

**SJR**

**50**

House of Representatives  
State of Michigan

36TH DISTRICT  
STATE REPRESENTATIVE  
ALAN L. CROSEY  
STATE CAPITOL  
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48913  
(517) 373-1778

COMMITTEES  
JUDICIARY  
EDUCATION  
LABOR  
CORRECTIONS

November 23, 1993

Thank you for your interest in Michigan House Concurrent Resolution No. 185. This resolution requests the Michigan Attorney General to file a lawsuit in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the Vietnam War era Michigan POW/MIAs. The Attorney General told me that we need at least two or three other states to join with us before we file the lawsuit.

Enclosed with this letter is a copy of the Michigan resolution. I would suggest that you use this resolution as a basis for a resolution in your state. Obviously you would change the names of the people to those who are POW/MIA status in your state. Your resolution should end by requesting that your state join with Michigan in pursuing this issue in front of the United States Supreme Court.

Enclosed with the resolution are the following items:

1. A newspaper article about the Michigan resolution entitled "Supreme Court to Hear POW Issue".
2. An Associated Press story about a retired Russian military officer who saw American POWs from the Korean conflict being held in the Soviet Union.
3. A memorandum dated September 7, 1993 concerning a new document found in the files of the Soviet military intelligence which states that the number of American aviator POWs in Communist Vietnam was 735 and that they had only published the names of 368 American aviators. The same document on a different page it states again that they have published the names of 368 American flyers.
4. A three page report and a 25 page report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
  - a. The second page of the three page report says the total American POWs in North Vietnam was 1205, of which 671 were taken prisoner in North Vietnam, 426 in South Vietnam, 43 in Laos and 65 in Cambodia. There were 767 aviators among the prisoners, three of which went through training for space flight and 15 of which have more than 4000 flight hours each. There is also a breakdown by rank of the prisoners. The United States government did not know the precise number of POWs. The North Vietnamese Army kept this information in strict secrecy.
  - b. The report attached to the three page report is approximately 25 pages long and goes into greater detail, starting on page 17, about the North Vietnamese exploitation of the American POWs.

5. Several memoranda from John Dean Holstein, one of the investigators for the Senate Select Committee, concerning the ordering of the document destruction by the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIAs. Mr. Holstein and the other investigators were very upset that certain documents that should have been filed in the Senate were destroyed instead.
6. The oral briefing introduction given to the Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War on April 8, 1992. This briefing is approximately 19 pages long. Page 18 states the investigators' conclusion:

**THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE BEEN HELD CONTINUOUSLY AFTER OPERATION HOMECOMING AND REMAIN IN CAPTIVITY IN VIETNAM AND LOAS AS LATE AS 1989. THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT NO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE SURVIVED IN CAMBODIA.**
7. A memorandum to Senator John F. Kerry and Senator Bob Smith from Dr. Joseph Douglass. This is six page "sensitive" memorandum gives a synopsis of the information that Dr. Douglass had been able to glean from Jan Senja, a Czechoslovakian defector who was a Major General and had direct contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Major General Senja's information is highly explosive. He is currently working for the Department of Defense.
8. A transcript of Dr. Douglas' statement at the National Alliance of Families press conference this July. The Defense Department prohibited Major General Senja from speaking at this press conference held in Washington.
9. A brochure from Task Force Omega that gives a synopsis of much of the evidence that the POWs are still being held. While I am not supporting any single POW/MIA group over the others I am enclosing this brochure to give you some of the evidence that has been uncovered in the past.
10. Newspaper article entitled "Dealing With The Haunting Legacy".

The evidence is clear. POWs still being held either by the Communist nations of Southeast Asia or former Communists nations throughout the rest of the world.


It is extremely important that this lawsuit move forward. President Clinton has already allowed the IMF to give loans to Vietnam. Even though the U.S. still has a trade embargo in effect, American businesses are allowed to participate in the building of Vietnam using these IMF loans.

Unless the American people demand that the POW issue be resolved, I believe full normalization with Vietnam will take place later this year. Vietnam and Loas have held on to the POWs to use them as pawns in getting aid from the United States. If Vietnam's relationship with the United States is normalized and aid flows to Vietnam without the release of the POWs, Vietnam and Loas have no further use for the POWs. In fact, the POWs would become a liability to Vietnam and would probably be killed.

I strongly urge you to have your legislature pass a resolution joining with Michigan asking that our United States Supreme Court hear this issue. If the U.S. Supreme Court allows the states to have standing to bring this lawsuit, then we would demand discovery of government documents that have not been released to the public.

Please do all you can and keep me informed.

Sincerely Yours,

  
Alan L. Cropsey  
State Representative



ICF  
 2-7-94  
 asked who - behind the  
 HJR push?  
 crosses the  
 P.O. Box 8-2977  
 Fairbanks, Alaska 99708  
 04 January, 1994

The Honorable Jeannette James  
 Alaska State Legislature  
 State Capitol, Pouch V  
 Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Mrs. James:

For many veterans and families of servicemen, the Viet Nam war is a wound that has yet to heal. We were sent to do our government's bidding, but without the support of the nation, expressed in a formal declaration of war. We won the battles, but the war was lost. And the government that specifically instructed us that, if captured, to hold out, because it would secure our release -- that government has turned its back on hundreds of Americans "Missing in Action" or known to be "Prisoners of War". Of the more than 3,700 Americans known or suspected of being in enemy hands, fewer than one-sixth were returned during Operation Homecoming. Less than three weeks later, the United States government summarily declared all the other POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia dead, though it had extensive information to the contrary.

Our own government administratively buried the men we left behind -- or tried to. Various POW/MIA families and veterans groups knew that available evidence did not support the government's official position, and asked for "the rest of the story". What they got, instead, was a series of special commissions, Congressional hearings, and "fact-finding" trips which demonstrated what has been described by a former National Security Council Intelligence Chief as "a mindset to debunk", within the government. Whenever new evidence of American POW/MIA's would come to light, the "standard of proof" ante would be raised. The government conspicuously avoided having to take meaningful action on the issue.

Nevertheless, the public consciousness became aroused, through well-documented publications such as those listed on the attached "References" page and through more general articles in publications such as Reader's Digest (1/93), Airman (2/93), Parade (5/30/93), and VFW (9/93).

Recent news media coverage of the POW/MIA issue has focussed almost exclusively on the return of "remains" (the Viet Nameese are known to have stockpiled and catalogued over 400 sets - most not yet returned), and on the "excellent cooperation" of the Viet Nameese communist government in resolving remaining cases. (Only two sets of remains were identified during all of 1992, and only one set in 1993, through early December.) We're being told the United States should lift its trade embargo -- its last leverage on the Viet Nameese government -- so that American firms can prosper by freely doing business there (with one of the poorest countries in the world). Proponents of this position choose to ignore the likely fate of POW/MIA's, who would no longer be valuable to the Viet Nameese as political bargaining chips but rather would become serious liabilities, if discovered.

04 January, 1994

Before Americans consider doing business with Viet Nam, we need to bring our men home -- both those who remain alive and those dead of whom the Viet Nameese government could readily give an accounting.

In a fresh approach to obtaining release of more complete information on POW/MIA cases, so that pressure can be brought to bear for their return, the Michigan State Legislature last session passed a resolution enjoining their Attorney General to petition the United States Supreme Court, under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Their resolution asks the other states to join the action.

Enclosed is a copy of Michigan's House Concurrent Resolution No. 185, with the text highlighted to show the minimal changes necessary for it to become the text of a resolution of our own Alaska Legislature. With it are copies of letters dated 9/30, 11/17, and 11/23/93 from Rep. Alan Cropsey with attachments containing supporting documentation from a variety of sources.

Alaska has two POW/MIA's; they are

Anderson, Thomas E.	USMC	from Spenard
Koslosky, Howard M.	USN	from Anchorage


(Col. Floyd W. Richardson, USAF, from Anchorage, was listed as MIA on 3/03/67. His remains were returned 12/15/88.)

I respectfully request your sponsorship and support of a similar resolution by the Alaska House of Representatives, this session. The same request is being made to the Senate, through Senate President Rick Halford (copy attached). Copies of the Michigan Resolution and these cover letters are also being sent to local veterans organizations, asking them to express support for the resolution. If you would like additional information or have any questions, please call me at 488-1433 (evenings) or 451-2218 (days).

Please help close this chapter of American history with honor.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,



Gary C. Tyndall

Enclosures: As stated

cc(w/ resolution): Rep. Ramona Barnes, Speaker of the House  
 Rep. Gene Therriault, District 33  
 Rep. Richard Foster, Co-Chair, Military & Veterans Affairs  
 Rep. Eldon Mulder, Co-Chair, Military & Veterans Affairs

04 January, 1994

REFERENCES

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Plume/Penguin Books, New York, 1991

The Bamboo Cage, Nigel Cawthorne, U.S.Veteran News & Report, Kinston, N.C., 1991

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Bethesda, MD, 1993

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1987

Americans Abandoned, (VHS), American Defense Institute & Global Communications,  
1992



## THE AMERICAN LEGION

DEPARTMENT OF ALASKA  
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File HJR 51  
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February 23, 1994

The Honorable Jeannette James  
Alaska State Capitol  
Capitol Building, Room 501  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Representative James:

I was recently sent a copy of House Joint Resolution No. 51 and, as a Vietnam veteran, felt very proud of you as I read it.

As you may or may not know, our National Headquarters took a firm stand against lifting the embargo against Vietnam until we had a full accounting of those POW/MIAs left behind. Unfortunately, it appears that our President bowed to the pressure of big business.

I want you to know that you have our deepest gratitude for your efforts on HJR 51. It may seem a cold and lonely place you have opted to stand; however, I believe I can speak on behalf of the over 70 thousand veterans of this state when I say we are standing beside you.

I took the liberty of FAXing a copy of the resolution to our National Headquarters last week. Today, I received a call from a member on *The American Legion Magazine* staff. He wanted your full names and intends to put an article in the next issue addressing your efforts on HJR 51. That magazine goes to over 3,000,000 members living in every state of the Union and in many foreign countries. Perhaps your request to have other states join in the suit will be answered through that article.

Once again, thank you.

Sincerely,

Dean C. Hill  
Department Adjutant

cc: Rep. Gene Therriault  
Rep. Ed Willis

THE AMERICAN LEGION  
DEPARTMENT OF ALASKA

PHONE 278-8598  
FAX 278-0041

March 2nd, 1994

The Honorable Jeannette James  
Alaska State Capitol  
Capitol Building, Room 501  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Representative James:

On Friday, February 25th, I talked briefly with Representative Ed Willis. During that discussion, Ed indicated someone had expressed doubts to him about the accuracy of some of the information provided in HJR 51. Ed asked if I was aware of a knowledgeable authority at our National Headquarters who could review the Resolution. He said his primary concern was to save the Legislature from any embarrassment for voting on a Resolution containing incorrect support clauses.

I FAX'd a copy of the updated House Joint Resolution No. 51 (MLV) to John Sommer, Jr., the American Legion's Executive Director of Administration in Washington D.C. John is our National Headquarters' in-resident expert on Vietnam issues. Should you like to talk to him, his number is (202) 861-2711.

