

SCOMM

123:10

RESPONSE PLANNING STANDARD WORK GROUP

Co-chairs: Gene Burden, Lee Egland, John Hansen

Meeting on September 6, 2000

Anchorage Legislative Information Office

9:30 a.m. to noon and 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

DRAFT AGENDA

GOAL: Determine how to achieve the response planning standard for
(a) affected nontank vessels and
(b) trains carrying oil.

1. Recommendations from RPS Work Group on Alaska Railroad 8/30/00
 - Endorse Risk Assessment process
 - Complete RPS methodology
 - Undertake C-plan review under existing law
 - Undertake Prevention plan review under existing law
 - Alaska Railroad report to Task Force at October meeting
2. DEC review of federal and state response planning and contingency plans
 - Explanation of current roles and responsibilities
 - Short version of "Response 101"
 - Briefing on major response elements of contingency plans
3. Primary Response Action Contractor briefing on response capabilities
4. Discuss "strawman" proposal for how RPS can be met by non-tank vessels
 - Resources - equipment, people, process
 - Review generic spill scenarios in subarea plans
 - Adopt recommendations for Task Force action
5. Review status of vessel data with focus on Regions 5-9
 - Determine form of report to Task Force on 9/20
6. Briefing on Marine Exchange Alaska
7. Decide on any other recommendations to Task Force
8. Future Issues
 - Determine if RPS Work Group needs an additional meeting to complete its work
 - Discussion of participation by Regional Citizens Advisory Councils in development of contingency plans - at Task Force meeting 9/20



LEGISLATIVE TELECONFERENCE NETWORK

SIGN-IN SHEET

10913

PLEASE PRINT

SPONSOR: Motorized Oil Transport TF

SUBJECT: Motorized Oil Transport

START/END TIME: 9:30 DATE: 9-6-00

	Name/Representing	Address	Zip	Phone No.	Testify	Observe	Bill No.
1.	Buzz Rome	CISPRI, Box 7314, NIKISKI	99635	776-5129		✓	
2.	Scott Carter	AK NITROGEN PRODUCTS	99611	776-3280			
3.	LURELLA LEE Trident Seafoods	5303 Shilshole Ave, NW, Seattle, WA 98107	98107	206-783-3818			
4.	Tim Robertson	PO Box 175, Seldovia	99663	234-7821			
5.	DAVID OWINGS	SEAPRO, KTN.	99901	225-7002			
6.	LEE EGLAND	PO Box 2287 SEATTLE WA	98111	206-340-8941			
7.	Breck Tostevin	Dip 28 Law, 1031 4th Ave	99501	269-5274			
8.	Susan Harvey	DEC Anch AK		269-3054			
9.	Don Rogowski	" "	99501	269-7540			
10.	SIMON LISIECKI	BT Shipping		564-5815			
11.	PAULA AXELSON	UPMI Box 8090 KTN, AK	99901	225-2200			
12.	BOB BERTO	CRUISE LINE AGENCIES of AK	99901	225-0999		✓	
13.	Rory Dabney	CIRCAE, 910 Highland Ave, Kona	99611	283-7222			
14.	BOB HEAVILIN	AK CHADUX CDRD 721 W. 13th AV	99501	278-3365			
15.	Tom Rueter NORTH STAR	PO Box 102019 ANCH	99510	272-7537			



LEGISLATIVE TELECONFERENCE NETWORK SIGN-IN SHEET

SPONSOR: _____

SUBJECT: _____

START/END TIME: _____ DATE: _____

PLEASE PRINT

	Name/Representing	Address	Zip	Phone No.	Testify	Observe	Bill No.
1.	LARRY IWAMOTO ADEC	555 CORDOVA ST ANCH, AK	99501	269-7683		✓	
2.	TERRY MURPHY CHADUX	221 W 1ST AVE ANCH AK	99501	278 3301		✓	
3.	Doug Lentsch CISPRI	Box 7314 NIKISKI AK	99635	776-5129			
4.	JIM CARTER CIRCAK	910 HIGHLAND DR	99611	283-7222			
5.	Jeff GINALINS ARRC			265-2535			
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.							
12.							
13.							
14.							
15.							

Figure A-1: ALASKA ICS STRUCTURE FOR OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RELEASES


KEY:

 Activities not directly associated with the response

 Indicates direct coordination

 Indicates indirect coordination

* = other potential options



- UNIFIED RESPONSE ORGN (ICS)
- PLANNING/RESPONSE BOUNDARIES
- FUNDING GUIDANCE
- ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE/PERMITS
- PUBLIC INFORMATION/AFFAIRS
- WILDLIFE PROTECTION GUIDELINES
- STATEWIDE RESOURCES
- HEALTH, SAFETY & TRAINING
- DISPERSANTS, IN SITU BURNING
- RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE
- HAZMAT RESPONSE

UNIFIED PLAN

- ID FACILITIES, ROUTES, AND AT-RISK FACILITIES
- EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES
- CEC & FEC DESIGNATION
- NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
- EMERGENCY EQPT & FACILITIES
- EVACUATION PLANS
- ICS SYSTEM
- TRAINING & EXERCISES
- RELEASE DETERMINATION/AFFECTED AREA

LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

LOCAL

FEDERAL/
STATE

COORDINATED
RESPONSE

INDUSTRY

- LOCAL AREA DESCRIPTION
- LOCAL RESPONSE SYSTEM/ORGN
- AREA ASSESSMENTS
- RESPONSE SCENARIOS
- LOCAL RESOURCES
- EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS
- RESPONSE CHECKLISTS
- HAZMAT RESPONSE
- SENSITIVE AREAS ANNEX

SUBAREA PLANS

- RESPONSE ACTION PLAN
 - NOTIFICATION & REPORTING
 - SAFETY, COMMUNICATIONS
 - DEPLOYMENT/RESPONSE STRATEGIES
- PREVENTION PLAN
- SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
 - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, EQUIPMENT
 - COMMAND SYSTEM
 - SENSITIVE AREAS PROTECTION

FACILITY/VESSEL C-PLANS

What is SEAPRO?

SEAPRO is an industry funded non-profit oil spill response cooperative that provides training, planning and spill response services to the regulated community in Southeast Alaska from Dixon Entrance to Yakutat. The following companies are members of SEAPRO:

Alaska Marine Lines
Alaska Ship & Dry Dock
Anderes Oil Company, Inc
Annette Island Gas Service
Boyer Towing
Coeur Alaska, Inc.
Columbia Helicopters, Inc
Crowley Marine Services
Delta Western
Dutch Harbor Seafoods
Elfin Cove Fuels
Gateway Forest Products
Gildersleeve Logging, Inc
Greens Creek Mining Co
Haida Corporation
Island Tug & Barge
Kake Tribal Corporation
Ketchikan Public Utilities
Ketchikan Pulp Company
Metlakatla Power & Light

National Park Service
Newport Petroleum
Petro Alaska
Petro Marine Services
Rayonier Incorporated
Samson Tug & Barge
Sea Coast Towing
Sealaska Corporation
Silver Bay Logging
Sitka Fuels
Southcoast, Inc
Southeast Stevedoring
Taku Oil Sales, Inc
Tlingit Haida Regional Electric Authority
Tesoro Alaska Petroleum
Wards Cove Packing
Western Pioneer Shipping
Wrangell Oil
Yutana Barge Lines

Southeast Alaska Zones

SEAPRO has broken Southeast Alaska into nine different zones for the purposes of pre-staging equipment and resources for spill response. The zones are identified as follows:

- Zone 1: Ketchikan and Metlakatla
- Zone 2: Craig and Klawock
- Zone 3: Wrangell and Petersburg
- Zone 4: Kake
- Zone 5: Sitka
- Zone 6: Elfin Cove, Gustavus (Glacier Bay) and Pelican
- Zone 7: Juneau
- Zone 8: Haines and Skagway
- Zone 9: Yakutat

SEAPRO ZONE MAP
SEAPRO Member Company
*Locations are illustrated for
Each zone in Section 3.10.1,
Starting on page 10.*

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Starting on page 10.

SEAPRO Staffing

SEAPRO has a full time staff of five who run the corporation during its day-to-day activities. Each staff member has specific responsibilities during a response that fall under the different sections of the Incident Command System. Following is a list of SEAPRO full-time staff positions.

- General Manager
- Operations Manager
- Planning Manager
- Training & Safety Manager
- Response Team Administrator (Logistics/Finance)

Response Personnel come from the Response Teams we have organized and trained in each of the nine SEAPRO zones. Team Members are individuals who live and work in the various communities of Southeast Alaska. SEAPRO began its Response Team Program in 1997 and currently we have approximately 240 Responders.

SEAPRO provides all required Training for its Response Team Personnel. Training includes an OSHA 24-Hour Hazwoper Course and specialized Oil Spill Response Team Training. Response Team Training ensures that personnel are able to safely and efficiently deploy and operate SEAPRO's equipment. Personal Protective Equipment for Response Team Members is pre-staged with SEAPRO's Response Equipment throughout Southeast Alaska. This ensures that personnel responding to a spill are properly protected against chemical and physical hazards.

SEAPRO Programs

Spill Response Teams

SEAPRO's Oil Spill Response Team provides a rapid response for a spill in Southeast Alaska.

Spill Management Team

SEAPRO's Spill Management Team is comprised of SEAPRO Staff, Member Company Personnel and Response Team Leaders who have been through specialized ICS Training.

Wildlife Response Teams

Wildlife Response Teams are made up of individuals who have completed specialized training dealing with wildlife that may be/has been impacted by an oil spill. Depending on the location of a spill, time of year and product(s) spilled, wildlife considerations may be a major component of a response

SEAPRO Projects

SEAPRO has several major projects underway. Following is a brief overview of them:

ESI Project

Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) Mapping Project for Southeast Alaska was begun by NOAA in 1992 but not completed. Nature of the project is to perform an aerial survey of all shorelines in S.E. Alaska and index them as to their sensitivity to oiling. Biological resources (wildlife populations and habitats) are also identified.

SEAPRO is facilitating and partially financing the project's completion with additional financing and services in kind from state and federal agencies and organizations (ADEC, USFS, National Park Service (Glacier Bay), NOAA, USCG and the Civil Air Patrol). The final survey overflights were completed earlier this week and product deliverables (in ArcInfo and ArcView formats as well as hardcopy maps) are expected on or before the end of next year.

Unified Plan

Revised version to be renamed "SEAPRO Technical Manual".

Scheduled for submittal to ADEC for review on September 9th. Following any revisions required by ADEC, the report will be put on CD ROMs and distributed to SEAPRO member companies, USCG and others. Eventually, SEAPRO plans to put the Technical Manual on its web site for instant access and instant updating.

The primary purpose of the Manual is to support the contingency plans prepared by SEAPRO member companies. Specifically, SEAPRO has designed its scenarios to reflect clearly and fully its resources and capabilities in terms of a response anywhere in Southeast Alaska, at any time of year, for either a vessel or facility discharge. By so doing, each member company will then need only describe its own facility, vessel and emergency response plans up to the time SEAPRO arrives to assist. The balance of the member's scenario can then be satisfied by SEAPRO's Technical Manual and its lists of equipment, responders, training, safety protocols, ICS structure, communications systems and plans, wildlife, decon and disposal plans, all of which can be incorporated by reference into the member's plan. The benefits are multiple: the plan reviewer only has to read SEAPRO's plan once and the member company contingency plan is much shorter. Additionally, plan preparation time is substantially reduced for SEAPRO members because they are just describing their own plans, facilities and equipment, and no longer have to include what SEAPRO has in its plan.

