

HB

218

<TARGET><BILL>HB 218</BILL><SUBJECT>HB
218</SUBJECT><COMM>HJUD28</COMM></TARGET>

CS FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 218(JUD)

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

TWENTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

BY THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Offered:
Referred:

Sponsor(s): REPRESENTATIVES CHENAULT, MILLETT, HERRON, AND LYNN, Stoltze, Peggy Wilson

A BILL

FOR AN ACT ENTITLED

1 "An Act relating to the aggravating factor at felony sentencing of multiple prior
2 misdemeanors when a prior misdemeanor involves an assault on a correctional
3 employee; providing that deportation is not a proper factor for referral of a case to a
4 three-judge panel for sentencing for a felony; and providing for an effective date."

5 **BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

6 * **Section 1.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section
7 to read:

8 LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the legislature that AS 12.55.165(d),
9 added by sec. 3 of this Act, and AS 12.55.175(g), added by sec. 4 of this Act, overturn the
10 decision of the Alaska Court of Appeals in State v. Silvera, 309 P.3d 1277 (Alaska Ct. App.
11 2013), and the Alaska Supreme Court in Dale v. State, 626 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1980) to the
12 extent that the decisions hold that the risk of deportation may be considered a basis for
13 referral of a felony sentencing to a three-judge panel.

14 * **Sec. 2.** AS 12.55.155(c) is amended to read:

1 (c) The following factors shall be considered by the sentencing court if proven
2 in accordance with this section, and may allow imposition of a sentence above the
3 presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125:

4 (1) a person, other than an accomplice, sustained physical injury as a
5 direct result of the defendant's conduct;

6 (2) the defendant's conduct during the commission of the offense
7 manifested deliberate cruelty to another person;

8 (3) the defendant was the leader of a group of three or more persons
9 who participated in the offense;

10 (4) the defendant employed a dangerous instrument in furtherance of
11 the offense;

12 (5) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
13 victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to
14 advanced age, disability, ill health, homelessness, consumption of alcohol or drugs, or
15 extreme youth or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising
16 normal physical or mental powers of resistance;

17 (6) the defendant's conduct created a risk of imminent physical injury
18 to three or more persons, other than accomplices;

19 (7) a prior felony conviction considered for the purpose of invoking a
20 presumptive range under this chapter was of a more serious class of offense than the
21 present offense;

22 (8) the defendant's prior criminal history includes conduct involving
23 aggravated assaultive behavior, repeated instances of assaultive behavior, repeated
24 instances of cruelty to animals proscribed under AS 11.61.140(a)(1) and (3) - (5), or a
25 combination of assaultive behavior and cruelty to animals proscribed under
26 AS 11.61.140(a)(1) and (3) - (5); in this paragraph, "aggravated assaultive behavior"
27 means assault that is a felony under AS 11.41, or a similar provision in another
28 jurisdiction;

29 (9) the defendant knew that the offense involved more than one victim;

30 (10) the conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious
31 conduct included in the definition of the offense;

1 (11) the defendant committed the offense under an agreement that the
2 defendant either pay or be paid for the commission of the offense, and the pecuniary
3 incentive was beyond that inherent in the offense itself;

4 (12) the defendant was on release under AS 12.30 for another felony
5 charge or conviction or for a misdemeanor charge or conviction having assault as a
6 necessary element;

7 (13) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the
8 offense at an active officer of the court or at an active or former judicial officer,
9 prosecuting attorney, law enforcement officer, correctional employee, firefighter,
10 emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency
11 responder during or because of the exercise of official duties;

12 (14) the defendant was a member of an organized group of five or
13 more persons, and the offense was committed to further the criminal objectives of the
14 group;

15 (15) the defendant has three or more prior felony convictions;

16 (16) the defendant's criminal conduct was designed to obtain
17 substantial pecuniary gain and the risk of prosecution and punishment for the conduct
18 is slight;

19 (17) the offense was one of a continuing series of criminal offenses
20 committed in furtherance of illegal business activities from which the defendant
21 derives a major portion of the defendant's income;

22 (18) the offense was a felony

23 (A) specified in AS 11.41 and was committed against a spouse,
24 a former spouse, or a member of the social unit made up of those living
25 together in the same dwelling as the defendant;

26 (B) specified in AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.458 and the defendant
27 has engaged in the same or other conduct prohibited by a provision of
28 AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.460 involving the same or another victim;

29 (C) specified in AS 11.41 that is a crime involving domestic
30 violence and was committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child
31 under 16 years of age who was, at the time of the offense, living within the

1 residence of the victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where
2 the crime involving domestic violence occurred;

3 (D) specified in AS 11.41 and was committed against a person
4 with whom the defendant has a dating relationship or with whom the defendant
5 has engaged in a sexual relationship; or

6 (E) specified in AS 11.41.434 - 11.41.458 or AS 11.61.128 and
7 the defendant was 10 or more years older than the victim;

8 (19) the defendant's prior criminal history includes an adjudication as a
9 delinquent for conduct that would have been a felony if committed by an adult;

10 (20) the defendant was on furlough under AS 33.30 or on parole or
11 probation for another felony charge or conviction that would be considered a prior
12 felony conviction under AS 12.55.145(a)(1)(B);

13 (21) the defendant has a criminal history of repeated instances of
14 conduct violative of criminal laws, whether punishable as felonies or misdemeanors,
15 similar in nature to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced under this
16 section;

17 (22) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the
18 offense at a victim because of that person's race, sex, color, creed, physical or mental
19 disability, ancestry, or national origin;

20 (23) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and

21 (A) the offense involved the delivery of a controlled substance
22 under circumstances manifesting an intent to distribute the substance as part of
23 a commercial enterprise; or

24 (B) at the time of the conduct resulting in the conviction, the
25 defendant was caring for or assisting in the care of a child under 10 years of
26 age;

27 (24) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and
28 the offense involved the transportation of controlled substances into the state;

29 (25) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and
30 the offense involved large quantities of a controlled substance;

31 (26) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and

1 the offense involved the distribution of a controlled substance that had been
2 adulterated with a toxic substance;

3 (27) the defendant, being 18 years of age or older,

4 (A) is legally accountable under AS 11.16.110(2) for the
5 conduct of a person who, at the time the offense was committed, was under 18
6 years of age and at least three years younger than the defendant; or

7 (B) is aided or abetted in planning or committing the offense by
8 a person who, at the time the offense was committed, was under 18 years of
9 age and at least three years younger than the defendant;

10 (28) the victim of the offense is a person who provided testimony or
11 evidence related to a prior offense committed by the defendant;

12 (29) the defendant committed the offense for the benefit of, at the
13 direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang;

14 (30) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.41.410
15 - 11.41.455, and the defendant knowingly supplied alcohol or a controlled substance to
16 the victim in furtherance of the offense with the intent to make the victim
17 incapacitated; in this paragraph, "incapacitated" has the meaning given in
18 AS 11.41.470;

19 (31) the defendant's prior criminal history includes convictions for five
20 or more crimes in this or another jurisdiction that are class A misdemeanors under the
21 law of this state, or having elements similar to a class A misdemeanor; two or more
22 convictions arising out of a single continuous episode are considered a single
23 conviction; however, an offense is not a part of a continuous episode if committed
24 while attempting to escape or resist arrest or if it is an assault on [UPON] a uniformed
25 or otherwise clearly identified peace officer or correctional employee; notice and
26 denial of convictions are governed by AS 12.55.145(b), (c), and (d);

27 (32) the offense is a violation of AS 11.41 or AS 11.46.400 and the
28 offense occurred on school grounds, on a school bus, at a school-sponsored event, or
29 in the administrative offices of a school district if students are educated at that office;
30 in this paragraph,

31 (A) "school bus" has the meaning given in AS 11.71.900;

1 (B) "school district" has the meaning given in AS 47.07.063;

2 (C) "school grounds" has the meaning given in AS 11.71.900;

3 (33) the offense was a felony specified in AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.455,
4 the defendant had been previously diagnosed as having or having tested positive for
5 HIV or AIDS, and the offense either (A) involved penetration, or (B) exposed the
6 victim to a risk or a fear that the offense could result in the transmission of HIV or
7 AIDS; in this paragraph, "HIV" and "AIDS" have the meanings given in
8 AS 18.15.310;

9 (34) the defendant committed the offense on, or to affect persons or
10 property on, the premises of a recognized shelter or facility providing services to
11 victims of domestic violence or sexual assault;

12 (35) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the
13 offense at a victim because that person was 65 years of age or older.

14 * **Sec. 3.** AS 12.55.165 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

15 (d) A court may not refer a case to a three-judge panel under (a) of this section
16 if the request for referral is based, in whole or in part, on the claim that a sentence
17 within the presumptive range may result in the classification of the defendant as
18 deportable under federal immigration law or that collateral consequences may or will
19 result if the defendant is classified as deportable.

20 * **Sec. 4.** AS 12.55.175 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

21 (g) A defendant being sentenced under AS 12.55.125(c), (d), (e) or (i) may not
22 establish, nor may a three-judge panel find under (b) of this section or any other
23 provision of law, that manifest injustice would result from imposing a sentence within
24 the presumptive range based, in whole or in part, on the claim that the sentence may
25 result in the classification of the defendant as deportable under federal immigration
26 law or that collateral consequences may or will result if the defendant is classified as
27 deportable.

28 * **Sec. 5.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to
29 read:

30 **APPLICABILITY.** (a) Section 2 of this Act applies to offenses committed on or after
31 the effective date of this Act.

1 (b) Sections 3 and 4 of this Act apply to offenses committed before, on, or after the
2 effective date of this Act if the sentence is imposed on or after the effective date of this Act.

3 * **Sec. 6.** This Act takes effect July 1, 2014.

Alaska State Legislature

State Capitol, Room 208
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Phone: 907-465-3779
Fax: 907-465-2833
Toll Free: 800-469-3779

145 Main St. Loop
Second Floor
Kenai, Alaska 99611
Phone: 907-283-7223
Fax: 907-283-7184



REPRESENTATIVE MIKE CHENAULT SPEAKER OF THE ALASKA STATE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

TO: Representative Wes Keller, Chair
House Judiciary Committee

FROM: Representative Mike Chenault
Speaker, Alaska State House 

DATE: January 27, 2014

RE: Request for Hearing, House Bill 218

Please consider this memorandum as a request to hear House Bill 218: Penalty: Assault on a Correctional Officer, before the House Judiciary Committee at your convenience.

Back up materials will be forwarded to your committee aide as soon as possible.

Thank you for your consideration of my request. Call either myself or Tom Wright of my staff in the event either of us can provide further information.

Alaska State Legislature

State Capitol, Room 208
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Phone: 907-465-3779
Fax: 907-465-2833
Toll Free: 800-469-3779



145 Main St. Loop
Second Floor
Kenai, Alaska 99611
Phone: 907-283-7223
Fax: 907-283-7184

REPRESENTATIVE MIKE CHENAULT SPEAKER OF THE ALASKA STATE HOUSE

SPONSOR STATEMENT

HOUSE BILL 218: *"An act relating to the aggravating factor at felony sentencing of multiple prior misdemeanors when a prior misdemeanor involves an assault on a correctional officer."*

The aggravating factor in AS 12.55.155(c)(31) allows a judge who is sentencing a person for a felony offense to impose a sentence above the presumptive range if the defendant has five previous convictions for class A misdemeanors.

Generally, convictions for two crimes that are part of a single criminal episode are counted as one prior conviction. However, there are exceptions. Current law provides that prior convictions for resisting arrest, a misdemeanor while attempting escape, and assault on a peace officer would each count as a prior conviction even though they were part of the same criminal episode.

HB 218 extends this extra protection of counting prior convictions to similar crimes committed on uniformed or clearly identified correctional employees.

28-LS0941A-2
Straubach
2/11/14

AMENDMENT

#1 Y:4 N:2

OFFERED IN THE HOUSE
TO: HB 218

BY REPRESENTATIVE CHENAULT

1 Page 1, line 3, following "employee":

2 Insert "; providing that deportation is not a proper factor for referral of a case to
3 a three-judge panel for sentencing for a felony; and providing for an effective date"

4

5 Page 1, following line 4:

6 Insert a new bill section to read:

7 **** Section 1. The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section
8 to read:**

9 **LEGISLATIVE INTENT FOR SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THIS ACT. It is the intent
10 of the legislature that AS 12.55.165(d), added by sec. 3 of this Act, and AS 12.55.175(g),
11 added by sec. 4 of this Act, overturn the decision of the Alaska Court of Appeals in State v.
12 Silvera, 309 P.3d 1277 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013), and the Alaska Supreme Court in Dale v.
13 State, 626 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1980) to the extent that the decisions hold that the risk of
14 deportation may be considered a basis for referral of a felony sentencing to a three-judge
15 panel."**

16

17 Page 1, line 5:

18 Delete "Section 1"

19 Insert "Sec. 2"

20

21 Renumber the following bill section accordingly.

22

23 Page 6, following line 4:

*Grunberg Motion to table amendment
Y: 2 N: 4
Motion to rescind?*

1 Insert new bill sections to read:

2 **** Sec. 3.** AS 12.55.165 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

3 (d) A court may not refer a case to a three-judge panel under (a) of this section
4 if the request for referral is based, in whole or in part, on the claim that a sentence
5 within the presumptive range may result in the classification of the defendant as
6 deportable under federal immigration law or that collateral consequences may or will
7 result if the defendant is classified as deportable.

8 *** Sec. 4.** AS 12.55.175 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

9 (g) A defendant being sentenced under AS 12.55.125(c), (d), (e) or (i) may not
10 establish, nor may a three-judge panel find under (b) of this section or any other
11 provision of law, that manifest injustice would result from imposing a sentence within
12 the presumptive range based, in whole or in part, on the claim that the sentence may
13 result in the classification of the defendant as deportable under federal immigration
14 law or that collateral consequences may or will result if the defendant is classified as
15 deportable.

16 *** Sec. 5.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to
17 read:

18 **APPLICABILITY.** (a) Section 2 of this Act applies to offenses committed on or after
19 the effective date of this Act.

20 (b) Sections 3 and 4 of this Act apply to offenses committed before, on, or after the
21 effective date of this Act if the sentence is imposed on or after the effective date of this Act.

22 *** Sec. 6.** This Act takes effect July 1, 2014."

MEMORANDUM

STATE OF ALASKA

Department of Law

To: Honorable Mike Chenault
Speaker of the House

Date: February 11, 2014

Tel. No.: (907) 465-4044

From: Richard Svobodny
Deputy Attorney General

Subject: HB 218 and Analysis of
State v. Silvera and State v. Perez 309, P.2d 1277,
(Alaska App 2013)

State v. Silvera and *State v. Perez*, 309 P.3d 1277 (Alaska App. 2013), are two cases that allow for a reduction in a sentence by a three-judge sentencing panel for noncitizens of the United States, with the resulting consequence that citizens of the United States are sentenced to harsher sentences than noncitizens. Put another way, a person born in Jamaica (Mr. Silvera) or the Dominican Republic (Mr. Perez) who comes to Alaska and commits a felony can receive a lesser sentence for the same crime than a person born in Bethel or Anchorage, Alaska.

These combined cases involve two noncitizens convicted of violent felonies. In a drunken rage, Silvera stabbed a man in the face with a knife after Silvera's drunken girlfriend began a verbal argument with the victim. (The girlfriend was casting slurs about the victim's Native ethnicity). Perez severely beat a State's witness in Perez's then pending felony drug case when both the victim and defendant were in a State confinement facility. If the defendants were to receive at least one year's confinement (the presumptive minimum) for their offenses, each might be classified by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as an "aggravated felon," as that term is defined by the federal immigration statutes, and so they might be considered "deportable." If they are "deportable" ICE then has prosecutorial discretion to initiate removal proceedings against them. The defendants asked the sentencing courts to sentence them below the minimum statutory presumptive ranges for their crimes so that they could avoid possible deportation – that is, so that they could avoid being classified as "aggravated felons." The three-judge panel sentenced Silvera below the minimum presumptive range and proposes to similarly sentence Perez below the presumptive range. The panel's rulings are based solely on their determinations that "manifest injustice" will occur if the defendants are subjected to United States immigration law regarding removal of people convicted of aggravated felonies.

In its decision, the court of appeals ruled that Alaskan sentencing courts may impose less severe sentences on noncitizen defendants than sentences they would impose on otherwise similarly situated citizen defendants, to specifically include imposing sentences below the presumptive minimum sentences generally mandated by the Alaska Legislature. Under the court of appeals' ruling, courts may do so for the sole purpose of providing noncitizen defendants with *de facto* immunity from or providing them with otherwise prohibited defenses to immigration law. Specifically, the court ruled that a three-judge panel may impose a sentence below the presumptive minimum term for the sole purpose of shielding a noncitizen defendant from possible deportation proceedings (the outcome of which would be uncertain). The state sought discretionary review by the Alaska Supreme Court but the State's petition for hearing was denied.

The court of appeals has adopted an overly broad interpretation of Alaska sentencing law and this interpretation should be reversed. The sentencing criteria upon which Alaskan courts may base a sentence (presumptive or otherwise) are the seriousness of the offense; the defendant's criminal history; rehabilitation, deterrence of self and others, affirmation of community norms, and where necessary, isolation to protect the community, as well as victims' rights. State court's control over whether a defendant may be subject to removal from the United States and what exceptions to removal may apply are not listed among these criteria. Thus, formulating a sentence based on the goal of controlling whether and to what extent a defendant may be subject to removal under federal law exceeds the scope of authority the Alaska Constitution and the Legislature have granted sentencing judges, including the three-judge panel.

The court of appeals' ruling violates the equal protection principles of the Alaska Constitution because it authorizes courts to treat defendants differently based on their citizenship and immigration status. Although noncitizen defendants benefiting from the diverse treatment will most likely not claim a violation, similarly situated citizen defendants denied the same non-statutory mitigating factor will have colorable equal protection claims. Applying a different sentencing standard for citizens and noncitizens will undermine public confidence in Alaska's criminal justice system. From the citizens' point of view, they will be denied an opportunity to be sentenced by the three-judge panel simply because they are citizens and so are not subject to federal immigration laws that the state judges have decided are unjust.