I asked John to read over the Resolution and let me know if there were any changes he would suggest that would improve the accuracy of the statements contained therein. John just called and recommended the following.

PAGE ONE:

1. In the 2nd WHEREAS (line 9), change to read, " WHEREAS the implied United States government position is that all ..."

2. In the 3rd WHEREAS (line 12), change the spelling of the General's last name from Kwong to Kwang.

PAGE TWO:

1. In the 2nd WHEREAS, (line 5), change to read, "...to the public, yet individuals within the federal ...".


2. In the 5th WHEREAS, (line 16), change to read, "...not actively searching for remaining Americans; and".

Stating he presumed the WHEREAS statement addressing the two missing and unaccounted for servicemen from Alaska was correct, Mr. Sommer indicated the remainder of the statements reflected factual information.

I have sent copies of HJR 51 to all Posts within the State and intend to address the American Legion, Department of Alaska's support for this Resolution at our next Department Executive Committee meeting to be held in Palmer, Alaska on March 10th.

Once again, thank you for your continued Veterans' support and submission of this most important Resolution.

Sincerely,



Dean C. Hill  
Department Adjutant

cc: Rep. Therriault  
Rep. Willis  
Rep. Martin  
Rep. Mulder  
Rep. Larson  
Mr. John Sommer, Jr., American Legion Executive Director of  
Administration



## THE AMERICAN LEGION

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March 21, 1994

The Honorable Jeannette James  
Alaska State Capitol  
Capitol Building, Room 501  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Representative James:

On March 10th, 1994, The American Legion, Department of Alaska's Executive Committee voted unanimously on behalf of its 9,000 members to support passage of HJR 51.


Our National Headquarters, representing over three million veteran Legionnaires, has adamantly opposed lifting the embargo against Vietnam for several years. As a Vietnam veteran and an Alaska resident, I felt a deep sense of pride in our great state when I became aware of HJR 51, sponsored by yourself, and co-sponsored by Representatives Therriault, Mulder and Martin.

The federal government has all but given up trying to obtain an accounting for over two thousand Americans missing in Southeast Asia. However, passage of HJR 51 will let them know Alaska will never rest until we have an accounting for our own.

Our National Headquarters has taken a keen interest in HJR 51. They indicated they intend to address it in the next copy of the *LEGION* magazine, going to those three million members mentioned earlier. Perhaps passage of HJR 51 will become contagious and start grass roots movements in the other states. I believe it will.

I am asking that you consider only two things when you have an opportunity to vote on HJR 51: What if Thomas E. Andersson, USMC, or Howard M. Koslosky, USN, were your own father, son, brother or neighbor? And, don't we owe this to those missing Alaskans and their families?

For God and Country,



George P. Sterbenz  
Department Commander

# Alaska State Legislature

REPRESENTATIVE  
JEANNETTE JAMES

P.O. Box 56622  
North Pole, Alaska 99705  
(907) 465-0862

House District 34



White House  
State Capitol  
Juneau, Alaska  
99801-1182  
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## House Of Representatives SPONSOR STATEMENT

2/3/94

HJR 51

### **Requesting the Governor to file suit against the U.S. and others over POW/MIA'S from Alaska**

There is continuing controversy concerning the presence of American servicemen, who were listed as Prisoners of War or Missing in action and may be being held against their will in the Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia).

The United States government has stated that all of our Prisoners of War have been returned from Vietnam. A top secret Vietnamese report, dated 1972, by General Tran Von Kwong, Deputy Chief of Staff for the North Vietnamese Army, reported that in September of 1972 Hanoi held 1,205 American prisoners. Only 591 American Prisoners of War have been released under the 1973 Peace Settlement.

There are two missing and unaccounted for servicemen in Southeast Asia from Alaska.

I request that the Alaska Legislature hereby require the Governor of the state of Alaska, on behalf of the people of the state of Alaska, to file in the United States Supreme Court a cause of action against the government of the United States. Including the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies, and also against the ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls of the governments of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Russia, and China, alleging violation of civil rights of the people of Alaska. Especially alleging the violation of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness of the following named citizens of the State of Alaska, **Thomas E. Anderson, U.S.M.C. Spenard** and **Howard M. Koslosky U.S.N. Anchorage.**

## Yeltsin Drops a Bombshell

Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, raising the possibility that U.S. military personnel missing since the Vietnam War might still be alive, inadvertently re-opened a painful chapter in the nation's history.

It was a bolt from out of the blue: Yeltsin, while traveling to his summit with President Bush, told NBC News on June 15 that American prisoners of war (POWs) from the Vietnam War might still be held in the former Soviet Union.

"We don't have complete data and can only surmise that some of them may still be alive," Yeltsin said through an interpreter. "That is why our investigations are continuing. Some of them may have ended up in psychiatric asylums."

For lawmakers and the family members of 2,200 men still listed as missing in action (MIAs) from the Vietnam War, the disclosure triggered a whirl of emotions—hope that some MIAs could have survived the war, dread over their possible conditions after two decades in a Soviet gulag. U.S. officials immediately began scrambling for evidence.

The revelation also came several months after a spate of widely publicized photographs purporting to show U.S. military personnel still in captivity in Southeast Asia, which also spurred hopes among the families of MIAs.

But those hopes were dashed when Pentagon investigators determined the photos to be fraudulent.

President Bush dispatched Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and the co-chairman of a joint Russian-U.S. commission on POWs/MIAs, to review evidence compiled by Russia. But some Defense Department officials, while vowing that the government would fully investigate Yeltsin's statement, reportedly were skeptical of his claim.

The select committee, meanwhile, acted on separate reports that an American from the Korean War was being held near the Ural Mountains in Russia. Kerry said June 17 that the panel's Moscow-based investigator was traveling to the area to investigate the matter.

### Personal Diplomacy

Yeltsin's disclosure initially threatened to overshadow the purpose of his visit: Instead of talking to policy-makers about aid and arms control, he was peppered with questions about MIAs.

The bombshell prompted some lawmakers to call for a delay in congressional action on the administration's aid proposal for the former Soviet republics, at least until the story could be checked out.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., perhaps the most famous POW from the Vietnam War, said June 16 that Congress should not move on the aid package "without obtaining a complete report on President Yeltsin's statement."

Through some personal diplomacy, Yeltsin managed



to assuage McCain and other anxious members. Following his triumphant June 17 speech to a joint meeting of Congress, during which he vowed quick action to resolve the issue, Yeltsin asked to meet privately with McCain.

The senator was impressed. "He looked me right in the eye and said 'look, I guarantee this, and I will get this done,'" McCain said after his brief

meeting with Yeltsin. "I can't ask anything more than that."

McCain indicated that he would not oppose the aid on the basis of his concerns.

Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and a Vietnam veteran, reacted cautiously to Yeltsin's statements, indicating that the Russian president had only mentioned the possibility that Americans could be alive.

But Kerry acknowledged that the notion of Americans being held in Soviet psychiatric hospitals is "disturbing to everybody."

And while the select committee sought to clarify Yeltsin's statement, it also became embroiled in presidential politics when undeclared candidate Ross Perot refused a request from the panel to testify about his efforts to search for MIAs and POWs in Vietnam.

In a June 16 letter to Kerry, Perot said he feared that in the current political climate, his appearance "could become a rerun of the Judge [Clarence] Thomas/Anti Hill hearings."

But the committee decided against issuing a subpoena to the popular Perot. Instead, Kerry said he would "give him a call. There's no sense of confrontation with the committee; I want to emphasize that."

### A Simmering Issue

Bush said on June 17 that, in light of Yeltsin's pledge to return any captured POWs to their families, he hoped "that matter has been disposed of." But the sensitivity of the POW-MIA issue — as well as Yeltsin's sometimes confusing statements — appear likely to keep it simmering.

Yeltsin told reporters after his address to Congress that a presidential commission he established to review reports of American POWs had reviewed the archives of the KGB and the former Communist Party.

"Amongst the 22,554 names that the commission has so far investigated, there were names of the American prisoners of war in Vietnam, which the Vietnamese at that time transferred to the former Soviet Union," he said.

But in a June letter to the Senate panel, Yeltsin used the same figure as the number of American POWs repatriated by Soviet troops after World War II.

And in that letter he said "no date are as yet available" on American prisoners being transferred to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the war.

—Carroll J. Doherty

## ADDRESS TO CONGRESS

# 'There Will Be No More Lies,' Yeltsin Vows to the Nation

*Russian pledges action on POWs, asks American support,  
saying 'there is no alternative to reform'*

*On June 17, Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin addressed a joint meeting of the House and Senate. Following is the Reuter transcript of his remarks, delivered through an interpreter. (Story p. 1812)*

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen:

It is indeed a great honor for me to address the Congress of the great land of freedom as the first-ever, over 1,000 years of history of Russia, popularly elected president, as a citizen of the great country which has made its choice in favor of liberty and democracy.

For many years, our two nations were the two poles, the two opposites. They wanted to make us implacable enemies. That affected the destinies of the world in a most tragic way.

The world was shaken by the storms of confrontation. It was close to exploding; close to perishing beyond salvation.

That evil scenario is becoming a thing of the past. Reason begins to triumph over madness. We have left behind the period when America and Russia looked at each other through gun sights, ready to pull the trigger at any time.

Despite what we saw in the well-known American film, "The Day After," it can be said today, tomorrow will be a day of peace, less of fear and more of hope for the happiness of our children.

The world can sigh in relief. The idol of communism, which spread everywhere social strife, animosity and unparalleled brutality, which instilled fear in humanity, has collapsed.

It has collapsed never to rise again. I am here to assure you, we will not let it rise again in our land.

I am glad that the people of Russia have found strength to shake off the crushing burden of the totalitarian system. I am proud that I am addressing you on behalf of the great people whose dignity is restored.

I admire ordinary Russian men and women who, in spite of severe trials, have preserved their intellectual integrity and are enduring tremendous hardships for the



BY MICHAEL LEWIS

Addressing Congress June 17, Yeltsin vowed to account for any American POWs in the former Soviet Union.

sake of the revival of their country.

Russia has made its final choice in favor of a civilized way of life, common sense and universal human heritage. I am convinced that our people will reach that goal. There is no people on this earth who could be harmed by the air of freedom. There are no exceptions to that rule.

Liberty sets the mind free, fosters independence and unorthodox thinking and ideas. But it does not offer instant prosperity or happiness and wealth to everyone. This is something that politicians in particular must keep in mind. Even the most benevolent intentions will inevitably be abandoned and committed to oblivion if they are not translated into everyday efforts.

Our experience of the recent years has conclusively pointed that out. Liberty will not be fooled. There can be no coexistence between democracy and a totalitarian state system. There can be no coexistence between market economy and powers who control everything and everyone.

There can be no coexistence between a

civic society, which is pluralist by definition, and communist intolerance to dissent. The experience of the past decade has taught us: Communism has no human face. Freedom and communism are incompatible.

You will recall August 1991, when for three days Russia was under the dark cloud of dictatorship.

I addressed the Muscovites who were defending the White House of Russia. I addressed all the people of Russia. I addressed them standing on top of the tank whose crew had disobeyed criminal orders.

I will be careful with you. At that moment, I feared. But I had no fear for myself. I feared for the future of democracy in Russia and throughout the world. Because I was aware what could happen if we failed to win.