SEAPRO Equipment Descriptions and Locations

Zone 1 – Ketchikan and Metlakatla

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	4,000'	20" Containment Boom
Boom	820'	20" Inflatable Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Aquaguard Drum/Brush
Skimmer	1	Horizontal Rope Mop
Skimmer	2	Foilex Skimming Systems
Skimmer	1	LORI Brush Skimmer
Storage	1	1,200 gallon Fastank
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	4,200 gallon bladder
Storage	1	6,000 gallon bladder
Storage	2	26,500 gallon bladder
Storage	2	265,000 gallon bladder
Storage	2	10,458 gallon Response Barge

Zone 2 – Craig and Klawock

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Action Drum Skimmer
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	3,300 gallon bladder

Zone 3 – Wrangell and Petersburg

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Action Drum Skimmer
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	3,000 gallon bladder
Storage	1	4,200 gallon bladder

Zone 4 – Kake

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Action Drum Skimmer
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	4,200 gallon bladder

Zone 5 – Sitka

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	7,000'	20" Containment Boom
Boom	820'	20" Inflatable Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Aquaguard Brush/Drum
Skimmer	1	Foilex Skimming System
Storage	1	3,300 gallon bladder
Storage	1	25,600 gallon bladder
Storage	1	265,000 gallon bladder
Wildlife Care & Rehab	1	Wildlife Care Facility

Glacier Bay

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	LORI Brush Skimmer
Skimmer	1	Hyde AD1 Light Oil Skimmer
Storage	2	10,458 gallon Response Barge
Vessel	1	21' Response Skiff

Zone 6 – Elfin Cove and Pelican

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	1,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Horizontal Rope Mop
Storage	1	1,000 portable tank
Storage	1	4,200 gallon bladder

Zone 7 – Juneau

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	5,200'	20" Containment Boom
Boom	820'	20" Inflatable Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Komara Disc Skimmer
Skimmer	1	LORI Brush Skimmer
Skimmer	1	Horizontal Rope Mop
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	3,300 gallon bladder
Storage	1	6,000 gallon bladder
Storage	2	10,458 gallon Response Barge

Zone 8 – Haines and Skagway

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Foam Filled Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Horizontal Rope Mop
Skimmer	1	Action Drum Skimmer
Skimmer	1	LORI Brush Skimmer
Storage	2	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	4,200 gallon bladder
Storage	2	10,458 gallon Response Barge

Zone 9 – Yakutat

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	2,000'	20" Containment Boom
Skimmer	1	Horizontal Rope Mop
Storage	1	1,000 gallon portable tank
Storage	1	6,000 gallon bladder

SEAPRO Equipment – From the Haines Nearshore Project

SEAPRO has worked with the Borough of Haines in the development of a Nearshore Response Project. This project uses state funds to purchase spill response equipment. Following is a list of major equipment approved for purchase under this program. This equipment will be located on a Response Barge in the Haines area. These assets will be available for use during a response.

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	3,000'	Ro-Boom 1000
Vessel	2	21' Response Skiff

SEAPRO Equipment – From the RCCL Settlement

As a result of a settlement between the State of Alaska and Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, a 2.1 million dollar donation of oil spill response equipment is being made to an oil spill response cooperative in Southeast Alaska. SEAPRO has been working with the State of Alaska, the U.S. Coast Guard and Royal Caribbean to finalize a list of equipment. The following list represents the approved list of major equipment to be purchased under this settlement. These assets will be available for use during a response.

Item	Quantity	Description
Boom	1,000'	Ro-Boom Beach Shore Seal Boom
Boom	2,000'	Ro-Boom 1000
Skimmer	1	LORI HK-3 Skimmer
Skimmer	2	Marco Sidewinder Skimming System
Storage	1	10,458 gallon Response Barge
Vessel	2	48' Response Vessel with Integrated LORI Side Skimmers
Vessel	7	21' Response Skiff
Wildlife Care & Rehab	1	Wildlife Care Facility



LTNS Announcements and Messages

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Announcements

[10913](#) 9/6/00 9:10 AM

ANN: In Progress.bbn

[10923](#) 9/6/00 8:13 AM

ANN: announced. pw

Messages

[10913](#) 9/6/00 10:17 AM

ALL: just gregg erickson and deborah vogt in juneau. got your fax. pw

9/6/00 9:13 AM



ALL: The committee is gathering in Anchorage. Send your parts list asap. Thanks. bbn/anc



ARRT Website

- ***Unified Plan***
- ***Subarea Plans***
- ***AIMS Guide***
- ***Wildlife Protection Guidelines***

<http://www.akrrt.org/plans.html>

Pertinent Definitions:

Worst Case Discharge:

In the case of a vessel, a discharge in adverse weather conditions of its entire cargo. (CWA, Section 311(a)(24))

Maximum Most Probable Discharge:

The maximum most probable discharge scenario in most cases will be based on the largest recorded spill size for the area. The maximum most probable discharge will take into account such factors as the size of the largest recorded spill, traffic flow through the area, hazard assessment, risk assessment, seasonal considerations, spill histories and operating records of facilities and vessels in the area. (COMDTNOTE 16471M, 30 Sep 92)

Average Most Probable Discharge:

The most probable discharge scenario is based on the size of the average spill in the area. (COMDTNOTE 16471M, 30 Sep 92)

SCENARIOS: PART ONE - MAXIMUM MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE

Situation. In the early morning hours of March 15, a severe windstorm parts the mooring lines of M/V LOGSHIP, which is anchored in Kazakof Bay near the Silver Bay Logging Camp on Afognak Island. While attempting to get underway, the vessel is pushed onto the rocks. At 0300 Air Station Kodiak receives notification via VHF from the vessel's master. The master states that the hull has come into contact with the rocks, but the extent of damage is uncertain. The master feels that the vessel is not in danger of sinking and is not taking on water in any of the manned spaces.

Vessel particulars:

M/V LOGSHIP

Flag: Korean

Owner: Korean Lumber Corp., Inc.

Agent: North Pacific Maritime, Ketchikan

Status: 40% loaded with logs for Japan

Fuel: 150,000 gallons Bunker fuel

Tank configuration: unknown

Weather: winds are initially 50 mph with gusts to 90 mph. Winds diminish as the day progresses. Skies are clear with no precipitation.

Tides: Highs - 3:02 a.m., 8.6 feet and 3:15 p.m., 8.2 feet

Lows - 9:07 a.m., 0.6 feet and 9:16 p.m., 0.7 feet

Sunrise: 7:12 a.m.; Sunset 6:11 p.m.

Hour 0-9*: Initial Response Team (0300 to 1200)

*Note: For this scenario, the initial response team extends until hour 9, instead of hour 6 as indicated in the ramp up section, because the spill is discovered after dark and little action occurs until sunrise.

Notifications. Upon notification, Air Station Kodiak notifies MSD Kodiak, which then notifies MSO Anchorage. An initial command center is started in Anchorage at 0500, with plans to move the command center to Kodiak sometime in the afternoon. MSD Kodiak notifies the Kodiak Police Department and the police dispatch notifies the Kodiak Emergency Services Director and other local responders. MSO Anchorage notifies ADEC and federal stakeholders. Once notified, ADEC begins to notify other state agencies (ADNR, ADF&G, DES).

Initial Response Actions.

MSD Kodiak requests immediate transportation via USCG helicopter to the vessel with plans to set up a forward command post at the logging camp or onboard the vessel. The exact location will be determined once the MSD party arrives on-scene.

Within ADEC, response personnel communicate with natural resource trustee agency leadership to identify response priorities for booming and containment.

MSD Kodiak response personnel arrive on-scene at 0600 via USCG helicopter, advise the vessel master of the legal responsibilities for spill response, and instruct the vessel master to continually sound his tanks to check whether any oil has begun to leak. On-scene weather is high winds (steady at 40 mph with gusts to 80 mph). Skies are dark but begin to lighten by 0630. MSD Kodiak personnel are initially unable to visually detect a sheen. However, tanks are sounded and determined to be leaking bunker fuel. By hour 6, a sheen is visible.

Locally, in Kodiak, response personnel (at the direction of the Emergency Services Council) work to ensure that mechanisms are in place to prioritize protection of locally-important resources. Local responders (KIB) work to ensure that state agency protection priorities are aligned with those of the local community. The Borough or the ESC contact the City of Ouzinkie to notify them of the situation and to discuss protection of subsistence areas.

ADEC has one Environmental Health person located in Kodiak, and he is dispatched to the scene until ADEC spill response personnel arrive.

Command Center Establishment. The Incident Command will start to form in Anchorage, with plans to move the command center to Kodiak if the situation warrants. The KIB Assembly Chambers is selected as the site for the command center, if and when it is moved to Kodiak. Borough personnel begin to assemble the resources necessary to set up operations at the command center, such as telephones, fax machines, computers, and other office equipment. The Borough communications trailer is set up to enhance communications. The command center is designed to accommodate approximately 50 people, although not all of them will work out of the Assembly Chambers. The LOSC will also begin to consider alternate locations for a long-term command center, should the response run for a period of several weeks or months. The Resources Section of the KSCP and the Communications Plan in the Resources Section outline office and communications equipment needs for the command center, and these lists will be used as a guideline in setting up the command center in Kodiak.

A forward command post is also established near the spill site as a headquarters for on scene response personnel. The forward command post is established at the logging camp on Afognak (Silver Bay Logging). Initial response personnel, consisting of MSD Kodiak and additional Coast Guard responders, agree that it is a priority to establish a communications link between the forward command post and the command center as early as possible. This is initially accomplished by using the telephones at the logging camp.

ICS Mobilization. By 0800, the ICS begins to form as additional personnel are called on-scene (transported via USCG helicopters) and to the command center. Agency involvement is still limited primarily to ADEC and the USCG. MSO Anchorage has already set up an IC, which is being moved to a command center in Kodiak.

By approximately 0900, the KIB had been notified of the situation and of the need to establish a command center in Kodiak. The Emergency Services Director calls an Emergency Services Council meeting. The ESC is the policy-making board for emergency response in Kodiak, and the only ones with the authority to reassign personnel during an emergency response. The Emergency Services Director (LOSC) contacts Kitoy Bay Hatchery and the City of Ouzinkie regarding equipment mobilization, and the LOSC begins to work on identifying sensitive areas in cooperation with ADF&G and USFWS.

The Coast Guard sends a C-130 to Anchorage to transport USCG personnel, leaving only a skeleton crew at MSO Anchorage to answer phones, etc. One or two command-level people also remain in Anchorage. Other USCG personnel continue working with KIB to set up the command center in Kodiak and mobilize resources. The FOSC begins mobilizing members of the Pacific Strike Team from CA with bunker fuel response equipment. The strike team responds with approximately 6 people, and they will arrive on-scene with most of the necessary equipment and resources to conduct all vessel lightering operations. The strike team will arrive in their own C-130 around sunset.

Staging Areas. Shoreline areas near the logging camp and spill are designated for use as staging areas. Because of the high winds, response equipment (boom, etc.) which arrives on-scene via helicopter will not be deployed immediately. Until the conditions die down, this equipment will be staged in a shoreline area accessible to both helos and landing craft. An equipment check-in point is established at the staging area to track equipment and staffed with USCG personnel. MSD Kodiak response personnel or the LOSC contact the logging camp and request use of the logging camp's oil spill response equipment. They also request personnel support (primarily administrative and organizational) from the logging camp until additional responders arrive on-scene. The SOSC agrees to allow the logging camp to release equipment as necessary. The logging camp releases its equipment, but the Silver Bay containment boom and sorbents are determined to be of limited value to this spill response as it is designed for diesel/gasoline spills, and this incident involves Bunker "C" oil, which is not easily contained by boom.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. Weather conditions (primarily winds) are too severe during hours 0-9 to consider deploying equipment. The FOSC recognizes that the RP does not have the resources to respond to the spill and initiates the necessary paperwork to release and mobilize federal resources to supplement the response, thus federalizing the spill response. A federal project number is assigned in order to fund response operations. Responders begin to mobilize equipment from the USCG base and Anchorage, in anticipation of calmer seas. The petty officer at MSD Kodiak acquires as much containment boom as is locally available, and will begin loading this equipment on Coast Guard helicopters as soon as the winds die down to a safe level. The MSD staff is also beginning to call for USCG boats to deploy the boom as soon as the weather abates.