Fiscal Note

State of Alaska
2014 Legislative Session

Bill Version: HB 218
Fiscal Note Number: _____
() Publish Date: _____

Identifier: HB218- ACS-TRC-02-06-14
Title: PENALTY: ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL
EMPLOYEE
Sponsor: ** CHENAULT, MILLETT
Requester: House Judiciary

Department: Alaska Court System
Appropriation: Alaska Court System
Allocation: Trial Courts
OMB Component Number: 768

Expenditures/Revenues

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below. (Thousands of Dollars)

	FY2015 Appropriation Requested	Included in Governor's FY2015 Request	Out-Year Cost Estimates					
			FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
OPERATING EXPENDITURES								
Personal Services								
Travel								
Services								
Commodities								
Capital Outlay								
Grants & Benefits								
Miscellaneous								
Total Operating	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Fund Source (Operating Only)

None								
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Positions

Full-time								
Part-time								
Temporary								

Change in Revenues								
---------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Estimated SUPPLEMENTAL (FY2014) cost: 0.0 *(separate supplemental appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

Estimated CAPITAL (FY2015) cost: 0.0 *(separate capital appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS

Does the bill direct, or will the bill result in, regulation changes adopted by your agency? No
If yes, by what date are the regulations to be adopted, amended or repealed?

Why this fiscal note differs from previous version:

Initial version

Prepared By:	Nancy Meade, General Counsel	Phone:	(907)463-4736
Division:	Alaska Court System	Date:	02/06/2014 12:00 PM
Approved By:	Nancy Meade for Christine Johnson, Administrative Director	Date:	02/06/14
Agency:	Alaska Court System		

FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

STATE OF ALASKA
2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. HB218

Analysis

House Bill 218 would modify the existing aggravating factor for sentencing that concerns a defendant's prior criminal history, AS 12.55.155(c)(31). Specifically, it provides that a prior offense that is an assault on a correctional employee will not be considered part of a "continuous episode" that would be counted as a single conviction; instead, those assaults would be counted separately when determining the defendant's prior crimes.

The court can apply this aggravating factor with no fiscal impact. Therefore, the Alaska Court System submits this zero fiscal note for HB 218.

Fiscal Note

State of Alaska
2014 Legislative Session

Bill Version: HB 218
Fiscal Note Number: _____
() Publish Date: _____

Identifier: HB218-DOA-OPA-02-07-14
Title: PENALTY: ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL
EMPLOYEE
Sponsor: ** CHENAULT, MILLETT
Requester: House Judiciary

Department: Department of Administration
Appropriation: Legal and Advocacy Services
Allocation: Office of Public Advocacy
OMB Component Number: 43

Expenditures/Revenues

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below. (Thousands of Dollars)

	FY2015	Included in	Out-Year Cost Estimates				
	Appropriation Requested	Governor's FY2015 Request	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2015	FY 2015					
Personal Services							
Travel							
Services							
Commodities							
Capital Outlay							
Grants & Benefits							
Miscellaneous							
Total Operating	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Fund Source (Operating Only)

None							
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Positions

Full-time							
Part-time							
Temporary							

Change in Revenues							
---------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Estimated SUPPLEMENTAL (FY2014) cost: 0.0 (separate supplemental appropriation required)
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

Estimated CAPITAL (FY2015) cost: 0.0 (separate capital appropriation required)
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS

Does the bill direct, or will the bill result in, regulation changes adopted by your agency? No
If yes, by what date are the regulations to be adopted, amended or repealed?

Why this fiscal note differs from previous version:

Initial version for current legislative session.
--

Prepared By: <u>Richard Allen, Director</u>	Phone: <u>(907)269-3504</u>
Division: <u>Office of Public Advocacy</u>	Date: <u>02/07/2014 12:30 PM</u>
Approved By: <u>Curtis Thayer, Comissioiner</u>	Date: <u>02/07/14</u>
Agency: <u>Department of Administration</u>	

FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

STATE OF ALASKA
2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. HB 218

Analysis

HB218 would amend Alaska's main criminal offense sentencing statute, AS 12.55.155, at sub-section (c)(31), to specify that a prior misdemeanor conviction for assault on a correctional officer may be counted as an aggravating factor when sentencing the offender on a new felony conviction. The purpose of the bill is to recognize the serious nature of prior assaultive misconduct directed at correctional officers in evaluating the offender being sentenced on a subsequent felony conviction. If enacted as filed HB218 would likely impact the sentences of some Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) criminal clients on a case-by-case basis. The overall impact on agency operations and the workload of agency attorneys would be slight. The bill would most directly affect offenders subject to its terms, prosecutors, sentencing courts and the Department of Corrections, which would house offenders serving aggravated sentences increased under the bill.

The bill if enacted as drafted would likely produce only a marginal increase in OPA defense attorney workloads. Therefore OPA submits a zero fiscal note.

Fiscal Note

State of Alaska
2014 Legislative Session

Bill Version: HB 218
Fiscal Note Number: _____
() Publish Date: _____

Identifier: HB218-LAW-CRIM-02-07-14
Title: PENALTY: ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL
EMPLOYEE
Sponsor: ** CHENAULT, MILLETT
Requester: (H) JUDICIARY

Department: Department of Law
Appropriation: Criminal Division
Allocation: Criminal Justice Litigation
OMB Component Number: 2202

Expenditures/Revenues

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below. (Thousands of Dollars)

	FY2015	Included in	Out-Year Cost Estimates					
	Appropriation Requested	Governor's FY2015 Request	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2015	FY 2015	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
Personal Services								
Travel								
Services								
Commodities								
Capital Outlay								
Grants & Benefits								
Miscellaneous								
Total Operating	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Fund Source (Operating Only)

None								
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Positions

Full-time								
Part-time								
Temporary								

Change in Revenues								
---------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Estimated SUPPLEMENTAL (FY2014) cost: 0.0 *(separate supplemental appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

Estimated CAPITAL (FY2015) cost: 0.0 *(separate capital appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS

Does the bill direct, or will the bill result in, regulation changes adopted by your agency? No
If yes, by what date are the regulations to be adopted, amended or repealed?

Why this fiscal note differs from previous version:

Initial version, not applicable.

Prepared By:	Loretta Withington, Division Operations Manager	Phone:	(907)465-5427
Division:	Administrative Services Division	Date:	02/07/2014 05:07 PM
Approved By:	Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General	Date:	02/07/14
Agency:	Department of Law		

FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

STATE OF ALASKA
2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. HB 218

Analysis

HB 218 amends the method for counting prior convictions of misdemeanors for persons who are being sentenced for a felony that has a sentence within a presumptive range. AS 12.55.155(c)(31) allows the court to sentence a person above the range if the person has five or more prior class A misdemeanor convictions. Generally, convictions for two crimes that are part of a single criminal episode are counted as one prior conviction in sentencing law. There are exceptions, however. HB 218 provides that a prior conviction of, for example, misdemeanor assault on a correctional officer and escape would count as two prior convictions even though they were part of the same criminal episode.

The Department of Law anticipates no fiscal impact from HB 218.

Fiscal Note

State of Alaska
2014 Legislative Session

Bill Version: HB 218
Fiscal Note Number: _____
() Publish Date: _____

Identifier: HB218-DOC-OC-02-07-14
Title: PENALTY: ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL
EMPLOYEE
Sponsor: ** CHENAULT, MILLETT
Requester: House Judiciary

Department: Department of Corrections
Appropriation: Administration and Support
Allocation: Office of the Commissioner
OMB Component Number: 694

Expenditures/Revenues

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below. (Thousands of Dollars)

	FY2015 Appropriation Requested	Included in Governor's FY2015 Request	Out-Year Cost Estimates					
			FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
OPERATING EXPENDITURES								
Personal Services								
Travel								
Services								
Commodities								
Capital Outlay								
Grants & Benefits								
Miscellaneous								
Total Operating	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Fund Source (Operating Only)

None								
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Positions

Full-time								
Part-time								
Temporary								

Change in Revenues								
---------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Estimated SUPPLEMENTAL (FY2014) cost: 0.0 *(separate supplemental appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

Estimated CAPITAL (FY2015) cost: 0.0 *(separate capital appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS

Does the bill direct, or will the bill result in, regulation changes adopted by your agency? No
If yes, by what date are the regulations to be adopted, amended or repealed?

Why this fiscal note differs from previous version:

This is the original version of the bill.

Prepared By: <u>April Wilkerson, Director</u>	Phone: <u>(907)465-3460</u>
Division: <u>Administrative Services - Department of Corrections</u>	Date: <u>02/08/2014 02:00 PM</u>
Approved By: <u>Leslie Houston, Deputy Commissioner</u>	Date: <u>02/08/14</u>
Agency: <u>Department of Corrections</u>	

FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

STATE OF ALASKA
2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL NO. HB 218

Analysis

Currently, when determining an aggravated sentence, if a defendant has five or more prior class A misdemeanors, those offenses which arose out of the same offense episode are counted as one conviction. However, if the offenses involve resisting arrest, escape, or an assault on a peace officer they are counted as separate convictions. HB 218 adds assaults on correctional employees to the list of misdemeanors that will be counted as separate convictions regardless of whether or not they arose out of the same offense episode when determining an aggravated sentence.

Any additional time served by an offender as a result of this aggravator will result in an increase in mandays to the Department. However, the number of assaults on correctional employees is relatively minimal, therefore, this bill will have no fiscal impact on the Department.

Fiscal Note

State of Alaska
2014 Legislative Session

Bill Version: HB 218
Fiscal Note Number: _____
() Publish Date: _____

Identifier: HB218-DOA-PDA-02-07-14
Title: PENALTY: ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL
EMPLOYEE
Sponsor: ** CHENAULT, MILLETT
Requester: House Judiciary

Department: Department of Administration
Appropriation: Legal and Advocacy Services
Allocation: Public Defender Agency
OMB Component Number: 1631

Expenditures/Revenues

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below. (Thousands of Dollars)

	FY2015	Included in	Out-Year Cost Estimates				
	Appropriation Requested	Governor's FY2015 Request	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2015	FY 2015					
Personal Services							
Travel							
Services							
Commodities							
Capital Outlay							
Grants & Benefits							
Miscellaneous							
Total Operating	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Fund Source (Operating Only)

None							
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Positions

Full-time							
Part-time							
Temporary							

Change in Revenues

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Estimated SUPPLEMENTAL (FY2014) cost: 0.0 *(separate supplemental appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

Estimated CAPITAL (FY2015) cost: 0.0 *(separate capital appropriation required)*
(discuss reasons and fund source(s) in analysis section)

ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS

Does the bill direct, or will the bill result in, regulation changes adopted by your agency? No
If yes, by what date are the regulations to be adopted, amended or repealed?

Why this fiscal note differs from previous version:

Not applicable, initial version.

Prepared By: <u>Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender</u>	Phone: <u>(907)334-4414</u>
Division: <u>Public Defender Agency</u>	Date: <u>02/07/2014 12:34 PM</u>
Approved By: <u>Curtis Thayer, Commissioner</u>	Date: <u>02/07/14</u>
Agency: <u>Department of Administration</u>	

FISCAL NOTE ANALYSIS

**STATE OF ALASKA
2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION**

BILL NO. HB 218

Analysis

This bill amends AS 12.55.155(c) by adding assaults of correctional officers as sentencing aggravators.

This legislation is not expected to have a fiscal impact on the Public Defender Agency. The agency, therefore submits a zero note.

LEGAL SERVICES

DIVISION OF LEGAL AND RESEARCH SERVICES
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY
STATE OF ALASKA

(907) 465-3867 or 465-2450
FAX (907) 465-2029
Mail Stop 3101

State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Deliveries to: 129 6th St., Rm. 329

MEMORANDUM

August 14, 2013

SUBJECT: Penalty for Assault of Correctional Officer
(Work Order No. 28-LS0941\A)

TO: Representative Mike Chenault
Attn: Tom Wright

FROM: Kathleen Strasbaugh
Legislative Counsel

You requested a bill that would assure that persons convicted of physically assaulting correctional officers received the same penalties as those who are convicted of physically assaulting police officers. As it turns out, correctional employees are already included in certain statutes setting penalties for assault on certain uniformed officials. I left a message to this effect for Mr. Wright. I later found another felony sentencing statute that mentions police officers, but not correctional employees, the statute covering the aggravating factor of multiple misdemeanors, AS 12.55.155(c)(31). The attached draft amends that statute. It adds assaults directed at correctional employees to the types of misdemeanor charges that will not be considered a continuous incident for the purpose of counting misdemeanors that trigger the aggravating factor. I am not sure if this draft is really consistent with your request. Please let me know if it is not.

The existing provisions are set out below.

There is a mandatory 99-year sentence for first degree murder of a correctional employee:

AS 12.55.125. Sentences of imprisonment for felonies. (a) . . . A defendant convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years when

(1) the defendant is convicted of the murder of a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, or correctional employee who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the murder;

Representative Mike Chenault
August 14, 2013
Page 2

AS 12.55.135 requires certain mandatory minimum sentences where the victim commits fourth degree assault or harassment directed at a correctional employee:

AS 12.55.135. Sentences of imprisonment for misdemeanors.

...

(d) A defendant convicted of assault in the fourth degree or harassment in the first degree who knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at

(1) a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, correctional employee, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder or medical professional who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the assault or harassment shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of

(A) 60 days if the defendant violated AS 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2) or AS 11.61.118;

(B) 30 days if the defendant violated AS 11.41.230(a)(3);

Committing a felony directed at a correctional employee is an aggravating factor that can increase a felony sentence:

AS 12.55.155. Factors in aggravation and mitigation.

...

(c)The following factors shall be considered by the sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow imposition of a sentence above the presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125:

(13) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at an active officer of the court or at an active or former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney, law enforcement officer, correctional employee, firefighter, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder during or because of the exercise of official duties;

If I may be of further assistance, please advise.

KJS:lnd
13-312.lnd

Enclosure

Sec. 12.55.155. Factors in aggravation and mitigation.

(a) Except as provided in (e) of this section, if a defendant is convicted of an offense and is subject to sentencing under AS 12.55.125(c), (d), (e), or (i) and

(1) the low end of the presumptive range is four years or less, the court may impose any sentence below the presumptive range for factors in mitigation or may increase the active term of imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment for factors in aggravation;

(2) the low end of the presumptive range is more than four years, the court may impose a sentence below the presumptive range as long as the active term of imprisonment is not less than 50 percent of the low end of the presumptive range for factors in mitigation or may increase the active term of imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment for factors in aggravation.

(b) Sentences under this section that are outside of the presumptive ranges set out in AS 12.55.125 shall be based on the totality of the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in (c) and (d) of this section.

(c) The following factors shall be considered by the sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow imposition of a sentence above the presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125:

(1) a person, other than an accomplice, sustained physical injury as a direct result of the defendant's conduct;

(2) the defendant's conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to another person;

(3) the defendant was the leader of a group of three or more persons who participated in the offense;

(4) the defendant employed a dangerous instrument in furtherance of the offense;

(5) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, disability, ill health, homelessness, consumption of alcohol or drugs, or extreme youth or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance;

(6) the defendant's conduct created a risk of imminent physical injury to three or more persons, other than accomplices;

(7) a prior felony conviction considered for the purpose of invoking a presumptive range under this chapter was of a more serious class of offense than the present offense;

(8) the defendant's prior criminal history includes conduct involving aggravated assaultive behavior, repeated instances of assaultive behavior, repeated instances of cruelty to animals proscribed under AS 11.61.140(a)(1) and (3) - (5), or a combination of assaultive behavior and cruelty to animals proscribed under AS 11.61.140(a)(1) and (3) - (5); in this paragraph, "aggravated assaultive behavior" means assault that is a felony under AS 11.41, or a similar provision in another jurisdiction;

(9) the defendant knew that the offense involved more than one victim;

(10) the conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious conduct included in the definition of the offense;

(11) the defendant committed the offense under an agreement that the defendant either pay or be paid for the commission of the offense, and the pecuniary incentive was beyond that inherent in the offense itself;

(12) the defendant was on release under AS 12.30 for another felony charge or conviction or for a misdemeanor charge or conviction having assault as a necessary element;

(13) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at an active officer of the court or at an active or former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney, law enforcement officer, correctional employee, firefighter, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder during or because of the exercise of official duties;

(14) the defendant was a member of an organized group of five or more persons, and the offense was committed to further the criminal objectives of the group;

(15) the defendant has three or more prior felony convictions;

(16) the defendant's criminal conduct was designed to obtain substantial pecuniary gain and the risk of prosecution and punishment for the conduct is slight;

(17) the offense was one of a continuing series of criminal offenses committed in furtherance of illegal business activities from which the defendant derives a major portion of the defendant's income;

(18) the offense was a felony

(A) specified in AS 11.41 and was committed against a spouse, a former spouse, or a member of the social unit made up of those living together in the same dwelling as the defendant;

(B) specified in AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.458 and the defendant has engaged in the same or other conduct prohibited by a provision of AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.460 involving the same or another victim;

(C) specified in AS 11.41 that is a crime involving domestic violence and was committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child under 16 years of age who was, at the time of the offense, living within the residence of the victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the crime involving domestic violence occurred;

(D) specified in AS 11.41 and was committed against a person with whom the defendant has a dating relationship or with whom the defendant has engaged in a sexual relationship; or

(E) specified in AS 11.41.434 - 11.41.458 or AS 11.61.128 and the defendant was 10 or more years older than the victim;

(19) the defendant's prior criminal history includes an adjudication as a delinquent for conduct that would have been a felony if committed by an adult;

(20) the defendant was on furlough under AS 33.30 or on parole or probation for another felony charge or conviction that would be considered a prior felony conviction under AS 12.55.145(a)(1)(B);

(21) the defendant has a criminal history of repeated instances of conduct violative of criminal laws, whether punishable as felonies or misdemeanors, similar in nature to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced under this section;

(22) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at a victim because of that person's race, sex, color, creed, physical or mental disability, ancestry, or national origin;

(23) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and

(A) the offense involved the delivery of a controlled substance under circumstances manifesting an intent to distribute the substance as part of a commercial enterprise; or

(B) at the time of the conduct resulting in the conviction, the defendant was caring for or assisting in the care of a child under 10 years of age;

(24) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved the transportation of controlled substances into the state;

(25) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved large quantities of a controlled substance;

(26) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved the distribution of a controlled substance that had been adulterated with a toxic substance;

(27) the defendant, being 18 years of age or older,

(A) is legally accountable under AS 11.16.110(2) for the conduct of a person who, at the time the offense was committed, was under 18 years of age and at least three years younger than the defendant; or

(B) is aided or abetted in planning or committing the offense by a person who, at the time the offense was committed, was under 18 years of age and at least three years younger than the defendant;

(28) the victim of the offense is a person who provided testimony or evidence related to a prior offense committed by the defendant;

(29) the defendant committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang;

(30) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.455, and the defendant knowingly supplied alcohol or a controlled substance to the victim in furtherance of the offense with the intent to make the victim incapacitated; in this paragraph, "incapacitated" has the meaning given in AS 11.41.470;

(31) the defendant's prior criminal history includes convictions for five or more crimes in this or another jurisdiction that are class A misdemeanors under the law of this state, or having elements similar to a class A misdemeanor; two or more convictions arising out of a single continuous episode are considered a single conviction; however, an offense is not a part of a continuous episode if committed while attempting to escape or resist arrest or if it is an assault upon a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer; notice and denial of convictions are governed by AS 12.55.145(b), (c), and (d);

(32) the offense is a violation of AS 11.41 or AS 11.46.400 and the offense occurred on school grounds, on a school bus, at a school-sponsored event, or in the administrative offices of a school district if students are educated at that office; in this paragraph,

(A) "school bus" has the meaning given in AS 11.71.900;

(B) "school district" has the meaning given in AS 47.07.063;

(C) "school grounds" has the meaning given in AS 11.71.900;

(33) the offense was a felony specified in AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.455, the defendant had been previously diagnosed as having or having tested positive for HIV or AIDS, and the offense either (A) involved penetration, or (B) exposed the victim to a risk or a fear that the offense could result in the transmission of HIV or AIDS; in this paragraph, "HIV" and "AIDS" have the meanings given in AS 18.15.310;

(34) the defendant committed the offense on, or to affect persons or property on, the premises of a recognized shelter or facility providing services to victims of domestic violence or sexual assault.