Citizens of Russia upheld their freedom and did not allow the continuation of the 75 years of nightmare. From this high rostrum I want to express our sincere thanks and gratitude to President Bush and to the American people for their invaluable moral support for the just cause of the people of Russia.

Last year citizens of Russia passed another difficult test of maturity. We chose to forgo vengeance and the intoxicating craving for summary justice over the fallen colossus known under the name of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

There was no replay of history. The Communist Party citadel, next to the Kremlin, the Communist Bastille, was not destroyed. There was not a hint of violence against Communists in Russia. People simply brushed off the venomous dust of the past and went about their business.

There were no lynch law trials in Russia. The doings of the Communist Party over many years have been referred to the constitutional court of the Russian Federation. I am confident that its verdict will be fair.

Russia has seen for itself that any delay in strengthening the foundations of freedom and democracy can throw the society far back. For us the ominous lesson of the past is relevant today as never before. It was precisely in a devastated country, with an economy in near paralysis, that

Bolsheviks succeeded in building a totalitarian regime, creating a gigantic war machine and an insatiable military-industrial complex.

### Economic and Political Reforms

This must not be allowed to happen again. That is why economic and political reforms are the primary tasks for Russia today. We are facing the challenges that no one has ever faced before at any one time.

We must carry through unprecedented reforms in the economy, which over the seven decades has been stripped of all market infrastructure; lay the foundations for democracy; and restore the rule of law in the country that for scores of years was poisoned with political strife and political oppression.

We have no right to fail in this most difficult endeavor, for there will be no second try, as it sports. Our predecessors have used them all up. The reforms must succeed.

I am given strength by the support of the majority of the citizens of Russia. The people of Russia are aware that there is no alternative to reform, and that this is very important.

My job, as everybody else's in Russia, is not an easy one. But in everything I do, I have the reliable and invaluable support of my wife, and of my entire large family.

Today I am telling you what I tell my fellow countrymen: I will not go back on the reforms. And it is practically impossible to topple Yeltsin in Russia. I am in good health, and I will not say "uncle" before I make the reforms irreversible.

We realize our great responsibility for the success of our changes, not only toward the people of Russia but also toward the citizens of America and of the entire world.

Today the freedom of America is being upheld in Russia. Should the reforms fail, it will cost hundreds of billions to upset that failure.

### Now Arms Treaty

Yesterday we concluded an unprecedented agreement on cutting down strategic offensive arsenals. They will be reduced radically in two phases, not by 30 or 40 percent, as negotiated previously over 15 years. They will be slashed to less than one-third of today's strength — from 21,000 nuclear warheads on both sides down to 6,000 to 7,000 by the year 2000. And it has taken us only five months to negotiate. And I fervently hope that George Bush and myself will be there in the year 2000 to preside over that.

We have simply no right to miss this unique opportunity, the more so that arms and the future of Russian reforms designed to make impossible any restoration of the totalitarian dictatorship in Russia are so dramatically interrelated.

I am here to say that we have the firm determination and the political will to move forward. We have proved that by what we have done.

It is Russia that has put an end to the imperial policies and was the first to recog-

nize the independence of the Baltic republics.

Russia is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has averted uncontrolled disintegration of the former empire and the threat of a general interethnic blood bath.

Russia has granted tangible powers to its autonomous republics. The treaty of federation has been signed, and our nation has escaped the fate of the Soviet Union.

Russia has preserved its unity. It was Russia that substantially slowed down the flywheel of militarization and is doing all a man to stop it altogether.

I am formally announcing that, with out waiting for the treaty to be signed, we have begun taking off alert the heavy SS-18 missiles targeted on the United States of America.

And the defense minister of Russia is here in this room to confirm that.

Russia has brought its policies toward a number of countries in line with its solemn declarations of the recent years. We have stopped arms deliveries to Afghanistan, where the senseless military adventure has taken thousands of Russian and hundreds of thousands of Afghan lives.

With external props removed, the puppet regime collapsed.

We have corrected the well-known imbalances in relations with Cuba. At present that country is one of our Latin American partners. Our commerce with Cuba is based on universally accepted principles and world prices.

### An End to Double Standards

It is Russia that once and for all has done away with double standards in foreign policy. We are firmly resolved not to lie any more, either to our negotiating partners, or to the Russian or American or any other people.

There will be no more lies — ever.

The same applies to biological weapons experiments and the facts that have been revealed about American prisoners of war, the KAL 007 flight and many other things. That list could be continued.

The archives of the KGB and the Communist Party Central Committee are being opened.

Moreover, we are inviting the cooperation of the United States and other nations to investigate these dark pages.

I promise you that each and every document in each and every archive will be examined in order to investigate the fate of every American unaccounted for. As president of Russia, I assure you that even if one American has been detained in my country, and can still be found, I will find him; I will get him back to his family.

*(sustained applause)*

I thank you for the applause. I could see everybody rise.

Some of you who have just risen here to applaud me have also written in the press that until Yeltsin gets things done and gets all the jobs done, there should be no Freedom Support Act passing through the Congress.

Weil, I don't really quite understand you, ladies and gentlemen. This matter has been investigated, and is being investigated. Yeltsin has already opened the archives, and is inviting you to join us in investigating the fate of each and every unaccounted American.

So now you are telling me: first, do the job, and then we shall support you in passing that act. I don't quite understand you.

We have made tangible moves to make contact between Russia and foreign business communities much easier. Under the recent legislation, foreign nationals who privatize a facility or a building in Russia are given property rights to the plot of land on which they are located.

Legislation on bankruptcy has been recently enacted.

Mandatory sale of foreign currency to the state, at an artificially low rate of exchange, has been ended.

We are ready to bring our legal practice, as much as possible, in line with world standards, of course on the basis of symmetry with each country.

We are inviting the private sector of the United States to invest in the unique and untapped Russian market. And I am saying: Do not be late.

### U.S. Policy

Now that the period of global confrontation is behind us, I call upon you to take a fresh look at the current policy of the United States toward Russia, and also to take a fresh look at the longer-term prospects of our relations.

Russia is a different country today. Sometimes the obsolete standards brought into being by a different era are artificially imposed on new realities.

True, that equally applies to us. Let us together, therefore, master the art of reconciling differences on the basis of partnership, which is the most efficient and democratic way.

This would come naturally both for the Russians and the Americans. If this is done, many of the problems which are now impeding mutual advantageous cooperation between Russia and the United States will become irrelevant, and I mean legislative frameworks too.

It will not be a wasteful endeavor. On the contrary, it will promote a more efficient solution of your problems, as well as of ours. And of course it will create new jobs, in Russia as well as in the United States.

History is giving us a chance to fulfill President [Woodrow] Wilson's dream, namely, to make the world safe for democracy.

More than 30 years ago, President [John F.] Kennedy addressed these words to humanity: "My fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America can do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man."

I believe that his inspired call for working together toward a democratic world is addressed above all to our two peoples, to the great...

the people of Russia.

Partnership and friendship of our two largest democracies, in strengthening democracy, is indeed a great goal.

Joining the world community, we wish to preserve our identity, our own image and history, promote culture, strengthen moral standards of our people.

We find relevant the warning of the great Russian philosopher, Berdyaev, who said to negate Russia in the name of humankind is to rob humankind.

At the same time, Russia does not aspire to change the world in its own image. It is the fundamental principle of the new Russia to be generous and to share experience, moral values and emotional warmth, rather than to impose and curse.

It is the tradition of the Russian people to repay kindness with kindness. This is the bedrock of the Russian lifestyle, the underlying truth revealed by the great Russian culture.

Free and democratic Russia will remain committed to this tenet. Today, free and democratic Russia is extending its hand of friendship to the people of America. Acting on the will of the people of Russia, I am inviting you, and through you, the people of the United States, to join us in partnership in the quest for freedom and justice in the 21st century.

The Russo-American dialogue has gone through many a dramatic moment. But the peoples of Russia and America have never gone to war against each other. Even in the darkest periods, our affinity prevailed over our hatred.

In this context, I would like to recall something that took place 50 years ago. The unprecedented war, world war, was waging. Russia, which was bleeding white, and all our people were looking forward to the opening of the second front. And it was opened, first and foremost, thanks to the active stance taken by President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and by the entire American people.

Sometimes I think that if today, like during that war, a second but peaceful front could be opened to promote democratic market reforms, their success would be guaranteed early.

The passing by Congress of the Freedom Support Act could become the first step in that direction.

Today legislation promoting reforms is much more important than appropriation of funds.

May I express the hope that the United States Congress, as the staunch advocate of freedom, will remain faithful to its strategic course on this occasion as well.

Members of Congress, every man is a man of his own time. No exception is ever made for anyone, whether an ordinary citizen or the president. Much experience has been gained; many things have been reassessed.

I would like now to conclude my statement with the words from a song by Irving Berlin, an American of Russian descent: God bless America, to which I add, and Russia. ■

## JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE

# Bush, Yeltsin Announce Accord On Speeding Arms Reductions

*Following is the Reuter transcript of the joint announcement June 16 by President Bush and Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin on the new strategic arms agreement and on the POW/MIA question. Yeltsin spoke through an interpreter.*

**PRESIDENT BUSH:** Let me just say that I'm pleased to announce that President Yeltsin and I have just reached an extraordinary agreement on two areas of vital importance to our countries and to the world. First, we have agreed on far-reaching new strategic arms reductions, building on the agreement reached with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Our two countries are now agreeing to even further dramatic strategic arms reductions substantially below the levels determined by START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty].

We have agreed to eliminate the world's most dangerous weapons, heavy

months.

Our ability to reach this agreement so quickly is a tribute to the new relationship between the United States and Russia and to the personal leadership of our guest, Boris Yeltsin.

In the near future, the United States and Russia will record our agreement in a brief treaty document that President Yeltsin and I will sign and submit for ratification in our countries.

President Yeltsin and I have also agreed to work together, along with the allies and other interested states, to develop a concept for a global protection system against limited ballistic missile attack.

And we will explore a senior group — or we will establish a senior group — to explore practical steps toward that end, including the sharing of early warning and cooperation in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies.

This group will also explore the development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements, and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement the global protection system.

That group is headed by [State Department Policy Planning Director] Dennis Ross for the United States [and] will first meet in Moscow within the next 30 days.

In conclusion, these are remarkable steps for our two countries, a departure from the tensions and the suspicions of the past, and a tangible, important expression of our new relationship. They also hold major promise for a future world protected against the danger of limited ballistic missile attack.

### Yeltsin Responds

**PRESIDENT YELTSIN:** Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to add a few words to what President Bush has just announced here.

What we have achieved is an unparalleled and probably an unexpected thing for you and for the whole world. You are the first to hear about this historic decision, which has been reached today after just five months of negotiations. We are in fact meeting a sharp, dramatic reduction in the total number for the two sides of the number of nuclear warheads, from 21,000 to 6,000 or 7,000 for the United States of America and Russia.

Indeed, we have been able to cut over those five months of negotiations the total number of nuclear warheads to one-third, while it took 15 years under the START treaty to make some reductions.

This is an expression of the funda-

**"With this agreement, the nuclear nightmare recedes more and more for ourselves, for our children and for our grandchildren."**

—President Bush

ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, and dramatically reduce our total strategic nuclear weapons.