The LOSC contacts the state (ADEC) to get permission to mobilize the KIB-owned equipment staged in Ouzinkie by activating the response agreement with Ouzinkie. Permission is obtained and the Ouzinkie spill response equipment is mobilized to the staging area at the logging camp using local fishing vessels and skiffs from Ouzinkie. Because the Ouzinkie equipment is owned by the KIB, it may be released by the LOSC without initiating additional contracts. The equipment packages fit onto most fishing vessels. The on-scene coordinators also contact CISPRI and initiate a contract to use CISPRI resources. CISPRI gets approval from its Board of Directors to release equipment for the non-member, and then begins to mobilize resources. CISPRI personnel explain to the government response agencies that some of their equipment may not be as effective in responding to this spill, because Bunker C fuel differs in chemical and physical properties from other crude and non-persistent oils, which are more commonly transported by CISPRI members.

CISPRI mobilizes their response vessel, the BANDA SEAHORSE, within an hour of approval, and begins to transport additional response equipment via aircraft. The Unified Command contacts SERVS in order to initiate contracts with local response vessels. The LOSC begins to implement a volunteer action plan to coordinate volunteers as they arrive on-scene.

Hour 9-96: Transitional Response Team

Weather: Winds are diminishing and by Hour 12, they have decreased to 25 knots.

Quantity of oil spilled: Still unknown. Tanks are definitely leaking bunker fuel. Vessel is stable and in no immediate threat of sinking. By hour 12, the oil has traveled almost as far as the Triplets Islands (see attached trajectory).

On-Scene Response. By approximately noon (hour 9), we start to see increased activity and equipment mobilization. At this point, the MSD Kodiak responder is the sole FOSC representative on-scene in Afognak. No other state or federal agencies have arrived on scene yet, and there are no other vessels on scene.

USCG personnel request that the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator develop a spill trajectory. Although the amount of spilled oil is still uncertain and weather conditions are dynamic, a reasonable trajectory is completed by 1200, based on information gathered since 0500. (See spill trajectory attached)

Borough personnel will provide assistance with setting up the command center, providing logistical support, office space, communications equipment, and other locally available resources. The LOSC and borough personnel also begin to look for a backup location for the command center to be moved as the response continues over the long term. The local government (KIB) sets up a public information center in town at the Kodiak Library to address public concerns. The Coast Guard also has their own Public Affairs people who begin to work on public outreach and coordinate media coverage. During the first few days of the response, several different public information outlets may be established. However, as the ICS forms, a joint information center with federal, state and local public affairs representatives will be formed.

By 1200, ADFG begins to coordinate their efforts with other natural resource agencies and the local government/community to identify sensitive areas at risk.

By 1200, ADEC personnel have attempted to contact the Responsible Party's Protection & Indemnity club, begun to ramp up state resources, and continued to contact other state agencies. ADEC assigns response personnel to ICS positions, mostly into the planning section, some with some assigned to operations. ADEC tries to include ADFG and ADNR representatives with ADEC personnel on the initial flight to Kodiak and begin to deploy on-scene.

As they arrive at the command center, ADEC personnel begin to formulate a Sitrep, which is the situation report sent by ADEC to the other state resource agencies, federal agencies, and Juneau ADEC office, summarizing state actions so far. The ADEC public information office

in Juneau uses the Sitrep to develop an initial press release. The Coast Guard will generate a POLREP, which is also a situation report, for essentially the same purposes as ADEC's Sitrep.

Early in the response (by hour 12, 1500) the Unified Command contracts with an archaeologist, because there are several important historical sites adjacent to the spill, such as Monk's Lagoon. The LOSC suggests that the Alutiiq museum may be able to provide the necessary expertise. The Unified Command also initiates contracts with wildlife response organizations and other specialists in order to mount an effective response.

By 1600 - 1800, as flying conditions improve and it becomes easier to transport people and equipment (helos can land), ADEC responders (with possibly one or two ADFG/USFWS responders) begin to arrive on-scene (logging camp on Afognak Island) to initiate containment and response activities and to identify wildlife protection priorities. Volunteer responders arriving on-scene in vessels are directed by the LOSC to work through the volunteer coordination center in Kodiak. Two CG helicopters are used to transport personnel and equipment, which continues in earnest between 1600 and 1800. By 1800, one helicopter full of ADEC responders (6-10) has landed, and several loads of equipment, including light sets, portable generators and other support equipment have arrived on-scene. The initial ADEC team brings a "crash kit" of office and planning supplies, laptop computers, and other office equipment, and they also bring their own PPE, mustang suits, etc. The limited support equipment which arrives in the helicopters is used to set up a forward command post, and oil spill response equipment is stored at the staging area overnight. Due to the large amount of equipment being mobilized, several trips between Kodiak and the staging area are required. Equipment transport is prioritized according to the needs on-scene, with operational equipment such as boom, anchors and PPE prioritized over other support equipment. Coast Guard and privately contracted vessels are also used to transport equipment to the scene. Transit time from Kodiak is approximately 12 hours, but these vessels are able to operate after dark (when USCG helicopters are no longer flying.)

As the weather calms and the response proceeds (Day 2), additional personnel begin to arrive on-scene. The Kodiak USCG air station continues to provide the primary logistics support for transporting and staging equipment. The USCG VOSS system and additional oil spill response equipment from the MSD Kodiak and other commercial/industry sources in Kodiak is transported on-scene from MSD Kodiak on a CG cutter, which arrives in Kazakof Bay by 2200 .

By daybreak on Day 2, ADEC has begun to make logistical arrangements to transport personnel and resources from Anchorage. As ADEC and other agency personnel arrive on-scene and in Kodiak, the command center in Kodiak is beginning to come together and the ICS continues to form and expand.

By 1800, the response has begun to coalesce and the ICS continues to expand. An initial incident action plan has been developed. At this point, Ouzinkie community members are anxious to begin deploying response equipment to protect local streams and subsistence use areas. However, due to the sustained winds and dwindling daylight hours, the Unified Command decides to delay boom deployment until dawn.

Once the command center is up and running, the ICS will continue to grow and specialize, with regular briefings and situation reports. As early as possible, the Public Information Officer(s) will work with communications and computer experts to establish an internet site to keep the public up-to-date on response activities, spill trajectory, and other situation specifics. The Unified Command web site established during the M/V KUROSHIMA spill was considered to be a public relations success and would be used as a model for future medium to large sized spills in the Kodiak Subarea.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. By hour 12 or so, there is approximately 3000 feet of boom available on-scene (KIB boom from Ouzinkie and boom from the logging camp) and ready to deploy as soon as the weather permits. Coast Guard buoy tenders back in Kodiak are being loaded with as much boom as is locally available and begin to travel to the scene. It will take about a half a day for the buoy tenders to arrive on-scene, and meanwhile USCG helicopters are bringing the MSD boom to the staging area. The vessels and helos will also be loaded with equipment such as PPE, which would be staged on the beach as it arrives. The winds do not die down until 1600 or so, and until this point it is not possible for a helicopter to land.

The FOSC may direct the RP to contract with SERVS or Chadux, both of whom train local fishing vessels for oil spill response. The LOSC will work with the RP and Unified Command to coordinate all volunteers arriving on-scene.

Equipment deployment does not commence until daybreak of the second day (hour 28); however by the afternoon of day 1, crews have begun to stage boom and other equipment at certain key shoreline locations which are accessible on the Kodiak road system. The KIB-owned equipment staged at Ouzinkie, as well as other containment boom maintained by the village are mobilized to be ready for deployment at first light. The City of Ouzinkie has approximately 3,000 to 4,000 feet of boom on hand, which will be used to boom the city harbor. There is another 3,000 feet of boom in the KIB equipment package staged at the village, which will also be used in the response, and MSD Kodiak is able to mobilize approximately 4,000 feet of boom as well by hour 18. Some of this KIB and MSD boom will be used to boom off the salmon streams near Ouzinkie, and the rest will be used to boom off the streams prioritized by the sensitive areas group (See Wildlife Response discussion).

Communications. At this point (hour 12), radio communications from Afognak to the command center in Kodiak are still complicated and not reliable. It will take a few days for a communications system to support the on-scene response to evolve, and in the meantime response personnel use VHF radios and Coast Guard high sites to communicate with the evolving command center. CISPRI has portable, self-contained communications units set up with a portable repeater, phone and fax, which can be sent to the scene with initial responders.

Wildlife Protection and Response. ADEC and the FOSC have both notified the appropriate Natural Resource Trustee Agencies. USFWS, ADNR, NMFS and ADFG wildlife experts begin to arrive at the command center with other ADEC personnel. The FOSC initiates contracts with seabird and sea mammal responders, including the WRRT (Wildlife Rapid Response Team from Homer), IBRRC (International Bird Rescue and Research Center), and International Wildlife Research (for sea otters & marine mammals). Arrival times for wildlife responders are estimated to be early afternoon of Day 2.

According to the trajectory, oil hits the Triplets by Hour 12 (1500), endangering a seabird colony in that area. Due to the high winds, the birds have congregated on the water in the lee of the island, and are therefore safe from the immediate impacts of the oil. Should the wind shift or die down, however, this population would remain in danger.

At this time of year, there are other populations feeding in the open water and they are also at risk of being oiled. Wildlife responders prepare to capture and treat oiled wildlife as sea and wind conditions die down, and undertake the necessary paperwork to obtain hazing and capture permits.

If local residents arrive on-scene (via private vessels) anxious to assist with wildlife protection and rescue, they are directed through the planning section (volunteer coordinator) to the contracted wildlife response groups. Volunteers are dissuaded from interfering with ongoing wildlife response operations.

As wildlife responders arrive on-scene with hazing kits and other support equipment, LOSC representatives assist them with logistical considerations as they set up a station at the forward command post. The logistics section works with wildlife responders to identify potential locations for wildlife collection, cleaning and rehab stations and the Incident Commander (FOSC) begins to direct the development of a disposal plan for any dead wildlife.

Once the weather has abated enough to begin boom deployment (morning of Day 2), Ouzinkie harbor and the nearby salmon streams are boomed (approximately 4,000 feet of boom total). USCG response equipment (approximately 10,000 ft. containment boom, sorbent material, a VOSS, and several small skiffs) from Kodiak arrived in Kazakof Bay via Coast Guard cutter the evening prior. Next, boom will be deployed at the Monashka Bay creeks (Monashka and Pillar Creeks), Island Lake Creek (if the surf is not too high), and the Buskin River, in that order. The next protection priorities identified are the lagoon on Long Island, the two lagoons on the backside of Spruce Island and, if threatened, the Women's Bay and Chiniak salmon streams, beginning with the Russian River and Sargent Creek and moving sequentially toward Chiniak. Monk's Lagoon would also be a protection priority for natural resource and historical reasons, and boom may be deployed there as well.

Because most of the salmon streams identified above are road accessible, land-based crews will deploy the boom at the bridges at each of these streams. While the mouths of the streams may not be protected with this strategy, it will allow for the greatest number of streams to be protected with a limited amount of boom (approximately 50 feet per stream). If the trajectory proves to be incorrect or if the wind shifts, booming strategies will be revised to protect additional areas at risk.

It is possible that the amount of oil which actually reaches as far as Monashka Bay or even the Chiniak salmon streams is extremely minimal, as much of the oil may accumulate on Spruce Island. However, even if the perceived risk is minimal, defensive booming of the salmon streams on the Kodiak road system will be carried out during day 2.

As the winds die down the next day (hour 28 and on), wildlife responders consider the viability of hazing threatened wildlife populations. This decision is made on a site-by-site basis, contingent upon a variety of considerations and supported by the necessary permits. The major

priorities for wildlife responders continue to be capturing and treating injured wildlife and collecting carcasses before they can be consumed by other animals.

By Hour 28-30, wildlife collection points have been established near the City of Kodiak harbor and also near the spill site. ADFG and USFWS biologists identify oiled carcasses and record the appropriate data before freezing or disposing of the animals. A disposal plan is coordinated with the local landfill, and freezer vans are set up at each of the collection points as well as at the landfill. If the number of dead animals exceeds the capacity of the landfill, arrangements will be made to dispose of the animals in alternate locations. Injured or oiled wildlife are handled by the contracted rehabilitation organizations according to their internal operating procedures. Wildlife responders may set up rehabilitation and cleaning stations in Kodiak, or they may arrange to transport oiled wildlife to Homer or Anchorage. Any sea otters killed by the oil will be necropsied before disposal.

