

HJR

9

ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE



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Representative Gabrielle LeDoux

SPONSOR STATEMENT FOR HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 9

This resolution from the Alaska State Legislature urges that the United States Congress respect the judicial process and refrain from enacting any legislation that would alter the punitive damages awarded to more than 32,000 plaintiffs as a result of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as finally determined by the federal courts.

Nearly 15 years after the disaster, and more than ten years after the original jury verdict, the plaintiffs are still waiting resolution of the lawsuit.

While the United States Congress considered the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Exxon Mobil Corporation sought an amendment that would have substantially reduced the punitive damages that it would have paid for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This resolution urges Congress only to let the courts determine this matter.

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
2005 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Fiscal Note Number: _____
 Bill Version: HJR 9
 () Publish Date: _____

Revision Date/Time (Note if correction): _____ Dept. Affected: Legislature
 Title "Urging the United States Congress to BRU Legislative Council
honor the process and judgment of the federal courts..." Component: Council and Subcommittees
 Sponsor "Representatives LeDoux, Gara, ..." Session Expenses
 Requestor House Resources Committee Component No. 783

Expenditures/Revenues (Thousands of Dollars)

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below.

OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011
Personal Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Travel	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contractual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Supplies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Equipment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Land & Structures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Grants & Claims	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Miscellaneous	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL OPERATING	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
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CHANGE IN REVENUES ()	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
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FUND SOURCE (Thousands of Dollars)

1002 Federal Receipts						
1003 GF Match						
1004 GF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1005 GF/Program Receipts						
1037 GF/Mental Health						
Other (Specify Type--Do not abbreviate)						
TOTAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Estimate of any current year (FY2004) cost: 0.0

Check this box (X) if funding for this bill is included in the Governor's FY 2005 budget proposal:

POSITIONS

Full-time						
Part-time						
Temporary						

ANALYSIS: (Attach a separate page if necessary)

This legislation has zero fiscal impact on the Legislative Affairs Agency.

Prepared by: Karla Schofield, Deputy Director
 Division: Administrative Services
 Approved by: Pamela Varni, Executive Director
 Agency: Legislative Affairs Agency

Phone 465-6626
 Date/Time 3/29/05 10:02 AM
 Date 3/29/2005

Exxon Valdez Update¹

The Spill

When the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in 1989, it released eleven million gallons of toxic crude oil that spread throughout and beyond Prince William Sound. The oil spread past numerous islands and along the coast of the Kenai Peninsula, Cook Inlet, and Kodiak Island. The spill disrupted the lives and livelihoods of those in its path, including fishermen in commercial fisheries that were closed for the 1989 season; additional commercial fisheries that were not closed but suffered significant price declines; the subsistence fisheries in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet villages; shore-based businesses dependent on the fishing industry; and the people of cities such as Cordova.

Initial Litigation

Litigation included both civil and criminal actions. Civil suits came first but developed slowly due to their number and complexity. Both the United States and the State of Alaska sued Exxon for environmental damage, and that litigation was settled by means of a consent decree whereby Exxon agreed to pay to the governments, for environmental damage, \$900 million over a period of ten years, with a "re-opener" provision allowing for additional claims of up to \$100 million for damage discovered after settlement.

Exxon was prosecuted by the federal government for various environmental crimes. Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping pleaded guilty to a total of four counts of violating three different environmental laws, were jointly fined \$25 million and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$100 million.

The Class Action Suit

The civil cases were ultimately (with a few exceptions) consolidated into one class action suit with more than 32,000 plaintiff class members from all fifty states, which has been winding its way through the courts for nearly 16 years. In the consolidated cases, there was never any dispute as to Exxon's liability for compensatory damages, only the amount of economic losses and the appropriateness of punitive damages were controverted. By the time of the punitive damages phase of the trial in 1994, the parties had stipulated that the actual damages were estimated to be between \$432 million and \$768 million, and compensable harm was eventually determined to be \$513 million.

This figure does not include additional harms that have never been compensated. The Ninth Circuit observed that the spill "obviously caused harm beyond the 'purely economic.'" The District Court Judge found: "The social fabric of Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all information contained in this update is from the January 24, 2004, Order No. 364 of the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, *In re: the EXXON VALDEZ*, Case Number A89-0095CV.

was torn apart," citing research that clearly delineated a chronic pattern of spill-related economic loss, social conflict, cultural disruption and psychological stress; an increased incidence of alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, mental health problems, and occupation related problems; and a high percentage of affected fishermen suffering from severe depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, or a combination of all three.