(d) The following factors shall be considered by the sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow imposition of a sentence below the presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125:

(1) the offense was principally accomplished by another person, and the defendant manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the safety or well-being of the victim;

(2) the defendant, although an accomplice, played only a minor role in the commission of the offense;

(3) the defendant committed the offense under some degree of duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense, but that significantly affected the defendant's conduct;

(4) the conduct of a youthful defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the defendant;

(5) the conduct of an aged defendant was substantially a product of physical or mental infirmities resulting from the defendant's age;

(6) in a conviction for assault under AS 11.41.200 - 11.41.220, the defendant acted with serious provocation from the victim;

(7) except in the case of a crime defined by AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.470, the victim provoked the crime to a significant degree;

(8) before the defendant knew that the criminal conduct had been discovered, the defendant fully compensated or made a good faith effort to fully compensate the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct for any damage or injury sustained;

(9) the conduct constituting the offense was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense;

(10) the defendant was motivated to commit the offense solely by an overwhelming compulsion to provide for emergency necessities for the defendant's immediate family;

(11) after commission of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, the defendant assisted authorities to detect, apprehend, or prosecute other persons who committed an offense;

(12) the facts surrounding the commission of the offense and any previous offenses by the defendant establish that the harm caused by the defendant's conduct is consistently minor and inconsistent with the imposition of a substantial period of imprisonment;

(13) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved small quantities of a controlled substance;

(14) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved the distribution of a controlled substance, other than a schedule IA controlled substance, to a personal acquaintance who is 19 years of age or older for no profit;

(15) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in AS 11.71 and the offense involved the possession of a small amount of a controlled substance for personal use in the defendant's home;

(16) in a conviction for assault or attempted assault or for homicide or attempted homicide, the defendant acted in response to domestic violence perpetrated by the victim

against the defendant and the domestic violence consisted of aggravated or repeated instances of assaultive behavior;

(17) except in the case of an offense defined by AS 11.41 or AS 11.46.400, the defendant has been convicted of a class B or C felony, and, at the time of sentencing, has successfully completed a court-ordered treatment program as defined in AS 28.35.028 that was begun after the offense was committed;

(18) except in the case of an offense defined under AS 11.41 or AS 11.46.400 or a defendant who has previously been convicted of a felony, the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a mental disease or defect as defined in AS 12.47.130 that was insufficient to constitute a complete defense but that significantly affected the defendant's conduct;

(19) the defendant is convicted of an offense under AS 11.71, and the defendant sought medical assistance for another person who was experiencing a drug overdose contemporaneously with the commission of the offense.

(e) If a factor in aggravation is a necessary element of the present offense, or requires the imposition of a sentence within the presumptive range under AS 12.55.125(c)(2), that factor may not be used to impose a sentence above the high end of the presumptive range. If a factor in mitigation is raised at trial as a defense reducing the offense charged to a lesser included offense, that factor may not be used to impose a sentence below the low end of the presumptive range.

(f) If the state seeks to establish a factor in aggravation at sentencing

(1) under (c)(7), (8), (12), (15), (18)(B), (19), (20), (21), or (31) of this section, or if the defendant seeks to establish a factor in mitigation at sentencing, written notice must be served on the opposing party and filed with the court not later than 10 days before the date set for imposition of sentence; the factors in aggravation listed in this paragraph and factors in mitigation must be established by clear and convincing evidence before the court sitting without a jury; all findings must be set out with specificity;

(2) other than one listed in (1) of this subsection, the factor shall be presented to a trial jury under procedures set by the court, unless the defendant waives trial by jury, stipulates to the existence of the factor, or consents to have the factor proven under procedures set out in (1) of this subsection; a factor in aggravation presented to a jury is established if proved beyond a reasonable doubt; written notice of the intent to establish a factor in aggravation must be served on the defendant and filed with the court

(A) 20 days before trial, or at another time specified by the court;

(B) within 48 hours, or at a time specified by the court, if the court instructs the jury about the option to return a verdict for a lesser included offense; or

(C) five days before entering a plea that results in a finding of guilt, or at another time specified by the court.

(g) Voluntary alcohol or other drug intoxication or chronic alcoholism or other drug addiction may not be considered an aggravating or mitigating factor.

(h) In this section, "serious provocation" has the meaning given in AS 11.41.115(f).



THE STATE
of **ALASKA**
GOVERNOR SEAN PARNELL

Department of Corrections
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

550 West 7th Avenue, Ste 601
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Main: 907.269.7397
Fax: 907.269.7390

February 19, 2014

The Honorable Wes Keller
House Judiciary Chair
State Capitol, Rm 118
Juneau, AK 99801-1182

Dear Representative Keller:

Thank you for allowing the Department of Corrections an opportunity to address the committee regarding HB 218 Penalty: Assault on a Correctional Employee. At the February 12, 2014 hearing, Rep. Millett asked a question regarding inmate Jose Perez. Mr. Perez was party to a decision issued by the court of appeals which allowed the possibility of deportation to mitigate his sentence for assaulting a state's witness while at the Lemon Creek Correctional Center.

The Department makes every effort to ensure the safety of its inmates and staff. At times, this requires separating certain inmates from each other. The Department relies on behavior while incarcerated as well as communications from the court, law enforcement, and the District Attorney's office to determine whether certain inmates need to be separated. Once this determination is made, separatee documentation is completed and verified by the Department's central classification unit. This unit monitors the separatee status of each individual and ensures that the inmates are not housed in situations where they have access to each other.

Mr. Perez and J.W. were remanded for similar crimes on 1/05/11. At that time, J.W. was not Mr. Perez's victim nor was the Department made aware that J.W. was a witness in Mr. Perez's case. On 1/11/11, Mr. Perez assaulted J.W. while they were both incarcerated at Lemon Creek Correctional Center. Mr. Perez faced appropriate institutional disciplinary action for the assault, and was charged with assault in the fourth degree as well as interference with official proceedings. From that point on, Mr. Perez and J.W.'s housing was monitored so as to prevent access to one another.

I hope this helps explain the Department's separatee protocols. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me. Thank you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ronald F. Taylor".

Ronald F. Taylor
Deputy Commissioner for Re-Entry and Population Management

February 20, 2014

Representative Wes Keller
Chair
House Judiciary Committee
Alaska State Legislature
State Capitol
120 4th Street
Juneau, AK 99801-1182

Re: Amendment to House Bill 218 Relating to Immigration Consequences

Via Electronic Mail

Dear Representative Keller,

I am writing on behalf of the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project to express our opposition to the amendment offered by Representative Chenault to House Bill 218, which your committee will consider tomorrow. This amendment would preclude Alaska State courts from taking into account immigration consequences of criminal convictions at the time of sentencing.

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) is a nonprofit organization providing immigration legal services to low-income individuals. NWIRP is based in Washington State and most of our clients are residents of that state, but we serve numerous residents of Alaska who have been detained there and transferred to the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington, to face deportation (also known as "removal") proceedings. The Northwest Detention Center (NWDC) is a regional detention facility operated by a private contractor on behalf of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Our organization provides a variety of legal assistance activities, including direct representation, to individuals at the facility who cannot afford private representation.

Because of our experience serving residents of Alaska and other states at the NWDC, we are deeply concerned about the proposed amendment to HB 218 that would eliminate the discretion of Alaska State courts to take into account in sentencing the impact that deportation can have on an individual. Many of the individuals we have encountered have been long-time residents of the United States and a substantial portion of them are lawful permanent residents (also known as "green card holders"), who were residing legally in the U.S but are facing deportation as a result of a criminal conviction. Our immigration laws have in many cases eliminated the discretion that immigration judges previously had to suspend deportation in

compelling circumstances. In many instances, therefore, the result of the proceeding in the criminal case is where the harsh consequence of deportation is effectively determined. It is therefore critical that sentencing courts retain the ability to consider all of the factors, and the actual consequences on the individual and his family in making sentencing decisions.


We appreciate that some individuals might view as inappropriate to consider immigration consequences in sentencing in that it might result in a slightly different sentence for a noncitizen defendant versus a U.S. citizen defendant. However, the much greater disparity is in the fact that, if immigration consequences are not taken into account, the noncitizen faces a penalty—effective banishment from his home—that is far more significant than most terms of imprisonment. It is notable that the United States Supreme Court has itself recognized that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.” *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).

Finally, it is important to note that the consequences of deportation do not fall only on the noncitizen defendants but all too often on their family members, most of whom are United States citizens. In our experience, we have seen all too often how family members are profoundly impacted by losing a parent, a spouse, and frequently a source of financial support. Depriving sentencing courts from considering this type of impact will only lead to substantial hardship to countless Alaska families in the future.

For all these reasons, we urge you and other members of the committee to reject the amendment offered by Representative Chenault to House Bill 218 and preserve the ability of Alaska courts to take into account immigration consequences in sentencing decisions.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. You may reach me at 206-957-8609 or via email at jorge@nwirp.org.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. L. Baron". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.


Jorge L. Baron
Executive Director



**U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement**

June 17, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Field Office Directors
All Special Agents in Charge
All Chief Counsel

FROM: John Morton
Director 

SUBJECT: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

Purpose

This memorandum provides U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to ensure that the agency's immigration enforcement resources are focused on the agency's enforcement priorities. The memorandum also serves to make clear which agency employees may exercise prosecutorial discretion and what factors should be considered.

This memorandum builds on several existing memoranda related to prosecutorial discretion with special emphasis on the following:

- Sam Bernsen, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel, Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (July 15, 1976);
- Bo Cooper, INS General Counsel, INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (July 11, 2000);
- Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (November 17, 2000);
- Bo Cooper, INS General Counsel, Motions to Reopen for Considerations of Adjustment of Status (May 17, 2001);
- William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, Prosecutorial Discretion (October 24, 2005);
- Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (November 7, 2007);
- John Morton, Director, Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (March 2, 2011); and
- John Morton, Director, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011).

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

The following memoranda related to prosecutorial discretion are rescinded:

- Johnny N. Williams, Executive Associate Commissioner (EAC) for Field Operations, Supplemental Guidance Regarding Discretionary Referrals for Special Registration (October 31, 2002); and
- Johnny N. Williams, EAC for Field Operations, Supplemental NSEERS Guidance for Call-In Registrants (January 8, 2003).

Background

One of ICE's central responsibilities is to enforce the nation's civil immigration laws in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). ICE, however, has limited resources to remove those illegally in the United States. ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes represent, as much as reasonably possible, the agency's enforcement priorities, namely the promotion of national security, border security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system. These priorities are outlined in the ICE Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities memorandum of March 2, 2011, which this memorandum is intended to support.

Because the agency is confronted with more administrative violations than its resources can address, the agency must regularly exercise "prosecutorial discretion" if it is to prioritize its efforts. In basic terms, prosecutorial discretion is the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law to decide to what degree to enforce the law against a particular individual. ICE, like any other law enforcement agency, has prosecutorial discretion and may exercise it in the ordinary course of enforcement¹. When ICE favorably exercises prosecutorial discretion, it essentially decides not to assert the full scope of the enforcement authority available to the agency in a given case.

In the civil immigration enforcement context, the term "prosecutorial discretion" applies to a broad range of discretionary enforcement decisions, including but not limited to the following:

- deciding to issue or cancel a notice of detainer;
- deciding to issue, reissue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear (NTA);
- focusing enforcement resources on particular administrative violations or conduct;
- deciding whom to stop, question, or arrest for an administrative violation;
- deciding whom to detain or to release on bond, supervision, personal recognizance, or other condition;
- seeking expedited removal or other forms of removal by means other than a formal removal proceeding in immigration court;

¹ The Meissner memorandum's standard for prosecutorial discretion in a given case turned principally on whether a substantial federal interest was present. Under this memorandum, the standard is principally one of pursuing those cases that meet the agency's priorities for federal immigration enforcement generally.

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

- settling or dismissing a proceeding;
- granting deferred action, granting parole, or staying a final order of removal;
- agreeing to voluntary departure, the withdrawal of an application for admission, or other action in lieu of obtaining a formal order of removal;
- pursuing an appeal;
- executing a removal order; and
- responding to or joining in a motion to reopen removal proceedings and to consider joining in a motion to grant relief or a benefit.

Authorized ICE Personnel

Prosecutorial discretion in civil immigration enforcement matters is held by the Director² and may be exercised, with appropriate supervisory oversight, by the following ICE employees according to their specific responsibilities and authorities:

- officers, agents, and their respective supervisors within Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) who have authority to institute immigration removal proceedings or to otherwise engage in civil immigration enforcement;
- officers, special agents, and their respective supervisors within Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) who have authority to institute immigration removal proceedings or to otherwise engage in civil immigration enforcement;
- attorneys and their respective supervisors within the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) who have authority to represent ICE in immigration removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR); and
- the Director, the Deputy Director, and their senior staff.

ICE attorneys may exercise prosecutorial discretion in any immigration removal proceeding before EOIR, on referral of the case from EOIR to the Attorney General, or during the pendency of an appeal to the federal courts, including a proceeding proposed or initiated by CBP or USCIS. If an ICE attorney decides to exercise prosecutorial discretion to dismiss, suspend, or close a particular case or matter, the attorney should notify the relevant ERO, HSI, CBP, or USCIS charging official about the decision. In the event there is a dispute between the charging official and the ICE attorney regarding the attorney's decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the ICE Chief Counsel should attempt to resolve the dispute with the local supervisors of the charging official. If local resolution is not possible, the matter should be elevated to the Deputy Director of ICE for resolution.

² Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Delegation No. 7030.2 (November 13, 2004), delegating among other authorities, the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement matters (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(17)).

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

Factors to Consider When Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion

When weighing whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be warranted for a given alien, ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to—

- the agency's civil immigration enforcement priorities;
- the person's length of presence in the United States, with particular consideration given to presence while in lawful status;
- the circumstances of the person's arrival in the United States and the manner of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the United States as a young child;
- the person's pursuit of education in the United States, with particular consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution of higher education in the United States;
- whether the person, or the person's immediate relative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or national guard, with particular consideration given to those who served in combat;
- the person's criminal history, including arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants;
- the person's immigration history, including any prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior denial of status, or evidence of fraud;
- whether the person poses a national security or public safety concern;
- the person's ties and contributions to the community, including family relationships;
- the person's ties to the home country and conditions in the country;
- the person's age, with particular consideration given to minors and the elderly;
- whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent;
- whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a mental or physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative;
- whether the person or the person's spouse is pregnant or nursing;
- whether the person or the person's spouse suffers from severe mental or physical illness;
- whether the person's nationality renders removal unlikely;
- whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from removal, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident;
- whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other crime; and
- whether the person is currently cooperating or has cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S. Attorneys or Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among others.

This list is not exhaustive and no one factor is determinative. ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should always consider prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The decisions should be based on the totality of the circumstances, with the goal of conforming to ICE's enforcement priorities.

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

That said, there are certain classes of individuals that warrant particular care. As was stated in the Meissner memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, there are factors that can help ICE officers, agents, and attorneys identify these cases so that they can be reviewed as early as possible in the process.

The following positive factors should prompt particular care and consideration:

- veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;
- long-time lawful permanent residents;
- minors and elderly individuals;
- individuals present in the United States since childhood;
- pregnant or nursing women;
- victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other serious crimes;
- individuals who suffer from a serious mental or physical disability; and
- individuals with serious health conditions.

In exercising prosecutorial discretion in furtherance of ICE's enforcement priorities, the following negative factors should also prompt particular care and consideration by ICE officers, agents, and attorneys:

- individuals who pose a clear risk to national security;
- serious felons, repeat offenders, or individuals with a lengthy criminal record of any kind;
- known gang members or other individuals who pose a clear danger to public safety; and
- individuals with an egregious record of immigration violations, including those with a record of illegal re-entry and those who have engaged in immigration fraud.

Timing

While ICE may exercise prosecutorial discretion at any stage of an enforcement proceeding, it is generally preferable to exercise such discretion as early in the case or proceeding as possible in order to preserve government resources that would otherwise be expended in pursuing the enforcement proceeding. As was more extensively elaborated on in the Howard Memorandum on Prosecutorial Discretion, the universe of opportunities to exercise prosecutorial discretion is large. It may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings. It is also preferable for ICE officers, agents, and attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion in cases without waiting for an alien or alien's advocate or counsel to request a favorable exercise of discretion. Although affirmative requests from an alien or his or her representative may prompt an evaluation of whether a favorable exercise of discretion is appropriate in a given case, ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should examine each such case independently to determine whether a favorable exercise of discretion may be appropriate.

In cases where, based upon an officer's, agent's, or attorney's initial examination, an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be warranted but additional information would assist in reaching a final decision, additional information may be requested from the alien or his or her representative. Such requests should be made in conformity with ethics rules governing

Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens

communication with represented individuals³ and should always emphasize that, while ICE may be considering whether to exercise discretion in the case, there is no guarantee that the agency will ultimately exercise discretion favorably. Responsive information from the alien or his or her representative need not take any particular form and can range from a simple letter or e-mail message to a memorandum with supporting attachments.

Disclaimer

As there is no right to the favorable exercise of discretion by the agency, nothing in this memorandum should be construed to prohibit the apprehension, detention, or removal of any alien unlawfully in the United States or to limit the legal authority of ICE or any of its personnel to enforce federal immigration law. Similarly, this memorandum, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.