Those dramatic reductions will take place in two phases. They will be completed no later than the year 2003 and may be completed as early as the year 2000 if the United States can assist Russia in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems.

With this agreement, the nuclear nightmare recedes more and more for ourselves, for our children and for our grandchildren.

Just a few years ago, the United States was planning a strategic nuclear stockpile of about 13,000 warheads. Now President Yeltsin and I have agreed that both sides will go down to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, with each nation determining its own force structure within that range.

And I'd like to point out that this fundamental agreement, which in earlier years could not have been completed even in a decade, has been completed in only five

AO432 -----

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RUSSIAN IDENTIFIES MARINE MISSING FROM KOREA AS SOVIET PRISONER IN 1960S  
BY ROBERT BURNS

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A RETIRED RUSSIAN MILITARY OFFICER HAS RAISED FRESH QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER SOME U.S. SERVICEMEN CAPTURED IN THE KOREAN WAR MAY HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

VLADIMIR MAKPOVICH MALININ, A 74-YEAR-OLD RETIRED COLONEL AND SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET MVD, OR INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY, HAS TOLD U.S. OFFICIALS THAT PHOTOS OF A MARINE MISSING IN KOREA MATCHED THE LIKENESS OF A MAN HE HAD SEEN IN A SIBERIAN PRISON CAMP IN THE 1960S.

UNTIL NOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THERE WAS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT ANY AMERICAN SERVICEMEN WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION FROM KOREA. RUSSIAN OFFICIALS, AND BEFORE THEM OFFICIALS OF THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE CONSISTENTLY DENIED THAT ANY SUCH TRANSFERS OF PRISONERS TOOK PLACE DURING THE WAR.

IN AN INTERVIEW AT HIS HOME WITH MEMBERS OF A JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN TEAM ON AUGUST 28, MALININ SAID THAT WHILE VISITING THE COMMANDER OF A PRISON IN THE SIBERIAN CITY OF MAGADAN IN THE 1960S, HE NOTICED THE UNUSUAL SIGHT OF A MAN IN PRISON CLOTHES WALKING BY HIMSELF IN A LARGE CIRCLE AROUND THE EXERCISE AREA.

"MALININ SAID HE ASKED THE COMMANDER ABOUT THIS, AND WAS TOLD THAT THE MAN WAS A U.S. SPY WHO HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM A CAMP OF THE GULAG TO THE PRISON," ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEW, OBTAINED WEDNESDAY.

THE MAN, ACCORDING TO MALININ'S PHOTO IDENTIFICATION, WAS MARINE CORPS SGT. PHILIP VINCENT MANDRA, AN INFANTRYMAN CAPTURED DURING AN ENCOUNTER WITH CHINESE FORCES IN NORTH KOREA ON AUG. 7, 1952. HE INITIALLY WAS LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION BUT IN JANUARY 1954 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DECLARED HIM DEAD. HIS BODY WAS NEVER RECOVERED.

IN THE INTERVIEW, MALININ WAS SHOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN UNACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE 1950-53 KOREAN WAR. HE PICKED OUT TWO: ONE OF MANDRA IN KOREA BEFORE HIS DISAPPEARANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE OTHER A COMPUTER-ENHANCED PICTURE OF WHAT MANDRA WOULD LOOK LIKE TODAY AT AGE 62.

MALININ DIDN'T KNOW MANDRA'S NAME BUT SAID HE RECOGNIZED HIM FROM TWO VISITS TO THE MAGADAN PRISON IN THE 1960S.

MALININ TOLD THE INTERVIEWERS HE HAD GOTTEN A GOOD LOOK AT THE PRISONER AT MAGADAN. HE "FIRMLY STATED" THAT HE WAS SURE THE PRISONER WAS MANDRA, ACCORDING TO THE SUMMARY REPORT PREPARED SEPT. 13 BY OFFICIALS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

U.S. OFFICIALS CONSIDER MALININ'S TESTIMONY TO BE CREDIBLE.

A COPY OF A VIDEOTAPE OF THE INTERVIEW WITH MALININ IS BEING PROVIDED TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. THE TAPE ITSELF IS BEING SENT TO U.S. INVESTIGATORS IN WASHINGTON.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON TUESDAY OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED MANDRA'S SISTER, IRENE MANDRA OF FARMINGDALE, N.Y., OF THE MALININ INTERVIEW.

MS. MANDRA SAID WEDNESDAY SHE HAS KEPT ON HER WALL A LETTER RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER IN 1954 EXPRESSING SYMPATHY FOR HER BROTHER'S DEATH. SHE WAS THRILLED TO BE TOLD THERE IS NEW EVIDENCE HE WAS NOT KILLED AND WAS SEEN ALIVE AS RECENTLY AS 1966.

"I'M FRAYING AND HOPING THE PENTAGON WILL FOLLOW UP" AND PRESS THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ACCESS TO RECORDS THAT COULD REVEAL HER BROTHER'S FATE, SHE SAID.

MALININ MADE HIMSELF KNOWN TO THE U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POWS BY ANSWERING A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT SEEKING INFORMATION

# Supreme Court to Hear POW Issue

...ies of American  
... didn't come  
... from Vietnam  
... the Clinton  
... ration smuggle  
... e communist  
... ithout a fight.

BY THE SPOTLIGHT

MIKE BLAIR

House is being hauled  
...reme Court for violat-  
... rights of American  
... IAs that it abandoned  
... nists at the end of the

...ll be a landmark case,  
...orney General Frank  
...g suit in the Supreme  
...g the U.S. government,  
... the Department of De-

sense and the nation's intelligence  
agencies, with failure to account for  
Michigan's 72 POWs and MIAs still  
missing and unaccounted for from  
the Southeast Asian war.

The state's action is being taken as  
allowed by Article 3, Section 2 of the  
U.S. Constitution, which allows a  
state to by-pass lower federal courts  
in bringing actions against the federal  
government.

The section states: "In all cases af-  
fecting ambassadors, other public  
ministers and counsels, and those in  
which a state shall be a party, the  
Supreme Court shall have the original  
jurisdiction."

#### OTHERS ACCUSED

In addition to the U.S. government  
and its agencies, the state will also  
charge in the suit "ambassadors or  
other public ministers and consuls of  
the governments of Vietnam, Laos,

7 Kampuchea (Cambodia), Russia (former  
USSR), (Red) China, Australia,  
Canada, and France, alleging viola-  
tion of civil rights of the people of  
Michigan, especially alleging the viola-  
tion of the right to life, liberty, and  
the pursuit of happiness" of the 72  
Michigan servicemen who were left  
behind at the end of the war.

The action by Attorney General  
Kelly was precipitated by a concu-  
rent resolution unanimously passed  
by the Michigan Legislature and in-  
troduced by State Rep. Alan Cropsey.

Although the resolution calling for  
the attorney general to take the ac-  
tion was non-binding, Kelly immedi-  
ately indicated that he would com-  
mence the maneuver in the Supreme  
Court.

Specifically, the Michigan resolu-  
tion calls for the release by all of the  
accused of all documents relating to  
Michigan's POWs and MIAs.

The resolution also calls for "the  
sister forty-nine states of the United  
States of America . . . to join in this  
action on behalf of their state and  
the citizens of their state who are  
being held in captivity in Southeast  
Asia."

Copies of the resolution are to be  
sent to the clerks of all of the legisla-  
tures of the other 49 states.

According to Paul E. Rifenberg, a  
Niles, Michigan, POW-MIA activist,  
citizens of other states interested in  
getting the action initiated in their  
states can use Michigan resolution  
HCR 186 to present their state legis-  
lators to use as a model for drafting  
similar legislation.

They can contact Rep. Cropsey by  
writing to the Michigan House of  
Representatives in Lansing and re-  
quest a copy of the resolution or by  
calling his legislative office at 517-  
373-1778.

517-373-1778

On September 2, 1993, the Russian side of the U.S. - Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs provided Ambassador Malcolm Toon, the U.S. co-chairman of the Commission, a document possibly related to U.S. POWs held in Vietnam. The document came from the files of the GRU -- Soviet military intelligence.

According to an unofficial translation, the document states that the total number of American aviators held captive at the time was 735, but that only 368 names were made public. According to the document, the 368 aviator POWs were to be released when the U.S. agreed to withdraw from South Vietnam, and the remainder were to be released when the U.S. withdrawal was completed.

The document, in the Russian language, purports to be a portion of comments made during the 20th Plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party in late 1970 or early 1971.

The material received from the Russians consists of a title page and two pages of text from a lengthier document (remaining text not provided to the U.S.). An additional, unrelated note was also provided. The note, dated February 6, 1973, and signed by CPSU official I. Ognatov, is in fact an addendum to the September 1972 speech attributed Tran Van Quang, known as the "1205 document," and is unrelated to this document.

At the time the "1205 document" appeared, the U.S. Government committed to continue searching for further information relating to our POW/MIAs. Ambassador Toon's August 28 trip to Moscow, which led to the discovery of this new document, is evidence of this commitment.

This new document has not been analyzed. The Department of Defense can not speak to its authenticity, or the accuracy or validity of its information until it has undergone a thorough review by the intelligence community.

The unofficial translation from the Russian language version of the document and the unrelated note received at the same time are attached.

-END-

WAR-ERA CONFLICTS.

MS. MANDRA SAID SHE WAS TOLD MALININ SAW MANDRA AT THE PRISON IN 1963 AND 1966.

'ACCORDING TO MALININ, HE WAS TOLD THAT PRISONERS WHO WERE SENT THERE WERE NOT INTENDED EVER TO RETURN (AND DID NOT RETURN),' THE U.S. SUMMARY REPORT SAID.

THE REPORT ALSO SAID MALININ TOLD U.S. INVESTIGATORS IN THE INTERVIEW THAT WHILE IN MAGADAN IN THE 1960S HE WAS TOLD BY A KGB OFFICER THAT FOUR AMERICANS WERE IN A HOSPITAL A FEW MILES SOUTH OF A PRISON CAMP AT SUSUMAN, WHICH IS ROUGHLY 200 MILES NORTH OF MAGADAN. NO OTHER DETAILS ON THIS WERE PROVIDED.

REP. PETER KING, A NEW YORK REPUBLICAN WHOSE DISTRICT INCLUDES FARMINGDALE, SAID HE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK DELEGATION INTEND TO PRESS PRESIDENT CLINTON AND RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN TO PURSUE ANY AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS ABOUT MANDRA.

APNT-09-16-93 0029CDT

5.

Informal translation of page 1:

NOTE

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To document No. 38995 of 1 December 1972

The instruction was OBE'd by the development of the situation.

Comrade Katushev, K.F. was informed.

Director of Section of a Division of the CC CPSU

(I. Ognatov)

6 February 1973

ENC 2

undertake a preemptive blow at our rear, he achieves a massive advance in the theater of military activity.

