trigger a great deal of litigation in a number of different contexts. If the courts were to construe the amendment in a fashion that the Legislature felt was harmful to the public interest, the only way that the law could be changed, without inducing the court to change its own position, would be through another constitutional amendment. Thus, the amendment would give the courts a much greater role in interpreting the regulatory authority of the Legislature than it has at present.

As discussed above, relying on legal precedents from the courts of other states to predict what the Alaska court may decide under the proposed amendment is fraught with difficulty. Although proponents of amending Alaska's constitution argue that at least 42 states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms, and that all firearms laws have been upheld in every state, this assertion is incorrect and misleading, as discussed below.

Most constitutional provisions enacted by other states differ from SJR4 because they either define the circumstances in which the constitutional right applies, or they expressly recognize that the constitutional provision is subject to legislative regulation.²⁵ Only Rhode Island has a constitutional provision, like SJR4, that grants an apparently unfettered right to keep and bear arms.²⁶

Each of the 50 state supreme courts interpret its own constitutional provisions consistent with the legal precedents of that state. Decisions made by courts of sister states may be

²⁵See R. Dowlut & J. Knoop, "State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 7 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 177, 236-240 (1982).

²⁶We have been unable to find any cases in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court has directly interpreted this constitutional provision.

informative, yet are not persuasive or conclusive authority from which one can predict the result in a different jurisdiction. For example, the West Virginia court struck down its licensing statute after considering and rejecting an Indiana Supreme Court decision that reached the opposite conclusion.²⁷ In the Indiana decision, the dissent noted that "The decisions from other jurisdictions are not uniform on the right to keep and bear arms any more than the constitutional provisions are stated in the same language."

²⁷An Indiana statute which imposed licensing requirements on handguns similar to those of West Virginia was addressed in Matthews v State, 148 N.E. 2d 334 (1958). As in West Virginia, the Indiana statute placed no restrictions on possessing or carrying a weapon on one's own premises, but to carry a gun elsewhere required a license conditioned on a showing that, among other things, "the applicant has a proper reason for carrying a pistol and is of good character and reputation and a suitable person to be so licensed." 148 N.E.2d at 336. The Indiana constitution provided that "the people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State." The Matthews court affirmed the statute and held that the licensing statute was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power to provide for the public safety and welfare.

In a subsequent case, Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Indiana App. 1980), the Indiana court relied on the constitutional right to bear arms provision in reversing the denial of a license to carry a handgun made by an applicant who claimed he needed a gun for self-defense. The authorities had denied the license after reviewing evidence showing that the applicant "was a 'chronic liar' suffering from a 'gigantic police complex.'" Evidence also showed that when the applicant had previously held a license, he "had carried and displayed his pistol at inappropriate times." Other witnesses testified that the applicant had "mental problems."

The Schubert court reiterated that establishing a licensing procedure for handguns is not violative of the constitution. However, the court ruled that once a person makes the claim that a gun is needed for self-defense, the constitutional right to bear arms provision prohibits authorities from withholding the license, or even making a factual determination as to whether the person actually needs a gun.

Since the analysis of each case turns on the precise wording of each constitutional provision, it is difficult to use the cases for purposes of comparison. For example, the court's reasons for upholding a challenged statute in State v. Grob, 690 P.2d 951 (Idaho App. 1984) are illustrative of the limited precedential value out-of-state decisions would have in Alaska. In this case, the defendant argued that a statute providing a mandatory sentence for using a firearm while engaged in kidnapping or aggravated battery violated his constitutional right to bear arms. Since Idaho's constitutional right to bear arms provision was amended in 1978, the court looked to the language of both the pre-1978 and post-1978 constitutions. The court found that the statute was constitutional under the pre-1978 language because the provision specifically stated "the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law." Similarly, the statute was found to be constitutional under the post-1978 language based on the specific authorization given the legislature to prescribe "minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm" and to punish the unlawful "use of a firearm."²⁸

5. The Risk to Specific Alaska Statutes

a. Constitutionality of Concealed Weapons Statutes

Despite the assertions of supporters of this amendment, it is by no means certain that a new right to bear arms amendment

²⁸State v. Grob, 690 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Idaho App. 1984)

would leave current Alaska statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons untouched. If the Alaska courts interpreted the amendment to permit the carrying of concealed weapons, AS 11.61.220(a)(1) would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the Alaska Supreme Court would hold that this was an area beyond legislative regulation. The matter is simply uncertain.