³ For questions concerning such rules, officers or agents should consult their local Office of Chief Counsel.

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Distinguished by Bolanos v. Holder, 9th Cir., August 21, 2013
632 F.3d 1049
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Cirilo Aaron COVARRUBIAS TEPOSTE,
Petitioner,
v.
Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.

No. 08-72516. | Argued and Submitted Sept. 2,
2010. | Filed Oct. 26, 2010. | Amended Jan. 20,
2011.

Synopsis

Background: Alien, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 2008 WL 2401132, dismissing his appeal of Immigration Judge's (IJ) order of removal.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gould, Circuit Judge, held that alien's California conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle was not categorically a crime of violence.

Petition granted; order vacated.

Opinion, 623 F.3d 1094, amended and superseded.

Attorneys and Law Firms

*1050 Michael K. Mehr (argued) and Rachael E. Keast, Law Office of Michael K. Mehr, Santa Cruz, CA, for petitioner Cirilo Aaron Covarrubias Teposte.

Manuel Palau (argued), Tony West, and Terri J. Scadron, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for respondent Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. A078-469-158.

Before: DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN, RONALD M. GOULD and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

ORDER

Petitioner's Motion to Amend Opinion is GRANTED in part. The opinion filed on October 26, 2010 and published at 623 F.3d 1094, is amended as follows.

*1051 The opinion concludes with: "We therefore grant the petition for review. **PETITION GRANTED.**" These two sentences shall be deleted and replaced with the following language:

"We therefore grant the petition for review and vacate the order of removal.

PETITION GRANTED, ORDER VACATED."

Footnote 2 shall remain unchanged and shall follow the final sentence in the opinion as amended.

Petitioner's motion for permission to file a supplemental reply to response to motion to amend opinion is denied. No petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Cirilo Aaron Covarrubias Teposte (hereafter "Covarrubias") petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") order of removal based on a conviction of an aggravated felony. We must decide whether the California offense of shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle is categorically a crime of violence as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore is an aggravated felony making Covarrubias removable. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we grant the petition for review.

Covarrubias is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on February 15, 2002. On April 23, 2003, Covarrubias was convicted in state court in California of the offense “Shooting at Inhabited Dwelling or Vehicle” in violation of California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 246. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years.

The government initiated removal proceedings against Covarrubias on March 12, 2007 by filing a Notice to Appear. The government charged him as removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), alleging that his conviction under CPC § 246 was an aggravated felony in the form of a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year.

On February 28, 2008, Covarrubias appeared at a hearing before the IJ and contested removability, denying the allegations pertaining to the California conviction. The IJ sustained the charge of removability in light of the conviction documents submitted by the Government¹ and the IJ’s conclusion that the conviction was an aggravated felony. Covarrubias did not apply for relief from removal. The IJ issued a memorandum and order setting out his reasoning. The IJ determined that § 246 was categorically a crime of violence under both 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and (b) because “the crime of discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle quite obviously has as an element the use or attempted use of force against the person or property of another, and also poses a substantial risk that force will be actively employed against the person or property of another.”

¹ The record before the IJ included copies of an incomplete abstract of judgment, the criminal complaint, and the transcript of a sentencing hearing.

Covarrubias appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, and the BIA dismissed the appeal on May 15, 2008. The BIA agreed with the IJ that CPC § 246 qualifies as a *1052 “crime of violence” and therefore as an aggravated felony, but the BIA relied on 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) only and did not address § 16(a). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Covarrubias was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Covarrubias filed a petition for review in our court, arguing that, contrary to the BIA’s conclusion, his conviction under CPC § 246 is not categorically a crime of violence under § 16(b).

II

^{[1] [2]} We review de novo whether a criminal conviction is a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony rendering an alien removable. *Suazo Perez v. Mukasey*, 512 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.2008). The BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16 and its interpretation of that statute gains no deference. *Fernandez–Ruiz v. Gonzales*, 466 F.3d 1121, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (citing *Oyebanji v. Gonzales*, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir.2005)).

III

Covarrubias is removable if his conviction in California for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle constitutes an aggravated felony in the form of a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(F). A “crime of violence” is either:

- (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
- (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 16. Because the BIA rested its decision in this case on § 16(b) and did not rely on § 16(a), we do not address § 16(a) here.

Covarrubias does not dispute that he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for his California offense, and that California law treats his offense as a felony. We have yet to establish whether the word “felony” in § 16(b) is defined as an offense punishable by more than one year in prison, or alternatively as an offense that is characterized as a felony under state law. *Ortega–Mendez v. Gonzales*, 450 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.2006). We need not decide this question because, under either approach, Covarrubias’s offense is a felony and satisfies that element of § 16(b). *See id.* (declining to decide the question of which definition applied because the result would be the same under either definition); *see also United States v. Campos–Fuerte*, 357 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that a conviction for a California “wobbler” offense, which could be either a felony or misdemeanor, was a felony in light of the sentence imposed), *amended by* 366 F.3d 691 (9th Cir.2004).

^[3] ^[4] The question is whether CPC § 246, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). We apply the categorical approach set forth in *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and ask whether the full range of conduct proscribed by the statute meets the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of § 16(b). See *Fernandez–Ruiz*, 466 F.3d at 1125; *Ruiz–Morales v. Ashcroft*, 361 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.2004). If the statute of conviction is broader in scope than the federal provision, then ordinarily we turn to the modified categorical approach *1053 and consult certain documentation in the record to determine whether the conviction entailed admission to or proof of the necessary elements. See *United States v. Pallares–Galan*, 359 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir.2004); *Fernandez–Ruiz*, 466 F.3d at 1132. However, because the BIA did not apply the modified categorical approach and the government did not raise it on appeal, we limit our analysis to the categorical approach. See *Latu v. Mukasey*, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2008) (“[W]here, as here, the government has not asked us to apply the modified categorical approach, we ‘consider only whether the categorical approach is satisfied.’”) (quoting *Mandujano–Real v. Mukasey*, 526 F.3d 585, 589 (9th Cir.2008)).

In *Leocal v. Ashcroft*, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of § 16(a) and explained that the phrase “use ... of physical force” “requires active employment” of force and suggests a “higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” 543 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004). The Court further held that the words “use” and “physical force” in § 16(b) should be given an “identical construction” to § 16(a), again “requiring a higher *mens rea* than merely accidental or negligent conduct.” *Id.* at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377. The “reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime.” *Id.* at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377.

^[5] Thus § 16(b) “covers offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense.” *Id.* at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377. The Court in *Leocal* cited burglary as the “classic example” of a § 16(b) offense, explaining that it “would be covered under § 16(b) *not* because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but

because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime.” *Id.*

In *Fernandez–Ruiz*, we joined several other circuits in holding that the reasoning of *Leocal* means that crimes involving the reckless use of force do not qualify under § 16 as a crime of violence. 466 F.3d at 1129. There we held that “neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient *mens rea* to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence” under § 16. *Id.* at 1130. We have since interpreted the en banc decision in *Fernandez–Ruiz* to mean that “reckless use of force is not sufficient to support a finding of commission of a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16(b).” *Malta–Espinoza v. Gonzales*, 478 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir.2007). “The effect of our holdings is that in order to be a predicate offense under either 18 U.S.C. § 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an *intentional* use of force or a substantial risk that force will be *intentionally* used during its commission.” *United States v. Gomez–Leon*, 545 F.3d 777, 787 (9th Cir.2008). Thus our precedent seems squarely to place crimes motivated by intent on a pedestal, while pushing off other very dangerous and violent conduct that, because not intentional, does not qualify as a “crime of violence.”

^[6] Covarrubias was convicted of CPC § 246, which provides:

Any person who shall maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar, ... or inhabited camper, ... is guilty of a felony, and *1054 upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not less than six months and not exceeding one year.

As used in this section, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.

CPC § 246.

Applying the categorical approach, “we consider not only the language of the state statute, but also the interpretation of that language in judicial opinions” to give meaning to the elements of CPC § 246. *Ortega–Mendez*, 450 F.3d at 1016. California courts have interpreted the provision to require at minimum a reckless state of mind.

To illustrate: In *People v. Overman*, a California Court of Appeal held that “section 246 is not limited to shooting

directly at an inhabited or occupied target. Rather, it proscribes shooting either directly at or in close proximity to an inhabited or occupied target under circumstances showing a conscious disregard for the probability that one or more bullets will strike the target or persons in or around it.” 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 798, 805 (2005). Similarly, in *People v. Jischke*, the defendant was charged with violating CPC § 246 after shooting a gun through the floor of his apartment into the apartment below. 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 272 (1996). The court observed that CPC § 246 is “a general intent crime” and held that “[t]here is no requirement that the defendant intend to strike the building.” *Id.*; see also *People v. Chavira*, 3 Cal.App.3d 988, 83 Cal.Rptr. 851, 855 (1970) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding of “intent” to hit a building under CPC § 246 because the defendant had engaged “in a fusillade of shots” with “a reckless disregard” of the probability that some shots would hit the building).

In *United States v. Narvaez-Gomez*, we recognized this controlling precedent from California on § 246 and determined that a violation of the statute “may result from purely reckless conduct.” 489 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir.2007). Here, the BIA and the government correctly acknowledged that CPC § 246 requires a merely reckless *mens rea*. Given the elements of that statute set by California judicial decisions, we can gather with certainty only that Covarrubias intentionally discharged a gun with reckless disregard as to whether the bullet would hit an inhabited vehicle or dwelling. This creates a risk of injury to other people and damage to property. But it does not involve a substantial risk of using force with intent against persons or property. See *Tran v. Gonzales*, 414 F.3d 464, 472 (3d Cir.2005) (concluding that a Pennsylvania offense of reckless burning or exploding did not involve a substantial risk that force would be used). “Reckless conduct, as generally defined, is not purposeful.” *Fernandez-Ruiz*, 466 F.3d at 1130. An individual may be subjected to prosecution under § 246 if he consciously disregards the risk that the shots he fires will hit a dwelling, but “this subjective awareness of possible injury is not the same as the intentional use of physical force against the person of another.” *Id.* at 1130.

The government contends that reckless shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle in violation of § 246, like burglary, carries a substantial risk that intentional force will be used not in the act of shooting but rather during the course of commission, through some kind of escalating confrontation. The government posits that the reckless shooting required for CPC § 246 itself does not involve the intentional use of force, but such a shooting will, in *1055 the ordinary case, provoke a reaction from

the occupant of the target building or vehicle, which will in turn cause the offender to employ intentional force against the occupant.

This argument, while not entirely devoid of merit, stretches the Supreme Court’s burglary analogy in *Leocal* too far. Burglary is a specific intent crime, while CPC § 246 is a general intent crime. The criminal goal of burglary makes it likely that the offender will undertake other intentional acts to achieve that goal. See *United States v. Becker*, 919 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir.1990) (“Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension.”). But with a crime committed recklessly, it is unlikely that the reckless actor will, in response to external events, form an intent to use force in furtherance of his crime. See *Tran*, 414 F.3d at 471–73 (concluding that a Pennsylvania reckless burning statute “does not contemplate a risk that the reckless burning offender will step in and commit an intentional act of violence”); *Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales*, 413 F.3d 444, 446–47 (4th Cir.2005) (concluding that aggravated involuntary manslaughter is not analogous to burglary for purposes of § 16(b) because it “does not intrinsically involve a substantial risk that force will be applied ‘as a means to an end’ ”). Indeed, once the initial shooting has occurred, an offender of CPC § 246 has no further criminal purpose to accomplish through the use of intentional force. The idea that a reckless act of a shooter will provoke violence from a building inhabitant which in turn will provoke a now-intentional action by the shooter in furtherance of his offense is thus too speculative to support a conclusion that CPC § 246 is categorically a crime of violence.

We can imagine scenarios in which a reckless shooter would ultimately use force during the course of the crime after events escalated the violence. Yet there must be a limit to the speculation about what intentional acts could hypothetically occur in response to the crime of conviction. Otherwise, in contravention of *Fernandez-Ruiz*, every recklessly committed offense could categorically satisfy § 16(b) based on the risk, even if remote, that it could lead to future intentional conduct.

Other circuits are in accord. The Seventh Circuit evaluated a similar statute in *Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey*, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir.2008). The Seventh Circuit held that it was not a categorical crime of violence under § 16(b) to “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally” perform “an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person” by “shooting a firearm into an

inhabited dwelling or other building or place where people are likely to gather.” *Id.* at 559. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the fact that the offense at issue did “not require *any* purposeful conduct,” whereas burglary and other firearms offenses that have been held to constitute crimes of violence “required *intentional* conduct exhibiting a *reckless* disregard to the likelihood of injury.” *Id.* at 561. The court also observed that “[u]nlike burglary, where there necessarily is a risk of force being employed in a confrontation inside the dwelling, the offense of criminal recklessness is complete when the gun is fired.” *Id.*

Because California Penal Code § 246 is not categorically a crime of violence according to the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s decision finding Covarrubias removable for an aggravated felony. We therefore *1056 grant the petition for review and vacate the order of removal.²

² We grant this relief under compulsion of our prior precedent. The basic question here is whether the act of intentionally discharging a firearm with conscious disregard of the proximity to an inhabited dwelling or vehicle is by its nature a violent act. It does not take a sophisticated understanding of weaponry to know that

if the discharged bullet aimed at the dwelling or vehicle struck a person therein, it would cause grievous harm. Shooting a gun in the direction of another person seems like a paradigm of violent action. The shooter’s indifference to the result of his dangerous act might be thought sufficient to call it a “use” of force. But our en banc precedent in *Fernandez–Ruiz* stands in the way of a doctrinal development that would acknowledge the common sense view that shooting at an inhabited structure, whether intentionally or recklessly, is a crime of violence warranting removal under the immigration laws. Our panel has no power to modify circuit precedent, and we are bound by *Fernandez–Ruiz* until such time as the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of our court revisits this issue.

PETITION GRANTED, ORDER VACATED.

Parallel Citations

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 843, 2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1081



4141 B Street, Suite 205
Anchorage, AK 99503
T: 360.671.5945
F: 360.676.5459
www.cascadiaimmigrationlaw.com

Reply To:
Margaret Stock, Attorney At Law
mstock@americanlaw.com

VIA EMAIL ONLY

February 24, 2014

Honorable Mike Chenault
Speaker of the House

Re: Alaska Department of Law's proposed amendment to HB218 to deny any person the ability to ask a three-judge panel to review sentencing for a felony on the basis that the sentence will result in the harsh collateral consequence of deportation

Dear Speaker Chenault:

At the request of three different legislators who are members of the House Judiciary Committee, I am providing the attached list of legal errors in the Memorandum provided to you on February 11, 2014 by Richard Svobodny, Alaska Department of Law.

For the record, I also state the following:

1. The proposed amendment to HB 218 interferes with our judges' duty to ensure that justice is served;
2. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of *Padilla v. Kentucky*, specifically recognized and sanctioned a judge's power, ability, and duty to fashion sentences that avoid the severe consequences of deportation when appropriate and necessary;
3. The amendment would harm Alaska families. Many persons who would be denied justice under this amendment are the spouses and parents of US citizens and lawful permanent residents. Deportation would result in the permanent break-up of these mixed status families, something that the Department of Law fails to mention whatsoever. Many especially vulnerable Alaska Native families will be harmed by this amendment.
4. The Department of Law lost the arguments made in the Department of Law legal memo when it made these arguments before the three-judge panel in the *Silvera* case. The Department now mischaracterizes what the Court of Appeals did in the *Silvera* case. The *Silvera* decision did not mandate that a three-judge panel must

creating

borders™


Letter to Speaker Mike Chenault
February 24, 2014
Page 2

impose lower sentences, but merely acknowledged that deportation is an appropriate factor to consider when a judge is exercising his or her discretionary sentencing authority.

5. The State of Alaska Department of Law's proposed amendment likely violates the Alaska and Federal Constitutions in that it puts the "manifestly unjust" provision of the three-judge sentencing panel statute off-limits to an entire category of defendants based specifically on their national origin. Although deportation is an extraordinarily harsh collateral consequence, the amendment prohibits the courts from considering it entirely. As the second sentence of the State of Alaska's legal memo indicates, this amendment is apparently motivated by an animus to "foreign born" people.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Very truly yours,



Margaret D. Stock

Enclosures:

Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, by the Immigration Policy Center
List of Aggravated Felonies (Immigration & Nationality Act §101(a)(43))
Padilla v. Kentucky, US Supreme Court decision
State of Alaska v. Silvera, 309 P.3d 1277

creating

borders™

March 2012

AGGRAVATED FELONIES: An Overview

“Aggravated felony” is a term of art used to describe a category of offenses carrying particularly harsh immigration consequences for non-citizens convicted of such crimes. Regardless of their immigration status, non-citizens who have been convicted of an “aggravated felony” are prohibited from receiving most forms of relief that would spare them from deportation, including asylum, and from being readmitted to the United States at any time in the future.

Yet despite what the ominous-sounding name may suggest, an “aggravated felony” need not be “aggravated” or a “felony” to qualify as such a crime. Instead, an “aggravated felony” is simply an offense that Congress sees fit to label as such, and today includes many nonviolent and seemingly minor offenses.

This fact sheet provides an overview of “aggravated felonies” under federal immigration law and the immigration consequences of being convicted of an “aggravated felony.”¹

What Makes a Crime an “Aggravated Felony”?

An offense need not be “aggravated” or a “felony” in the place where the crime was committed to be considered an “aggravated felony” for purposes of federal immigration law. Instead, an “aggravated felony” is any crime that Congress decides to label as such. As two prominent immigration judges recently noted, numerous “non-violent, fairly trivial misdemeanors are considered aggravated felonies under our immigration laws.”²

As initially enacted in 1988, the term “aggravated felony” referred only to murder, federal drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking of certain firearms and destructive devices.³ Congress has since expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” on numerous occasions,⁴ but has never removed a crime from the list. Today, the definition of “aggravated felony” covers more than thirty types of offenses, including simple battery,⁵ theft,⁶ filing a false tax return,⁷ and failing to appear in court.⁸ Even offenses that sound serious, such as “sexual abuse of a minor,” can encompass conduct that some states classify as misdemeanors or do not criminalize at all, such as consensual intercourse between a 17-year-old and a 16-year-old.⁹

What if the Conviction Occurred before the Crime was Labeled an “Aggravated Felony”?

