SCOMM

127:27

HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT

(7)
Date Referred to Committee: May 1, 2001 **FURTHER REFERRALS:**

Date of Committee Action: 5-02-01

The HOUSE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AND VETERANS' AFFAIRS Committee considered:
SJR 27

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 27 **NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY IN JUNEAU**

Relating to an Alaska National Guard Armory in Juneau.

Recommends it be replaced with _____CS_____(_____) [ ] Same Title [ ] New Title
For Senate Bills with new title: [ ] Technical Title [ ] New Title: HCR_____

[ ] attach amendments
[ ] add new referral to _____ Committee
[ ] Letter of Intent _____ Committee

List of Abbrev. For Depts.:
ADM
CED
COR
CRT
EED
DEC
DFG
GOV
HSS
LAA
LAW
LWF
MVA
DNR
DPS
REV
DOT
UA

***NEW* FISCAL NOTES** *For Chief Clerk's Office Use Only				
FN# *	List by Dept(s):	Fiscal	Indet.	Zero

***PREVIOUS* FISCAL NOTES**				
List by Dept(s):	FN #	Fiscal	Indet.	Zero
(5) STA				✓

Signing with recommendations	Printed Last Name	DP	DNP	NR	AM
Pete Kott	KOTT	✓			
[signature]	Green			✓	
[signature]	Hayes	✓			
[signature]	CISSNA	✓			
Chair: [signature]	Chenault	✓			
Chair:					

Special Committee on Military & Veterans' Affairs
Representative Mike Chenault, Chair

Committee Members
Representative Bev Masek
Representative Lisa Murkowski
Representative Joe Green
Representative Pete Kott
Representative Sharon Cissna
Representative Joe Hayes

Alaska State Capitol, Room 432
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Phone 907-465-3779
Fax 907-465-2833

AGENDA

May 2, 2001 3:00 – 3:30 Room 102

I. Call to order

II. Roll call

III. Introductions

IV. SJR 27 – Supporting a National Guard Armory in Juneau

V. Next Meeting – No scheduled meetings until further notice

VI. Adjournment

SENATOR KIM ELTON

MEMORANDUM

5/1/2001

To: Representative Mike Chenault, Chair
House Special Committee on Military & Veterans' Affairs

From: Senator Kim Elton

Re: Hearing Request for SJR 27

I respectfully request a hearing for SJR 27, supporting a new National Guard armory in Juneau. This resolution expresses the Alaska Legislature's support for the Guard and its mission in Southeast Alaska. The legislature has long proved itself a friend to men and women in uniform, and this resolution provides us with another opportunity to support their service.

I have met with a number of my constituents who are members of the Alaska National Guard on this issue. Support for a new armory is tremendous both in the guard and in the community at large, as evidenced by the City and Borough of Juneau's resolution, which I have attached.

It is important that the resolution pass the Legislature this session to have an impact on the federal project ranking process. I ask that you hear this resolution at your earliest convenience.

Attachments:
Sponsor Statement
Resolution

ALASKA SENATE
STATE CAPITOL • JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801-1182 • (907) 465-4947 • FAX (907) 465-2108
SENATOR_KIM_ELTON@LEGIS.STATE.AK.US

SENATOR KIM ELTON

SJR 27
Supporting a National Guard Armory in Juneau

Sponsor Statement

During the last several years, the Alaska Army National Guard and the University of Alaska Southeast have each sought ways to construct much-needed new facilities. The National Guard armory in Juneau no longer meets the Guard's needs, and must move from its present location because it sits on Mental Health Trust land. The university lacks a suitable student recreational facility. Today, the two institutions are working together to build a joint facility near Auke Bay. This proposed facility would provide a cost-efficient way to meet the needs of both organizations.

In 1998 the Mental Health Land Trust claimed the present site of the Juneau armory as part of a settlement agreement, and the state is currently renting the site at a cost of $330,000 per year. The trust plans to redevelop the site for other uses, so a new Guard facility is essential.

Juneau is the battalion headquarters for the National Guard units in Southeast Alaska. As such, it serves as the nerve center for emergency readiness in the Alaska panhandle. Each region of Alaska poses its own unique characteristics and geographic challenges to emergency response and Guard readiness. The Juneau armory has for years provided the local knowledge and expertise so essential to accomplishing the Guard's mission.

In 1997 and 1998, the legislature recognized the value of a new armory with appropriations totaling $1.7 million for planning, design, and site preparation. Design is complete, and more than half of that funding remains available for future work. Today, as the Guard pursues a federal appropriation for the new joint facility, SJR 27 will show the legislature's official support. Through this resolution, we will demonstrate that the State of Alaska recognizes and supports the Guard and the good work it does in our state.

ALASKA SENATE
STATE CAPITOL • JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801-1182 • (907) 465-4947 • FAX (907) 465-2108
SENATOR_KIM_ELTON@LEGIS.STATE.AK.US

FISCAL NOTE

STATE OF ALASKA
2001 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Fiscal Note Number: 1
Bill Version: SJR 27
(S) Publish Date: 4/27/01

Revision Date/Time (Note if correction): _____
Dept. Affected: _____
Title: National Guard Armory in Juneau
BRU: _____
Component: _____
Sponsor: Senator Elton
Requester: State Affairs Committee
Component Number: _____

Expenditures/Revenues (Thousands of Dollars)

Note: Amounts do not include inflation unless otherwise noted below.

OPERATING EXPENDITURES	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007
Personal Services						
Travel						
Contractual						
Supplies						
Equipment						
Land & Structures						
Grants & Claims						
Miscellaneous						
TOTAL OPERATING	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES						
CHANGE IN REVENUES ( )						

FUND SOURCE (Thousands of Dollars)

1002 Federal Receipts						
1003 GF Match						
1004 GF						
1005 GF/Program Receipts						
1037 GF/Mental Health						
Other (Specify Type)						
TOTAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Estimate of any current year (FY2001) cost: 0.0

POSITIONS

Full-time						
Part-time						
Temporary						

ANALYSIS: *(Attach a separate page if necessary)*

Prepared by: SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE Phone 465-4522

Senator: /s/ SENATOR THERRIAULT Date 4/25/01
Committee Chair

COMMITTEE COPY

CITY/BOROUGH OF JUNEAU
ALASKA'S CAPITAL CITY

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
Telephone: (907) 586-5240;
Facsimile: (907) 586-5385
Sally_Smith@ci.juneau.ak.us

March 23, 2001

The Honorable Kim Elton
Alaska State Senator
Mail Stop 3100
Juneau, AK 99801-1182

Subject: Resolution of the City & Borough of Juneau, Serial No. 2086
A Resolution Encouraging State and Federal Funding for the Relocation of the Alaska National Guard Armory

Dear Senator Elton:

Enclosed is a copy of a resolution adopted at the March 19, 2001 meeting of the City and Borough of Juneau, Alaska Assembly, in support of relocation of the Alaska National Guard Armory.

The National Guard plays a vital role in the safety and welfare of Southeast Alaska during times of natural disasters and emergencies. The steep mountains, deep waters, open oceans and inland channels of Southeast Alaska provide for a challenging environment for emergency management, and it is imperative that rescue workers understand the climate, culture and coordinates of the area.

The men and women serving in the National Guard in Juneau are our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends, who give many hours of their busy lives perfecting their emergency readiness skills. We depend on their expertise in times of crisis, tragedy and loss. Those who serve, deserve modern training facilities to provide for their safety and education.

The City and Borough of Juneau unanimously supports the relocation and construction of a new National Guard Readiness Center in Juneau. Please lend your support to this effort. I would be happy to discuss this project with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Sally Smith
Mayor

Presented by: The Manager
Introduced: 03/19/2001
Drafted by: S. Gilbertson / J. Corso

RESOLUTION OF THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA

Serial No. 2086

A Resolution Encouraging State and Federal Funding for the Relocation of the Alaska National Guard Armory.

WHEREAS, the Alaska National Guard has occupied an armory in downtown Juneau since 1960, and

WHEREAS, the property on which the armory is located is now owned by the Alaska Mental Health Trust, and

WHEREAS, the City and Borough of Juneau and the Mental Health Trust have worked together to provide a new site for a National Guard Readiness Center, and

WHEREAS, relocation of the facility will allow a significant area of the downtown waterfront to be redeveloped for a mixture of private and public uses, and

WHEREAS, the City and Borough of Juneau has donated ten acres of land for construction of a new National Guard Readiness Center, and

WHEREAS, the National Guard is also considering constructing a joint facility with the University of Alaska Southeast, and

WHEREAS, it is vitally important for the safety and welfare of Juneau residents that a National Guard facility be constructed to provide necessary assistance in times of natural disasters or other emergencies, and

WHEREAS, the National Guard facility will also serve the needs of other Southeast Alaska communities which have limited emergency services;

//

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NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA:

Section 1. That the Alaska Congressional delegation and the Governor of Alaska are respectfully requested to provide the federal and state funding necessary to construct a new National Guard Readiness Center in Juneau.

Section 2. Effective Date. This resolution shall be effective immediately upon adoption.

Adopted this 19th day of March, 2001.

Sally Smith, Mayor

Attest:

Laurie J. Sica, Clerk

SJR 27 – "National Guard Armory in Juneau"

List of Witnesses

Jessee Kiel, staff Sen. Elton	**465-4947**
Mac Metcalfe, 624 6th St. Juneau, Ak 99801	**586-1534**
Carol Carroll, Director DMVA	**465-4730**

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET REPORT TO GOVERNOR TONY KNOWLES

CONFIDENTIAL

November 5, 2001

Maj. Gen. Phillip Oates
Adjutant General / Commissioner
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

TONY KNOWLES, GOVERNOR

PO BOX 5750
FT. RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505-5750
PHONE: (907) 428-7000
FAX: (907) 428-7009
www.ak-prepared.com

December 11, 2001

Representative Mike Chenault
Chair, House Military and Veterans Affairs Committee
Alaska House of Representatives
145 Main Street Loop, Suite 221
Kenai, Alaska 99611

Dear Representative Chenault:

Enclosed is the "Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet Report to Governor Tony Knowles" you requested. The enclosure constitutes the entire report, exactly as it went to the Governor, to include the following four subgroup reports: Transportation Security, Information Technology/Telecommunications Security, Energy/Security and Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management.

Because of your position in the House, we understand your need for more details and specifics versus the "public" version released by the Governors Office. However, we emphatically request that you retain this information for your personal use only. As you can see the report contains sensitive information, that if released to the public, could compromise security. In addition, in the wrong hands, this version of the report could jeopardize the Governor's Homeland Security appropriations bill.

Thank you for your interest in the bill and for your understanding and commitment to keeping the enclosed version of the report confidential.

I'll be out of the State until December 22nd. If you have any immediate questions about the report please call Wayne Rush, my Homeland Security Coordinator (428-7032). In any case, I'll be glad to speak with you about the report upon my return.

Sincerely,

Phillip E. Oates

PHILLIP E. OATES, Commissioner
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

Enclosure: "Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet Report to Governor Tony Knowles"

Cc: Carol Caroll

peo:war:lvg

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STATE OF ALASKA

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

from the

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

November 5, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Additional Information

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW & SUMMARY

An analysis of the terrorism threat to Alaska, the State's current capability to meet that threat, the risks that result from lack of full capability in certain areas, and the actions the State needs to take to eliminate or reduce those risks.

The recommendations contained in this report, and any action taken on them by the State of Alaska, reflect an evaluation and weighing of safety, risk, and economic, budgetary, social, and other public policy factors. Preparedness for and response to terrorist threats and incidents cannot be reduced to a single set of guidelines, but inherently involves the exercise of discretion in decision making. Nothing in this report shall establish an actionable duty of care, standard of care, or liability of the state or any state official for claims arising out of the planning, implementation, preparedness, response, and other activities discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The tragic events of September 11th have vaulted Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness over most other issues requiring immediate attention at all levels of government. The purpose of this report is to provide the Governor of the State of Alaska with the Disaster Policy Cabinet (DPC) assessment and recommendations concerning Terrorism/WMD policy, priorities and resources.

B. At the request of the Governor, the Disaster Policy Cabinet met on September 26, 2001 to begin an assessment of Terrorism/WMD in Alaska. The following approach was established by the DPC and subsequently approved.

1. The DPC, because of its experience in addressing all-hazard disaster response and recovery, is the appropriate State agency to review and forward Terrorism/WMD policy, priority and resource requirement recommendations to the Governor.
2. Because of the complexity of Terrorism/WMD, the DPC established five ad hoc sub-cabinet groups to develop comprehensive reports and recommendations. The focus of four of the sub-cabinet groups was primarily on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The focus of the fifth was the response and recovery from such an attack. The subgroups and chairpersons are as follows:
   a. Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Sub-cabinet: Co-chairs - Commissioners Jay Livey (DHSS) and Phillip Oates (DMVA)
   b. Energy Security Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs - Deputy Commissioners Del Smith (DPS) and Marty Rutherford (DNR)
   c. Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Glenn Godfrey (DPS)
   d. Information Technology and Telecommunications Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Commissioner Jim Duncan (DOA)
   e. Transportation Security Sub-cabinet: Chair - Deputy Commissioner Boyd Brownfield (DOT & PF)
3. The DPC established the following principles to guide sub-cabinet efforts to establish priorities and recommendations:

a. Strengthen existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives
b. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies
c. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide importance
d. Maintain continuity of government operations at all levels
e. Reinforce first responder capabilities
f. Use deployable resources to augment areas with inadequate capabilities
g. Maintain appropriate balance between security and individual freedom
h. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times
i. Maximize use of existing or anticipated Federal programs and grants
j. Share costs at all levels, both public and private

C. The DPC met weekly to assess progress of the sub-cabinet group efforts to develop a report to the Governor in each subject area. In each case, the sub-cabinet groups compared the threat and the State's current capabilities to minimize or eliminate the threat. The vulnerabilities that emerged from these assessments became the basis for sub-cabinet recommendations. Because of many overlapping issues, the Energy and Security Sub-cabinet groups combined their reports. The four resulting reports, each accompanied by an executive summary of recommendations, are attached as follows:

Tab A Transportation Security

Tab B Information Technology/Telecommunications Security

Tab C Energy/Security

Tab D Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management

D. Section II of this Executive Summary provides information concerning the key assets in the state. Section III describes the Threat. Section IV assesses Alaska's fundamental ability to respond to terrorism. Section V outlines a proposal that could allow states to increase use of the National Guard. Section VI addresses local considerations. Section VII establishes general State priorities. Section VIII proposes legislative actions. Section IX highlights funding issues. Section X summarizes the Sub-cabinet recommendations for urgent and immediate action and Section XI summarizes the longer-term recommendations.

II. KEY ASSETS/POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS

A preliminary list of Alaska's key assets, which might become targets for terrorists, is contained at Tab E of this report. These assets are grouped geographically. Power plants and airports are considered critical in every region of the State. Elements of TAPS are, of course, on the list of key assets, as are military installations and State/Federal buildings. The list is not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive. It is presented to give a sense of the types of assets that must be considered.

III. THE THREAT

A. In a free and open society, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence of terrorist activities and threats becomes increasingly important. That quality of

intelligence allows all levels of business and government to increase efforts to protect citizens and infrastructure during periods of increasing threats, assuming adequate resources, policies, and procedures are available.

B. Inter-agency sharing of intelligence information and complementary efforts to analyze that information are key to our ability to establish appropriate threat levels and increase protective measures at the right places and at the right times. We are fortunate in Alaska because interagency cooperation is strong at all levels—local, state, and federal. Our strong interagency relationships in Alaska, however, cannot overcome many Federal statutes and policies that limit the exchange of information and intelligence with the Departments of Defense and Justice. Although these firewalls exist to protect information and intelligence sources, they also inhibit the ability of states and territories to fight terrorism. A comprehensive review at the national level is necessary to establish the changes that would retain essential safeguards yet would improve quick and timely access to critical information and intelligence by states and territories.

C. We must also remember that even good coordination of inter-agency efforts and effective sharing of information will not allow a perfect assessment of the terrorist threat to Alaska. However, all current assessments by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies agree that there are no known groups in Alaska that have the objective of conducting a large-scale attack or the capability to conduct such an attack. Yet, we cannot discount the possibility that individuals—for a variety of personal, political, or religious motives—could independently attack a facility or concentration of people without warning. This could be done through various delivery means such as the mail.

D. The 11 September disaster and subsequent events reveal that international terrorists are well funded, well organized and fully capable of attacking the United States. Therefore, we will assume that Alaska is a potential target. Alaska does have relatively large population centers and targets of national significance, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) being the most prominent. Our geographic isolation from the "lower 48" does not guarantee that these potential targets will have immunity from attack. It is also important to recognize another reality. As our nation improves its homeland security and targets become more difficult to attack, terrorists could well look to targets that are less protected. Alaska can reduce the changes of becoming a target by devoting the resources and efforts to improve our capability to identify, protect, and respond to those attacks.

E. In the event of a terrorist attack, the State may have to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each event presents a different challenge and requires different resources for prevention, response, and protection. Since no state will ever have sufficient resources to respond to every possible contingency in every location where an attack might occur, threat and risk assessments are necessary.

1. Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the capability of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given relatively lower priority than preparation for other threats.

2. As recent events indicate, chemical/biological attacks are possible. Terrorists have the means to make the substances and deliver them. The State does have some capabilities to respond to these attacks, however, improvements are necessary. These

types of threats, because of the possibility of an attack and the potential consequences, are given a high priority for resources.

3. Other events, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the World Trade Center, highlight terrorist capabilities to employ high explosive/incendiary devices. For the largest-scale attacks, there are no jurisdictions in our country capable of a complete response. Strong public safety and law enforcement efforts, however, have proven effective in preventing these attacks. Since these attacks are possible, this area is also given a high priority for resources.

IV. THE ABILITY TO RESPOND

A. Alaska is fortunate in that its constitution provides a strong Office of the Governor that has unified and singular authority over the Executive Branch. This structure is proving to have many advantages over other models of State governments in dealing with terrorism. In addition, the policies and procedures established in Alaska over the last ten years—because of oil spills, natural disasters at the state and federal level, and Y2K efforts—have produced integrated and effective emergency management and inter-agency procedures.

B. The Federal Response Plan provides an appropriate and effective foundation for response and recovery from emergencies and disasters in the nation. It also outlines the procedures to quickly provide resources from federal and state levels to augment and assist efforts by first responders at the local level. Alaska's frequent natural disasters have served to improve emergency management and response at and between local, state and federal levels

C. The procedures listed below have also made Alaska more capable of responding to any emergency or disaster, including terrorism and the threat from an attack with weapons of mass destruction.

1. Disaster Policy Cabinet that provides coordinated, timely, and appropriate policy and resource recommendations to the Governor
2. State Emergency Operations Plan that delineates agency and departmental responsibilities
3. State Emergency Coordination Center that operates 24/7/365
4. State Emergency Response Commission that focuses on planning, preparing, and training for emergencies and disasters
5. Local Emergency Planning Committees throughout the state that have an all-hazards charter
6. Incident Command System that is modeled on the National Interagency Incident Management System

D. Alaska is also one of 22 states where the Adjutant General and Commander of the National Guard is also a Cabinet member responsible for state emergency management. This arrangement helps encourage unification and synergy of efforts while facilitating inter- and intra-agency coordination and assistance at local, state, and federal levels. The recent addition of a 24/7/365 State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) capability in Alaska adds yet another advantage. We are now one of some 19 states that have a

more rapid means to react, respond, and provide resources to a WMD or other emergency event where the time, efficiency, and effectiveness of that response are critical for success.

E. Since 1996, the State has had a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) working group developing a Level A capability for chemical response. The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) provides the chair for this group that meets periodically to inventory and update a list of HAZMAT capabilities in Alaska and develop statewide standard operating procedures.

1. With the consensus of the work group, DEC has built upon the core HAZMAT capability for the two largest fire departments— Anchorage and Fairbanks. Both now have 24-hour Level A capability, with 40 responders in Anchorage and 24-30 in Fairbanks. Agreements with Anchorage and Fairbanks allow deployment of these teams anywhere in the state at the direction of the State On Scene Coordinator. Under these agreements, the State reimburses the cost of response and relieves the communities of liability, indemnification, and worker's compensation responsibilities.

2. A chart of all available HAZMAT resources from industry, federal agencies, and fire departments is maintained and available from DEC or the SECC. There are also 33 local response agreements with local communities to increase HAZMAT training, funding, and response throughout Alaska. Training is routinely available by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DEC, and the National Guard. To date, there are 1,895 trained personnel in Alaskan communities (a total that includes 786 trained National Guard members).

3. There are three immediate needs. The first is to have the core HAZMAT teams equipped and trained to deal with biological threats. The second is to establish additional core regional HAZMAT capabilities in other areas of the state, particularly the Southeast. The third is to ensure that the National Guard 103rd Civil Support Team is fully equipped and certified to respond to any nuclear, biological, or chemical incident.

F. The greatest national shortages in capabilities and resources to respond and react to WMD events are in the areas of public health and medical response. Alaska is no exception to these shortages. To deal with a mass casualty event, our nation and State must make the increase in public health and medical capabilities, and the ability to deploy these resources, very high priorities.

G. There are changes to programs and policies in Alaska that will allow us to be even more effective in responding to terrorism while providing better protection to our citizens and key assets. The following changes will significantly improve the capability of Alaska's Emergency Management System to address events of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

1. Actions are necessary to improve rapid and timely notification to medical personnel at all levels both private and public about any sickness or disease that may be a result of a terrorist attack. Notifications relying on the right individuals reading a fax or electronic mail message will not be sufficient for WMD events.

2. Plans must be completed and approved to receive and distribute the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Alaskan Pharmaceutical Cache.
3. A database should be established of retired and non-active licensed health care providers, veterinarians, and dentists to assist in mass casualty situations.
4. Plans, protocols, and procedures should be refined and strengthened to ensure continuity of government operations and continuous communications at all times—before, during, and after an event.
5. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Management System should address and outline specific policies, procedures, actions, responsibilities, and training for WMD events.
6. Formal and permanent procedures should be developed to obtain, analyze, and disseminate threat information.
7. Standing Incident Management Teams should be established for WMD events.
8. Greater efforts should be made to identify, plan, and exercise urban search and rescue teams, state disaster medical teams, and mortuary teams.

H. In every disaster response over the past few years, after action reviews reveal that the lack of interoperable communications is always at the top of significant issues. Emergency responders from different response units are unable to communicate by radio even when they are only a few yards apart. The Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) could virtually eliminate this long-standing problem. ALMRS will improve the State's ability to respond to all disasters not just WMD events.

V. THE NATIONAL GUARD

A. The Alaska Army National Guard is uniquely structured to accomplish homeland security. The basic mission of the Scout Group is reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of critical sites while operating in hazardous environments. The Scout Group has aviation capabilities—both rotary and fixed wing—to perform other tasks that are important in a homeland security role. These tasks include combat search and rescue, troop and equipment movement, and medical evacuation. The recent addition of a 22-member deployable team to the Alaska Army National Guard—the 103rd Civil Support Team—also provides a significant ability to accomplish rapid assessment, testing, identification, and detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents and limited decontamination operations and communication support while giving expert on-scene advice to first responders.

B. Federal statutory and policy changes are now possible that could permit greater use of the National Guard on a daily basis in a homeland security role. This is because of the recent and more liberal legal interpretation of "other duties" in 32 USC 112 that allowed federally funded National Guard forces to perform airport security roles, while remaining under a Governor's control. The Alaska National Guard is already one of several states that have another program that fits this new model. This program provides federally funded National Guard personnel and equipment for inter-agency support of drug demand reduction and counter drug activities under the direction of the Governor.

C. Another change that is seen as desirable would be to give Governors, through their Adjutant Generals, coordination authority over all military forces in the state that are

providing military support to civil authorities. This would provide Governors, who already have broad powers in emergency situations, the ability to coordinate all the actions of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces that are providing support to their states.

VI. LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This report focuses on statewide needs rather than on individual analyses of each community's needs. However, the recommendations in this report assist and broadly supplement local capabilities, either directly or on a regional basis. For example, adding State Troopers, providing first responder training and completing the Health Alert Network are actions in direct support of communities. Expanding the State's public and environmental health capabilities, creating additional Level A HAZMAT Teams, improving security at airports and planning for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile improve the State's capabilities to support communities on a regional basis. When it is recommended that a resource be placed in a specific jurisdiction (e.g., an additional HAZMAT Team), it is to serve as a regional resource, not just a local asset. This regional approach is consistent with the DPC's guiding principles. For high cost, high maintenance and training intensive items, this approach provides efficiency and effectiveness.

VII. GENERAL STATE OF ALASKA PRIORITIES

The review of capabilities and vulnerabilities in Alaska revealed the following five general requirements, listed in highest priority order, that should guide counter terrorism resources during the coming years.

A. Expand public safety capabilities with an emphasis on emergency response and security of communications, transportation, Trans-Alaska Pipeline and public utilities infrastructure

B. Expand public health capabilities to detect and respond to biological or chemical terrorism

C. Establish additional and deployable medical response capabilities

D. Establish training for first responders and a deployable capability to operate in a contaminated environment

E. Secure Alaska's communications infrastructure and provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System for local, state, federal and private entities.

The State should immediately establish an Office of Homeland Security to implement these priorities and the other specific recommendations in this report.

VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

Although Alaska has developed a strong system of emergency management, some legislative or regulatory changes could improve these capabilities. The following areas should have further legal analysis and policy review.

A. Revise Alaska statutes to allow the State to become a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (a national disaster response mutual aid agreement among the states).

B. Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.

C. Revise laws (e.g. AS 18.50.230; 7AAC 05.400) to facilitate the issuance of death certificates in mass casualty situations where recovery of bodies may not be possible or recovery will take an extended period of time.

D. Change AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the definition of "disaster," and by adding the ability to allocate or redistribute pharmaceutical supplies to the Governor's powers under conditions of a disaster emergency.

E. Change AS 26.20 (Civil Defense Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the policy and purpose paragraph to insure this contingency is covered by the act.

F. Modify AAC Title 17 as necessary to accommodate accomplishment of short-term security improvements to the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).

G. Revise AS 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for security infractions involving airport security.

H. Revise AS 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect sensitive security documents.

I. Revise AS 44.62.125 to exempt sensitive airport security programs from regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.

J. Establish legislation to ensure National Guard members who are also state employees do not lose state employment benefits or increases in seniority or retirement when they are mobilized for state or federal active duty.

K. Review the definition of disaster contained in AS 26.20 to determine if the recent legislative changes to that statute adversely impact on the State's ability to respond to WMD events.

IX. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

A. Many of the security tasks related to transportation are dictated by federal mandates such as from the Federal Aviation Agency. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the State will request waivers where appropriate. However, failure to adequately follow mandates that are not waived may result in unacceptable financial or operational sanctions by the federal government. Because of possible sanctions, it is important that security related funding issues be addressed expeditiously.

B. Many of the recommendations in this report require financial investments over the next 18 months. Some of these activities can be handled internally by shifting work activities. But many are well beyond the scope of existing budgets The Priority/Cost Breakdown spreadsheet in Tab G of this report shows both one-time and recurring costs of the DPC's priority recommendations.

C. The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. The funding spreadsheet indicates some areas where federal funds might be available to either replace or supplement state support. The federal support might come in any one of several forms: supplemental federal agency budgets, an economic stimulus package, next year's federal budget, etc. However, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal

government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. There are also some costs which may be most appropriately handled by local governments (e.g. their own planning work) or the private sector (e.g. pipeline security).

X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOST URGENT REQUIREMENTS

A. Begin monitoring access to the Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge by establishing a checkpoint south of the bridge. The bridge, in addition to being the critical feature on the Dalton Highway, also carries TAPS. Positive control of vehicles and personnel at a checkpoint could free up some of the security elements that currently patrol the northern section of the highway. These security elements would be available to provide a greater presence at the most critical and vulnerable areas of the pipeline where damage is much more difficult to repair.

B. Develop procedures to expand the opportunities to use National Guard personnel under Title 32 for WMD emergencies to accomplish State and Federal requirements. This keeps command and control under the Governor but allows Federal funding for National Guard personnel and equipment.

C. Review the statutory and regulatory changes in Section VIII for possible introduction to the Legislature or administrative action.

D. Open the Fox Weigh Station on a 24-hour-per-day, seven days per week basis, to monitor trucks and cargo on the Dalton Highway.

E. Establish pipeline defense drills and formal response and resource procedures for all emergencies.

F. Increase ground and air patrols along the pipeline.

G. Initiate an immediate study of Alaska Marine Highway System physical security requirements for ashore and afloat.

H. Increase the presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at primary airports and implement a variety of other airport security measures.

I. Develop a list of essential bridges and require maintenance personnel to check these bridges on a daily basis.

J. Establish a Transportation Security Officer in DOT/PF to coordinate security of state facilities and disaster preparedness.

K. Meet with key telecommunication providers to ensure disaster recovery planning is adequate to maintain continuity of operations and state government communications.

L. Establish redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.

M. Fund and implement the North Zone Pilot of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System.

N. Establish an Enterprise Data/Network Security Manager Position.

O. Identify telecommunications sites that need added security and take the necessary protective measures.

P. Hire and train four additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams to improve response capabilities for various regions of the state.

Q. Train and equip a Level A Hazardous Materials Team for Juneau to provide regional coverage for Southeast Alaska.

R. Improve the State's preparedness for chemical/biological/radiological and high-explosive/incendiary events with State plans for WMD, (including plans for transportation of mass casualties, receipt and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and a plan for the detection of and response to biological terrorism); an improved intelligence system for the Alaska State Troopers; personnel and equipment decontamination sets; WMD training for first responders and emergency managers; protective equipment for first responders; additional Alaska State Troopers; completion of the Division of Public Health HealthAlert Network; equipment for the 103d Civil Support Team (WMD); improvements to the State Public Health Lab; increased public and environmental health surveillance and testing capabilities; and implementation of a statewide WMD exercise program.

S. Establish an Office of Homeland Security to ensure intensive preparations for countering terrorism in Alaska. This office would mirror the effort at the national level for the Office of Homeland Security recently established by the President. A full description of Alaska's Office of Homeland Security, to include recommended duties and staffing requirements, is found at Tab F.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONGER-TERM

A. Complete and fund Phases I and II of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (recommended by every Sub-cabinet group).

B. Hire additional State Troopers over a two-year period.

C. Develop contingency plans for the State's critical bridges and stockpile moveable temporary bridge spans.

D. Continue to improve security of Ted Stevens Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports.

E. Ensure the physical security of critical IT/Telecom sites.

F. Continue to improve the State's Public Health and Environmental Health bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities.

G. Train and equip three additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams for more comprehensive statewide rapid response.

H. Continue to provide first responder protective equipment.

I. Continue to provide WMD training and conduct WMD exercises.

J. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

Public

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW & SUMMARY
ALASKA'S TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

An analysis of the terrorism threat to Alaska, the State's current capability to meet that threat, the risks that result from lack of full capability in certain areas, and the actions the State needs to take to eliminate or reduce those risks.

The thoughts and recommendations contained in this report, and any action taken on them by the State of Alaska, reflect an evaluation and weighing of safety, risk, and economic, budgetary, social, and other public policy factors. Preparedness for and response to terrorist threats and incidents cannot be reduced to a single set of guidelines, but inherently involves the exercise of discretion in decision-making. Nothing in this report shall establish an actionable duty of care, standard of care, or liability of the state or any state official for claims arising out of the planning, implementation, preparedness, response, and other activities discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The tragic events of September 11th have vaulted Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness over most other issues requiring immediate attention at all levels of government. This executive overview provides a public summary of the comprehensive report prepared by the Disaster Policy Cabinet (DPC) for the Governor of the State of Alaska concerning Terrorism/WMD policy, priorities and resources.

B. The Disaster Policy Cabinet, chaired by Major General Phillip E. Oates, met on September 26, 2001, to begin an assessment of Terrorism/WMD in Alaska. The following approach was established by consensus of the DPC members.

1. The DPC, with its experience in addressing all-hazard disaster response and recovery, was the appropriate State agency to review and forward Terrorism/WMD policy, priority and resource requirement recommendations to the Governor.

2. Because of the complexity of Terrorism/WMD, the DPC established five sub-cabinet groups to develop comprehensive reports and recommendations. The focus of four of the sub-cabinet groups was primarily on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The focus of the fifth was the response and recovery from such an attack. The following sub-cabinet groups and chairpersons were established to complete this task.

   a. Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs – Commissioners Jay Livey (DHSS) and Phillip Oates (DMVA)

   b. Energy Security Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs – Deputy Commissioners Del Smith (DPS) and Marty Rutherford (DNR)

   c. Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Commissioner Glenn Godfrey (DPS)

   d. Information Technology and Telecommunications Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Commissioner Jim Duncan (DOA)

   e. Transportation Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Deputy Commissioner Boyd Brownfield (DOT & PF)

3. The DPC established the following principles that guided sub-cabinet efforts to establish priorities and recommendations:

   a. Strengthen existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives

   b. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies

   c. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide importance

   d. Maintain continuity of government operations at all levels

   e. Reinforce first responder capabilities

   f. Use deployable resources to augment areas with inadequate capabilities

   g. Maintain appropriate balance between security and individual freedom

   h. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times

   i. Maximize use of existing or anticipated Federal programs and grants

   j. Share costs at all levels, both public and private

C. Weekly DPC meetings were held to review the progress of sub-cabinet efforts. Each sub-cabinet compared the threat and the State's capabilities to minimize or eliminate the threat. The vulnerabilities that emerged from these assessments became the basis for sub-cabinet recommendations. Because of many overlapping issues, the Energy and Security Sub-cabinet groups combined their findings and produced a single report. Their combined report and the other three sub-cabinet reports (Domestic Preparedness and Consequence Management, Information Technology and Telecommunications, and Transportation) were included as attachments to the full report of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet. Additionally, the full report included other attachments that described a State Office of Homeland Security, listed key assets in the State, and outlined the costs and timelines for recommendations.

D. Section II of this document provides information concerning the key assets in the state. Section III describes the Threat. Section IV assesses Alaska's fundamental ability to respond to terrorism. Section V outlines a proposal that could allow states to increase use of the National Guard. Section VI addresses local considerations. Section VII establishes general State priorities. Section VIII proposes legislative actions. Section IX highlights funding considerations. Sections X, XI, and XII contain immediate recommendations, longer-term recommendations and a conclusion.

E. This executive overview and summary has been written to protect sensitive information while providing essential information to the public about the process, findings, recommendations and conclusions of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet.

II. KEY ASSETS/POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS

A list of Alaska's key assets that could be targets for terrorists was part of the full report. The assets were grouped geographically. Power plants and airports were considered critical in every region of the State. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) and the Port of Valdez were on the list of key assets, as were military installations and State/Federal buildings. The list was not intended to be fully comprehensive or exhaustive. It was presented to portray the types of assets that must be considered and protected in Alaska.

III. THE THREAT

A. In a free and open society, accurate and timely intelligence of terrorist activities and threats becomes increasingly important. That quality of information will allow all levels of business and government to increase protection of citizens and key assets during periods of increasing threats, assuming adequate resources, policies, and procedures are available. Inter-agency sharing of intelligence information and complementary efforts to analyze information are key to the ability to establish appropriate threat levels and increase protective measures at the right places and at the right times.

B. We are fortunate in Alaska— interagency cooperation is strong at and between all levels of government. Our strong interagency relationships, however, cannot overcome the many Federal statutes and policies that inhibit the exchange of information and intelligence with the Departments of Defense and Justice. Although firewalls exist to protect information and intelligence sources, they also inhibit the ability of states and territories to fight terrorism. A comprehensive national review should be undertaken to establish the changes to statutes and policies that are needed to allow states and territories to better protect their citizens. This will be a challenging task. We will need to retain the most essential safeguards while balancing the protection of our freedoms with the need for timely access to critical information and intelligence by states and territories.

C. All current assessments by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies agree that there are no known groups in Alaska that have the objective of conducting a large-scale attack or the capability to conduct such an attack. Yet, we cannot discount the possibility that individuals— for a variety of personal, political, or religious motives— could independently attack a facility or concentration of people without warning. This could be done through various delivery means such as the mail. We must always keep in mind that even the best coordination of inter-agency efforts and sharing of information will not allow a perfect assessment of the terrorist threat to Alaska.

D. The September 11th disaster and subsequent events reveal that international terrorists are well funded, well organized and fully capable of attacking the United States. Therefore, we will assume that Alaska is a potential target. Alaska does have relatively large population centers and targets of national significance. Our geographic isolation from the "lower 48" does not guarantee that these potential targets will have immunity from attack. It is also important to recognize another reality— as our nation improves its homeland security and targets become more difficult to attack— terrorists could well look to targets that are less protected. Alaska can reduce the chances of becoming a target by devoting resources and efforts that improve the ability to identify, protect, and respond to those attacks.

E. In the event of a terrorist attack, the State may have to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each event presents a different challenge and requires different resources for prevention, response, and protection. Since no state will ever have sufficient resources to respond to every possible contingency in every location where an attack might occur, accurate threat and risk assessments are necessary.

1. Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the current capabilities of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given

the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given a lower priority than preparation for other types of threats.