Punitive Damages

For the punitive damages phase of the trial, unusually detailed jury instructions were developed. The jury was specifically instructed that even if it found Exxon's conduct reckless, it was not required to award punitive damages; that it must use reason in setting the amount of punitive damages; that any award should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused; that punitive damages are not intended to provide compensation; and that jurors should assume the plaintiffs had already been fully compensated.

Factors the jury was told it could consider in setting an amount of punitive damages included the reprehensibility of the defendants' conduct, the amount of harm suffered by members of the plaintiff class as a result of the defendants' conduct, and the financial condition of the defendants. As to the defendants' wealth, the jury was instructed to consider the defendants' financial condition only in terms of what level of award would be necessary to achieve punishment and deterrence. The jury was also instructed that it should not count any damage to natural resources or the environment in general when assessing harm suffered by plaintiff class members, and that it could consider mitigating factors (such as criminal fines or civil awards already levied for the same conduct) and the extent to which the defendants had taken steps to remedy the consequences of the spill and prevent future ones.

The Alaska jury deliberated for 22 days on the issue of punitive damages and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict in the amount of \$5 billion. The District Court denied Exxon's motion to reduce the award, concluding that it was not so grossly excessive as to violate the defendants' due process rights.

Appeals and Remands

Exxon appealed both its liability for, and the amount of, the punitive damages awarded by the jury and upheld by the District Court in 1994. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Exxon's contention that punitive damages should have been barred and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support a jury verdict of liability for punitive damages as to both Exxon and the ship's captain. In the end, the Court of Appeals also found that the amount of the award was too high and remanded the matter to the District Court for further review and reduction of the award. After considering the briefing and hearing oral arguments, the District Court found again in 2002 that the award of punitive damages complied with due process. It reduced the punitive damages award to \$4 billion and entered the judgment on December 10, 2002. Exxon appealed again, and the plaintiffs also appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, prior to receiving briefing on either appeal, vacated the \$4 billion punitive damages judgment and again remanded the case to the District Court, this time to

consider the award in light of a recent U.S. Supreme Court case providing new guidance on evaluating punitive damages awards. Both parties submitted supplemental briefing and engaged in oral arguments applying the new guidance. The District Court then considered, for the third time, the question of whether the \$5 billion punitive damages award against Exxon comports with due process. The court applied the Supreme Court guidance and concluded that the \$5 billion award was not grossly excessive and that it had no principled means by which it could reduce the award. Ultimately, however, to comply with the directive of the Ninth Circuit's remand, the District Court entered judgment in the amount of \$4.5 billion and encouraged plaintiffs to cross appeal if Exxon chose to take further appeal of the punitive damages award. In doing so, the District Judge stated that he would have denied the defendants any reduction in the award had it not been for the specific direction imposed by the Court of Appeals to effect some reduction in the punitive damages award.

The \$4.5 billion judgment entered by the District Court represents a 9:1 ratio between punitive damages and the \$513 million of compensated harm. Courts applying the Supreme Court's punitive damage decisions have understood those decisions to provide a general guideline that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process." In the three cases in which the Supreme Court held that punitive damage awards were excessive, the awards ultimately approved on remand were 9:1 (*State Farm v. Campbell*), 10:1 (*Cooper v. Leatherman*) and 12.5:1 (*BMW v. Gore*).

Current Status of Case

Presently, Exxon is appealing the punitive damages award for the third time. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is expected to issue its decision on the appeal sometime later this year.

Ongoing Damage

Damage from Exxon Valdez oil continues to this day. According to the 2003 Status Report of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, more than fifteen different species and resources, as well as commercial fishing, recreation and tourism, and subsistence harvesting, have still not fully recovered; and the recovery of five resources is considered unknown.² Trustee Council-funded researchers with the National Marine Fisheries Service's Auke Bay Laboratory found beaches in Prince William Sound still contaminated in 2001. More oil was found than expected, especially in the subsurface; subsurface oil was less weathered and more toxic; and oil was found in the intertidal zone, closest to the zone of biological production. Other Trustee Council-funded research indicates that these remaining pockets of oil may be impeding the recovery of several species.

² Not recovering: common loon, cormorants, harbor seal, harlequin duck, Pacific herring, and pigeon guillemot. Recovering: clams, designated wilderness, intertidal communities, killer whale (AB pod), marbled murrelet, mussels, sea otter, and sediments. Recovery unknown: cutthroat trout, dolly varden, Kittlitz's murrelet, rockfish, subtidal communities.