In most federal courts, a conviction for any offense listed as an “aggravated felony” is grounds for deportation, even if the crime was not considered an “aggravated felony” at the time of conviction.¹⁰ In other words, whenever Congress adds a new offense to the list of “aggravated felonies” in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), lawfully present immigrants who have previously been convicted of such crimes become immediately deportable. As a result, any addition to the list of “aggravated felonies” will apply to prior convictions unless Congress affirmatively states that it will only apply to future convictions.

Are “Aggravated Felonies” the Only Crimes for Which an Immigrant Can be Deported?

No. An “aggravated felony” is one—but not the only—basis to deport immigrants convicted of a criminal offense. Removal proceedings may also be initiated against immigrants convicted of one or more crimes involving “moral turpitude,”¹¹ a broad category of offenses that includes, but is not limited to, most crimes that qualify as an “aggravated felony.”¹² Immigrants convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude are subject to deportation, but do not face the additional consequences associated with a conviction for an “aggravated felony.” The immigration laws also permit deportation for convictions of various standalone offenses.¹³

Thus, whether a noncitizen is subject to deportation for a crime is not determined by whether the crime is labeled an “aggravated felony.” Instead, the primary impact of the “aggravated felony” classification relates to the increased immigration penalties attached to the label, including the inability to apply for most forms of relief from removal.

What are the Potential Consequences of Being Convicted of an “Aggravated Felony”?

Deportation without a Removal Hearing

Certain non-citizens convicted of an “aggravated felony” are provided fewer legal protections than other immigrants. For example, any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” who is not a lawful permanent resident (LPR) may be administratively deported from the United States without a formal hearing before an Immigration Judge.¹⁴ Immigrants placed in such proceedings are not eligible for asylum or any other form of discretionary relief.¹⁵ Immigrants found deportable in this manner may not appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and can be physically removed two weeks after entry of the order.¹⁶

Mandatory Unreviewable Detention Following Release from Criminal Custody

Federal immigration authorities are *required* to detain any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” upon his or her release from criminal custody.¹⁷ To obtain bond from an immigration judge, LPRs who are detained following an “aggravated felony” conviction must demonstrate with substantial likelihood that the crime in question does not qualify as an “aggravated felony.”¹⁸

Ineligibility for Asylum

Any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” is ineligible for asylum.¹⁹ Asylum is a form of immigration relief available to immigrants who suffered or have a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of nationality or last habitual residence.²⁰ Immigrants convicted of an “aggravated felony” may also be ineligible for “withholding of removal,” a similar form of relief for noncitizens whose life or freedom would be threatened in the country of deportation.²¹

Ineligibility for Cancellation of Removal

Any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” is ineligible for cancellation of removal (“cancellation”).²² Cancellation is a form of relief allowing immigration judges to permit otherwise deportable immigrants to remain in the United States. The bar to cancellation for

immigrants convicted of an “aggravated felony” applies regardless of whether their removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to an immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or LPR.²³

Ineligibility for Certain Waivers of Inadmissibility

Certain LPRs may not obtain a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the INA if they were convicted of an “aggravated felony.”²⁴ A waiver of inadmissibility is a means of excusing immigrants for past misconduct that makes them ineligible for admission to the United States. Waivers under Section 212(h) are available to prospective LPRs whose removal from the United States would cause “extreme hardship” to a qualifying U.S. citizen or LPR.

Ineligibility for Voluntary Departure

An immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” is ineligible for voluntary departure.²⁵ Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief allowing otherwise deportable immigrants to leave the country at their own expense in place of formal deportation under an order of removal.

Permanent Inadmissibility Following Departure from the United States

An immigrant removed from the United States after being convicted of an “aggravated felony” (or who leaves while an order of removal is outstanding) is permanently inadmissible.²⁶ To lawfully reenter the United States, such an immigrant must receive a special waiver from the Department of Homeland Security (which is very rare), in addition to meeting all other grounds of admissibility.

Enhanced Penalties for Illegally Reentering the United States

An immigrant who is removed from the United States following a conviction for an “aggravated felony,” and who subsequently reenters the country illegally, may be imprisoned for up to 20 years rather than two years.²⁷

Conclusion

In the words of the Supreme Court, immigrants convicted of an “aggravated felony” face the “harshest deportation consequences.”²⁸ As Congress ponders proposals to include even more crimes under the definition of “aggravated felony,” it must consider the extremely severe consequences that will result. The immigration laws include numerous provisions to ensure that criminals are not allowed to remain in the United States, yet also recognize that exceptions should be made in particularly compelling cases, especially when an immigrant’s removal will create hardship for U.S. citizens. Once a crime is labeled an “aggravated felony,” however, deportation is all but assured and individualized determinations are rarely possible to make.

Endnotes

¹ The Immigration Policy Center wishes to thank Dan Kesselbrenner of the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild for his assistance in preparing this fact sheet.

- ² Hon. Dana Leigh Marks and Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin, *A View Through the Looking Glass: How Crimes Appear from the Immigration Court Perspective*, Fordham Urb. L.J. 91, 92 (2012).
- ³ Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4469, 4470.
- ⁴ Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, §501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048; Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416, § 222, 109 Stat. 4305, 4320; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1276, 1277; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-627.
- ⁵ INA § 101(a)(43)(F).
- ⁶ INA § 101(a)(43)(G).
- ⁷ INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); *Kawashima v. Holder*, No. 10-577 (Feb. 21, 2012).
- ⁸ INA § 101(a)(43)(Q), (T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Q), (T).
- ⁹ *United States v. Castro-Guevarra*, 575 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2009).
- ¹⁰ INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). In removal proceedings arising in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, an “aggravated felony” conviction is grounds for removal only if the conviction occurred after November 19, 1988. *Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder*, 636 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2010).
- ¹¹ INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
- ¹² *Judulang v. Holder*, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011).
- ¹³ See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) (failure to register as a sex offender); INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (controlled substances violations); INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (certain firearms offenses); INA § 237(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D) (miscellaneous crimes); INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (crimes of domestic violence).
- ¹⁴ INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
- ¹⁵ INA § 238(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5).
- ¹⁶ INA § 238(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(3).
- ¹⁷ INA § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).
- ¹⁸ *Matter of Joseph*, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
- ¹⁹ INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
- ²⁰ INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
- ²¹ INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(3)(B).
- ²² INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
- ²³ INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
- ²⁴ INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
- ²⁵ INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1); INA § 240B(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(C).
- ²⁶ INA § 212(a)(9)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(ii).
- ²⁷ INA § 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
- ²⁸ *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010).

Quotations from State of Alaska Legal Memo	Discussion of Error in State's Memorandum
<p>"<i>State v. Silvera</i> and <i>State v. Perez</i>, 309 P.3d 1277 (Alaska App. 2013), are two cases that allow for a reduction in a sentence by a three-judge sentencing panel for noncitizens of the United States "</p>	<p>These decisions do not just affect noncitizens, but also allow citizens of the United States to seek a reduction in sentence if they might face denaturalization and deportation as a result of the original sentence</p>
<p>" . . . with the resulting consequence that citizens of the United States are sentenced to harsher sentences than noncitizens."</p>	<p>Citizens may also seek reductions in their sentence in appropriate circumstances. They are not categorically "sentenced to harsher sentences" just because they are citizens</p>
<p>"Put another way, a person born in Jamaica (Mr. Silvera) or the Dominican Republic (Mr. Perez) who comes to Alaska and commits a felony can receive a lesser sentence for the same crime than a person born in Bethel or Anchorage, Alaska."</p>	<p>This statement shows a fundamental misunderstanding of citizenship law. Many people born in Jamaica and/or the Dominican Republic are American citizens at birth. Likewise, a person born in Alaska to invading Japanese troops during the Japanese World War II occupation of Attu and Kiska would not be a US citizen, although born in Alaska. Many Americans are born in foreign countries. Examples include US Senator Ted Cruz (born in Canada) , US Senator John McCain (born in Panama), and George Romney (born in Mexico). Place of birth is irrelevant to sentencing decisions under the cases cited.</p>
<p>"If the defendants were to receive at least one year's confinement (the presumptive minimum) for their offenses, each might be classified by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as an 'aggravated felon,' as that term is defined by the federal immigration statutes, and so they might be considered 'deportable.'"</p>	<p>There is no "might" about any of this. Federal immigration law classifies as an "aggravated felony" any crime—whether felony or misdemeanor, and whether "aggravated" or not—if the offense is a "crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense), for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." INA §101(a)(43)(F). If the US Government—not just ICE, but other federal agencies as well—considers a crime to be an "aggravated felony," then a person is deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that "Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." If the alien has not yet been</p>

creating

borders™

	<p>admitted to the United States, there is a waiver—but if the alien has been granted a green card, as Silvera and Perez had, then there is no waiver for the aggravated felony ground of deportation. An “aggravated felon” is permanently barred from naturalizing as a US citizen and is subject to mandatory detention and deportation, without hope of relief unless the person would be tortured if returned to his or her country of citizenship. There is no “might” about any of this. The statute does not provide discretion not to deport an “aggravated felon,” and does not give ICE the discretion to refuse to classify the person as an “aggravated felon.” The State Department of Law’s use of the word “might” is misleading.</p>
<p>“If they are ‘deportable’ ICE then has prosecutorial discretion to initiate removal proceedings against them.”</p>	<p>Immigration detention is mandatory for aggravated felons. ICE does not have discretion, nor do immigration judges have discretion to provide relief to “aggravated felons.” Moreover, ICE is not the only federal agency that is implicated. Other federal agencies can initiate removal proceedings based on a person’s conviction for an “aggravated felony.” Customs and Border Protection is mandated to deny entry to a person who has an aggravated felony conviction, and USCIS is required to deny a naturalization application filed by such a person.</p>
<p>“The defendants asked the sentencing courts to sentence them below the minimum statutory presumptive ranges for their crimes so that they could avoid possible deportation -that is, so that they could avoid being classified as ‘aggravated felons.’”</p>	<p>They were not necessarily avoiding deportation, they were merely attempting to avoid being classified as “aggravated felons.” They remain highly likely to face deportation proceedings. Being an “aggravated felon” is not the only reason why a person might face deportation proceedings. There are numerous offenses that can lead to deportation and being an “aggravated felony” is only one of</p>

creating

borders™

	<p>them. See, generally, INA 237(a); see also the attached Factsheet from the Immigration Policy Center. The defendants, however, were trying to avoid being convicted of something defined under federal law as an “aggravated felony” because those convicted of such crimes generally have no possible relief from deportation, no matter how long they have lived in the US, no matter what their ties here, and no matter what their equities. If they are considered deportable for a reason besides being an “aggravated felon,” they can sometimes obtain relief from deportation before an immigration judge.</p>
<p>“In its decision, the court of appeals ruled that Alaskan sentencing courts may impose less severe sentences on noncitizen defendants than sentences they would impose on otherwise similarly situated citizen defendants, to specifically include imposing sentences below the presumptive minimum sentences generally mandated by the Alaska Legislature.”</p>	<p>The Court of Appeals indicated that it could also impose less severe sentences on citizens who might face deportation after being denaturalized.</p>
<p>“Under the court of appeals’ ruling, courts may do so for the sole purpose of providing noncitizen defendants with <i>de facto</i> immunity from or providing them with otherwise prohibited defenses to immigration law.”</p>	<p>The defendants received no immunity whatsoever. They may still face deportation. They only avoided the classification of “aggravated felon.” An immigration judge could still order them deported.</p>
<p>“Specifically, the court ruled that a three-judge panel may impose a sentence below the presumptive minimum term for the sole purpose of shielding a noncitizen defendant from possible deportation proceedings (the outcome of which would be uncertain).”</p>	<p>The outcome of a deportation for an “aggravated felon” is certain—the person is ordered removed, with no relief available unless the person would be tortured if returned to his or her country of citizenship. The person is also subject to mandatory detention when transferred from state to immigration custody.</p>
<p>“The court of appeals’ ruling violates the equal protection principles of the Alaska Constitution because it authorizes courts to</p>	<p>The Court of Appeals specifically rejected the argument that considering deportation consequences would violate equal protection.</p>

creating

borders™

<p>treat defendants differently based on their citizenship and immigration status.”</p>	<p>Moreover, there is no equal protection violation because (1) citizens who face possible deportation may also ask for a sentence reduction, and (2) equal protection does not mean that all persons have to be treated exactly the same. For example, it is not an equal protection violation against sane people that insane people may raise an insanity defense, a defense that is not available to sane people. Moreover, citizens are harmed when their noncitizen loved ones are banished permanently from the United States.</p>
<p>“Applying a different sentencing standard for citizens and noncitizens will undermine public confidence in Alaska’s criminal justice system.”</p>	<p>Having the Alaska State legislature ratify the break-up of mixed status families so that mandatory detention and deportation may occur will no doubt undermine public confidence in Alaska’s criminal justice system. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court specifically ratified the concept of taking immigration consequences into account when sentencing a defendant, in the case of <i>Padilla v. Kentucky</i>.</p>
<p>“From the citizens’ point of view, they will be denied an opportunity to be sentenced by the three-judge panel simply because they are citizens and so are not subject to federal immigration laws that the state judges have decided are unjust.”</p>	<p>Nothing in current prevents a citizen who may face denaturalization and deportation from asking to be sentenced by a three-judge panel. Citizens may also be subject to federal immigration laws. The State’s proposed amendment would prevent citizens from arguing to a three-judge panel that the immigration consequences to citizens may be taken into account in sentencing.</p>

creating

borders™

Sec. 101 [1101] Definitions
[8 U.S.C. 1101]

101(a) [1101(a)] As used in this Act--

101(a)(43) [1101(a)(43)] The term "aggravated felony" means--

101(a)(43)(A) [1101(a)(43)(A)] murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;

101(a)(43)(B) [1101(a)(43)(B)] illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code);

101(a)(43)(C) [1101(a)(43)(C)] illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title);

101(a)(43)(D) [1101(a)(43)(D)] an offense described in section 1956 of title 18, United States Code (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded \$10,000;

101(a)(43)(E) [1101(a)(43)(E)] an offense described in--

101(a)(43)(E)(i) [1101(a)(43)(E)(i)] section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, United States Code, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses);

101(a)(43)(E)(ii) [1101(a)(43)(E)(ii)] section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18, United States Code (relating to firearms offenses); or

101(a)(43)(E)(iii) [1101(a)(43)(E)(iii)] section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to firearms offenses);

101(a)(43)(F) [1101(a)(43)(F)] a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at [sic]

least 1 year;

101(a)(43)(G) [1101(a)(43)(G)] a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at [sic]

least 1 year;

101(a)(43)(H) [1101(a)(43)(H)] an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18, United States Code (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom);

101(a)(43)(I) [1101(a)(43)(I)] an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18, United States Code (relating to child pornography);

101(a)(43)(J) [1101(a)(43)(J)] an offense described in section 1962 of title 18, United States Code (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of 1 year imprisonment or more may be imposed;

101(a)(43)(K) [1101(a)(43)(K)] an offense that--

101(a)(43)(K)(i) [1101(a)(43)(K)(i)] relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business;

101(a)(43)(K)(ii) [1101(a)(43)(K)(ii)] is described in section 2421, 2422, 2423, of Title 18, United States Code (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or

101(a)(43)(K)(iii) [1101(a)(43)(K)(iii)] is described in any of sections 1581-1585 or 1588-1591 of title 18, United States Code (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons);

101(a)(43)(L) [1101(a)(43)(L)] an offense described in--

101(a)(43)(L)(i) [1101(a)(43)(L)(i)] section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18, United States Code;

101(a)(43)(L)(ii) [1101(a)(43)(L)(ii)] section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or

101(a)(43)(L)(iii) [1101(a)(43)(L)(iii)] section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents);

101(a)(43)(M) [1101(a)(43)(M)] an offense that--

101(a)(43)(M)(i) [1101(a)(43)(M)(i)] involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds \$10,000; or

101(a)(43)(M)(ii) [1101(a)(43)(M)(ii)] is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds \$10,000;

101(a)(43)(N) [1101(a)(43)(N)] an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this Act;

101(a)(43)(O) [1101(a)(43)(O)] an offense described in section 275(a) or 276 committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph [;]

101(a)(43)(P) [1101(a)(43)(P)] an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of title 18, United States Code, or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this Act;

101(a)(43)(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more;

101(a)(43)(R) [1101(a)(43)(R)] an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;

101(a)(43)(S) [1101(a)(43)(S)] an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;

101(a)(43)(T) [1101(a)(43)(T)] an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed; and

101(a)(43)(U) [1101(a)(43)(U)] an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.

The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph.

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PADILLA *v.* KENTUCKY

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

No. 08–651. Argued October 13, 2009—Decided March 31, 2010

Petitioner Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faces deportation after pleading guilty to drug-distribution charges in Kentucky. In postconviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla postconviction relief on the ground that the Sixth Amendment's effective-assistance-of-counsel guarantee does not protect defendants from erroneous deportation advice because deportation is merely a "collateral" consequence of a conviction.

Held: Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here. Pp. 2–18.

(a) Changes to immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited judges' authority to alleviate deportation's harsh consequences. Because the drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes, the importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. Thus, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Pp. 2–6.

Syllabus

(b) *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U. S. 668, applies to Padilla's claim. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U. S. 759, 771. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. However, this Court has never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" required under *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 689. The question whether that distinction is appropriate need not be considered in this case because of the unique nature of deportation. Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because that distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a *Strickland* claim concerning the specific risk of deportation, advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Pp. 7–9.

(c) To satisfy *Strickland's* two-prong inquiry, counsel's representation must fall "below an objective standard of reasonableness," 466 U. S., at 688, and there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," *id.*, at 694. The first, constitutional deficiency, is necessarily linked to the legal community's practice and expectations. *Id.*, at 688. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk. And this Court has recognized the importance to the client of "[p]reserving the . . . right to remain in the United States" and "preserving the possibility of" discretionary relief from deportation. *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U. S. 289, 323. Thus, this is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear. In those cases, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Accepting Padilla's allegations as true, he has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy *Strickland's* first prong. Whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance. Pp. 9–12.

(d) The Solicitor General's proposed rule—that *Strickland* should

Syllabus

be applied to Padilla's claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice—is unpersuasive. And though this Court must be careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, the 25 years since *Strickland* was first applied to ineffective-assistance claims at the plea stage have shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions after a trial. Also, informed consideration of possible deportation can benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants, who may be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. This decision will not open the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained through plea bargains. Cf. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U. S. 52, 58. Pp. 12–16.