An article published by Robert Dowlut, General Counsel for the National Rifle Association,²⁹ gives rise to concern about the constitutionality of an Anchorage municipal ordinance, if the proposed amendment to the Alaska constitution were approved. Dowlut asserts that the right to keep and bear arms includes the right to carry weapons in private vehicles,³⁰ something which is now prohibited by Anchorage Municipal Code 8.05.070(A), as interpreted in Municipality of Anchorage v. Lloyd, 679 P.2d 486 (Alaska App. 1984).³¹

²⁹Dowlut & Knoop, "State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 7 Oklahoma City University Law Review 177 (1982).

³⁰Id. at 220.

³¹Support for amending Alaska's constitutional right to bear arms provision has been predicated on an unwarranted assumption that the amendment will not have an effect on existing state or municipal laws. For example, Resolution No. AR 87-238, dated September 29, 1987 and passed by the Anchorage Assembly, included the bald assertion that the amendment "will not invalidate existing municipal public safety measures regulating the use and possession of firearms."

In the document entitled "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms," which was written by Dowlut and provided to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the assertion is made that "concealed carrying statutes ... are routinely upheld." A review of the cases cited in support of this proposition highlights the problems involved in relying on judicial decisions in jurisdictions outside the state of Alaska to predict how our court would interpret the proposed constitutional amendment.

For example, Dowlut cites Holland v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1956) as standing for the proposition that concealed weapons statutes are constitutional despite the broadly drafted language of SJR4. However, a review of the case shows that the Kentucky constitution explicitly declares that the right to bear arms is "subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons," a phrase not included SJR4. The court upheld the concealed weapons statute because it found that "the meaning of the constitutional provision is plain and the legislature has exercised the power granted to it by enacting [the concealed weapons statute]." Id. at 85.

Similarly, Dowlut claims that State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Oregon 1980) is another case in which a concealed weapons statute was "routinely upheld." In fact, the court in Kessler

struck down a statute that prohibited possessing billy clubs. Despite Dowlut's claim, the court did not address the constitutionality of concealed weapons laws, although it noted in passing that the court in State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72 (Idaho 1945) upheld a concealed weapons statute.

In Hart the Idaho court specifically based its decision to uphold the ordinance on the language of Idaho's constitutional right to bear arms provision. At the time Hart was decided, the Idaho constitution stated "The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense; but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law."

The final case cited by Dowlut to support his claim that Alaska's courts will uphold concealed weapons statutes is State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1986). However, once again, the constitutional provision that was analyzed in McAdams is significantly narrower than the proposed amendment contained in SJR4. The Wyoming constitution provides, "The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied." The court upheld the concealed weapons statute because it did not believe that the law placed unnecessary restraints on the right to possess arms for self defense: "We are cognizant of the fact that our concealed deadly weapons statute imposes some limitation on a person's right to bear arms in defense of himself;

but, when balanced against the object of the statute, we do not find the limitation unreasonable." Id. at 1238.

b. Constitutionality of Felon in Possession Statutes

It is also by no means certain that the Alaska Supreme Court would uphold current laws controlling or prohibiting convicted felons from owning or possessing weapons if SJR4 were adopted. Felons convicted of bootlegging or drug dealing would be allowed to possess firearms with impunity if the opinion expressed by the General Counsel of the National Rifle Association, and discussed below, were adopted in this state. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted its constitutional right to bear arms as providing a defense to the charge of felon in possession. If the Alaska courts reached a similar interpretation, the ability to prosecute felons for possessing firearms would certainly be impaired.