Natural Resource Damages: A Primer

Introduction

The purpose of this primer is to define Natural Resource Damage (NRD) concepts and terms, and discuss the following topics as they relate to NRD: the authority under which NRD are assessed; the definition of natural resources; the role of EPA; the designation of Natural Resource Trustees; and the conduct of natural resource damage assessments (NRDAs) and restorations. **Although impacts to natural resources may be addressed under other statutory authorities, this site focuses on provisions under CERCLA or OPA.**

Natural resource injuries may occur at sites as a result of releases of hazardous substances or oil. Trustees use NRDAs to assess injury to natural resources held in the public trust. This is an initial step toward restoring injured resources and services and toward compensating the public for their loss.

CERCLA and OPA Statutory Authority

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides a comprehensive group of authorities focused on one main goal: to address any release, or threatened release, of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants that could endanger human health and/or the environment. CERCLA's response provisions focus on the protection of human health and the environment. The statute also provides authority for assessment and restoration of natural resources that have been injured by a hazardous substance release or response.

The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was enacted in reaction to the Exxon Valdez oil spill and provides authority for oil pollution liability and compensation as well as for the Federal government to direct and manage oil spill cleanups. Similar to CERCLA, OPA contains authorities to allow the assessment and restoration of natural resources that have been contaminated by the discharge, or threatened discharge, of oil.

Natural Resources Defined

Both CERCLA and OPA define "natural resources" broadly to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources..." Both statutes limit "natural resources" to those resources held in trust for the public, termed Trust Resources. While there are slight variations in their definitions, both CERCLA and OPA state that a "natural resource" is a resource "belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" the United States, any State, an Indian Tribe, a local government, or a foreign government [CERCLA §101(16); OPA §1001(20)].

NRD are for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of a damage assessment [CERCLA §§101(6); 107(a)(4)(C); OPA §§1001(5); 1002(b)(2)]. The measure of damages is the cost of restoring injured resources to their baseline condition, compensation for the interim loss of injured resources pending recovery, and the reasonable cost of a damage assessment [43 CFR Part 11 ; 15 CFR Part 990].

EPA's Role: Notification and Coordination

EPA is not a Natural Resource Trustee, nor is it authorized to act on behalf of Natural Resource Trustees. Rather, under CERCLA and OPA, EPA shares with the U.S. Coast Guard the general responsibility for investigating and responding to contamination by hazardous substances or oil. The Coast Guard is primarily responsible for contamination involving the coastal zone including all U.S. waters subject to the tide, the Great Lakes, and deepwater ports. EPA is primarily responsible for contamination on land and inland waters.

Natural Resource Trustees

Under both CERCLA and OPA, responsibility for protection of natural resources falls with Federal, State, and Tribal Trustees. This is because no one individual "owns" a natural resource; rather, they are held in trust for the public.

Both CERCLA and OPA provide authority for designated Trustees to act as Natural Resource Trustees on behalf of the public. In both CERCLA and OPA, certain Federal, State, and Indian Tribe officials can be designated as Trustees. However, under OPA foreign governments can also choose officials to act as Trustees.

Trustees have been given responsibility for restoring injured natural resources. The two major areas of Trustee responsibility under CERCLA and OPA are:

- * Assessment of injury to natural resources; and**
- * Restoration of natural resources injured or services lost due to a release or discharge.**

To meet these responsibilities, both statutes provide several mechanisms. The Trustees can either:

- * Sue in court to obtain compensation from the potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for NRD and the costs of assessment and restoration planning; or**
- * Conduct assessments or restorations in accordance with certain standards specified by the Federal government and file a claim for reimbursement from the Trust Fund established under OPA; or**
- * Participate in negotiations with PRPs to obtain PRP-financed or PRP-conducted assessments and restorations of NRD.**

Details about these statutory tools can be found in NRD Related Statutory Information.

NRD Assessments

One of the primary responsibilities of Trustees under both CERCLA and OPA is to assess the extent of injury to a natural resource and determine appropriate ways of restoring and compensating for that injury. A natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) is the process of collecting, compiling, and analyzing information to make these determinations. Trustees have the option of using the methodologies prescribed by the Department of the Interior (DOI), 43 CFR Part 11, or the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 15 CFR Part 990. The DOI regulations are to assess NRD under CERCLA, while the NOAA methodologies are applicable for NRDA's under OPA. NRDA's are underway in a variety of locations; many of which involve one or more Superfund sites.

