

**S B**

**8 8**

# STATE OF ALASKA

## DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TONY KNOWLES, GOVERNOR

P.O. BOX 110300  
DIMOND COURT HOUSE, 6<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR  
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811-0300  
PHONE: (907)465-3600  
FAX: (907)465-6735

March 14, 2001

The Honorable Jerry Ward  
Alaska State Senate  
State Capitol, Room 423  
Juneau, AK 99811

Re: SB 88 relating to metropolitan planning organizations and the metropolitan planning organization for the Anchorage metropolitan area

Dear Senator Ward:

On February 20, 2001, I testified before the Senate Transportation Committee that the provisions of SB 88 that appoint a senator and a representative to sit on the Anchorage area metropolitan Transportation Study board violate the dual office holding provisions of the Alaska Constitution. At the end of my testimony you asked that I put my conclusion in writing.

Art. II, § 2 of the Alaska Constitution provides:

**SECTION 5. DISQUALIFICATIONS.** No legislator may hold any other office or position of profit under the United States or the State. During the term for which elected and for one year thereafter, no legislator may be nominated, elected, or appointed to any other office or position of profit which has been created, or the salary or emoluments of which have been increased, while he was a member. This section shall not prevent any person from seeking or holding the office of governor, secretary of state, or member of Congress. This section shall not apply to employment by or election to a constitutional convention.

(Emphasis added). Under these provisions a member of the legislature may not hold any other office during the member's term. Similar provisions prohibiting dual office holding exist for the governor in Art. III, § 6, and for justices of the supreme court and judges under Art. IV, § 14.

The Department of Law has issued three formal attorney general's opinions regarding dual office holding, which I have enclosed with this letter. In the past inter-branch task forces, have been formed to assemble and disseminate information, but did not assume any

The Honorable Jerry Ward  
Re: SB 88

March 14, 2001  
Page 2

duties assigned any branch of government. These sorts of bodies have not been seen to violate the constitution's prohibitions against dual office holding. On the other hand, if a legislator, or a judge, holds a position in an executive branch agency or a political subdivision, and the duties of the position require the office holder to take action regarding the management of the agency, the prohibition against dual office holding is violated.


Under SB 88, a senator and a representative will be appointed to sit on the board that allocates federal surface transportation money in the Anchorage area. At the present time there are three voting members of the board appointed by the mayor of Anchorage and two state employees, who sit in an advisory capacity. Under the bill, the board's composition and functioning change. Three members voting members will still be appointed by the mayor. In addition, two voting members would be appointed by the governor, and two voting members by the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a senator and a member of the House of Representatives whose districts include at least a portion of the Municipality of Anchorage. A quorum of the board is a majority of the voting members.

We believe that the prohibition against dual office holding by legislators would be violated. The board would be making decisions on which projects will receive allocated federal money, when they will receive it, and in what order specific projects will be built. These functions are clearly more than collection or dissemination of information and under current practice, these functions are clearly municipal managerial responsibilities.

If you have any questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

BRUCE M. BOTELHO  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:   
William F. Cummings  
Assistant Attorney General

WFC:pvp

Enclosure(s)

cc: Mike Abbott, Legislative Director  
Deborah Behr, Dept. of Law  
Chrystal Smith, Dept. of Law  
Don Smith, Senate Transportation Committee  
Senator Randy Phillips, Attn: Kim Ross

# STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OPINION NO. 26  
JAY S. HAMMOND, GOVERNOR

June 29, 1976

The Honorable Lowell Thomas, Jr.  
Lieutenant Governor  
State of Alaska  
Pouch A, State Capitol  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Re: Legality of legislators running  
for other house following increase  
in legislative salary.

Dear Lieutenant Governor Thomas:

You have asked whether, under Warwick v. State, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976), a member of one house of the legislature may run for a seat in the other house, when the pay for that seat in the other house has been increased by the legislature in which the candidate served. While the Alaska courts have not ruled on the issue, it is our view that the answer is yes.