253 S. W. 3d 482, reversed and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 08–651

JOSE PADILLA, PETITIONER v. KENTUCKY

**ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
KENTUCKY**

[March 31, 2010]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years. Padilla served this Nation with honor as a member of the U. S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.¹

In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.” 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). Padilla relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney.

Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme

¹Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

Opinion of the Court

Court of Kentucky denied Padilla postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a "collateral" consequence of his conviction. *Id.*, at 485. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.

We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.

I

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation or removal, *Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan*, 333 U. S. 6, 10 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Nation's first 100 years was "a period of unimpeded immigration." C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, *Immigration Law and Procedure* §1.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order the deportation of those

Opinion of the Court

immigrants he “judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,” Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon §1.2, at 5. It was not until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon §1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of excludable persons those “who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.²

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought “radical changes” to our law. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54–55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil. *Id.*, at 55. Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of “any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States” 39 Stat. 889. And §19 also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any time after entry. *Ibid.* Congress did not, however, define the term “moral turpitude.”

While the 1917 Act was “radical” because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation “that such alien

²In 1907, Congress expanded the class of excluded persons to include individuals who “admit” to having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 899.

Opinion of the Court

shall not be deported." *Id.*, at 890.³ This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was "consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation," *Janvier v. United States*, 793 F. 2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986). Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case basis.

Although narcotics offenses—such as the offense at issue in this case—provided a distinct basis for deportation as early as 1922,⁴ the JRAD procedure was generally

³As enacted, the statute provided:

"That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act." 1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889–890.

This provision was codified in 8 U. S. C. §1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to §1227 (2006 ed.)). The judge's nondeportation recommendation was binding on the Secretary of Labor and, later, the Attorney General after control of immigration removal matters was transferred from the former to the latter. See *Janvier v. United States*, 793 F. 2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986).

⁴Congress first identified narcotics offenses as a special category of crimes triggering deportation in the 1922 Narcotic Drug Act. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596. After the 1922 Act took effect, there was some initial confusion over whether a narcotics offense also had to be a crime of moral turpitude for an individual to be deportable. See *Weedin v. Moy Fat*, 8 F. 2d 488, 489 (CA9 1925) (holding that an individual who committed narcotics offense was not deportable because offense did not involve moral turpitude). However, lower courts eventually agreed that the narcotics offense provision was "special," *Chung*

Opinion of the Court

available to avoid deportation in narcotics convictions. See *United States v. O'Rourke*, 213 F. 2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954). Except for "technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics," *ibid.*, it appears that courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917 Act's broad JRAD provision. See *ibid.* (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics case "was effective to prevent deportation" (citing *Dang Nam v. Bryan*, 74 F. 2d 379, 380–381 (CA9 1934))).

In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see *Janvier*, 793 F. 2d 449. See also *United States v. Castro*, 26 F. 3d 557 (CA5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was "part of the sentencing" process, *Janvier*, 793 F. 2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel's duty to provide effective representation.

However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),⁵ and in

Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F. 2d 789, 790 (CA9 1926); thus, a narcotics offense did not need also to be a crime of moral turpitude (or to satisfy other requirements of the 1917 Act) to trigger deportation. See *United States ex rel. Grimaldi v. Ebey*, 12 F. 2d 922, 923 (CA7 1926); *Todaro v. Munster*, 62 F. 2d 963, 964 (CA10 1933).

⁵The Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics offense provision within 8 U. S. C. §1251(a) (1994 ed.) under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(11), respectively. See 66 Stat. 201, 204,

Opinion of the Court

1990 Congress entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009–596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period prior to 1996, *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U. S. 289, 296 (2001). Under contemporary law, if a non-citizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses.⁶ See 8 U. S. C. §1229b. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. See §1101(a)(43)(B); §1228.

These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part⁷—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.

206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U. S. C. §1251(b) (1994 ed.), applied only to the "provisions of subsection (a)(4)," the crimes-of-moral-turpitude provision. 66 Stat. 208; see *United States v. O'Rourke*, 213 F. 2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs).

⁶The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory text now uses the term "removal" rather than "deportation." See *Calcano-Martinez v. INS*, 533 U. S. 348, 350, n. 1 (2001).

⁷See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as *Amici Curiae* 12–27 (providing real-world examples).

Opinion of the Court

II

Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel.” *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970); *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 686. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about the risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, *i.e.*, those matters not within the sentencing authority of the state trial court.⁸ 253 S. W. 3d, at 483–484 (citing *Commonwealth v. Fuardado*, 170 S. W. 3d 384 (2005)). In its view, “collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment,” and, therefore, the “failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” 253 S. W. 3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from alone in this view.⁹

⁸There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences. See Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124, n. 15 (2009). The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this case because, as even JUSTICE ALITO agrees, counsel must, at the very least, advise a noncitizen “defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences,” *post*, at 1 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also *post*, at 14 (“I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation”). In his concurring opinion, JUSTICE ALITO has thus departed from the strict rule applied by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and in the two federal cases that he cites, *post*, at 2.

⁹See, *e.g.*, *United States v. Gonzalez*, 202 F. 3d 20 (CA1 2000); *United States v. Del Rosario*, 902 F. 2d 55 (CAD9 1990); *United States v. Yearwood*, 863 F. 2d 6 (CA4 1988); *Santos-Sanchez v. United States*, 548 F. 3d 327 (CA5 2008); *Broomes v. Ashcroft*, 358 F. 3d 1251 (CA10 2004); *United States v. Campbell*, 778 F. 2d 764 (CA11 1985); *Oyekoya v. State*, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); *State v. Rosas*, 183

Opinion of the Court

We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required under *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 689. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.

We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,” *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U. S. 698, 740 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984), deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century, see Part I, *supra*, at 2–7. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. *United States v. Russell*, 686 F. 2d 35, 38 (CAD 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See *St. Cyr*, 533 U. S., at 322 (“There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions”).

Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction

Ariz. 421, 904 P. 2d 1245 (App. 1995); *State v. Montalban*, 2000–2739 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; *Commonwealth v. Frometa*, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A. 2d 92 (1989).

Opinion of the Court

is thus ill-suited to evaluating a *Strickland* claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. *Strickland* applies to Padilla's claim.

III

Under *Strickland*, we first determine whether counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U. S., at 688. Then we ask whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id.*, at 694. The first prong—constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community: "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." *Id.*, at 688. We long have recognized that "[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . ." *Ibid.*; *Bobby v. Van Hook*, 558 U. S. ____, __ (2009) (*per curiam*) (slip op., at 3); *Florida v. Nixon*, 543 U. S. 175, 191, and n. 6 (2004); *Wiggins v. Smith*, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003); *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U. S. 362, 396 (2000). Although they are "only guides," *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 688, and not "inexorable commands," *Bobby*, 558 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 5), these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and immigration law.

The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation §6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining §3.03,

Opinion of the Court

pp. 20–21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, *Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas*, 87 *Cornell L. Rev.* 697, 713–718 (2002); A. Campbell, *Law of Sentencing* §13:23, pp. 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 *Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance*, pp. D10, H8–H9, J8 (2000) (providing survey of guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, *Prosecution Function and Defense Function* 4–5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, *Pleas of Guilty* 14–3.2(f), p. 116 (3d ed. 1999). “[A]uthorities of every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications—universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients” Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as *Amici Curiae* 12–14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, *inter alia*, National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., *Guidelines, supra*, §§6.2–6.4 (1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, *Practice Points: Representing a Noncitizen in a Criminal Case*, 31 *The Champion* 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, *Criminal Defense of Immigrants* §1.3 (3d ed. 2003); 2 *Criminal Practice Manual* §§45:3, 45:15 (2009)).

We too have previously recognized that “[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.” *St. Cyr*, 533 U. S., at 323 (quoting 3 *Criminal Defense Techniques* §§60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). Likewise, we have recognized that “preserving the possibility of” discretionary relief from deportation under §212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed by Congress in 1996, “would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.” *St. Cyr*, 533 U. S., at 323. We

Opinion of the Court

expected that counsel who were unaware of the discretionary relief measures would “follo[w] the advice of numerous practice guides” to advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief. *Ibid.*, n. 50.

In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction. See 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable”). Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla’s counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.

Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the scenarios

Opinion of the Court

posited by JUSTICE ALITO), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.¹⁰ But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of *Strickland*. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he can satisfy *Strickland*'s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.

IV

The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude that *Strickland* applies to Padilla's claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice. In the United States' view, "counsel is not constitutionally required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . .," though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to discuss these matters. Brief for United States as *Amicus Curiae* 10.

Respondent and Padilla both find the Solicitor General's proposed rule unpersuasive, although it has support among the lower courts. See, e.g., *United States v. Couto*, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); *United States v. Kwan*, 407 F. 3d 1005 (CA9 2005); *Sparks v. Sowders*, 852 F. 2d 882 (CA6 1988); *United States v. Russell*, 686 F. 2d 35 (CA6 1982); *State v. Rojas-Martinez*, 2005 UT 86, 125 P. 3d 930, 935; *In re Resendiz*, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 19 P. 3d 1171 (2001). Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as "result-driven, incestuous . . .

¹⁰ As JUSTICE ALITO explains at length, deportation consequences are often unclear. Lack of clarity in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of counsel's advice.

Opinion of the Court

[,and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases.” Brief for Respondent 31. We do not share that view, but we agree that there is no relevant difference “between an act of commission and an act of omission” in this context. *Id.*, at 30; *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 690 (“The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”); see also *State v. Paredes*, 2004–NMSC–036, 136 N. M. 533, 538–539.

A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even when answers are readily available. Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of “the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.” *Libretti v. United States*, 516 U. S. 29, 50–51 (1995). When attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.¹¹ Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available. It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so “clearly satisfies the first prong of the *Strickland* analysis.” *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U. S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J.,

¹¹As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant’s lawyer to know that a particular offense would result in the client’s deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client’s home country, any decent attorney would inform the client of the consequences of his plea. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38. We think the same result should follow when the stakes are not life and death but merely “banishment or exile,” *Delgado v. Carmichael*, 332 U. S. 388, 390–391 (1947).

Opinion of the Court

concurring in judgment).

We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, and *amici* have stressed regarding the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern in *Hill*, see *id.*, at 58, but nevertheless applied *Strickland* to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.¹²

A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake. Surmounting *Strickland*’s high bar is never an easy task. See, e.g., 466 U. S., at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”); *id.*, at 693 (observing that “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial”). Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. See *Roe v. Flores-Ortega*, 528 U. S. 470, 480, 486 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now quite experienced with applying *Strickland*—can effectively and efficiently use its framework to

¹²However, we concluded that, even though *Strickland* applied to petitioner’s claim, he had not sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy *Strickland*’s second prong. *Hill*, 474 U. S., at 59–60. This disposition further underscores the fact that it is often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy *Strickland*’s prejudice prong.

JUSTICE ALITO believes that the Court misreads *Hill*, *post*, at 10–11. In *Hill*, the Court recognized—for the first time—that *Strickland* applies to advice respecting a guilty plea. 474 U. S., at 58 (“We hold, therefore, that the two-part *Strickland v. Washington* test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”). It is true that *Hill* does not control the question before us. But its import is nevertheless clear. Whether *Strickland* applies to Padilla’s claim follows from *Hill*, regardless of the fact that the *Hill* Court did not resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that was before it.

Opinion of the Court

separate specious claims from those with substantial merit.

It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client's plea. See, *supra*, at 11–13. We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty. *Strickland*, 466 U. S., at 689.

Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first applied *Strickland* to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage, practice has shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions obtained after a trial. Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.¹³ But they account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.¹⁴ The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial—imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a

¹³See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17) (only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of federal criminal prosecutions go to trial); *id.*, at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5% of all state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial).

¹⁴See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts 36–38 (1994) (demonstrating that 5% of defendants whose conviction was the result of a trial account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions filed).

Opinion of the Court

guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a *less favorable* outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.

Finally, informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining process. By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does.

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. *Hill*, 474 U. S., at 57; see also *Richardson*, 397 U. S., at 770–771. The severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” *Delgado v. Carmichael*, 332 U. S. 388, 390–391 (1947)—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.¹⁵

¹⁵To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used in Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration conse-

Opinion of the Court

V

It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.” *Richardson*, 397 U. S., at 771. To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.

Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty concluding that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed on below. See *Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC*, 535 U. S. 467, 530 (2002).

quences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to Enter Guilty Plea, Form AOC-491 (Rev. 2/2003), <http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf> (as visited Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Further, many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009–2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-1j (2009); D. C. Code §16-713 (2001); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. §17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4-242 (Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, §29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); Mont. Code Ann. §46-12-210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. §220.50(7) (West Supp. 2009); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A-1022 (Lexis 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2943.031 (West 2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. §135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws §12-12-22 (Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code Ann. Crim. Proc., Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev. Code §10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. §971.08 (2005–2006).

Opinion of the Court

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

309 P.3d 1277
Court of Appeals of Alaska.

STATE of Alaska, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Michael SILVERA, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
State of Alaska, Petitioner,
v.
Jose Manuel Perez, Respondent.

Nos. A-11174, A-11193, A-
11195. | Sept. 27, 2013.

Synopsis

Background: After defendant's conviction of second-degree assault was affirmed, 244 P.3d 1138, case was referred to three-judge sentencing panel. The Statewide Three Judge Panel, Eric Smith, John Suddock, and Fred Torrisi, JJ., concluded that harsh collateral consequences of deportation was appropriate non-statutory mitigating factor and imposed sentence below presumptive range. State appealed. Following second defendant's conviction of fourth-degree assault and interference with official proceedings, case was referred to three-judge sentencing panel. The Statewide Three Judge Panel, Eric Smith, John Suddock, and Anna Moran, JJ., assumed, without deciding, that deportation would be harsh collateral consequence, and imposed composite sentence on defendant to avoid deportation. State appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated cases.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Allard, J., held that:

[1] panels' sentencing hearings were not de facto immigration hearings;

[2] panels' decision did not provide defendants with expressly-proscribed exemption from deportation;

[3] federal law did not prohibit panels from considering consequences of deportation;

[4] panels had statutory authority to impose sentence below presumptive range; and

[5] panels' considering deportation did not violate equal protection clause.

Affirmed in part and remanded in part with instructions.

West Headnotes (12)

[1] **States**

↔ Conflicting or conforming laws or regulations

States

↔ Occupation of field

Courts generally apply two-step analysis to preemption questions: (1) courts look to see whether Congress has overtly preempted subject matter state wishes to regulate, either explicitly, by declaring its intent to preempt all state authority, or implicitly, by occupying the entire field of regulation on subject in question, and (2) if neither kind of direct preemption is found, courts look to whether federal and state law conflict in this particular instance. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.

[2] **States**

↔ State police power

In preemption analysis, courts must assume that historic police powers of states are not superseded unless that was clear and manifest purpose of Congress. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.

[3] **Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship**

↔ Sentencing Rquirements

Federal law did not prohibit three-judge sentencing panel from considering the harsh collateral consequences of deportation as non-statutory mitigating factor and, if manifest injustice would otherwise result, from imposing a sentence below the presumptive range based on that consideration; Congress expressly reserved a role for state courts in determining when defendant has committed aggravated felony for purposes of federal immigration law, panel did not conduct de facto immigration hearing in

considering deportation as mitigating factor, and panel's decision did not provide defendants with exemption from deportation that Congress expressly proscribed. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2; Immigration and Nationality Act, § 239(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b); AS 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[4] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↳ Sentencing Proceedings in General

States

↳ Offenses and punishments

Sentencing hearings conducted by three-judge panels that considered consequences of deportation as non-statutory mitigating factor to sentence imposed on defendants were not de facto immigration hearings such that panels' decisions would be preempted by federal immigration law, even though federal immigration officials would weigh some of the same considerations panels considered at sentencing; potential overlap between state sentencing considerations and federal immigration considerations did not establish Congress's clear and manifest purpose to prohibit state courts from considering the totality of legally relevant circumstances at sentencing, including risk and consequences of deportation. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2; Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.; AS 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[5] **Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship**

↳ Aggravated felonies in general

Sentencing and Punishment

↳ Sentencing Proceedings in General

States

↳ Offenses and punishments

Decision of three-judge sentencing panels, in concluding it would be manifestly unjust to impose sentences on defendants within presumptive range, to consider non-statutory mitigating factor of harsh collateral consequence of deportation to impose sentences below presumptive range did not provide defendants

with exemption from deportation that Congress expressly proscribed, such that panels' decision would be preempted by federal immigration law, and thus defendants were not barred from any available remedies under Immigration and Nationality Act; defendants had not been convicted of aggravated felonies. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2; Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101 et seq., 239(b), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 et seq., 1229(b); AS 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[6] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↳ Effect of Statute or Regulatory Provision

Sentencing and Punishment

↳ Mitigating circumstances in general

Goal in enacting presumptive sentencing was to reduce disparity in criminal sentencing, and it gave sentencing courts no authority to impose sentence below presumptive range unless defendant established at least one of statutory mitigating factors. AS 12.55.005, 12.55.155(d).

[7] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↳ Effect of Statute or Regulatory Provision

Sentencing and Punishment

↳ Factors or Purposes in General

Sentencing and Punishment

↳ Mitigating circumstances in general

If three-judge sentencing panel concludes that non-statutory mitigating factor is proved, and that it would be manifestly unjust to fail to adjust presumptive sentencing range based on that factor, panel must assess proper sentence, taking mitigating factor into consideration and applying sentencing criteria to determine whether sentence would further sentencing goals of rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, affirmation of societal norms, and public safety. Const. Art. 1, § 12; AS 12.55.155(d), 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[8] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↳ Other offender-related considerations

Sentencing and Punishment

↪ Sentencing Proceedings in General

Three-judge sentencing panel had statutory authority to impose sentence below presumptive range based on non-statutory mitigating factor of harsh collateral consequences of deportation, since, if panel was precluded from considering harsh collateral consequences, there would be substantial risk that unduly harsh, manifestly unjust sentences would be imposed on non-citizens, which would defeat goal of uniformity of sentencing. Const. Art. 1, § 12; AS 12.55.005, 12.55.155(d), 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[9] **Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship**

↪ Aggravated felonies in general

Federal immigration officials did not have broad discretion to decide whether to deport aggravated felons; even though deportation would be speculative in some cases, it would be practically certain in others. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.