The supporters of SJR4 have provided you with the "Analysis of Proposed Alaska Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms" which implies that Alaska's felon in possession statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, Robert Dowlut, General Counsel for the National Rifle Association, has previously published contrary statements. In a law review article, he stated, "To prevent the people from being disarmed by the expedient of classifying regulatory offenses as felonies, the disqualification

for felons should be restricted to common law felonies and their modern equivalents and to offenses requiring some state of mind above strict liability which are inherently inimical to life and property."³² (emphasis added). Thus, under Dowlut's view, felons charged with drug dealing and bootlegging, which are not "common law felonies," could legally carry weapons.

Under current AS 11.61.200, all persons convicted of any felony are prohibited from possessing a firearm capable of being concealed on the person, and this law applies to persons convicted of regulatory offenses such as bootlegging and drug dealing, as well as the common law felonies such as murder, assault or kidnapping. If Dowlut's interpretation were adopted, Alaska's statute would be overbroad, and struck down as unconstitutional.

A conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Ford, 568 P.2d 26 (Colorado 1977), based on the "right to bear arms" provision of the Colorado Constitution. The court held that the constitutional protection extends to a defendant "who presents competent evidence showing that his purpose in possessing weapons was the defense of his home, person, and property" and that this type of evidence provides a complete defense to a felon-in-

³²Dowlut & Knoop at 192.

possession charge.³³ Once the defendant has raised the issue as a defense, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's purpose in possessing firearms was not for defense. Thus, unless the felon is committing a crime with the gun, it is virtually impossible to prove that the weapon was not for "defense." As a practical matter, the teeth have been taken out of the law because of the problems of proving that a felon in possession of a gun at the felon's home, on the felon's person, or on the felon's property is using it other than for defense.

As with the concealed weapons statutes, there are problems in relying on the judicial decisions of other states in reaching the conclusion that Alaska's statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, in the North Dakota case distributed to the Senate Judiciary Committee, State v. Ricehill³⁴, the statute only prohibited persons "convicted anywhere for a felony involving violence or intimidation" from owning firearms. Unlike current Alaska law, North Dakota's narrower felon in possession statute would fall within the category of felon in possession statutes that Dowlut considers to be constitutional, in

³³The court noted at page 28 that this affirmative defense is available in cases involving the charge of carrying a concealed weapon.

³⁴415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).

that it only prohibits felons convicted of common law felonies from having firearms.³⁵

Other state courts have upheld felon in possession statutes based on express constitutional language that preserved the right of the legislature to regulate arms. In Landers v. State, 299 S.E 2d 707 (Ga. 1983), the court affirmed the conviction of a felon charged with possessing a firearm, and held "Where a State constitution in terms provides, in connection with the right to bear arms, that the State may regulate this right, or may regulate the manner of bearing arms, these words expressly

³⁵See also, Dickerson v. State, 517 So.2d 625 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986), Bristow v. State, 418 So.2d 927 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) and Mason v. State, 103 So.2d 337 (Ala.App. (1956), aff'd 103 So.2d 341 (1958) (Statute prohibited "a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence from owning or possessing a pistol); State v. Krantz, 164 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1945) and State v. Tully, 89 P.2d 517 (Wash. 1939) (Statute prohibited possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1982) (Statute prohibited persons convicted of "murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault to commit murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary or sexual assault in the first or second degree, or mayhem" to possess any firearms.); State v. Noel, 414 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1966) and State v. Rascon, 519 P.2d 37 (Ariz. 1974) (Statute prohibited any person convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a pistol); Sheppard v. State, 586 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), McGuire v. State, 537 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976) and Webb v. State, 439 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969) (Statute prohibited persons convicted of "a felony involving an act of violence or threatened violence to a person or property" from possessing firearms "away from the premises where he lives."); State v. Cartwright, 418 P.2d 822 (Ore. 1966) (Statute prohibited possession where convicted of "a felony against the person or property of another."

recognize the police power in direct connection with the constitutional declaration as to the right."³⁶

Similarly, in Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1967), the conviction for possession of a pistol by a defendant who had previously been convicted of a felony was upheld. Although the statute applied to persons convicted of all felonies, Florida's constitutional provision said "The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law."