The question arises from Article II, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution which provides in part:

During the term for which elected  
and for one year thereafter, no legis-  
lator may be nominated, elected, or  
appointed to any other office or position

The Honorable Lowell Thomas, Jr.  
Lieutenant Governor

June 29, 1976  
Page Two

of profit which has been created, or the salary or emoluments of which have been increased, while he was a member. This section shall not prevent any person from seeking or holding the office of governor, secretary of state, or member of Congress. This section shall not apply to employment by or election to a constitutional convention.

The purpose of the prohibition is to remove temptation and improper motives from considerations of legislators in voting for increased salaries or the creation of new offices. Warwick v. State, supra, at 388. Because prohibitions like this are contrary to general public policy which favors eligibility for office, they are usually given a literal construction and are rarely expanded beyond their literal terms. Id. at 389. Where there is doubt as to their coverage, courts have emphasized that when the office is elective, the preference for eligibility is stronger, since voters thereby exercise a direct control. Id.

In connection with legislative office,

the relevant terms of the prohibition are as follows:

During the term for which elected and  
for one year thereafter, no legislator  
may be nominated, elected, or appointed  
to any other office . . . the salary or  
emoluments of which have been increased,  
while he was a member. Alaska Constitution.  
art. II, §5 (emphasis added).

Reading the prohibition purely literally, it does  
not apply to a legislator's running for a seat in the other house  
of the legislature. His office, that of a "legislator," remains  
the same. While the term of office differs (four years for members  
of the senate, two years for members of the house) and the consti-  
tuency may differ, the "office" of "legislator" is constant.

This literal interpretation gives full effect to  
the purpose of the prohibition (to prevent improper motives  
in voting on a salary increase). Indeed, expanding the coverage  
of the provision would not further the purpose of the section  
but would in fact be irrational. This is so because the members  
of both houses receive the same salary and emoluments. There is

The Honorable Lowell Thomas, Jr.  
Lieutenant Governor

June 29, 1976  
Page Four

no question that, following a salary increase, a legislator may run for re-election to his own seat. No possible purpose is served then by barring a legislator from running for a seat in the other house.

The question you have raised was touched on by Judge Carlson in his opinion in Warwick but not in any detailed fashion. In his Memorandum of Decision, Judge Carlson noted that originally, the proposed section 5 contained an express provision allowing election to the other house of the legislature and that it was stricken from the final document. This, in the Judge's passing view appeared to raise questions concerning eligibility in situations like this, though as he noted, "this does not appear to have been the framers' intent". In fact, however, the exception Judge Carlson made reference to had no relation to the prohibition in issue here. It was, rather, an exception to an altogether different prohibition, and both that prohibition and that exception were deleted by the framers.

As originally proposed, section 5 provided:

No legislator or other elective or  
appointive officer of this state shall

The Honorable Lowell Thomas, Jr.  
Lieutenant Governor

June 29, 1976  
Page Five

file or run for election to any other state office until his services have been terminated, but a member of one house of the legislature may be nominated or elected to the other house. 6 Proceedings Alaska Constitutional Convention, App. V, at 30 (emphasis added).

This is the prohibition and exception which were deleted by the framers. The purpose of that provision was not to eliminate temptation and improper motivation in voting on salary increases or creating offices but rather to "prevent any state official from using his office or expense account as a vehicle for campaigning for another office." Committee on Legislative Branch, Commentary, on file with Legislative Affairs Agency; quoted by the lower court in its Memorandum Decision, supra, at 10 and in Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 30, text and n. 7 (Alaska 1968). The framers decided that this prohibition went too far in that it would, with but the single exception expressed in the provision, require any public official who sought higher office to resign. Accordingly, they deleted the prohibition, including the exception, which-- without the prohibition--was meaningless. 3 Proceedings Alaska

The Honorable Lowell Thomas, Jr.  
Lietenant Governor

June 29, 1976  
Page Six

Constitutional Convention 1801-1816. The distinction between the two prohibitions and their respective exceptions was noticed and described in the course of the debate. Id. at 1803 (dialogue of Taylor and Sundborg).