Our losses from the enemies aerial activities are great. Nevertheless, the enemy does not have the power by air attack alone to cause us such losses as would have fatal effects for us. But if the enemy, using his diversionary forces (and also other troops) undertakes an invasion of the North, we will suffer great losses. Therefore, we should raise our alertness, oppose all moves by the aggressors, because, in our opinion, the enemy can make such an invasion with land forces and marines with the strong support of aviation and the fleet. We presuppose that the enemy will not attempt to invade not all the territory of North Vietnam, but only those regions where there are important lines of communication leading into Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. In addition to accomplishing its military goals, the enemy is counting on putting political pressure on us through its invasion, to demoralize the nation, force it to refuse to carry out the battle to free the South.

Now I would like to settle on one more question -- about American aviator POW's. The total number of American aviator POW's in the DRV is 735. As I have already said, we have published the names of 168 aviators. This is our diplomatic step. If the Americans agree to the withdrawal of all their troops from South Vietnam we will, as a start, return to them these 168 people. And when the Americans withdraw their troops we will return to them the rest. In connection with the above, the question of American aviator POW's has great importance for us.

On the whole, speaking of the situation in South Vietnam, I would like to underline that it is favorable to us, although we have met with serious difficulties. We will try to do all that is required of us to achieve even greater successes in South Vietnam.

In Cambodia, after the reactivation of negotiations on 18 March 1970 and the entry of U.S.-Saigon troops onto her territory

informal translation of page 2:

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR  
Main Intelligence Directorate

Top Secret

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

REPORT  
OF KHOANG ANYA, SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE P  
THE WPV AT THE XX PLENUM OF THE CC WPV AT THE END OF  
DECEMBER 1970 - BEGINNING OF 1971

(Translation from Vietnamese)

(handwritten note: indecipherable "p. II, 18")

Moscow - 1971

0937(?)

large quantity of the enemy. Together with this, we avoided large losses on our part. This was also a great victory for our strategic line.

Now, another question. When we published the names of 368 American fliers, shot down and captured on the territory of the SRV, opportunists began to say that this was a concession to the Americans. This is not correct. It is not a concession, but a political blow aimed at Nixon. We have achieved much through this. Opportunists also say that we are making concessions to the Americans at the negotiations in Paris. This is also untrue. Our line at the negotiations is correct.

In this fashion, we are as a whole following a correct line, although we do allow as that there may have been some errors. But the opportunist grouping grasps at these minor errors in order to prove that the entire course of our party is mistaken. Its members say that we are afraid of difficulties and sacrifices. This is not true. We do not fear sacrifices and difficulties, but you need to take something else into account as well -- our people have carried out a constant military struggle for 25 years. During that time very many people have died. If we truly were afraid of sacrifices and difficulties, as the oppositionists state, we would not have started the armed battle against the Americans. But it is necessary to see the link between victories and losses and objectively evaluate the situation.

For us, naturally, there are mistakes on military questions in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in questions of the economic construction of the SRV, in questions of raising the level of well-being of the population. We are particularly worried by the question of raising the the living standard of the people. It is necessary to take into account that in this sense our abilities are limited for now, and that therefore this problem has not been solved. And in addition to everything else, the opposition helps prevent us from solving it.

We clearly see all the mistakes of the oppositionist grouping, and at this plenum we have carefully analyzed their views and will wage a decisive fight with them. We recognize they have the right and possibility to admit their mistakes and correct them. Then they can again serve the party and nation.

[TFR 116-1]  
Top Secret  
Copy No. 1

(stamp 'TsK KPSS  
1 Dec 72 38995  
SUBJECT TO RETURN  
TO THE GENERAL SECTION  
OF THE TsK KPSS')  
(handwritten '15 Dec 72')

TsK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party  
of the Soviet Union)

I am reporting:

Translation of the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vietnamese People's Army, General-Lieutenant Chan Van Quang (Tran Van Quang), at the Politburo session, TsK PTV (Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam), 15 September 1972.

This report outlines the measures which are being carried out by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South Vietnam to develop opportunities for cooperation with and for recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government and army to the side of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been established and meetings conducted with several civilian and military leaders, to include generals Ngo Din' Dru (Commander, 2nd Regional Corps), Nguyen Khan and Syong Van Min' (former leader of the Saigon administration), Khoang Guan Lam (former Commander, 1st Regional Corps) and others.

According to the speaker, during these meetings many of the generals have spoken against the Thieu (Thieu) regime and against the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization", have acknowledged the major victories of the Patriotic forces and also agreed to be part of the future coalition government for South Vietnam. The leadership of the DRV is convinced that even though they have anticommunist views, such people will be able to greatly assist the Patriots in overthrowing the Thieu dictatorship and in forming a coalition government.

Tran Van Quang has presented the contents of the plan "Ba Be" which is planned for execution in South Vietnam. This plan envisions the resolution of a number of tasks, the principal one of which is the physical extermination of the reactionary leaders

Dear comrades!

I reported to you earlier about the situation which has developed, about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's conflict against the American imperialists. I will dwell on the main tasks of the people and the army of North and South Vietnam which were proposed by the 23rd Plenum of the TSK PTU.

These tasks once again confirm our resoluteness to attain victory. This is a very correct course for our party and people in the contemporary stage of conflict. We have already worked out measures for realizing the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the TSK. We will also dwell on a number of the Supreme Command's and the Government Defense Council's positions, in which an evaluation of our victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the present is given.

The military situation for us is developing favorably on all fronts. A number of profound changes which took place in the military situation demanded that we develop a necessary point of view for solving all issues which come up during the war. Several meetings between us and the US aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue have already taken place.

We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by the American side. With assistance from a number of countries, there should have been secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at drawing up a solution to the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place. They once again testified to the deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side. As previously, we have maintained our position, the essence of which includes the following: if the US truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else it must refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and only afterwards will we engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This demand is the main tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists.

If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then the peace negotiations between us and the US will not yield any results.

Hence,  
Keep back  
POWs.

During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our strategic and tactical line [direction, orientation] was clearly evident.

I earlier analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great victories we have attained and I also explained the shortcomings and mistakes that we made during the general offensive. The lessons we learned from analysing the mistakes we made were also discussed. I stated all of this to the Politburo in order to work out a direction for solving the fundamental principal problems.

Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the scope of our future offensive.

We organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives aimed at preparing a solution of the military and political issues in South Vietnam according to the Politburo's and State Defense Council's plan, we organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives. These meetings have great significance for us, and we are affiliating several of our plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]. A number of our comrades have met with representatives of the South Vietnamese authorities, and it can be said that we have succeeded in winning their sympathy at these meetings. We were able to exchange ideas not only orally, but also in written form during these meetings and contacts. This gave us the opportunity to draw definite conclusions. Recently, we have conducted a similar meetings with representatives of the Saigon authorities and South Vietnamese political figures.

First, we will dwell on meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dru<sup>B</sup>. Earlier Ngo Dinh Dru was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam and battled with Nguen Van Thieu and Nguen Kao Xi for this post. Ngo Dinh Dru is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist and well-known political figure. He occupied the post of chairman of the upper chamber of the Saigon Parliament and during the Ngo Dinh Diem government, he was a senator in the upper chamber. Ngo Dinh Dru, in his own opinion, is a nationalist. He speaks

<sup>B</sup> Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam, General-Lieutenant (GRU's note).

against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, and also against several policy positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. At the same time, he is characterized as a reactionary, an enemy of communism. Afterwards, as Ki and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections, the latter undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used the pre-election campaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to undermine its security. He spoke against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, for which he was subjected to bitter attacks from Nguen Van Thieu. General Dzu was forced to leave the political arena after 9 months under pressure from Thieu. Afterwards, General Dzu became an even greater enemy of Nguen Van Thieu and his government. This is why we tried to attract this person to our side.

Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations with Nguen Van Thieu and the present Saigon alignments, and also our meetings with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans and the present face of the Saigon Government.

We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which lasted 3 hours, General Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government and spoke out against the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried out by Nixon and also against the Nguen Van Thieu clique. During this meeting he also stated that he will fight against Nguen Van Thieu's clique and Nixon's present designs.

Now, we see well how significant changes have taken place in General Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is already not the same ardent anticommunist. In his views, now prevail those features such as the conflict against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and against Nguen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as expressing the interests of the financial oligarchy which is against freedom and independence. And, finally, General Dzu is for the expansion of democracy and freedom over the entire territory

of South Vietnam. These are the main national traits of General Dzu, which correspond to our present course. This is why we are attempting to attract General Dzu to our side and why we entered into contact with him. After the first meeting, there were recently three other meetings during which he spoke his opinions. During these meetings, we understood what kind of major changes took place in his way of thinking and in the position he has taken and in his approach to solving the problem.

Thus, we can ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General Dzu had very good results. Recently, General Dzu requested to meet with one of the prominent leaders of the NFO (National Liberation Front) of South Vietnam. We are now busy preparing for the upcoming meeting between General Dzu and Khyuin' Tan Fat. This meeting will be conducted secretly in order to insure the fulfillment of our main principles because we understand that this new person expresses contradictions - he is among those in the Saigon Government whose number is growing every day.

The second person is Nguen Khan' who earlier occupied the prime minister post for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Din' Diem. Nguen Khan' is a representative of the army. Earlier he served in the French Army; now he is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist whose capital is invested in various foreign enterprises, especially in France. Nguen Khan' is a representative of the new trend. This is why we have entered into contact with him. These contacts took place in Paris, where we have conducted 5 meetings.

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Nguen Khan' maintains constant contact with military circles in the Nguen Van Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left the country, but periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in political activities in the capacity of an emigree representative.

In summarizing the five meetings, we noticed in Nguen Khan the following: first, as regards the ruling faction he believes that Nguen Van Thieu is a dictator and fascist who is not capable of being the head of the government. Khan' considers the present government to be rotten to the core; second, he is against the bombing of North

Vietnam; third, while criticizing the Nguen Van Thieu faction, he speaks against the participation of Saigon troops in combat actions on Cambodian territory. He believes that the threat of disintegration has arisen over the Saigon Army, that it has poor morale and combat spirit. Nguen Khan' speaks for the establishment of a new government which would have authority with the people and which would carry out a nationalist policy, while receiving foreign aid. These are the views of Nguen Khan'. He says nothing about his feelings toward the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. This is explained, first of all, by his connections with military circles. Therefore, we are not striving to directly attract him to our side. Presently, Nguen Khan' is maintaining connections with the current Saigon generals.

The third person is Zyong Van Min', who also represents the military circles. Previously, he occupied the prime minister post after Nguen Khan', and was then sent out of the country as an ambassador. The political views of Zyong Van Min' differ from the political views of Nguen Khan'. This is first expressed in Zyong Van Min' speaking out against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution of internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He believes that the US should carry responsibility for drawing out the Vietnamese War and for its consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese policy of Nixon to sharp criticism, and also the policy carried out by the current Saigon Government. These are very good political views. He speaks against Thieu's clique, considering it to be pro-fascist, anti-democratic and not capable of carrying out the leadership of the country. These are the main political views of Zyong Van Min'.

As a result of these contacts with Zyong Van Min', we have attained an important victory, forcing him to reflect. He also met with Nguen Tkhii Bin' several times in Paris. At these meetings, Zyong Van Min' felt that he as before was close to the Fatherland and that he is Vietnamese. This is why he began to conduct this great work with us and with the intelligentsia and military circles located outside of the country, with the aim of entering into a coalition government and in the hope of solving the Vietnamese issue

on the basis of conducting consultations and negotiations between the various political factions of South Vietnam. This is Zyong Van Mia's desire.