2. As recent events indicate, chemical or biological attacks are indeed possible. Terrorists have increasing opportunities to purchase or manufacture these weapons and the ability to use them. Alaska has some capacity to respond to these types of attacks because of increasing efforts over the past five years to develop greater hazardous material (HAZMAT) capabilities. Improvements, however, are necessary because of the enormous consequences of any attack with chemical or biological weapons. These threats, because of a greater probability of occurrence and greater potential consequences, are given a high priority for resources.

3. Other events, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the World Trade Center, highlight terrorist capabilities to employ high explosive or incendiary devices. Since these types of weapons are relatively easy to manufacture or obtain, additional resources are necessary to decrease the likelihood of these types of attacks from occurring. Strong public safety capabilities and a comprehensive law enforcement presence will help identify and prevent these attacks and will help maintain law and order if a high explosive attack does occur.

IV. THE ABILITY TO RESPOND

A. Alaska's constitution provides a strong Office of the Governor with unified and singular authority over the Executive Branch. This structure is proving to have many advantages over other models of state governments in dealing with terrorism. In addition, the policies and procedures established in Alaska over the last ten years— because of natural disasters, oil spills, and Y2K efforts— have produced integrated and effective emergency management and inter-agency procedures at all levels.

B. The Federal Response Plan provides an appropriate and effective foundation for response and recovery from emergencies and disasters in the nation. It also outlines the procedures that make resources available from federal and state agencies to augment and assist efforts by first responders. The State's significant supporting plans, programs, and procedures are listed below.

1. Disaster Policy Cabinet that provides coordinated, timely, and appropriate policy and resource recommendations to the Governor
2. State Emergency Operations Plan that delineates agency and departmental responsibilities
3. State Emergency Coordination Center that operates 24/7/365
4. State Emergency Response Commission that focuses on planning, preparing, and training for emergencies and disasters
5. Local Emergency Planning Committees throughout the state that have an all-hazards charter
6. Incident Command System that is modeled on the National Interagency Incident Management System
7. Hazardous Material working group

C. Alaska is one of 22 states where the Adjutant General and Commander of the National Guard is also a Cabinet member who is responsible for state emergency management. This arrangement encourages a single and strong focus for state emergency response while facilitating inter- and intra-agency coordination and cooperation at local, state, and federal levels. The recent addition of a 24/7/365 State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) capability in Alaska adds yet another advantage. We are now one of some 19 states that have a more rapid means to react, respond, and provide resources to a WMD incident or other emergency event where the time, efficiency, and effectiveness of that response are critical for success.

D. Since 1996, the State has had a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) working group that has been developing a Level A capability for chemical response. The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) provides the chair for this group. Meetings are held periodically to inventory and update a list of HAZMAT capabilities in Alaska and develop statewide standard operating procedures.

1. With the consensus of the work group, DEC has built upon the core HAZMAT capability for the two largest fire departments— Anchorage and Fairbanks. Both now have 24-hour Level A capability, with 40 responders in Anchorage and 24-30 in Fairbanks. Agreements between State and local governments permit deployment of these teams anywhere in Alaska at the direction of the State On Scene Coordinator. The State reimburses the costs of these responses and relieves the communities of liability, indemnification, and worker's compensation responsibilities.

2. There are also local response agreements with local communities to increase HAZMAT training, funding, and response throughout Alaska. Training is routinely available by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DEC, and the National Guard. To date, there are 1,895 trained personnel in Alaskan communities (a total that includes 786 trained National Guard members).

3. There are three immediate needs. The first is to have the core HAZMAT teams equipped and trained to deal with biological threats. The second is to establish additional core regional HAZMAT capabilities in other areas of the state, particularly the Southeast. The third is to ensure that the National Guard 103rd Civil Support Team is fully equipped and certified to respond to any nuclear, biological, or chemical incident.

E. The greatest national shortages in capabilities and resources to respond and react to WMD events are in the areas of public health and medical response. Alaska is no exception to these shortages. To deal with a mass casualty event, our nation and State must make the increase in public health and medical capabilities, and the ability to deploy these resources, very high priorities.

F. There are changes to programs and policies in Alaska that will allow us to be even more effective in responding to terrorism while providing better protection to our citizens and key assets. The following changes will significantly improve the capability of Alaska's Emergency Management System to address events of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

1. Actions are necessary to improve rapid and timely notification to medical personnel at all levels, both private and public, about any sickness or disease that may be a

result of a terrorist attack. Notifications relying on individuals to read a FAX or electronic mail message will not be sufficient for some WMD events.

2. Plans must be completed and approved regarding the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Alaskan Pharmaceutical Cache.
3. A database should be established of retired and non-active licensed health care providers, veterinarians, and dentists who could assist in mass casualty situations.
4. Plans, protocols, and procedures should be refined and strengthened to ensure continuity of government operations and continuous communications at all times—before, during, and after an event.
5. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Management System should address and outline specific policies, procedures, actions, responsibilities, and training for WMD events.
6. Formal and permanent procedures should be developed to obtain, analyze, and disseminate threat information.
7. Standing Incident Management Teams should be established for WMD events.
8. Greater efforts should be made to identify, plan, and exercise urban search and rescue teams, state disaster medical teams, and mortuary teams.

G. In every disaster response over the past few years, after action reviews reveal that the lack of interoperable communications is always at the top of significant issues. Emergency responders from different response units are frequently unable to communicate by radio even when they are only a few yards apart. The Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) would virtually eliminate this long-standing problem. Completion of ALMRS will significantly improve the State's ability to respond to all disasters, including WMD events.

V. THE NATIONAL GUARD

A. The Alaska Army National Guard is uniquely structured to accomplish homeland security. The basic mission of the Scout Group is reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of critical sites while operating in hazardous environments. The Scout Group has aviation capabilities—both rotary and fixed wing—to perform many tasks that are important in a homeland security role. These tasks include combat search and rescue, troop and equipment movement, and medical evacuation. The recent addition of a 22-member deployable team to the Alaska Army National Guard—the 103rd Civil Support Team—also provides a significant ability to accomplish rapid assessment, testing, identification, and detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents and limited decontamination operations and communication support while giving expert on-scene advice to first responders.

B. Federal statutory and policy changes are now possible that could permit greater use of the National Guard on a daily basis in a homeland security role. This is because of the recent and more liberal legal interpretation of "other duties" in 32 USC 112 that allowed federally funded National Guard forces to perform airport security roles, while remaining under a Governor's control. The Alaska National Guard is already one of several states that have another program that fits this new model. This program provides

federally funded National Guard personnel and equipment for inter-agency support of drug demand reduction and counter drug activities under the direction of the Governor.

C. Another recommended change would be to give governors, through their Adjutant Generals, coordination authority over all military forces in the state— active, reserve, and National Guard— that are providing military support to civil authorities. This would significantly enhance a governor's ability to ensure appropriate protection to the citizens of the state. It is also a change that is complementary and supportive of the broad powers that governors already have in an emergency or disaster.

VI. LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This report focuses on statewide needs rather than the individual analyses of each community's needs. However, the recommendations in this report assist and broadly supplement local capabilities, either directly or on a regional basis. For example, adding State Troopers, providing first responder training and completing the Health Alert Network are actions in direct support of communities. Expanding the State's public and environmental health capabilities, creating additional Level A HAZMAT Teams, improving security at airports and planning for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile improve the State's capabilities to support communities on a regional basis. When it is recommended that a resource be placed in a specific jurisdiction (e.g., an additional HAZMAT Team), it is to serve as a regional resource, not just a local asset. This regional approach is consistent with the DPC's guiding principles. For high cost, high maintenance and training intensive items, this approach provides efficiency and effectiveness.

VII. GENERAL STATE OF ALASKA PRIORITIES

This review of capabilities and vulnerabilities in Alaska led to the following five general requirements, listed from highest priority, as a guide for the expenditure of resources for counter-terrorism.

A. Expand public safety capabilities with an emphasis on community safety, emergency response and security of communications, transportation, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and public utilities infrastructure

B. Expand public health capabilities to detect and respond to biological or chemical incidents or attacks

C. Establish additional and deployable medical response capabilities

D. Increase HAZMAT and WMD response training for first responders and develop a greater deployable capability for conducting operations in a contaminated environment anywhere in Alaska

E. Secure Alaska's communications infrastructure and provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System for local, state, federal and private entities.

The State should immediately establish an Office of Homeland Security to implement these priorities and the other specific recommendations in this report.

VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

Alaska has developed a strong system of emergency management, but legislative or regulatory changes are possible that could assist effort to improve the State's procedures for dealing with terrorism. Although a comprehensive review is necessary, a preliminary assessment indicates that the following legal analyses and policy reviews should occur.

A. Revise Alaska statutes to allow the State to become a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (a national disaster response mutual aid agreement among the states).

B. Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.

C. Revise laws (e.g. AS 18.50.230; 7AAC 05.400) to facilitate the issuance of death certificates in mass casualty situations where recovery of bodies may not be possible or recovery will take an extended period.

D. Change AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the definition of "disaster," and by adding the ability to allocate or redistribute pharmaceutical supplies to the Governor's powers under conditions of a disaster emergency.

E. Change AS 26.20 (Civil Defense Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the policy and purpose paragraph to insure this contingency is covered by the act.

F. Modify AAC Title 17 as necessary to accommodate accomplishment of security improvements to the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).

G. Revise AS 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for security infractions involving airport security.

H. Revise AS 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect sensitive security documents.

I. Revise AS 44.62.125 to exempt sensitive airport security programs from regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.

J. Establish legislation to ensure National Guard members who are also state employees do not lose state employment benefits or increases in seniority or retirement when they are mobilized for state or federal active duty.

K. Review the definition of disaster contained in AS 26.20 to determine if the recent legislative changes to that statute adversely impact the State's ability to respond to a WMD event.

IX. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

A. Many of the security tasks related to transportation are dictated by federal mandates such as those from the Federal Aviation Agency. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the State will request waivers where appropriate. However, failure to adequately follow mandates that are not waived may result in unacceptable financial or operational sanctions by the federal government. Because of possible sanctions, it is important that security related funding issues be addressed expeditiously.

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S. Establish an Office of Homeland Security to ensure intensive preparations for countering terrorism in Alaska. This office would mirror the effort at the national level for the Office of Homeland Security recently established by the President. A full description of Alaska's Office of Homeland Security, to include recommended duties and staffing requirements, was part of the full report given to the Governor.

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C. Develop contingency plans for the State's critical bridges and stockpile moveable temporary bridge spans.

D. Continue to improve security of Ted Stevens Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports.

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F. Continue to improve the State's Public Health and Environmental Health bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities.

G. Train and equip three additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams for statewide rapid response.

H. Continue to provide first responder protective equipment.

I. Continue to provide WMD training and conduct WMD exercises.

J. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

XII. CONCLUSION

A. No community, state or nation will ever have the wealth to meet all responsibilities of government while building a stand-alone system that focuses solely on the protection from terrorism. It is important, therefore, to focus on strengthening existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives while improving capabilities for responding to all emergencies. Since full capabilities and a complete level of preparedness will never be possible in every locale, we must also have the ability to move resources quickly around the State. Another essential element of any response will revolve around the ability to communicate— on a continuous and comprehensive inter-agency network of telephone devices, computers, and radios.

B. We must maximize the use of existing programs and grants at the local, state and federal levels to establish the broadest possible basis for the significant funding requirements. The cost of dealing with terrorism must be shared at all levels— government, business, charities, and the private sector.

C. Alaska's constitutional framework, its strong Office of the Governor, and the emergency response policies and procedures that have evolved over the last ten years have given the State a superior ability to coordinate inter-agency efforts and accomplish emergency management. This structure provides an essential foundation for preventing, responding, and reacting to the threats of terrorism and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY SUBGROUP

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

November 3, 2001

9:30 a.m.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUBGROUP REPORT

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Surface Transportation (highways, bridges, public transit systems, Alaska Railroad).

1. Recommendations for Specific Critical Facilities of Surface Transportation

   a. Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge. This facility has the highest priority for protection within the State's surface transportation system. In the short- term (immediately) establish a checkpoint on the south side of the bridge. Long-term – establish two checkpoints, one at each end of the bridge, and implement a system of tracking commercial vehicles.

   b. Whittier Tunnel. In the short-term provide 24-hour on-site security personnel. In the long-term establish checkpoints on both sides of the tunnel to check for explosives and combustibles.

   c. Port of Anchorage Access Road (a State road). The State should continue to work with the Port of Anchorage and the US Coast Guard to increase control of road access to the port.

   d. Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage and Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge. Trained maintenance personnel should periodically check bridges for explosive charges and local police and State Troopers should increase patrols in these areas.

   e. Fort Richardson Detour Routing. In the short-term, lane crossovers and temporary interconnects should be added to the Fort Richardson road network south of the highway. Traffic control devices should be procured and stored near the site. Traffic control plans should be developed for the detour. Long-term – construct extensions to detour routes to establish an interconnect directly with existing highway interchanges.

   f. Key Bridges. Develop a list of essential bridges and have maintenance personnel check these bridges on a daily basis. Barricades should be placed to block access to roads under the bridges.

   g. Transportation Security Director's Office. Establish a Transportation Security Director's Office within DOT/PF.

2. General, Long-Term Recommendations for Surface Transportation

   a. Emergency Evacuation. Identify and mark emergency evacuation routes around the State.

   b. Personnel Security. Improve personnel security (background checks for commercial driver's license operators and selected DOT/PF positions).

   c. Security of Transportation Assets. Evaluate transportation operators' inventory and security measures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous materials, etc.

d. Contingency Roads. Evaluate the feasibility of keeping the Denali Highway and Independence Mine Roads open year round as alternate routes between Anchorage and Fairbanks.

e. Training. Establish a transportation security training program.

f. Contingency Planning. Develop contingency plans and have materials in place to re-establish DOT/PF services.

g. Highway Bridges. Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges and purchase and stockpile Bailey Bridge spans in Fairbanks.

h. Land Mobile Radio System. Complete the purchase and installation of an integrated network system to provide inter-agency, statewide communications.

i. Intelligent Transportation System. Expand the project design to incorporate security as an objective.

j. Implement Alaska Railroad security measures.

B. Aviation

1. Short-Term Aviation Recommendations

a. Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports

(1) Enhance presence and visibility of law enforcement officers.

(2) Seek additional baggage explosive detection machines.

(3) Review access control as well as employee training.

(4) Establish temporary gates and check points.

(5) Respond immediately to unauthorized vehicles at curbside and restricted areas.

(6) Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles.

(7) Establish controls for Anchorage International aircraft taxiing from general aviation areas to SIDA.

(8) Purchase War Risk Insurance.

b. Rural Airports

(1) Authorize all local law enforcement officers to enforce state or federal laws.

(2) Authorize State airport employees to enforce selected safety and security regulations currently in force.

c. Expand the use of National Guard soldiers when they are not needed at security screening points.

d. Work with air carriers to achieve strict adherence to one carry-on bag coupled with thorough pre-board carry-on and passenger screening.

e. Initiate or review vehicle key control programs to ensure airport safety equipment is properly secured.

f. Statutory changes for all state airports

g. Revise Alaska Statutes 02 to establish civil penalties for infractions that are additions to current criminal misdemeanor sanctions.

h. Revise Alaska Statutes 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect security sensitive documents.

i. Revise Alaska Statutes 44.62.125 to exempt security sensitive airport security programs from the regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act.

j. Purchase War Risk Insurance.

2. Long-Term Aviation Recommendations

a. Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports

(1) Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback.

(2) Review terminal configuration.

(3) Install new state-of-the-art access control systems.

(4) Establish access control for Anchorage International general aviation areas.

(5) Relocate facilities that are not compatible with new security provisions.

b. Rural Airports

(1) Require additional airport security and operational personnel.

(2) Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback.

(3) Increase municipal law enforcement officers.

(4) Complete construction of perimeter fencing with automated gates for access control.

(5) Install traffic barriers and blast deflection devices.

(6) Install automated lock and key control.

(7) Reconfigure aprons for better separation of large and small aircraft.

C. Marine

1. Short-Term Marine Recommendations

a. Establish, immediately, a security force in all AMHS ships.

b. Designate the USCG as the lead federal agency to provide and fund all marine security functions within the US.

c. Initiate a security study of AMHS operations.

d. Complete port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships.

e. Begin the process of installing security measures in AMHS ships.

f. Modify AAC, Title 17 to allow for security procedure improvements.

2. Long-Term Marine Recommendations

a. Establish an AMHS operations center.

b. Make security improvement recommendations part of the process where plans for port facilities are made available to the public.

c. Establish a process for the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program to receive and evaluate physical security improvement projects.

D. For all transportation modes complete the Statewide Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Work Group HAZMAT Commodity Study to identify chemicals transported by surface, air and marine modes. Also, develop strategies to prevent and respond to incidents.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The assets and components of surface, aviation and marine transportation in Alaska have the potential to become terrorist targets. The number of primary targets is limited. The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the assets, security currently in place, vulnerabilities, security priorities and recommendations for increasing protection of the transportation system.

B. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:

AMHS	Alaska Marine Highway System
ANC	Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport
ASP	Airport Security Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COTP	Captain of the Port
CVISN	Commercial Vehicles Information Systems and Networks
DOT & PF	Department of Transportation and Public Facilities
FAI	Fairbanks International Airport
ITS	Intelligent Transportation Systems
LMRS	Land Mobile Radio System
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
SIDA	Security Identification Display Area
USCG	United States Coast Guard

II. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION

The evaluation of surface transportation systems includes:

- Highways
- Bridges
- Public transit systems
- Alaska Railroad

The Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT & PF) with the input and assistance of the Alaska Railroad prepared this summary. Representatives from the Department of Law, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Public Safety and Department of Environmental Conservation reviewed a draft.

A. Current Security Measures and Policies: The current security measures for surface transportation systems are:

1. *Yukon River Bridge.* Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has posted security guards on both sides of the bridge. These guards are monitoring traffic.

2. *DOT & PF.* Regional maintenance staff has not implemented any security measures for protecting highway and bridges. They continue to drive the highway system daily performing routine inspections of transportation facilities.

3. *Transit Systems.* Managers across the state have not changed their operation or increased security.

4. *Port of Anchorage.* The port, working in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and DOT & PF, has significantly increased security measures relating to vehicle and pedestrian access to port facilities. The port's security checkpoint has been moved to a more strategic location along Ocean Dock Road, which is part of the state's road system. DOT & PF assisted in the layout of the checkpoint, installing additional signing and paving a vehicle turn around and associated road.

5. *Ft. Richardson Detour Routing.* In the past, during serious traffic accidents on this section of the Glenn Highway, police often routed traffic through portions of Ft. Richardson north of the highway. Following the events of September 11, the Army no longer will allow that detour routing to be used. Instead, an alternative detour south of the highway will be used that passes through areas of low risk on Ft. Richardson property.

6. *Whittier Tunnel.* Security measures provide monitoring to "count" vehicle traffic, monitor vehicle progress and provide visual confirmation of traffic/incidents throughout the tunnel and key points in the staging areas. The control center and tollbooths are manned only during hours the tunnel is open to vehicles (two shifts in summer, one in winter.) Maintenance and emergency response personnel are also onsite during normal operating hours. Vehicle inspections are limited in scope, checking for size and overweight restrictions and hazardous cargo.

7. *Statewide Highways/Bridges.* There are no additional security measures in place for protecting any bridges other than the Yukon River Bridge.

8. *Motor Carrier Watch.* Division of Measurement Standards and Commercial Vehicle Enforcement inspectors are assisting Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration special agents conducting security visits to hazardous materials carriers. These visits are not safety compliance reviews, nor enforcement visits. A broad sweep of these carriers is being made nationwide. The object is to heighten the sensitivity of carriers to be alert and report suspicious behavior from drivers, shippers, consignees or the public. Priority is given to carriers who transport bulk explosives, anhydrous ammonia, petroleum products, poison gas etc. These activities are consistent with the FMCSA alert.

9. *Physical Security of Transportation Equipment and Facilities.* Most transportation companies secure their transportation equipment and cargo warehouses with locks. Some fence their equipment. Not all DOT & PF facilities are fenced.

B. Vulnerability Assessments: Surface transportation networks are vulnerable to disruption by terrorist attacks by destroying bridges or roadway segments, or the deliberate release of landslides in confined canyons or avalanches. Because of Alaska's remote location and small population, the threat to the highway system is perceived to be low at this time. However, these are considered possible targets:

1. *Dalton Highway, Fairbanks to the North Slope.* The Yukon River Bridge carries the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The above ground sections of the pipeline parallel the Dalton highway in most locations. The pipeline has the greatest national significance and is the most vulnerable surface transportation element. As such, increased security is needed for these segments of the Dalton and the bridge.

2. *Port of Anchorage Access Road.* With the recent checkpoint location change, security has improved significantly. There are, however, additional concerns regarding jet fuel pipelines to Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport, Elmendorf Air Force Base and the fuel storage tank farms located in the vicinity of the port. There is also the issue of controlling water borne access and the Alaska Railroad facilities. The port is currently working on these issues with the USCG, the military and the railroad.

3. *Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage.* Several bridges are vulnerable along this section of highway. The highway itself is not considered to be susceptible to damage that could not be repaired in a reasonably short timeframe. The key bridges include four (two in each direction) over the Kink River and two at Eagle River. There are also several smaller bridges at various locations that, although vulnerable, would be easier to bypass or repair. Security protection for any of these bridges would be very difficult and require 24-hour surveillance and security checkpoints to search vehicles for explosives.

4. *Ft. Richardson Detour routing.* Routing detour traffic through the secure section of Ft. Richardson poses an obvious and high-level security risk. The new alternate routing to the south, although on Ft Richardson property, passes through areas of low security risk.

5. *Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge.* The Bridge is the most vulnerable location on this highway. Like other major bridges, explosives could render this bridge inoperable for an extended period. Although there are numerous other bridges along the highway that are also vulnerable, they are considerably shorter in length and would be easier to bypass or repair.

6. *Whittier Tunnel.* Damage to the tunnel, control center or ventilation system could render the tunnel unusable for weeks or months. There is also a second "utility tunnel" which houses commercial natural gas supply and electrical service to Whittier. This utility tunnel also contains fiber optic cables that provide the primary fiber optic links between Anchorage and the Lower 48. Although access to the utility tunnel is locked, damage by explosives or physical tampering would be relatively easy and take the utilities out of service for an extended duration.

7. *Richardson Highway, Valdez to Glennallen.* Bridges within this segment, if destroyed, would eliminate surface access to the Alyeska Pipeline Terminal. This segment of

highway generally parallels the pipeline corridor and there is no detour route south of Glennallen.

8. *Alaska & Richardson Highways, Tanana River Bridges.* The Alaska Highway segment east of Tok is the only highway link into the state. The Tanana River crossing at MP 1303 of the Alaska Highway, if lost, would be difficult to re-establish and there is no detour route. The bridge at MP 275 of the Richardson Highway is in close proximity to the pipeline crossing and providing temporary crossing would be difficult. A 300-mile detour is available. These sections of road are also important defense routes.

9. *Parks Highway, Bridges.* This important transportation corridor contains long span bridge structures and crossings with severe terrain. Providing temporary access would be difficult. The Alaska Railroad and long detours are available.

10. *Explosive and Ammo Storage Magazines.* Located at Atigun and Thompson passes, these magazines are vulnerable to theft.

11. *Southeast Region.* Due to its remote location, unconnected highways, and low population, Southeast Alaska presents few surface transportation targets of perceived value to terrorists. Highways could easily be cut, thus isolating some communities from road access. Most vulnerable is the Moore Creek Bridge in Skagway. The exception to low vulnerability in southeast is tourism, which brings large numbers of people to the area. All facets of tourists' visit are vulnerable. Tour ships are clustered while docked and tourists are concentrated in large groups while shopping, sightseeing and touring shoreside attractions.

12. *Misc Highway Bridges.* Destruction of bridges is the simplest way to disrupt normal highway operations. The relative importance of the state's highway routes and related bridges are summarized in Bridge Design's seismic retrofit prioritization. Rather than focus on ways to further prioritize numerous bridges along various routes and attempt to protect them from possible terrorist attacks, the state's initial priority should be to develop a plan for rapid deployment of materials and crews to construct temporary replacement bridges.

13. *Transit Services.* Transit systems vulnerability is perceived by their managers to be minimal. The systems are small and the number of passenger relatively low compared to national figures. If there was a disruption the systems would recover quickly

C. Security Priorities:

1. *Dalton Highway & Yukon River Bridge.* This section of highway and structure are the highest protection priorities in the surface transportation network because of the pipeline system's national significance. The Pipeline Coordinator's office can brief policy makers on operational requirements and associated actions necessary to upgrade the system's security.

2. *Port of Anchorage Access Road.* The port serves as the primary supply line for Anchorage and much of the state and is vital to the state's overall economy. Maintaining port operations is a very high priority. With respect to road access, the vulnerability and security aspects are lessened with the recent implemented changes. It is unlikely that Ocean Dock Road, the access road into and out of the port; could

be rendered inoperable for an extended period of time. It is conceivable that the A-C couplet overpass, which is the primary access route to Ocean Dock Road, could be destroyed, however, in such an event; there are alternate routes through the Ship Creek basin that could be used to access Ocean Dock Road.

3. *Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage.* This section of the highway is the most heavily traveled roadway in the state. It is important to residents of the area, and is also a vital surface transportation link between the Port of Anchorage, Ted Stevens International Airport, military bases and numerous businesses providing services and supplies to much of the state. Security for this highway really translates into protecting the key bridges - four (two in each direction) over the Kink River and two at Eagle River.

4. The relative importance of security for the bridges becomes a function of alternatives in the event the bridges are taken out of service. For the Knik River Bridges, there is a detour route available using the Old Glenn Highway. For the Eagle River bridges there are two possible alternate routes: the Briggs Bridge connecting with Hiland Drive, and a military road crossing the river within the boundaries of Ft. Richardson. Although such detours would be very inconvenient and would result in significant traffic problems, vital links could be maintained.

5. *Ft. Richardson Detour Routing.* This section of the Glenn Highway experiences a relatively high level of accidents resulting in extreme traffic delays. The Anchorage Police Department and/or Alaska State Troopers will implement the newest detour routing plan and deploy traffic control devices as needed. Ft. Richardson Provost Marshall will provide the "on base" security along the detour route.

6. *Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge .* This highway is the second most heavily traveled road in the state and is the only highway link for the Kenai Peninsula to Anchorage and the rest of the state. Although Canyon Creek Bridge would be difficult to repair, there are several temporary bridge options available. The original bridge is still in place and is part of a separated trail system. Re-routing traffic into a single lane configuration onto the bike path could be accomplished relatively quickly. Large trucks could have some difficulty using this detour routing due to clearances under the new bridge. A second alternative would be the installation of a short-span temporary bridge located in the bottom of the canyon similar to the one used during construction. The access road on the south side of the creek already exists, and the north side access road could be re-established within a couple days.

7. *Whittier Tunnel.* Volumes of vehicle traffic to Whittier are relatively low. Although important to local residents and commercial traffic for access to the highway system and supplies, from an economic perspective the tunnel is probable more critical to the Alaska Railroad for barge freight operations. Similarly, the utility tunnel is important for general utility service to Whittier, but even more critical for its fiber optics link to the Lower 48.

8. *Richardson Highway, Valdez to Glennallen.* As the single highway route between Valdez (Alyeska Terminal) and the remaining surface transportation system, several bridges are high security priorities to maintain access through the adjacent pipeline corridor. If temporary bridge components were available, individual short spans could be

restored within one week. If multiple spans were lost, access could be eliminated for extended periods.

9. *Alaska Highway, Tanana River Bridge (MP 1303).* Providing the only surface transportation link to the state, this section between Tok and the Border is critical for defense route access and the movement of commerce through the remaining road system. Bridge # 505 over the Tanana River is 946' long with single spans up to 430'. Providing temporary access would be difficult and no detour route is available. The ports of Seward, Anchorage and Valdez would become the keys to moving commerce into the state.

10. *Richardson Highway, Tanana River Bridge (MP 275).* With an intermediate span of400', temporary access would be difficult to establish. Key access to defense installations and close proximity to the pipeline-crossing make this structure a security priority. A detour route is available, adding 300 miles from Delta to Fairbanks via the Denali Highway. The Denali is not maintained in the winter.

11. *Parks Highway Bridges, Tanana River at Nenana, Hurricane Gulch, Nenana River at Rex and Moody.* These long span bridges along with terrain constraints would preclude timely temporary access. Detours of considerable length are available. The Alaska Railroad can also provide access through the Parks highway corridor.

12. *Explosive and Ammo Storage Magazines.* Though not a significant loss if destroyed, these storage facilities near Atigun Pass on the Dalton Highway and Thompson Pass on the Richardson Highway are potential theft liabilities.

D. Recommendations:

1. Security Actions.

Implement a number of short-term (less than four months) and long-term (greater than four months) security actions to increase protection of transportation assets.

Funding has not been determined on most of the measures and could come from a variety of sources. The ability to implement some of these actions will depend on additional funding being identified.

a. Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge.

- *Short-term* Take immediate action to establish a checkpoint on the Dalton Highway as recommended by the Energy and Security committee. While details need to be worked out, DOT & PF could establish the checkpoint within a day. Manning should be coordinated between the Department of Public Safety, the National Guard, and DOT & PF. The urgency to step up security for the bridge and highway is recommended as the highest priority.

- *Long-term* Establish two checkpoints, one at each end of the bridge. The Division of Measurement Standards & Commercial Vehicle Enforcement has developed a concept for the structure of a checkpoint for tracking commercial vehicles.

  The Joint Pipeline Office has drafted a similar proposal and forwarded it to Department of Interior in Washington DC.

b. Whittier Tunnel

- *Short-term* Provide 24-hour onsite security personnel to monitor the site.
- *Long-term* Implement a vehicle security inspection program at the tollbooths to check for possible explosives and combustibles. Construct and staff a similar security checkpoint on the Whittier side of the tunnel.

c. Port of Anchorage Access Road

- *Short-term* Continue to work with the port and the Coast Guard on any additional security measures they believe necessary to control highway access to the port.
- *Long-term* No specific needs or recommendations identified at this time.

d. Glenn Highway, Palmer/Wasilla to Anchorage

- *Short-term* Have trained maintenance personnel periodically check bridge structures for explosive charges. Increase police patrols along this section of highway.
- *Long-term* No specific recommendations at this time. If threat seems likely, establish checkpoints and surveillance.

e. Ft. Richardson Detour Routing

- *Short-term* Construct lane crossovers and temporary interconnects to Ft. Richardson road network south of the highway. Formalize traffic control plan for implementation of the detour. Procure and store necessary traffic control devices near the site.
- *Long-term* Construct extensions to detour routes to interconnect directly with existing highway interchanges.

f. Seward Highway, Canyon Creek Bridge

- *Short-term* Establish routine inspections of critical bridges for explosive charges. Increase State Trooper patrols along the highway.
- *Long-term* No specific recommendations. If threats seem likely, establish checkpoints and increase surveillance.

g. Key Bridges. Develop a list of essential bridges and have maintenance personnel check these bridges on a daily basis. Barricades should be placed to block access roads under bridges.

h. Long-Term Items.

- *Emergency evacuation* routes around the state should be identified and become a part of the emergency response plan. These routes should be marked and the public educated on their use.
- *Personnel security* All organizations that hire CDL operators must ensure proper background checks are completed. Install safeguards against impersonation of DOT & PF maintenance/bridge crews or construction contractors. Identify DOT & PF employment positions warranting background checks.

- *Security of transportation assets.* Transportation operators must ensure their equipment is safe from theft/hijacking and their cargo and fuel storage areas are secured from unauthorized entry. Evaluate security and inventory procedures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous chemicals, nuclear sources, etc.
- *Regulations.* Establish emergency regulations to implement travel permit system on the Dalton Highway. Establish no parking regulations on or within 30' of a bridge through emergency regulations.
- *Contingency Roads.* Evaluate highways which would be essential as an alternate route to link Fairbanks and Anchorage. As examples, keeping the Denali Highway and the Independence Mines Road open during the winter would allow essential travel around destroyed structures. These are highways, which the department usually allows to be snowed in. It could take over a week to open these routes in case of an emergency.
- *Transportation Security Director's Office.* Establish a transportation security element within the Commissioner's office. This function would be staffed adequately to address all modes of transportation, i.e. surface, air and water. This new function would establish security as a department priority.

2. Training.

Establish and implement a transportation security training program.

- The DOT & PF maintenance staff traveling the highways on a daily basis should receive immediate training that includes procedures for reporting suspicious activity and contact numbers for law enforcement and investigative agencies. Training materials should be requested from Department of Public Safety, FBI or other security agency.
- The program should include training for personnel to required to check bridge structures for explosive charges and establish appropriate response protocol.
- Federal Motor Carrier Security Administration should present security briefings to all transportation organizations that employ CDL drivers in Southeast Alaska. Short-term (4-6 months) cost probably born by FMCSA.

Fund as a STIP project using FHWA training monies.

3. Preparedness and Contingency Planning.

a. DOT & PF should develop contingency plans and have materials in place to re-establish services.

- Develop contingency plans. train staff and implement an Incident Command Structure management system for emergency responses. This system is in place in several state agencies and is consistent with state emergency response plans.

- Establish an agreement with the Alaska Railroad for a detour route using their bridges. The plan should include a secure method to load/unload commercial vehicles.
- Security for the Alaska Highway should be explored and coordinated with Canada and a program of mutual assistance established and implemented.

b. Highway Bridges.

Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges and purchase and stockpile Bailey bridge spans in Fairbanks.

The initial step needed is development of a comprehensive list of bridge materials available in the state. This inventory should include state, municipal, military and private resources. The Preconstruction Division should develop several designs for temporary bridges utilizing available materials for various bridge/span lengths and potential foundation types.

Contingency plans should cover at least the three scenarios. Bailey bridges can be launched from one end of a span with an appropriate "launching nose." Span length is critical, not bridge length. DOT & PF has a very limited stockpile in Fairbanks for a 70' to 80' bridge but no launching nose. Nationally the inventory is in New Jersey. It might be possible to borrow materials from the State of Oregon. Because of shipment time, it is recommended that these sections be staged in Alaska.

Options for spans greater than 250' such as floating or ice bridges, "Flexifloat" bridges or ferries should be evaluated. The plan should look at areas that would require detours such as Hurricane Gulch. Another necessary component of the contingency plan should be transporting materials to sites.

DOT & PF should procure Bailey Bridge sections sufficient to construct temporary bridges that could span two "typical" longest bridge locations. This should include launching platforms or other materials essential for rapid deployment. These materials should be stored at a central location within the state. Identify available materials and location of pontoons necessary to span locations where construction of intermediate piers would be problematic. Develop typical designs for both types of bridges.

Funding estimate undetermined for these recommendations. Possible STIP project.

4. Land Mobile Radio System/Complete the purchase and installation of an integrated network system to provide inter-agency and statewide communications.

The Land Mobile Radio System (LMRS) is part of a statewide plan being implemented in conjunction with the Department of Defense, municipal and local governments to create a command and control communication network. The proposed system under consideration applies to several aspects of data communications, including protocols for data objects, data transport standards such as Ethernet, modems, PPP and the like. In the case of LMRS, the project is not focused on a particular ITS application or type of data. Instead, it is a wireless mechanism for transmitting data.

Phase 1 of LMRS consists of deploying mobile and portable radios at strategically located maintenance stations along the National and State Highway Systems. This command and control ability will give DOT & PF better response options. The improved communications and data collected will be shared with partner agencies and provided to the public via the Internet. Phase 2 of this project provides base station radios with data link to complete the statewide network. Statewide LMRS coverage is dependent on the Department of Defense completing the repeater installation project.

Cost estimate for DOT & PF's network is $ 2.9 million.

5. Intelligent Transportation System.

Expand project design to incorporate security as an objective, goal and enhancement to current system plans.

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) across the US have been focused on public safety, efficiency and operational improvements. The events of September 11th have given a new and important reason for ITS – transportation security. Fortunately, these systems can be adapted and modified to serve the role of security, in some cases rather easily. US DOT officials confirm that national policy will quickly emerge identifying ITS as an important facet of transportation security for the nation.

Of all the potential security applications which ITS can serve, perhaps none is more germane than the national CVISN (commercial vehicles information systems and netwc ks) program. CVISN is a voluntary program c ently installed in about 35 states. Alaska has a project underway to install CVISN .chnology, initially in the Anchorage area. While focused on improving operations for the state and commercial vehicle industry, along with safety benefits, there is no doubt that CVISN can rapidly ramp-up to provide security benefits. A recent meeting in Seattle addressed multi-state issues involving commercial vehicles. The four west-coast states and British Columbia participated along with US DOT and US Customs. The focus was establishing a consortium to share CVISN data to enhance transportation security.

Fund as STIP project using FHWA - ITS project monies.

III. ALASKA RAILROAD

A. Security Assessment – A complete independent third party review of ARRC current security systems with recommendations on improvements in light of current events and new FRA and FTA regulations. Estimated cost $150,000.

B. Switch Locks – Tamper-proof switch locks estimated cost $300,000 (Derail Prevention). ARRC has experienced several switch lock tamperings in the past year. A high security lock would make it much more difficult to access the switches. An open switch would allow a train to move unexpectedly from one track to the other, which could easily derail the train if it were above the proper speed.