Accordingly, while the Supreme Court has limited the exceptions to the operation of section 5 to those expressly made by the Alaska Constitution, Warwick v. State, supra; Beigich v. Jefferson, supra, no exception is required here, because the prohibition has no application to a legislator's running for legislative office and it should not be expanded to apply to one's doing so. Cf. Warwick v. State, supra, at 389.

Sincerely yours,

Avrum M. Gross  
Attorney General

AMG:db:RWP

# STATE OF ALASKA

JAY S. HAMMOND, GOVERNOR

## DEPARTMENT OF LAW

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

POUCH. R. - STATE CAPITOL  
FILING 95811

December 27, 1976

The Honorable Christopher R. Cooke  
Judge of the Superior Court  
P. O. Box 555  
Bethel, Alaska 99559

Re: Prohibition against  
dual office holding.

Dear Judge Cooke:

You have asked whether as a judge you may also continue to be a regent of the University of Alaska. Your situation is that you are a member of the Board of Regents and have recently been appointed to the Superior Court. Judges of the Superior Court are prohibited from holding "any other office or position of profit under the United States, the State, or its political subdivisions." Art. IV, §14 (emphasis added).

### Introduction

While the answer to your question should be plain on its face, there exist in Alaska a number of commissions in the executive branch whose membership includes legislators and one commission whose membership includes two legislators and the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. The question is whether these memberships offend the prohibition against dual office holding, and if not, whether membership on the Board of Regents by a governor, legislator or judge

is also valid. It is our opinion that neither the prohibition against dual office holding nor the separation of powers doctrine absolutely forbids the formation of inter-branch commissions but that the Board of Regents is not an inter-branch commission, and a judge may not, therefore, sit as a regent while holding office. \*/

#### Discussion

At the outset it should be noted that the prohibition against dual office holding is literally enforced in Alaska. State v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1968). The purpose of the prohibition is ". . . to guard against conflicts of interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration of power, and dilution of separation of powers in regard to the exercise . . . of the executive, judicial, and legislative functions of our state government." Id., at 35. The Alaska Supreme Court has concluded that the very limited exceptions to the prohibition necessarily result in its very broad application. Id., at 30-33. In essence, because only service in the armed forces and election to or employment by a constitutional convention are excluded, the prohibition must include all other offices and positions of profit. Id.

Judges and justices are not only prohibited from holding any other office under the United States and the State (as are legislators) but also from holding any office

---

\*/ By the same token, neither a legislator, art. II, §5, nor the Governor, art. III, §6, may sit as a regent.

of a political subdivision (as is the governor). Plainly, the framers of our constitution imposed a broad bar against conflicts of interest on the judiciary and the chief executive. Alaska Constitution, Art. II, §5; art. III, §6; art. IV, §14. In essence, that is the legal context in which your question arises. We turn next to the existing situation with respect to the inter-branch commissions and the board of regents.

The Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education consists of persons who represent the University of Alaska, the SJC, the Department of Education, the general public, vocational education groups, local college advisory councils, and the legislature. AS 14.40.903(a). The commission is "advisory," on the one hand, AS 14.40.909(a), and something of a clearinghouse, on the other. AS 14.40.909(b)(2)(4). However, it does appear to exercise some sovereign, executive powers. AS 14.40.909(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6), and AS 14.40.909(c) (in part). To the extent that it does so, the presence of members of the legislature on the commission appears to violate the prohibition against dual office holding, Alaska Constitution, art. II, §5, and the separation of powers doctrine. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405-406 (1928); Book v. State Office Bldg. Commn., 149 N.E. 2d 273, 296 (Ind. 1958); Saxby v. Sonnemann, 149 N.E. 526, 528 (Ill. 1925). \*/

---

\*/ Because it is not germane to your question, we do not discuss the highly questionable method employed for appointing the members of this commission under AS 14.40.903(a). Suffice to say that they are of dubious validity. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976).

The Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice, AS 44.19.746--758, is essentially an intra-governmental, inter-branch clearinghouse. It is a means for providing advice and exchanges of information and recommendations between the branches on matters of criminal justice. While this commission may incidentally exercise some administrative power, AS 44.19.756, there is nothing to indicate that this exercise is not in furtherance of each branch's separate powers or that any branch encroaches upon or tries to exercise the powers of another. The executive functions of the commission's staff are expressly under the executive branch, AS 44.19.758. Were the legislative or judicial members of this commission to exercise powers of the executive branch, the validity of their membership would be much in doubt. Since all laws are presumed to be constitutional, and there is nothing to show that the law establishing the governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice is being applied in an unconstitutional manner, it is proper to view the membership of the legislators and the Chief Justice as additional to their other duties, i.e., as legislative and judicial functions, representing their respective branches of the government. \*/

---

\*/ We do not comment on the apparent disparity between the state and federal laws on how this representation should be achieved. Compare AS 44.19.748 and 754 with 42 U.S.C.A. §3723. Suffice to say that there is nothing wrong per se with such representation qua representation.

Again, we emphasize that, were the legislators or the chief justice to exercise the administrative or law enforcement powers of the executive branch through their membership on this commission, then the prohibition against dual office holding, Alaska Constitution, art. II, §5, and art. IV, §14, and the separation of powers doctrine would be violated.

The Commission on the Conference of the Law of the Sea, AS 44.19.789, also in the office of the governor and also with members from the legislature, is essentially an advisory group. It gathers and disseminates information. Since both the executive and legislative branches may perform such functions, no reason appears why they may not do them together. Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The legislators appointed to this commission may in no way exercise or encroach on the powers of the executive branch. They serve on it merely as representatives of the legislative branch in furtherance of its law making functions.

The Alaska International Development Commission, AS 44.19.400, is also in the office of the governor. Its members include, inter alia, the State's congressional delegation and a state senator and representative. AS 44.19.410. The Governor is chairman. AS 44.19.430. Its functions are almost purely advisory and informational, i.e., it has no power to execute. AS 44.19.440. The presence of legislators on this commission is plainly in a representative capacity and violates neither the prohibition against dual office holding nor the separation of powers doctrine.

The Rural Affairs Commission is also in the office of the governor, AS 44.19.720, and legislators may be appointed to it. AS 44.19.722(b). This commission's sole functions are to gather and to disseminate information and make recommendations. As with similar bodies discussed above, no reason occurs why legislators may not serve on such a body in a representative capacity.

Again, we emphasize that we are observing--as we must--the presumption that a statute is constitutional. Nothing on the face of the several statutes examined here--with the exception of AS 14.40.909(b)(1), (4)--(6) and AS 14.40.909(c) (in part)--requires the members of one branch to exercise the powers of another branch or to exercise the powers of another office, i.e., each merely performs additional duties in his capacity as legislator, governor, administrator, and, in one instance, as chief justice. Accordingly, absent a factual showing of encroachment--or of acting in another capacity--we find no other constitutional offense. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 142 N.E. 401, 403 (Ohio 1924). If--in fact--an encroachment or dual office holding were to exist, then the presumption of constitutionality would be rebutted, and our opinion would be different.

The Board of Regents of the University of Alaska is altogether different from these advisory and clearinghouse commissions. "The University of Alaska shall be governed by a board of regents." Alaska Constitution, Art. VII, §3. Its function is to ". . . formulate policy and appoint the president of the university." Id. The latter is ". . . the

executive officer of the board." Id. Governing, formulating university policies, and appointing university presidents are executive functions. Compare, Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976). At any event, it seems rather obvious that they are not functions of the judicial branch. Compare, Alaska State-Operated School System v. Mueller, 536 P.2d 99, 103 (Alaska 1975).