The overall intent of the assessment regulations is to determine appropriate restoration and compensation for injuries to natural resources. If a Federal or State Trustee goes into Federal court and sues a potentially responsible party (PRP) for NRD under CERCLA, an assessment done in accordance with the DOI regulations is given the force and effect of a "rebuttable presumption" [CERCLA §107(f)(2)(C)]. If a Federal, State, or Tribal Trustee sues a PRP for NRD under OPA, an assessment done in accordance with the NOAA regulations is given a rebuttable presumption [OPA §1006(e)(2)]. This means that the burden of persuasion in court shifts to the PRP. It will be the task of the PRP to disprove the Trustee's assessment.

NRD Restorations

Under CERCLA, monies recovered from an NRD claim are to be used only for restoration or replacement of the injured natural resource, or for acquisition of an equivalent resource (hereinafter called "restoration" unless otherwise noted) [CERCLA §107(f)(1)]. Under OPA, recovered sums are to be used only to reimburse or pay costs incurred by the Trustee with respect to the natural resources [OPA §1006(f)]; these include costs incurred while conducting NRDA's and developing and implementing plans for "the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent, of the natural resources" [OPA §1006(c)]. **Any amount in excess of these costs must be deposited in the Oil Spill Liability Fund [OPA §1006(f)].**

Restoration actions are principally designed to return injured resources to baseline conditions, but may also compensate the public for the interim loss of injured resources from the onset of injury until baseline conditions are re-established. Restoration activities have been successfully completed at several sites.

Natural Resource Trustees are required to develop and implement plans for the restoration of natural resources. The Trustee's plans form the basis of calculating NRD for court actions or claims against the OPA Trust Fund [OPA §§1006(c), (d)(1)-(2), 1012(a)(2)].

Suzanne: Here are some FAQ's from another EPA site on OPA.

1. Which federal agencies are responsible for implementing the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)?

Executive Order 12777, issued on October 18, 1991, delegated the authority to implement the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) to several federal agencies. EPA carries the responsibility for non-transportation-related onshore facilities and incidents in the Inland Zone. **United States Coast Guard (USCG) has responsibility for marine transportation-related facilities and incidents in the Coastal Zone. The Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety within the Research and Special Programs Administration oversees onshore transportation-related facilities. The Department of Interior has responsibility for off-shore fixed facilities beyond the coastline. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for natural resource damage assessments relating to oil discharges.**

2. How can I report an oil spill?

Spills should be reported immediately to the National Response Center at 800-424-8802. Threats of discharges or releases to the waters of the U.S. should also be reported.

3. What is the definition of oil?

Oil is defined as oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil [40 CFR 112.2 and CWA Section 311(a)(1)]. Section 1001(23) of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) further narrows this definition by excluding any substance which is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under Section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or "Superfund").

4. Does the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) preempt state laws?

No. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) Section 1018(a) specifically provides that the OPA does not preempt state laws.

5. Who is responsible for cleanup costs incurred under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)?

Section 1001(32)(B) of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) states that in the case of an onshore facility, any person owning or operating the facility is the responsible party.

6. Who can be ordered to cleanup an oil spill?

EPA can enter into an agreement or order any person who owns or operates a facility to perform a cleanup under Section 311(c) and/or (e) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), as amended by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).

7. Where can I find the text of the laws dealing with Oil Spills?

The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) can be found at <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/33/ch40.html>.

Timeline of *Exxon Valdez* Punitive Damages Litigation

Date	Litigation Milestones
1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Exxon Valdez</i> oil tanker runs aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, discharging 11 million gallons of toxic crude oil. Within a month, numerous civil suits are filed in U.S. District Court and Alaska State court for compensatory and punitive damages.
1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ U.S. District Court initially denies motion for certification of class action, resulting in thousands of additional individual lawsuits being filed, mostly in State court.
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State court grants motion for certification of class action. ▪ Exxon removes most of the certified class action cases pending in State court to U.S. District Court. These cases are consolidated by the District Court into <u>In re: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation</u>.
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cases consolidated in <u>In re: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation</u> consist of nearly 200 direct actions on behalf of approximately 5,000 named plaintiffs and five certified class actions, with class membership estimated to be in the tens of thousands.
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ U.S. District Court dismisses the first of Exxon's many attempts to avoid punitive damages by arguing it is not subject to them as a matter of law.
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ U.S. District Court grants final approval of mandatory punitive damages class. ▪ Trial takes place from May 2 – September 16. ▪ U.S. District Court jury returns a verdict for plaintiffs, finding Exxon liable for punitive damages in the amount of \$5 billion. ▪ Exxon, and the ship's captain, file 22 post-trial motions seeking, among other things, a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ U.S. District Court denies Exxon's post-trial motions.
1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ U.S. District Court enters final judgment as to the mandatory punitive damages class in the amount of \$5 billion (paving the way for the appeals process to begin), and stays execution of the judgment based on Exxon's posting of an irrevocable letter of credit. ▪ Exxon seeks entitlement to a portion of the punitive damages award based on secret settlement agreements made with a group of seafood processors who agreed to obtain the punitive damages on Exxon's behalf.
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exxon appeals the amended judgment, both as to liability and amount of the punitive damages award.
2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ninth Circuit affirms original judgment regarding liability for punitive damages but vacates the award and remands to the U.S. District Court to reduce the amount of the award. ▪ On remand, U.S. District Court concludes that the full \$5 billion punitive damages is constitutionally permissible but reduces award to \$4 billion based on Ninth Circuit's direction that the award be reduced.
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exxon and plaintiffs both appeal the reduced award to the Ninth Circuit. ▪ U.S. Supreme Court decides a separate case (<u>State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell</u>), revisiting due process issues as they relate to punitive damages. ▪ Prior to hearing the appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacates the \$4 billion punitive judgment without ruling on the merits and remands to the U.S. District Court to reconsider the award in light of the <u>State Farm</u> decision. ▪ Exxon files second renewed motion to reduce the amount of the punitive damages