C. Security Cameras – Whittier and Seward docks handle passengers from cruise vessels in large numbers. Estimated cost $500,000.

In addition, fuel off-loading located at the Port of Anchorage and Anchorage and Fairbanks yards (including fuel racks) move large volumes of hazardous materials that need monitoring.

D. Lighting – Luminated areas have been a successful intrusion deterrent and can assist video detection. Estimated cost $1 million.

E. Fuel Rack Remote Monitoring – Fuel racks at ARRC are not attended. Remote monitoring would allow the dispatch center to be alerted when unusual flow of fuel is detected. Estimated cost $250,000.

F. Track Integrity Circuits – Most of the Alaska Railroad is non-signalized. On signalized track, rail is checked for continuity and the signals are designed to detect broken rails or other hazards. Presently, a railroad employee must physically inspect to detect broken rail and open switch points. Automatic reporting equipment would monitor the status of switches, track circuits and switch point locks and would provide information regarding track integrity to the dispatch system before a train encounters a potential problem. Estimated cost $5 Million.

G. ARRC Building Security Systems (card readers, cameras) – Secure and log access to all of ARRC facilities including train control dispatch, depot baggage areas, and food preparation areas. Estimated cost $1 Million.

H. Fencing – Many key locations do not have fencing to protect ARRC assets, allowing unlimited access. Estimated cost $1 Million.

I. Intermodal Facility Entry Control Points for Rail Yards – Currently, any private vehicle can have access to an entire yard facility. Propose fencing and manned control entry points, to control access to trains, equipment and loaded railcars in yards. Estimated cost $3 Million.

J. Detection of Bridge Faults – Propose installation of track alignment remote monitoring technology to allow checking of bridge integrity. Estimated cost $2 Million.

K. Passenger Baggage Handling – New procedures being proposed by FAA and Coast Guard will require implementation of new level of security for baggage handling. Ensure that no one is boarding trains with inappropriate items such as guns, knives, etc.; metal detectors and x-ray equipment will be required. All depots will need to be equipped with metal detectors. Additionally, ensure that checked baggage is secured once checked. Estimated cost $4 Million.

L. Operational Support – Provide background investigations on new employees and contractors. Photo ID system for ARRC employees. Train employees in security awareness. Provide for additional Special Agent and Investigative assistance support. The ARRC is over 500 miles in length and has been experiencing steady increase in passenger traffic. Estimated cost $250,000 annual increase.

M. Seward Cruise Ship Dock – Provide for security fencing, controlled gate access and ticket passenger access. Estimated cost $1 Million.

N. Security Monitoring Center – Provide for a center where all sensitive and controlled areas along the rail belt can be monitored. Estimated cost $ (In progress).

O. Airport Security Improvements - Heightened FAA security requirements tentatively include blast proof glass for the ARRC rail depot. Undercarriage inspections will be required. Estimated cost $2 Million.

** Note: The heightened airport security measures were the result of a meeting between the Alaska Railroad, Anchorage Airport and the FAA (11/01/01) wherein the FAA verbally informed both the airport and the railroad that new security measures would most likely include "blast proof" glass in the airport terminal.*

IV. AVIATION

Airports in the U.S. that receive service by aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats must have a security program under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107. There are currently 21 airports in Alaska that have FAA mandated security programs. Ted Stevens Anchorage International (ANC) and Fairbanks International (FAI) are the largest state operated airports and have the most sophisticated security programs due to larger numbers of screened passengers. The 16 other airports operated by the DOT & PF with FAA required and approved security programs include: Barrow, Bethel, Cold Bay, Cordova, Deadhorse, Dillingham, Gustavus, King Salmon, Kodiak, Kotzebue, Nome, Petersburg, Sitka, Unalaska, Wrangell, and Yakutat. Three municipally operated airports are also in this category: Adak, Ketchikan and Juneau. The airport in Valdez does not receive aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats. However, DOT & PF has elected to implement an airport security program in the interest of public safety because of the proximity of the airport to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Terminal.

The remaining 266 state or municipally owned airports are not served by large enough passenger aircraft to be required to have a FAA approved security plan. The airport operator or municipality, on an individual basis, addresses security issues as it deems necessary. In addition, private aircraft are based at numerous private airstrips and summer float-plane/winter ski-plane lakes with little if any security.

A. Current Security Measures and Policies

Each airport that receives aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats must develop an Airport Security Program (ASP) to comply with 14 CFR Part 107. Each ASP is a specific security plan tailored to the needs of the respective airport. It defines how airport security is conducted and typically identifies the following security features: fencing, either total or partial perimeter fencing with controlled gate access; gates at critical locations around the airport; badging of airport workers; security sweeps of the airport; and law enforcement officer support at passenger screening areas.

The airports administer the security programs while the FAA Civil Aviation Security Division provides regulatory oversight. The FAA routinely reviews the airport programs with on site inspections. The FAA holds the airport operator responsible for compliance with the airport's security program, including responsibility for ensuring compliance by badged personnel. Thus, the airport operator must have the enforcement tools to compel compliance by all employees of the various airlines, ground handlers and others who must access restricted areas in the performance of private business operations.

The ASP is a strictly controlled document under the terms of 14 CFR Part 191. Persons who receive airport identification and access badges are provided training specific to their access authority. Copies of the full ASP, however, are provided only to key airport management and the FAA Security Division.

The air carriers that fly aircraft with more than 60-passenger seat configuration also have security responsibilities. Passenger screening using magnetometer devices and baggage checks by either x-ray or visual checks is the responsibility of the airlines. Airlines may elect to carry out passenger screening and baggage checks for aircraft with less than 60 passenger seats, but this action is not required by current FAA regulations.

Security measures at the remaining airports in depend on each airport's location relative to vital interests and the decision of the airport manager. For instance, Merrill Field, is two minutes or less flying time away from both Elmendorf Air Force Base and 20 story buildings in downtown Anchorage, including hotels, oil company headquarters, and the state owned Atwood Building. The decision whether Merrill Field should have a formal security program is up to the Municipality of Anchorage. Currently, Merrill Field is patrolled by the Anchorage Police Department and has partial fencing and controlled gates. Only a few of Alaska's smaller airports have any fencing. Generally, it is safety fencing to prevent inadvertent access to the runways rather than as security fencing. Most airports in Alaska, except for the notable exception of the 21 airports operated under 14 CFR Part 107, as described above, have few and no formal security measures but respond to any security issues on an 'as needed' basis.

B. Vulnerability Assessments

Understanding the vulnerability of Alaska's airports and aircraft has changed significantly and must now be reexamined in light of the suicidal attitude of terrorists. Security must be addressed in ways never before imagined. The likelihood that a person would commandeer an aircraft and fly it into a building--whether as an act of international terrorism, or as a copy-cat act of violence as an alternative to the type previously carried out with an automatic weapon in a public place--increased exponentially on September 11.

Based upon the September 11 attacks, it might seem that terrorists would be interested only in national landmarks and the potential for high casualties. However, other past attacks against such targets as embassies, military barracks, and a naval vessel have involved smaller federal targets. The plot against Los Angeles World Airport targeted a high profile municipal facility, and key transportation hub. Heightened security over more prominent sites could result in targeting less prominent sites. Alaska has targets of potential interest in close proximity to the airports. The likelihood of a terrorist cell targeting Alaska is unknown; however, the state must be prepared for the possibility.

Previously aircraft had been targets of destruction only. Now, we must recognize them as potential weapons. Any size or type of aircraft could be a potential target. Large aircraft may be the most prized targets as potential weapons due to their on board fuel load, high speed and large mass with its resultant kinetic energy. Small aircraft, such as the Cessna 208 Caravan for example, carries only 370 gallons of fuel, with a maximum gross weight of 8,000 pounds. Small aircraft could cause damage only on a relatively small scale, since they carry less fuel and have significantly less kinetic energy than large aircraft. The ability of terrorists to gain access to large and small aircraft is variable across the state due to the different levels of airport security. At airports with security programs, procedures are in place for authorized personnel to challenge any person in a location or engaged in conduct not in accord with the ASP or otherwise acting suspiciously or out of place in the secure areas. Even though all other airports without ASP's may have sporadic

inspections by local police or DOT & PF personnel, neither aircraft nor passengers are generally under surveillance.

Terrorist actions involving aircraft might range from stationary attacks on individual aircraft to hijacking. A stationary attack could involve a vehicle colliding with an aircraft either on an airport apron or runway. Such an act would probably only disable the aircraft unless (1) the aircraft were moving at high speed in the act of takeoff or landing, or (2) the vehicle were rigged with explosives. Although such an attack is not seen as a high probability due to the minimal damage that would likely be inflicted on a stationary aircraft and the difficulty of "accurately" timing contact with an aircraft moving at high speed, the risk cannot completely be discounted. Especially at ANC and FAI, large cargo freighters and a few passenger aircraft, fuel-up daily for long-haul international fights. Even domestic passenger carriers fuel up for long domestic routes, including summer routes as far as Atlanta. The September 11 horror showed all too tragically the explosive capacity of a large aircraft's fully loaded jet-fuel tanks. Though it may be difficult to engineer a ground attack that would rupture and ignite fuel as explosively as a full-throttle mid-air collision, any fully fueled large aircraft contains tremendous energy.

Fortunately, the same airports that serve the largest aircraft are also those at which the FAA regulations require the most comprehensive security programs. Some of the airports not served by the larger passenger jets, and not required to have ASPs, however, have fuel, both gasoline and diesel, flown in by specially outfitted cargo aircraft. These aircraft, while nowhere near as large as wide-body jetliners, carry an unusually large fuel payload, and may also be considered a threat.

"Hijacking" of an aircraft for use as a missile has a higher potential payback for a terrorist. There are a few targets of national interest within close proximity to our larger communities and even on the major air routes for all north and south bound traffic to the Lower 48. We have no way to assess the likelihood that an aircraft in Alaska might be targeted for hijacking. Targets of national interest include military installations, Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the Alyeska Pipeline Company's marine terminal in Valdez, and even fully loaded oil tankers en route to the Lower 48. The oil facilities or tankers would arguably make prime targets in terms of sheer explosive and environmental destructive potential, as well as the potential for raw economic damage. Whether terrorists who would like to see less U.S. interest in Middle Eastern oil are likely to select a target that could have the opposite result is beyond the expertise of the aviation subcommittee. A large cruise ship crossing the Gulf of Alaska might also make a prime target for maximum terror. The great distances and associated travel time and jet-fuel consumption may limit the desirability of Alaska as a location from which a terrorist might highjack an aircraft to attack significant targets in the Lower 48.

Airport maintenance vehicles are also a potential terrorist target. The large size and power of some pieces of airport maintenance equipment make them potential weapons for destruction of aircraft, buildings and facilities on and near airports.

Vulnerable stationary targets at ANC and FAI are of similar types, although in each case, the facility at ANC is larger. Both airports have terminal buildings that are frequently occupied by large numbers of people. Each airport has a FAA air traffic control tower, and each airport has an aircraft fuel tank farm. ANC has a public parking garage, a large

U.S. Post Office facility, a major Federal Express facility and numerous other airline and cargo-related facilities.

These two airports are also relatively close to other important facilities. ANC is near Elmendorf AFB, important oil company regional headquarter office buildings and other office buildings, hotels and hospitals. The Beluga natural gas field and Chugach Electric's nearby power generation facility, the refinery at Nikiski, and oil platforms in Cook Inlet all seem less likely targets. FAI is near the Williams refinery at North Pole and Eielson AFB and not terribly far by air from a number of Trans-Alaska Pipeline pump stations. Jet aircraft routes very quickly pass the Valdez marine terminal and oil tanker shipping lanes from either airport.

The Juneau International Airport is a potential target due to its proximity to the State capital and the Snettisham hydropower facility, which supplies power to the Juneau area. In addition, the airport has a terminal, a FAA air traffic control tower, and a fuel tank farm for refueling aircraft. Other targets may include cruise ships visiting the port of Juneau. Up to five large vessels are in port on any given summer day.

Vehicle-transported explosive devices (car or truck bombs) are tools available to terrorists within Alaska's larger cities but seem far less likely in more rural communities, if only because there are fewer facilities to destroy and their destruction would have relatively little national impact. To destroy a terminal at ANC or FAI would seriously disrupt aviation at that location and regionally, but would not significantly disrupt aviation on a national level. It seems, therefore, that the threat is greater from a local malcontent wanting to make a local statement, than from international terrorism. Maintaining a vehicle setback at ANC and FAI is warranted, however it is hard to judge how valuable it is, other than for preventing local threats.

The air traffic control towers, radar systems and fuel tank farms face a similar threat. Destruction of the fuel farm at either airport, for example, would hurt the Alaskan economy but would probably not hurt the US economy, assuming aircraft would simply divert to other U.S. airports for refueling. The controls already in place are considered a reasonable response to this level of threat.

As noted above, the air carriers are responsible for baggage screening. Variation in the capability and capacity of baggage screening equipment, even among the international airport terminals, however, poses some concern. If a machine is not capable of screening all baggage enplaned at the airport, only a portion of baggage may be screened comprehensively according to the air carrier's approved security program. Likewise, some baggage enplaned at a rural airport and that transfers at ANC or FAI, may be screened less thoroughly than others.

The parking garage at ANC is a potential target, however, the threat is considered to be low. Destroying or damaging this structure would temporarily disrupt aviation at ANC, but would not cause large-scale disruption of the aviation system.

Most of the rural airport terminal buildings have parking lots that are close to the terminal structures, so located because of inclement weather. These structures are theoretically vulnerable to a vehicle-transported explosive device. However the probability seems very low. In most of the communities there is no source of ammonium nitrate based fertilizer in quantities to build explosives. Likewise, in most communities

there is no source of high explosive, with the exception of some mining districts. Although explosives could be brought to a rural airport, they would have to pass through more likely targets on the way. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that a vehicle bomb would be assembled and used in these communities. We conclude that the current 300-foot FAA mandated setback of vehicles from a passenger terminal is not warranted at our rural communities.

The vulnerability of aircraft at rural airports may be higher than at ANC and FAI, but lower risk levels result in a lower threat as a practical matter. The aircraft at rural airports are relatively smaller, slower and carry less fuel, and would not be particularly potent weapons.

The highest probability of attack at rural airports would be for a perpetrator to try taking a weapon through a rural security screening point or explosives through the baggage checkpoint, to be transported for use elsewhere against a more prominent target, such as a major population center. The rural airports do not have sophisticated checked bag screening (hand check only of suspect baggage) and while most have carry-on-screening devices to x-ray for weapons, locally trained screeners may or may not be capable of spotting a threat. The probability of a passenger placing explosives in checked baggage is generally considered low due to the lack of availability of explosives in most originating rural communities, however, it is certainly possible.

A vulnerability assessment of the security at ANC is currently underway. The study will be a multi-step process designed to address the security vulnerability of the existing terminal and airfield configuration with the objective of enhancing the existing security at ANC, both from a procedural and facility standpoint.

The initial phase included on site review of the existing security program with respect to airport configuration and procedures. The second phase will include a comprehensive review of the architectural drawings and specifications for new Concourse C, currently under construction. The emphasis will be on the security aspects of the current design and the impacts of the new security "rules". Expediting this work will be critical since the building's steel structure has been erected. Thus, any potential physical changes to the existing design must be done with an awareness that the building's shell is fixed.

This assessment will address the building's interior spaces, curbside and associated aircraft apron, with particular attention being paid to the baggage system, passenger security checkpoints and employee access to the aircraft apron, commonly referred to as the "Security Identification Display Area (SIDA). Any modifications to the terminal construction for enhance security will likely increase the cost of the project. The potential cost increase project is unknown. The assessment will prepare a detailed cost analysis.

The main thrust of this assessment will be to establish how successful, or not, ANC's security measures and procedures will be to detect, assess, intercept and neutralize each threat.

Other points that will be addressed include, but are not limited to:

- Definition of perceived threats at ANC.
- Price differentials between various access control technologies.
- Reduction of existing vehicle access points on the Airport.

- Fingerprinting of foreigners desiring work at the Airport.
- General Aviation activity vis a vis overall security.
- Baggage from tour operators.
- Drug interdiction versus current personnel levels.

C. Security Priorities

The security priority at all of the airports is public safety and to comply with FAA security directives and amendments. Compliance has changed and is continuing to change the way business is done. These changes require airport management to spend more money than was budgeted for this fiscal year. Airport personnel are now required along with law enforcement agencies, to perform more security inspections and to provide a more visible security presence. For the DOT & PF-operated airports this means prematurely expending personnel services budgets resulting in the need to seek a midyear increment from the legislature. The DOT & PF will also seek federal assistance, where available, to cover these FAA mandated security measures. Municipal airports will also need to seek funding increases from their governing boards. The final dollar amount needed has not yet been determined, as the FAA is still mandating changes. For the remainder of the state fiscal year, the DOT & PF estimates that ANC will spend an additional $1.55 million, FAI will spend $0.43 million, and the rural airport system will expend about $4.8 million. Estimates from the municipal airports are unavailable.

All airports need relief from the FAA-imposed 30' vehicle parking setback from the airport passenger terminal. The DOT & PF believes the threat of a suicide car bombing is very low. Relief from this requirement, especially in Alaska's smaller communities is vital. The monetary impact, to both Fairbanks and Juneau airports, has been quite significant since a large portion of their parking lots and subsequent revenue is unavailable. Rural airports are expending valuable resources enforcing this requirement, and it causes hardship for passengers (especially for older persons, families and the disabled) who must park farther from the terminal and walk through inclement weather to reach the terminal building.

All airports need additional personnel, both for the airport staff and for the airport screener/local law enforcement agencies. At the rural airports, DOT & PF has not historically had adequate numbers of personnel to perform normal duties as well as security patrols required by current FAA regulations. This is especially so during the winter months, when DOT & PF airport staff works overtime just keeping the snow clear from the runways.

At most rural airports, local law enforcement agencies are contracted with to provide law enforcement. Likewise, many of these agencies are not staffed to provide officers as now required by the FAA on an ongoing basis. In addition, several communities have no local law enforcement agency. If additional security or law enforcement staffing is required beyond the current standards, the level of air service at these communities will be restricted to smaller aircraft unless the state or local governments can provide adequate law enforcement.

D. Recommendations

1. Security Actions

Implement a number of immediate, short-term (less than four months) and long-term (greater than four months) security actions, steps and initiatives to increase protection of vulnerable transportation assets.

Funding has not been determined on most of the measures, and could come from a variety of sources. The ability to implement some of these steps will depend on additional funding being identified.

Short-term - To meet the security requirements set by the FAA the following should be enacted.

2. ANC and FAI:
   a. Enhance presence and visibility of law enforcement officers
   b. Seek additional baggage explosive detection machines for installation at both ANC and FAI for use by air carriers
   c. Review access control as well as employee training and updating
   d. Establish temporary gates and check points
   e. Immediate response to unauthorized vehicles at curbside and restricted areas
   f. Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles
   g. Establish controls for ANC aircraft taxiing from general aviation areas to SIDA
3. Rural airports:
   a. All local law enforcement officers should be authorized to enforce state or federal laws. Some local police are currently not authorized and trained in this area.
   b. State airport employees need to have authority to take specific limited actions to enforce the safety and security regulations currently in force. DOT & PF currently relies on the State Troopers or local law enforcement. Employees should have authority to issue tickets and summons for minor infractions. Not all security oriented personnel meet FAA "Law Enforcement Officer" (LEO) criteria (meeting a stringent training protocol and having arrest and detention powers).
   c. The National Guard troops currently supplementing airport security on a short-term basis are currently restricted to screening point duties only. Use of these troops needs to be expanded when they are not needed at security screening points. Additional communications equipment is also needed so the guard staff is in contact with airport and airline screening staff.
   d. Work with air carriers to achieve strict adherence to one carry-on bag coupled with thorough pre-board carry-on and passenger screening. On-line transfer of checked bags should continue with consideration of diverting selected checked baggage, identified by profiling or other means, through the explosive detection machine in ANC.

e. Initiate vehicle key control program and/or review existing program to ensure airport snow removal equipment and/or airport rescue and fire fighting equipment is properly secured to avoid unauthorized use.

4. Statutory changes for all state airports:

a. Revise Alaska Statutes 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for various infractions in addition to current criminal misdemeanor sanctions. Many minor breaches of routine security procedures are enforced by warnings or withdrawal of security access, but otherwise ignored by law enforcement due to lack of appropriate sanctions. A ticketing regime similar to that for traffic offenses would allow more tailored enforcement. More severe criminal sanctions may also be appropriate for certain intentional security violations. (Specific amendment to AS 02 will be needed, but will require significant thought, coordination and procedural formatting and are therefore not provided herein.)

b. Revise Alaska Statutes 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect security sensitive documents.

c. Revise Alaska Statutes 44.62.125 to exempt security sensitive airport security programs from regulations adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act

5. Long-term .

a. To meet security threats at both ANC and FAI the following should be implemented:

- Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback
- Review terminal configuration
- Install new state-of-the-art access control systems (biometrics is suggested as a system that is more difficult to gain unauthorized access to the airport)
- Establish access control for ANC general aviation areas
- Relocate facilities that are not compatible with new security provisions

b. Long term needs for the rural airport system include:

- Additional airport security and operational personnel
- Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback
- Additional municipal law enforcement officers
- Complete perimeter fencing and automated gates with access control
- Traffic barriers and blast deflection devices
- Automated lock and key control
- Reconfigure aprons to better separate large and small aircraft

V. MARINE

A. Introduction

Alaska has 33,000 miles of coastline and many port communities, all with a host of commercial and public facilities on their waterfronts. The state does not operate most ports; in fact, local municipalities operate the 12 largest and the only ports with substantial cargo activity. The state does, however, operate a wide-ranging ferry system along its Pacific coast.

The Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) operates nine roll-on, roll-off passenger ships and carries some 350,000 passengers and 105,000 vehicles, including commercial cargo vans, each year. AMHS routes extend from Bellingham, WA to Dutch Harbor, AK (3,000 miles), and include the Canadian border crossing at Prince Rupert, BC.

Visiting cruise ships originate in Vancouver and Seattle, but some passengers and crew change in several Alaskan ports. Cruise activity is highly seasonal, but there can be three to five cruise ships in a port at one time, carrying 1,200 to 2,000 passengers each, plus a very large crew. The crew is almost entirely foreign nationals. On September 10, 2001, for example, four large cruise ships visited Juneau, bringing 6,806 passengers and 2,845 crew, for a total of 9,651 visitors. Ketchikan, Juneau, Sitka and Seward host the largest numbers of cruise ships.

Alaska's commercial cargoes are primarily domestic, from Puget Sound to Anchorage via container ships and Puget Sound to coastal communities by container and open deck barge. Kodiak and Dutch Harbor also have container service from U.S. ports. Commercially important shipments of ore originate from the Red Dog mine on the Chukchi Sea and both liquefied natural gas and anhydrous ammonia are handled in the Cook Inlet area. Valdez is the only transshipment point at which North Slope crude oil transitions from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to crude oil tankers. There is some international export activity and some interchange through Canada, primarily wood chips.

Unimak Pass in the Aleutian Islands is a major transit point for international cargo shippers using the great circle route from the West Coast to Asia. While it is not likely a way could be found to block that pass, and it could be circumvented at some cost, it does represent a choke point and a "target rich" opportunity.

There are several hundreds small watercraft, both pleasure and commercial transiting from out of state, and many more in, around and between communities. Small boat harbors are found in larger coastal communities.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the lead federal agency for maritime operations, safety and security. They have identified at-risk marine facilities and activities for Alaska. In general, the Alyeska Oil Terminal in Valdez, the Port of Anchorage and the Nikiski Terminals in Cook Inlet are potential targets of high national interest and the USCG has allocated resources accordingly.

Under current statute and regulations, marine security is the responsibility of the USCG. This responsibility includes identification of risks, establishing security zones and security plans for vessels and cruise ship terminals. However, they normally do not conduct water-borne or landside patrols of harbors or perform any routine security functions with

their own personnel. Rather, they most often function as an oversight agency for private or state marine operations.

This assessment was conducted in consultation with the Commander, Seventeenth District, USCG, commercial cargo carriers, port operators, pilot associations, the Marine Exchange of Alaska, DOT & PF staff and many others. Their contribution has been substantial but does not necessarily imply an endorsement of the conclusions contained herein.

B. Current Security Measures and Policies

1. AMHS

There are at present no security measures in effect for the AMHS that remotely resemble those for air travel. There are, for example, no devices for screening passengers, baggage, or vehicles; no controls over passenger access to vehicles on the car deck and no security personnel at the terminals or aboard the ships. The AMHS has instituted a number of measures (e.g., verification of passenger ID/reservations, rejection of unaccompanied vehicles that have not been searched, local police presence at some terminals for some sailings) within its personnel and financial ability. But those measures are regarded as inadequate by contemporary standards.

Correction of these deficiencies will be both costly and lengthy. Correction will involve significant structural changes to terminal buildings and staging areas, ships and the connecting ramps. It will also require the recruitment and training of security personnel. All of these will take years to complete, especially if the physical improvements are competing for funding and contractor resources. Until security improvements are complete throughout the AMHS route system, equipment and/or personnel gaps will undermine traveler and employee security.

2. Ports, Cruise Ships and Commercial Shipping

Port and harbor security has similar objectives to other transportation modes; control access, control cargo, prevent sabotage. The USCG has taken on these missions throughout Alaska, but its resources are highly focused on a single mode (e.g., cruise ships) in many ports or, more often, on all operations in only a few ports (e.g., Valdez and Anchorage.)

a. Control access to the port, its installations and vessels (ref. CFR 33, Part 120 Subpart A, 120.100.)

Statutory authority exists for the USCG to establish procedures for vessel and terminal security. Vessel and Terminal Security Plans are in place for passenger vessels and terminal facilities servicing passenger vessels over 100 registered tons, carrying more than 12 passengers for hire, or making a voyage lasting more than 24 hours, any part of which is on the high seas.

Passenger cruise ships and terminals in Alaska have Vessel and Terminal Security Plans in place. They are security plans that specify actions based on a series of threat levels, low, medium and high. A typical dock for a cruise ship is nestled adjacent to public right of way. (Ketchikan, Juneau, Skagway, for examples.)

These security plans do not apply to AMHS ships holding USCG Certificates of Inspection endorsed for "Lakes, Bays, and Sounds," that transit international waters for only short periods of time, on frequent schedules.

The plans and the threat levels also do not apply to other maritime facilities and activities of lesser value or public interest.

With few exceptions, like the Alyeska Oil Terminal in Valdez, and the Port of Anchorage, most port and harbor facilities have limited security except a fence and signage. Many more have no evidence of security. Security is limited to private operators challenging unwanted visitors on private property or in unauthorized areas. Crime, property damage and liability avoidance are the primary risks motivating the security measures found.

The Valdez Oil Terminal is a high security area. Fences, gates and armed security personnel control access. The USCG has a long-established marine safety zone in place in Valdez. "Vessels not engaged in the movement and support of tank vessels at the Alyeska Marine Terminal are required to make non-stop transits between Valdez Narrows and the City of Valdez port facilities. Vessels are required to transit north of 61-06.8N when east of 146-32.0W. Vessels may not anchor, lay to, or loiter in this zone without COTP permission." *(ref. USCG Local Restrictions for Valdez.)*

b. Control access to cargo or passenger vessels while in port.

The Valdez Oil Terminal has full control of the product but not the surrounding environment, i.e., air space and sea space. The sea space around the terminal is under the control of the USCG, which is devoting increased assets to the maintenance of security in that port.

Control of passengers and baggage is the responsibility of the cruise industry in general with it's own motivations to protect ships and passengers. The Vessel and Port Security Plans are implemented depending on the threat status; low, medium or high, based on intelligence information.

Container movement is controlled by the shippers and terminal security; however, the ability to put almost anything into a container and ship it anywhere in the world is not a controlled activity. It is estimated that less than 1% of foreign origin containers are inspected at the port of entry by U.S. customs. Internal movements are not necessarily inspected but depending on corporate policy, some containers are inspected to verify that the cargo matches the bill of lading. In addition, one shipper reported inspecting and sealing every empty container leaving Alaska. In general, control begins when the container enters the point of shipping and ends when the container exits the port compound. At Glacier Marine Transport on Channel Drive in Juneau, for example, the gate is always open and there are no fence or security personnel. This is typical in most of Alaska's port facilities and the perceived risk is very low.

c. Prevent sabotage to vessels calling at ports, to port installations, and businesses and trade information systems.

Preventing sabotage is the other dimension of security to control risk in all forms. The extent of sabotage possibilities is limited only by one's imagination. The measures previously discussed are part of the process.

Physical separation of activity is the most common measure. Separation provides the physical and visible barriers. Fences, flow control, and shrub clear zones enhance observation of all activity. Separation isolates activity for emergency response services. Port security planning entails evaluating these emergency response conditions.

The USCG has established security zones in many U.S. ports. Moving, temporary safety zones around vessels or fixed zones around port facilities is a common measure employed to enhance safety of marine operations but which may also enhance security. Other port security measures include prohibiting ship movements after dark, expanding notification requirements for ships entering and exiting, movement by Captain of the Port (COTP) permission only, mandatory vessel boarding by armed USCG escorts, and many other details specific to each port as determined by the COTP.

Sabotage in other forms, such as interrupting business activity, is not discussed here but should be evaluated in the context of other communication systems and processes.

C. Vulnerability Assessments

1. AMHS

The AMHS is the most vulnerable of all the State-conducted transportation operations. It offers a target with a large number of passengers, who, during voyage, are isolated from outside assistance. The ability to bring a vehicle aboard as a weapon, or containing weapons, is apparent to any observer. There are no personnel available to DOT & PF who have the training to inspect a vehicle (or a passenger) for any kind of contraband and none that have the authority to react to what they might find. AMHS ships would provide excellent targets for remote detonation of bombs, indiscriminate shooting, or for hijacking. The latter kind of attack would be particularly daunting. If the M/V Kennicott, for example, were hijacked, some 500 passengers of all ages would be at risk, aboard a ship which might remain under way for weeks, while the hijackers use their hostages to enforce their demands. If the seizure were timed properly, it might be as much as 37 hours before the ship failed to arrive at its next port and any authority ashore became aware of the event.

Within the ship, the long-standing regulations which have as their objective ease of movement for fire fighting and escape from damage situations appear to conflict with efforts to prevent unauthorized entry into secure areas. Significant compromises may have to be made in these areas. In the interest of getting early and valuable improvements in shipboard security, regulatory agencies, especially the USCG, may have to invest some effort in resolving those conflicts.

2. Port of Anchorage

The port is a unique and valuable asset. Through the port passes almost 100% of the food and commodities consumed in the interior of the state. It also is the

source of all of the jet fuel for Department of Defense services in the interior and all of the jet fuel at the Ted Stevens International Airport. A loss of this transportation connection would have very significant negative impact to the rail belt and communities down river on the Yukon. The single road access facilitates security efforts but might hinder response in the event of an emergency.

Whatever vulnerabilities may exist for individual operations, such as fuel handling facilities, a port is a diverse and challenging target. The most effective way to disrupt any port is to block the channel. Even this tactic would only be effective in those cases where the channels are few or navigationally restricted. Whether that tactic is available depends in part on the draft and maneuverability of the largest ships that normally use the port. In the case of Anchorage, sinking of a ship in order to block the channel is considered to be an effective tactic

3. Other Ports

Unique opportunities exist at other ports for terrorist activity. For example, Kodiak Island is dependent on its port facilities for virtually all its consumables. Interruption of the availability of those facilities would not only threaten the population but also the nationally significant missile launch facilities located there. Other, smaller communities are even more dependent on their ports but offer much less attractive targets. Many ports, including several that host cruise ships, have not yet developed port security plans.

The potential for blocking the entry/exit channel exists at several ports in Alaska, most notably Anchorage and Juneau. While such blockage might be inconvenient for larger ships and impede private operations such as cruise ships, it would not be a threat to the public. In most cases, barge shipments would be adequate to cope with consumable requirements. Home heating fuel, gasoline, and DOD fuel requirements might be more seriously impeded.

4. Details of Port Facility Layout

The detailed plans for such sensitive facilities as ports, oil terminals, and in fact every public building or other structure, are totally open to public scrutiny. Not only are paper copies of such plans available but they may often be accessed through the Internet. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) facilitates such scrutiny, both before and after construction. Some resolution of the conflicting demands of security versus an informed public may be required in this case.

5. Hazardous Substances

Ports in Alaska, as elsewhere, handle large amounts of hazardous chemicals which, in themselves, constitute potentially powerful weapons. A chlorine gas tank car or tank truck, for example, can be extremely deadly in a population center. The transport of hazardous materials is addressed in the surface transportation section.

D. Security Priorities

The prioritization of security concerns requires consideration of the attractiveness of potential targets from the perpetrator's point of view and the relative difficulty of achieving the intended level of damage (recognizing security measures already in effect)

and the American social norms for public safety. Accordingly, protection of human life has been given the greatest priority.

1. High Priority

   a. Establish physical security conditions for Alaska Marine Highway operations that are equal to the highest standards in effect for any other transportation mode in the U.S.

   b. Designate a single federal agency to provide overall marine security, including grant funding for that purpose, and fund that agency at a level adequate to accomplish its mission.

2. Medium Priority

   a. Review the procedures by which plans for port facilities and other essential public infrastructure are made available to the public, with a view toward preventing access for criminal or terrorist activity.

   b. Review, in cooperation with the USCG, the measures currently in effect for the ports of Anchorage (including Nikiski) and Valdez, with the objective of identifying any state-responsible improvements required.

   c. Evaluate the feasibility and utility of establishing an ongoing marine security review process so that the marine security posture within the State of Alaska can receive the benefit of the experience of all users and operators of marine transportation.

3. Low Priority

   a. Create, within the DOT & PF planning and programming process, methods for evaluating physical security improvements in the marine transportation environment

   b. Examine the physical security conditions within each port visited by cruise ships in order to determine necessary improvements and identify security issues appropriate to the concern of public agencies.

E. Recommendations

1. Security Measures

   Implement a number of immediate, short-term (less than six months) and long-term (greater than six months) actions, steps and initiatives to increase protection of transportation assets.

   a. Short-term

      - Establish, at the earliest possible date, a security force in all AMHS ships. In order to compensate in the short term for those physical improvements that will require more time to complete, this force should be in place not later than 1 June 2002.

      - Designate the USCG as the federal agency responsible for provision of all marine security functions within the U.S. Staff and fund that agency accordingly. (This designation must explicitly task the USCG with

providing a detachment of security personnel for each passenger ship operated by a public agency.)

- Alternatively, designate the Alaska State Troopers to assume the mission of providing security aboard all AMHS ships.
- Alternatively, organize, train, and equip a Transportation Security Division within the DOT & PF with the mission of providing security personnel for all DOT & PF-operated transportation modes.
- Initiate a security study of AMHS operations in order to establish those modifications that may be necessary ashore and afloat and to evaluate their impact on the AMHS' ability to carry out its mission.
- Complete, and obtain USCG approval for, port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships (no later than the 2002 cruise ship season.)
- Begin the process of installing in AMHS ships measures to improve their security. Develop plans for continual improvements.
- Issue such modifications to the Alaska Administrative Code Title 17 as are necessary to meet the security procedure improvements that can be implemented in the short run.

b. Long -term – Establish an AMHS operations center capable of communicating with all ships, maintaining accurate position information and responding to all emergencies.

- Review the process by which plans for port facilities are made available to the public and with make recommendations for modifications to that process which will improve public security.
- Establish in the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program a process a method for receiving and evaluating physical security improvement projects. Designate the Project Evaluation Board to review and approve such submissions.

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2001

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP REPORT

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Short-Term IT/Telecomm Recommendations

1. ITG should meet with all key telecomm providers to insure Disaster Recovery (DR) plans are adequate for the State's needs.
2. ITG should identify resources or services to allow for redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.
3. ITG and the Division of Emergency Services should identify the State communications sites that require added security and establish or recommend action that will improve the overall level of protection.
4. The State should survey physical security of critical telecommunication sites and determine the resources required to improve security.
5. The State should complete the Security Policy process and establish a Security Manager position and staff to help agencies implement the actions and procedures necessary to implement the policy.
6. The State should continue to implement the ALMRS Northzone Pilot Project with 500 subscriber units.

B. Long-Term Information Technology/Telecommunications Security Recommendations

1. The State should acquire the service of a Disaster Recovery expert and conduct a DR Planning process.
2. The State should accelerate the implementation of Phase 1 and 2 of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) project from 2002 through 2004.
3. The State's public/private information policies should be reviewed by each Department.
4. The State should fund and design, build, or acquire an image base map to help plan preparedness and response geographically to emergency situations. The base map could be acquired and hosted on an enterprise server for around $2.5m.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
IT/TELECOMM SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objective: To prepare recommendations regarding steps to take to provide security on our state network and physical sites. Recommendations will be presented to the Disaster Policy Cabinet for forwarding to the Governor by 27 October.

B. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:

ACS	Alaska Communications Systems
AKPAY	Alaska State Payroll System
ALMR	Alaska Land Mobile Radio
ATT	American Telephone and Telegraph Company
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
DES	Division of Emergency Services
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DOT	Department of Transportation
DR	Disaster Recovery
DMVA	Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
GCI	General Communication, Inc.
ITG	Information Technology Group
LMR	Land Mobile Radio project
TIC	Telecommunications Information Council

II. DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING

A. Alaska has a Disaster Recovery (DR) mainframe hot site contract with Weyerhaeuser. It is about to expire. It is for mainframe services only.