The court in Amos v. State, 343 So.2d 166 (La. 1977) upheld charges for felon in possession of a firearm because the "purpose [of the statute] is to limit the possession of firearms by person who, by their past commission of certain specified serious felonies, have demonstrated a dangerous disregard for the law and present a potential threat of further or future criminal activity." However, two justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court dissented from the opinion, believing that the statute impermissibly infringed on the right to bear arms.

³⁶Georgia's constitution states "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne."

The reasoning of the two dissenting justices in Amos is important, since if this position were adopted in Alaska, AS 11.61.200 would be struck down. The dissenters stated that the felon in possession statute "impermissibly limits the affirmative constitutional guarantee and as such is not a valid exercise of the police power." The dissenters looked at other state decisions upholding felon in possession laws and concluded "These states, however, have constitutional provisions different from ours. Every one of these constitutions link the right to bear arms to the need for a militia. Unlike these provisions, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly grants to each citizen the 'right to keep and bear arms,' a right which 'no law' shall abridge. This constitutional guarantee is not limited by linking it to a militia or a defense for the people as a whole. It is limited only by one state exception: the legislature has the authority to prohibit the concealment of weapons on the person. Otherwise, the legislature lacks the authority to nullify the right of Louisiana citizens to keep and bear arms."

An analysis of the effect the proposed right to bear arms amendment will have on the state's felon in possession statute must be undertaken with both the right to privacy and the Alaska Supreme Court's expansive equal protection standard in mind. Alaska law prohibits all felons, including persons convicted of non-violent felonies such as embezzlement and certain sex offenses, from

possessing firearms. If SJR4 were adopted, the court would require the state to prove that the law is based on a compelling state interest. In relation to non-violent felons, it is not unlikely that the state would be unable to meet the burden of proving it had a compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession of firearms by non-violent felons.

c. Constitutionality of Prohibited Weapons Statutes

The possession of certain classes of weapons is prohibited in Alaska.³⁷ Included in the category of prohibited weapons are switchblades, gravity knives, and metal knuckles. Under SJR4, this law would be unconstitutional, if the court in this state accepted the analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Ore. 1984); State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824 (Ore. 1981); and State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Ore. 1980).

In Delgado, the Oregon court held that a statute prohibiting mere possession of a switchblade was unconstitutional under the right to bear arms provision of the Oregon constitution.³⁸ The court first determined that the drafters of Oregon's constitution "intended that the private citizen have the

³⁷AS 11.61.200(e).

³⁸Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution provides: "The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State..."

right to possess arms for the defense of person and property."³⁹ Next, the court reasoned that switchblades were arms, and as a result, possession of a switchblade is a constitutionally protected in Oregon and the statute making such possession a crime is unconstitutional.

d. Constitutionality of Game Regulations

Alaska's regulatory scheme relating to the lawful methods of taking game is potentially at risk if the proposed amendment is adopted.⁴⁰ Since each of the game regulations infringes on the right to bear a particular type of arm, in order for the regulation to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the state would need to prove that it had a compelling state interest for adopting the regulation.

For example, under 5 AAC 92.100(a)(1), it is illegal to shoot waterfowl with a rifle or pistol. The purpose of the regulation is to make hunting waterfowl less efficient, and more

³⁹Delgado at 611.