Date	Litigation Milestones
2004	<p>award.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ U.S. District Court issues its order on remand, in which it considers the recent Supreme Court case, concludes that the punitive damages award still comports with due process and that the full \$5 billion is not excessive, and enters a final judgment for \$4.5 billion in punitive damages.▪ Exxon appeals to the Ninth Circuit, and plaintiffs cross appeal.▪ Ninth Circuit receives briefing on appeal.
2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Ninth Circuit expected to hear oral argument and issue a decision on appeal later this year.



UNITED FISHERMEN OF ALASKA

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March 3, 2005

Representative Ralph Samuels, Co-Chair
House Resources Committee
Alaska State Legislature
State Capitol (Mail Stop 3100)
Juneau AK 99801-1182

Dear Representative Samuels,

UFA represents thirty-one Alaska commercial fishing groups and hundreds of individual fishermen, crew members and related businesses.

United Fishermen of Alaska (UFA) supports HJR 9 as a meaningful statement from the State of Alaska to urge that the United States Congress respect the judicial process and refrain from enacting any legislation that would alter the punitive damages awarded to more than 32,000 plaintiffs as a result of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as finally determined by the federal courts.

The sixteen year delay in just compensation has prolonged the economic damage from the spill beyond justification. All reasonable positions in this sad episode have received due process in courts. Fishermen and communities should be compensated without any undue further delay.

We appreciate your consideration and encourage your support of HJR 9.

Sincerely,

Mark D. Vinsel
Executive Director

CC: Representative Gabrielle LeDoux

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS

Alaska Crab Coalition • Alaska Druggers Association • Alaska Longline Fishermen's Association • Armstrong Keta • Al-sea Processors Association
Bristol Bay Reserve • Concerned Area Fishermen • Cordova District Fishermen United • Douglas Island Pink and Chum
Fishing Vessel Owners Association • Groundfish Forum • Kenai Peninsula Fishermen's Association • Kodiak Regional Aquaculture Association
North Pacific Fisheries Association • North Pacific Scallop Cooperative • Northern Southeast Regional Aquaculture Association
Old Harbor Fishermen's Association • Petersburg Vessel Owners Association • Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation
Purse Seine Vessel Owner Association • Seafood Producers Cooperative • Southeast Alaska Herring Sciners Marketing Association
Southeast Alaska Regional Dive Fisheries Association • Southeast Alaska Seiners Association • Southern Southeast Regional Aquaculture Association
United Catcher Boats • United Salmon Association • United Southeast Alaska Gillnetters • Valdez Fisheries Development Association
Western Gulf of Alaska Fishermen

Support

Statement in Support of House Resolution re: Exxon

To whom it may concern:

Before the 3/24/89 Exxon Valdez oil spill, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1653 established a Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund (TAPLF), by which vessel owners and operators, if they spilled oil that had passed through the Alaska pipeline were strictly liable for damages from the discharge, up to \$100,000,000.

When the spill occurred on 3/24/89, plaintiffs looked to the Fund as one source of money to pay damages, but brought our primary litigation claims in state and federal court, arguing that state statutes, state common law theories (such as negligence, trespass and nuisance), and federal admiralty law all gave claimants (fishermen, municipalities, businesses, landowners, etc) rights of action. We were aware then that 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1653 (c)(9) said specifically that the law that established the Fund "shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of strict liability or to preclude any State from imposing additional requirements," and thus assumed that the existence of the Fund legislation, and the Fund itself, should not bar, or hold back our claims.