B. A hot site drill was conducted during the first week of October 2001. DOA/Division of Finance successfully tested the online portion of the State payroll system (AKPAY) at the drill.

C. Agencies are invited to attend the drills but they have only been marginally participating.

D. No voice communication, mid-tier or open system disaster plan exists for the state, although the State's enterprise email systems in Juneau and Anchorage can back each

other up. Additional resources are needed to develop these processes and to conduct tests and drills. Key systems need to be inventoried as part of the DR Plan.

E. Agencies with different mail systems, for example DMVA's First Class system, may or may not be able to communicate with the rest of the state's mail systems, in the event of a disaster. These issues need to be evaluated in the DR plan. Redundancy and standardization are tightly coupled.

F. Key provider's DR Plans need to be reviewed in conjunction with the state's planning process.

G. DR Planning needs to be a part of the statewide enterprise IT Plan. A RFP for a consultant to put the IT planning process together is about to be released.

H. Recommendations:

1. **Immediately, ITG should meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their DR plans are adequate for the State's needs.**
2. **Immediately, ITG should identify resources or services to allow for redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.**
3. **Longer Term, the State acquire the service of a DR expert and conduct a DR Planning process that would involve all mission critical systems, data and IT services of the state, dovetailed into the IT Plan being conducted by ITG.**

III. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

A. Email is critical for emergency communications. What will it take for state's e-mail systems to operate in an emergency situation and to allow messaging to continue?

B. The Land Mobile Radio project (LMR) is an existing, ongoing project designed to deliver inter-agency communications for emergency and for normal operations. Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) is a system that delivers inter-agency communications for emergency and for normal operations. A project is currently underway to implement new LMR technology with initial phases coming online during the summer/fall of 2002. This system is being built as a joint initiative with Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal non-DoD agencies, such as BLM, FAA, DOT as well as Municipal governments and state agencies. This system is critical not only to state government, but during the time of disaster it will allow all responding agencies from federal, state and local agencies to communicate effectively and seamlessly with one another. LMR funding received to date is $1.638m GF, $1.389 ISF and $15.243m in authority to collect federal receipts. Federal funding has not yet been identified. **LMR Funding requirements are:**

1. State of Alaska component
   - Phase 1 and Phase 2 Infrastructure- $17.4m
   - Phase 3 and Phase 4 Infrastructure (Southeast and Remote Areas) - $20.9m
   - Subscriber units - $12.0m
2. **Federal component**
   - Phase 1 and Phase 2 Infrastructure- $13.6m

- Phase 3 and Phase 4 Infrastructure (Southeast and Remote Areas) - $6.0m
- Subscriber units - $43.0m

3. Local component:
   - Subscriber units - $29.4m

C. Recommend that the State continue to prioritize and accelerate the implementation of Phase 1 and 2 of the project from 2002 through 2004. Funding for these phases has not been secured to date, however is being sought at the federal level in grants and appropriations. LMR system should be classified as a critical system and included in the State's Disaster Recovery Plan (for physical sites and equipment, software and hardware).

IV. PHYSICAL SECURITY

A. ITG needs to work with the DMVA/Division of Emergency Services (DES) and the telecomm providers (ATT, GCI and ACS) to update the state's critical IT/Telecomm sites for added security in the event of a threat and to mitigate disasters associated with these sites. These sites should also be evaluated for access security (fencing, alarms, and surveillance) requirements and limitations. Additional resources will be needed to improve the security and will be identified in the DR Plan.

B. Recommendations:

1. Short term, that ITG & DES quickly identifies the sites that require added security in the event of a threat and take necessary precautions necessary to protect them as needed.
2. Long term, the State identifies physical security of critical sites and the resources required to correct the deficiencies in their security as part of the DR Plan.

V. SECURITY PLANNING

A. TIC Policy has already endorsed the need for a statewide Security Policy and a committee is formed and working toward that end.

B. Recommend that the State complete the Security Policy process and fund the planning process, a Security Manager position with staff to help agencies implement the tools and procedures necessary to implement the policy.

VI. PUBLIC/PRIVATE INFORMATION

A. State's Privacy Policies need to be maintained during emergencies and recoveries.

B. Many State's are reviewing their public information policies (web information) to minimize the threat to critical systems, like water supplies. Does Alaska have too much sensitive information on the Web?

C. Does Alaska have the information it needs to quickly identify geographically critical site and location information?

D. Recommendations:

1. The State's public/private information policies need to be reviewed, by each Department, for appropriateness in light of new security perspectives.

2. The State needs to fund, design/build or acquire an image base map to help plan preparedness and response to emergency situations geographically. This base map database can be built in phases with the most critical sites added first and would provide image information on access roads, trails, communities, utility corridors, etc. to a 5 meter resolution. DNR estimates the base map could be acquired and hosted on an enterprise server for around $2.5m.

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2001

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP REPORT

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ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS)

1. Establish a vehicle checkpoint south of the Yukon River Bridge on the Dalton Highway.
2. Increase ground patrols along the pipeline.
3. Formalize methods for sharing resource information for response to a TAPS incident.
4. Continue to practice and expand TAPS defense drills.
5. Consider satellite monitoring of TAPS.
6. Continue site hardening and ground security at the VMT.
7. Develop procedures to quickly deploy military resources to the Valdez area.
8. Increase Alaska State Trooper presence in the Valdez area.
9. Review the capacity of oil producers to store oil on the North Slope.
10. Increase State security at the Deadhorse Airport.

B. Other Energy Production Sites

1. Increase security by producers at on-shore facilities.
2. Increase monitoring by local, private and State law enforcement agencies of refinery infrastructure.
3. Fence the entire perimeter of the refinery in Valdez and limit access with a security gate check.

C. Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). Implement security measures necessary to protect APSIN data and conform to NCIC security policies.

D. Border Crossings. Provide border crossings with access to Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN) and NCIC.

E. State Facilities. Each agency responsible for operation of a State office building should have procedures in place to notify employees immediately of hazardous situations and evacuation plans for those situations.

F. Miscellaneous Security Issues

1. The State of Alaska should move forward aggressively to fund and install the State's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS).
2. The State needs additional troopers for enhanced information gathering and analysis capability.

3. Because security of water supply systems and air intake systems on large buildings is not feasible, routine testing should be conducted for water supplies and building air handling systems. Consider improving drinking water security where possible.

4. If Alaska State Trooper staff was expanded by 105 personnel over three years, requests for Troopers to handle increased security requirements could be accommodated.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
ENERGY/SECURITY SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Current Situation

In the State there is currently only one national energy asset, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS). This includes the Prudhoe Bay Oil Fields and the Shipping Terminal in Valdez at the terminus of the Pipeline.

While there are many other energy-related infrastructure facilities in state, the loss of any of those individual facilities does not affect the national interest in the same way as TAPS.

It should be noted that besides the obvious energy assets, such as oil refineries and TAPS, there are many pieces of our energy infrastructure that must be considered in an overall security and response package. These include power plants statewide, (some of these are extremely large and service large population centers) the larger power substations, oil refineries on the Kenai Peninsula, at Valdez, and in Fairbanks. Most of our port facilities provide, in some manner, shipping and receiving of energy sources to our rural communities. The Alaska Railroad provides movement of coal and fuel from the Interior to Southcentral Alaska. *Attachment A* is an overview of key assets of all types that must be considered in overall security/energy responses.

It also should be noted from a security standpoint, the concept of preventing a "suicide bomber" from disrupting any of the energy facilities is not possible from a pure "hardening" of the site itself. It has been long determined and established that prevention through intelligence and interception of individuals involved in potential criminal terrorist activities is the only adequate intervention possibility.

This should not be taken to mean that every means to harden sites and enhance security whenever possible shouldn't be taken, because those actions certainly can prevent the less organized or less dedicated individual working toward a criminal terrorist act. Additionally, such actions provide opportunity to mitigate events, prevent total success, improve chances of identifying and apprehending the perpetrator(s) and allow for successful and timely recovery. This is true for both the organized and less organized individuals or groups.

B. Critical Infrastructure

The most critical infrastructure identified and agreed upon is TAPS including the Prudhoe Bay oilfields, the Pipeline and the Valdez terminal.

II. THE ALASKA PIPELINE

A. Current Situation

Security for the Pipeline has been substantially increased from the level that existed prior to September 11. The security coverage over the 800-mile Pipeline is inadequate for the terrorist threat potential that currently exists. Alyeska security resources are at or near capacity. Although the recent incident near Livengood did not involve any planned effort

to disrupt the Pipeline, it clearly points out the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure. Access to the Pipeline is easily accomplished on much of the 420 miles of aboveground segments within the 800-mile route. The line is extremely vulnerable to long-term damage in some locations. Security efforts are focused at the most vulnerable locations along the entire pipeline. At this time, the pipeline is receiving only intermittent air and ground surveillance, due in large part to the vast size. As evidenced by the incident near Livengood, a single individual, let alone an organized effort, could cause great harm and potentially stop production and delivery of oil to the terminus in Valdez. These have obvious state and national implications as well as the potential for long-term damage to the Prudhoe Bay Oil Fields if pumping at some of the marginal wells ceases. It is clear from briefings by the oil industry that loss of some wells would occur if those wells have to shut down. Experts currently disagree on the cold start-up ability of the Pipeline after it has to be shut down for an extended period of time, especially during winter months.

B. What We Have

Alyeska currently has security officers providing stationary and mobile security patrols along the length of the Pipeline, including the terminal in Valdez. Pipeline right-of-way access gates have been closed and locked, but this does not prevent access to the roads to someone even marginally determined to pass around the gate.

Regular, but limited, helicopter flights are being conducted on the Alyeska right-of-way. These flights are limited by weather conditions as well as the vast distances the flights must cover. Troopers are also monitoring access to the right-of-way gates and the visible portions of the Pipeline from the Yukon River Bridge south to Valdez as time permits in their routine patrols.

C. What We Need

It has been the recommendation of Alyeska security, the North Slope Producers, as well as the Committee, that at a minimum a checkpoint south of the Yukon River Bridge be established to monitor access to the Dalton Highway and Pipeline north of the river and ultimately into the Prudhoe Bay oilfields. Monitoring access to the area north of the river will allow Alyeska more flexibility in managing their limited security resources. Staffing for a checkpoint and additional ground and air patrols within Pipeline corridor are necessary for prevention and rapid response to events. The amount of staffing and cost involved will be dictated by the type and detail of the restriction to travel the Dalton Highway. The access can be restricted to permitted commercial traffic or local residents only on one end of the closure scale, to a simple checkpoint where people would provide identification prior to being allowed to proceed up the Dalton Highway north of Pump Station 6.

Restriction of airspace along the entire Pipeline and all of the pump stations, as is currently in place at the Valdez terminal. This should include a "no flight zone" over all the pump stations (five-mile radius) and the Pipeline, except when crossing. This would require FAA action.

Formalize the methods to share information on resources available to respond to a TAPS incident.

Continue to practice and expand Pipeline defense drills to validate existing security and response measures and identify opportunities for improvement. (These have been

ongoing between Alyeska security, the FBI, BATF, ALCOM, local police, emergency response agencies, and the Alaska State Troopers. These exercises should be expanded to include other response agencies, such as DNR, DEC, DOT and the Alaska National Guard.)

Consideration of satellite monitoring of the TAPS to detect temperature changes should be discussed with the military and national security agencies.

III. THE TAPS TERMINAL IN VALDEZ

A. Current Situation

The Valdez Oil Terminal is currently serviced by Alyeska security through contract and is a limited enclosed area with restricted access to the facility. Access controls include use of the natural barriers that are complemented by site hardening technology and physical barriers. The Valdez Police Department is the primary response law enforcement agency in the region. The Valdez Police Department has been dealing with security issues with the terminal and within the city limits since the completion of the Pipeline. It is a small agency that depends on outside support in the event of a large incident. Currently, there is only one Alaska State Trooper assigned to the Fish & Wildlife Division stationed in Valdez. Additional Trooper resources come from the Glennallen area for support.

B. Threat

The terminal is vulnerable to attack by air, sea and ground and is potentially one of the most critical assets in the Pipeline system. It is imperative for the storage and transportation of oil in order that the continued pumping of wells in Prudhoe Bay can take place.

C. What We Have

Alyeska security has personnel in place at the terminal, one Alaska State Trooper in the FWP Division, and the Valdez Police Department. Prior to 9/11, the primary law enforcement responder for on-water events was the Valdez Police Department and the Fish & Wildlife Troopers, generally using the FWP vessel. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has dramatically increased its law enforcement presence and contingencies for protecting the Valdez terminal assets, the Valdez harbor and Prince William Sound. Because Valdez is situated in a bay surrounded by high mountains, access to the airport is generally by small aircraft (less than 60 people). Other than the Coast Guard, there are no military assets in the Valdez area that would be able to currently enforce a "no fly" zone, and even with response from Anchorage, which is relatively quick with current military assets, it is difficult for those assets to operate at low levels in the confined areas around Valdez.

D. What We Need

Additional site hardening and ground security of the Valdez Terminal are taking place and should continue. Military assets necessary to detect the airspace violations by organized groups will have to be stationed in Valdez if airspace security were ever to be maintained. At a minimum, the infrastructure for deployment of aircrews into Valdez during high-risk times should be accomplished. An increase in the presence of the Alaska State Troopers in the Valdez area would not only help response to the terminus, they would provide

patrol and response capabilities in the area of the Pipeline through Thompson Pass. Key personnel routinely working in and around the Valdez Terminal are required to have pre-employment background checks. This process is being expanded to cover the majority of TAPS workers, per the Joint Pipeline Office. Tanker crews and other key personnel should have comprehensive background checks.

IV. PRUDHOE BAY PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Current Situation

Producers on the North Slope currently control access to the area with patrol checkpoints. This currently does not take place until people reach the Prudhoe Bay area where the Dalton Highway terminates on the north end. There is no current protection against individuals and illicit cargo being transported up the Dalton Highway.

Security at the Deadhorse Airport is now being handled by oil company security contractors. Threat at the Prudhoe Bay oilfields is less than that of the TAPS or the Valdez Oil Terminal. At this time logistics even for air travel, other than scheduled flights into the Prudhoe Bay and North Slope area is limited. Any individual asset compromised in Prudhoe Bay, except for Pump Station # 1 may not necessarily mean the shutdown of the rest of the field. Pump Station # 1 is the central gathering site and metering for oil shipped down the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and is one of the most critical infrastructures on the North Slope.

B. What We Have

Currently there are no state law enforcement personnel assigned to the North Slope. Law enforcement is handled by the North Slope Borough with two officers assigned to the Greater Prudhoe Bay - North Slope area. These officers have been augmented as necessary from the North Slope Borough out of Barrow, and by Alaska State Troopers and the Troopers' tactical teams several times in recent years when environmental groups have attempted to disrupt construction on the North Slope.

There has been an increase in contract security through Alyeska, British Petroleum and Arco to allow the Deadhorse Airport to meet the FAA requirements. Private industry has agreed to handle security at the state airport up to this point to keep their personnel and cargo moving via aircraft.

C. What We Need

A review of the capacity of the producers to store oil on the North Slope should be undertaken by the Joint Pipeline Office. This would include the feasibility of long-term oil storage of up to 60 days .

Increased state security at the Deadhorse Airport to alleviate Alyeska resources that are currently doing airport security mandated by the FAA.

V. OTHER ENERGY PRODUCTION SITES

A. Cook Inlet Production Facilities

1. Current Situation

Currently, there are 16 offshore oil and gas platforms, including sub-sea pipelines, and two processing facilities on both sides of Cook Inlet. There are also on-shore oil and gas fields and pipelines, docks, and liquified natural gas facilities. All the on-shore facilities on the Kenai Peninsula side of this production are accessible by road in North Kenai. Any of the oil platforms are potentially vulnerable to water or air assault. Some of the facilities are highly explosive Disruption of supplies from these facilities would have impacts on Anchorage and the Kenai areas. The facilities are low national security risks. These facilities also have a relatively low profile internationally.

2. What We Have

There is little or no formal security on the Cook Inlet platforms. Security takes place on-shore during access to the facilities by helicopter from the North Kenai area. Helicopters are used to resupply and relieve crews.

3. What We Need

Increased security by the producers at their air access on-shore facilities is recommended.

B. Petroleum Facilities

Currently there are petroleum refinery facilities in North Kenai (Tesoro), North Pole out of Fairbanks (Williams), and Valdez (PetroStar). Each refinery produces products that impacts separate segments of Alaska's population. These will be addressed separately. All facilities are similar in their security needs, in that they are normally closed facilities with 24 hour-gated security.

C. Tesoro, North Kenai

1. Current Situation

The Tesoro facility provides gas and oil products for the Kenai Peninsula as well as Anchorage. The facility is a closed facility that is fenced and has basic security 24 hours a day.

2. Threat

The Tesoro Facility is on the Kenai Spur Highway and is accessible immediately off the roadway by vehicles. It could also be a potential air target. Immediately surrounding the area within a five-mile radius are residential areas as well as schools. The Kenai Peninsula Borough has one of the State's most comprehensive emergency response plans and the Tesoro personnel are a part of the Local Area Planning Commission for response to disasters and releases from their facility.

D. Williams Refinery, Fairbanks

1. Current Situation

The Williams Refinery is a gated and secure facility with 24-hour contract security coverage. This facility produces fuel for Golden Valley Electric, and jet fuel for the military, and local heating oil. It also ships refined products to the Anchorage area. This could be disrupted if it could not extract crude oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

2. Threat

The Williams Refinery is again a low-level threat. Damage or shutdown would impact primarily local resources and infrastructure and the military. The Refinery is the primary distributor for jet fuel to all Alaska military and for refuel of commercial air carriers. Arrangements would have to be made through other means to ship military fuel to the Fairbanks area.

3. What We Have

Activities that are associated with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline security, Williams' security, local North Pole police presence and Alaska State Trooper presence. There is also some limited park ranger presence.

4. What We Need

Increased monitoring by private, local and state law enforcement agencies would produce the best results for increases to the security situation.

E. PetroStar, Valdez

1. Current Situation

PetroStar is an oil production facility near the Valdez Pipeline Terminal. It primarily produces marine and aviation fuels as well as diesel fuel for generating plants. The facility currently has no contract security. It is not a closed facility. There is a fence with open gates on the front side but the sides and the back, which is on the water, are not secure or enclosed. The facility primarily ships fuels north out of Valdez as well as ships from Valdez via the marine terminal.

2. Threat

This facility is a much lower level threat than the TAPS terminal in Valdez. It is a stand-alone facility, but is in close proximity to the TAPS facility. A significant event at the PetroStar facility has the potential of closing the road to the TAPS terminal.

3. What We Have

On land, Alyeska security has personnel in place at the terminal, one Alaska State Trooper in the FWP Division, and the Valdez Police Department. On the water there is a site of the Valdez operation, the Coast Guard presence is the primary law enforcement responder. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has dramatically increased its presence and contingencies for the Valdez terminal assets.

4. What We Need

The PetroStar plant recommendation would be to secure its entire perimeter with fence and to provide at least limited access via a security gate check in to the facility.

VI. STATE FACILITIES

A. Current Situation/Threat

The level of threat to state court buildings, office buildings, and other facilities from terrorist related activities is considered low at this time. However, all occupants of the buildings should be advised to monitor access to their facility and immediately report

unusual suspicious activity and/or behavior by persons in or near the building or facility. This vigilance is necessary as individuals may inspire to take action against a state facility with the thought it will be blamed on others. In light of the most recent incidents of anthrax threats and false anthrax calls similar to a false bomb threat rate, a higher degree of diligence is necessary.

In addition, capitol building and other major state facilities in our capital are for the most part without security.

B. What We Have

The court buildings, other state buildings/facilities around the state have limited to non-existent security in place.

C. What We Need

Additional security measures as a specific response to current terrorism situation would appear to be a lower priority at this time. However, each agency is responsible for operation of the individual state owned/operated buildings needs to have in-place systems for notification of all employees of emergency situations and a plan in place to conduct evacuation if necessary. Buildings and facilities need to have in place a method to notify employees immediately of hazardous situations and evacuation plans.

VII. ALASKA PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION NETWORK (APSIN) SECURITY

A. What Alaska Has

1. DPS operates the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). APSIN provides access to state criminal history records, which can be used to screen people for sensitive positions, as well as driving, vehicle, wants/warrants, and other law enforcement records relied upon every day for officer safety and public protection.
2. DPS provides connection to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) through APSIN. As the state's "Control Terminal Agency" DPS is responsible for ensuring compliance with security standards set by the FBI.

B. What Alaska Needs

1. Before the terrorist attack on September 11, the Division of Administrative Services was already planning APSIN enhancements to comply with technical security guidelines issued by the FBI. These "NCIC 2000" security requirements speak directly to the needs of law enforcement to protect against terrorism as well as to respond to a terrorist attack. They are designed to protect criminal justice information from unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction.
2. DPS needs the following tools, or some combination of them, to meet FBI requirements: "smart cards" or other physical tokens that must be combined with passwords, biometric validation of user identity (e.g., fingerprints or facial scanning), encryption of data, and implementation of a "virtual private network" (VPN).
3. The first step is a concise cost/benefit analysis of the options by someone familiar with the FBI standards as well as Alaska's unique geography, political structure, and resources; cost $15,000.00.

4. Based on the cost benefit analysis, DPS must select the best solution and implement it by July 2002; cost $1,300,000.

VIII. BORDER CROSSINGS

A. What Alaska Has

1. DPS operates the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN). APSIN provides access to state criminal history records, which can be used to screen individual travelers for entry to Alaska and the US. APSIN includes driving, vehicle, wants/warrants and other law enforcement records relied upon every day for officer safety and public protection.

2. The APSIN system provides connection to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) for law enforcement agencies throughout the state.

B. What Alaska Needs

1. Access to APSIN and NCIC (via APSIN) is provided at cost to all approved law enforcement agencies. The cost of access to APSIN is directly related to the cost of providing the required communications technology. In general, the further from a metropolitan area an agency is located, the more costly the technology.

2. There are four (4) US border crossings on the interconnected Alaska/Canadian road systems. Currently, only one of these locations has even intermittent access to the APSIN/NCIC system.

3. Alaska needs the following tools to provide the communications technologies that will allow these four (4) border crossings reliable access to APSIN and NCIC, with a total cost of $360,000.

   a. Installation of T1 lines, DSUs and Routers; cost $40,000.

   b. Computer Terminals and Printers; cost $32,000

   c. Annual Line costs and device dees (5 years); $288,000

IX. MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY ISSUES

A. Communications

The State of Alaska needs to move forward aggressively to finalize plans for funding, for obtaining and installation of appropriate equipment for the State's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (VHF), narrow band, digital, trunked system. This system involves the Department of Defense, (DoD), non-DoD federal agencies, State of Alaska and local agencies and would allow these agencies to communicate effectively in emergency situations.

B. Law Enforcement Intelligence Gathering

1. Current Situation

Currently the Alaska State Troopers oversee the criminal intelligence gathering for the State of Alaska. They are co-located with the FBI and run a joint intelligence facility with the FBI. This is the only state in the nation that coexists with and routinely shares unclassified intelligence that the FBI has access to. As stated earlier,

the gathering of criminal intelligence has the potential for preventing terrorist acts, both internally and externally, and is the most valuable asset from a law enforcement perspective.

2. What We Have

There is one Alaska State Trooper overseeing four civilian intelligence personnel and several National Guard resources through the National Guard's Drug Interdiction program.

3. What We Need

Currently the Alaska State Troopers, like several of the federal agencies, have analysis capabilities of intelligence but little field intelligence access other than what is provided by patrol troopers and local law enforcement. This unit should be increased to include additional analysts and the capability for the Alaska State Troopers to operate covert surveillance in the field. This would be an addition of ten troopers for this unit, which would provide intelligence on criminal and environmental issues.

C. Miscellaneous Energy Production

In addition to the previously discussed energy facilities, there are several facilities in and around the area of the Tesoro Refinery in North Kenai that have consequences if disrupted.

1. Phillips' Gas-to-Liquid Plant

This facility has full time 24-hour security, is fenced, and has regular perimeter patrols. This facility ships liquid natural gas from Alaska, primarily to the Orient and is located along the same stretch of beach in North Kenai as several other facilities for shipping purposes.

2. Kenai Pipeline

This facility is also secured. Its primary purpose is storage of fuels for Tesoro and other producers. This facility appears to be part of the Tesoro Plant, but is owned and operated separately from the Tesoro Plant. Security is provided 24 hours a day.

3. Agrium Plant

This plant produces urea fertilizers. It has 24-hour security and is patrolled routinely.

4. Current Situation

All of these facilities are located in proximity of each other in the Nikiski/North Kenai area. The highway passes near all of these facilities, and their security is acceptable under normal circumstances. All of the facilities have a potential environmental/economic consequence to the State of Alaska if disrupted.

D. Public Water Supply

There is a concern that a relatively small amount of a chemical or biological agent could heavily contaminate a large city water system. It would actually take a very large amount of contaminants to threaten a city water system, which reduces the likelihood of a

successful attack. A surface water source, such as a lake or stream, would be a much easier target to access than a secure closed-loop system, like a well.

In some cases, surface water sources are owned by the State of Alaska and used by a water utility. The State is typically responsible for public use of the watershed, and the water system owners/operators are ultimately responsible to ensure safe water is provided to the public. Water utilities can take actions to increase security and restrict access to water system components by locking doors to well houses, vaults, and treatment plants, securing other access points to a distribution system, installing alarm systems, posting signs in restricted areas, and increasing employee awareness of security issues. Restricting physical access to all parts of a city water system is not practical.

A specific monitoring program would be a more feasible approach to providing assurance that safe drinking water is reaching the tap. The State of Alaska is ready to respond to an attack on a public drinking water system with assistance and guidance in water sample collection, laboratory analysis, and recovery efforts. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has technical experts and federal laboratories available for immediate assistance.

Although controls on public use and access to public water supply watersheds may be impractical or undesirable, increased surveillance and monitoring of users by state land managers may provide added protection. Additionally, there may be particular areas where public access is provided where traffic design and passive barriers could be installed to prevent direct access to public water supplies. Both of these actions might be particularly feasible and should be considered on state lands such as Chugach State Park, which constitutes much of the public drinking water watershed for Anchorage, where public access occurs and where existing state management personnel could be readily supplemented.

E. United States Customs Border Crossings (Personnel)

There are five primary potential border crossings in Alaska, i.e. the main crossing at the Alaska-Canada Highway, Canada into Haines, Canada into Skagway, the Stewart-Hyder crossing, (which may be diminished as the Ferry goes back into B.C. so that it requires Customs clearance in conjunction with the Ferry trip). The fifth and most unprotected is the border crossing from Dawson at the Canadian border and through Boundary over the Taylor Highway. There are no Troopers assigned in Skagway, and two Troopers assigned in Haines – one each from the Fish & Wildlife Division and the Division of Alaska State Troopers. There is no longer a Trooper stationed at the Alaska-Canada border crossing – the closest Trooper is in the Northway area. There are no Troopers in the Eagle or Boundary area. U.S. Customs has increased container inspection and has attempted to increase their security alert at the border crossings that they man.

F. Alaska State Troopers

During several of the subcommittee conferences, as well as discussion with the Governor's staff, there have been repeated requests for the Alaska State Troopers to handle aspects of security from Prudhoe Bay to the Ferry system. Many of the specifics are outlined in other subcommittee reports, i.e. Transportation, consequence management, etc.

The Division of Alaska Troopers would be the best agency to handle many of these mandates. It will take an expansion of one hundred (100) Troopers to provide the necessary personnel to handle these tasks.

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

October 26, 2001

2:30 p.m

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP REPORT

Table of Contents

DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS/CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

These recommendations are the Sub-committee's number one (first) priority recommendations. They are grouped by time period (short-term, mid-term, long-term). The recommendations assigned a lesser priority (2 or3) can be found in the Priority/Cost Breakdown Spreadsheet which contains all the Sub-committee's recommendations, in priority and grouped by time period.

A. Short-term recommendations (accomplish by 12/30/01).

1. Complete a State management plan for management of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and feasibility study for Alaska Pharmaceutical Cache.
2. Disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities.
3. Establish a recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government and plan for continuity of government and continuity of operations.
4. Hire a Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner.
5. Hire an Analyst/Programmer to support the Health Alert Network.
6. Hire a Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network.
7. Hire a contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises.
8. Develop a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State.
9. Develop a Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) kits for emergency medical service providers statewide.
10. Build a state-of-the-art 103d CST (WMD) facility—funded but not yet under construction.
11. Acquire a Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST (WMD)—federally funded and awaiting delivery.
12. Acquire 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary—federally funded and awaiting delivery.
13. Procure Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD).
14. Conduct a feasibility study regarding Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in-State).

B. Mid-term recommendations (accomplish by 06/30/02).

1. Hire 38 Alaska State Troopers (AST) (Phase 1 of 3) to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide (see Energy/Security recommendations).
2. Develop and publish a WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan

3. Develop and publish a comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP.

4. Develop a small community WMD Annex to the Community Model Disaster Response Plan.

5. Develop and publish a medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood.

6. Develop a State plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism.

7. Hire three Emergency Management Specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises.

8. Establish a Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) (four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations.

9. Hire a pharmacist to manage the State pharmaceutical cache.

10. Hire six additional staff for the DEC response corps to maintain alert status on a 24-hour per day basis.

11. Hire two microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab (Anchorage) to handle additional testing requirements.

12. Hire a Microcomputer Tech/Network Specialist/Program Analyst to support the Medical Examiner's Office and the State Public Health Lab.

13. Hire two Microcomputer Technicians to support State Public Health Centers.

14. Complete the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems.

15. Upgrade computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information.

16. Produce canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events.

17. Procure training, trucks and equipment for a Level A HAZMAT team in Juneau.

18. Procure equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and food and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation).

19. Procure 480 Modified Level B suits for State and local law enforcement personnel (Phase 1 of 3).

20. Establish hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) including training.

21. Pre-position decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak and nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai,

Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer; two each in Fairbanks) and six deployable decontamination sets (Phase 1 of 2).

22. Pre-position personal privacy kits (Phase 1 of 2).

23. Procure test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements (Phase 1 of 2).

24. Conduct WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team.

25. Conduct training in managing WMD incidents for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders.

26. Conduct WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school and public works employees and local elected officials.

27. Conduct WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide.

28. Provide First Class e-mail training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders.

29. Conduct robust WMD exercises that encompass all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors (Phase 1 of 4).

C. Long-range (accomplish in SFY 2003 or after).

1. Develop WMD annexes for jurisdictions without them.

2. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

3. Purchase Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment.

4. Obtain equipment and a mouse colony for the Anchorage Public Health Lab so it can have a botulism diagnosis capability.

5. Obtain test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements (Phase 2 of 2).

6. Continue a robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors.

7. Complete WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel Statewide.

8. Construct and operate the State Seafood and Safety Laboratory.

GOVERNOR'S DISASTER POLICY CABINET
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS / CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
SUBGROUP REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The objectives of this report are:

1. To have plans in place that will ensure a coordinated response to WMD events at all levels of government.
2. To have enough personnel, with the appropriate skills, so that State and local government can effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
3. To have a reliable, interagency, State-wide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
4. To provide State agencies, local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the equipment, materials and assets they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.
5. To provide State agencies, local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the training and exercise they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

B. The Threat

In the event of a terrorist attack, the State has to be prepared to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each presents a different challenge to the State. However, it is not feasible for the State to be prepared to respond to all equally; there just aren't enough resources.

Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the capability of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given relatively lower priority than preparation for other threats.

As recent events indicate, chemical/biological attacks are possible. Terrorists have the means to make the substances and deliver them. And although the State is marginally prepared to respond to these events, its posture needs improvement.

Again, recent events highlight the terrorist abilities to employ high explosive/incendiary devices. There are no jurisdictions in our country capable of effective initial responses to an event like the destruction of the World Trade Center. But, local first responders are fairly well prepared to handle lesser events. To some degree the do so on a daily basis.

In terms of the State's focus on types of threats this Subgroup believes that the State's first priority should be for chemical/biological events, secondly to high explosive/incendiary events and lastly to nuclear/radiological events.

C. These assumptions are specific to this report. They are supplemental to the assumptions contained in the State Emergency Operations Plan.

1. In the event of a catastrophic WMD attack, similar competing events in the Lower 48 and/or poor weather conditions, the arrival of national assets will delay (beyond the 12-hour planning figure).
2. Whatever the total cost of implementing some or all of the measures contained in this report, the annual recurring costs will amount to 25-33% of the total startup cost.

D. This report does not attempt to cover long-term recovery because we can never see far enough ahead to anticipate the long-term recovery requirements. They are highly specific to each disaster and are best planned for during the response phase of an actual event.

E. Despite the assumption made above there is a considerable array of national assets available to the State though FEMA. The most significant are:

1. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (one in Alaska);
2. Disaster Mortuary Teams;
3. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile;
4. Heavy Urban Search and Rescue Teams;
5. Prime Power; and
6. Type I Incident Management Teams (one in Alaska).

F. Some of the acronyms used in this report are:

AICC..... Alaska Interagency Coordination Center
CBNRE..... Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, Explosive
CHEMS..... Community Health and Emergency Medical Services
103d CST (WMD)..... 103d Civil Support Team (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
DES..... Division of Emergency Services
EMS..... Emergency Medical Services
EOC..... Emergency Operations Center
EOP..... Emergency Operations Plan
FNSB..... Fairbanks North Star Borough
HAZMAT..... Hazardous Materials
LMRS..... Land Mobile Radio System
MOA..... Municipality of Anchorage
NPS..... National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
PH..... Public Health
SAR..... Search and Rescue
SECC..... State Emergency Coordination Center

USAR..... Urban Search and Rescue

WMD..... Weapons of Mass Destruction

II. SUMMARY

A. Part IV of the report lists the State's current capabilities and requirements, in general terms, with regard to core emergency management functions (i.e., Direction and Control, Human Services, etc.). That is, Part IV describes what the State can do now in response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack and what it needs to be able to do to provide the optimal response. In Part III the general response and recovery functions from Part IV are translated into the specific: plans; personnel; communications; equipment, material and assets; and training and exercises the State must have to mount the optimal response.

B. In part III costs are shown for most of the required elements. In some cases these costs are precise and in others they are rough estimates. The costs of WMD specific equipment changes constantly and varies widely depending on the vendors consulted. In a few cases the cost is unknown at this time and is so described. Cost totals are shown in Part III for the five major Preparation and Mitigation categories.

C. The Subgroup prioritized the lists of plans; personnel; communications; materials, assets and facilities; and training and exercises. For Part III, the criteria used are:

- Does the item support response to a chemical, biological or high explosive/incendiary event?
- Does the item directly support response to a major population center or provide support to local communication on a regional basis?
- Does the item support the core emergency management functions of Human Services, Public Safety, Communications and/or Direction and Control?
- Does the item give the State a capability where it had none at all, or does it improve an existing capability?

D. The Subgroup assigned each item a priority ranking from one (the highest) to four (the lowest). Then the members determined how quickly the item could be accomplished: 3 months or less; 3 to 6 months; 6 months to 1 year; 1 year to two years; 2 years to 3 years; or long-term (more than 3 years). The result is the listing at Annex A. Each item is assigned a priority and a timeline for accomplishment. This list below summarizes the number one ranked items by time period.

1. 3-Month Priorities:

- State management plan for management of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and feasibility study for Alaska Pharmaceutical Cache: $75,000
- State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD): funded but not yet under construction. $0
- Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for $0

103d CST (WMD): federally funded; awaiting delivery.