The fourth person is the former emperor Bao Daj. At one time the possibility existed that the former emperor would have been behind us. But, under pressure from reactionary factions after the August revolution, he was forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Daj holds great influence amongst the political figures in the Kyang-Chu and Tjoa-Txien Provinces, and also in the city of Gyeh, the ancient capital of Vietnam. This is why we moved to make contact with Bao Daj. We are not hoping that Bao Daj becomes a part of the coalition government, but to attract him to our side is to attract his supporters in the regions where he has influence. As a result of the meetings conducted, we clarified that Bao Daj will come out against the presence of American troops on the territory of South Vietnam, and also criticizes Ngyen Van Tkhieu's existing regime. Bao Daj is also calling for all of the political factions to create a free, neutral, peace-loving government that would resolve the tense situation that has taken form in the country. This is why we entered into contact with Bao Daj and are trying to attract him to our side. We hope that he, in turn, will work with his people in a plan for securing peace and freedom for our country.

The fifth person is General Ngyen Van Vi who earlier occupied the post of Minister of Defence of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him from his post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real reason, however, for Ngyen Van Vi's retirement was the series of serious defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Ngyen Van Tkhieu's viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with a specific reaction. We also had contacts with General Ngyen Van Vi which allowed us to understand his political position. He thinks that the US will certainly suffer defeat in this war and that a war in Vietnam is not the responsibility of the American Army. This is why Ngyen Van Vi is also coming out for the creation of a coalition government in order to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.

Some regions that Gen Ngyen Van Vi occupied

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Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguyen Van Vi. We scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his agreement to take part in a coalition government to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. Nguyen Van Vi also officially recognized the victories won by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, i.e. our victories.

As concerns our contacts within the South Vietnamese governing apparatus, it is fitting to mention here the letter from Nguyen Kao Xi addressed to our address. In the letter, he lays out his views on the route to a resolution of the Vietnam problem.

I have reported to you today on the contacts with all of these people so that you would know how the Politburo's instructions on the recruitment of these people to our side is being carried out.

The strong protest from their side is a result of a growth of contradictions within Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and of contradictions of Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. We can use these contradictions to improve the situation in South Vietnam, to resolve the issue in our favor, and the agreement of these people to enter into a coalition government will precisely go in our favor. In addition to a resolution of the issue by military means on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join the ranks of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we have gained an understanding of the political views of these people and have expressed our point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam problem.

These contacts with people who occupy high stations, prominent military and political figures, ministers and senators of the upper and lower chambers of the Saigon parliament give the basis for making the following conclusions:

1. They are against the present regime of Nguyen Van Tkhieu, considering that, Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique is dictatorial, pro-fascist, rotten and not

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capable of carrying out the leadership of the country under the situation that has developed in South Vietnam at the present. They also think that if the US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam and stops aiding the regims, the government would instantly fall to pieces.

2. The majority of them are against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war, against the broadening of the bombing of North Vietnam, and think that Nixon does not want to resolve the Vietnam issue or the Indochina issue as a whole.

3. They consider that the National Liberation Front has recently scored enormous victories on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. They recognize that on the military front we were able to win over extensive heavily populated regions. They also recognize the National Liberation Front's great success with the strengthening of the army, the increase in its combat ability and leadership level, the improvement in cooperation between the branches of service and many other areas.

In the provinces and in many towns amongst the people who occupy less important positions in the state apparatus, we also tried to win over this category of people to our side. It is possible to say that they are also ready to aid in the creation of a coalition government. They are also against the policy of "Vietnamization", against Nguan Van Tkhiu's clique and want to resolve the Vietnamese issue on the basis of a cessation of war.

Thus, on the orders of the Politburo we have been preparing to conduct meetings with various categories of the South Vietnamese population, aimed at resolving the South Vietnamese issue through peaceful negotiations between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. As a result of the contacts that have taken place to recruit these people to our side, conditions have presented themselves so that these people will be able to aid us in the creation of a coalition government and in the overthrow of Nguan Van Tkhiu's dictatorial regime. We see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also clearly indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee.

In other words, we should recruit these people to our side, and bring them into the coalition government so that we

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can use them to our favor in the diplomatic and political plan. In order to create a base for the successful resolution of the issues that stand before us, we specifically want to bring into the coalition government those people who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or are holding at the present a high post in the power structure.

If we are successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding a mammoth case on which we will again report to the Politburo so that you are well informed on these issues and have formed a plan of action for mission completion. Thanks to these meetings, we are able to know who supports us and who is against us in South Vietnam. We have also worked out a new plan for the realization of our new intentions in South Vietnam and now know which representatives of the present South Vietnamese power apparatus are in favor of the war.

The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality of rights and helped us recruit representatives of all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the Vietnamese issue.

Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population considers the course we are taking to be just. I.e. we have exposed all of those who are against Nixon's politics for the prolongation of the war, against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and will join with us in the creation of a coalition government.

In addition to the military issues, this is one of the problems we are trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings and contacts directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic problems.

With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed directives for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Ba" plan, which is scheduled to be executed in October. The "Ba Ba" plan provides for the resolution of a number of problems. Four hundred and six individuals were sent to execute the plan in South Vietnam. These individuals had gone through sufficient preparation and

Ba Be goes  
back to 1945  
August  
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well armed. Earlier these people worked in the South Vietnam government apparatus. After the August revolution, during the resistance war against the French Colonials, these people were left behind by us to active work with the enemy and therefore enter into the staff of various organs of the Saigon government apparatus. Prior to departure for South Vietnam, we prepared and armed them well for the fulfillment of the "Ba Be" plan.

The basic tasks of the "Ba Be" plan are:

- elimination of all people; who are stubborn and oppose our course; who occupy leadership positions in the realm of the province-level and above; a full paralyzation of the wills of these people;

- conduct of activities for carrying out disruption in the Saigon government apparatus in the realm of province and lower with the goal being the [installation] of new people at the next shift of this apparatus. We are attentively observing the people who oppose us and our decision with regards to this group must be very serious and firm. This matter occupies an important place in carrying out the "Ba Be" plan. We must have lists of these people and full dossiers on them beforehand to conduct preparatory training in carrying out the plan in order to quickly do away with them and ruin their order;

- search and acquire materials testifying to the crimes of the Americans and their puppets with regards to the Vietnamese people, so that during opportune conditions we may accuse them of the perpetration of these crimes by means of publishing the materials.

These are the three basic missions of the people for carrying out of the "Ba Be" plan. As for the time of completion, general opinion is that it will be completed simultaneously with Plan TS-6 (Chuong Shen-6)\*, that is, in the month of October. This plan must be well carried-out in order to influence the course of the Paris Peace talks on Vietnam and the development of conditions in the near future. This is a very important task, the decision of which may help us carry out a more successful attack on the front, the pace of development of which we need to increase in order to achieve great victories in short amounts of time. Therefore the "Ba Be" plan is already being implemented and we are continuing the training of people to realize it.

\* Plan TS-6 - a military action plan of the VPA in South Vietnam with a focus on the basic strengths in the Quach region (GRU note).

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necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming battle depends upon the solution of these important questions. It is necessary to attain a clear understanding among the generals of the fact that the Thieu regime never will employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are the fundamental questions which we should resolve in the near future.

From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the situation is developing in a direction favorable to us. We can bring into being Plan "BA BE," but for this we should expand the net of communications and connections with people who will carry out Plan "BA BE," in order to obtain from them all necessary materials. We should likewise search for ways to establish connections with officers and officials of the Saigon government. This matter occupies a significant place in the implementation of Plan "BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed all matters related to successful implementation of this plan and levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for implementation of this plan. We successfully deployed and recovered our forces in all regions and now are conducting the final work in order to complete preparatory measures for this Plan by September 30th of this year. In comparison to other plans, the preparation of Plan "BA BE" is developing well. Such a plan we will foremost ring into being on the territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its realization we will acquire experience which can help us counter the designs of the enemy at the front.

However more cruel the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become, so much greater the victory we should grasp at the front, just such victories aid realization of Plan "BA BE." With the implementation of this plan we join great hopes, especially in accelerating the pace at which the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you above. The favorable development of the situation will be a huge and significant factor in collapse of the military designs of the USA and of the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the thickheaded and treacherous plans of the enemy, successful carrying out of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These victories will have great strategic significance in implementation of Plans TS-6 and

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Plan 8-6, which were topics above.

The goal of Plan 'BA BE' is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of Plan 'BA BE' will help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The closer is victory, so much more clearly will appear the treacherous designs of the Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise of the puppet government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of Plan 'BA BE' will be a great step in the resolution of many issues in the current situation. Because of this, its significance is so great.

For successful realization of this plan we should as soon as possible deploy our forces, in order to approach implementation of this plan in the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.

In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met in recent days with a series of difficulties. These difficulties are explained by the fact that Nixon being stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve a military solution of the issue and only then to move to settlement of political issues, which exercises great influence on the course of development of the situation in Vietnam. As a result of the exchange of opinions in the private meetings with Nixon's advisor, Kissinger, we understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the USA will suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in continuing aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why we think, that with the USA taking such a position, peaceful solution of the Vietnamese question is not possible. We see that the USA obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van Thieu as before holds to his insolent position. That is why we are filled with resolution to carry out Plan 'BA BE,' the realization of which will be a turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.

This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage.

I) Plan 8-6 -- Plan for military operations in the Saigon region (footnote of the GRU)

In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs captured on the various fronts of Indochina.

The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST dated 23 Mar 71, and decision No. 31 B dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of exploiting these American POWs captured during the war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole world and of the US. There are various thoughts on the American POW issue. Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there are a number of comrades whose opinions differ from the opinion of the Politburo. These comrades are not taking into consideration the particulars of the developing situation nor the inherent difficulties in their judgements. These opinions harm us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW issue.

Dear comrades! The American POW issue is very complex. The peoples of the world (world opinion) and the peoples of our fraternal socialist nations (allied popular opinion) as well as our (people) want to know the exact number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that the US introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war against North Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their aggression by spreading this aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 8 Aug 65 when the US imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public to this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.

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(handwritten '201')

The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, i.e. in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and 143 aviators (were captured) in South Vietnam. This means the total number of aviators, and saboteurs (special operations) (American advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the territories of North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391 comprise 1205 people.

Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.

We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7 colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, i.e. the total number of senior US Air Force and Navy officers comprises 275 people. The 624 American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim Katto, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.

Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border region between the DRV and Laos; 10 diversisionists who were conducting reconnaissance of our main transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned their ships that we damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.

In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.

Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors. The remaining officers are captain and below,

as well as American enlisted soldiers.

Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:

- 624 aviators captured in North Vietnam;
- 143 aviators captured in South Vietnam;
- 47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North Vietnam;
- 391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.

All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from Kha-Taj [Son Tay] we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs.

Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through them, we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation which has developed in the American Army, extract the material and information we need, and determine our position toward them.

We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location and are attempting to extract information - secret information about troop dispositions and information concerning the US Defense Department from them.

We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.

Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers of the American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two for majors. The rest of the POWs, captain and below, were placed in other prisons.

A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.