Sensitive Areas Identification and Protection. As soon as it is apparent that oil is in the water (hour 6), the local government begins to consult with the Natural Resource Trustee Agencies regarding sensitive area protection priorities. It is likely, given the weather conditions, that no boom will be deployed until daybreak of the second day (hour 28), therefore these individuals consult the trajectory for hour 24 as they begin to identify protection priorities and sensitive areas at risk.

In recommending sensitive areas for protection, the local government and resource agencies use the prioritization scheme in the Sensitive Areas section of the KSCP, balancing natural resource population information with human use and subsistence considerations. The resource agencies provide information on marine mammal populations and rookeries, seabird concentrations, and shoreline sensitivity. Local residents and the local government provide input on human use, recreation, and subsistence areas.

While it seems certain that no boom will be deployed until at least day 2, protection priorities are pre-identified and submitted to the Operations Section by approximately hour 18 (2100 on Day 1). Depending upon how early these areas are identified, response equipment may be pre-positioned at those streams and shoreline areas which are road accessible.

The resource trustees and local government representatives determine that the most effective use of boom would be to deploy exclusionary and deflective boom at all the major road-accessible salmon streams downstream from the spill site. In addition to providing salmon habitat, these streams are identified as sensitive areas due to their recreational and subsistence use (because of proximity to road system). It is suggested that boom be deployed at the heads of bays but due to the high winds and rough seas, and the limited number of trained personnel, this option is tabled for reconsideration when the weather abates.

The local government indicates that it is a local priority to protect the area around Ouzinkie Narrows and to boom off the village harbor in order to protect the salmon stream it contains. There are two other salmon streams in the vicinity of Ouzinkie and they, too, are identified as booming priorities because of their high subsistence fishing use. The local government next identifies Monashka Bay as a protection priority, because it is an important recreational area and also a vulnerable tidal flat. Monashka Bay is selected as a protection priority, with emphasis on the two salmon streams it contains (Monashka Creek and Pillar Creek).

After Monashka Bay, the salmon stream in Mill Bay (Island Lake Creek) is identified as a booming priority, as long as the surf is not too high in Mill Bay. After that, booming priorities continue stream by stream moving toward Chiniak. Once all threatened salmon streams are protected, protection priorities will extend to entire beaches, with emphasis on areas that are commonly used for recreation or subsistence. Because of the potential for high surf at Mill Bay beach, it is designated as a potential collection area, depending on how much oil reaches that far down. Although it is terribly unpleasant to consider "sacrificing" a beach, it is apparent that Mill Bay is a natural collection beach and that it would be feasible to use the beach for collection purposes due to its easy road and vehicle access.

Based on the spill trajectory, Ugak Island is identified as a protection priority because it is a marine mammal haul out, although it may be a difficult area to protect because of deep water and rough surf.

Clean up and Recovery. From Day 2 (hour 28) on, as people arrive on scene and boom deployment is accomplished, the focus of the response will begin to switch from protection to oil removal and recovery. After the initial influx of containment boom and other initial response equipment, storage equipment is transported to the scene. Temporary storage bladders are transported from MSD Kodiak, and a local barge *Anna Lee* with a storage capacity of over 100,000 gallons, is contracted by the FOSC and dispatched to the scene (ETA sundown day 2). Recovery concerns will include protecting resources, and addressing issues such as lighterage and salvage. The Pacific Strike Team will be able to provide some lightering expertise. Navy SUPSALV should be consulted for salvage issues, or the RP may choose to contract with a private salvage company to remove the vessel from the rocks.

After Day 3 or so (hour 52), disposal will become an issue. Bunker oil is extremely problematic from a removal standpoint, as skimmers are not effective in separating bunker oil from water. Bunker C has the consistency of peanut butter or "flubber", and it is extremely hard to collect, load, and generally difficult to deal with. Oily wastes, debris and recovered bunker fuel are transported to Kodiak for disposal.

Mill Bay, Abercrombie Beach, or another shoreline with road access may be selected as a keeper/collection beaches because it is possible to get heavy equipment onto the beach for removal. Landing craft will bring oil and debris to the shore, where it will be loaded into dumpsters or totes and transported from the beach for ultimate disposal. The RP (Incident Commander) is responsible for developing and implementing a disposal plan which complies with existing local, state and federal laws and regulations. ADEC and the Kodiak Island Borough will oversee this process. Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Teams are organized and deployed to assess shoreline impacts and make recommendations regarding additional cleanup.

Personnel Considerations. Initially, lodging and food are provided by the Silver Bay Logging Camp and supplemented with supplies from Ouzinkie. The school at the logging camp is used for temporary lodging and to cook meals for responders.

Figure G-1: Spill Trajectory Hour 6



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 6


Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.



- UNIFIED RESPONSE ORGN (ICS)
- PLANNING/RESPONSE BOUNDARIES
- FUNDING GUIDANCE
- ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE/PERMITS
- PUBLIC INFORMATION/AFFAIRS
- WILDLIFE PROTECTION GUIDELINES
- STATEWIDE RESOURCES
- HEALTH, SAFETY & TRAINING
- DISPERSANTS, IN SITU BURNING
- RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE
- HAZMAT RESPONSE

UNIFIED PLAN

- ID FACILITIES, ROUTES, AND AT-RISK FACILITIES
- EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES
- CEC & FEC DESIGNATION
- NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
- EMERGENCY EQPT & FACILITIES
- EVACUATION PLANS
- ICS SYSTEM
- TRAINING & EXERCISES
- RELEASE DETERMINATION/AFFECTED AREA

LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

FEDERAL/
STATE

LOCAL

COORDINATED
RESPONSE

INDUSTRY

- LOCAL AREA DESCRIPTION
- LOCAL RESPONSE SYSTEM/ORGN
- AREA ASSESSMENTS
- RESPONSE SCENARIOS
- LOCAL RESOURCES
- EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS
- RESPONSE CHECKLISTS
- HAZMAT RESPONSE
- SENSITIVE AREAS ANNEX

SUBAREA PLANS

- RESPONSE ACTION PLAN
 - NOTIFICATION & REPORTING
 - SAFETY, COMMUNICATIONS
 - DEPLOYMENT/RESPONSE STRATEGIES
- PREVENTION PLAN
- SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
 - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, EQUIPMENT
 - COMMAND SYSTEM
 - SENSITIVE AREAS PROTECTION

FACILITY/VESSEL C-PLANS

Industry “C-Plans”

Oil Discharge Prevention & Contingency Plan

- ⇒ **Industry Specific**
- ⇒ **Site Specific**
- ⇒ **Addresses unique**
 - ⇒ **prevention**
 - ⇒ **response**
 - ⇒ **facility, vessel and corporate issues**

Goal: document and demonstrate sufficient resources to contain, clean-up and mitigate potential oil discharges and protect environmentally sensitive areas

C-Plan Contents (18 AAC 75.425)

PART 1 - Response Action Plan

PART 2 - Prevention Plan

PART 3 - Supplemental Information

PART 4 - Best Available Technology (BAT)

+ Financial Responsibility

C-Plan Contents (Proposed SB273 Vessels)

PART 1 -

Response Action Plan (RAP)

- ⇒ **Initial Notification (e.g. SOPEP)**
- ⇒ **Membership in Co-op (or equivalent capability)**
- ⇒ **Spill Management Capability**

PART 2 -

Prevention Plan by Rule

BAT

**potentially handle by updating RAP and
Prevention Rules every 3-5 years**

+ Financial Responsibility

Figure G-2: Spill Trajectory Hour 12



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 12

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) more complete information.




Figure G-3: Spill Trajectory Hour 24



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 24

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-4: Spill Trajectory Hour 48



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 48

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-5: Spill Trajectory Hour 72



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 72

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-6: Spill Trajectory Hour 96



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr. 96

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-7: Oil Budget Table

Oil Budget Table

ADIOS™ 1.1.3



Oil Name: FUEL OIL NO.6

API: 11.8

Pour Point: between 24.8 F and 59.0 F

Emulsification Const: 18% evaporated

Wind Speed: Constant at 50 kn

Wave Height: Default values

Water Temperature: 45 F

Instantaneous release of 150000 gal

*Insufficient emulsification data, answers may be inaccurate.

Time hours	Total Released gallons	Evaporated percent	Dispersed percent	Floating percent
0	150,000	0	0	100
3	150,000	0	0	100
6	150,000	1	0	99
9	150,000	3	1	96
12	150,000	5	2	93
15	150,000	7	3	90
18	150,000	9	5	86
21	150,000	10	7	83
24	150,000	12	8	80
30	150,000	15	11	74
36	150,000	17	14	69
42	150,000	18	17	65
48	150,000	19	20	61
60	150,000	20	24	56
72	150,000	21	28	51
84	150,000	22	32	46
96	150,000	23	36	41
108	150,000	24	39	37
120	150,000	24	41	35

SCENARIOS: PART TWO - TYPICAL DISCHARGE

Situation. At 0500, June 15, USCG Air Station Kodiak receives a call from the salmon tender F/V ROTTEN LUCK stating that the vessel had collided with another vessel, F/V BAD DAY, in the channel at the mouth of Larsen Bay. Both vessels have sustained damage and are leaking oil. All crewmembers were successfully removed from the vessels by another boat fishing nearby. The two vessels have onboard an estimated total of 12,500 gallons of diesel fuel and 600 gallons of lube and hydraulic oils, which is rapidly leaking at an undetermined rate. There is a westerly wind at 20 knots.

Notifications. MSD Kodiak is notified of the situation by the Air Station at 0515. MSD Kodiak notifies MSO Anchorage, ADEC and the Kodiak Emergency Services Director. MSO Anchorage and ADEC notify other state and federal agencies. Because it is a relatively small spill of non-persistent oil, it is determined that the initial response team will be limited to MSD Kodiak.

At 0700, an Incident Command Center is established at MSD Kodiak.

Initial Response Actions. MSD Kodiak requests transport via Coast Guard helicopter. He gathers basic equipment (including the "consumables" supplement to the KIB equipment package in Larsen Bay) and is transported to the scene. He arrives by 0900.

By the time MSD Kodiak arrives on-scene, mobilization of local (Larsen Bay) resources has already begun, as local residents initiate defensive booming of important subsistence areas. The MSD Kodiak Supervisor (first responder on-scene) will serve as FOSC representative for the duration of the response, and will advise the local responders to deploy defensive boom at the sensitive areas identified by the local community in the KSCP Sensitive Areas document. The FOSC notifies the Responsible Parties of their responsibilities to contain and remove the spill, and informs them that he can use government property to accomplish this objective and then bill them for the clean up, or they may replace his equipment in kind. The vessel masters acknowledge that they have limited resources and indicate that they are willing to fulfill their obligation under law.

The LOSC (back in Kodiak) contacts the state (ADEC) to get permission to activate the local response agreement with Larsen Bay so they can deploy the boom in the KIB equipment package (approximately 3000 feet).

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. In considering the size and type of spill and the resources at risk, the FOSC representative (in consultation with ADEC, the LOSC and local community) determines that the preferred strategy is to keep all oil offshore until it can evaporate or dissipate. The primary objective of the response is to ensure that the least possible amount of oil reaches the shoreline.

Because the spill is moderate in size and the Responsible Parties' resources are finite, response equipment is limited to that which is located in Larsen Bay (either at the cannery or in the KIB Equipment package). Equipment is deployed via the local response agreement between the Borough and Larsen Bay, using 3 skiffs as work vessels.

First, boom (and sorbents) are deployed around the leaking vessels, which are still floating. Responders then begin defensive booming of streams. Only hazwoper-trained individuals may deploy boom around the vessels, and individuals who undertake defensive booming at the stream mouths must also have had a minimal level of hazardous materials training. The FOSC will ensure that only properly trained individuals engage in boom deployment. The first protection priority (identified by the local community and LOSC) is to keep the oil out of Larsen Bay by booming across the bay. The other major priority is to boom off or protect Brown's lagoon (see discussion of sensitive areas below).

By Hour 6 of the response (1100), boom has been deployed around the vessels. By Hour 8 (1300), Larsen Bay has been boomed, and by Hour 10 (1500), Brown's lagoon has been boomed.