- 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary: federally funded; awaiting delivery. $0
- Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD): $150,000
- Dissemination of building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities: $0
- A recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government: $0
- Contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises: $60,000
- Development of a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State: $0
- Simple Treatment and Rapid Transportation (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide: $15,000
- System security software for State Public Health Lab LAN: $10,000
- Feasibility study re: Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in-state): $100,000
- Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner: $74,000
- Analyst/programmer to support the Health Alert Network: $67,000
- Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network: $38,000

Total Cost 3-Month Priorities: $589,000

2. 6-Month Priorities:

- A WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan; included in Division of Emergency Services' (DES) budget: $0
- A comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP: $0
- A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood: $20,000
- State plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism: $25,000

- ❑ Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems: $213,000
- ❑ Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events: $0
- ❑ Three hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) (including training): $60,000
- ❑ Modified Level B suits for 1200 State and local law enforcement personnel- Phase 1: $394,000
- ❑ Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: $100,000
- ❑ 1.5 rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches: $500,000
- ❑ First Class E-mail training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders: $20,000

Total Cost 6-Month Priorities: $1,332,000

3. 1-Year Priorities:
   - ❑ 33 Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to complete Phase 1 to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: $5,500,000
   - ❑ Two microbiologists or the State Public Health Lab (Anchorage {to provide a redundant capability}) to handle additional testing requirements: $135,000
   - ❑ Two Microcomputer Techs to support State Public Health Centers $106,000
   - ❑ Computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information: $200,000
   - ❑ Trucks and equipment for HAZMAT teams in Kodiak, Juneau, Kenai and Valdez: $1,200,000
   - ❑ Equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation): $100,000
   - ❑ Training for four Level A HAZMAT teams (Kenai, Valdez, Juneau, Kodiak): $500,000
   - ❑ WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team: $40,000
   - ❑ Managing WMD Incidents Training for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders: $80,000
   - ❑ WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials: $100,000

- WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide: $515,000
- Pre-positioned decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak: Nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai, Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer; two each in Fairbanks). Six fly-a-way decontamination sets: $528,000
- Pre-positioned personal privacy kits: $90,000
- A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors: $125,000
- 1.5 rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches (final phase): $500,000

Total Cost 1-Year Priorities: $9,719,000

4. 2-Year Priorities:

- Implementation of Phases 1 and 2 of the State portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS). Funding for these phases will provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. It will give agencies the capability to operate on a narrow-band, FM digital architecture with internet protocol address capability and a full feature set of mobile communications. The backbone coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the major population centers of the State. The participants in the recent (September 21) Interagency Security Meeting agreed unanimously that interoperable communications was the single most important factor in coordinating a successful response to a terrorist incident. State of Alaska component: $17,400,000
- An alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harms way and that can be used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system: $1,200,000
- Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment: $210,000
- WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel: $150,000
- 33 Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: $5,500,000
- Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: $200,000
- A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels $125,000

of government and the private and volunteer sectors:

- Anchorage Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colony for botulism diagnosis: $110,000

Total Cost 2-Year Priorities: $24,895,000

5. 3-Year Priorities:
   - 33 Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide: $5,500,000
   - A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors: $125,000

Total Cost 3-Year Priorities: $5,625,000

6. Long-Term Priorities:
   - A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors: $125,000

Total Cost Long-Term Priorities: $125,000

Grand Total First Ranked Priorities $42,285,000

7. **Second Ranked Priorities Total: $23,901,000**
8. **Third Ranked Priorities Total: $20,372,000**
9. **Fourth Ranked Priorities Total: $8,164,000**
10. **Municipality of Anchorage Total: $11,196,000**

III. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS - PREPARATION AND MITIGATION

A. Plans

1. Objective: To have plans in place that will ensure a coordinated response to WMD events at all levels of government.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - State of Alaska Emergency Operations Plan, published 1994.
   - Alaska Inter-agency Fire Management Plan.
   - Local, all-hazard EOPs, some with WMD annexes.
   - A Community Model Disaster Response Plan with a WMD Annex.
   - A State mandated incident management system, the Incident Command System (ICS).
   - Signatory to the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement (a disaster mutual aid compact).
   - State of Alaska "Mental Health Disaster/Emergency Response Plan."

- CHEMS "Mass Casualty Response: A Workbook for Emergency Medical Responders in Alaska."
- CHEMS "Alaska Bioterrorism Resource Guide."
- Radiation monitoring plan for airborne contaminants.
- Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (Unified Plan).
- Ten Federal/State Sub-area Plans for Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills and Releases (Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Kodiak Island, Aleutians, Bristol Bay, Western Alaska, Northwest Arctic, North Slope, and Interior Alaska).
- Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide for Oil and Hazardous Substance Response.
- States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Mutual Aid Agreement.
- Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA).
- Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB).
- Numerous Regulated Industry Contingency Plans for Oil Spills from Facilities and Vessels.
- Member of the Northwest Compact for disposal of low level radioactive material at a disposal site at Pasco, WA.

3. General requirements (what we need):

❑ A WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan; included in Division of Emergency Services' (DES) budget:	$0
❑ A comprehensive emergency communications annex to the State EOP:	$0
❑ A small community WMD Annex to the Community Model Disaster Response Plan: included in DES budget:	$0
❑ WMD plans/annexes for jurisdictions without them:	$250,000
❑ A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary,	$20,000

using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood:

- ❑ State management plan for Alaska pharmaceutical cache: $25,000
- ❑ State management plan for National Pharmaceutical Stockpile: $50,000
- ❑ Community Technical Assistance Teams (TAT) (for medical response and communications planning): $50,000
- ❑ Dissemination of building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities: $0
- ❑ Legislative approval to become signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact: $0
- ❑ A review of Alaska statutes to determine their adequacy for WMD response (AS 26.20; AS 26.23; AS 46.03.865; AS 18.60.505): $0
- ❑ A recall procedure for every agency of the executive branch of state government: $0
- ❑ Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency: $0
- ❑ Update laws and regulations (e.g. AS 18.50.230, 7AAC 05.400) concerning the issuance of death certificates: $0
- ❑ Revised Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan for the Municipality of Anchorage (including WMD): $120,000

4. Special Requirements:

a. Chemical:

b. Biological:

- ❑ State public health plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism: $25,000

c Nuclear:

d. Radiological:

- ❑ A State WMD radiological response plan (integrated – DEC & DHSS), including a plan for collection, containment, storage and transportation of nuclear and radioactive waste: $150,000

e. High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:

Total cost for Plans: $690,000

B. Personnel

1. Objective: To have enough personnel, with the appropriate skills, so State and local government can effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

2. General situation (what we have):

- Trained SECC staff (10) at the State facility on Fort Richardson.
- The Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet.
- An Alaska Type I Interagency Incident Management Team.
- Two, Type II Incident Management Teams.
- Trained personnel in the Alaska Interagency Coordination Center in Fairbanks.
- Twenty-two highly trained WMD response personnel in the 103d CST (WMD) at Fort Richardson.
- A State Section of Epidemiology nine-member surveillance and outbreak investigation team.
- An Alaska Disaster Medical Assistance Team.
- One hundred forty public health nurses.
- A Statewide EMS system including 100 certified ground ambulance services, 84 first responder units and 14 aeromedical services.
- 110 registered fire departments; 80-100 fire response organizations.
- 330 commissioned officers in the Alaska State Troopers.
- Eighty-five Village Public Safety Officers.
- Fifty police departments.
- Several certified peace officers in Division of State Parks (also trained in SAR).
- Two Level A HAZMAT Response Teams.
- 35 DEC primary spill responders (incident management personnel).
- HAZMAT Response Teams at Eielson and Elmendorf Air Force Bases (available via mutual aid agreements).
- The 210th Rescue Squadron (Alaska Air National Guard).
- Sixteen volunteer search and rescue groups statewide (approximately 70 personnel).
- Seventy-three trained wild land fire fighting crews.

- Four "hot shot" fire fighting crews.
- Nineteen Local Emergency Planning Committees, most of which are "all-hazard."
- Eighteen designated local Emergency Managers.
- Two full-time radiological engineers (DEC); one full-time radiological specialist (DHSS).

3. General requirements (what we need):

❑ Three emergency management specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises:	$225,000
❑ Health Alert Network Telecommunications Planner:	$74,000
❑ Analyst/programmer to support the Health Alert Network:	$67,000
❑ Data Entry Clerk to support Health Alert Network:	$38,000
❑ Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) (four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations):	$20,000
❑ CHEMS Public Health Specialist to work with communities on planning:	$67,000
❑ CHEMS Publication Specialist to develop public information materials:	$60,000
❑ Pharmacist to manage the State pharmaceutical cache:	$74,000
❑ One hundred Alaska State Troopers (AST) in order to give AST a 24-hour per day capability statewide:	$16,500,000
❑ Three additional State fire training staff to accommodate increased demands created by the WMD threat:	$300,000
❑ Personnel for Municipality of Anchorage (air and water quality monitoring, health emergency preparedness officer, bomb squad, support to Office of Emergency Management, overtime to train first responders):	$1,946,000

4. Special Requirements:

a. Chemical:

❑ Six additional staff to DEC response corps to maintain alert status on a 24-hour per day basis:	$240,000

b. Biological:

❑ Contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises:	$60,000
❑ Four microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab (2 Anchorage and 2 Fairbanks {to provide a redundant capability}) to handle additional testing requirements:	$270,000

- Microcomputer Technician for the Fairbanks Public Health Lab: $54,000
- Microcomputer Tech/Network Specialist/Program Analyst to support Medical Examiner and Anchorage Public Health Lab: $60,000
- Two Microcomputer Techs to support State Public Health Centers: $106,000
- Microcomputer Tech to support detection and surveillance in the State Epidemiology Section: $54,000

c. *Nuclear:*

d. *Radiological:*

- Two additional radiological health specialists (DHSS): $175,000

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

Total cost for Personnel: **$20,390,000**

C. Communication (internal and external)

1. Objective: To have a reliable, interagency, statewide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - An emergency telecommunications network based on a combination of the State of Alaska Telecommunications System (SATS) (a microwave system) and commercial telephone lines. SATS supports local law enforcement agencies, DHSS, DPS, DOF, DOT, DEC and ARRC.
   - The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 29 communities and State and Federal agencies.
   - An E-mail system that reaches virtually all the emergency management points-of-contact in the state.
   - A State of Alaska Wide Area Network that connects 38 communities and 14,000 users.
   - Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
   - Division of Forestry radio caches and trained communications unit leaders.
   - DEC communications (17 permanent and 6 portable VHF repeaters, 5 portable base stations, repeater extenders, satellite phones and 166 portable radios {130 VHF and 36 UHF}).

- A National Guard HF radio net that reaches many rural communities in the State.
- 103d CST (WMD) secure satellite communications suite.
- A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding WMD events (50% complete).
- SECC telephone, HF/VHF/UHF radio, satellite phone and First Class E mail communications capabilities.
- Alaska Interagency Coordination Center communications capabilities.
- The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 16 communities.
- The Emergency Alerting System that reaches most communities in Alaska.
- The Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS) provides broadcast services to rural communities.
- The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center that issues tsunami watches and warnings via the NAWAS.
- The Alaska Volcano Observatory provides volcano watches and warnings statewide.
- Siren systems in some communities.
- The National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather watches and warnings and can provide some plume modeling support.
- NWS supports the NOAA Weather Radio program.

3. General requirements (what we need):

- Implementation of Phases 1 and 2 of the State portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS). Funding for these phases will provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. It will give agencies the capability to operate on a narrow-band, FM digital architecture with internet protocol address capability and a full feature set of mobile communications. The backbone coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the major population centers of the State. The participants in the recent (September 21) Interagency Security Meeting agreed unanimously that interoperable communications was the single most important factor in coordinating a successful response to a terrorist incident. State of Alaska component: $17,400,000
- An improved statewide all-hazard warning system – $7,500,000

AlaskaAlert Network:

❑ Review, plan, design and build an enterprise wide security system to protect the State's critical information and communications resources:	$500,000
❑ Integration of all Fairbanks North Star Borough volunteer emergency services organizations into the Alaska LMRS:	$2,500,000
❑ Improved statewide communications coverage and command communications for DEC, which would also serve DHSS and DPS:	$1,300,000
❑ A two-way radio communications system to support spill response, public safety and human services operations along the Trans-Alaska Pipeline:	$2,000,000
❑ Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems (systems that link the health care community statewide):	$213,000
❑ Backup communications for key public health personnel:	$12,000
❑ Cell phones (8) for public health nurse managers:	$6,000
❑ Satellite phones (50) for public health and EMS regions and ambulance services:	$75,000
❑ Public Health Offices cable connections to support distance learning:	$8,000
❑ Public Health Offices (Matanuska-Susitna and Kenai Peninsula Borough) satellite dishes to support distance learning:	$30,000
❑ Development of a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the State:	$0
❑ High-speed, leased-line communications link between the Fairbanks and Anchorage State Public Health Labs:	*unknown*
❑ Configure the Anchorage Public Health Lab to support 100MB network communications:	*unknown*
❑ Develop database management and communications capabilities for State Medical Examiners Office:	*unknown*
❑ Computer hardware and software for an enhanced intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information:	$200,000
❑ Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events:	$0
❑ Portable, interoperable supplementary and backup radios for MOA first responders:	$300,000

4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

Total cost for Communications: $32,044,000

D. Equipment, Materials and Assets

1. Objective: To provide State agencies local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the equipment, materials and assets they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

2. General situation (what we have):

- The SECC facility located on Fort Richardson (24-hour per day operations, 365 days per year).
- The MOA dedicated EOC facility.
- The Alaska Interagency Coordination Center facility on Fort Wainwright.
- One DEC command trailer with response equipment trailer.
- 30 DEC spill response equipment conexes located in communities throughout the State.
- State Public Health Laboratories in Anchorage and Fairbanks (Anchorage facility capable of on-site testing for some biological agents).
- Rural clinics staffed by a variety of health care professionals (150 staffed by Community Health Aides, 19 staffed by Practitioners, 7 staffed by Physicians) that treat minor injuries and routine medical conditions and stabilize the severely ill and injured.
- Fourteen rural hospitals that serve as regional hubs to the rural clinics. Some of these hospitals lack surgical capabilities and intensive care units (ICU) and all have extremely limited bed space.
- Eight urban hospitals that have ICU beds and surgical suites. However, most of them are full to near full capacity during normal circumstances.
- Division of Forestry equipment caches (Fairbanks and Palmer).

- Permitted municipal solid waste disposal facilities for non-contaminated debris.
- Private sector contractors that can collect and transport non-contaminated debris.
- Private sector businesses that dispose of commercially generated hazardous waste.
- Nine radiation monitoring stations, eight health care facilities with radiation detection instruments, and other survey and sampling equipment.
- DEC Food Safety and Seafood Laboratory in Palmer cultures and identifies enteric pathogens along with vibrio staphylococcus, and listeria in food and water.
- DEC Chemistry laboratory in Juneau tests for the presence or absence of most chemical warfare compounds.
- DEC State Veterinarian in Palmer.

3. General requirements (what we need):

❑ A dedicated EOC for Fairbanks North Star Borough:	$5,000,000
❑ A dedicated EOC for City and Borough of Juneau:	$1,000,000
❑ An alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system:	$1,200,000
❑ A fully outfitted State ferry (Kennicott) that can be used as an alternate Emergency Coordination Center in Southeast Alaska:	$500,000
❑ An improved local siren warning system in Juneau:	$200,000
❑ Trucks and equipment for HAZMAT teams in Kodiak, Juneau, Kenai and Valdez:	$1,200,000
❑ Limited emergency blood testing capability at the two State Public Health Labs:	$90,000
❑ Office equipment for Public Health Nurses (including computers and servers to support WMD activities):	$100,000
❑ Funds for Phase II of EMS Code Blue Project (EMS equipment:	$300,000
❑ Simple Treatment and Rapid Transportation (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide:	$15,000
❑ New workstation computers for State Public Health Lab staff:	$60,000
❑ System security software for State Public Health Lab LAN:	$10,000

- Computer software upgrades for Public Health Centers: $75,000
- Specialized equipment to assist in evacuating persons with disabilities from multi-story buildings: $10,000
- Equipment and training to improve the State's ability to sample and test drinking water and to monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation): $100,000
- State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD): funded but not yet under construction. *federally funded*
- Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST (WMD): federally funded; awaiting delivery. *federally funded*
- 103d CST (WMD) trauma equipment and medical formulary: federally funded; awaiting delivery. *federally funded*
- Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST (WMD): $150,000
- Three rapidly deployable Alaska pharmaceutical caches: $1,000,000
- Fairbanks North Star Borough Civil Defense Equipment: $425,000
- Shelter preparation, letters of agreement, equipment caches and training statewide – American Red Cross: $4,100,000
- For Municipality of Anchorage - Equipment and supplies (USAR, WMD equipment storage building, mass decontamination, bomb squad, mass shelter, biomedical monitoring of WMD victims, air and water quality monitoring, EOC upgrades, etc.): $7,000,000

4. Special Requirements:

   a. *Chemical:*

   - Detection equipment for fire departments in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Kodiak, Valdez, and Kenai: $500,000
   - Level C suits for 150 ambulance and first responder units, 14 aeromedical services and 22 non-military hospitals (1000 people): $250,000
   - Modified Level B suits for 1200 State and local law enforcement personnel: $985,000
   - Turnout clothing and SCBA for 1500 volunteer fire fighters: $3,750,000
   - Three hospital decontamination systems (1 Juneau, 2 Fairbanks) (including training): $60,000
   - Pre-positioned decontamination foam in Wasilla/Palmer, Fairbanks, Valdez, Juneau, Kenai, and Kodiak: Nine decontamination trailers (one each in Kodiak, Kenai, $990,000

Seward, Juneau, Wasilla/Palmer; two each in Fairbanks). Six fly-a-way decontamination sets:

- Fairbanks North Star Borough personnel decontamination equipment: $210,000
- Pre-positioned personal privacy kits: $180,000
- Protective equipment for search and rescue personnel statewide: $70,000

a. *Biological:*

- Lab equipment to give Fairbanks State Public Health Lab an all threat agent testing capability: $315,000
- Specialized equipment for the State Medical Examiner's staff: $274,000
- Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab (for a redundant capability in-state): $9,400,000
- Enhanced rapid infectious agent detection using molecular methods: $30,000
- Anchorage Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colony for botulism diagnosis: $110,000
- Test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements: $300,000

c *Nuclear:*

d. *Radiological:*

- Replace and upgrade current radiological monitoring system (NEWNET) and to provide Statewide coverage: $1,200,000
- Laboratory for in-state gamma and alpha particle analysis: $2,500,000
- Detection, identification and decontamination equipment for DHSS staff: $240,000
- Detection and identification equipment for DEC staff: $300,000
- Radiation monitoring equipment for local fire departments: $120,000

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

- Three USAR simulators (Juneau, Fairbanks, Anchorage) and associated props to be used for USAR training: $2,500,000
- Equipment and training for Fairbanks North Star Borough Advanced Urban Search and Rescue Team: $350,000

Total cost for Equipment, Materials and Assets: $47,169,000

E. Training and Exercises

1. Objective: To provide State agencies: local emergency managers, first responders, hospitals and volunteer organizations with the training and exercises they need to effectively prepare for and respond to WMD events.

2. General situation (what we have):

   - Many fire departments throughout the State have received introductory WMD response training.
   - Level A trained HAZMAT teams in Anchorage and Fairbanks.
   - 103d CST (WMD) a highly trained, highly mobile WMD response organization capable of agent detection and identification, communication with a wide variety of agencies in all locations and capable of providing technical advice to local on-scene commanders.
   - Forty-five WMD trained responders in Anchorage Fire Department.
   - Elmendorf Air Force Base has 53 trained WMD response personnel.
   - Fairbanks North Star Borough has 20 trained volunteer WMD response personnel.
   - Eielson Air Force Base has 20 WMD trained personnel.
   - Two DEC staff trained in radiation detection; three DHSS staff trained in radiological response procedures.

3. General requirements (what we need):

❑ Training for four Level A HAZMAT teams (Kenai, Valdez, Juneau, Kodiak):	$500,000
❑ WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks hazardous materials response team:	$40,000
❑ Two trained HAZMAT technicians per borough/LEPC:	$20,000
❑ Hazardous Materials Technician Training for 200 first responders statewide:	$200,000
❑ Managing WMD Incidents Training for local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders:	$80,000
❑ WMD Awareness Training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials:	$100,000
❑ WMD Response Training for 1200 law enforcement personnel statewide:	$515,000
❑ WMD Awareness Training for search and rescue personnel statewide:	$30,000

- ❑ Completion of command staff training for local fire organizations: $500,000
- ❑ EMT training to increase the number of available responders throughout the State: $300,000
- ❑ First Class Email training for public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders: $20,000
- ❑ University of Alaska satellite broadcasts for distance training of public health workers: $40,000
- ❑ Satellite dish access for distance training of public health workers in Juneau: *unknown*
- ❑ Training of State Public Health Lab IT and lab staff on the new Laboratory Information System (LIS): $100,000
- ❑ A robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors: $500,000
- ❑ Training in procedures for evacuating people with disabilities from multi-story buildings: $10,000
- ❑ WMD Awareness Training for 200 ATC-20 (building damage assessment) trained personnel: $100,000
- ❑ Training to ensure proper monitoring of worker safety at the attack site: $0
- ❑ Municipality of Anchorage training (bomb squad, USAR, air and water quality monitoring, public education, etc.): $1,950,000

4. Special Requirements:

a. Chemical:

- ❑ Chem-Bio decontamination training for hospital personnel: $100,000
- ❑ Chem-Bio response training for EMS responders: $150,000
- ❑ Mass fatality management and Chem-Bio decontamination training for the State Medical Examiner's Office: $40,000
- ❑ Ongoing education of workers to provide a safer workplace in the event of a chemical or biological attack: $0

b. Biological:

(see above)

c. Nuclear:

d. Radiological:

- ❑ WMD response training for 25 DEC and DHSS staff and 60-100 survey personnel: $150,000

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

- Light USAR training for selected groups statewide: $120,000
- Explosive training for HAZMAT team personnel: $60,000

Total cost for Training and Exercises: $5,625,000

IV. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT - RESPONSE AND SHORT-TERM RECOVERY

A. Direction and Control

1. Objective: To have the facilities, plans and organizations in place to effectively manage response to Terrorist/WMD incidents at all levels of government in the State of Alaska.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - Twenty-four hour per day, 7 days per week SECC located in Anchorage.
   - The Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet.
   - Legislation (AS26.23, The Alaska Disaster Act) that gives the Governor extraordinary powers during a declared disaster and activates the Disaster Relief Fund.
   - Legislation (AS 26.20, the Alaska Civil Defense Act) giving DMVA broad authority to undertake civil defense planning and operational functions. Also giving the Governor extraordinary powers during a declared emergency, but only "in the event of an actual enemy attack against the state." The laws are dated, enacted in 1951.
   - Legislation (AS 46.03.865) giving DEC extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an actual or imminent discharge of a hazardous substance or low level radioactive materials poses an immediate threat to the public health or welfare or the environment.
   - Legislation (AS 18.60.505) giving DHSS extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect the public health or welfare from radiation.
   - Legislation (AS 46.03.865) giving DEC extraordinary authority to issue orders directing that action be taken when it finds that an actual or imminent discharge of a hazardous substance or low level radioactive materials poses an immediate threat to the public health or welfare or the environment.
   - The Municipality of Anchorage has a dedicated Emergency Operations Center facility.
   - A Statewide incident management system, the Incident Command System.
   - A State Emergency Operations Plan.
   - Alaska Inter-agency Fire Management Plan.
   - A Community Model Disaster Response Plan.
   - Local, all-hazard emergency operations plans, some with WMD annexes.

- Signatory to the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement.
- Alaska Type I Interagency Incident Management Team.
- Two Type II Incident Management Teams in Alaska.
- Division of Forestry resource ordering system.
- Alaska Interagency Coordination Center in Fairbanks.
- 103d CST (WMD) capability to provide CBNRE information, advice and communications support to the local Incident Commander.
- Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (Unified Plan).
- Ten Federal/State Sub-area Plans for Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills and Releases (Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Kodiak Island, Aleutians, Bristol Bay, Western Alaska, Northwest Arctic, North Slope, and Interior Alaska).
- Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide for Oil and Hazardous Substance Response.
- States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Mutual Aid Agreement.
- Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA).
- Local Response Agreement between the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB).
- Numerous Regulated Industry Contingency Plans for Oil Spills from Facilities and Vessels.

3. General requirements (what we need):
   - Pre-designated alternate State Emergency Coordination Center facilities.
   - A WMD annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan.
   - WMD annexes to local Emergency Operations Plans.
   - Participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
   - Information/data protection.
   - Dedicated EOCs in the larger communities in Alaska.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

B. Detection and Surveillance

1. Objective: To be able to detect and monitor WMD events that occur in Alaska, and the ability to monitor WMD events that affect Alaska, regardless of origin.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - A well-developed wild land fire detection and monitoring system.
   - An atmospheric radiation monitoring system (personnel, equipment and plan).
   - 103d CST (WMD) with the capability to detect and identify CBNRE substances and accomplish plume modeling.
   - A State Section of Epidemiology nine-member surveillance and outbreak investigation team.
   - A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding indicators of potential WMD events (50% complete).
3. General requirements (what we need):
   - An improved drinking water monitoring capability.
   - State-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD).
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:* Detection capability in selected communities.
   b. *Biological:*
      - Ongoing education of private health care providers to recognize indicators of biological attack.
      - Electronic reporting of notifiable pathogens by laboratories that process Alaska clinical specimens.
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
      - An improved atmospheric radiation monitoring system.
      - A radiation monitoring response plan.
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

C. Communications (internal and external)

1. Objective: To have a reliable, interagency, statewide emergency communications system to support direction and control, detection and surveillance, warning and notification and all the other emergency management functions in the event of a threatened or actual WMD event.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - An emergency telecommunications network based on a combination of the State of Alaska Telecommunications System (SATS) (a microwave system) and commercial telephone lines. SATS supports local law enforcement agencies, DHSS, DPS, DOF, DOT, DEC and ARRC two radio systems.

- The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 29 communities and State and Federal agencies.
- An E-mail system that reaches virtually all the emergency management points-of-contact in the state.
- A State of Alaska Wide Area Network, connecting 38 communities and 14,000 users.
- DEC radios, satellite phones and repeaters.
- Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
- Division of Forestry radio caches and trained communications unit leaders.
- A statewide Health Alert Network.
- A National Guard HF radio net that reaches many rural communities in the State.
- 103d CST (WMD) secure satellite communications suite.
- A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid exchange of information regarding WMD events (50% complete).

3. General requirements (what we need):
   - Digital, narrow-band, integrated, first responder emergency communications at all levels of government.
   - A comprehensive State emergency communications plan.
   - Improved communications along the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

D. Warning and Notification

1. Objective: To be able to warn the State's population, or selected portions of the population, about threatened WMD events on a timely basis, and to provide information/instructions to the population about WMD events after they happen.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - The Alaska segment of the National Attack Warning System that reaches directly to 16 communities.
   - The Emergency Alerting System that reaches most communities in Alaska.
   - The Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS) provides broadcast services to rural communities.

- The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center that issues tsunami watches and warning via the NAWAS.
- The Alaska Volcano Observatory provides volcano watches and warnings statewide.
- Twenty-four hour per day, 7 days per week State Emergency Coordination Center located in Anchorage.
- A statewide Health Alert Network.
- Siren systems in some communities.
- The National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather watches and warnings and can provide some plume modeling support.
- NWS supports the NOAA Weather Radio program.
- A Statewide Health Alert Network for the rapid dissemination of information to health care providers regarding indicators WMD events (50% complete).

3. General requirements (what we need):
   - A comprehensive State emergency communications plan.
   - A reliable statewide warning system.
   - A recall system for every agency of the executive branch of State government.
   - Canned public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

E. Human Services (categories: Public Health {including hospitals and labs}, EMS)

1. Objective: To prevent illness and injury before and after a WMD event occurs, and to save lives and prevent suffering after an event.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - Alaska Disaster Medical Assistance Team.
   - Statewide emergency medical services backbone radio system, including repeaters.
   - Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems, but only 50% complete.
   - Public health laboratories in Anchorage and Fairbanks.

- DEC Food Safety and Seafood laboratory in Palmer can culture and identify enteric pathogens along with vibrio, staphylococcus, and listeria in food and water.
- DEC Chemistry laboratory in Juneau can run tests for the presence or absence of most chemical warfare compounds.
- DEC State Veterinarian in Palmer.
- One hundred forty public health nurses.
- Rural clinics staffed by a variety of health care professionals (Community Health Aides, Nurse Practitioners, Physicians Assistants) that treat minor injuries, routine medical conditions and stabilize the severely ill and injured.
- Rural hospitals serve as regional hubs to the rural clinics. Some of these hospitals lack surgical capabilities and intensive care units (ICU) and all have extremely limited bed space.
- Urban hospitals have ICU beds and surgical suites. However, most of them are full to near full capacity during normal circumstances.
- A Statewide Emergency Medical Services system, including 100 certified ground ambulance services, 84 first responder units and 14 aeromedical services.
- CHEMS "Mass Casualty Response: A Workbook for Emergency Medical Responders in Alaska."
- State of Alaska "Mental Health Disaster/Emergency Response Plan" and 10 Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) teams.
- CHEMS "Alaska Bioterrorism Resource Guide"

3. General requirements (what we need):
   - Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.
   - Update laws and regulations (e.g. AS 18.50.230, 7 AAC 05.400) concerning the issuance of death certificates.
   - Improved communications for emergency medical services statewide.
   - Completion of the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems.
   - Emergency medical services equipment, disaster caches and Simple Triage and Rapid Transportation kits for emergency medical services.
   - Emergency blood testing capability at the two State Public Health Labs.
   - A medical plan for transportation and distribution of mass casualties to include large numbers of trauma and burn victims. The plan would include methods for increasing the number of victims that could be moved rapidly to definitive care hospitals within Alaska and out of state if necessary, using large stretcher equipped aircraft with trained medical personnel, medical equipment and

supplies on board. It would also include provisions for backhauling medical personnel, medical supplies and blood.

- Pre-designated medical subject matter experts to provide liaison to the SECC regarding WMD and mass casualty events when they occur.
- A plan to replenish in-State medical supplies, blood and medical personnel from the Lower 48.
- Accommodations to help people with disabilities evacuate multi-story buildings.

4. Special Requirements:

a. Chemical: Plans for treatment of larger numbers of patients from chemical events to include decontamination.

b. Biological:

- Biological agent training for hospital personnel.
- Plans for treatment of larger numbers of patients from chemical events to include decontamination.
- Plan for receipt of National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and creation of a mini-stockpile in Alaska.
- Improved State Laboratory capability to include enhanced rapid infectious agent detection using molecular methods, redundancy of critical lab resources in Fairbanks, stockpile of decontamination materials and investigative equipment and body bags for the State Medical Examiner's office. (Note: The Fairbanks Public Health Laboratory does not currently have the space or equipment to handle state lab needs in the event the Anchorage Lab was rendered unusable. Cost of complete repair/renovation or replacement is unknown at this time.).
- Community technical assistance teams, mass casualty protocols, and comprehensive public health and emergency medical services weapons of mass destruction web page.
- Technical and support personnel to develop public education materials, maintain medical stockpiles/caches and help install the new Laboratory Information System.

c. Nuclear:

d. Radiological:

e. High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:

F. Sheltering

1. Objective: To provide temporary shelter and food for those whose homes are rendered unusable by a WMD event.
2. General situation (what we have): A well-developed shelter training program run by the American Red Cross.

3. General requirements (what we need): Additional shelters, shelter training and equipment and supply caches.

4. Special Requirements:

   a. Chemical:

   b. Biological:

   c Nuclear:

   d. Radiological:

   e High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:

G. Public Safety (categories: fire, hazardous materials, urban search and rescue, mass decontamination and law enforcement)

1. Objective: To provide public safety support to local government to save lives, prevent further injuries and property damage, locate missing people, maintain law and order and support the other emergency management functions when a WMD event occurs.

2. General situation (what we have):

   - 110 fire departments: 80-100 fire response organizations.
   - Many fire departments throughout the state have received introductory WMD response training.
   - 330 commissioned officers in the Alaska State Troopers.
   - Eighty-five Village Public Safety Officers.
   - Fifty police departments.
   - Certified peace officers employed in Division of State Parks (also trained in SAR).
   - Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).
   - Two level A hazardous materials response teams.
   - 35 DEC primary spill responders.
   - One team trained specifically for CBRNE operations; the 103d Civil Support Team (CST) (WMD) at Fort Richardson.
   - Hazardous Materials Response Teams at Eielson and Elmendorf Air Force Bases (available via mutual aid agreements).
   - The 210th Air Rescue Squadron.
   - Sixteen volunteer search and rescue groups statewide (approximately 70 personnel).
   - Seventy-three trained wildland firefighting crews in Alaska.
   - Four "hot-shot" firefighting crews.
   - Division of Forestry equipment caches (warehouses).

- 30 DEC spill response equipment conexes in communities throughout the State.
- One DEC command trailer with response equipment trailer.
- Personnel decontamination capability using soap and water and/or swimming pools and car washes.
- Concept plan for light USAR.

3. General requirements (what we need):
   - Additional Level A hazardous materials response teams located in major population centers.
   - Protective clothing for State and local law enforcement, fire and EMS personnel.
   - WMD training for law enforcement officers.
   - Introductory and follow-on WMD response training for fire department personnel throughout the state.
   - WMD training for command staff and general staff of local fire organizations.
   - WMD awareness training for volunteer search and rescue groups.
   - An equipment and property decontamination capability positioned in selected population centers.
   - Portable decontamination systems (equipment and property) for deployment to communities without a capability.
   - An improved intelligence information management system for law enforcement agencies.
   - Current manning level in Alaska State Troopers does not allow for 24-hour per day operations in most posts and stations. Troopers need a 24-hour per day capability to simultaneously monitor the situation effectively, gather and analyze intelligence, respond to disasters including WMD events and conduct routine law enforcement functions.
   - Light USAR training for selected groups.
   - Additional State fire training staff.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
      - Specialized detection equipment for fire organizations.
      - A DEC response corps 24-hour per day capability.
   b. *Biological:*
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:* Specialized detection equipment for fire organizations.

e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:* An in-state Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) capability.

H. Public works

1. Objective: To effect the maintenance and emergency repair of essential facilities, utilities and other public works when a WMD event occurs.
2. General situation (what we have):
3. General requirements (what we need): WMD awareness training for selected public works personnel.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

I. Damage assessment

1. Objective: To rapidly and accurately assess WMD caused property damage.
2. General situation (what we have): A robust building damage assessment program developed by the Applied Technology Council (ATC-20), funded by the State and conducted by Municipality of Anchorage personnel. Over 200 people trained in-State.
3. General requirements (what we need): WMD training for the people who have been trained.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
   b. *Biological:*
   c *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

J. Debris removal

1. Objective: To safely collect, contain and store WMD generated hazardous waste and debris.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - Numerous statewide permitted municipal solid waste disposal facilities for the disposal of non-contaminated debris.
   - Numerous private sector contractors with adequate heavy equipment for the collection and transport of non-contaminated debris.

- Industry hygienists and safety consultants that are available to assist businesses in training workers for debris removal safe practices.

3. General requirements (what we need):
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
      - Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
   b. *Biological:*
      - Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
   c. *Nuclear:*
   d. *Radiological:*
      - Trained and certified personnel for the collection and containerizing of radioactive waste material.
      - Appropriate containers for radioactive waste material, to be stockpiled in major population centers.
      - Secured, segregated storage space for radioactive waste containers awaiting shipment to lower 48 disposal site.
   e. *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

K. Hazardous waste disposal

1. Objective: To safely and properly dispose of WMD generated hazardous waste.
2. General situation (what we have):
   - Industrial hygienists and safety consultants that are available to assist businesses in training workers for debris removal safe practices.
   - Private sector businesses that dispose of commercially generated hazardous waste.
   - Member of the Northwest Compact for disposal of low level radioactive material at a disposal site in Pasco, WA.
3. General requirements (what we need):
   - Pre-disaster approved permits for treating biological and chemical hazardous waste on site.
   - Plan to remove contaminated waste from the State.
   - Identify contractors to do hazardous waste clean-up.
4. Special Requirements:
   a. *Chemical:*
      - Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.
   b. *Biological:*
      - Worker training to ensure safe removal of debris.

c *Nuclear:*

d *Radiological:* A nuclear and radioactive material removal and disposal plan.

e *High explosive / incendiary event / mass trauma:*

TALKING PAPER
ON
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Purpose:
The purpose of this paper is to forward to Governor Knowles a proposal on an organizational structure for a State of Alaska Office of Homeland Security.

Mission:
The mission of the Office of Homeland Security shall be to develop and coordinate the state's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks in coordination with local, educational, private, business, federal and military agencies, while improving overall emergency management capabilities in the State of Alaska.

Core Duties:
- Assist assessment and analysis of intelligence across agencies (federal, state, local and private)
- Maintain a threat assessment for Alaska
- Develop protocols among federal, state, local and private entities to respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction events
- Work with the National Office of Homeland Security and other states to increase preparedness
- Provide the Governor with an expert advisor on Homeland Security
- Coordinate planning, training and exercises for departments and agencies
- Develop program budgets and manage anti-terrorism grants
- Provide a single channel of communications for Homeland Security issues
- Review and develop legislative actions and proposals

Supporting Elements to the Office of Homeland Security
- Governor's Disaster Policy Cabinet
- ADES (SECC)
- Alaska State Trooper Ops. Center
- Army National Guard (POMSO and CST)
- Navy Militia
- Anti-Terrorism Working Group
- Federal Agencies
- State Emergency Response Commission
- Rescue Coordination Center
- Municipal Emergency Operations Centers
- Alaska State Defense Force
- Air National Guard
- Business Partners

Office of Homeland Security Staff Requirements:
To ensure a consistent level of effort and expertise the Office of Homeland Security should be staffed by representatives from across state departments and agencies. The following departments should be assigned to the Office of Homeland Security:
- DMVA/DES (1)
- DEC (1)
- DNR (1)
- DHSS (1)
- DPS (1)
- DOT/PF (1)
- DOA/ITG (1)
- Admin. Staff (1)

Leadership Options:
It is recommended the Office of Homeland Security be led by a Deputy Commissioner due to the level of interest identified at both the national and state level.

The Office could be led by either an Assistant Chief of Staff or Director. Both options were considered but eliminated due to existing state command relationships and authorities and the Director level may not present the appropriate level of management when dealing with agencies outside the state departments and agencies.