⁴⁰5 AAC 92.075 (the permissible weapons for taking big game are a shotgun, a muzzle-loading rifle, or a rifle or pistol using a center-firing cartridge); 5 AAC 92.080 (it is prohibited to take game with the use or aid of a machine gun, set gun, or a shotgun larger than 10 gauge); and 5 AAC 92.100 (it is prohibited to take waterfowl, snipe and cranes with a rifle or pistol, a shotgun larger than 10 gauge, or a shotgun not plugged to a three shell capacity).

sporting.⁴¹ However, many biologists have argued that the regulation is unnecessary as it doesn't matter how a bird is killed, it only matters how many animals are shot, and whether the appropriate bag limit was exceeded.⁴² In the face of this type of expert testimony, it is not unlikely that a court would strike down 5 AAC 92.100(a)(1) as an infringement of the right to bear arms.

6. The Legislature Should Affirmatively State Its Intent

The State, through exercise of its police power, is vested with the authority to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the general welfare of its citizenry. The Alaska Supreme Court examined the state's police power in light of express constitutional limitations on regulatory authority in Matthews v. Quinton.⁴³ In this case, the court analyzed whether a statute providing for the transportation of children to nonpublic schools at public expense was in contravention of a constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public funds for the support of private schools. Since the statute had been on the books before the constitutional provision was adopted, the court

⁴¹Telephone conversation with James Sheridan, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Law Enforcement, Alaska Region, United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

⁴²Id.

⁴³362 P.2d 932, app. disp., cert. den. 82 S.Ct. 530, 368 U.S. 517, 7 L.Ed.2d 522 (Alaska 1961)

considered the effect of subsequently adopted constitutional provisions on existing statutes.

The court concluded that for a constitutional provision to operate retrospectively to validate antecedent legislation in the face of claimed unconstitutionality, "the validating constitutional provision must make some reference, however slight or inferential, to the statute intended to be validated." The statute authorizing transportation of private school pupils was declared void because the newly adopted constitutional provision did "not show by the language used, either directly or by necessary implication, that it was intended to operate retrospectively so as to validate [the statute]." Id. at 939.

Whether the statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the state was also considered in Matthews. The court noted that "the police power -- broad and comprehensive though it is -- may not be exercised in contravention of plain and unambiguous constitutional inhibitions." Although the state has "inherent and reserved police power to enact laws to promote the safety, health and general welfare of society," the court emphasized that "this power must be exercised within constitutional limits." Id. at 944.

During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Legislatures, versions of the right to bear arms amendment contained a general statement of "legislative intent" indicating that the constitutional amendment, if adopted, "should not be construed to preclude the regulation of the manner in which arms may be borne, carried, or used." We are concerned that this indirect statement of legislative intent will not be effective to preserve the present power to reasonably regulate the possession and use of weapons.

As a general rule, a statute or constitutional provision will be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language on its face. If the intent behind the adoption of the amendment were to later become an issue, it is the intent of the voters who adopted the measure that will be relevant, rather than the intent of the legislators who drafted it. Although last session's resolution directed the Legislative Affairs Agency to consider the stated "legislative intent" when preparing its neutral summary for the election pamphlet, the intent language would not appear on the ballot itself, and might not be contained verbatim in the election pamphlet. See art. XIII, sec. 1 of the Alaska Constitution and AS 15.58.010.

Conclusion

It is our belief that the present provision of the Alaska constitution and the traditional restraint of the legislature in

regulating firearms adequately protect the right to bear arms. However, if the legislature believes this issue should be placed before the people in the form of a constitutional amendment, that amendment should be drafted to explicitly recognize the legislature's regulatory authority with regard to arms.

Both legal principles and common sense dictate that a well-drafted statute or constitutional provision should reduce uncertainty and disputes about interpretation. Statements of "legislative intent" are not an adequate substitute for clear, unambiguous language in the proposed constitutional amendment. A more precisely drafted amendment would minimize the possibility that a criminal defendant would later be able to successfully convince a court, as has been done in other that states, that a statute, regulation, or ordinance is unconstitutional.

As alternatives to SJR4, we suggest language such as:

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state, except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

or

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state, except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law.