With increased federal interest in legislation after the spill (which ultimately resulted in OPA 90), we were very concerned that the industry would try to interfere with what we viewed as our non-Fund existing remedies. We were able to secure a special section in OPA that said, "Nothing in this title shall apply to any cause of action or right of recovery arising from any incident which occurred prior to August 18, 1990. Such claims shall be adjudicated pursuant to the law applicable at the date of the incident. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2717(e)." OPA also added some good language that we fought for, (and which applied both to future spills and retroactively to our case), relating to the right of a municipality or state to recover for additional public services (like police and fire services) after a spill, which language countered a legal doctrine based on a case called Flagstaff which said that such costs were not recoverable, but had to be passed through to taxpayers, and also permitting states and municipalities to recover for lost revenues, such as taxes.

As we were pursuing our federal and state claims after the passage of OPA 90, Exxon argued in federal court to Judge Holland that all of those claims had to be pursued first before the Liability Fund, even though section 1653 (c)(9) said specifically that it "shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of strict liability or to preclude any State from imposing additional requirements."

In 1992, when it appeared that Judge Holland might require us to present all the claims first to the TAPLF before we could proceed on our other claims in federal court, we asked for an amendment to the TAPLF legislation which would clarify that the Fund was not the exclusive arbiter of damages from oil spills. Exxon and other oil companies opposed the legislation as it was inconsistent with their position in court that at the very least we had to exhaust remedies with the Fund before we could pursue court claims.

Matt Jamin
Jamin, Ebell, Schmitt & Mason

adn.com

Anchorage Daily News

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16 years later, pressure mounts to settle spill suit**EXXON VALDEZ: State, federal lawyers must decide by next summer whether to seek additional damages.**By TOM KIZZIA
Anchorage Daily News*(Published: February 27, 2005)*

State and federal officials in charge of spending Exxon Valdez oil spill settlement funds are pushing new efforts to reach "closure" on controversies about environmental damage posed by crude oil, some of which still lies buried in the sands of Prince William Sound.

Since the election of Gov. Frank Murkowski in 2002, the oil spill trustees have put some broader, long-range scientific projects on hold. Instead, the trustee council has directed Exxon settlement funds to studies of herring and other injured species in hopes of writing the final chapter on spill damage and the effects of so-called lingering oil.

A key piece of that work has been contracted to a private Seattle consulting firm that normally does much of its work for companies accused of pollution. Integral Consulting has \$850,000 in contracts to weigh conflicting studies by government and Exxon scientists and reach independent conclusions on the lingering spill impacts. A state lawyer said the firm is expected to have some answers by late summer or fall.

The change in priorities has drawn strong protests from public advisers and scientists, who say they don't know what's going on because the council has conducted little open discussion. Some critics say they fear the Murkowski and Bush administrations are eager to close the book on a resource-development public-relations mess.

TRUSTEE COUNCIL MISSION

The trustee council was formed to oversee restoration of the ecosystem damaged by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. The company tanker hit a charted reef and dumped a reported 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.

The oil spill trustees say they haven't been secretive. But under fire from their public advisory group, which approved a sharply critical resolution last month, they say they are trying harder to make their intentions plain. In recent interviews, several trustees said the new priorities are necessary in part to address the lingering oil, which only showed up in studies beginning in 2001.

"The lingering oil was something no one contemplated back in '89 when the spill happened," said Drue Pearce, the Alaska special assistant for the U.S. Department of the Interior, who holds a federal seat on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Pearce said she visited a beach last summer with still-smelly oil buried in the sand and found it "astounding."

Pearce said findings of the Integral Consulting study will be important to state and federal lawyers, who must decide by the summer of 2006 whether to seek additional damages of up to \$100 million from the spiller, now known as Exxon Mobil. The 1991 settlement between Exxon and the state and federal governments included a short "reopener" period allowing new claims based on

environmental harm that was not foreseen at the time.

UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

That litigation deadline aside, the trustees appear uncomfortable with having unresolved questions of environmental damage hover indefinitely over the Sound.

"Maybe (herring) will never recover. But we need to bring closure to that question," said Kurt Fredriksson, acting commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation and one of three state trustees. "We need to get restoration of those resources taken care of, or conclude that we cannot."