By late afternoon, reports begin to come in that there is evidence of some oil reaching the shoreline. ADEC dispatches an investigator that evening to verify this report. ADEC Environmental Health personnel will also sample local shellfish to determine whether they are safe for consumption.

Wildlife and Sensitive Areas Protection. Local protection priorities in Larsen Bay include the clam beds and salmon streams in Brown's Lagoon and Larsen Bay. Brown's Lagoon has been identified by the local community as a protection priority, and this area is also considered to be important wildlife habitat by USFWS.

The FOSC representative requests that the LOSC contact the Alutiiq museum to get an archaeologist to consult on protecting nearby cultural and historical sites.

Sea otter concentrations and herring spawning are two major considerations this time of year (summer), and Brown's lagoon is important for both of these activities. The LOSC communicates with Larsen Bay and also the USFWS to identify additional protection priorities, which are forwarded to the FOSC. Brown's lagoon is the only place in the immediate vicinity with an anadromous stream.

In the days following the spill, USFWS will contact the Coast Guard to determine whether any wildlife has been oiled.

Clean Up and Recovery. Collected oil is left in the booms until it evaporates or dissipates. Any oiled sorbent materials are collected by the USCG MSD and properly disposed of.

Federal/State Subarea Contingency Plan – Coastal Scenarios

Subarea	Incident Location	Vessel Info	Type of Product	Amount	Time of Year	Weather/Currents	Brief Description
Southeast Alaska							
Worst Case Discharge	Cozian Reef, Hoonah - Peril Strait	Tank Barge	No. 6 Fuel	20K bbls	Nov 26 0130	30 knot winds, strong tidal currents	Tug loses propulsion, barge goes aground.
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	Pt Whidbey - entrance to St James Bay	Tank Barge	Diesel Fuel, Gasoline	25.6K bbls	Jun 15 0300	Strong storm, northerly winds	Barge runs aground.
Average Most Probable Discharge	KPC facility, Ketchikan	Tank Barge	#6 Fuel Oil	20 bbls	Aug 15 1200	Flood tide, 0.27 knots	Transfer hose ruptures
Prince William Sound							
Worst Case Discharge	Naked Island (eastern tip)	Tanker Vessel	ANS Crude Bunker C	2.2M bbl 12K bbl	Nov	NE Winds @ 40 kts Seas 10-15 ft, Air Temp 35 F	Steering failure, escort vessels unable to vessel goes aground
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	Bligh Reef	Exxon Valdez					
Average Most Probable Discharge	Valdez Tesoro Dock	Tank Barge	Diesel Fuel	1,050 gals	June	SW winds at 10 kts, seas 1-2 ft, Air Temp 60 F	Cargo transfer hose fails, causing loss of product
Cook Inlet							
Worst Case Discharge	Perl Rock (Kennedy Entrance)	Tanker Vessel	ANS Crude	380K bbl	Apr 15	SW Winds @ 40 kts Seas 10-30 ft; Temp 40 F	Boiler failure, complete loss of power, vessel goes aground
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	Granite Point Platform	Offshore Platform	Crude Oil	5.5K bbls/day	Sep 1	SW Winds @ 15 kts Seas 3 ft; Temp 45 F	Wellhead blowout
Average Most Probable Discharge	Pickworth Dock, Port of Anchorage	Fuel Vessel	Diesel Fuel	50 bbls	Mar 15	W Winds @ 15 kts; sea state 30% coverage open pack ice; Temp 35 F	Valve failure; fuel released into Cook Inlet
Kodiak							
Worst Case Discharge	Perl Rock Scenario						
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	Kazakof Bay, Afognak Island	M/V Logship	Bunker Fuel	150K gals	Mar 15	Winds 50 mph, with gusts to 90 mph	Severe windstorm, vessel driven onto rocks
Average Most Probable Discharge	Larsen Bay	Fishing Vessel & F/V Tender	Diesel Fuel Lube Oils	12.5K gals 600 gals	Jun 15	W Winds @ 20 kts	Collision at sea.
Aleutian							
Worst Case Discharge (Draft)	Pribilof Islands	M/V	Bunker Fuel Diesel Fuel	120K gals 30K gals	Late July	SE winds @ 20 kts; Temp 48 F	Boiler explosion
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	(To be developed)						
Average Most Probable Discharge	(To be developed)						

Federal/State Subarea Contingency Plan – Coastal Scenarios

Subarea	Incident Location	Vessel Info	Type of Product	Amount	Time of Year	Weather/Currents	Brief Description
Bristol Bay							
Worst Case Discharge							
Maximum Most Probable Discharge							
Average Most Probable Discharge							
Western Alaska							
Worst Case Discharge							
Maximum Most Probable Discharge (old plan)	Naknek	Tanker Barge	Arctic Diesel	1,000 bbls	Jul 1	E Winds @ 10 kts; River current 3 kts; Temp 65 F	Collision with fishing vessel.
Average Most Probable Discharge							
Northwest Arctic							
Worst Case Discharge (old plan)	Cape Blossom Kotzebue	Tanker Barge	Diesel Fuel	20K bbl	Jun 15	W Winds @ 10 kts; seas light chop; Temp 45 F Scattered ice floes	Fire on board barge.
Maximum Most Probable Discharge							
Average Most Probable Discharge							
North Slope							
Worst Case Discharge	26 miles NE of Cape Halkett	Exploratory Well	ANS Crude	5K bbl/day	Sep 15	E Winds @ 5 kts; Seas calm; Temp 30 F	Well blowout
Maximum Most Probable Discharge	Barter Island Long Range Radar Site	Fuel Barge	Arctic Diesel	500 bbls	Aug 1	E winds @ 10 kts; Seas calm; Temp 50 F	Vessel struck submerged object
Average Most Probable Discharge	Barrow (fuel truck)						
Interior (no coastal scenarios)							

Pertinent Definitions:

Worst Case Discharge:

In the case of a vessel, a discharge in adverse weather conditions of its entire cargo.
(CWA, Section 311(a)(24))

Maximum Most Probable Discharge:

The maximum most probable discharge scenario in most cases will be based on the largest recorded spill size for the area. The maximum most probable discharge will take into account such factors as the size of the largest recorded spill, traffic flow through the area, hazard assessment, risk assessment, seasonal considerations, spill histories and operating records of facilities and vessels in the area. (COMDTNOTE 16471M, 30 Sep 92)

Average Most Probable Discharge:

The most probable discharge scenario is based on the size of the average spill in the area.
(COMDTNOTE 16471M, 30 Sep 92)

SCENARIOS: PART ONE - MAXIMUM MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE

Situation. In the early morning hours of March 15, a severe windstorm parts the mooring lines of M/V LOGSHIP, which is anchored in Kazakof Bay near the Silver Bay Logging Camp on Afognak Island. While attempting to get underway, the vessel is pushed onto the rocks. At 0300 Air Station Kodiak receives notification via VHF from the vessel's master. The master states that the hull has come into contact with the rocks, but the extent of damage is uncertain. The master feels that the vessel is not in danger of sinking and is not taking on water in any of the manned spaces.

Vessel particulars:

M/V LOGSHIP

Flag: Korean

Owner: Korean Lumber Corp., Inc.

Agent: North Pacific Maritime, Ketchikan

Status: 40% loaded with logs for Japan

Fuel: 150,000 gallons Bunker fuel

Tank configuration: unknown

Weather: winds are initially 50 mph with gusts to 90 mph. Winds diminish as the day progresses. Skies are clear with no precipitation.

Tides: Highs - 3:02 a.m., 8.6 feet and 3:15 p.m., 8.2 feet

Lows - 9:07 a.m., 0.6 feet and 9:16 p.m., 0.7 feet

Sunrise: 7:12 a.m.; Sunset 6:11 p.m.

Hour 0-9*: Initial Response Team (0300 to 1200)

*Note: For this scenario, the initial response team extends until hour 9, instead of hour 6 as indicated in the ramp up section, because the spill is discovered after dark and little action occurs until sunrise.

Notifications. Upon notification, Air Station Kodiak notifies MSD Kodiak, which then notifies MSO Anchorage. An initial command center is started in Anchorage at 0500, with plans to move the command center to Kodiak sometime in the afternoon. MSD Kodiak notifies the Kodiak Police Department and the police dispatch notifies the Kodiak Emergency Services Director and other local responders. MSO Anchorage notifies ADEC and federal stakeholders. Once notified, ADEC begins to notify other state agencies (ADNR, ADF&G, DES).

Initial Response Actions.

MSD Kodiak requests immediate transportation via USCG helicopter to the vessel with plans to set up a forward command post at the logging camp or onboard the vessel. The exact location will be determined once the MSD party arrives on-scene.

Within ADEC, response personnel communicate with natural resource trustee agency leadership to identify response priorities for booming and containment.

MSD Kodiak response personnel arrive on-scene at 0600 via USCG helicopter, advise the vessel master of the legal responsibilities for spill response, and instruct the vessel master to continually sound his tanks to check whether any oil has begun to leak. On-scene weather is high winds (steady at 40 mph with gusts to 80 mph). Skies are dark but begin to lighten by 0630. MSD Kodiak personnel are initially unable to visually detect a sheen. However, tanks are sounded and determined to be leaking bunker fuel. By hour 6, a sheen is visible.

Locally, in Kodiak, response personnel (at the direction of the Emergency Services Council) work to ensure that mechanisms are in place to prioritize protection of locally-important resources. Local responders (KIB) work to ensure that state agency protection priorities are aligned with those of the local community. The Borough or the ESC contact the City of Ouzinkie to notify them of the situation and to discuss protection of subsistence areas.

ADEC has one Environmental Health person located in Kodiak, and he is dispatched to the scene until ADEC spill response personnel arrive.

Command Center Establishment. The Incident Command will start to form in Anchorage, with plans to move the command center to Kodiak if the situation warrants. The KIB Assembly Chambers is selected as the site for the command center, if and when it is moved to Kodiak. Borough personnel begin to assemble the resources necessary to set up operations at the command center, such as telephones, fax machines, computers, and other office equipment. The Borough communications trailer is set up to enhance communications. The command center is designed to accommodate approximately 50 people, although not all of them will work out of the Assembly Chambers. The LOSC will also begin to consider alternate locations for a long-term command center, should the response run for a period of several weeks or months. The Resources Section of the KSCP and the Communications Plan in the Resources Section outline office and communications equipment needs for the command center, and these lists will be used as a guideline in setting up the command center in Kodiak.

A forward command post is also established near the spill site as a headquarters for on scene response personnel. The forward command post is established at the logging camp on Afognak (Silver Bay Logging). Initial response personnel, consisting of MSD Kodiak and additional Coast Guard responders, agree that it is a priority to establish a communications link between the forward command post and the command center as early as possible. This is initially accomplished by using the telephones at the logging camp.

ICS Mobilization. By 0800, the ICS begins to form as additional personnel are called on-scene (transported via USCG helicopters) and to the command center. Agency involvement is still limited primarily to ADEC and the USCG. MSO Anchorage has already set up an IC, which is being moved to a command center in Kodiak.

By approximately 0900, the KIB had been notified of the situation and of the need to establish a command center in Kodiak. The Emergency Services Director calls an Emergency Services Council meeting. The ESC is the policy-making board for emergency response in Kodiak, and the only ones with the authority to reassign personnel during an emergency response. The Emergency Services Director (LOSC) contacts Kitoi Bay Hatchery and the City of Ouzinkie regarding equipment mobilization, and the LOSC begins to work on identifying sensitive areas in cooperation with ADF&G and USFWS.

The Coast Guard sends a C-130 to Anchorage to transport USCG personnel, leaving only a skeleton crew at MSO Anchorage to answer phones, etc. One or two command-level people also remain in Anchorage. Other USCG personnel continue working with KIB to set up the command center in Kodiak and mobilize resources. The FOSC begins mobilizing members of the Pacific Strike Team from CA with bunker fuel response equipment. The strike team responds with approximately 6 people, and they will arrive on-scene with most of the necessary equipment and resources to conduct all vessel lightering operations. The strike team will arrive in their own C-130 around sunset.