The Honorable Jan Faiks
SJR4 - Right to Keep and Bear Arms

January 29, 1989
Page 38

We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and trust that we can work together to accomplish your goals in a way that does not detrimentally affect our ability to prosecute activities that we all agree should be against the law.

Respectfully submitted,

GRACE BERG SCHAIBLE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: 

Laurie H. Otto
Assistant Attorney General

cc: The Honorable Pat Rodey
The Honorable Peter Goll
The Honorable Max Gruenberg
The Honorable Dave Donley
Grace Berg Schaible
Bob Evans

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RESERVING THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
REASONABLY REGULATE ARMS IN SJR 4

The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the state or a political subdivision of the state,

1. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

2. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may reasonably regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used.

3. ... except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law.

4. ... except that the exercise of this right may be reasonably regulated by law.

5. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

6. ... except that the state or a political subdivision of the state may reasonably regulate the manner in which arms may be kept, borne, or used. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

7. ... except that the exercise of this right may be regulated by law. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

8. ... except that the exercise of this right may be reasonably regulated by law. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms.

Department of Law
Laurie Otto

2/13/89

Patrick M. Rodey
Senator

Alaska State Legislature



Senate

3111 C. St., Suite 510
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
(907) 561-7618

During Session:
P.O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-3793

DATE: February 13, 1989

TO : Senator Rick Uehling, Co-Chair
Senator John Binkley, Co-Chair
Senate Finance Committee

FROM: Senator Patrick Rodey

RE : Senate Joint Resolution 4 - Proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to the individual
right to keep and bear arms.

Senate Joint resolution would place a proposed constitutional amendment before the voters at the next general election. The resolution contains an amendment to the state constitution which would establish and clarify an individual's right (rather than a collective right) to keep and bear arms. It also precludes local regulation of the possession or use of firearms.

There is a fiscal note of \$2,200 for printing, typesetting and computer programming requirements associated with the Official Elections Pamphlet and ballot cards.

5UR

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SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT

FURTHER

DATE TURNED INTO OFFICE 2/13/90

4/26/89
Mr. President:

FINANCE

Committee considered SSSJR 5

Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska amending provisions relating to the Alaska permanent fund; establishing temporary provisions relating to dedicated funds, the Alaska permanent fund; etc. and recommended

replace with CS ~~SS SJR 5 (Finance)~~) same title
 or adopt CS) new title
 attached amendment(s) and technical title change (HB only)
 letter of intent adopted

do pass

do not pass

no recommendation

~~individual recommendations~~

further referral to

FISCAL NOTE(S) zero ^{2.2 Gov/Div of Elects} ~~fiscal impact~~ appropriation no FN
 new updated previous
 same as previous fiscal note(s) published

MEMBERS SIGNING DO PASS

[Signature]

Paul Fricker

[Signature] (Do Pass)

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Paul J. Zhang do not Pass -
Jim Dunne Do Not Pass -

Chair: signature and recommendation

Committee Backup attached

FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: 1/18/90
 Title: Provisions relating to the
Alaska Permanent Fund
 Sponsor: Faiks
 Requestor: Faiks

Agency Affected: Office of the Governor
 BRU: Division of Elections
 Components: II - Elections

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

CAPITAL						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

REVENUE						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	2.2*	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

* Costs included cover 2 to 3 pages in each Official Election Pamphlet, for printing and typesetting, and costs estimated to cover computer programming requirements for vote counting purposes.