Office Location:

It is recommended the Office of Homeland Security be located within the Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs at the National Guard Armory on Fort Richardson. This location provides the benefit of cost saving by using the existing infrastructure in the Division of Emergency Services and Division of Administrative Support to support the Office of Homeland Security.

POSSIBLE KEY ASSETS IN ALASKA

South Central

Power Plants:
- Beluga Power Plant
- Beluga Undersea Cables
- Anchorage Extra High Voltage Substation
- Other Critical Power Plants

Refineries/Fuel Related:
- Nikiski-Tesoro
- Valdez-Petrostar
- ANC International Airport Fuel Storage
- Fuel Manifolding Port of ANC

Oil Industry:
- Valdez Terminal/Port

Communication:
- ALASCOM Gov't. Hill
- ANC FAA Regional ARTCC
- Eagle River Earth Station
- GCI Switch Center

Transportation:
- Airports (ANC, etc.)
- Whittier Port/Dock
- Ferry Terminals (SWD, etc.)

Military:
- Fort Richardson
- Elmendorf AFB
- Kulis ANGB
- Coast Guard Base (KOD)

Other:
- Federal Building (ANC)
- FBI Building (ANC)
- BP/Phillips Buildings (ANC)
- City Halls (ANC/Other)
- State Emergency Coordination Center
- ANC Hillside (Fire)
- Kodiak Launch Facility

Northwest

Power Plants
Early Warning Sites
Airports (NOME, KOTZ, etc.)

Southwest (YK Delta)

Power Plants
Early Warning Sites
Airports (Bethel, etc)

Interior

Power Plants:
- Fairbanks Power Plant
- North Pole Power Plant
- Healy Power Plant
- Other Power Plants

Refineries:
- North Pole-MAPCO

Oil Industry:
- Pump Stations 1-12 (-)
- Yukon River Bridge

Transportation:
- Airports (FAI, etc.)
- Hurricane Gulch RR Bridge

Military:
- Fort Wainwright
- Eilson AFB
- Fort Greely
- Galena AFS

Other:
- UAF Poker Flats/Computer

North Slope

Power Plants
Early Warning Sites
Airports (Barrow, etc.)

Southeast

Power Plants
Ferry Terminals
Capitol Building (JNU)
Airports (JNU, etc.)

Aleutians

Power Plants
Early Warning Sites
Airports (Cold Bay, etc.)
Eareckson AFS

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Many of the recommendations made by the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet require financial investments over the next 18 months – the remainder of FY2002 and FY2003. Some expenses had to be incurred immediately, such as increased security to allow reopening of airports and provide additional protection for the pipeline. Some activities can be handled by shifting work priorities. But most recommendations either require capital investment or are well beyond existing financial and staff resources.

Potential Federal Support

The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. Most states agree that the task is well beyond their financial resources. The governor is communicating Alaska's needs directly to the state's congressional delegation, the White House and appropriate federal agencies such as FEMA. The Administration is also participating in the National Governor's Association work to document and lobby for federal financial support for state needs.

While reimbursement of costs such as the first several months of increased airport security have been promised by federal agencies, there are conflicting indications about the availability of federal funds to replace or supplement state costs for the longer term and in areas other than airport security. Financial support could come in supplemental federal agency budgets, existing agency grant programs, a national economic stimulus package, or next year's federal budget. Nevertheless, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. Certain activities are more appropriately paid for by states (e.g. staff at the State Emergency Coordination Center), local governments (e.g. community preparedness planning) or the private sector (e.g. commercial facility security).

Cost estimates and state-federal funding allocations will be updated as federal agencies modify their mandates and Congress takes action on appropriations bills.

Timing for Action

Because of the urgency of implementing the recommendations for increased state preparedness and response, the Administration will present a separate appropriations bill to the Legislature in November so public hearings and discussion of the recommendations could begin even before the Legislature reconvenes on January 14th. Action on the bill will be requested in the first two weeks of the session.

The attached spreadsheet (and the Homeland appropriations bill to be submitted) cover both the rest of FY2002 and all of FY2003 to allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of the recommendations and because many of them are for on-going action. For instance, it would not make sense to begin certain activities in FY2002 without knowing they are also funded for FY2003 – e.g. hiring two troopers for Valdez because of the strategic importance of the pipeline and marine terminal.

Many of the transportation requirements are dictated by federal mandates, particularly from the Federal Aviation Agency. Unacceptable federal operating restrictions (such as closure of certain airports) or financial penalties may result if these requirements are not met in a timely manner. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the state will seek waivers wherever appropriate. (Possible waiver situations are noted separately at the end of the spreadsheet.) If waivers cannot be obtained, these federal mandates will have to be addressed expeditiously during the session.

DRAF

Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet
Cost Estimates for Highest Priority Recommendations

(all dollars shown in thousands)

Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02	On-Going FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
Admin	Accelerate funding of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Pilot so it will be ready for testing in July, 2002	2,700.0			2,700.0	already have state match	2,700.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match
Admin	Acquire the services of a Disaster Recovery (DR) expert and to help conduct a DR planning process			500.0	500.0	500.0			
Admin	Analyst/Programmer for changes to drivers license system (ALVIN)			113.0	113.0	113.0			
Admin	Conduct an enterprise-wide information technology (IT) security planning process	500.0			500.0	500.0			
Admin	Add security equipment identified in the IT security plan	500.0			500.0	500.0			Very rough estimate
Admin	Establish redundance between state enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau	400.0			400.0	400.0			
Admin	Hire a state information technology security manager		60.0	120.0	180.0	180.0			
Admin	Identify telecommunications sites that require added security	100.0			100.0	100.0			Capital costs will depend on results of site survey
Admin	Correct any deficiencies in security at high priority communication sites	3,000.0			3,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	Estimate assumes 50 sites @ 60.0 each; potential 1/3 each GF, Fed, & private
Admin & Health & Social	Develop and disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities				depts will do within budgets				
Admin	Implement Phases 1 and 2 of the state's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) to provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. Coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the state's major population centers.	17,400.0			17,400.0	1,740.0	15,660.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match Operational costs begin in FY2004
Admin	Implement security measures to protect criminal history (APSIN) data and conform to NCIC security policies	1,300.0			1,300.0	1,300.0			
Admin	Meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their disaster recovery plans are adequate for state needs	to be determined			0.0				Unknown whether state will need additional protections
Admin	Review all state public/private information policies in each department to see if changes are needed for security purposes				do within existing budgets				May require legislation

	A	B	C	D		F	H	I	J	
4			One-Time	On- Going		Total	General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost	Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
	Health & Social	Buy test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements at the Public Health Lab		100.0	200.0	300.0	300.0			
36										
37	Health & Social	Central Vaccine Depot	126.5			126.5		126.5		
	Health & Social	Complete the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems	213.0			213.0		213.0		
38										
	Health & Social	Create a Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) with four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations		10.0	20.0	30.0	30.0			
39										
	Health & Social	Develop a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the state				dept will do w/in budget				
40										
	Health & Social	Develop the state plan for using the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and do a feasibility study for a pharmaceutical cache in Alaska	75.0			75.0	75.0			
41										
	Health & Social	Do a feasibility study for a Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab to provide in-state redundant capability	100.0			100.0		100.0		Study will include estimate of cost of construction
42										
	Health & Social	Engage a contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises	60.0			60.0	60.0			
43										
	Health & Social	Epidemiologist and nurse epidemiologist, and training travel			258.0	258.0	258.0			
44										
	Health & Social	Establish a medical plan for transportation of mass casualty victims (including many trauma and burn victims) and backhauling medical personnel, supplies and blood	20.0			20.0	20.0			
45										
	Health & Social	Field EMS Operations Upgrade: Training for regional EMS centers			330.0	330.0	330.0			
46										
	Health & Social	Hire a Health Alert Network telecommunications planner		37.0	74.0	111.0	111.0			
47										
	Health & Social	Hire a pharmacist to manage the state pharmaceutical cache		30.8	74.0	104.8	104.8			
48										
	Health & Social	Hire an analyst/programmer and data entry clerk to support the Health Alert Network		52.5	105.0	157.5	157.5			
49										
	Health & Social	On-going bioterrorism response capacity including training, travel to training, lab supplies, and salary/overtime costs/vacancy reduction			608.0	608.0	608.0			
50										
	Health & Social	Produce public service announcements that tell the public how to react specific WMD events	do within existing budget			0.0	0.0			
51										

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	A	B	C	D		F	H	I	J	
	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02	FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
7	Military & Vets	Establish a mobile State Emergency Coordination Center that can be moved out of harms way and used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system	1,200.0			1,200.0		1,200.0		
8	Military & Vets	Establish notification procedures and evacuation plans so each state office is ready for immediate action in hazardous situations				depts to do w/in budgets	0.0			
9	Military & Vets	Establish WMD plans and procedures annexes for jurisdictions without them	250.0			500.0	250.0	125.0	125.0	Assumes 20 communities need plans
10	Military & Vets	National Guard coordination in rural areas			200.0	200.0	200.0			
11	Military & Vets	Provide Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST(WMD)	150.0			150.0	150.0			
12	Military & Vets	Provide training in managing WMD incidents to local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders	80.0			80.0	80.0			
13	Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for a Level A HAZMAT team in Juneau to serve Southeast (Phase 1 of 3)	425.0			425.0	425.0			
14	Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for Level A HAZMAT team in Valdez (Phase 2 of 3)	425.0			425.0		425.0		
15	Military & Vets	Provide WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks HazMat team	40.0			40.0		40.0		
16	Military & Vets	Provide WMD awareness training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials	100.0			100.0	100.0			
17	Military & Vets	Provide WMD response training for 1,200 law enforcement personnel statewide	515.0			515.0		515.0		
18	Military & Vets	Reconfigure the State Emergency Coordination Center for increased operational efficiency	190.0			190.0	190.0			
19	Military & Vets	Response training for 60-100 initial survey assessing personnel and 25 response staff in DEC and DHSS	150.0			150.0	150.0			
20	Military & Vets	Secure trauma equipment and medical formulary for the 103d Civilian Support Team for Weapons of Mass Destruction (CST-WMD) -- federally funded, awaiting delivery.				already federally funded		already funded		
21	Military & Vets	State Emergency Coordination Center Computer Replacement	25.0			25.0	25.0			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	H	I	J	
1										
5	Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02	On-Going FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
99	Public Safety	Purchase computer hardware and software for an expanded intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information		200.0	60.0	260.0	260.0			FY2002 purchase of equipment; FY2003 annual line costs
100	Transportation	Add a Low Earth Orbital communication system	See Note	101.4	174.0	275.4	275.4			Annual operating costs, capital costs incurred by provider
101	Transportation	Add municipal law enforcement officers for rural airports to meet FAA's mandatory 15 minute response time		1,292.0	1,550.0	2,842.0	2,842.0			
102	Transportation	Conduct engineering blast assessment at Anc and Fbx airports and construct deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback	6,800.0			6,800.0		3,400.0	3,400.0	Internat'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
103	Transportation	Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges; purchase and stockpile moveable, temporary bridge spans in Fairbanks	3,500.0			3,500.0		3,500.0		FHWA
104	Transportation	Establish a Transportation Security Office within DOT/PF		274.9	400.0	674.9	674.9			
105	Transportation	Establish a transportation security training program		150.0	150.0	300.0		300.0		FHWA
106	Transportation	Evaluate transportation operators' inventory and increase security measures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous materials	350.0			350.0	350.0		private costs unknown	consider containers also
107	Transportation	Expand Fox weigh station hours to 24/7		242.5	416.0	658.5	658.5			Being done on interim, emergency basis
108	Transportation	Have DOT/PF maintenance personnel check key bridges on a daily basis and block access to roads under bridges				dept to do w/in budget				May have training costs
109	Transportation	Help communities complete port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships				0.0				Would be funded by local port or possibly with federal funds
110	Transportation	Improve personnel security (background checks) for commercial driver's license operators and selected DOT/PF positions		35.0	35.0	70.0	70.0			May require legislation
111	Transportation	Establish temporary gates and check points at Anchorage and Fairbanks airports		690.0	690.0	1,380.0			1,380.0	Internat'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
112	Transportation	Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles at Anc and Fbx airports		13.0	15.0	28.0			28.0	Internat'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible
113	Transportation	Increase presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at Anc and Fbx airports		2,158.2	2,590.0	4,748.2		2,374.1	2,374.1	Internat'l Airport Funds Federal funding possible

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A	B	C	D	E	F	H	I	J	
Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On- Going FY02	FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
Transportation	Install rural airport traffic barriers and blast deflection devices if no federal waiver received	15,000.0			15,000.0	1,500.0	13,500.0		Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate
Transportation	Establish rural airport automated lock and key control systems if no federal waiver received	300.0			300.0	30.0	270.0		
	TOTAL POTENTIAL FAA WAIVERS	**29,350.0**	**2,417.0**	**7,250.0**	**39,017.0**	**13,282.0**	**25,735.0**	**0.0**	
FOR INFORMATION ONLY - FY2004 PHASES OF MULTI YEAR EFFORTS									
Admin	Implement Phases 3 and 4 of the state portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS): full infrastructure and backbone for Southeast Alaska and rural communities.	20,900.0			20,900.0	2,090.0	18,810.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match Operational costs begin in FY2004 or 2005
Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for two regional Level A HAZMAT teams to be located in Kodiak and Kenai (Phase 3 of 3)	850.0			850.0	850.0			
Military & Vets	Conduct robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors				125.0		125.0		
Public Safety	Add 34 State Troopers and 19 civilians to handle increased security requirements (Phase 3 of 3)				6,940.0	6,940.0			

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

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Many of the transportation requirements are dictated by federal mandates, particularly from the Federal Aviation Agency. Unacceptable federal operating restrictions (such as closure of certain airports) or financial penalties may result if these requirements are not met in a timely manner. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the state will seek waivers wherever appropriate. (Possible waiver situations are noted separately at the end of the spreadsheet.) If waivers cannot be obtained, these federal mandates will have to be addressed expeditiously during the session.

Information current as of 11-16-01

Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet

Cost Estimates for Highest Priority Recommendations

(all dollars shown in thousands)

Dept	Description	One-Time FY02-03	On-Going FY02	On-Going FY03	Total Cost	General Funds	Federal Funds	Other Funds	Funding Notes
Admin & Health & Social	Develop and disseminate building evacuation procedures for people with disabilities				depts will do within budgets				
Admin	Accelerate funding of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Pilot so it will be ready for testing in July, 2002	2,700.0			2,700.0	already have state match	2,700.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match
Admin	Acquire the services of a Disaster Recovery (DR) expert and to help conduct a DR planning process			500.0	500.0	500.0			
Admin	Analyst/Programmer for changes to drivers license system (ALVIN)			113.0	113.0	113.0			
Admin	Conduct an enterprise-wide information technology (IT) security planning process	500.0			500.0	500.0			
Admin	Add security equipment identified in the IT security plan	500.0			500.0	500.0			Very rough estimate
Admin	Establish redundance between state enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau	400.0			400.0	400.0			
Admin	Hire a state information technology security manager		60.0	120.0	180.0	180.0			
Admin	Identify telecommunications sites that require added security	100.0			100.0	100.0			Capital costs will depend on results of site survey
Admin	Correct any deficiencies in security at high priority communication sites	2,000.0			2,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	Private Costs est.1,000.0	Estimate assumes 50 sites @ 60.0 each; potential 1/3 each GF, Fed, & private
Admin	Implement Phases 1 and 2 of the state's portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) to provide full infrastructure and backbone on the railbelt and road systems. Coverage will include all active duty military installations, the pipeline corridor and many of the state's major population centers.	17,400.0			17,400.0	1,740.0	15,660.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match Operational costs begin in FY2004
Admin	Implement security measures to protect criminal history (APSIN) data and conform to NCIC security policies	1,300.0			1,300.0	1,300.0			
Admin	Meet with all key telecomm providers to insure their disaster recovery plans are adequate for state needs	to be determined			0.0				Unknown whether state will need additional protections
Admin	Review all state public/private information policies in each department to see if changes are needed for security purposes				do within existing budgets				May require legislation
Admin	Increased costs for insurance such as Casualty, Aviation, Marine, Property, etc.			492.9	492.9	492.9			Various departments affected
Admin	Assess on-going need for Risk of War insurance, impact on bond ratings, etc. and purchase policies if needed			cost to be determined	0.0	cost to be determined		cost to be determined	Various departments affected, some costs would be borne by Intnt'l Airports
Admin Total		**24,900.0**	**60.0**	**1,225.9**	**26,185.9**	**6,825.9**	**19,360.0**	**0.0**	

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
24	Environ Cons	Construct the new DEC Environmental Health Laboratory for food safety, seafood, and water testing	Bond Bill for 13M	no debt in FY02	no debt in FY03	0.0		none in FY02 or 03			Requires legislation to authorize Certificates of Participation
25	Environ Cons	Increase DEC emergency alert status to 24 hours per day with six additional response corps staff	100.0	250.0	600.0	950.0		950.0			
26	Environ Cons	Locate personnel decontamination equipment in key locations.	300.0			300.0		90.0	210.0		Could be funded by local or federal government
27	Environ Cons	Pre-position decontamination foam and trailers in six cities to serve regions throughout the state and obtain six fly-a-way decontamination sets	528.0			528.0		264.0	264.0		
28	Environ Cons	Provide equipment and training for improved ability to sample and test drinking water and monitor the air for chemical or biological agents (not radiation)	180.0			180.0			180.0		
29	**Environ Cons Total**		**1,108.0**	**250.0**	**600.0**	**1,958.0**		**1,304.0**	**654.0**	**0.0**	
30											
31	Health & Social	Add a computer network specialist/program analyst to support Medical Examiner and Anchorage Public Health Lab		25.0	60.0	85.0		85.0			
32	Health & Social	Add Public Health Lab equipment and mouse colonies for diagnosing botulism	110.0			110.0			110.0		
33	Health & Social	Add two microbiologists for the State Public Health Lab to handle additional testing requirements		56.3	135.0	191.3		191.3			
34	Health & Social	Add two microcomputer techs to support state Public Health Centers		44.2	106.0	150.2		150.2			
35	Health & Social	Bioterrorism coordinator and support staff and training travel			134.0	134.0		134.0			
36	Health & Social	Buy regional hospital decontamination systems for Juneau and Fairbanks and provide necessary training	60.0			60.0		60.0			
37	Health & Social	Buy test kits and lab medium to handle surge testing requirements at the Public Health Lab		100.0	200.0	300.0		300.0			
38	Health & Social	Central Vaccine Depot	126.5			126.5			126.5		
39	Health & Social	Complete the Health Alert Network/Public Health Alert Systems	213.0			213.0			213.0		
40	Health & Social	Create a Medical Crisis Action Team (MCAT) with four physicians on standby to provide medical response recommendations		10.0	20.0	30.0		30.0			
41	Health & Social	Develop a secure Internet communication system for physicians, nurse practitioners and physician assistants throughout the state				dept will do w/in budget					
42	Health & Social	Develop the state plan for using the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and do a feasibility study for a pharmaceutical cache in Alaska	75.0			75.0		75.0			

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
43	Health & Social	Do a feasibility study for a Biosafety Level III lab facility at the Fairbanks Public Health Lab to provide in-state redundant capability	100.0			100.0			100.0		Study will include estimate of cost of construction
44	Health & Social	Engage a contractor to develop bioterrorism drills and exercises	60.0			60.0		60.0			
45	Health & Social	Epidemiologist and nurse epidemiologist, and training travel			258.0	258.0		258.0			
46	Health & Social	Establish a medical plan for transportation of mass casualty victims (including many trauma and burn victims) and backhauling medical personnel, supplies and blood	20.0			20.0		20.0			
47	Health & Social	Field EMS Operations Upgrade: Training for regional EMS centers			330.0	330.0		330.0			
48	Health & Social	Hire a Health Alert Network telecommunications planner		37.0	74.0	111.0		111.0			
49	Health & Social	Hire a pharmacist to manage the state pharmaceutical cache		30.8	74.0	104.8		104.8			
50	Health & Social	Hire an analyst/programmer and data entry clerk to support the Health Alert Network		52.5	105.0	157.5		157.5			
51	Health & Social	On-going bioterrorism response capacity including training, travel to training, lab supplies, and salary/orvertime costs/vacancy reduction			608.0	608.0		608.0			
52	Health & Social	Produce public service announcements that tell the public how to react to specific WMD events	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			
53	Health & Social	Provide Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) Triage kits for EMS service providers statewide	20.0			20.0		20.0			at $70.00 per kit
54	Health & Social	Public Health and Epidemiology increases needed to address bioterrorism cases			690.0	690.0		690.0			
55	Health & Social	Public Health nursing positions			450.0	450.0		450.0			
56	Health & Social	Train public health, hospital staff and EMS first responders in the First Class email system		dept to do w/in budget		0.0		0.0			
57	**Health & Social Total**		**784.5**	**355.8**	**3,244.0**	**4,384.3**		**3,834.8**	**549.5**	**0.0**	
58											
59	Military & Vets	24-hour State Emergency Coordination Center additional support			100.0	100.0		100.0			
60	Military & Vets	Acquire the Mobile Analytical Laboratory and Unified Command Suite for 103d CST(WMD) -- federally funded; awaiting delivery				already federally funded			already funded		
61	Military & Vets	Add three emergency management specialists in the Division of Emergency Services to focus entirely on WMD planning, training and exercises	12.0	98.8	213.0	323.8		323.8			
62	Military & Vets	Build a state-of-the-art facility for the 103d CST (WMD) -- federally funded but not yet under construction				already federally funded			already funded		
63	Military & Vets	Develop a comprehensive emergency communications annex to the state Emergency Operations Procedures (EOP)	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
64	Military & Vets	Develop a robust WMD exercise program for all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors		125.0	125.0	250.0		250.0			
65	Military & Vets	Develop a small community Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Annex to the Community Model Disaster Response Plan	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			
66	Military & Vets	Develop a state plan for detection of and response to biological terrorism	25.0			25.0		25.0			
67	Military & Vets	Develop a WMD Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan	do within existing budget			0.0		0.0			
68	Military & Vets	Develop specific emergency contact procedures for key individuals in every executive branch agency				no addt'l funds needed		0.0			
69	Military & Vets	Establish a Homeland Security Office within the department to implement the recommendations	43.7	387.5	885.0	1,316.2		1,316.2			
70	Military & Vets	Establish a mobile State Emergency Coordination Center that can be moved out of harms way and used as an alternate local Emergency Operations Center for communities on the road system	1,200.0			1,200.0			1,200.0		
71	Military & Vets	Establish notification procedures and evacuation plans so each state office is ready for immediate action in hazardous situations				depts to do w/in budgets		0.0			
72	Military & Vets	Establish WMD plans and procedures annexes for jurisdictions without them	250.0			250.0		250.0		private costs est. 125.0	Assumes 20 communities need plans
73	Military & Vets	National Guard coordination in rural areas			200.0	200.0		200.0			
74	Military & Vets	Provide Alaska specific detection, identification and safety equipment for 103d CST(WMD)	150.0			150.0		150.0			
75	Military & Vets	Provide training in managing WMD incidents to local emergency managers, first responders and DEC primary responders	80.0			80.0		80.0			
76	Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for a Level A HAZMAT team in Juneau to serve Southeast (Phase 1 of 3)	425.0			425.0		425.0			
77	Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for Level A HAZMAT team in Valdez (Phase 2 of 3)	425.0			425.0			425.0		
78	Military & Vets	Provide WMD advanced level training for the Fairbanks HazMat team	40.0			40.0			40.0		
79	Military & Vets	Provide WMD awareness training for 200 hospital, school, public works employees and local elected officials	100.0			100.0		100.0			
80	Military & Vets	Provide WMD response training for 1,200 law enforcement personnel statewide	515.0			515.0			515.0		
81	Military & Vets	Reconfigure the State Emergency Coordination Center for increased operational efficiency	190.0			190.0		190.0			

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going				General	Federal	Other	
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Total Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Funding Notes
82	Military & Vets	Response training for 60-100 initial survey assessing personnel and 25 response staff in DEC and DHSS	150.0			150.0		150.0			
83	Military & Vets	Secure trauma equipment and medical formulary for the 103d Civilian Support Team for Weapons of Mass Destruction (CST-WMD) -- federally funded; awaiting delivery.				already federally funded			already funded		
84	Military & Vets	State Emergency Coordination Center Computer Replacement	25.0			25.0		25.0			
85	Military & Vets	Blood delivery, State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) staff assistance at New York, and temporary SECC coordination postion	108.0			108.0		108.0			
86	**Military & Vets Total**		**3,738.7**	**611.3**	**1,523.0**	**5,873.0**		**3,693.0**	**2,180.0**	**0.0**	
87											
88	Natural Res	Add Park Rangers to provide full-time security of the watershed in Chugach State Park			200.0	200.0		200.0			
89	Natural Res	Add 20 part-time highly trained, specialized firefighters at urban areas around the state		400.0	400.0	800.0		800.0			
90	Natural Res	Emergency communications equipment for firefighters	400.0			400.0		400.0			
91	Natural Res	Emergency fire fighter training	300.0			300.0		300.0			
92	**Natural Res Total**		**700.0**	**400.0**	**600.0**	**1,700.0**		**1,700.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	
93											
94	Public Safety	Add 17 state troopers to handle increased security requirements statewide	294.4	1,763.6	2,252.4	4,310.4		4,281.4		29.0	SDPR Includes housing in Cantwell for 2 troopers
95	Public Safety	Add 2 state troopers and two civilians for additional analysis and field surveillance capability		271.0	387.6	658.6		658.6			
96	Public Safety	Add 2 troopers to increase security in the Valdez area		205.4	260.0	465.4		465.4			
97	Public Safety	Temporary checkpoint at Yukon River Bridge	88.4			88.4		88.4			Includes State Defense Force in DMVA
98	Public Safety	Add 6 troopers and 1 civilian for a permanent vehicle checkpoint south of the Yukon River Bridge on the Dalton Highway	1,071.2	686.0	932.7	2,689.9		2,594.7		95.2	SDPR Includes housing and office (current checkpoint and housing established on a temporary basis)
99	Public Safety	Add 6 state troopers for ground patrols along the pipeline	419.6	645.2	849.6	1,914.4		1,885.4		29.0	SDPR Includes housing for 2 troopers
100	Public Safety	Add 29 troopers and 20 civilians in FY03 to handle increased security requirements statewide			6,185.0	6,185.0		6,185.0			
101	Public Safety	Add 4 troopers in FY03 for increased field surveillance and analysis capability			660.0	660.0		660.0			Annual training for each year
102	Public Safety	Add 6 constables and support for regional hub areas			802.4	802.4		802.4			Includes housing and office space
103	Public Safety	Add 20 VPSOs and associated support			1,651.9	1,651.9		1,651.9			

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
104	Public Safety	Continue to practice and expand TAPS defense drills through joint annual training with the State Troopers & FBI		64.9	64.9	129.8		129.8			
105	Public Safety	Provide four border crossings with access to criminal information (APSIN and NCIC)	72.0	57.6	57.6	187.2		187.2			Installation, Computers, Line Costs
106	Public Safety	Provide modified Level B HazMat suits for 480 State and local law enforcement personnel (Phase 1 of 3)	432.0			432.0			432.0		
107	Public Safety	Public safety information system (APSIN) progamming and data charges, recruitment for additional troopers, support for Lab Services and Search and Rescue, risk management and vehicle costs			920.8	920.8		460.4	460.4		
108	Public Safety	Purchase computer hardware and software for an expanded intelligence system to allow law enforcement agencies to receive, store, analyze and disseminate information		200.0	60.0	260.0		260.0			FY2002 purchase of equipment; FY2003 annual line costs
109	**Public Safety Total**		**2,377.6**	**3,893.7**	**15,084.9**	**21,356.2**		**20,310.6**	**892.4**	**153.2**	
110											
111	Transportation	Add a Low Earth Orbital communication system	See Note	101.4	174.0	275.4		275.4			Annual operating costs, capital costs incurred by provider
112	Transportation	Add municipal law enforcement officers for rural airports to meet FAA's mandatory 15 minute response time		1,292.0	1,550.0	2,842.0		2,842.0			
113	Transportation	Conduct engineering blast assessment at Anc and Fbx airports and construct deflection devices in lieu of 300' parking setback	6,800.0			6,800.0			3,400.0	3,400.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
114	Transportation	Develop plans for replacement of priority bridges; purchase and stockpile moveable, temporary bridge spans in Fairbanks	3,500.0			3,500.0			3,500.0		FHWA
115	Transportation	Establish a Transportation Security Office within DOT/PF		274.9	400.0	674.9		674.9			
116	Transportation	Establish a transportation security training program		150.0	150.0	300.0			300.0		FHWA
117	Transportation	Evaluate transportation operators' inventory and increase security measures for explosives, ammunition, hazardous materials	350.0			350.0		350.0		pr vate costs unknown	consider containers also
118	Transportation	Expand Fox weigh station hours to 24/7		242.5	416.0	658.5		658.5			Being done on interim, emergency basis
119	Transportation	Have DOT/PF maintenance personnel check key bridges on a daily basis and block access to roads under bridges				dept to do w/in budget					May have training costs
120	Transportation	Help communities complete port security plans for all ports that host cruise ships				0.0					Would be funded by local port or possibly with federal funds
121	Transportation	Improve personnel security (background checks) for commercial driver's license operators and selected DOT/PF positions		35.0	35.0	70.0		70.0			May require legislation
122	Transportation	Establish temporary gates and check points at Anchorage and Fairbanks airports		690.0	690.0	1,380.0				1,380.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible

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	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going				General	Federal	Other	
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Total Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Funding Notes
123	Transportation	Increase inspections and random checks of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) authorized vehicles at Anc and Fbx airports		13.0	15.0	28.0				28.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
124	Transportation	Increase presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at Anc and Fbx airports		2,158.2	2,590.0	4,748.2			2,374.1	2,374.1	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
125	Transportation	Install additional baggage explosive detection machines at Anc and Fbx airports	425.0			425.0			212.5	212.5	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
126	Transportation	Install state-of-the-art access control systems at Anc and Fbx airports	8,625.0			8,625.0			4,312.5	4,312.5	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
127	Transportation	Provide handheld communication equipment for expanded use of National Guard soldiers at rural airports when not needed at security screening points	34.0			34.0		17.0	17.0		Federal funding possible
128	Transportation	Provide increased security at the Port of Anchorage Access Road	30.0			30.0		30.0			Task completed
129	Transportation	Conduct a detailed security study and risk analysis of Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) operations	75.0			75.0			75.0		Implementation costs to be determined in study
130	Transportation	Purchase short-term War Risk Insurance for AMHS and analyze need for longer term insurance		331.1	420.0	751.1		751.1			Already purchased for remainder of FY2002
131	Transportation	Purchase short-term War Risk Insurance for Anc and Fbx airports and analyze need for longer term insurance		395.1	550.0	945.1				945.1	Internat'l Airport Rev Fund Already purchased for FY2002
132	Transportation	Purchase short-term War Risk Insurance for rural airports and analyze need for longer term insurance		80.0	150.0	230.0		230.0			Already purchased for FY2002
133	Transportation	Respond immediately to unauthorized vehicles at curbside and restricted areas at Anc and Fbx airports		25.0	25.0	50.0				50.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
134	Transportation	Review access control and employee training at Anc, Fbx and rural airports	235.0			235.0		10.0		225.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
135	Transportation	Review and modify Anc and Fbx airport terminal configurations to meet security requirements	3,000.0			3,000.0			1,500.0	1,500.0	Internat'l Airport Rev Funds Federal funding possible
136	**Transportation Total**		**23,074.0**	**5,788.2**	**7,165.0**	**36,027.2**		**5,908.9**	**15,691.1**	**14,427.2**	
137											
138	Grand Total		56,682.8	11,359.0	29,442.8	97,484.6		43,577.2	39,327.0	14,580.4	
139											
140											
141	**ALASKA RAILROAD**										
142	AK Railroad	Install remote fuel rack monitoring	250.0			250.0			250.0		
143	AK Railroad	Install security cameras at Whittier and Seward docks	500.0			500.0			500.0		
144	AK Railroad	Operational Support – Provide background investigations on new employees and contractors. Photo ID system for ARRC employees. Train employees in security awareness. Provide additional Special Agent and Investigative assistance support		125.0	250.0	375.0			375.0		

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02-03	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
145	AK Railroad	Conduct a detailed security assessment	150.0			150.0			150.0		
146	**ALASKA RAILROAD TOTAL**		**900.0**	**125.0**	**250.0**	**1,275.0**		**0.0**	**1,275.0**	**0.0**	
147											
148	**WILL SEEK FAA WAIVERS, AS APPROPRIATE**										
149	Transportation	Add rural airport security and operational personnel		2,417.0	7,250.0	9,667.0		9,667.0			Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate
150	Transportation	Conduct engineering blast assessment of deflection devices at rural airports in lieu of 300' parking setback	1,700.0			1,700.0		850.0	850.0		Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate
151	Transportation	Install rural airport perimeter fencing and automated gates with access control if no federal waiver received	12,350.0			12,350.0		1,235.0	11,115.0		Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate
152	Transportation	Install rural airport traffic barriers and blast deflection devices if no federal waiver received	15,000.0			15,000.0		1,500.0	13,500.0		Federally mandated - will seek waivers as appropriate
153	Transportation	Establish rural airport automated lock and key control systems if no federal waiver received	300.0			300.0		30.0	270.0		
154	**TOTAL POTENTIAL FAA WAIVERS**		**29,350.0**	**2,417.0**	**7,250.0**	**39,017.0**		**13,282.0**	**25,735.0**	**0.0**	
155											

Information current as of 11-16-01

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
4			One-Time	On-Going		Total		General	Federal	Other	Funding
5	Dept	Description	FY02	FY02	FY03	Cost		Funds	Funds	Funds	Notes
156	FOR INFORMATION ONLY - FY2004 PHASES OF MULTI YEAR EFFORTS										
157	Admin	Implement Phases 3 and 4 of the state portion of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS): full infrastructure and backbone for Southeast Alaska and rural communities.	20,900.0			20,900.0		2,090.0	18,810.0		Assumes 90/10% federal/state match Operational costs begin in FY2004 or 2005
158	Military & Vets	Provide training, trucks, and equipment for two regional Level A HAZMAT teams to be located in Kodiak and Kenai (Phase 3 of 3)	850.0			850.0		850.0			
159	Military & Vets	Conduct robust WMD exercise program that encompasses all levels of government and the private and volunteer sectors				125.0		125.0			
160	Public Safety	Add 34 State Troopers and 19 civilians to handle increased security requirements (Phase 3 of 3)				6,940.0		6,940.0			
161	Public Safety	Add 6 constables to meet increased community safety requirements (Phase 2 of 3)				802.4		802.4			
162	Public Safety	Add 20 VPSOs to meet increased community safety requirements (Phase 2 of 3)				1,651.9		1,651.9			

Link to Updated Homeland Security Budget Proposal, released on December 21, 2001

STATE OF ALASKA

TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

Executive Summary and Financial Information



Released November 12, 2001

Maj. Gen. Phillip Oates
Adjutant General / Commissioner
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW & SUMMARY
ALASKA'S TERRORISM DISASTER POLICY CABINET

An analysis of the terrorism threat to Alaska, the State's current capability to meet that threat, the risks that result from lack of full capability in certain areas, and the actions the State needs to take to eliminate or reduce those risks.

The thoughts and recommendations contained in this report, and any action taken on them by the State of Alaska, reflect an evaluation and weighing of safety, risk, and economic, budgetary, social, and other public policy factors. Preparedness for and response to terrorist threats and incidents cannot be reduced to a single set of guidelines, but inherently involves the exercise of discretion in decision-making. Nothing in this report shall establish an actionable duty of care, standard of care, or liability of the state or any state official for claims arising out of the planning, implementation, preparedness, response, and other activities discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The tragic events of September 11th have vaulted Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness over most other issues requiring immediate attention at all levels of government. This executive overview provides a public summary of the comprehensive report prepared by the Disaster Policy Cabinet (DPC) for the Governor of the State of Alaska concerning Terrorism/WMD policy, priorities and resources.

B. The Disaster Policy Cabinet, chaired by Major General Phillip E. Oates, met on September 26, 2001, to begin an assessment of Terrorism/WMD in Alaska. The following approach was established by consensus of the DPC members.

1. The DPC, with its experience in addressing all-hazard disaster response and recovery, was the appropriate State agency to review and forward Terrorism/WMD policy, priority and resource requirement recommendations to the Governor.