Scientists involved in past research have questioned the apparent change of direction, saying the new council members were ignoring years of scientific planning and recommendations from peer-review groups. Many were concerned that broader ecosystem research, considered by previous administrations the best way to examine long-term spill impacts, would eventually be canceled. The trustees have \$106 million left for scientific work from the \$900 million civil settlement paid by Exxon.

Trustees have recently assured them that the long-range work will continue after this pause, said Brenda Norcross, a University of Alaska marine science professor and co-chairwoman of the trustees' scientific advisory committee.

Critics also expressed concern over the Christmas-week firing of the trustee council's science director, Phil Mundy, who had helped build the old research program.

"It's very difficult to get all the work done without a science director," Norcross said.

Mundy said he was given no reason except that his firing was ordered by Murkowski's office. Trustee council executive director Gail Phillips said she could not discuss the decision because it was a confidential personnel matter.

SKEPTICISM ABOUNDS

The council's actions were viewed warily by the advisory committee set up under the settlement to ensure public involvement in how the funds are spent. In January, the committee passed a resolution branding council actions last August secret and illegal, and calling on the council to reconsider its work plan, this time in public.

"I think the controversy is more the secrecy of how they are doing it," said committee member Pat Lavin of the National Wildlife Federation. "We think it's pretty clear the council violated its own procedures."

Lavin and others say the push for new priorities has come largely from trustees representing the state.

Some question giving the important job of summarizing past research to an independent firm like Integral Consulting.

"They're a complete outsider to this. I don't think they've got the history to make the judgment," said Stan Senner, a longtime science coordinator for the trustee council who is now executive director of Audubon Alaska.

But Craig Tillery, an assistant attorney general for the state who has been involved in the oil spill since the tanker hit Bligh Reef, said it's the right time for an independent summary.

"You've got these disparate studies. You don't have an analysis," Tillery said.

Stacy Studebaker, a Kodiak environmentalist who has served nine years on the public advisory committee, is suspicious.

"I think there's a mandate on the state trustees to get this thing over with, to tidy things up," Studebaker said. "They're trying to clean up a PR mess with Exxon."

But her fellow committee member Lavin said the focus on answering the big remaining questions seems to make sense.

"It's exactly what they should be doing," he said. "My great fear is that, voila, the studies show that everything's great. But I have no reason to think that will happen."

LONG-TERM PROJECTS

The trustee council, made up of six top bureaucrats from the federal and state governments, has spent \$375 million on buying and protecting habitat, \$176 million to reimburse governments for spill response costs, and \$173 million on scientific studies.

By the spill's 10-year anniversary in 1999, with echoes of the Exxon Valdez catastrophe growing fainter, officials and science advisers were turning attention to planning long-term projects under the umbrella of the so-called Gulf Ecosystem Monitoring Program, or GEM. In 2002, most of the remaining money, around \$87 million, was set aside for GEM studies looking at long-range spill impacts in the context of broader changes in the North Pacific. The council now spends between \$3 million and \$5 million a year on various studies.

The Bush-Murkowski council began to change course in 2004. An August decision to turn down funding for some GEM projects drew a stern complaint from University of Alaska president Mark Hamilton. He said the council had ignored recommendations of staff and science advisers in rejecting high-ranked projects by university scientists while funding some that had been recommended against.

"Violation of the practices and tenets of science sponsorship which have for generations guided successful research in this country -- including peer review, openness, and transparency -- puts at risk the scientific credibility of not only yourselves as trustees, but the organizations you represent," Hamilton wrote the trustees last September.

The state trustees responded with a stout defense of their prerogative, saying their "highest priority" was projects with "the most direct and immediate restoration effects" on damaged resources and lost services. "While some disappointment is expected among investigators whose projects did not receive funding, no reasonable person should conclude a conspiracy exists in the process or a mystery surrounds our decisions," the state trustees wrote to Hamilton.

Studebaker came back with a newspaper column saying the council didn't need to rubber-stamp projects but did need to explain its reasons. Its failure to do so in August had been "a stick in the eye" to those trying to keep public the often-politicized science surrounding the Exxon Valdez spill, she said.

Trustee council members are now going further to explain their thinking, saying the attention to

assessing and restoring damage is essential under the council's 1994 work plan.

"From where I sit, it was a nicety that we jumped to too quickly," DEC's Fredriksson said of the GEM program. "We hadn't completed the restoration work that had to be done."

He said an assessment of resource recovery hadn't been made since 2002. At that point, five species and several other resources were listed as still recovering, while eight species were listed as "not recovering."