In establishing the Alaska Commission on Post-secondary Education, the Alaska Legislature expressly affirmed . . . the legal authority for the operation and management of the statewide university system remains with the Board of Regents of the University of Alaska . . ." AS 14.40.901(b). This authority over the "operation and management" of the university arises from the Alaska Constitution, Art. VII, §3, and is more particularly provided for by statute. AS 14.40.170, 250, 280, 350, and 360. All the powers devolved upon the board are essentially administrative, i.e., to execute in accordance with law.

It simply is not within the province of the office of a judge of the Superior Court to manage and control the university's property and invest its money, execute its leases, select its lands, hire and fire its presidents, set salaries, and otherwise manage the university. These are not judicial functions.

You suggest that the position of regent is neither an office nor a position of profit as those terms are used in the constitution. The very limited exceptions from the application of those terms expressly made in the constitution,

Art. II, §5 (legislators), Art. XII, §3 (general exemption), precludes our arriving at that conclusion. While not a position of profit, i.e., not salaried employment, the position of regent of the University of Alaska is--almost by definition--an office of the State. First, it is one of the few offices provided for by the constitution. Art. XII, §3. Second, regents are appointed to their positions by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the legislature. *Id.* They have fixed terms of office. AS 14.40.140. They exercise a specific and significant share of the sovereign power of the State which is expressly provided for by constitution and statute. These factors are those which characterize an office of government. See, Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 31 n. 10 (Alaska 1968). Both Black's and Words and Phrases so thoroughly confirm this view that further citation would be wastefully redundant.

A judge does not sit on the Board of Regents in a representative capacity of the judicial branch. When he sits as a regent he is not exercising judicial power but rather certain executive powers of control vested in the regents over the State's sole institution of higher learning. This he may not do. Alaska Constitution, Art. IV, §14. The University of Alaska is an instrumentality of the State, and membership on its Board of Regents is necessarily an office under the State. Compare, University of Alaska v. National Aircraft Leasing, Ltd., 536 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1975) with, Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968).

The Honorable Christopher R. Cooke


December 27, 1976

Page Nine

Accordingly, it is our view that it would be improper for you to continue to serve as a regent of the University of Alaska. We would appreciate your resignation from that office at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

AVRLM M. GROSS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:   
Rodger W. Feguel  
Assistant Attorney General

cc: Hon. Jay Hammond, Governor  
Hon. Robert Boochever, Chief Justice  
Mr. Robert Hiatt, President, University of Alaska  
Mr. Arthur H. Snowden, Administrative Director,  
Alaska Court System

November 16, 1977

The Honorable George Holman  
Senator  
Pouch V  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Re: Constitutionality of  
legislators serving on  
state bond committee -  
Our file J-66-265-78

Dear Senator Holman:

You have asked whether it would be constitutional for the chairman of the House and Senate finance committees to be members of the State Bond Committee.

The short answer is no.

The Alaska Constitution provides for the separation of powers between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the government. Hammer v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976); Laege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963). The doctrine of the separation of powers precludes one branch from exercising the power of another. Hampton Jr. & Co v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Nor may one branch intrude into the functions of another. Mabury v.

Senator Hohman  
November 16, 1977  
Page 12

Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-171 (1803); Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976). The State Bond Committee is within the executive branch and performs executive functions. AS 37.15.101 - 160; cf., Walker v. Alaska State Mtg. Ass'n., 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966). Accordingly, membership on the committee by members of the legislature would violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Additionally, the Alaska Constitution prohibits members of the legislature from holding any other office. Alaska Const., art. II, §5; Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968). While some jurisdictions allow inter-branch committees for financial matters, e.g., Woodward v. Riley, 152 So 2d 41 (La. 1963), the prohibitions contained in art. II, §5 are literally and strictly enforced in Alaska. Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976); Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968). Membership on the state bond committee would constitute dual-office holding for legislators and violate the prohibition. Cf., Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm., 169 N.E. 2d 273 (Ind. 1958); Opinion of the Justices, 17 N.E. 2d 337, 316-317 (Mass. 1939).