2. Because of the complexity of Terrorism/WMD, the DPC established five sub-cabinet groups to develop comprehensive reports and recommendations. The focus of four of the sub-cabinet groups was primarily on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The focus of the fifth was the response and recovery from such an attack. The following sub-cabinet groups and chairpersons were established to complete this task.

   a. Domestic Preparedness/Consequence Management Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs – Commissioners Jay Livey (DHSS) and Phillip Oates (DMVA)

   b. Energy Security Sub-cabinet: Co-Chairs – Deputy Commissioners Del Smith (DPS) and Marty Rutherford (DNR)

   c. Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Commissioner Glenn Godfrey (DPS)

   d. Information Technology and Telecommunications Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Commissioner Jim Duncan (DOA)

   e. Transportation Security Sub-cabinet: Chair – Deputy Commissioner Boyd Brownfield (DOT & PF)

3. The DPC established the following principles that guided sub-cabinet efforts to establish priorities and recommendations:
   a. Strengthen existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives
   b. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies
   c. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide importance
   d. Maintain continuity of government operations at all levels
   e. Reinforce first responder capabilities
   f. Use deployable resources to augment areas with inadequate capabilities
   g. Maintain appropriate balance between security and individual freedom
   h. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times
   i. Maximize use of existing or anticipated Federal programs and grants
   j. Share costs at all levels, both public and private

C. Weekly DPC meetings were held to review the progress of sub-cabinet efforts. Each sub-cabinet compared the threat and the State's capabilities to minimize or eliminate the threat. The vulnerabilities that emerged from these assessments became the basis for sub-cabinet recommendations. Because of many overlapping issues, the Energy and Security Sub-cabinet groups combined their findings and produced a single report. Their combined report and the other three sub-cabinet reports (Domestic Preparedness and Consequence Management, Information Technology and Telecommunications, and Transportation) were included as attachments to the full report of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet. Additionally, the full report included other attachments that described a State Office of Homeland Security, listed key assets in the State, and outlined the costs and timelines for recommendations.

D. Section II of this document provides information concerning the key assets in the state. Section III describes the Threat. Section IV assesses Alaska's fundamental ability to respond to terrorism. Section V outlines a proposal that could allow states to increase use of the National Guard. Section VI addresses local considerations. Section VII establishes general State priorities. Section VIII proposes legislative actions. Section IX highlights funding considerations. Sections X, XI, and XII contain immediate recommendations, longer-term recommendations and a conclusion.

E. This executive overview and summary has been written to protect sensitive information while providing essential information to the public about the process, findings, recommendations and conclusions of the Terrorism Disaster Policy Cabinet.

II. KEY ASSETS/POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS

A list of Alaska's key assets that could be targets for terrorists was part of the full report. The assets were grouped geographically. Power plants and airports were considered critical in every region of the State. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) and the Port of Valdez were on the list of key assets, as were military installations and State/Federal buildings. The list was not intended to be fully comprehensive or exhaustive. It was presented to portray the types of assets that must be considered and protected in Alaska.

III. THE THREAT

A. In a free and open society, accurate and timely intelligence of terrorist activities and threats becomes increasingly important. That quality of information will allow all levels of business and government to increase protection of citizens and key assets during periods of increasing threats, assuming adequate resources, policies, and procedures are available. Inter-agency sharing of intelligence information and complementary efforts to analyze information are key to the ability to establish appropriate threat levels and increase protective measures at the right places and at the right times.

B. We are fortunate in Alaska—interagency cooperation is strong at and between all levels of government. Our strong interagency relationships, however, cannot overcome the many Federal statutes and policies that inhibit the exchange of information and intelligence with the Departments of Defense and Justice. Although firewalls exist to protect information and intelligence sources, they also inhibit the ability of states and territories to fight terrorism. A comprehensive national review should be undertaken to establish the changes to statutes and policies that are needed to allow states and territories to better protect their citizens. This will be a challenging task. We will need to retain the most essential safeguards while balancing the protection of our freedoms with the need for timely access to critical information and intelligence by states and territories.

C. All current assessments by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies agree that there are no known groups in Alaska that have the objective of conducting a large-scale attack or the capability to conduct such an attack. Yet, we cannot discount the possibility that individuals—for a variety of personal, political, or religious motives—could independently attack a facility or concentration of people without warning. This could be done through various delivery means such as the mail. We must always keep in mind that even the best coordination of inter-agency efforts and sharing of information will not allow a perfect assessment of the terrorist threat to Alaska.

D. The September 11th disaster and subsequent events reveal that international terrorists are well funded, well organized and fully capable of attacking the United States. Therefore, we will assume that Alaska is a potential target. Alaska does have relatively large population centers and targets of national significance. Our geographic isolation from the "lower 48" does not guarantee that these potential targets will have immunity from attack. It is also important to recognize another reality—as our nation improves its homeland security and targets become more difficult to attack—terrorists could well look to targets that are less protected. Alaska can reduce the chances of becoming a target by devoting resources and efforts that improve the ability to identify, protect, and respond to those attacks.

E. In the event of a terrorist attack, the State may have to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or high explosive/incendiary events. Each event presents a different challenge and requires different resources for prevention, response, and protection. Since no state will ever have sufficient resources to respond to every possible contingency in every location where an attack might occur, accurate threat and risk assessments are necessary.

1. Nuclear and radiological attacks are probably beyond the current capabilities of most terrorist groups. The materials are difficult to handle and difficult to obtain. Given

the relatively low risk of a nuclear/radiological event occurring in Alaska, preparation for this threat is given a lower priority than preparation for other types of threats.

2. As recent events indicate, chemical or biological attacks are indeed possible. Terrorists have increasing opportunities to purchase or manufacture these weapons and the ability to use them. Alaska has some capacity to respond to these types of attacks because of increasing efforts over the past five years to develop greater hazardous material (HAZMAT) capabilities. Improvements, however, are necessary because of the enormous consequences of any attack with chemical or biological weapons. These threats, because of a greater probability of occurrence and greater potential consequences, are given a high priority for resources.

3. Other events, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the World Trade Center, highlight terrorist capabilities to employ high explosive or incendiary devices. Since these types of weapons are relatively easy to manufacture or obtain, additional resources are necessary to decrease the likelihood of these types of attacks from occurring. Strong public safety capabilities and a comprehensive law enforcement presence will help identify and prevent these attacks and will help maintain law and order if a high explosive attack does occur.

IV. THE ABILITY TO RESPOND

A. Alaska's constitution provides a strong Office of the Governor with unified and singular authority over the Executive Branch. This structure is proving to have many advantages over other models of state governments in dealing with terrorism. In addition, the policies and procedures established in Alaska over the last ten years—because of natural disasters, oil spills, and Y2K efforts—have produced integrated and effective emergency management and inter-agency procedures at all levels.

B. The Federal Response Plan provides an appropriate and effective foundation for response and recovery from emergencies and disasters in the nation. It also outlines the procedures that make resources available from federal and state agencies to augment and assist efforts by first responders. The State's significant supporting plans, programs, and procedures are listed below.

1. Disaster Policy Cabinet that provides coordinated, timely, and appropriate policy and resource recommendations to the Governor
2. State Emergency Operations Plan that delineates agency and departmental responsibilities
3. State Emergency Coordination Center that operates 24/7/365
4. State Emergency Response Commission that focuses on planning, preparing, and training for emergencies and disasters
5. Local Emergency Planning Committees throughout the state that have an all-hazards charter
6. Incident Command System that is modeled on the National Interagency Incident Management System
7. Hazardous Material working group

C. Alaska is one of 22 states where the Adjutant General and Commander of the National Guard is also a Cabinet member who is responsible for state emergency management. This arrangement encourages a single and strong focus for state emergency response while facilitating inter- and intra-agency coordination and cooperation at local, state, and federal levels. The recent addition of a 24/7/365 State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) capability in Alaska adds yet another advantage. We are now one of some 19 states that have a more rapid means to react, respond, and provide resources to a WMD incident or other emergency event where the time, efficiency, and effectiveness of that response are critical for success.

D. Since 1996, the State has had a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) working group that has been developing a Level A capability for chemical response. The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) provides the chair for this group. Meetings are held periodically to inventory and update a list of HAZMAT capabilities in Alaska and develop statewide standard operating procedures.

1. With the consensus of the work group, DEC has built upon the core HAZMAT capability for the two partnered response organizations Municipality of Anchorage Fire Department and the Fairbanks North Star Borough. Both now have 24-hour Level A capability, with 40 responders in Anchorage and 24-30 in Fairbanks. Agreements between State and local governments permit deployment of these teams anywhere in Alaska at the direction of the State On Scene Coordinator. The State reimburses the costs of these responses and relieves the communities of liability, indemnification, and worker's compensation responsibilities.

2. There are also local response agreements with local communities to increase HAZMAT training, funding, and response throughout Alaska. Training is routinely available by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DEC, and the National Guard. To date, there are 1,895 trained personnel in Alaskan communities (a total that includes 786 trained National Guard members).

3. There are three immediate needs. The first is to have the core HAZMAT teams equipped and trained to deal with biological threats. The second is to establish additional core regional HAZMAT capabilities in other areas of the state, particularly the Southeast. The third is to ensure that the National Guard 103rd Civil Support Team is fully equipped and certified to respond to any nuclear, biological, or chemical incident.

E. The greatest national shortages in capabilities and resources to respond and react to WMD events are in the areas of public health and medical response. Alaska is no exception to these shortages. To deal with a mass casualty event, our nation and State must make the increase in public health and medical capabilities, and the ability to deploy these resources, very high priorities.

F. There are changes to programs and policies in Alaska that will allow us to be even more effective in responding to terrorism while providing better protection to our citizens and key assets. The following changes will significantly improve the capability of Alaska's Emergency Management System to address events of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

1. Actions are necessary to improve rapid and timely notification to medical personnel at all levels, both private and public, about any sickness or disease that may be a

result of a terrorist attack. Notifications relying on individuals to read a FAX or electronic mail message will not be sufficient for some WMD events.

2. Plans must be completed and approved regarding the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Alaskan Pharmaceutical Cache.
3. A database should be established of retired and non-active licensed health care providers, veterinarians, and dentists who could assist in mass casualty situations.
4. Plans, protocols, and procedures should be refined and strengthened to ensure continuity of government operations and continuous communications at all times—before, during, and after an event.
5. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Management System should address and outline specific policies, procedures, actions, responsibilities, and training for WMD events.
6. Formal and permanent procedures should be developed to obtain, analyze, and disseminate threat information.
7. Standing Incident Management Teams should be established for WMD events.
8. Greater efforts should be made to identify, plan, and exercise urban search and rescue teams, state disaster medical teams, and mortuary teams.

G. In every disaster response over the past few years, after action reviews reveal that the lack of interoperable communications is always at the top of significant issues. Emergency responders from different response units are frequently unable to communicate by radio even when they are only a few yards apart. The Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (ALMRS) would virtually eliminate this long-standing problem. Completion of ALMRS will significantly improve the State's ability to respond to all disasters, including WMD events.

V. THE NATIONAL GUARD

A. The Alaska Army National Guard is uniquely structured to accomplish homeland security. The basic mission of the Scout Group is reconnaissance, surveillance, and security of critical sites while operating in hazardous environments. The Scout Group has aviation capabilities—both rotary and fixed wing—to perform many tasks that are important in a homeland security role. These tasks include combat search and rescue, troop and equipment movement, and medical evacuation. The recent addition of a 22-member deployable team to the Alaska Army National Guard—the 103rd Civil Support Team—also provides a significant ability to accomplish rapid assessment, testing, identification, and detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents and limited decontamination operations and communication support while giving expert on-scene advice to first responders.

B. Federal statutory and policy changes are now possible that could permit greater use of the National Guard on a daily basis in a homeland security role. This is because of the recent and more liberal legal interpretation of "other duties" in 32 USC 112 that allowed federally funded National Guard forces to perform airport security roles, while remaining under a Governor's control. The Alaska National Guard is already one of several states that have another program that fits this new model. This program provides

federally funded National Guard personnel and equipment for inter-agency support of drug demand reduction and counter drug activities under the direction of the Governor.

C. Another recommended change would be to give governors, through their Adjutant Generals, coordination authority over all military forces in the state—active, reserve, and National Guard—that are providing military support to civil authorities. This would significantly enhance a governor's ability to ensure appropriate protection to the citizens of the state. It is also a change that is complementary and supportive of the broad powers that governors already have in an emergency or disaster.

VI. LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This report focuses on statewide needs rather than the individual analyses of each community's needs. However, the recommendations in this report assist and broadly supplement local capabilities, either directly or on a regional basis. For example, adding State Troopers, providing first responder training and completing the Health Alert Network are actions in direct support of communities. Expanding the State's public and environmental health capabilities, creating additional Level A HAZMAT Teams, improving security at airports and planning for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile improve the State's capabilities to support communities on a regional basis. When it is recommended that a resource be placed in a specific jurisdiction (e.g., an additional HAZMAT Team), it is to serve as a regional resource, not just a local asset. This regional approach is consistent with the DPC's guiding principles. For high cost, high maintenance and training intensive items, this approach provides efficiency and effectiveness.

VII. GENERAL STATE OF ALASKA PRIORITIES

This review of capabilities and vulnerabilities in Alaska led to the following five general requirements, listed from highest priority, as a guide for the expenditure of resources for counter-terrorism.

A. Expand public safety capabilities with an emphasis on community safety, emergency response and security of communications, transportation, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and public utilities infrastructure

B. Expand public health capabilities to detect and respond to biological or chemical incidents or attacks

C. Establish additional and deployable medical response capabilities

D. Increase HAZMAT and WMD response training for first responders and develop a greater deployable capability for conducting operations in a contaminated environment anywhere in Alaska

E. Secure Alaska's communications infrastructure and provide full and comprehensive interagency communications through the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System for local, state, federal and private entities.

The State should immediately establish an Office of Homeland Security to implement these priorities and the other specific recommendations in this report.

VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

Alaska has developed a strong system of emergency management, but legislative or regulatory changes are possible that could assist effort to improve the State's procedures for dealing with terrorism. Although a comprehensive review is necessary, a preliminary assessment indicates that the following legal analyses and policy reviews should occur.

A. Revise Alaska statutes to allow the State to become a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (a national disaster response mutual aid agreement among the states).

B. Update laws (e.g. AS 18.05.042) to allow appropriate access to and interagency sharing of privileged medical information in times of a public health emergency.

C. Revise laws (e.g. AS 18.50.230; 7AAC 05.400) to facilitate the issuance of death certificates in mass casualty situations where recovery of bodies may not be possible or recovery will take an extended period.

D. Change AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the definition of "disaster," and by adding the ability to allocate or redistribute pharmaceutical supplies to the Governor's powers under conditions of a disaster emergency.

E. Change AS 26.20 (Civil Defense Act) by adding "terrorist attack" to the policy and purpose paragraph to insure this contingency is covered by the act.

F. Modify AAC Title 17 as necessary to accommodate accomplishment of security improvements to the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).

G. Revise AS 02 to establish or authorize civil penalties for security infractions involving airport security.

H. Revise AS 40.25.120 dealing with open public records to protect sensitive security documents.

I. Revise AS 44.62.125 to exempt sensitive airport security programs from regulation adoption procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.

J. Establish legislation to ensure National Guard members who are also state employees do not lose state employment benefits or increases in seniority or retirement when they are mobilized for state or federal active duty.

K. Review the definition of disaster contained in AS 26.20 to determine if the recent legislative changes to that statute adversely impact the State's ability to respond to a WMD event.

IX. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

A. Many of the security tasks related to transportation are dictated by federal mandates such as those from the Federal Aviation Agency. Because of Alaska's unique geographic and transportation circumstances, the State will request waivers where appropriate. However, failure to adequately follow mandates that are not waived may result in unacceptable financial or operational sanctions by the federal government. Because of possible sanctions, it is important that security related funding issues be addressed expeditiously.

B. Many of the recommendations in this report require financial investments over the next 18 months. Some of these activities can be handled internally by shifting work activities. But many are well beyond the scope of existing budgets.

C. The level of federal support to states for the enormous financial burden of additional security and response capabilities is not yet known. There are indications that some federal funds may become available to either replace or supplement state support. The federal support might come in any one of several forms: supplemental federal agency budgets, an economic stimulus package, next year's federal budget, etc. However, substantial state general fund investments are inevitable, even if the federal government might ultimately reimburse some of that expense. There are also some costs that are more appropriately handled by local governments (e.g. their own planning work) or the private sector (e.g. pipeline security).

X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOST URGENT REQUIREMENTS

A. Begin monitoring access to the Dalton Highway and Yukon River Bridge by establishing a checkpoint south of the bridge. The bridge, in addition to being the critical feature on the Dalton Highway, also carries TAPS. Positive control of vehicles and personnel at a checkpoint could free up some of the security elements that currently patrol the northern section of the highway. These security elements would be available to provide a greater presence at the most critical and vulnerable areas of the pipeline where damage is much more difficult to repair.

B. Develop procedures to expand the opportunities to use National Guard personnel under Title 32 for WMD emergencies to accomplish State and Federal requirements. This keeps command and control under the Governor but allows Federal funding for National Guard personnel and equipment.

C. Review the statutory and regulatory changes in Section VIII for possible introduction to the Legislature or administrative action.

D. Open the Fox Weigh Station on a 24-hour-per-day, seven days per week basis, to monitor trucks and cargo on the Dalton Highway.

E. Establish pipeline defense drills and formal response and resource procedures for all emergencies.

F. Increase ground and air patrols along the pipeline.

G. Initiate an immediate study of Alaska Marine Highway System physical security requirements for ashore and afloat.

H. Increase the presence and visibility of law enforcement officers at primary airports and implement a variety of other airport security measures.

I. Develop a list of essential bridges and require maintenance personnel to check these bridges on a daily basis.

J. Establish a Transportation Security Officer in DOT/PF to coordinate security of state facilities and disaster preparedness.

K. Meet with key telecommunication providers to ensure disaster recovery planning is adequate to maintain continuity of operations and state government communications.

L. Establish redundancy between the enterprise mail servers in Anchorage and Juneau.

M. Fund and implement the North Zone Pilot of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System.

N. Establish an Enterprise Data/Network Security Manager Position.

O. Identify telecommunications sites that need added security and take the necessary protective measures.

P. Hire and train four additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams to improve response capabilities for various regions of the state.

Q. Train and equip a Level A Hazardous Materials Team for Juneau to provide regional coverage for Southeast Alaska.

R. Improve the State's preparedness for chemical/biological/radiological and high-explosive/incendiary events with State plans for WMD, (including plans for transportation of mass casualties, receipt and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and a plan for the detection of and response to biological terrorism); an improved intelligence system for the Alaska State Troopers; personnel and equipment decontamination sets; WMD training for first responders and emergency managers; protective equipment for first responders; additional Alaska State Troopers; completion of the Division of Public Health HealthAlert Network; equipment for the 103d Civil Support Team (WMD); improvements to the State Public Health Lab; increased public and environmental health surveillance and testing capabilities; and implementation of a statewide WMD exercise program.

S. Establish an Office of Homeland Security to ensure intensive preparations for countering terrorism in Alaska. This office would mirror the effort at the national level for the Office of Homeland Security recently established by the President. A full description of Alaska's Office of Homeland Security, to include recommended duties and staffing requirements, was part of the full report given to the Governor.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONGER-TERM

A. Complete and fund Phases I and II of the Alaska Land Mobile Radio System (recommended by every Sub-cabinet group).

B. Hire additional State Troopers over a two-year period.

C. Develop contingency plans for the State's critical bridges and stockpile moveable temporary bridge spans.

D. Continue to improve security of Ted Stevens Anchorage and Fairbanks International Airports.

E. Ensure the physical security of critical IT/Telecom sites.

F. Continue to improve the State's Public Health and Environmental Health bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities.

G. Train and equip three additional Level A Hazardous Materials Response Teams for statewide rapid response.

H. Continue to provide first responder protective equipment.

I. Continue to provide WMD training and conduct WMD exercises.

J. Procure an alternate State Emergency Coordination Center – a mobile center that can be moved out of harm's way and that can be used as an alternate Emergency Operations Center for communities throughout the State.

XII. CONCLUSION

A. No community, state or nation will ever have the wealth to meet all responsibilities of government while building a stand-alone system that focuses solely on the protection from terrorism. It is important, therefore, to focus on strengthening existing programs, especially those that protect and save lives while improving capabilities for responding to all emergencies. Since full capabilities and a complete level of preparedness will never be possible in every locale, we must also have the ability to move resources quickly around the State. Another essential element of any response will revolve around the ability to communicate—on a continuous and comprehensive inter-agency network of telephone devices, computers, and radios.

B. We must maximize the use of existing programs and grants at the local, state and federal levels to establish the broadest possible basis for the significant funding requirements. The cost of dealing with terrorism must be shared at all levels—government, business, charities, and the private sector.

C. Alaska's constitutional framework, its strong Office of the Governor, and the emergency response policies and procedures that have evolved over the last ten years have given the State a superior ability to coordinate inter-agency efforts and accomplish emergency management. This structure provides an essential foundation for preventing, responding, and reacting to the threats of terrorism and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

SUMMARY OF GOVERNOR'S PROPOSED ANTI-TERROR LEGISLATION
Jan. 14, 2002
Mike Mitchell, Dept. of Law

Bill relating to civil defense and disasters

1. Amends the emergency powers of the governor under the civil defense statutes, AS 26.20, to authorize the governor to declare that a state of emergency exists and to exercise emergency civil defense powers in the event of a "terrorist attack or a credible threat of a terrorist attack on the state." Presently, the governor is authorized to declare a civil defense emergency and exercise these powers only in the event of an "actual enemy attack."

2. Amends the disaster statutes, AS 26.23, to include in the definition of "disaster" a terrorist or enemy attack, an outbreak of disease, or a credible threat of either such event. This amendment authorizes the governor to declare a disaster emergency and to exercise the disaster emergency powers if a terrorist or enemy attack, an outbreak of disease, or a credible threat of either such event, causes or imminently threatens widespread or severe damage, injury, loss of life or property, or shortage of food, water, or fuel. Presently, such incidents are not included within the definition of "disaster," which hampers the ability of the state to respond if they occur.

3. Amends the enumerated powers of the governor in the event of a disaster emergency to include the power to allocate or redistribute pharmaceuticals, medicine, and supplies. Presently, the governor is authorized to allocate or redistribute only food, water, fuel, or clothing in the event of a disaster emergency. It also authorizes the governor to access, inspect, and share health care and medical records as necessary to protect public heath and safety in the event of a disaster emergency.

Historical background on Alaska civil defense and disaster statutes. In 1951, Territorial legislature enacted civil defense statutes, now found at AS 26.20. In the summer of 1964, by AO, the governor redesignated the Division of Civil Defense (within DPS) as the Alaska Disaster Office. In 1967, a disaster relief fund was established. In 1969, by AO, the governor assigned the Alaska Disaster Office to DMVA.

The statute and the AOs set up a distinction between natural disasters and military attacks. The 1969 AO stated that "natural disaster" means "a flood, fire, drought, earthquake, tidal wave, typhoon, storm, or other natural disaster." In 1971, by AO, the governor defined "natural disaster" as meaning "any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind driven water, seismic sea wave, earthquake, drought, fire, or other catastrophe ... other than war caused, resulting in damage, casualties, or other harmful effects to the citizens of Alaska, their belongings, society, environment, or economy."

In the early 1970s, disaster preparedness and response became a concern at the federal level. 1972, the President's Office of Emergency Preparedness contracted with the Council of State Governments for preparation of a model act, the "Example State Disaster Act of 1972." In 1974, Congress passed the "Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974," which made various types of federal assistance to states contingent upon the adoption of a disaster program by the requesting state. In 1977, Alaska enacted disaster statutes, found in AS 26.23, which were based on the Example Act. This enactment established the Division of Emergency Services, which replaced the Alaska Disaster Office, an office that existed only by administrative order.

The Governor's 1977 transmittal letter stated that the civil defense statutes were primarily concerned with military or para-military disasters, while the disaster relief fund was limited to "natural" disasters. It explained that the disaster legislation defined the term disaster "to include only those disasters resulting from natural or non-military, man-made causes" and would limit the civil defense statute to "military or para-military situations."

Bill relating to state plans, programs, and procedures for the security of facilities and systems in the state

1. Adds a new section to the general provisions of the Alaska Aeronautics Act of 1949 (AS 02.15) to allow DOT/PF to adopt regulations to impose civil administrative penalties of up to $1100 per incident for violations of an airport security program. Currently, under federal law FAA may assess a civil penalty of up to this amount for violation of the airport security programs (which are FAA approved), however the penalty is levied against the state, even though nearly all violations are the result of the conduct of airport tenants and contractors. Presently DOT/PF can only pass these fines through to the tenants and contractors under applicable contracts. This bill would allow DOT/PF to directly fine the responsible parties.

2. Amends the public records act, to exclude from public accessibility: records or information pertaining to any security plan, program, or procedures or pertaining to any detailed description or evaluation of systems, facilities, or infrastructure in the state, but only to the extent that dissemination: (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with the implementation or enforcement of the security plan, program, or procedures; (B) would disclose confidential guidelines for investigations or enforcement and the disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (C) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual or to present a real and substantial risk to the public health and welfare.

3. Amends the APA (AS 44.17) by adding a new section to exempt the establishment of certain security plans, programs and procedures from adoption as regulations, in order to protect the confidentiality of these security measures (for example, Dept. of

Corrections prison security plans). Otherwise, if they were considered regulations, they could have to go through a public comment procedure.

Bill relating to state employees called to active military duty

Amends the public employees statutes (AS 39.09, miscellaneous provisions) to authorize the governor to provide that state employees who are members of reserve and auxiliary military units, including the Alaska National Guard, do not suffer a reduction in pay when they are called to active duty. (They would continue to receive their state salary or the equivalent, and some or all of their state benefits.) The governors of many other states possess this authority.

Bill adopting the Emergency Management Assistance Compact

1. Section 1 enacts the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), making Alaska the forty-fourth state to do so. (The transmittal letter says forty-third; since then Michigan has enacted it.) The EMAC is a mutual aid agreement that facilitates state assistance to other states in declared disasters and emergencies. A party state, through its authorized representative, may request assistance of another party state in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, or supplies, for emergency functions such as fire services, medical services, transportation, or other functions. The state receiving the request shall take such action as is necessary to provide the requested resources, although it may withhold them to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection in its own state. The state requesting the aid shall reimburse the state rendering aid for the costs incurred in connection with the request as well any losses or damages incurred in the operation of any equipment and the provision of any service.

2. The EMAC addresses certain legal issues of common concern relating to such assistance. Officers and employees of the state rendering aid shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes, and no assisting state's officers or employees shall be liable for any good faith act or omission of its forces or on account of the maintenance or use of equipment or supplies. The intent of this provision is that when officers or employees of another state come to Alaska to assist in a disaster, they have the good faith immunity from liability specified in the EMAC in addition to any other immunities and defenses that may be available to them as agents of the state of Alaska.

3. Each state shall provide for payment of compensation and death benefits to members of its emergency forces and representatives of deceased members who are injured and killed while rendering aid to another state, in the same manner and on the same terms as if they were injured or killed within their own state. Emergency forces of Alaska

assisting in another state will receive workers compensation benefits pursuant to AS 23.30.244.

4. Enacting the compact will benefit the state by providing immediate access to additional trained and experienced emergency specialists and other emergency resources nationwide during a disaster. It will further benefit the state by providing for prompt reimbursement by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the costs of emergency resources provided by other states to Alaska in the event of a disaster. Presently, the state must negotiate an agreement with FEMA for reimbursement in each disaster; this will not be necessary after the compact is enacted.

5. The bill also repeals and reenacts AS 23.30.244 to provide that an Alaskan civilian volunteer member of a state emergency force who is performing emergency or disaster relief functions in another state under EMAC, or who is performing disaster emergency relief functions in Alaska at the request of the Division of Emergency Services, is considered a state employee for workers compensation purposes. The reenacted statute will control state liability for workers compensation benefits by limiting eligibility to those volunteers who are on a roster maintained by the Division of Emergency and who perform services under the EMAC or at the request of the Division of Emergency Services.

6. Section 3 of this bill repeals the outdated Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact. This bill is anticipated to have no fiscal impact.

<u>Bill relating to the crimes of damaging an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility, criminal mischief, and terroristic threatening</u>.

1. Intentionally damaging an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility would be raised to a class A felony from a class B felony under current law.

2. Penalty for unlawful tampering with an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility would be raised to a class B felony from a class C felony.

3. Penalty for unlawfully tampering with an aircraft would be raised to a class B felony from a class C felony.

4. Unlawful tampering with water, including a public or private water supply, with intent to cause physical injury, would be the same level of crime (class B felony) as tampering with food, drug or cosmetic.

5. Makes it a class B felony to send or deliver (or attempting to send or deliver) an imitation biological or chemical substance with intent to frighten people or cause

other specified harm; depending on the circumstances, under current law this would either not be a crime or it could be a class C felony.

6. Makes it a class C felony to make a false report under certain circumstances regarding the sending or presence of a harmful biological or chemical substance, or a false report threatening damage to an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility.

7. Makes various conforming amendments to criminal code.

-CITE-

32 USC Sec. ***112*** 01/23/00

-EXPCITE-

TITLE 32 - NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER 1 - ORGANIZATION

-HEAD-

Sec. 112. Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities

-STATUTE-

(a) Funding Assistance. - The Secretary of Defense may provide funds to the Governor of a State who submits to the Secretary a State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan satisfying the requirements of subsection (c). Such funds shall be used for the following:

(1) The pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses, as authorized by State law, of personnel of the National Guard of that State used, while not in Federal service, for the purpose of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.

(2) The operation and maintenance of the equipment and facilities of the National Guard of that State used for the purpose of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.

(3) The procurement of services and equipment, and the leasing of equipment, for the National Guard of that State used for the purpose of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities. However, the use of such funds for the procurement of equipment may not exceed $5,000 per item, unless approval for procurement of equipment in excess of that amount is granted in advance by the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Use of Personnel Performing Full-Time National Guard Duty. -

(1) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, personnel of the National Guard of a State may, in accordance with the State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan referred to in subsection (c), be ordered to perform full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f) of this title for the purpose of carrying out drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.

(2)(A) A member of the National Guard serving on full-time National Guard duty under orders authorized under paragraph (1) shall participate in the training required under section 502(a) of this title in addition to the duty performed for the purpose authorized under that paragraph. The pay, allowances, and other benefits of the member while participating in the training shall be the same as those to which the member is entitled while performing duty for the purpose of carrying out drug interdiction and counter-drug activities. The member is not entitled to additional pay, allowances, or other benefits for participation in training required under section 502(a)(1) of this title.

(B) Appropriations available for the Department of Defense for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities may be used for paying costs associated with a member's participation in training described in subparagraph (A). The appropriation shall be reimbursed in full, out of appropriations available for paying those costs, for the amounts paid. Appropriations available for paying those costs shall be available for making the reimbursements.

(C) To ensure that the use of units and personnel of the National Guard of a State pursuant to a State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan does not degrade the training and readiness of such units and personnel, the following requirements shall apply in determining the drug interdiction and counter-drug activities that units and personnel of the National Guard of a State may perform:

(i) The performance of the activities may not adversely affect the quality of that training or otherwise interfere with the ability of a member or unit of the National Guard to perform the military functions of the member or unit.

(ii) National Guard personnel will not degrade their military skills as a result of performing the activities.

(iii) The performance of the activities will not result in a significant increase in the cost of training.

(iv) In the case of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities performed by a unit organized to serve as a unit, the activities will support valid unit training requirements.

(3) A unit or member of the National Guard of a State may be used, pursuant to a State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan approved by the Secretary of Defense under this section, to provide services or other assistance (other than air transportation) to an organization eligible to receive services under section 508 of this title if -

(A) the State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan specifically recognizes the organization as being eligible to receive the services or assistance;

(B) in the case of services, the performance of the services meets the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of section 508 of this title; and

(C) the services or assistance is authorized under subsection (b) or (c) of such section or in the State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan.

(c) Plan Requirements. - A State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan shall -

(1) specify how personnel of the National Guard of that State are to be used in drug interdiction and counter-drug activities;

(2) certify that those operations are to be conducted at a time when the personnel involved are not in Federal service;

(3) certify that participation by National Guard personnel in those operations is service in addition to training required under section 502 of this title;

(4) certify that any engineer-type activities (as defined by the Secretary of Defense) under the plan will be performed only by units and members of the National Guard;

(5) include a certification by the Attorney General of the State (or, in the case of a State with no position of Attorney General, a civilian official of the State equivalent to a State attorney general) that the use of the National Guard of the State for the activities proposed under the plan is authorized by, and is consistent with, State law; and

(6) certify that the Governor of the State or a civilian law enforcement official of the State designated by the Governor has determined that any activities included in the plan that are carried out in conjunction with Federal law enforcement agencies serve a State law enforcement purpose.

(d) Examination of Plan. - (1) Before funds are provided to the Governor of a State under this section and before members of the National Guard of that State are ordered to full-time National Guard duty as authorized in subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall examine the adequacy of the plan submitted by the Governor under subsection (c). The plan as approved by the Secretary may provide for the use of personnel and equipment of the National Guard of that State to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the transportation of aliens who have violated a Federal or State law prohibiting or regulating the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the Secretary shall carry out paragraph (1) in consultation with the Director of National Drug Control Policy.

(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply if -

(A) the Governor of a State submits a plan under subsection (c)

that is substantially the same as a plan submitted for that State for a previous fiscal year; and

(B) pursuant to the plan submitted for a previous fiscal year, funds were provided to the State in accordance with subsection (a) or personnel of the National Guard of the State were ordered to perform full-time National Guard duty in accordance with subsection (b).

(e) Exclusion From End-Strength Computation. - Members of the National Guard on active duty or full-time National Guard duty for the purposes of administering (or during fiscal year 1993 otherwise implementing) this section shall not be counted toward the annual end strength authorized for reserves on active duty in support of the reserve components of the armed forces or toward the strengths authorized in sections 12011 and 12012 of title 10.

(f) End Strength Limitation. - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), at the end of a fiscal year there may not be more than 4000 members of the National Guard -

(A) on full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f) of this title to perform drug interdiction or counter-drug activities pursuant to an order to duty for a period of more than 180 days; or

(B) on duty under State authority to perform drug interdiction or counter-drug activities pursuant to an order to duty for a period of more tha: 180 days with State pay and allowances being reimbursed with funds provided under subsection (a)(1).

(2) The Secretary of Defense may increase the end strength authorized under paragraph (1) by not more than 20 percent for any fiscal year if the Secretary determines that such an increase is necessary in the national security interests of the United States.

(g) Annual Report. - The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress an annual report regarding assistance provided and activities carried out under this section during the preceding

fiscal year. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of members of the National Guard excluded under subsection (e) from the computation of end strengths.

(2) A description of the drug interdiction and counter-drug activities conducted under State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plans referred to in subsection (c) with funds provided under this section.

(3) An accounting of the amount of funds provided to each State.

(4) A description of the effect on military training and readiness of using units and personnel of the National Guard to perform activities under the State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plans.

(h) Statutory Construction. - Nothing in this section shall be construed as a limitation on the authority of any unit of the National Guard of a State, when such unit is not in Federal service, to perform law enforcement functions authorized to be performed by the National Guard by the laws of the State concerned.

(i) Definitions. - For purposes of this section:

(1) The term ''drug interdiction and counter-drug activities'', with respect to the National Guard of a State, means the use of National Guard personnel in drug interdiction and counter-drug law enforcement activities, including drug demand reduction activities, authorized by the law of the State and requested by the Governor of the State.

(2) The term ''Governor of a State'' means, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Commanding General of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

(3) The term ''State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States.

-SOURCE-

(Added Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title XII, Sec. 1207(a)(1), Nov.

29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1564; amended Pub. L. 102-25, title VII, Sec. 703, Apr. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 118; Pub. L. 102-396, title IX, Sec. 9099A, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1926; Pub. L. 104-106, div. A, title X, Sec. 1021, Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 426; Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, title VI, Sec. 660, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-720; Pub. L. 105-85, div. A, title X, Sec. 1031, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1880; Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1022, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2120; Pub. L. 106-65, div. A, title X, Sec. 1021, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 746.)

-MISC1-

PRIOR PROVISIONS

Similar provisions were contained in Pub. L. 100-456, div. A, title XI, Sec. 1105, Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2047, which was set out as a note under section 374 of Title 10, Armed Forces, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 1207(b).

AMENDMENTS

1999 - Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 106-65 substituted ''per item'' for ''per purchase order'' in second sentence.

1998 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(e)(1), substituted ''for the following:'' for ''for - '' in introductory provisions.

Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(e)(2), (3), substituted ''The pay'' for ''the pay'' and ''activities.'' for ''activities;''.

Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(e)(2), (4), substituted ''The operation'' for ''the operation'' and ''activities.'' for ''activities; and''.

Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(a), (e)(2), substituted ''The procurement'' for ''the procurement'' and ''and equipment, and the leasing of equipment,'' for ''and leasing of equipment'' and inserted at end ''However, the use of such funds for the procurement of equipment may not exceed $5,000 per purchase order, unless approval for procurement of equipment in excess of

that amount is granted in advance by the Secretary of Defense.''

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(b), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: ''To ensure that the use of units and personnel of the National Guard of a State pursuant to a State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan is not detrimental to the training and readiness of such units and personnel, the requirements of section 2012(d) of title 10 shall apply in determining the drug interdiction and counter-drug activities that units and personnel of the National Guard of a State may perform.''

Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(c), amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: ''Section 508 of this title, regarding the provision of assistance to certain specified youth and charitable organizations, shall apply in any case in which a unit or member of the National Guard of a State is proposed to be used pursuant to a State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan to provide to an organization specified in subsection (d) of such section any of the services described in subsection (b) of such section or services regarding counter-drug education.''

Subsec. (i)(1). Pub. L. 105-261, Sec. 1022(d), inserted '', including drug demand reduction activities,'' after ''drug interdiction and counter-drug law enforcement activities''.

1997 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 105-85, Sec. 1031(a), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added pars. (2) and (3).