[10] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↪ Other offender-related considerations

Consideration of potential deportation consequences in sentencing as non-statutory mitigating factor would lead to sentence that better advanced sentencing goals of rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, affirmation of societal norms, and public safety. Const. Art. 1, § 12; AS 12.55.005, 12.55.155(d), 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[11] **Sentencing and Punishment**

↪ Other offender-related considerations

Allowing courts to adjust sentence to avoid risk of deportation based on non-statutory mitigating factor of harsh collateral consequences of deportation did not contravene goal of uniformity of sentencing; declining to impose sentence below presumptive sentencing range based on non-statutory mitigating factor had potential to defeat uniformity because non-citizen facing deportation may be subject to much harsher overall consequences than citizen

convicted of same offense. AS 12.55.005, 12.55.155(d), 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

[12] **Constitutional Law**

↪ Sentencing and Punishment

Sentencing and Punishment

↪ Other offender-related considerations

Three-judge sentencing panels' consideration of deportation risk as harsh collateral consequence when concluding it would be manifestly unjust to impose sentence within presumptive range on defendants did not violate federal or state equal protection clauses; defendants did not receive favorable treatment based on their status of non-citizens, but rather it was harsh collateral consequences they faced if deported that led panels to reach conclusion, defendants were not similarly situated to other defendants that did not face harsh consequence of deportation as a result of conviction, and departing from presumptive range based on collateral consequences would not necessarily result in sentence that was more lenient than that imposed on citizen. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 7; Const. Art. 1, § 12; AS 12.55.005, 12.55.155(d), 12.55.165(a), 12.55.175(b).

Attorneys and Law Firms

*1280 Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellants Silvera and Perez.

Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: MANNHEIMER, Chief Judge, ALLARD, Judge, and COATS, Senior Judge.¹

Opinion

OPINION

ALLARD, Judge.

This consolidated case raises the question of whether the statewide three-judge sentencing panel has the authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range to lessen, or eliminate, the risk that a defendant will be deported.

The State argues that federal law prohibits state courts from modifying a sentence for the purpose of influencing the federal immigration consequences of a conviction. It also argues that the Alaska Statutes do not authorize the three-judge panel to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the collateral consequences of deportation. Lastly, it argues that adjusting a sentence to lessen the risk of deportation violates the equal protection clause, because the non-citizen offender may receive a more lenient sentence than a citizen would based on the same conduct.

For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the three-judge panel has authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation and that this authority is not preempted by federal law.

With respect to Michael Silvera, the three-judge panel has already concluded that Silvera's potential deportation was a "harsh collateral consequence" that qualified as a non-statutory mitigating factor and has already imposed a sentence below the presumptive range. We therefore affirm Silvera's sentence.

With respect to Jose Manuel Perez, the three-judge panel did not directly decide whether deportation would qualify as a harsh collateral consequence. Instead, the panel assumed that Perez had established this non-statutory mitigating factor and concluded that consideration of this factor would justify imposing a sentence below the presumptive range for one of Perez's convictions. We therefore remand Perez's case to the three-judge panel for further proceedings.

Facts and proceedings

Michael Silvera

Michael Silvera has been a lawful resident of the United States since 1978. He served in the Armed Forces for more than six years and received an honorable discharge. In 2007, he was convicted of second-degree assault for assaulting a man with a knife during a drunken incident in a taxicab in Nome.² As a first felony offender, Silvera faced a presumptive range of 1 to 3 years for that offense.³ Because

his conviction was for a crime of violence, he also faced deportation as an "aggravated felon" if he was sentenced to 1 year or more.⁴

*1281 Silvera asked his sentencing judge to refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel for consideration of the non-statutory mitigating factor of "harsh collateral consequences."⁵ Silvera asserted that he had a serious medical condition for which he received regular treatment from the Veterans Administration and that he would lose those benefits if he were deported.⁶ The sentencing judge ultimately ruled that it would be manifestly unjust not to consider the non-statutory mitigating factor of "harsh collateral consequences," and he referred Silvera's case to the three-judge panel.

The three-judge panel concluded that "harsh collateral consequences" is an appropriate non-statutory mitigating factor. It then found that Silvera had established that factor by showing: (1) that he was at substantial risk of deportation to Jamaica if he received a sentence of 1 year or more; (2) that he would lose his medical benefits if he were deported; and (3) that he would not be able to afford the medical care he needed, even assuming it was available in Jamaica, because his illness had prevented him from working. The panel also found that Silvera was not at high risk of reoffending. Based on these findings, the panel concluded that a sentence within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust. It therefore imposed a sentence that would not subject Silvera to deportation as an aggravated felon: a sentence of 364 days to serve.

Jose Perez

In 2011, Jose Perez was convicted of fourth-degree assault⁷ and interference with official proceedings⁸ for assaulting a police informant who was a witness against him in a drug case while he and the informant were incarcerated. Perez entered a plea to the underlying drug charge (fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for possessing heroin).⁹

At the time of sentencing, Perez had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for twenty-six years, since he was ten years old. As a first felony offender, he faced a presumptive term of 1 to 3 years for the interference with official proceedings conviction¹⁰ and 0 to 2 years for the controlled substance conviction.¹¹ He also faced a sentence of up to 1 year for fourth-degree assault and imposition of up

to 437 days of suspended time for revocation of his probation in another misdemeanor case.

Like Silvera, Perez asked the sentencing court to refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel for consideration of the proposed non-statutory mitigator of "harsh collateral consequences." The consequence Perez faced was deportation as an aggravated felon if he received a sentence of 1 year or more for his interference with official proceedings conviction.¹² (Perez also faced deportation based on his drug offense, but because that offense was not an aggravated felony under federal law, he could apply for discretionary relief from deportation based on that conviction.¹³) Perez claimed this consequence was unduly harsh given that he had left the Dominican Republic at a young age and had no real ties there.

*1282 The sentencing judge concluded that if he was not otherwise bound by the presumptive range of 1–3 years for Perez's interference with official proceedings conviction, he might consider structuring Perez's composite sentence to lessen the risk that Perez would be deported. The judge therefore referred the case to the three-judge panel for consideration of the non-statutory mitigating factor of "harsh collateral consequences." The judge recommended that the panel impose a sentence of 364 days for the interference with official proceedings conviction and a total composite sentence of 3 years and 71 days.

The three-judge panel found, as a factual matter, that Perez would be deported if he received a sentence of 1 year or more for his interference with official proceedings conviction. The panel assumed, without deciding, that deportation would be a harsh collateral consequence in Perez's case.¹⁴ It then adopted the sentencing judge's recommended sentence, concluding that it would be manifestly unjust to subject Perez to inevitable deportation when it was possible to construct a composite sentence that fully satisfied the *Chaney*¹⁵ criteria but still allowed Perez to apply for relief from deportation.¹⁶

Alaska courts are not prohibited by federal law from imposing a sentence aimed at influencing the defendant's risk of deportation

The State argues that federal law preempts state sentencing law and that, because the federal government has exclusive authority over deportation decisions, the three-judge sentencing panel is prohibited from modifying a

sentence for the purpose of influencing the defendant's risk of deportation.

[1] The law of federal preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which declares that federal law shall be "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The Alaska Supreme Court generally applies a two-step analysis to preemption questions:

First, we look to see whether Congress has overtly preempted the subject matter the state wishes to regulate, either explicitly, by declaring its intent to preempt all state authority, or implicitly, by occupying the entire field of regulation on the subject in question. Second, if neither kind of direct preemption is found, we look to whether federal and state law conflict in this particular instance.¹⁷

[2] In this analysis, courts must assume that the historic police powers of the states are not superseded "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."¹⁸

[3] The State does not assert that Congress has enacted a statute expressly forbidding state courts from considering deportation consequences at sentencing. Instead, it argues that Congress's regulation of immigration is so pervasive that it establishes Congress's intent to displace any state action aimed at influencing who will be deported.

The flaw in the State's argument is that Congress expressly reserved a role for state courts in determining when a crime is an "aggravated felony" under federal law. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,¹⁹ *1283 some crimes—including murder, rape, and drug trafficking—are aggravated felonies no matter what sentence is imposed.²⁰ Other crimes are aggravated felonies based on the maximum sentence that may be imposed.²¹ But the offenses at issue in this case—crimes of violence and obstruction of justice—only become aggravated felonies if a court actually *imposes* a sentence of 1 year or more.²² We therefore infer that for these offenses, Congress expected that state courts would have a role in determining who qualified as an aggravated felon.²³

The State argues that Congress did not intend these state sentencing decisions to be motivated by a desire to influence the defendant's risk of deportation. To support this argument, the State observes that Congress in 1990 eliminated judicial authority to make binding recommendations against deportation in criminal cases.

Beginning in 1917, when Congress first authorized deportation based on certain criminal convictions, sentencing judges had the authority to make a "judicial recommendation against deportation," known as a JRAD, for non-citizens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, and this recommendation had the effect of binding the executive branch to disregard the conviction as a basis for deportation.²⁴ Congress first circumscribed that procedure in 1952, and then completely eliminated it in 1990.²⁵

But as the defendants point out, Congress did away with this judicial authority as part of a broader effort to streamline the deportation of non-citizens convicted of criminal offenses. The same 1990 legislation that eliminated the JRAD procedure also limited the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation to defendants convicted of aggravated felonies.²⁶ And in 1996, Congress eliminated the Attorney General's statutory authority to grant this relief to aggravated felons,²⁷ leaving the Attorney General with only "limited remnants of equitable discretion."²⁸

Even accepting that Congress intended to preempt state courts from issuing binding decisions on deportation in criminal cases, that does not mean Congress intended to prohibit state courts from considering the risk of deportation in deciding whether to impose a term of imprisonment that would lead to the defendant's classification as an aggravated felon. As already explained, Congress expressly reserved a role for state courts in determining when a defendant has committed an aggravated felony for purposes of federal immigration law; it reserved no such role for state courts in deciding whether a criminal defendant should be deported. For this reason, courts have consistently ruled that the federal government's exclusive power over the administration and enforcement of immigration laws deprives criminal courts of the authority to order a defendant to leave the United States or to require a defendant to leave or remain outside the United States as a condition of probation.²⁹ *1284 By contrast, state courts have asserted their authority to adjust a defendant's sentence

to lessen the risk that the defendant will be deported.³⁰ Moreover, the state courts that have directly considered the issue have rejected the claim that federal law prohibits state courts from modifying a defendant's sentence to avoid an aggravated felony conviction.³¹

We acknowledge that two federal circuits have held that Congress intended to prohibit federal courts from granting a downward adjustment in the federal sentencing guidelines to lessen the likelihood of deportation.³² But we do not find those decisions persuasive here. We note that Congress has given exclusive authority to the United States Sentencing Commission to decide what factors can never be the basis for a downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines,³³ and that the Sentencing Commission has not acted to make deportation a forbidden, or even a discouraged, sentencing factor.³⁴

[4] The State claims that the sentencing hearings conducted by the three-judge panel in Silvera's and Perez's cases were *de facto* immigration hearings. This claim is not supported by the record. In both cases, the three-judge panel addressed state sentencing considerations, and they did not purport, as the State argues, to substitute their judgment for that of federal immigration officials based on "myriad humanitarian, political, and national security factors." It may be that federal immigration officials weigh some of the same factors in deportation proceedings that state courts traditionally consider at sentencing, but this potential overlap does not establish Congress's clear and manifest purpose to prohibit state courts from considering the totality of legally relevant circumstances at sentencing—including the risk and consequences of deportation.

[5] The State also argues that the decisions of the three-judge panel provided Silvera and Perez with an exemption from deportation that Congress expressly proscribed. Specifically, the State points to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), which bars the Attorney General from cancelling the deportation of a non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony.³⁵ But Silvera and Perez have not been convicted of aggravated felonies; therefore, this provision does not bar them from any remedies available to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

For these reasons, we reject the State's claim that federal law prohibits the three-judge sentencing panel from considering the harsh collateral consequences of deportation and, if manifest injustice would otherwise result, from imposing

a sentence below the presumptive range based on that consideration.

The three-judge panel did not act outside its authority by considering the non-statutory mitigating factor of "harsh collateral consequences"

[6] [7] The Alaska Legislature's goal in enacting presumptive sentencing was to reduce *1285 disparity in criminal sentencing, and it gave sentencing courts no authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range unless the defendant established at least one of the mitigating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(d).³⁶ To avoid manifest injustice in cases in which these mitigating factors did not apply, the legislature created the "safety valve" of the three-judge sentencing panel.³⁷ If a sentencing judge finds that manifest injustice will result from the failure to consider a mitigating factor *not* listed in AS 12.55.155(d), that judge by statute must refer the case to the three-judge panel.³⁸ The three-judge panel then independently reviews whether the defendant has established the non-statutory mitigating factor by clear and convincing evidence.³⁹ If the panel concludes that the mitigating factor is proved, and that it would be manifestly unjust to fail to adjust the presumptive range based on that factor, it must "assess the proper sentence, applying the *Chaney* sentencing criteria and taking the mitigating factor into consideration."⁴⁰

[8] The State argues that this statutory scheme does not permit the three-judge panel to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation. It argues that mitigating a sentence to lessen the risk that a defendant will be deported defeats the legislative goal of promoting uniformity in sentencing⁴¹ and does not support the sentencing goals elucidated in *State v. Chaney*,⁴² AS 12.55.005,⁴³ or article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution.⁴⁴ The State also asserts that, as a matter of law, a federal deportation decision can never be "manifestly unjust."

The Alaska Supreme Court and this Court have previously recognized that the harsh collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, including deportation, are appropriate sentencing considerations.⁴⁵ The State argues that this precedent is limited to circumstances in which the defendant's deportation is "nearly certain,"⁴⁶ and that it does not apply when deportation is a "mere possibility." We have no reason

to decide in this case whether the "mere possibility" of deportation is a proper sentencing consideration. The three-judge panel found that Silvera was at "substantial risk" of deportation and that deportation was a certainty in Peretz's case. The State has not challenged these findings, and we therefore treat these findings as true.

[9] The State argues that a judicial finding that a defendant faces deportation will *always* be impermissibly speculative, because immigration officials have broad discretion in deciding whether to initiate deportation proceedings. To support this argument, the State relies on *State v. Mendoza*,⁴⁷ a Minnesota Court of Appeals case holding that the prospect of deportation is always too uncertain to be a proper consideration at sentencing.⁴⁸

As a preliminary matter, we do not agree that the State has established that immigration officials have broad discretion to decide whether to deport aggravated felons. A policy *1286 memorandum issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which is part of the record in this case, indicates that the agency treats aggravated felons as "priority 1" for deportation. And the United States Supreme Court has declared that, under current law, deportation is "practically inevitable" for non-citizens who commit deportable offenses.⁴⁹

We have no doubt that deportation will be speculative in some cases—but it will be practically certain in others. For this reason, even if we were not bound by the decisions of our supreme court holding that deportation is a proper consideration at sentencing, we would not be persuaded by the reasoning of the Minnesota Court of Appeals.⁵⁰ We note that courts regularly consider the prospect that a defendant will be deported in deciding whether to impose probation or certain conditions of probation.⁵¹

[10] The State next argues that considering the harsh collateral consequences of deportation is inconsistent with the *Chaney* goals of rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, affirmation of societal norms, and public safety, and also does not advance the interests of crime victims, because these goals are "not impaired by enforcing properly promulgated federal law." This argument frames the analysis too narrowly; the question is whether consideration of potential deportation consequences will, in appropriate cases, lead to a sentence that better advances the *Chaney* sentencing

goals. Alaska courts have already answered that question in the affirmative.⁵²

[11] The State contends that allowing courts to adjust a sentence to avoid the risk of deportation contravenes the legislative goal of uniformity in sentencing. This argument finds some support in our observation in our earlier decision in *Silvera* that a non-citizen who is sentenced to a term below the presumptive range because of the prospect of deportation may, in some instances, receive a more lenient sentence than an identical citizen who is not subject to deportation.⁵³ But the alternative—declining to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on this non-statutory mitigating factor—also has the potential to defeat uniformity in sentencing, because a non-citizen facing deportation may be subject to much harsher overall consequences than a citizen convicted of the same offense.

The State argues that, because of the procedural fairness and prosecutorial discretion built into the federal immigration system, it can never be manifestly unjust to refrain from mitigating a sentence to lessen the risk of deportation. But this argument ignores the statutory context in which an Alaska court's finding of manifest injustice is made. The question before Alaska courts is not whether it would be manifestly unjust for the federal government to deport a defendant; the mandate of Alaska sentencing courts is to determine whether a sentence within the *1287 presumptive range would be manifestly unjust in light of the *Chaney* criteria and the totality of legally relevant circumstances, including the non-statutory mitigating factor of "harsh collateral consequences."⁵⁴ Federal immigration officials are not motivated or constrained by these same considerations in deciding whether to deport a non-citizen. Therefore, even if the federal government's decision to deport a defendant is just in light of its statutory mandate and priorities, a sentence that does not take account of the risk of deportation might still be manifestly unjust under Alaska law.

We conclude that the three-judge panel has the statutory authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation. If the three-judge panel were precluded from considering this factor as a matter of law, there is a substantial risk that unduly harsh sentences would be imposed on non-citizens in particular cases, defeating the legislature's goal of uniformity in sentencing.⁵⁵

Considering deportation consequences does not violate the equal protection clause

[12] The State next argues that adjusting a sentence purely to avoid the immigration consequences of a conviction violates the federal and state equal protection clauses, because a non-citizen defendant in these circumstances might receive a more lenient sentence than would be imposed on a citizen defendant. This claim was not raised below, and the three-judge panel did not rule on it, so we review it for plain error.⁵⁶

The State's argument rests on the premise that Silvera and Perez received favorable treatment based on their status as non-citizens.⁵⁷ But as already explained, it was the harsh collateral consequences they faced if they were deported, not their status as non-citizens, that led the three-judge panel to conclude that sentencing the defendants within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust in these cases.

Moreover, to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that the persons being compared are similarly situated.⁵⁸ Defendants who face harsh collateral consequences as a result of deportation are not similarly situated to defendants who do not face these harsh consequences. In imposing a sentence that satisfies the *Chaney* criteria, a sentencing court must take the totality of legally relevant circumstances into account, including the risk of deportation. As noted earlier, the failure to account for these types of differences could result in a sentence that is unduly harsh and therefore not proportionate to sentences imposed on other defendants.

Permitting sentencing courts to consider immigration consequences will not invariably result in more lenient sentences for non-citizens. In some cases, sentencing courts may determine that the defendant's risk of deportation does not establish a non-statutory mitigating factor and that referral to the three-judge panel is not warranted. In other cases, the three-judge panel may reject the sentencing court's finding of a non-statutory mitigating factor, or it may conclude that, even though the factor was established, it would not be manifestly unjust to sentence the defendant within the presumptive range.