Staging Areas. Shoreline areas near the logging camp and spill are designated for use as staging areas. Because of the high winds, response equipment (boom, etc.) which arrives on-scene via helicopter will not be deployed immediately. Until the conditions die down, this equipment will be staged in a shoreline area accessible to both helos and landing craft. An equipment check-in point is established at the staging area to track equipment and staffed with USCG personnel. MSD Kodiak response personnel or the LOSC contact the logging camp and request use of the logging camp's oil spill response equipment. They also request personnel support (primarily administrative and organizational) from the logging camp until additional responders arrive on-scene. The SOSC agrees to allow the logging camp to release equipment as necessary. The logging camp releases its equipment, but the Silver Bay containment boom and sorbents are determined to be of limited value to this spill response as it is designed for diesel/gasoline spills, and this incident involves Bunker "C" oil, which is not easily contained by boom.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. Weather conditions (primarily winds) are too severe during hours 0-9 to consider deploying equipment. The FOSC recognizes that the RP does not have the resources to respond to the spill and initiates the necessary paperwork to release and mobilize federal resources to supplement the response, thus federalizing the spill response. A federal project number is assigned in order to fund response operations. Responders begin to mobilize equipment from the USCG base and Anchorage, in anticipation of calmer seas. The petty officer at MSD Kodiak acquires as much containment boom as is locally available, and will begin loading this equipment on Coast Guard helicopters as soon as the winds die down to a safe level. The MSD staff is also beginning to call for USCG boats to deploy the boom as soon as the weather abates.

The LOSC contacts the state (ADEC) to get permission to mobilize the KIB-owned equipment staged in Ouzinkie by activating the response agreement with Ouzinkie. Permission is obtained and the Ouzinkie spill response equipment is mobilized to the staging area at the logging camp using local fishing vessels and skiffs from Ouzinkie. Because the Ouzinkie equipment is owned by the KIB, it may be released by the LOSC without initiating additional contracts. The equipment packages fit onto most fishing vessels. The on-scene coordinators also contact CISPRI and initiate a contract to use CISPRI resources. CISPRI gets approval from its Board of Directors to release equipment for the non-member, and then begins to mobilize resources. CISPRI personnel explain to the government response agencies that some of their equipment may not be as effective in responding to this spill, because Bunker C fuel differs in chemical and physical properties from other crude and non-persistent oils, which are more commonly transported by CISPRI members.

CISPRI mobilizes their response vessel, the BANDA SEAHORSE, within an hour of approval, and begins to transport additional response equipment via aircraft. The Unified Command contacts SERVS in order to initiate contracts with local response vessels. The LOSC begins to implement a volunteer action plan to coordinate volunteers as they arrive on-scene.

Hour 9-96: Transitional Response Team

Weather: Winds are diminishing and by Hour 12, they have decreased to 25 knots.

Quantity of oil spilled: Still unknown. Tanks are definitely leaking bunker fuel. Vessel is stable and in no immediate threat of sinking. By hour 12, the oil has traveled almost as far as the Triplets Islands (see attached trajectory).

On-Scene Response. By approximately noon (hour 9), we start to see increased activity and equipment mobilization. At this point, the MSD Kodiak responder is the sole FOSC representative on-scene in Afognak. No other state or federal agencies have arrived on scene yet, and there are no other vessels on scene.

USCG personnel request that the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator develop a spill trajectory. Although the amount of spilled oil is still uncertain and weather conditions are dynamic, a reasonable trajectory is completed by 1200, based on information gathered since 0500. (See spill trajectory attached)

Borough personnel will provide assistance with setting up the command center, providing logistical support, office space, communications equipment, and other locally available resources. The LOSC and borough personnel also begin to look for a backup location for the command center to be moved as the response continues over the long term. The local government (KIB) sets up a public information center in town at the Kodiak Library to address public concerns. The Coast Guard also has their own Public Affairs people who begin to work on public outreach and coordinate media coverage. During the first few days of the response, several different public information outlets may be established. However, as the ICS forms, a joint information center with federal, state and local public affairs representatives will be formed.

By 1200, ADFG begins to coordinate their efforts with other natural resource agencies and the local government/community to identify sensitive areas at risk.

By 1200, ADEC personnel have attempted to contact the Responsible Party's Protection & Indemnity club, begun to ramp up state resources, and continued to contact other state agencies. ADEC assigns response personnel to ICS positions, mostly into the planning section, some with some assigned to operations. ADEC tries to include ADFG and ADNR representatives with ADEC personnel on the initial flight to Kodiak and begin to deploy on-scene.

As they arrive at the command center, ADEC personnel begin to formulate a Sitrep, which is the situation report sent by ADEC to the other state resource agencies, federal agencies, and Juneau ADEC office, summarizing state actions so far. The ADEC public information office

in Juneau uses the Sitrep to develop an initial press release. The Coast Guard will generate a POLREP, which is also a situation report, for essentially the same purposes as ADEC's Sitrep.

Early in the response (by hour 12, 1500) the Unified Command contracts with an archaeologist, because there are several important historical sites adjacent to the spill, such as Monk's Lagoon. The LOSC suggests that the Alutiiq museum may be able to provide the necessary expertise. The Unified Command also initiates contracts with wildlife response organizations and other specialists in order to mount an effective response.

By 1600 - 1800, as flying conditions improve and it becomes easier to transport people and equipment (helos can land), ADEC responders (with possibly one or two ADFG/USFWS responders) begin to arrive on-scene (logging camp on Afognak Island) to initiate containment and response activities and to identify wildlife protection priorities. Volunteer responders arriving on-scene in vessels are directed by the LOSC to work through the volunteer coordination center in Kodiak. Two CG helicopters are used to transport personnel and equipment, which continues in earnest between 1600 and 1800. By 1800, one helicopter full of ADEC responders (6-10) has landed, and several loads of equipment, including light sets, portable generators and other support equipment have arrived on-scene. The initial ADEC team brings a "crash kit" of office and planning supplies, laptop computers, and other office equipment, and they also bring their own PPE, mustang suits, etc. The limited support equipment which arrives in the helicopters is used to set up a forward command post, and oil spill response equipment is stored at the staging area overnight. Due to the large amount of equipment being mobilized, several trips between Kodiak and the staging area are required. Equipment transport is prioritized according to the needs on-scene, with operational equipment such as boom, anchors and PPE prioritized over other support equipment. Coast Guard and privately contracted vessels are also used to transport equipment to the scene. Transit time from Kodiak is approximately 12 hours, but these vessels are able to operate after dark (when USCG helicopters are no longer flying.)

As the weather calms and the response proceeds (Day 2), additional personnel begin to arrive on-scene. The Kodiak USCG air station continues to provide the primary logistics support for transporting and staging equipment. The USCG VOSS system and additional oil spill response equipment from the MSD Kodiak and other commercial/industry sources in Kodiak is transported on-scene from MSD Kodiak on a CG cutter, which arrives in Kazakof Bay by 2200 .

By daybreak on Day 2, ADEC has begun to make logistical arrangements to transport personnel and resources from Anchorage. As ADEC and other agency personnel arrive on-scene and in Kodiak, the command center in Kodiak is beginning to come together and the ICS continues to form and expand.

By 1800, the response has begun to coalesce and the ICS continues to expand. An initial incident action plan has been developed. At this point, Ouzinkie community members are anxious to begin deploying response equipment to protect local streams and subsistence use areas. However, due to the sustained winds and dwindling daylight hours, the Unified Command decides to delay boom deployment until dawn.

Once the command center is up and running, the ICS will continue to grow and specialize, with regular briefings and situation reports. As early as possible, the Public Information Officer(s) will work with communications and computer experts to establish an internet site to keep the public up-to-date on response activities, spill trajectory, and other situation specifics. The Unified Command web site established during the M/V KUROSHIMA spill was considered to be a public relations success and would be used as a model for future medium to large sized spills in the Kodiak Subarea.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. By hour 12 or so, there is approximately 3000 feet of boom available on-scene (KIB boom from Ouzinkie and boom from the logging camp) and ready to deploy as soon as the weather permits. Coast Guard buoy tenders back in Kodiak are being loaded with as much boom as is locally available and begin to travel to the scene. It will take about a half a day for the buoy tenders to arrive on-scene, and meanwhile USCG helicopters are bringing the MSD boom to the staging area. The vessels and helos will also be loaded with equipment such as PPE, which would be staged on the beach as it arrives. The winds do not die down until 1600 or so, and until this point it is not possible for a helicopter to land.

The FOSC may direct the RP to contract with SERVS or Chadux, both of whom train local fishing vessels for oil spill response. The LOSC will work with the RP and Unified Command to coordinate all volunteers arriving on-scene.

Equipment deployment does not commence until daybreak of the second day (hour 28); however by the afternoon of day 1, crews have begun to stage boom and other equipment at certain key shoreline locations which are accessible on the Kodiak road system. The KIB-owned equipment staged at Ouzinkie, as well as other containment boom maintained by the village are mobilized to be ready for deployment at first light. The City of Ouzinkie has approximately 3,000 to 4,000 feet of boom on hand, which will be used to boom the city harbor. There is another 3,000 feet of boom in the KIB equipment package staged at the village, which will also be used in the response, and MSD Kodiak is able to mobilize approximately 4,000 feet of boom as well by hour 18. Some of this KIB and MSD boom will be used to boom off the salmon streams near Ouzinkie, and the rest will be used to boom off the streams prioritized by the sensitive areas group (See Wildlife Response discussion).

Communications. At this point (hour 12), radio communications from Afognak to the command center in Kodiak are still complicated and not reliable. It will take a few days for a communications system to support the on-scene response to evolve, and in the meantime response personnel use VHF radios and Coast Guard high sites to communicate with the evolving command center. CISPRI has portable, self-contained communications units set up with a portable repeater, phone and fax, which can be sent to the scene with initial responders.

Wildlife Protection and Response. ADEC and the FOSC have both notified the appropriate Natural Resource Trustee Agencies. USFWS, ADNR, NMFS and ADFG wildlife experts begin to arrive at the command center with other ADEC personnel. The FOSC initiates contracts with seabird and sea mammal responders, including the WRRT (Wildlife Rapid Response Team from Homer), IBRRC (International Bird Rescue and Research Center), and International Wildlife Research (for sea otters & marine mammals). Arrival times for wildlife responders are estimated to be early afternoon of Day 2.

According to the trajectory, oil hits the Triplets by Hour 12 (1500), endangering a seabird colony in that area. Due to the high winds, the birds have congregated on the water in the lee of the island, and are therefore safe from the immediate impacts of the oil. Should the wind shift or die down, however, this population would remain in danger.

At this time of year, there are otter populations feeding in the open water and they are also at risk of being oiled. Wildlife responders prepare to capture and treat oiled wildlife as sea and wind conditions die down, and undertake the necessary paperwork to obtain hazing and capture permits.

If local residents arrive on-scene (via private vessels) anxious to assist with wildlife protection and rescue, they are directed through the planning section (volunteer coordinator) to the contracted wildlife response groups. Volunteers are dissuaded from interfering with ongoing wildlife response operations.

As wildlife responders arrive on-scene with hazing kits and other support equipment, LOSC representatives assist them with logistical considerations as they set up a station at the forward command post. The logistics section works with wildlife responders to identify potential locations for wildlife collection, cleaning and rehab stations and the Incident Commander (FOSC) begins to direct the development of a disposal plan for any dead wildlife.

Once the weather has abated enough to begin boom deployment (morning of Day 2), Ouzinkie harbor and the nearby salmon streams are boomed (approximately 4,000 feet of boom total). USCG response equipment (approximately 10,000 ft. containment boom, sorbent material, a VOSS, and several small skiffs) from Kodiak arrived in Kazakof Bay via Coast Guard cutter the evening prior. Next, boom will be deployed at the Monashka Bay creeks (Monashka and Pillar Creeks), Island Lake Creek (if the surf is not too high), and the Buskin River, in that order. The next protection priorities identified are the lagoon on Long Island, the two lagoons on the backside of Spruce Island and, if threatened, the Women's Bay and Chiniak salmon streams, beginning with the Russian River and Sargent Creek and moving sequentially toward Chiniak. Monk's Lagoon would also be a protection priority for natural resource and historical reasons, and boom may be deployed there as well.