Finally, the appointing authority for offices in the executive branch is the governor. Bradner v. Hammond,

Senator Honman  
November 16, 1977  
Page #3

553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976); Alaska Const., art. VII, §525, 26. He appoints the heads of the principal departments, and therefore, no problem arises from a statute which provides for several of them to serve, ex officio, as members of the bond committee, i.e., they are, in fact, appointed by the governor. But if the law were to designate legislative committee chairmen, i.e., persons appointed by the legislature or its officers, to hold an office in the executive branch, then there would be a serious constitutional problem. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); cf., Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976).

It is not our opinion that either the separation of powers doctrine or the prohibition against dual-office holding absolutely forbids the formation of inter-branch committees. Those inter-branch committees which are established as clearinghouses for an exchange of ideas and advice on a given subject and which do not exercise sovereign power, i.e., which do not make, execute, or declare the law, do not offend either prohibition. cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); State v. Powell, 142 N.W. 451 (Ohio 1924). But acting for the State to carry out the laws which authorize the issuance of bonds is, by definition, executing law, and that function does fall within the terms of the

Senator Hohman  
November 13, 1977  
Page #4

prohibition. Put another way, discussing and advising on the matter may be done by an inter-branch committee; deciding upon and acting on the matter may not.

Very truly yours,

AVRIL M. GROSS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: Rodger W. Pegues  
Assistant Attorney General

RWP:jeh

03/05/01 MON 14:30 FAX 907 3434313

MOA CLERK

002

Von Gemmingen, Van Ertan  
Traini, Tescha, Ahnau,  
Taylor, Clementson,

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54

CLERK'S OFFICE

APPROVED

Date 2-27-01

Submitted by: Assemblymembers Fairclough,  
Tremaine

Prepared by: Assembly Office

For reading: FEBRUARY 27, 2001

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA  
AR NO. 2001-44

A RESOLUTION OF THE ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY OPPOSING SENATE  
BILL 88, "AN ACT RELATING TO METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS AND TO  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION FOR THE ANCHORAGE  
METROPOLITAN AREA, AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE"

WHEREAS, the current Metropolitan Planning Organization consists of two Assemblymembers,  
the Mayor, and two representatives from the State of Alaska (Department of Transportation and  
Department of Environmental Conservation); and

WHEREAS, the Municipality and the State currently have a balanced and cooperative working  
relationship in the development of transportation and air quality plans; and

WHEREAS, 23 United States Code 134 states that a metropolitan planning organization is  
designated "by agreement among the Governor and the units of general purpose local government."; and

WHEREAS, the Municipality and the Governor must agree to any changes in the existing  
Metropolitan Planning Organization's membership; and

WHEREAS, the action to change the AMATS process, entered into unilaterally by the State of  
Alaska could endanger federal highway funding for Anchorage, which is intended to be handled  
cooperatively between the Municipality and the State; and

WHEREAS, the Assembly does not support inclusion of voting (or nonvoting) members from the  
Senate and the House.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Anchorage Assembly resolves:

Section 1: That the Assembly opposes Senate Bill 88 which modifies the membership of the  
Metropolitan Planning Organization.

Section 2: That the Municipal Clerk forward copies of this resolution to the Governor and the State  
Legislature upon passage and approval.

PASSED AND APPROVED by the Anchorage Municipal Assembly this 27<sup>th</sup> day of  
February, 2001.