Even in cases where the three-judge panel departs from the presumptive sentencing range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation, the result will not necessarily be a sentence that is more lenient than the sentence that would be

imposed on a citizen. In Perez's case, for example, the three-judge panel ultimately proposed a composite sentence that was no different than *1288 what Perez would have received if he did not face deportation.

We acknowledge that there may be some cases, such as Silvera's, where the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel is more lenient than the sentencing judge would have imposed if the defendant did not face deportation. But even then, the critical question for purposes of equal protection analysis is whether the sentence complies with the *Chaney* criteria. Notably, the State has not challenged Silvera's sentence as clearly mistaken.⁵⁹

We conclude that the State's generalized equal protection concerns are without merit and that its concerns about overly

lenient sentences in particular cases are most appropriately addressed in those individual cases through the existing legal framework of the *Chaney* criteria and Alaska sentencing law.

Conclusion

Silvera's sentence is AFFIRMED. Perez's case is REMANDED to the three-judge panel for a determination of (1) whether deportation is a harsh collateral consequence qualifying as a non-statutory mitigating factor in his case and, if so, (2) whether a sentence within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust given that harsh collateral consequence and the *Chaney* criteria. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Footnotes

- 1 Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
- 2 *Silvera v. State*, 244 P.3d 1138, 1141 42 (Alaska App.2010).
- 3 AS 11.41.210(a), (b) (providing that second-degree assault is a class B felony); AS 12.55.125(d)(1) (setting the presumptive range for a first felony offender convicted of a class B felony at 1–3 years).
- 4 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining "aggravated felony" to include a crime of violence if a sentence of 1 year or more is imposed); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is deportable).
- 5 *Silvera*, 244 P.3d at 1149.
- 6 *Id.* at 1150.
- 7 AS 11.41.230(a).
- 8 AS 11.56.510(a)(1)(A).
- 9 AS 11.71.040(a)(3)(A).
- 10 AS 11.56.510(b) (providing that interference with official proceedings is a class B felony); AS 12.55.125(d)(1) (setting the presumptive range for a first felony offender convicted of a class B felony at 1–3 years).
- 11 AS 11.71.040(d) (providing that fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct is a class C felony); AS 12.55.125(e)(1) (setting the presumptive range for a first felony offender convicted of a class C felony at 0–2 years).
- 12 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (defining "aggravated felony" to include an offense relating to obstruction of justice for which the term of imprisonment is at least 1 year); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is deportable).
- 13 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that non-citizens convicted of drug offenses are deportable); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (providing that certain long-time residents may apply for cancellation of removal, unless they have been convicted of an aggravated felony).
- 14 The panel concluded that it was not required to reach this issue, based on its reading of an order issued by this Court.
- 15 *State v. Chaney*, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
- 16 The three-judge panel did not impose this sentence. In response to a petition for review filed by the State, this Court had ordered the three-judge panel to decide on an appropriate sentence but to not impose the sentence to avoid any potential double jeopardy issues if the State prevailed on the claims raised in its petition for review. Court of Appeals Order, File No. A-11195 (March 9, 2012).
- 17 *Tlingit-Haida Reg'l Elec. Auth. v. State*, 15 P.3d 754, 766 (Alaska 2001) (footnote omitted).
- 18 *Arizona v. United States*, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2501, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (quoting *Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)).
- 19 See Pub.L. No. 104-208 (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (Immigration and Nationality Act).
- 20 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(C), (E), (H), (I), (K), (L), (N), (O).

- 21 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J), (Q), (T). With respect to the offense of failure to appear, characterization as an aggravated felony hinges on the length of the sentence that may be imposed for the underlying offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Q), (T).
- 22 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (S); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
- 23 Courts are constrained, of course, by the penalty ranges established by the legislature. But in any event, with respect to these crimes, it is state action—action by the state legislature or the state court—that determines whether a defendant is convicted of an aggravated felony under federal law.
- 24 *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 361–62, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1479 & n. 3, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (citing former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
- 25 *Id.*, 559 U.S. at 363, 130 S.Ct. at 1480.
- 26 *State v. Gaitan*, 209 N.J. 339, 37 A.3d 1089, 1101 (2012).
- 27 *Padilla*, 559 U.S. at 363, 130 S.Ct. at 1480; *Gaitan*, 209 N.J. 339, 37 A.3d at 1101.
- 28 *Padilla*, 559 U.S. at 364, 130 S.Ct. at 1480.
- 29 *See, e.g.,* *People v. Antonio–Antimo*, 29 P.3d 298, 302–03 (Colo.2000); *Torros v. State*, 415 So.2d 908, 908 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (per curiam); *Sanchez v. State*, 234 Ga.App. 809, 508 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1998); *Rojas v. State*, 52 Md.App. 440, 450 A.2d 490, 492 (1982); *State v. Pando*, 122 N.M. 167, 921 P.2d 1285, 1286–88 (N.M.App.1996); *Gutierrez v. State*, 380 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); *see generally* David E. Rigney, Annotation, *Propriety, in criminal case, of federal district court order restricting defendant's right to reenter or stay in United States*, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 619 (1989 & Supp.).
- 30 *See State v. Lewis*, 797 A.2d 1198, 1199, 1202–03 (Del.2002); *State v. Tinoco–Perez*, 145 Idaho 400, 179 P.3d 363 (App.2008); *State v. Quintero Morelos*, 133 Wash.App. 591, 137 P.3d 114, 116–18 (2006); *State v. Sway*, 828 A.2d 790, 794–95 (Me.2003); *Commonwealth v. Gevorgyan*, No.2003–CA–002743–MR, 2005 WL 1125194, at *1–2 (Ky.App. May 13, 2005); *Commonwealth v. Gomes*, unpublished, No. CA 971653, 1999 WL 1705908 at *1–2 (Mass.Super. Oct. 14, 1999). *But see State v. Mendoza*, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483–84 (Minn.App.2002) (ruling that deportation is never a proper sentencing consideration because it is too uncertain).
- 31 *Lewis*, 797 A.2d at 1202; *Quintero Morelos*, 137 P.3d at 119.
- 32 *United States v. Maung*, 320 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir.2003); *United States v. Aleskerova*, 300 F.3d 286, 301 (2nd Cir.2002).
- 33 *Koon v. United States*, 518 U.S. 81, 106–07, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2050–51, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).
- 34 *See United States v. Martinez–Carillo*, 250 F.3d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.2001).
- 35 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
- 36 *See Nell v. State*, 642 P.2d 1361, 1369–70 (Alaska App.1982); AS 12.55.005.
- 37 *See State v. Wagner*, 835 P.2d 454, 455–56 (Alaska App.1992); *Griffith v. State*, 653 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska App.1982); AS 12.55.165–175.
- 38 AS 12.55.165(a).
- 39 *Garner v. State*, 266 P.3d 1045, 1047–48 (Alaska App.2011) (citing AS 12.55.175(b)).
- 40 *Garner*, 266 P.3d at 1048.
- 41 Ch. 2, § 1, SLA 2005.
- 42 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
- 43 AS 12.55.005 codifies the *Chaney* criteria.
- 44 Alaska Const. art. 1, § 12 requires that criminal administration be based on “the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation.”
- 45 *Dale v. State*, 626 P.2d 1062, 1064 & n. 4 (Alaska 1980); *State v. Tucker*, 581 P.2d 223, 226 & n. 5 (Alaska 1978); *Chaney*, 477 P.2d at 446 n. 22; *Silvera*, 244 P.3d at 1150.
- 46 *Dale*, 626 P.2d at 1063.
- 47 638 N.W.2d 480.
- 48 *Id.* at 483–84.
- 49 *Padilla*, 559 U.S. at 364, 130 S.Ct. at 1480; *see also United States v. Couto*, 311 F.3d 179, 189–90 (2d Cir.2002), *abrogated on other grounds by Padilla*, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (noting that under the 1996 amendments “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically subject to removal and no one—not the judge, the INS, nor even the United States Attorney General—has any discretion to stop the deportation”).
- 50 Even the Minnesota Supreme Court has not signed on to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ “broad assertion that ‘possible deportation because of immigration status is not a proper consideration in criminal sentencing,’ ” leaving resolution of that question “for another day.” *State v. Kebaso*, 713 N.W.2d 317, 324 n. 7 (Minn.2006).
- 51 *See, e.g.,* *People v. Espinoza*, 107 Cal.App.4th 1069, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 670, 673 (2003); *People v. Hernandez–Clavel*, 186 P.3d 96, 99 (Colo.App.2008) (citing *People v. Sanchez*, 190 Cal.App.3d 224, 235 Cal.Rptr. 264, 267 (1987)); *Yemson v. United States*, 764 A.2d 816, 819 (D.C.2001); *State v. Martinez*, 38 Kan.App.2d 324, 165 P.3d 1050, 1055–57 (2007). *But see Mendoza*, 638 N.W.2d at 484.

State v. Silvera, 309 P.3d 1277 (2013)

- 52 *Dale*, 626 P.2d at 1064 & n. 4; *Tucker*, 581 P.2d at 226 & n. 5; *Silvera*, 244 P.3d at 1150.
- 53 *Silvera*, 244 P.3d at 1150; *see also* *Burleson v. State*, 543 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Alaska 1975) (“Sentencing is an individualized process, and all persons committing the same crime should not necessarily receive like sentences. Yet, theoretically, if two persons of identical background commit the same offense, they should receive like punishment.”).
- 54 *See* *Campbell v. State*, 594 P.2d 65, 67 n. 5 (Alaska 1979); *Juneby v. State*, 665 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska App.1983).
- 55 *See* *Smith v. State*, 711 P.2d 561, 570–71 (Alaska App.1985).
- 56 *See* *Bobby v. State*, 950 P.2d 135, 139 (Alaska App.1997).
- 57 *See* *Graham v. Richardson*, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications based on alienage).
- 58 *Brandon v. Corrections Corp. of America*, 28 P.3d 269, 275 (Alaska 2001) (noting that the federal and state equal protection clauses “require equal treatment only for those who are similarly situated”) (citation omitted).
- 59 *See* Appellate Rule 215(a)(3) (providing the procedural mechanism by which the State can challenge a sentence as too lenient).

End of Document

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Memo

To: Fellow Prosecutors
From: Jeff Rosen, District Attorney
Date: September 14, 2011
Re: Collateral Consequences

INTRODUCTION

As I discussed earlier in team meetings with all of you, the PPM has been modified to allow for the consideration of collateral consequences in appropriate cases. The following memo is designed to assist in the implementation of this policy.

POLICY

Section 5.02(b)(x)(6) Collateral Consequences

The highest duty of the prosecutor is to ensure that both the charges and ensuing punishment fit the crime. Collateral consequences are the inevitable product of criminal behavior. It is not generally the duty of a prosecutor to mitigate the collateral consequences to a defendant of his or her crime. However, in those cases where the collateral consequences are significantly greater than the punishment for the crime itself, it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to consider and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to mitigate those collateral consequences. If a defendant is charged with a serious or violent felony pursuant to Penal Code §667.5, any modification due to alleged collateral consequences is presumptively inappropriate. In those cases where a prosecutor mitigates either a charge or sentence in order to ensure a just resolution, the prosecutor should ensure that the totality of the resolution remains equitable with that offered to other similarly situated defendants. In other words, the facts of each case must be carefully evaluated to ensure equality and justice. If a significant change is contemplated, this should be discussed with the prosecutor's SuDDa. It is important to note that there are legal restrictions on a prosecutor's right to negotiate certain types of offenses. (Penal Code section 1192.7) We shall act within the bounds of those limitations.

DISCUSSION

The core duty of any prosecutor, the most central mission of our office, is the pursuit of justice. This is not an easy job. We must prosecute the guilty, protect the innocent, and make sure the punishment fits the crime.

One school of thought is that a prosecutor need not concern her or himself with any consequences that are not intrinsic in the statutory punishment itself. In other words, some might argue that if the statutory punishment fits the crime, then our duty is discharged and we can, in fact *should*, ignore the actual consequences of the sentence. Historically this view made some sense for as a practical matter, there were relatively few collateral consequences that resulted from a guilty plea. However, it is now widely acknowledged that collateral consequences have become much more pervasive, burdensome and harder to avoid or mitigate. Collateral consequences can now range, for example, from the loss of educational opportunities, financial assistance from the state, public housing, the ability to practice many trades or professions. Furthermore, collateral consequences often have the greatest impact on the innocent family members and children of a defendant. Of course, the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of *Padilla v. Kentucky* 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), ruled that collateral immigration consequences of a conviction for a non-citizen can be profound and warrant direct consideration by both the prosecution and defense.

Accordingly, a dominant paradigm has emerged - prosecutors should *consider* both collateral and direct consequences of a settlement in order to discharge our highest duty to pursue justice.

For example, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy addressed the ABA in 2003 with these words:

When someone has been judged guilty and the appellate and collateral review process has ended, the legal profession seems to lose all interest. When the prisoner is taken away, our attention turns to the next case. When the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think what is behind it. *We have a greater responsibility.*¹

Justice Kennedy then went on to address at length the crucial importance of prosecutors in particular considering the practical and real world effects of a given settlement. Less this is mistaken for some overly tender-hearted sentiment; in each case limiting the impact of collateral consequences is reserved for those circumstances where the impact of the collateral consequence is unjustified.

In other words, the goal of limiting the unjust impact of a collateral consequence is not a blanket goal of eliminating collateral consequences in all cases. Frequently, a collateral consequence is perfectly consistent with the just resolution of the case.

Robert Johnson, former president of the National District Attorneys Association, wrote in 2007:

Our job, our duty is to seek justice. How can we ignore a consequence of our prosecution that we know will surely be imposed by the operation of law? These collateral consequences cannot easily be changed or bargained away when justice requires them. But we must consider them if we are to see that justice is done. ... As a prosecutor, you must comprehend this full range of consequences that flow from a crucial conviction. If not, we will suffer the disrespect and lose the confidence of the very society we seek to protect."²

As mentioned earlier, we are all familiar with last years U.S. Supreme Court case of *Padilla v. Kentucky*³. Intrinsic to the *Padilla* decision is the constitutionality of considering collateral consequences when crafting a settlement. In other words, the court ruled that it was IAC for a defense counsel to fail to advise and negotiate on behalf of his client for an immigration neutral outcome. Logically essential to this holding is the view that such negotiations would be legal and proper.⁴

In fact, the Supreme Court reasoned that the consideration of such consequences should serve the interests of both the defendant and the state: "By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties."⁵ For example, not only would an open and realistic consideration of collateral consequences serve

¹ Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, August 9th 2003

² NDAA, Message from the President, 2/14/2007.

³ 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).

⁴ I have omitted from this brief the legal theories arguing that the consideration of collateral consequences in general, and immigration consequences in particular, is legally barred under a separation of powers or equal protection theory. I've chosen not to discuss this position for the simple reason that *Padilla* has dispositively answered this debate.

⁵ *Padilla* at 1486.

the interest of justice, in many cases, a defendant facing a significant collateral consequence would have a powerful incentive to resolve his or her case early for charges that would not trigger the feared collateral consequence.⁶

In sum, a dominant view has emerged that the appropriate consideration of collateral consequences is central to the pursuit of justice. In fact, *Padilla* constitutionally permits just such a consideration. It cannot be stressed enough that we can no more adopt a simplistic, black and white approach to this issue than we can to any other. In many cases, the impact of a collateral consequence will be appropriate and just, but in others it will not. A prosecutor must distinguish between the two.

Currently, in addition to our office, the United States Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, among others, allow for the consideration of collateral consequences in appropriate cases when negotiating a plea.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

A just settlement is highly fact specific. It requires a careful analysis of all relevant factors. Our jobs are too complicated for a single self-executing rule that will work in every case. It is simply too complicated and case specific. Just as we do not have a policy that outlines the one appropriate consequence for every burglary or assault, or for that matter dictates which defendants should be incarcerated for sixteen months, and which should go to county jail for a year, we don't have a policy that will resolve how collateral consequences should be weighed in each case. Our policy simply requires that we consider collateral consequences in appropriate cases.

The following guidelines are appropriate:

First, collateral consequences are not a relevant or appropriate factor in any case involving a serious or violent felony pursuant to Penal Code §667 and §1170;

Second, in general, the less serious the crime, the more likely a collateral consequence will unjustly impact a settlement;

Third, in general, the shorter the sentence, the more likely a collateral consequence will unjustly impact a settlement;

Fourth, by contrast, a serious felony accompanied by a lengthy sentence will rarely warrant significant consideration of collateral consequences;

Fifth, a prosecutor should determine an appropriate sentence based upon all traditional and appropriate factors, and then if a significant downward departure is appropriate due to a disproportionate collateral consequence, then the prosecutor should insist upon a concession to maintain a concordance between the modified and the original sentence. For example, if the prosecutor decides it is appropriate to

⁶ *Id.*

alter a charge to arrive at an immigration neutral result, and such an alteration results in the loss of priority, then the prosecutor might well decide to insist upon more custody time or a longer period of probation;

Sixth, in general, some collateral consequences are considered a normal and just consequence of a criminal conviction, however, when the collateral consequence is disproportionately heavy compared to the actual sentence, this is usually a signal that justice has not been done.

Seventh, any alteration of a charge in order to arrive at a result that is more collateral consequence neutral must be justified by the facts. These facts, however, do not need to be found in the original police report. They can be generated from subsequent investigation. For example, if in an appropriate case a prosecutor decides to alter a charge, from possession for sale of narcotics to transportation of narcotics, in order to secure an immigration neutral result, the factual basis for the transportation charge can be secured through an admission by the defendant.

Eighth, a prosecutor is obligated to consider the real world consequences of a plea in every case including all apparent collateral consequences. However, such a consideration does not mandate any alteration. Prosecutors must use their discretion to determine when such considerations result in a more just sentence and when they do not.

Ninth, as a practical matter, it is often impossible to verify the truth of the alleged collateral consequence that the defendant claims. For example, if a new mother who has committed a crime claims that she cannot go to county jail because nursing her new born will prove too difficult, we can rarely confirm whether the mother actually intends to nurse the child. In immigration matters, an individual will often allege severe immigration consequences, however, these determinations are sufficiently complicated that they are often difficult to predict. The remedy is to structure the new settlement so that it is comparable to the original offer. For example, if the new offer includes additional custody time to compensate for any shift in charge, then it is very unlikely that anyone would accept the offer unless they were actually facing the claimed collateral consequence. This is similar to the process we often engage when we give a defendant a choice of fewer counts for more time in custody.

Tenth, a prosecutor's decision concerning collateral consequences should be transparent and when appropriate noted on the record and, always, noted in the case file.

Any questions or concerns about a particular case can be discussed with the appropriate SuDDA or ADA.