Prepared by: Linda Edgeworth Phone: 465-4611
 Division: Division of Elections Date: _____

Approved by Commissioner: [Signature] Date: 1.19.90
 Agency: Division of Elections

Distribution (by preparer):

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)

CONTINUATION OF FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

For Bill/Resolution No. CSSSSJR 5

However, these costs are based on the assumption that all candidates and issues will fit on three ballot cards, which is the norm. It should be noted, however that should the inclusion of this issue require a 4th ballot to be printed, the cost increase would have to be calculated at 16 cents per ballot x approximately 320,000 voters. The total cost of printing the additional ballot card would be \$51.2

Under these circumstances the fiscal note would be:

53.4

Original sponsor(s): SEN. FAIKS, Jones, Eliason, Fischer, Duncan

IN THE SENATE

BY THE FINANCE COMMITTEE

CS FOR SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 5 (Finance)

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

SIXTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska establishing temporary provisions relating to dedicated funds, the expenditure limit, and the budget reserve fund; and suspending the operation of provisions relating to dedicated funds and the appropriation limit.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

* Section 1. Article XV, Constitution of the State of Alaska, is amended by adding new sections to read:

SECTION 29. DEDICATED FUNDS. (a) The operation of Section 7 of Article IX is suspended from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1996, and this section applies in lieu of Section 7 of Article IX.

(b) The proceeds of any State tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose, except as provided in Section 15 of Article IX and Sections 30 and 31 of this article or when required by the federal government for State participation in federal programs. This provision shall not prohibit the continuance of any dedication for special purposes existing upon the date of ratification of Section 7 of Article IX by the people of Alaska.

SECTION 30. EXPENDITURE LIMIT. (a) The operation of Section 16 of Article IX is suspended from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1996, and this section applies in lieu of Section 16 of Article IX.

(b) Except for appropriations to the permanent fund or for

Alaska permanent fund dividends, appropriations to the budget reserve fund, appropriations of revenue derived from a tax that has been approved by a vote of the taxpayers, appropriations of general obligation and revenue bond proceeds, appropriations required to pay the principal and interest on general obligation and revenue bonds issued by the State, appropriations to pay the principal and interest on general obligation bonds issued by a municipality for construction of elementary or secondary schools, appropriations to pay obligations of the State or a public authority or corporation of the State under lease-purchase agreements, appropriations of money received from a non-State source in trust for a specific purpose, appropriations of revenue of a public authority or corporation of the State that issues revenue bonds, and appropriations of revenue of a State program under which revenue bonds are issued, appropriations from the general fund made for

(1) fiscal year 1992 may not exceed \$2,300,000,000;

(2) fiscal years 1993 - 1996 may not exceed an amount equal to one percent less than the amount appropriated during the prior fiscal year that was subject to the limit under this subsection.

(c) During a fiscal year the legislature may exceed the expenditure limit under (b) of this section if each bill that exceeds the limit is passed by affirmative vote of

(1) three-quarters of the membership of each house of the legislature; or

(2) two-thirds of the membership of each house of the legislature and the appropriation is to meet a disaster emergency declared by the governor as prescribed by law.

(d) Except as provided in (e) of this section, all money received by the State during a fiscal year that is subject to the

expenditure limit under (b) of this section, that exceeds that limit, and that is not appropriated under (c) of this section shall be deposited in the budget reserve fund.

(e) Except for money deposited into the permanent fund under Section 15 of Article IX, all money received by the State as a result of the termination through settlement or otherwise, of litigation in State or federal court involving mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, and federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses shall be deposited in the budget reserve fund.

SECTION 31. BUDGET RESERVE FUND. (a) This section applies from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1996.

(b) In addition to deposits made to the budget reserve fund under Section 30(d) and (e) of this article, appropriations may be made to the fund at any time.

(c) Money in the budget reserve fund shall be invested so as to yield competitive market rates to the fund. Income from investment of the fund shall be retained in the fund.

(d) Except as provided in (e) of this section, money may be appropriated from the budget reserve fund only if the legislature determines that the money received by the State in a fiscal year and subject to the expenditure limit is less than the maximum amount that may be appropriated under Section 30(b) of this article. However, the amount appropriated from the budget reserve fund during a fiscal year may not exceed the lesser of

(1) the amount that, when added to money received by the State during that fiscal year and subject to the expenditure limit, equals the maximum amount that may be appropriated under Section 30(b) of this article; or

(2) twenty-five percent of the balance of the budget