There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.

They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on their part. They condemn the American administration and express a strong protest against this war. We will be able to release these 368 POWs first, if as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world, including the American people, a favorable international environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the political issue. We are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being conducted by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views.

There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We plainly see that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.

The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not changed their reactionary views.

The following is a summation:

1205

- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released first;
- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
- 465 POWs hold reactionary views.

All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e. they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they distort our course of action. We understand that these officers come from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.

We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW / MIA AFFAIRS  
INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

TO: File

FROM: Jon D. Holstine

SUBJECT: Events surrounding document destruction

DATE: April 21, 1992

On April 9, 1992, the Vietnam/Laos investigative team operating in SRB-78 provided a briefing, at the instructions of the Senate Select Committee's staff director, for Senate Staff Designees of Members of the Select Committee, previewing the material which the Vietnam/Laos team planned to present to the Committee Members the following day. The contents of the briefing were set forth in a paper prepared by John McCreary. It explained our approach, the purpose of the display map, and the numbers represented on the map, as well as the inferences and conclusions of the investigators from the intelligence material which went into the briefing. These were presented as the intelligence findings of the investigators at that date and time.

There were a limited number of copies of the Gaines Report (a classified DIA document), of the unclassified SI report, which had been highlighted for easy use/reference by the Senators, and of the briefing paper. In each case there were 15 copies; one each for 12 members and one each for Frances Swenig, Bill Cochran, and Dino Carluccio. It was the plan of the investigating team that all these materials would remain in SRB-78 to protect the security and integrity of the materials and briefing at least until after the presentation to the Senators occurred. Mr. McCreary called for all copies of each item to be returned. It turned out that some copies of the SI report and of the intelligence briefing paper were not returned before the designees left after the briefing. This was not immediately apparent until the briefing for the Members took place the following day. No copies of the classified Gaines report were

On Thursday, April 9, 1992, the investigators met with several of the Members of the Select Committee and other staff in S-407 to brief their results. Early in the meeting one copy of the Wednesday briefing paper was produced by Senator McCain, who referred to it as he addressed the Chair. There was one copy of the SI report which, it turned out, was in the possession of Carter Pilcher, Senator Brown's designee, who had retained it the evening before. No copies of the Gaines Report had been taken

out of SR3-78 until the Vietnam/Laos investigators carried them to S-407 for the briefing. The copy of the intelligence briefing in the possession of Senator McCain was returned to the Vietnam/Laos investigators at the conclusion of proceedings. Chairman Kerry instructed that the proceedings of the day were to be closely held, lest someone conclude that the Committee had reached a decision on the intelligence, and that the intelligence briefing paper was to be controlled also. He was very specific and adamant that the contents of the briefing were not to go out of the room.

Shortly after the Vietnam/Laos team returned with their materials, including the SI report copies and the copies of the Gaines Report, Frances Zwenig called to instruct the team to collect all copies of the intelligence briefing paper for transmission in a burn bag to Senate Security for destruction; Barry Valentine was to accomplish the delivery. A check of copies of the briefing paper revealed that only 14 copies were to be found. A telephonic check with Frances Zwenig led to the recovery of the copy from the office of Senator Kassebaum. At about 1800 hours the copies were sealed in a burn bag and locked in Barry Valentine's safe against delivery the next day to Senate Security for destruction. On April 10, 1992, Mr. Valentine made his delivery and received a receipt from Senate Security noted "received for destruction".

Friday, April 10, was a comp time day of sorts authorized by Senator Smith. The following week Mr. Hendon, on reflection, was quite concerned that he had participated in the improper destruction of Select Committee documents -- namely the intelligence briefing paper copies -- which concern was shared by Mr. McCraary. When aired in a meeting with Bill Codinha, Chief Counsel of the Select Committee on Wednesday April 15, the problem was not immediately obvious to Mr. Codinha. His first reaction was that it was no problem because no one was aware what had happened. He made no mention of any record copy having been set aside. Mr. Hendon made clear that he would welcome a special prosecutor to investigate the case, if that would be necessary to clear him of any wrongdoing in the case. My personal reaction was one of shock, because I had not until then come to realize the problem that was set forth by Mr. Hendon. It was clear in the subsequent conversation that a) there was a problem and b) Mr. Codinha was not prepared to acknowledge it.

The following day there was a considerable amount of pulling and tugging over the staff director's desire for the Vietnam/Laos team to prepare a "portable version" of the cluster map for the CODEL to use in Indochina. For a variety of reasons this was problematic. Mr. Carluccio passed on Senator Smith's wishes that the Staff Director's instructions were not to be complied with; the Vietnam/Laos team followed Mr. Carluccio's direction. At the same time Senator Smith communicated to Senator Kerry his concern about the destruction of documents.

Late Thursday, April 16, at a meeting in his office, Senator Kerry announced that the question of document destruction was "moot", because a copy had been placed in Senate Security. This was obviously news to most; Mr. Codinha had not mentioned an extant copy at 2:30 Wednesday afternoon.

Subsequently, after the meeting had adjourned and I returned home, I recalled seeing Frances Zwenig's signature on the sign-in sheet at Senate Security moments before we returned to work there Thursday afternoon. She had been there for about one minute. Later it was established that she had delivered a sealed envelope for her personal file.

April 21, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Document Destruction

1. Discrepancies concerning the destruction of Staff documents on 9 April 1992 prompted John McCreary, as Alternate Security Manager and author of the briefing text, entitled "Intelligence Briefing," to conduct further investigations into the disposition of the 15 copies of the Intelligence Briefing text.

2. Following a presentation of the Staff Intelligence briefing for the Staff designees on 8 April 1992, the Staff Director ordered that no copies of the briefing text should be removed from SRB-78. Both the Staff Director and the Deputy Staff Director returned their copies to the briefers and helped gather copies from the Designees. The Chief Counsel refused to use a copy during the briefing and did not have one in his possession at any time. A count of the copies following the briefing for the Staff designees indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization. One of these surfaced in the hand of Senator McCain during the 9 April 1992 briefing for the Select Committee.

3. Following the briefing to the Select Committee on 9 April, the Staff Director told the Staff to collect all copies of the briefing text held by the investigators and to deliver them to Mr. Valentine, the Security Manager, for destruction. She also directed that all computer files be purged. When informed that at least one copy was missing, the Staff Director assured Mr. McCreary that she did not have a copy, having left hers in SRB-78 on 8 April, but that she would ask the Designees whether they had kept any copies and to return them and opined that a copy might be in the office of Senator Kassebaum. Subsequently, the Staff Director informed Mr. McCreary that she had located a copy in the office of Senator Kassebaum and directed that Mr. Valentine pick it up, which he did. She also asked whether McCreary had received Senator McCain's copy of the briefing text which he displayed during the briefing. McCreary replied that Senator McCain's copy was in Mr. Valentine's hands. The copies received from both Senators Kassebaum and McCain had had their staples removed, raising the possibility that additional copies had been made. Nevertheless, Mr. McCreary believed that all copies of the document in the possession of the investigative staff plus all that could be retrieved in response to the query of the Staff Director had been accounted for. They were given to Mr. Valentine for destruction on 9 April, as ordered. On reflection, McCreary recalled that the 15 copies were in addition to the original printed copy which McCreary delivered in person to Mr. Valentine. Thus, at least one copy of the briefing text remained unaccounted for.

4. What prompted further investigation was Senator Kerry's statement during a Staff meeting at 162130 EDT April 1992 that all extraneous copies had been destroyed but that the original was deposited in the Office of Senate Security. Mr. McCreary was concerned about accountability for the documents because he personally had delivered the original to Mr. Valentine for destruction. The stated presence of the original report in the Office Senate Security was at variance with the orders the Staff Director gave to

4.2

McCreary and with Mr. McCreary's personal accounting of the original. This raised several possibilities concerning a lack of accountability for documents ostensibly destroyed but possibly removed without authorization or copied without authorization.


5. On 19 April 1992, while conducting a routine inventory of files in SRS-78, John McCreary found the original of a receipt signed by the Office of Senate Security for 15 copies of the briefing text ordered destroyed on 9 April. The receipt (attached) is dated 10 April 1992 and states "received for destruction."

6. On 201200 EDT April 1992 McCreary in the company of Mr. Taylor asked Mr. DiSilvestro whether 15 copies of the document in question had been destroyed as indicated on the receipt. Mr. McCreary informed Mr. DiSilvestro that he (McCreary) had been ordered on 9 April 1992 to deliver to Mr. Valentine for destruction all copies of the document and to purge all computer files. Mr. McCreary accomplished these tasks in the presence of Mr. Valentine. McCreary wondered how the original could now be deposited in the Office of Senate Security and asked whether anyone had brought up a copy of that document during the week.

7. After conducting an investigation, Mr. DiSilvestro informed Mr. McCreary that the 15 documents were destroyed by shredding on 10 April 1992 in the presence of Mr. Valentine. Mr. DiSilvestro also stated that the Staff Director had arrived (a check of the Access Log indicated at 161307 EDT April 1992) after lunch and gave to Pat a sealed envelope to be held for the Staff Director's eyes only in the Office of Senate Security. (FOR THE RECORD: This event took place about an hour after the Staff was informed that Senator Smith had sent to Senator Kerry a memo stating his concern about document destruction.) McCreary asked to see the envelope to determine whether it contained a copy of the intelligence briefing text.

8. DiSilvestro stated that he could not ethically open the document. Nor could he provide a copy of the Access Log for 16 April 1992. He was asked to retain for the record a copy of the Access Log to the Office of Senate Security which also showed the departure of the Staff Director exactly one minute after her arrival. Mr. DiSilvestro advised that if the "Eyes Only" document was a Committee document, it must be made available to both the Democratic and Republican members.

9. A check at the Office of Senate Security on 21 April 1992 indicated that no member of the Committee or of the Staff had requested the Office of Senate Security to log in and to assign a control number to a document bearing any resemblance to the intelligence briefing text. The files of the Select Committee held by or under the control of Office of Senate Security contain no document bearing any resemblance to the intelligence briefing text.

  
John P. McCreary

April 27, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION

FROM: John F. McCreary

SUBJECT: Legal Misconduct and Possible Malpractice in the Select Committee

1. As a member of the Virginia State Bar, I am obliged by Disciplinary Rule DR-1-103(a) to report knowledge of misconduct by an attorney "to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violations." Under Rule IV, Paragraph 13, of the Rules for the Integration of the Virginia State Bar, this obligation follows me as a member of the Bar, regardless of the location of my employment, for as long as I remain a member of the Virginia State Bar. Therefore, I am obliged, as a matter of law and under pain of discipline by the Virginia State Bar, to report to you my knowledge of misconduct and possible prima facie malpractice by attorneys on the Select Committee in ordering the destruction of Staff documents containing Staff intelligence findings on 9 April 1992 and in statements in meetings on 15 and 16 April to justify the destruction.