Subsec. (c)(4) to (6). Pub. L. 105-85, Sec. 1031(b)(1), added par. (4) and redesignated former pars. (4) and (5) as (5) and (6), respectively.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 105-85, Sec. 1031(d), designated par. (1) as subsec. (e) and struck out par. (2) which read as follows: ''The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives an annual report specifying for the

period covered by the report the number of members of the National Guard excluded under paragraph (1) from the computation of end strengths.''

Subsecs. (g) to (i). Pub. L. 105-85, Sec. 1031(c), added subsec. (g) and redesignated former subsecs. (g) and (h) as (h) and (i), respectively.

1996 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(a), amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: ''The Secretary of Defense may provide to the Governor of a State who submits a plan to the Secretary under subsection (b) sufficient funds for -

''(1) the pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses of personnel of the National Guard of that State used for -

''(A) the purpose of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities; and

''(B) the operation and maintenance of the equipment and facilities of the National Guard of that State used for that purpose; and

''(2) the procurement of services and leasing of equipment for the National Guard of that State used for the purpose of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.''

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(e), added subsec. (b). Former subsec. (b) redesignated (c).

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(c), substituted ''A State drug interdiction and counter-drug activities plan'' for ''A plan referred to in subsection (a)'' in introductory provisions and ''training'' for ''annual training'' in par. (3) and added pars. (4) and (5).

Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(b)(3), redesignated subsec. (b) as (c). Former subsec. (c) redesignated (d).

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(b)(3), redesignated

subsec. (c) as (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (g).

Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 104-208 inserted at end ''The plan as approved by the Secretary may provide for the use of personnel and equipment of the National Guard of that State to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the transportation of aliens who have violated a Federal or State law prohibiting or regulating the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance.''

Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(d)(1), inserted ''and before members of the National Guard of that State are ordered to full-time National Guard duty as authorized in subsection (b)'' after ''under this section'' and substituted ''under subsection (c)'' for ''under subsection (b)''.

Subsec. (d)(3)(A). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(d)(2)(A), substituted ''subsection (c)'' for ''subsection (b)''.

Subsec. (d)(3)(B). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(d)(2)(B), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: ''funds were provided to the State pursuant to such plan.''

Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(h)(1), substituted ''sections 12011 and 12012'' for ''sections 517 and 524''.

Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(h)(2), substituted ''the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives'' for ''the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives''.

Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(f), added subsec. (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated (h).

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(b)(2), redesignated subsec. (d) as (g) and transferred it to appear before subsec. (h), as redesignated.

Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(b)(1), redesignated subsec. (f) as (h).

Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 1021(g), amended par. (1) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (1) read as follows: ''The term 'counter-drug activities' includes the use of National Guard personnel, while not in Federal service, in any law enforcement activities authorized by State and local law and requested by the Governor.''

1992 - Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 102-396 inserted ''(or during fiscal year 1993 otherwise implementing)'' after ''administering''.

1991 - Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 102-25 substituted ''in consultation with the Director of National Drug Control Policy.'' for ''in consultation with -

''(A) the Attorney General of the United States in the case of a plan submitted for fiscal year 1990; and

''(B) the Director of National Drug Control Policy in the case of a plan submitted for subsequent fiscal years.''

-SECREF-

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in title 10 section 101.

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National Guard Review

Fall 2001

MG Paul Glazar Discusses Force Structure
MG Phil Oates Looks At Unique Missions For The Guard
MG Allen Tackett Talks To NGR About Maintaining Readiness
Nathan Perry On The Need For Strong Leadership
General Joe Ralston Speaks About The Total Force Imperati

What Should The National Guard Be Doing To Keep America Safe?


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

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Managing Editor and Publisher:
Zac Northup
Contributing Editors:
Frank VanFleet
Susan McCaffray
Greg Pickell
Nathan Perry
Copy Editor:
Melissa Northup

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PO Box 329
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In This Issue

Editorial

A Time For Leadership

By Nathan Perry

In the wake of the worst terrorist attack in the history of our nation, the Bush Administration has conducted itself more professionally and more effectively than many would have expected. Indeed, the President silenced his few remaining critics with a masterful speech before a joint session of Congress following the disaster. The speech was notable not simply for its demonstration of American will and for the lift in morale it provided, but in what it explicitly promised America's adversaries in the war on terrorism. Mr. Bush made it clear that the United States would go after the terrorists as well as the nations providing succor to these fanatics.

The President's message to nations that support terrorism represents a potentially defining moment in this war, because it suggests a departure from the failed attempts of the past. In identifying the nations that harbor and support terrorists as targets, the President demonstrated a recognition that these states lie at the heart of the issue. Just as terrorists cannot survive for long without state sponsorship, it is important to recognize that states are at liberty to sponsor any number of terrorist individuals or groups over an extended timeframe. State sponsorship of terrorism means just that - sponsorship - in much the same way that any person or group is sponsored. Individuals and 'teams' will come and go, but the sponsor remains.

In the context of the new war on terrorism, dealing with those who harbor terrorists means that Afghanistan's Taliban government must be eliminated before any longer-term success can be achieved. Shutting down the terrorist camps, and even handing over Bin-Laden represent nothing more to the Taliban than shifting of sponsorship from one entity to another. Years from now, after the Rangers, Special Forces Teams and Delta Force commandos have destroyed the existing training camps and terrorist cells, the Taliban will be at liberty to renew their support for terror with new groups and replacement infrastructure.

> "Having established terrorists as the symptom and governments like the Taliban as the problem, statements by key Administration officials in the wake of the President's speech are worrisome at best and potentially disastrous."

Having established terrorists as the symptom and governments like the Taliban as the problem, statements by key Administration officials in the wake of the President's speech are worrisome at best and potentially disastrous. It increasingly appears that the Administration is hesitant to turn the President's words into action by destroying the Taliban itself. As a 26 September Washington Post Op-Ed piece noted, "the President and other senior officials said yesterday that they were not, after all, making the destruction of the Taliban an explicit U.S. aim." As a news organization routinely critical of the administration, the tone of the Washington Post article might be dismissed, but its concerns cannot be so easily ignored.

Making matters worse is the feeling that we as a nation have been down this road before. Though there was no mandate to bring down the Iraqi government during the Gulf War, the consensus calling for the utter destruction of Saddam Hussein's military capability was clear. Shocked in many ways by scenes of immense destruction in Kuwait, however, senior U.S. leaders called a halt, suggesting that American war aims had been met with the physical liberation of Kuwait itself. Subsequent events have demonstrated the seriousness of this mistake.

Now the administration faces a test considerably more severe than that presented to the elder Bush a decade ago. Afghanistan is no Iraq, and the Taliban can be counted upon to resist far more fanatically than the Iraqi Army. Just getting into the theater of operations presents huge logistical and diplomatic challenges. Worst of all, casualties in such a war would assuredly be far higher than the losses suffered in Operation Desert Storm. Pursuing the Taliban

Editorial

government is not a course of action for the faint at heart.

Risky as attacking the Taliban may seem, however, the administration has little choice. Anything short of the utter elimination of this government will, in the long term, represent defeat in this new war. As Saddam Hussein has demonstrated so often, national survival can be parlayed into the victory in the eyes of the international community, and the Taliban government is no different. As the Post editors sagely pointed out, "if fear of a prolonged military operation or the promotion of a new Afghan regime causes the administration to duck a full confrontation with the Taliban, what other governments need take seriously Mr. Bush's demand that it cease all support for terrorism?" In effect, failure to successfully confront the Taliban will all but rule out any action against other states that support terrorism. This is especially true in light of the fact that the evidence against the Taliban is far more compelling than is the case for other potential targets like Iraq, Syria and Libya. If we fail to face down the Taliban, the United States will find little if any support for similar actions elsewhere, and terrorists around the world will rightly claim victory.

What then, must be done? The administration must recognize that while this war is certainly different than those which have come before, many of the instruments needed to fight it have not changed. Most or all of our current force structure is eminently suited to the task at hand. The Army's Special Operations forces, developed almost forty years ago, will lead the way against this new 21st century opponent. Our conventional combat force structure is well designed for the high intensity military operations that must be executed in dealing with the states that support terrorists. Both the Navy and the Air Force also have relevance, keying on high value targets belonging to sponsor states. Even our combat support and service support forces will play critical roles, providing essential homeland defense capabilities that will be vital to our success. In short, we have all the tools necessary to bring the conflict to our adversaries. All we require now is the willingness to put the tools to use.

Nathan Perry is a Contributing Editor to NGR.

MG Paul Glazar Focuses on Force Structure

As the Vice President of the Adjutant General's Association, New Jersey Adjutant General Paul **Glazar** *often sees how larger issues affect individual units in his state. He recently spoke with* **NGR** *about the important issues facing the National Guard today.*

NGR: "As the Vice President of the Adjutant's General Association, you are "tuned-in" to the national debate over the size and shape of the Guard and Reserve. Based on that perspective, what are the most pressing issues facing the National Guard today?"

GLAZAR: "I think it is a continuation of issues. We have been dealing with force structure, in my particular case, for seven or more years. Whether it is division redesign, or trying to determine the right size for the reserve component's force structure, particularly the National Guard piece. Also, we have been dealing with the governors so they have a full awareness of the different recommendations that are out there."

"So force structure has been up in the forefront for me for a very long time. As Vice President of the Adjutant General's Association I can tell you that we talk about force structure at every meeting."

NGR: "Does DoD consult with the governors when they are contemplating force structure changes that may affect a state's ability to respond to natural disasters?"

GLAZAR: "If the governors hear about it, they hear it from the Adjutants General. The leadership of both associations [NGAUS and AGUAS] has met with the secretaries of the Army and Air Force. From that perspective, we have been involved at the highest levels of the new administration."

NGR: "Do you think that the Guard and Reserve will face further force structure reductions once this year's QDR is completed?"

GLAZAR: "Well the Army has put forth in testimony a requirement for 30,000 more soldiers. From that perspective, I think it would show inconsistent thinking if they were to then say that the Guard and Reserve should be cut. I don't think that it will actually happen because of the credibility issues it would raise."

NGR: "What steps do you think the Army National Guard should be taking to ensure that it is not left behind by the Army's transformation process?"

GLAZAR: "We are having a dialogue with the Army. We continue to have a dialogue on the QDR. We have folks in the National Guard Bureau who are part of that process. On the association side, we have strategic planning committee meetings and have regular conferences with the Vice Chief of NGB to coordinate our efforts. When you put all of these conversations together it's easy to see that we are all sharing information. Through that process, everybody is aware of everyone else's issues and trying to work as a team to move the Army forward through the QDR process."

NGR: "It's been reported that the Secretary of Defense is considering one plan that will reduce the active component by 2.8 divisions. If that plan is enacted, do you think that we will see another round of fighting within the Army to determine who will ultimately pay the bill for those cuts?"

GLAZAR: "I think the lines of communications are such that we probably will not go back to that environment. I truly believe that all concerned – active, guard, reserve, and the associations – are working closer together than ever before."

NGR: "As the Air Force implements its modernization initiatives, what systems do you think the Air Guard should be focusing on to ensure its future relevance?"

GLAZAR: "To bring this down to the local level, when you look at the way the New Jersey Air Guard is structured, we have a balanced force. I have aircraft that are in the support role – our KC-135s - and aircraft that are in the fighter role – our F-16s. We need to continue to provide that support across the full spectrum."■

Alaska's Course to Renewed Relevance

If one were to rank National Guard organizations around the country according to their future relevance, it would be difficult to find a state that is better positioned than Alaska. Under the leadership of Phil Oates, the Alaska National Guard has carved out niche competencies that make it an integral part of U.S. military operations in the region. NGR spoke with MG Oates about his success in finding relevant missions for his units.

NGR: "For a variety of reasons, the Alaska National Guard is being offered a number of new mission opportunities. What are some of those opportunities and what will they mean for the future of the Alaska National Guard?"

OATES: "I think of our mission sets akin to three legs on a stool. Each one is important to the stability of the stool, and the organization, if you will. The first leg is our traditional mobilization mission that all National Guard units have. These are the mobilization missions derived from major contingencies and large wars. These missions will always be the bedrock of the National Guard"

"In addition to that – and this is where we are becoming very unique in Alaska – the second leg of the stool is comprised of those missions where we are a force provider. In other words, the National Guard provides a force package to an active duty commander on a daily and operational basis. That force package, then, works under the operational control of that active duty commander. By providing forces, what we mean is that we recruit the individuals, send them through their initial training, get them qualified in their basic military skill, equip them, maintain them, take care of their professional development, and finally, take care of their families. We then provide them as a package for an active duty commander for operational control."

"There are five major mission areas where we are doing this, and it looks like all five of these are really coming to fruition. The first is one that we have had for some time now where we provide forces to the commander of 11th Air Force for his daily rescue mission. We provide a Rescue Coordination Center, a rescue squadron on the Air Guard side, and with our Army Guard aviation battalion a new family of UH-60 aircraft that are becoming very well equipped for combat search and rescue. In Alaska we prosecute rescue missions very routinely because of the number of aircraft up here and the extreme flying conditions. On average we save one life a day with this capability."

"An interesting aside to the rescue capability is that we are also participating now in the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command's Combat Search and Rescue Center of Excellence. Because of the environment we fly in and the real-world missions we fly on almost a daily basis, I think that the CinC has recognized that we are very capable. This led him to establish the Center of Excellence designation under the banner of the 11th Air Force."

"The second mission area that we are concentrating on is the Alaska NORAD mission. We have been providing the daily refuel capability for the air sovereignty and air defense mission here for some time. Now, however, we are adding to that force the manning of the Regional Air Operations Center."

"The third mission area that we are very excited about involves providing forces to Air Force Space Command to assume the responsibility of manning the Clear Air Station here in Alaska. In taking on that duty, our guardsmen will have a role in the space surveillance and installation security mission that has been in Alaska for some years and performed by the Air

Force on remote tour status. The National Guard Bureau is in favor of our assumption of the mission over a six-year time line that begins in FY02. We are awaiting approval by the Air National Guard and Air Space Command Staffs."

"The fourth mission area that is beginning to develop is the one centered around National Missile Defense. As you may know, the administration has started moving forward to prepare for the establishment of a research and testing facility at Fort Greely. If it is decided to actually build a full-fledged missile defense system, the Alaska National Guard will become a force provider in this mission area for U.S. Army Space Command."

"The fifth and final force provider mission that we are excited about involves the new strategic airlift mission that we are working to establish in Alaska. Our current squadron of C-130s, in the 176 Wing, may become a C-17 squadron. Because of Alaska's geographic location, we are well positioned to assume a strategic airlift mission with C-17s that are oriented to Pacific missions. Even though the decision has not been made, there have been moves by DoD that seem to indicate that C-17s will flow to the Guard and that we will be stationed in Alaska as part of an associate wing between the Alaska Air National Guard and the Air Force."

NGR: "We are told that you have signed a MOU with several other states that could have an impact on your state's scout unit. What can you tell us about that initiative?"

OATES: "Yes, that leads me to the third leg of that stool that I was speaking about earlier, and it involves our Scout Group and what I see as our domestic preparedness and homeland defense mission. During the Cold War these small units were designed to be the eyes and ears of our forces along the border we share with Russia. After the end of the Cold War, our scout group went through an eight-year period where it didn't have a mission. Approximately four years ago, we were able to change that situation by adapting the Scout's surveillance mission to one of critical site protection. As we have developed this concept over the years, we have suddenly seen a force evolving that has significant utility in a homeland defense role. Because of that, we have sparked interest from four other states – Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island - to join with that group. **This is pretty significant.**"

"Heretofore, other units have not wanted to join the Scout Group because it was an atypical organization; it didn't look like other Army formations, and people were hesitant because they didn't want to put their future in jeopardy. Under the new agreement, those four states will potentially provide a total of two scout battalions. The battalions will remain in their respective states. They will be recruited, trained, retained, professionally developed, and made mission capable by each state's National Guard. But they will have a common mission focus for mobilization and readiness requirements for the Group as a whole. Their contingency mission will be to come together and form a Scout Group with five maneuver battalions for critical site protection in Alaska and worldwide."

"One interesting aspect, by forming this new organization, it gives us an ability to change some of the force structure in Alaska. This hasn't come to reality yet, but I will provide you some insight into our thinking. One of the challenges that we have in the National Guard is the recruit, train, lose, do loop. Anytime you have only one authorization for each position; you can never maintain 100% of your force fully trained. In a complex training environment, every time you lose someone, it takes time train someone else for that position, especially when it requires technical and complex skills."

"The way you would address that in an active duty unit, like the 82nd Airborne Division, is that the Army gives that unit a higher percentage of authorization. Perhaps 115% authorized in order to maintain 100% fully trained assigned strength. The way to do that in the National Guard, in my eye, would be to have a traditional National Guard formation for all critical mission areas. The good thing that would be derived from this is that you would have a package of trained people who are ready to be inserted if you are called for a major contingency. What I can do now with the Scout Group is take one of those companies and make it a multifunctional type of organization in that some of the skills would be centered on WMD response, some would be centered on

(Continued on page 15)

Essay

Before and After

By Zac Northup

"I should say that the National Guard is doing a fabulous job." That was the assessment of Major General Fred Rees, Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau when asked how the National Guard was responding to the terrorist attacks that took place in New York and Washington on September 11th. Sitting in his office that overlooks the Washington, D.C. skyline from Crystal City, Rees specifically praised the New York National Guard for its actions during and after the attack. "The units from New York have been particularly effective and have responded in a remarkable way." This is no faint praise from a man who perhaps more than any other person knows what might lie ahead for the U.S. military, particularly the National Guard.

Having served as Vice Chief since March 1999, Rees has often been credited within the defense community as being a forward-thinker on the subject of transforming the National Guard's roles and missions. Lately, he has been a busy man. Since September 11th, there were, and continue to be, a number of projections about how, when, where and in what strength the United States will respond to the attacks. Many of these discussions have centered on the issue of homeland defense. But even as the nation moves forward with its war on terrorism, it remains unclear exactly what role the National Guard sees itself playing in any future homeland defense force.

Prior to September 11th, whenever the subject of homeland defense came up in National Guard circles, there was always a low murmur of skepticism about where such a mission might lead. Most of the concern came from the belief that, if the National Guard's leadership "buys-in" to homeland defense in a big way, then that will give a green light to Guard opponents within the DoD to begin treating the Guard as little more than a local defense force. With that label, the reasoning continues, the Army in particular could then establish a different standard for training, equipping, and ultimately utilizing the National Guard during times of war. To many Guard observers, this will ultimately lead to total irrelevance for the entire organization.

Since the attack, these concerns have not abated. In an memo that was recently distributed to the leadership of one National Guard advocacy group, a senior Guard official noted that, "We are ever watching the situation regarding the use of the National Guard as well as future roles. We are maintaining our position that homeland security is *a* role not *the* role."

Comments by Major General Rees, seem to reflect this

In a world that many have often characterized as grey and uncertain, the events of September 11th have provided the United States a moral clarity not seen since the Second World War. In that conflict, the U.S. military underwent a massive transformation in order to defeat tyranny. Is today's Army and National Guard capable of changing itself to meet today's challenges? We shall soon find out.



position. When asked about the lasting impact that the attacks would have on the National Guard's roles and missions, he noted that September 11th was a seminal event, but that "one of the National Guard's greatest strengths lies in its adaptability and flexibility." Having said that, however, he later added that he believes the attacks will lead the National Guard to work even more closely with state and local officials to ensure that effective counterterrorism plans are developed in every state, and that more money is allocated at the national level to ensure that Guard units are properly trained and resourced to prepare for future attacks. But the emphasis, it seems, will still be on preparing the National Guard to be mobilized and deployed overseas to fight a traditional foe. Under the current organizational model, any capability the National Guard might possess to conduct homeland defense missions, will have to be derived from its preparation for a federal wartime mission.

Other services do not appear to have the same concerns about homeland defense. In an article that appeared in the *Washington Post* on September 30, the *Post's* defense writer, Thomas Ricks reported that the Marine Corps has formally submitted a proposal to the Pentagon's leadership that would establish a brigade-size counterterrorism unit designed to conduct missions both overseas and at home. In the same story, Ricks also noted that the Army, Air Force, and Navy are each developing their own plans that would create a command for homeland defense, provide additional resources to the Air National Guard, and position Aegis warships along the U.S. coast to provide additional air defense capabilities.

Notwithstanding the concerns held by some Guard leaders, it is clear that many within the defense community believe that homeland defense should in fact be "the" role for significant portions of the United States military. With that in mind, the National Guard may soon have to decide whether it wants to continue minimizing the importance of homeland defense even as the nation buries over 6000 of its citizens.

The Conundrum of Relevance

One of the factors preventing the Guard from assuming a higher profile in homeland defense is the issue of relevance. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, relevance has haunted significant portions of the United States military. Whether one was speaking about the large arsenal of nuclear tipped ICBMs, heavy Army divisions stationed in Europe, or Ronald Reagan's six hundred ship Navy, after 1989, many questioned whether we still needed *all* of the military we had built to fight the Cold War. Relevance became an important determining fac-

tor as to whether programs lived or died, or whether services could stave off force structure cuts. Without relevance there was little or no funding.

Throughout the 1990s, many programs that faced questions about relevance either adapted or were eliminated. The Air Force cut fighter wings and, along with its reserve components, created Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. The Navy, after sustaining a dramatic reduction in the number of surface combatants, began implementing "network centric" warfare initiatives designed to make its remaining platforms more lethal. The Army, for its part, developed a protracted transformation strategy that will ultimately convert a handful of its brigades to medium weight units that can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world. Currently, the Army plans to convert just one National Guard brigade to the new medium configuration.

There is little doubt that the Army and its reserve components have lagged behind the rest of the U.S. military in its search for post-Cold War relevance. Despite a decade's worth of new missions in Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, Army leaders have faced intransigence both within and outside the ranks. This is particularly true when it comes to the Army National Guard.

Over the last ten years, when it came time to discuss issues about the Army National Guard and its future capabilities, relevance seemed to always be measured by Cold War standards – or at least Desert Storm standards – which dictated a limited set of options when it came time to replenish the Army Guard's depleted training and modernization accounts. Fear that anti-Guard forces would relegate the Army Guard to "constabulary" status has stymied needed change. This has placed the Army Guard in a bad position. By working diligently to achieve relevance on the traditional battlefield – something that even after ten year's worth of political struggle, many Army National Guard units have failed to achieve due to a lack of resources - the Army National Guard has effectively diminished its relevance to the one mission today's America needs most; homeland defense.

Possible Solutions

Once the full impact of the attacks of September 11th was felt across the nation, the issue of homeland defense changed dramatically. No longer are such attacks a theoretical possibility to be debated and discussed by think tank analysts. With the names and pictures of the dead plastered over the world's televisions, America's vulnerability to these types of asymmetric assaults has now been exposed to all of our current and future enemies. Along with that exposure, the attacks have also highlighted the failure of the nation's policymakers to make any

substantive move towards developing a comprehensive homeland defense strategy. Like many national issues over the last ten years, there was a great deal of talk about homeland defense but very little action.

Whenever we get our collective ducks in a row, the new national homeland defense strategy, developed in part by Pennsylvania's former governor Tom Ridge, will most likely involve utilizing resources from the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, the Treasury Department, the Federal Emergency Management Administration, and dozens of other state and federal agencies. The Guard must be a player in this, and the Army National Guard's leadership must be willing to move beyond their past mindset for the good of the National Guard and the country. This does not mean that the Army Guard should give-up its focus on deploying and fighting high intensity conflicts overseas. Instead, we have to be willing to change existing force structure, equipment, and doctrine to enable units to respond across the full range of missions both at home and abroad.

How might the Army Guard renew its traditional capability to protect Americans at home? Among other initiatives, it has been suggested that:

1 The Army needs to totally revamp its transformation schedule.


White House photo by Paul Morse

Currently, the Army plans on completing its transformation to the Objective Force sometime around 2030. Any uniformed officer or government official who still believes that the nation can wait that long until the Army achieves full post Cold War relevance should have his or her head examined. Between 1941 and 1945 the Army grew by millions and totally transformed itself from ragtag garrison force to the worlds most awesome military organization. A similar effort is needed today.

2 Ensure that the Army National Guard converts a majority of its force structure to a more mobile and useful configuration.

Before any tankers get their hackles up about the thought of dumping their tanks, they should rest easy that heavy armor will remain safe for the near and mid-term. Indeed, until the Army can design, produce, and field the Future Combat System, it would make no sense disarming all of our heavy forces while significant threats remain around the world. That said, either within the National Guard divisions, or perhaps as part of the Enhanced Brigades, hybrid units need to be created that incorporate wheeled platforms that can operate more effectively on America's city streets. These vehicles do not need to be armored, but they should have resistance to chemical and biological attack.

Even though the IBCT format may not be the ideal solution for this conversion, its focus on mobility is a good starting point. Each of these new units should be able to operate independently from its parent division or brigade headquarters and should possess enough manpower to provide security for local officials responding to an attack. Three to four overstrength Military Police companies would probably suffice. Also, each new unit should have significant Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Medical Services, and WMD response capabilities. Robust communications and air mobility would also be essential.

By utilizing the IBCT development model, planners would start from the perspective of building a new unit that is both mobile and capable rather than trying to fit today's square peg equipment into the round hole of a new and important mission. If properly equipped and trained, these new units could respond to attacks against cities and towns within the United States, and also have the capability of providing rear area support for enhanced brigades or divisions if they are ever deployed overseas. Suffice it to say, however, in order to provide maximum response capability across the United States, units will need to be placed in nearly every state. This would not mean that an entire organization would need to be in all

fifty-four states and territories. Instead, portions of each unit could be placed in different states and agreements established between those states that would allow the entire unit to come together in the event of an emergency. Using this method, it might be possible to convert existing units to the new structure thus saving time and resources.

3 Place Homeland Defense at the Forefront

The Guard's leadership needs to realize that homeland defense is *the* mission and that fighting wars overseas is *a* mission. The Constitution charges the U.S. government with providing for the common defense. If the U.S. military cannot protect American citizens at home, then it has failed as an institution. No one should frame that responsibility as a secondary or additional duty. It is *the* duty of everyone who wears the uniform. The National Guard is uniquely qualified and sanctioned by history and law to provide this vital service to the nation. If they have not already done so, the leadership needs to realize this fact and step-off smartly on this critically important mission.

When historians sit down to write about this period years from now, they will probably describe the events we are now witnessing as turning points in American life. It remains unclear exactly what lies ahead. Two things, however, are certain; the American way of life has been changed forever, and the only way our collective sense of security can be restored is by taking resolute collective action at home and abroad. We know where the National Guard stood before the attack. Victory, however, will now depend on what the National Guard does after September 11th. ■

Zac Northup is the Managing Editor of NGR

Oates

(Continued from page 8)

National Missile Defense, still some others might possess skills such as security police. Ideally, you would want to place this company in an area around say, a major university, where you would get young men and women who share a higher educational background. This will give us depth in some of these mission areas where it is very critical that we maintain a high level of mission-capable people. This type of organization would be unique to the Guard in that the unit itself wouldn't have a unit mission, but the individuals would have individual missions."

NGR: "It would seem that this new organization would need to be jointly operated by the Air and Army National Guard. Is that part of the planning process?"

OATES: "I think that observation is spot on. I would like it to be a purple unit. It gets a little more complicated meeting administrative requirements for professional development and recruiting, but I think that there are missions in Alaska that could be done by either service. I would like to see us evolve into more of a purple organization, both at the headquarters level and in some of the unit mission areas. Right now, however, the reality is that we are much more service-specific in how we are organized."

NGR: "When we last spoke, you mentioned that at some point in time you would like to modernize the 210th Rescue Squadron with CV-22s. Given the challenges that program is facing, is the CV-22 still on your radar screen as far as a possible candidate for modernizing your CSAR unit?"

OATES: "Yes. The program has run into trouble lately, but I think that the Marine Corps' efforts are slowly working. The important thing in the National Guard, however, is that you must maintain the same equipment

that the active duty forces have. If Air Force transitions to the CV-22 platform for its combat search and rescue units, then it is very, very important that we go hand in hand with them. I think we need to get this program back on track. I think we need to see the Marine Corps work through the problems with the program. Once that has been accomplished, I am absolutely interested in being the earliest National Guard unit to have CV-22s as part of our search and rescue mission. Again though, we only want go in that direction if it's the direction the active Air Force goes with its combat search and rescue."

NGR: "It's no great secret that many Army National Guard aviation units are facing serious equipment readiness issues. Has the ongoing modernization crisis affected the Alaska Army National Guard?"

OATES: "Well we are very fortunate here in that we have had great support in the National Guard and in Congress to maintain a modern and ready Army aviation fleet. Our unit has the UH-60L models that are fairly modern, and we're still getting some new aircraft off the line.

We have done a lot of work to upgrade our equipment to enable our Army guardsmen to accomplish combat search and rescue. In fact, with Congressional support, the equipment on our UH-60L Black Hawks is probably the best in the conventional Army. We use this equipment on a daily basis. We have a state that, if superimposed over the lower forty-eight contiguous states, would stretch from Jacksonville, Florida to San Diego, California without a road network west of Kansas City and in most other areas. The Alaskan environment produces a high number of life saving missions. Our pilots fly in extreme weather conditions, over very unforgiving mountainous terrain. Because of that, not only does the State of Alaska benefit, but our Army has a force package up here that is extremely capable.

I realize that this is a rather unique situation [to the Army National Guard]. The Army tends to look at the National Guard as a mobilization force. And because the Active Army does not see us as a daily operational capability, they do not become as involved as the Air Force [does for the Air Guard] in fighting for our resources and assisting readiness.

In that respect, I think aviation is a great example of where the Army could be truly integrated. For example, if the Army put, say, 75% of the utility lift in the National Guard, they would then be more willing to resource us at a higher level because the Army Guard would be vital to them on a daily basis."

NGR: "Don't you think it would take an act of Congress to make such a drastic change in the status quo?"

OATES: "I think that sometimes Congress does have to get involved in these things. It took Goldwater-Nichols to fix many of the problems with the services and their officers becoming joint. I think it will take action in Congress to fix the resourcing problems I see in the Army National Guard."

NGR: "Is there anything else about the Alaska National Guard that is unique?"

OATES: "This year, we were successful in gaining approval for a state statute establishing a new General Officer position in our command structure. Alaska now is the only state to have an Assistant Adjutant General for Space and Missile Defense. We're awaiting approval from the National Guard Bureau to fill that traditional Guard position. I think space is a growing and important mission area for the National Guard as a whole. We have already talked about our evolving role in missile defense, our developing role in military launches, and things along these lines. As such, we felt that it would be prudent for us to establish a Brigadier General position to focus on this new mission." ■

A Total Force Integrator

An interview with General Joe Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Air Force General Joe Ralston is responsible for military operations that stretch from the tip of Norway to South Africa. He recently spoke with NGR about the role of the National Guard and Reserve in his theater.

NGR: "You have spoken of the need for the National Guard to be more 'seamlessly' integrated into operations with the active component. In practical terms, what does that mean?"

RALSTON: "Let me give you an example: On the air side, one of the things we do is test National Guard fighter squadrons to the same criteria as active ones. The active force gives that evaluation. Because of that, when I was the commander of Air Combat Command, I had National Guard F-16 squadrons, along with active F-16 squadrons that were both trained and tested by the same people. So, it was very easy when someone said 'I need an F-16 squadron.' I would say, 'Don't tell me you want an active-duty F-16 squadron, just tell me you need F-16s. Whatever I send you will be combat-ready.'"

"We need to make more progress in that regard on the Army side so that if you have an Army National Guard Transportation or Infantry company, they are tested to the same standards as an active unit. That way, we can fit them very easily into whatever situation we need to."

NGR: "How important is the National Guard to your day-to-day operations. If you didn't have the Guard available, what would that mean for operations in the European theater?"

RALSTON: "Well, it would mean a couple of things. First, the quality of our engagement activity would go down. Take Bosnia for example. If I have a National Guard division there, they have a lot of people that are highway patrolmen, municipal waterworks engineers, police, etc. As such, when an issue arises with the local population, we are able to find American soldiers with the expertise to help."

"Second, the [Guard's] numbers help me. I have got ninety-one countries with the European Command. Many of these countries have closer relationships with various states around the United States than they do with the U.S. Government. Lithuania and Pennsylvania immediately come to mind."

NGR: "So the State Partnership Program is a success?"

RALSTON: "The State Partnership Program is a home run. It has fostered strong relationships between states and countries with a somewhat common background. For example, it is

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easier for the state of Indiana to deal with Solvakia, not only because there are a lot of Slovaks that are settled in Indiana, but because they share common economic and social characteristics."

NGR: "Many leaders in the National Guard have looked at the transformation process and have concluded that they need to position their states to assume a greater role in future missions. Along these lines, some have expressed an interest in eventually acquiring airframes that are designed for missions such as strategic lift and special operations. The C-17 and CV-22 are the ones most often mentioned. If Guard units around the country were to acquire these capabilities, what would that mean for European Command?"

RALSTON: "We are always short of strategic lift. So the C-17 is a great program in terms of its reliability and responsiveness. Today, if I get strategic airlift, I don't know whether it's Guard, Reserve, or active duty. That's the strength of the system. That said, airlift is a job that the Guard has done very well. So if the Guard becomes more involved in the C-17 program, I would be in favor of it in terms of being able to get the responsiveness that comes with that aircraft. It is transparent to me as to who owns the airplane."

NGR: "There seems to be a broad-based agreement that the C-17 production line needs to be kept open with an additional buy of at least 60 aircraft. With the past success of the C-17, and the stated need for more aircraft from people such as yourself, why is it taking the Air Force so long to move forward on an additional buy?"

RALSTON: "Any change is hard. The reality is that I think the Air Force will buy more C-17s. I am confident that in the end, the nation will do the right thing. But the bureaucratic processes are slow. Everybody wants to see what will happen with the QDR. That's another excuse to avoid change. In the end, though, it'll be okay."

NGR: " Do you think that the total force needs more special operations capabilities?"

RALSTON: "Our special operations forces are the most heavily used units we have. They are always on the go. I can't say how many special ops units I truly need, but I can say that I am fully using the ones I have in EUCOM."

"Getting back to your question about CV-22, the European theater is a big theater. When you talk about going from the tip of Norway to the southern tip of South Africa, that's an enormous distance. The CV-22 would be enormously helpful for almost anything we do in Africa, for instance, because of its speed, its ability to self-deploy, and its long range. Now I am not going to get in to the acquisition side of it, but terms of its capability, it would be a great asset."

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MG Allen Tackett Strategy for Success

Interview By Zac Northup

Nearly five years ago, MG Allen **Tackett** *granted a new publication, National Guard Review, its first Adjutant General interview. Since that time, he has helped guide the West Virginia National Guard through several important events.* **NGR** *sat down with* **Tackett** *to discuss some of these successes.*

NGR: "Throughout the country, the National Guard has become heavily involved in various counter-drug missions. How have these programs faired in West Virginia?"

TACKETT: "I am very proud of both our counter-drug and our drug demand reduction programs here in West Virginia. We have taken it from what was really just a token presence to a very effective program. We have been extremely successful in the eradication of marijuana and continue to work with all the various state and federal agencies in West Virginia. Through these efforts, we have helped increase the number of arrests and convictions by providing some of the support that law enforcement agencies need."

NGR: "An armored battalion from West Virginia is said to be preparing to become affiliated with an enhanced brigade. What will this mean for the West Virginia National Guard?"

TACKETT: "We are certainly looking at that option. Rather than being a battalion in the 28th Division, we are looking at becoming part of the enhanced brigade in North Carolina. The benefits of that would be that our armored battalion would become a high priority unit. That would translate to increased full-time manning, increased OPTEMPO dollars, and would give us the dollars we need to train the organization the way it should be trained. So we are certainly looking at the possibility of putting our battalion into an enhanced brigade."

NGR: "West Virginia also has an artillery battalion that has a reputation for being particularly strong. Are there any plans to try to affiliate that unit with an enhanced brigade?"

TACKETT: "The 201st Field Artillery Battalion is already a high priority unit. In fact, it is one of the highest priority units in the nation. It deployed during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and did an outstanding job. They already have the M109A6 Palladin. One interesting bit of information though, is that, if the Crusader comes online, the 201st is supposed to be the first artillery battalion in the nation – both active and reserve – to be upgraded. It will actually be the test battalion if that system makes it through the QDR."

NGR: "What does the future hold for the West Virginia Air National Guard?"

TACKETT: "Until the QDR is completed and the new administration gives their roadmap for the future, everything we had planned in the past is now on hold. The last administration had made the decision to support a change in mission for the 167th Air Wing in Martinsburg. I think the Air Force still supports that, but it just depends on what the QDR recommends."

NGR: "As an Adjutant General, what kind of input do you have in the National Guard's QDR policy development?"

TACKETT:"The Adjutant's General Association has had several meetings this year to discuss the QDR. National Guard Bureau has people who are involved daily in the QDR process. These people keep us informed as to how the process is moving along. If we think things are not going forward in the way they should, then we have meetings where all the Adjutants General can have input. We try to come out of those meetings united about the requirements we have to address at both the state and federal levels." ■

M2A2 Operation Desert Storm Bradley

M88A2 HERCULES

M109A6 Paladin/M992A2 FAASV

M9 ACE

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