Fay Von Gemmingen  
Chair

ATTEST:

Lizbeth Ferguson  
Municipal Clerk

# FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA  
2001 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Fiscal Note Number: \_\_\_\_\_  
Bill Version: SB88  
( ) Publish Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Revision Date/Time (Note if correction): \_\_\_\_\_ Dept. Affected: DOT&PF  
Title: An act relating to metropolitan planning BRU: Central Region Planning  
organizations and to establishment... Component: Central Region Planning  
Sponsor: Senator Phillips  
Requester: Senate Transportation Component Number: 557

**Expenditures/Revenues** (Thousands of Dollars)

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below.

| OPERATING EXPENDITURES | FY 2002    | FY 2003    | FY 2004    | FY 2005    | FY 2006    | FY 2007    |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Personal Services      | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Travel                 | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Contractual            | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Supplies               | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Equipment              | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Land & Structures      | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Grants & Claims        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Miscellaneous          | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| <b>TOTAL OPERATING</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> |

|                             |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>CAPITAL EXPENDITURES</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|

|                               |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>CHANGE IN REVENUES ( )</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|

**FUND SOURCE** (Thousands of Dollars)

|                          |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1002 Federal Receipts    | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 1003 GF Match            | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 1004 GF                  | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 1005 GF/Program Receipts | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 1037 GF/Mental Health    | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| Other (Specify Type)     | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>             | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>0.0</b> |

Estimate of any current year (FY2001) cost: 0.0

**POSITIONS**

|           |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full-time | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Part-time | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Temporary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**ANALYSIS:** (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Prepared by: Dennis R. Poshard Phone 465-3904  
Division: Commissioner's Office Date/Time 2/20/01 11:11 AM  
Approved by: Joseph L. Perkins, P.E. Date 2/20/01  
Agency: Commissioner

For distribution information, call the Governor's Legislative Office



**ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE**  
**SENATOR RANDY PHILLIPS**  
Senate District L

Session (Jan-May)  
State Capitol, Rm 103  
Juneau, AK 99801  
(907) 465-4949  
(907) 465-4979 Fax  
Toll Free Anchorage Area  
800-478-4950

Interim  
P.O. Box 142  
Eagle River, AK 99577  
(907) 694-4949  
(907) 694-4948 Fax

February 13, 2001

Honorable John Cowdery  
Senate Transportation Committee  
State Capitol  
Juneau, AK 99801

Re: SB88 Metropolitan Planning Organizations  
**Sponsor Statement**

Dear Chairman Cowdery,

SB88, "An Act relating to metropolitan planning organizations and to establishment of a metropolitan planning organization for the Anchorage metropolitan area," would add two legislators on certain metropolitan planning organizations.

The purpose of SB88 is to assist in making the Anchorage Metropolitan Area Transportation Study, (AMATS), more responsive to the needs of communities. Many legislators feel that they are asked to approve state funding for the development of a multi-modal transportation system--including those projects that have not been established as local community priorities. Legislators have a direct link to constituents and community councils where many of the needs are initiated, and therefore, should have more input into the AMATS Policy Committee.

SB88 adds two legislators from the Anchorage Caucus to the AMATS Committee, increasing the voting Policy Committee from five to seven representatives, and will provide a more adequate level of citizen representation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Randy Phillips".

Senator Randy Phillips



**ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE**  
**SENATOR RANDY PHILLIPS**  
Senate District L

Session (Jan-May)  
State Capitol, Rm 103  
Juneau, AK 99801  
(907) 465-4949  
(907) 465-4979 Fax  
Toll Free Anchorage Area  
800-478-4950

Interim  
P.O. Box 142  
Eagle River, AK 99577  
(907) 694-4949  
(907) 694-4948 Fax

February 13, 2001

Honorable John Cowdery  
Senate Transportation Committee  
State Capitol  
Juneau, AK 99801

Re: SB88 Metropolitan Planning Organizations  
**Request for Hearing**

Dear Chairman Cowdery,

As sponsor of SB88, "An Act relating to metropolitan planning organizations and to establishment of a metropolitan planning organization for the Anchorage metropolitan area," I respectfully request a hearing in the Senate Transportation Committee as soon as possible.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Randy Phillips".

Senator Randy Phillips