Because most of the salmon streams identified above are road accessible, land-based crews will deploy the boom at the bridges at each of these streams. While the mouths of the streams may not be protected with this strategy, it will allow for the greatest number of streams to be protected with a limited amount of boom (approximately 50 feet per stream). If the trajectory proves to be incorrect or if the wind shifts, booming strategies will be revised to protect additional areas at risk.

It is possible that the amount of oil which actually reaches as far as Monashka Bay or even the Chiniak salmon streams is extremely minimal, as much of the oil may accumulate on Spruce Island. However, even if the perceived risk is minimal, defensive booming of the salmon streams on the Kodiak road system will be carried out during day 2.

As the winds die down the next day (hour 28 and on), wildlife responders consider the viability of hazing threatened wildlife populations. This decision is made on a site-by-site basis, contingent upon a variety of considerations and supported by the necessary permits. The major

priorities for wildlife responders continue to be capturing and treating injured wildlife and collecting carcasses before they can be consumed by other animals.

By Hour 28-30, wildlife collection points have been established near the City of Kodiak harbor and also near the spill site. ADFG and USFWS biologists identify oiled carcasses and record the appropriate data before freezing or disposing of the animals. A disposal plan is coordinated with the local landfill, and freezer vans are set up at each of the collection points as well as at the landfill. If the number of dead animals exceeds the capacity of the landfill, arrangements will be made to dispose of the animals in alternate locations. Injured or oiled wildlife are handled by the contracted rehabilitation organizations according to their internal operating procedures. Wildlife responders may set up rehabilitation and cleaning stations in Kodiak, or they may arrange to transport oiled wildlife to Homer or Anchorage. Any sea otters killed by the oil will be necropsied before disposal.

Sensitive Areas Identification and Protection. As soon as it is apparent that oil is in the water (hour 6), the local government begins to consult with the Natural Resource Trustee Agencies regarding sensitive area protection priorities. It is likely, given the weather conditions, that no boom will be deployed until daybreak of the second day (hour 28), therefore these individuals consult the trajectory for hour 24 as they begin to identify protection priorities and sensitive areas at risk.

In recommending sensitive areas for protection, the local government and resource agencies use the prioritization scheme in the Sensitive Areas section of the KSCP, balancing natural resource population information with human use and subsistence considerations. The resource agencies provide information on marine mammal populations and rookeries, seabird concentrations, and shoreline sensitivity. Local residents and the local government provide input on human use, recreation, and subsistence areas.

While it seems certain that no boom will be deployed until at least day 2, protection priorities are pre-identified and submitted to the Operations Section by approximately hour 18 (2100 on Day 1). Depending upon how early these areas are identified, response equipment may be pre-positioned at those streams and shoreline areas which are road accessible.

The resource trustees and local government representatives determine that the most effective use of boom would be to deploy exclusionary and deflective boom at all the major road-accessible salmon streams downstream from the spill site. In addition to providing salmon habitat, these streams are identified as sensitive areas due to their recreational and subsistence use (because of proximity to road system). It is suggested that boom be deployed at the heads of bays but due to the high winds and rough seas, and the limited number of trained personnel, this option is tabled for reconsideration when the weather abates.

The local government indicates that it is a local priority to protect the area around Ouzinkie Narrows and to boom off the village harbor in order to protect the salmon stream it contains. There are two other salmon streams in the vicinity of Ouzinkie and they, too, are identified as booming priorities because of their high subsistence fishing use. The local government next identifies Monashka Bay as a protection priority, because it is an important recreational area and also a vulnerable tidal flat. Monashka Bay is selected as a protection priority, with emphasis on the two salmon streams it contains (Monashka Creek and Pillar Creek).

After Monashka Bay, the salmon stream in Mill Bay (Island Lake Creek) is identified as a booming priority, as long as the surf is not too high in Mill Bay. After that, booming priorities continue stream by stream moving toward Chiniak. Once all threatened salmon streams are protected, protection priorities will extend to entire beaches, with emphasis on areas that are commonly used for recreation or subsistence. Because of the potential for high surf at Mill Bay beach, it is designated as a potential collection area, depending on how much oil reaches that far down. Although it is terribly unpleasant to consider "sacrificing" a beach, it is apparent that Mill Bay is a natural collection beach and that it would be feasible to use the beach for collection purposes due to its easy road and vehicle access.

Based on the spill trajectory, Ugak Island is identified as a protection priority because it is a marine mammal haul out, although it may be a difficult area to protect because of deep water and rough surf.

Clean up and Recovery. From Day 2 (hour 28) on, as people arrive on scene and boom deployment is accomplished, the focus of the response will begin to switch from protection to oil removal and recovery. After the initial influx of containment boom and other initial response equipment, storage equipment is transported to the scene. Temporary storage bladders are transported from MSD Kodiak, and a local barge *Anna Lee* with a storage capacity of over 100,000 gallons, is contracted by the FOSC and dispatched to the scene (ETA sundown day 2). Recovery concerns will include protecting resources, and addressing issues such as lightering and salvage. The Pacific Strike Team will be able to provide some lightering expertise. Navy SUPSALV should be consulted for salvage issues, or the RP may choose to contract with a private salvage company to remove the vessel from the rocks.

After Day 3 or so (hour 52), disposal will become an issue. Bunker oil is extremely problematic from a removal standpoint, as skimmers are not effective in separating bunker oil from water. Bunker C has the consistency of peanut butter or "flubber", and it is extremely hard to collect, load, and generally difficult to deal with. Oily wastes, debris and recovered bunker fuel are transported to Kodiak for disposal.

Mill Bay, Abercrombie Beach, or another shoreline with road access may be selected as a keeper/collection beaches because it is possible to get heavy equipment onto the beach for removal. Landing craft will bring oil and debris to the shore, where it will be loaded into dumpsters or totes and transported from the beach for ultimate disposal. The RP (Incident Commander) is responsible for developing and implementing a disposal plan which complies with existing local, state and federal laws and regulations. ADEC and the Kodiak Island Borough will oversee this process. Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Teams are organized and deployed to assess shoreline impacts and make recommendations regarding additional cleanup.

Personnel Considerations. Initially, lodging and food are provided by the Silver Bay Logging Camp and supplemented with supplies from Ouzinkie. The school at the logging camp is used for temporary lodging and to cook meals for responders.

Figure G-1: Spill Trajectory Hour 6



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 6

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

HAZMAT Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-2: Spill Trajectory Hour 12



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 12

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) more complete information.




Figure G-3: Spill Trajectory Hour 24



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 24

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-4: Spill Trajectory Hour 48



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 48

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-5: Spill Trajectory Hour 72



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr 72

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-6: Spill Trajectory Hour 96



Kazakof Spill

Estimate for: Hr. 96

Prepared: 1357, 2/5/98

MASS Analysis

NOAA/HAZMAT/MASS (206) 526-6317



These estimates are based on the latest available information. Please refer to the trajectory analysis briefing and your Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for more complete information.




Figure G-7: Oil Budget Table

Oil Budget Table

ADIOS™ 1.1.3



Oil Name: FUEL OIL NO.6

API: 11.8

Pour Point: between 24.8 F and 59.0 F

Emulsification Const: 18% evaporated

Wind Speed: Constant at 50 kn

Wave Height: Default values

Water Temperature: 45 F

Instantaneous release of 150000 gal

*Insufficient emulsification data, answers may be inaccurate.

Time hours	Total Released gallons	Evaporated percent	Dispersed percent	Floating percent
0	150,000	0	0	100
3	150,000	0	0	100
6	150,000	1	0	99
9	150,000	3	1	96
12	150,000	5	2	93
15	150,000	7	3	90
18	150,000	9	5	86
21	150,000	10	7	83
24	150,000	12	8	80
30	150,000	15	11	74
36	150,000	17	14	69
42	150,000	18	17	65
48	150,000	19	20	61
60	150,000	20	24	56
72	150,000	21	28	51
84	150,000	22	32	46
96	150,000	23	36	41
108	150,000	24	39	37
120	150,000	24	41	35

SCENARIOS: PART TWO - TYPICAL DISCHARGE

Situation. At 0500, June 15, USCG Air Station Kodiak receives a call from the salmon tender F/V ROTTEN LUCK stating that the vessel had collided with another vessel, F/V BAD DAY, in the channel at the mouth of Larsen Bay. Both vessels have sustained damage and are leaking oil. All crewmembers were successfully removed from the vessels by another boat fishing nearby. The two vessels have onboard an estimated total of 12,500 gallons of diesel fuel and 600 gallons of lube and hydraulic oils, which is rapidly leaking at an undetermined rate. There is a westerly wind at 20 knots.

Notifications. MSD Kodiak is notified of the situation by the Air Station at 0515. MSD Kodiak notifies MSO Anchorage, ADEC and the Kodiak Emergency Services Director. MSO Anchorage and ADEC notify other state and federal agencies. Because it is a relatively small spill of non-persistent oil, it is determined that the initial response team will be limited to MSD Kodiak.

At 0700, an Incident Command Center is established at MSD Kodiak.

Initial Response Actions. MSD Kodiak requests transport via Coast Guard helicopter. He gathers basic equipment (including the "consumables" supplement to the KIB equipment package in Larsen Bay) and is transported to the scene. He arrives by 0900.

By the time MSD Kodiak arrives on-scene, mobilization of local (Larsen Bay) resources has already begun, as local residents initiate defensive booming of important subsistence areas. The MSD Kodiak Supervisor (first responder on-scene) will serve as FOSC representative for the duration of the response, and will advise the local responders to deploy defensive boom at the sensitive areas identified by the local community in the KSCP Sensitive Areas document. The FOSC notifies the Responsible Parties of their responsibilities to contain and remove the spill, and informs them that he can use government property to accomplish this objective and then bill them for the clean up, or they may replace his equipment in kind. The vessel masters acknowledge that they have limited resources and indicate that they are willing to fulfill their obligation under law.

The LOSC (back in Kodiak) contacts the state (ADEC) to get permission to activate the local response agreement with Larsen Bay so they can deploy the boom in the KIB equipment package (approximately 3000 feet).

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. In considering the size and type of spill and the resources at risk, the FOSC representative (in consultation with ADEC, the LOSC and local community) determines that the preferred strategy is to keep all oil offshore until it can evaporate or dissipate. The primary objective of the response is to ensure that the least possible amount of oil reaches the shoreline.

Because the spill is moderate in size and the Responsible Parties' resources are finite, response equipment is limited to that which is located in Larsen Bay (either at the cannery or in the KIB Equipment package). Equipment is deployed via the local response agreement between the Borough and Larsen Bay, using 3 skiffs as work vessels.

First, boom (and sorbents) are deployed around the leaking vessels, which are still floating. Responders then begin defensive booming of streams. Only hazwoper-trained individuals may deploy boom around the vessels, and individuals who undertake defensive booming at the stream mouths must also have had a minimal level of hazardous materials training. The FOSC will ensure that only properly trained individuals engage in boom deployment. The first protection priority (identified by the local community and LOSC) is to keep the oil out of Larsen Bay by booming across the bay. The other major priority is to boom off or protect Brown's lagoon (see discussion of sensitive areas below).

By Hour 6 of the response (1100), boom has been deployed around the vessels. By Hour 8 (1300), Larsen Bay has been boomed, and by Hour 10 (1500), Brown's lagoon has been boomed.

By late afternoon, reports begin to come in that there is evidence of some oil reaching the shoreline. ADEC dispatches an investigator that evening to verify this report. ADEC Environmental Health personnel will also sample local shellfish to determine whether they are safe for consumption.

Wildlife and Sensitive Areas Protection. Local protection priorities in Larsen Bay include the clam beds and salmon streams in Brown's Lagoon and Larsen Bay. Brown's Lagoon has been identified by the local community as a protection priority, and this area is also considered to be important wildlife habitat by USFWS.

The FOSC representative requests that the LOSC contact the Alutiiq museum to get an archaeologist to consult on protecting nearby cultural and historical sites.