The apparent shift in priorities makes some sense to one prominent oil industry critic, Rick Steiner, a marine biologist at the University of Alaska Anchorage. Steiner, who has pushed government officials to stay focused on restoring the Sound, said it is important for the council to not allow its endowment to become a "cash cow" for general scientific research.

Steiner said he's worried, however, that the Bush and Murkowski administrations appear hostile to reopening spill litigation around continuing effects of the spill, which he contends go far beyond sheens leaching into the water from buried oil. He said debating the larger questions in court could reflect badly on their efforts to open other areas to oil drilling.

"The last thing they want is discussion of 15-year long-term damage we didn't expect," Steiner said.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS?

An example of these conflicting interests, cited by Steiner and others, is that Phillips, who made \$105,000 last year as the trustee council's executive director, has played a prominent role in Arctic Power, the group promoting oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Last year, Phillips was Arctic Power's co-chairman. She recently resigned the leadership position because of the complaints, she said, though she remains on the group's board.

"In my mind, it was never a conflict because I had been doing it for so long," said Phillips, a former state House speaker and candidate for lieutenant governor. "But I could understand where people could have thought it was."

Phillips said the question of whether to reopen the spill case is up to state and federal lawyers, not the trustee council.

Tillery, the assistant attorney general, said government lawyers are seriously exploring the potential for a reopener. He would not comment further.

It was Steiner who obtained secret trustee council documents in 2003 outlining the possibilities for reopening the case at that point. The documents, featured in a subsequent story in the Wall Street Journal, detailed growing scientific concern over lingering oil and cited unanticipated damage to pink salmon, sea otters, mussels and harlequin ducks.

"Much, if not all, of the information upon which a claim would be made is generated by the Trustee Council's restoration program," wrote Molly McCammon, Phillips' predecessor, in one of the secret memos.

That was then. Now, said Pearce, vital information for making any such claim is likely to be drawn from the analytical study of lingering oil and damaged resources by Seattle-based Integral Consulting.

INTEGRAL CONSULTING STUDY

The national consulting firm was first recommended to the state for spill restoration work by Murkowski's first DEC commissioner, Ernesta Ballard, who served as a spill trustee until resigning last year. Ballard said this month she had worked with Integral on a project for the Ketchikan Pulp Co. before joining state government.

According to the company's Web site, Integral is a specialist in polluted sediments and does much of its work for private companies accused of spills -- "potential responsible parties," in the legal term. Integral has also been involved in cleanup for government agencies such as the Port of Seattle, its Web site said.

The company reported at a January symposium that initial findings show the buried oil continues to leach into the environment, but most of the resources "currently" classified as injured are not exposed to it, Integral's Web site said.

Several calls to Integral officials handling the Alaska project were not returned.

Trustee council meetings are known for the jaw-dropping tedium of discussions about scientific appropriations of tens of thousands of dollars. So it was all the more surprising that there was little discussion on March 1, 2004, when the council returned from a lunchtime executive session and voted to give \$1.5 million to the state Department of Law for research "to fill in gaps related to lingering oil."

The motion was made by Jim Balsiger, Alaska administrator for the National Marine Fisheries Service, with little discussion, other than to specify that the department should work with federal agencies and with Integral Consulting. Ballard seconded.

Assistant attorney general Tillery spoke briefly in support, saying the lingering oil was "a cloud hanging over us of unfinished business," according to a transcript of the trustee council meeting.

Integral later received a \$200,000 contract to study sediments and a \$650,000 contract to analyze the lingering oil data and provide a fresh assessment of how species have recovered. The latter contract also calls for recommendations on monitoring and treatment of old oil, as well as "effective communication" to the public of the technical results.

CONFUSION LINGERS

Public confusion about the state's intentions has not been helped by turnover among the Murkowski administration trustees. In addition to Ballard, who left last October to become a senior vice president for the forest products giant Weyerhaeuser, Fish and Game Commissioner Kevin Duffy resigned at the end of the year to head the factory trawlers association. Now the third trustee, Attorney General Gregg Renkes, has resigned amid conflict of interest allegations involving a coal technology company.

Fredriksson said the spill trustees sought to explain themselves with a passage in their annual report released this month, which Phillips read aloud when asked about the changes:

"Over the next eighteen months, the Council has determined the need to realign priorities and restorative activities, placing focus on critical work required to reach closure in areas of restoration related to lingering oil and injured species."

The trustees also acceded to a request from public advisory committee members for more

dialogue, Phillips said. The next council meeting, scheduled for June in Cordova, will include time for an unprecedented back-and-forth conversation with committee members, she said.

"I think most of the trustees would agree we haven't done as great a job of communicating with our PAC as we might," Pearce said.

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