Sea otter concentrations and herring spawning are two major considerations this time of year (summer), and Brown's lagoon is important for both of these activities. The LOSC communicates with Larsen Bay and also the USFWS to identify additional protection priorities, which are forwarded to the FOSC. Brown's lagoon is the only place in the immediate vicinity with an anadromous stream.

In the days following the spill, USFWS will contact the Coast Guard to determine whether any wildlife has been oiled.

Clean Up and Recovery. Collected oil is left in the booms until it evaporates or dissipates. Any oiled sorbent materials are collected by the USCG MSD and properly disposed of.

DEC home | air | water | land | food | oil, chemicals | public facilities, businesses | pollution prevention |

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Alaska's Oil Spill Safety Net

Task Force on Motorized Oil Transport

Response Planning Standard Work Group
September 6, 2000 Meeting Summary
Nontank Vessel Issues
Anchorage Legislative Information Office
9:30 - 12:00, 1:30 - 5:00

Task Force members present:

RPS Work Group Co-chair Lee Eglund; and members Jim Carter, Scott Carter, Ernie Piper, Bob Heavilin, Doug Lentsch, Simon Lisiecki, Charlotte MacCay, Heather McCarty, Dave Owings, Jeff Thompson, Denise Henderson (for Rep. Kott), and Kristopher Knauss (for Sen. Pearce)

Task Force members on teleconference: RPS Work Group Co-chairs Gene Burden, John Hansen

DEC staff present:

Larry Dietrick, Susan Harvey, Steve Provant, Ken Rogowski, Larry Iwamoto

Task Force Facilitation:

Brian Rogers, Judith Erickson; Gregg Erickson, Deborah Vogt on teleconference

Task Force Technical Assistance:

Paul Fuhs

Members of the public also attended

Response Planning Standard Work Group Recommendations:

The RPS Work Group reached consensus on the following recommendations for how nontank vessels will meet the 15 percent RPS established by SB 273.

1. In virtually all cases, tank vessels carry more petroleum and petroleum products than non-tank vessels. The RPS Work Group does not believe additional control and containment equipment is necessary in areas where there is good geographic distribution of equipment stockpiled under the tank vessel program. Southeast, Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound and Kodiak either have or are phasing in adequate equipment for non-persistent and persistent fuels. New equipment, however, will be required in "gap areas," where a) non-tank vessels operate but tank vessels do not operate, or b) where persistent oil is being carried by non-tank vessels and tank vessels carry only non-persistent fuels.
2. At its August 23 meeting, after reviewing the distribution of existing equipment and the capacity of the largest persistent fuel carrying vessels operating various areas, the RPS Work Group determined that there are two gap areas: Western Alaska and Seward.
3. The RPS Work Group recommends that primary and secondary response hubs be established in a cascading response system. Primary hubs will have control, containment and portable recovery equipment such as skimmers; secondary hubs have only control and containment equipment. The work group considers the equipment located in the secondary response hubs as a starter kit, with more equipment to arrive later on-scene as needed.
4. Secondary response hubs will maintain containment boom sufficient to extend three times the length of the largest vessel operating in the area. Appropriate means will be provided for deploying the containment boom.
5. Cleanup equipment maintained at primary hubs will be appropriate to the type of oil to be recovered, persistent or non-persistent. Cleanup equipment maintained at primary hubs shall be mobile and designed to fit in usually available aircraft, probably a DC-6 as there are only two Hercules-type aircraft in Alaska and they are not always available. The Work Group adopted a planning-standard wave height of 3 feet or less. The Work Group recommends that skimmers have a daily nameplate recovery capacity equal to 15 percent of the capacity of the largest vessel in the area. For example, if the largest vessel carries 30,000 barrels of fuel, then

skimming equipment with a nameplate capacity of 4500 barrels per day is required. Temporary storage capacity must be provided equal to the expected EDRC (effective daily recovery capacity) of the chosen skimmer.

6. The Work Group recommends that Anchorage and Dutch Harbor be the designated primary response hubs for Western Alaska, and that secondary response hubs be established for Western Alaska at Adak, Atka, Akutan, and St. Paul. The Work Group recommends that a secondary response hub be established at Seward.
7. The RPS Work Group believes that schedules established under the tank vessel program for acquiring new equipment and placing it in service are sufficiently rapid for the additional equipment required to implement the non-tank program.

Discussion:

RPS Alaska Railroad recommendations: Brian Rogers, facilitator, gave a brief summary of the RPS Work Group's August 30 meeting, where participants reached consensus on four recommendations for the Alaska Railroad. The recommendations can be viewed in the summary for that meeting, available on the web site (www.state.ak.us/dec/nontank).

Contingency plan review: DEC staff Larry Dietrick, Larry Iwamoto and Susan Harvey provided the work group with a brief review of federal and state response planning and contingency plans (C-plans). Dietrick noted Alaska has one unified plan and 10 subarea plans. The subarea plans contain region-specific information. Iwamoto reviewed the planning status of the unified and subarea plans and discussed the on-scene coordinator's relationship to these plans.

Harvey said the goal of industry C-plans is to document and demonstrate there are sufficient resources to contain, clean-up and mitigate potential oil discharges and protect environmentally-sensitive areas. She described what is required by DEC regulation to be included in a C-plan.

For SB 273 vessels, Harvey said DEC envisions a more streamlined contingency plan process. Instead of the four part plan required now for the regulated community, a C-plan for SB 273 vessels would require two parts: a response action plan and a prevention plan. Harvey said the response action plan would address three issues: initial notification, which could be satisfied with a SOPEP; membership in a co-op or equivalent capability; and spill management capability. For smaller vessels, Harvey said the spill management capability might entail identification of one person in a company as the qualified individual (QI) to manage the spill. Larger companies might require a more sophisticated team. Any other requirements of C-plan holders, such as salvage fire fighting and lightering, would have to be identified in the plan. The Contingency Plan Work Group will address these issues at a future meeting.

The prevention plan portion of the C-plan would be a "plan by rule." After prevention measures are adopted in state regulation, the vessel owner would be required to notify DEC that those requirements have been met. A certificate of financial responsibility is also required by law. Harvey said DEC could potentially handle the use of best available technology (BAT) for prevention requirements by updating the response action plan and prevention rules every three to five years.

Harvey said DEC has not addressed spill drills and inspections. If the newly-regulated vessels belong to co-ops, DEC will drill the co-ops once or twice a year. If an individual party doesn't choose to join a co-op, the party will have to show DEC, through drills, how it will carry out its response. Harvey noted the contingency planning work group will address inspections. She said inspections are used to verify the information contained in a C-plan. Harvey said vessel owners could be required to submit their C-plan data to DEC and sign under affidavit that the information is correct. DEC would conduct spot check inspections to make sure all plan elements were onboard.

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Vessel data collection update: Brian Rogers reported to the work group that he is still working primarily with the data supplied by the marine pilots organizations. Data recently received from Task Force members and from the Financial Responsibility forms submitted to DEC will be entered into the data base shortly.

Future Action: The work group has not yet decided what threshold conditions would require an equipment hub to be upgraded from a secondary to primary hub. Committee members suggested the following factors might be considered in setting the threshold: vessel traffic and frequency, operating season, and port calls. Once the vessel data collection is complete a subgroup of the RPS work group will meet and try to reach agreement on the threshold question. The subgroup will work with the co-chairs on a method to get consensus on the recommendation from the full work group.

How to report a spill

[[Nontank Task Force Home](#)] [[Disclaimer](#)] [[ADEC](#)] [[State of Alaska](#)]

Last modified: September 9, 2000

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Federal/State Oil Spill and Hazardous Substance Release Contingency Planning

Larry Iwamoto

State of Alaska

***Department of Environmental Conservation
Division of Spill Prevention and Response***



Government Planning

- ***Oil Pollution Act of 1990***
- ***Alaska Statutes***

- ***Joint Planning Efforts***
 - » ***AK Federal/State Unified Plan***
 - » ***Subarea Plans***
 - » ***Geographic Response Strategies***



Government Planning

FEDERAL

**NATIONAL CONTINGENCY
PLAN**

**REGIONAL CONTINGENCY
PLAN**

**AREA CONTINGENCY
PLANS**


**UNIFIED
PLAN**

**SUBAREA
PLANS**

STATE

**STATE MASTER
PLAN**

**REGIONAL MASTER
PLANS**






Overall Planning Status

- ***Unified Plan (May 1994)***
 - » ***Change 2 Published (Sep 1999)***
- ***Subarea Plans***
 - » ***Prince William Sound (July 1997)***
 - ***Change 1 (July 1999)***
 - » ***Cook Inlet (July 1997)***
 - » ***Southeast Alaska (July 1997)***
 - » ***Kodiak (July 1998)***
 - » ***Aleutians (Sep 1999)***
 - » ***North Slope (February 2000)***
 - » ***Bristol Bay, Western AK, NW Arctic (12/00)***




Unified Command





On-Scene Coordinator's Relationship to Plans



FOSC: Federal On-Scene Coordinator (US Coast Guard/EPA)
 SOSC: State On-Scene Coordinator (ADEC)
 LOSC: Local On-Scene Coordinator (while immediate threat to public safety exists)
 CEC: Community Emergency Coordinator
 RPOSC: Responsible Party On-Scene Coordinator (Spiller Designee)



ARRT Website

- ***Unified Plan***
- ***Subarea Plans***
- ***AIMS Guide***
- ***Wildlife Protection Guidelines***

<http://www.akrrt.org/plans.html>



MEMBERSHIP FULL MEMBER

A full member can be either a vessel or a facility that operates within a Cost Participation Area within the state of Alaska.

Vessels: Primary business is the transportation, storage or transfer of petroleum products.

Facilities: Primary business is the storage of petroleum products.

Full members have voting privileges.

ASSOCIATE MEMBER

An associate member can be either a vessel or a facility. An associate member can be inside or outside of a Cost Participation Area within the state of Alaska.

Vessels: Primary business is from other than the transportation, storage or transfer of petroleum products whether inside or outside of a Cost Participation Area.

Facilities: Primary business is from other than the storage or transfer of petroleum products and is normally outside of a Cost Participation Area.

Associate members do not have voting privileges.

Note: Other factors may be a consideration in membership classification.

For more information contact:
Robert E. Heavilin
General Manager
via E-mail at
bheavilin@chadux.com or
phone us at **907.278.3365**



ALASKA
CHADUX
CORPORATION



721 West 1st Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
907.278.3365 24-Hour Contact
907.278.3330 Facsimile

ACTIVATION

Upon the request of a member or agency, Chadux can mobilize and deploy its equipment and personnel.

The **RESPONSIBLE PARTY (RP)** will direct the response to a spill. Chadux, under the direction of a RP, will position its equipment to control, recover and temporarily store recovered product.

Chadux may be activated 24 hours a day seven days a week by calling 907.278.3365.



EQUIPMENT

Oil spill and wildlife response equipment is maintained in a state of readiness and available for use by Chadux members. Chadux equipment is strategically stored near Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound, and Unalaska. Chadux's equipment is staged in geographic locations referred to as Cost Participation Areas (CPA's). To respond outside of Chadux's CPA's, equipment from Chadux's Anchorage base is available.

MISSION STATEMENT

To assist members with oil spill preparedness and response resources.

The services will be provided statewide within the inland waters of Alaska.



OPERATING PRINCIPALS

- Operate Safely.
 - Control Costs.
 - Generate Margins.
 - Customer Service.
-

CLASSIFICATIONS

Chadux is registered as a Primary Response Action Contractor (PRAC) by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and an Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) by the USCG.

RESPONSE PERSONNEL

Chadux provides, at a Member's request, oil spill response personnel. Currently, two 16-person teams are available on a 24-hour basis. The teams can provide a variety of operations including:

- Mobilization and deployment of Chadux containment boom.
 - Operation of skimmers and recovery equipment.
 - Demobilization and decontamination.
-



RESPONSE SERVICES

Safety of personnel is always the primary objective for Chadux responders.

Services available to member companies on a 24 hour basis:

- Provide response equipment that includes boats, containment boom, skimmers and temporary storage.
 - Qualified wildlife response team and equipment.
 - Spill response expertise.
-