2. The attached Memoranda For the Record, one by myself and another by Mr. Jon D. Holstine, describe the relevant facts, which I summarize herein:

a. On 9 April 1992, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in response to a protest by other members of the Select Committee, told the Select Committee members that "all copies" would be destroyed. This statement was made in the presence of the undersigned and of the Staff Chief Counsel who offered no protest.

b. Later on 9 April 1992, the Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, an attorney, repeated and insured the execution of Senator Kerry's order for the destruction of the Staff Intelligence briefing text. I personally delivered to Mr. Barry Valentine, the Security Manager for SRB-78, the original printed version of the intelligence briefing text. I also verified that the original was destroyed by shredding in the Office of Senate Security on 10 April 1992, along with 14 copies.

c. On 15 April 1992, the Staff Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha of Massachusetts, when advised by members of the Staff about their concerns over the possible criminal consequences of destroying documents, minimized the significance of the act of destruction; ridiculed the Staff members for expressing their concerns;

4. I believe that the foregoing facts establish a pattern of grave legal misconduct - possibly including orders to commit a crime, followed by acts to justify and then to cover-up that crime. Even absent criminal liability, the behavioral pattern of the attorneys involved plays fast and loose with the Canons of Legal Ethics and establishes that one or more of the attorneys on the Select Committee are unfit to practice law. I am obliged to recommend that this report be filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities of the State Bars in which these attorneys are members.

*John F. McCreary, Esq.*  
John F. McCreary, Esquire

May 3, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION

FROM: John F. McCreary

SUBJECT: Possible Violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, by the Select Committee and Possible Ethical Misconduct by Staff Attorneys

1. Continuing analysis of relevant laws and further review of the events between 8 April and 16 April 1992 connected with the destruction of the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text strongly indicate that the order to destroy all copies of that briefing text on 9 April and the actual destruction of copies of the briefing texts plus the purging of computer files might constitute violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, which imposes criminal penalties for unlawful document destruction. Even absent a finding of criminal misconduct, statements, actions, and failures to act by the senior Staff attorneys following the 9 April briefing might constitute serious breaches of ethical standards of conduct for attorneys, in addition to violations of Senate and Select Committee rules. The potential consequences of these possible misdeeds are such that they should be brought to the attention of all members of the Select Committee, plus all Designees and Staff members who were present at the 9 April briefing.

2. The relevant section of Title 18, U.S.C., states in pertinent part Section 2071. Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally (a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than \$2,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. (June 25, 1848, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 795)

3. The facts as the undersigned and others present at the briefing recall them are presented in the attached Memorandum for the Record. A summary of those facts -- and others that have been established since that Memorandum was written -- follows.

a. On 8 April 1992, the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text was presented to Senior Staff members and Designees for whom copies were available

45.

prior to beginning a briefing. Objections to the text by the Designees prompted the Staff Director to order all persons present to leave their copies of the briefing text in Room SRB-78. Subsequent events indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization.

b. On 9 April 1992, at the beginning of the meeting of the Select Committee and prior to the scheduled investigators' briefing, Senator McCain produced a copy of the intelligence briefing text, with whose contents he strongly disagreed. He charged that the briefing text had already been leaked to a POW/MIA activist, but was reassured by the Chairman that such was not the case. He replied that he was certain it would be leaked. Whereupon, the Chairman assured Senator McCain that there would be no leaks because all copies would be gathered and destroyed, and he gave orders to that effect. No senior staff member or attorney present cautioned against a possible violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, or of Senate or Select Committee rules.

c. Following the briefing on 9 April, the Staff Director, Ms. Frances Zwenig, restated to the intelligence investigators the order to destroy the intelligence briefing text and took measures to ensure execution of the destruction order. (See paragraph 3 of the attachment.) During one telephone conversation with the undersigned, she stated that she was "acting under orders."

d. The undersigned also was instructed to delete all computer files, which Mr. Barry Valentine witnessed on 9 April.

e. In a meeting on 15 April 1992, the Staff's Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, was advised by intelligence investigators of their concerns about the possibility that they had committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing text. Mr. Codinha minimized the significance of the documents and of their destruction. He admonished the investigators for "making a mountain out of a molehill."

f. When investigators repeated their concern that the order to destroy the documents might lead to criminal charges, Mr. Codinha replied "Who's the injured party." He was told, "The 2,494 families of the unaccounted for US Servicemen, among others." Mr. Codinha then said, "Who's gonna tell them. It's classified." At that point the meeting erupted. The undersigned stated that the measure of merit was the law and what's right, not avoidance of getting caught. To which Mr. Codinha made no reply. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Codinha give any indication that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.

g. Investigators, thereupon, repeatedly requested actions by the Committee to clear them of any wrongdoing, such as provision of legal counsel. Mr. Codinha admitted that he was not familiar with the law and promised to look into it.

46.

He invited a memorandum from the investigators stating what they wanted. Given Mr. Codinha's statements and reactions to the possibility of criminal liability, the investigators concluded they must request appointment of an independent counsel. A memorandum making such a request and signed by all six intelligence investigators was delivered to Mr. Codinha on 16 April.

h. At 2130 on 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, convened a meeting with the intelligence investigators, who told him personally of their concern that they might have committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing texts at the order of the Staff Director. Senator Kerry stated that he gave the order to destroy the documents, not the Staff Director, and that none of the Senators present at the meeting had objected. He also stated that the issue of document destruction was "moot" because the original briefing text had been deposited with the Office of Senate Security "all along." Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel supported this assertion by the Chairman.

i. Senator Kerry's remarks prompted follow-up investigations (See paragraphs 4 through 9 of the attachment) and inquiries that established that a copy of the text was not deposited in the Office of Senate Security until the afternoon of 16 April. The Staff Director has admitted that on the afternoon of 16 April, after receiving a copy of a memorandum from Senator Smith to Senator Kerry in which Senator Smith outlined his concerns about the destruction of documents, she obtained a copy of the intelligence briefing text from the office of Senator McCain and took it to the Office of Senate Security. The access log maintained by the Office of Senate Security establishes that at 1307 EDT on 16 April the Staff Director entered the Office of Senate Security. Office of Senate Security personnel confirmed that the Staff Director gave them an envelope, marked "Eyes Only," to be placed in her personal file. The Staff Director has admitted that the envelope contained the copy of the intelligence briefing text that she obtained from the office of Senator McCain.

3. The facts of the destruction of the intelligence briefing text would seem to fall inside the prescriptions of the Statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, so as to justify their referral for investigation to a competent law enforcement authority. The applicability of that Statute was debated in *United States v. Poindexter*, D.D.C. 1989, 725 F. Supp. 13, in connection with the Iran-Contra investigation. The District Court ruled, *inter alia*, that the National Security Council is a public office within the meaning of the Statute and, thus, that its records and documents fell within the protection of the Statute. In light of that ruling, the Statute would seem to apply to this Senate Select Committee and its Staff. The continued existence of a "bootleg" copy of the intelligence briefing text - i.e., a copy that is not one of those made by the investigators for the purpose of briefing the Select Committee - would seem to be irrelevant to the issues of intent to destroy and willfulness; as well as to the issue of responsibility for the order to destroy all copies of the briefing text, for the attempt to carry out that order, and for the destruction that actually was accomplished in



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

October 7, 1992

COMBATING COMMUNICATIONS  
AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Senator Kerry

At 1230PM on October 7, 1992, Senator Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, called for Assistant Secretary Andrews. As he was at lunch, Senator Kerry asked for me. This was a conference call and included Ms. Francis Zwemig, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

He cited the POW/MIA intelligence material released on NBC last evening [Dateline] and the leaks in the press [Evans & Novak, etc.] and said that he was very upset.

Senator Kerry was very emphatic that this has gone too far and that the Department has an obligation to take on the issue. We cannot continue to keep our arms tied behind our back. He said that we need to do at the hearing next week [October 15 and 16] what we did at the last meeting [Monday, October 5]. Bring a blow up of the photographs of the "USA" and "K" symbols and show that the "K" is not a K and that it does not have walking feet. Have Mr. Gadonry explain how the USA could have been made. He stressed that unless we answer this attack directly the leakers will win and they will be able to claim "everyone knows" it was made by a POW. "We need to demonstrate reality." "Put a lie to it." The Secretary should make a one-time exception on the photography— show a blow up of the actual photograph (symbol portion) on TV.

He said that we have been repeatedly attacked by those who do not want to deal with reality. Each time we answer they find something new to raise. If we are ever going to stop this we need to demonstrate convincingly what the real thing looks like. Openness will take the wind out of their sails.

He urges the Department to come on very strong: "We are appalled. These leaks jeopardize any American in captivity who would try to signal. It is dishonest to leak information obtained in closed hearings knowing the Department cannot discuss intelligence sources and methods in public. We took responsible actions as soon as we found this symbol."

I raised our concern with discussing intelligence in public as we have global responsibilities that we cannot jeopardize. He agreed that this is difficult but that in this one case we need to find a way to take on the issue, find some way to lay out the issue.

Concerning the hearing, he agreed that a script would be unwise and recommended Mr. Andrews just "come on strong—appalled."

He stressed that he wants to work with us but reiterated that it is time for us to take on the issue.

*Ronald J. Knecht*

Ronald J. Knecht

October 30, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: John F. McCreary

SUBJECT: Obstruction of the Investigation

1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.

*Leak of Information on Jan Sejna*

2. My MFR concerning discussions with former Czech Gen Maj Sejna have ended up in the hands of private citizen and Sejna's co-author Joseph Douglas and the LA Times. I provided copies of that memorandum to Carluccio, Codirka, and Kolesnick.

3. In spite of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DLA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW-related.

4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.

*Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai*

5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempt to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which

his request for asylum would be favorably considered.

6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreezy and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.

7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, the contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October after which I wrote another MFR. This MFR was sent only to JW Codinha on 28 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.

8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.

9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstructions of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.

BRIEFING  
FOR THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON  
PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE MISSING IN ACTION

April 8, 1992

## AGENDA

Introductory Statement (15 mins)

Briefing on Nommarath (45 mins)

Map Briefing (20 min)

Conclusion

22  
April 8, 1

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

SENATORS,

(Introductions)

The purpose of this briefing is to inform you of what substantive intelligence indicates about the possibility of POWs and MIAs remaining in Southeast Asia.

We carefully have studied a large computer printout that contains a summary of the intelligence reporting on POWs and MIAs, which is called the SI Report. We have found this listing to be reasonably accurate and complete as a guide for our

investigation. In addition, we have scrutinized hundreds of files provided by the Department of Defense, DIA, the Department of State, JCRC, and the Air Force. Our BRIEFING is based principally on these materials and our own professional analyses.

Work that DIA already has done constitutes an important point of reference for our investigation of the intelligence. In reaching our own conclusions, we have taken into account DIA's evaluations and assessments as reflected in the eyewitness files and in the extract of the SI Report. But I want to stress that we have used a different analytical approach than that used by DIA and we have reached very different conclusions about what the intelligence indicates. We did this because we deemed that DIA's

55

approach can not take into account or integrate the total volume of intelligence reporting.

## THE SI REPORT

As for the SI report, the data base is current as of 9 March 1992, when the Committee received it from the Department of Defense. The original document runs to 231 pages, containing some 16,000 entries, and is available for your inspection.

For our examination of the intelligence, we have used a 91-page extract of that report, which lists intelligence reports dated after Operation Homecoming. I'd like to walk through the format of the extract. (VG-1)

- a. The first page in the package is the letter of transmittal

from DIA.

b. The second page (VG-2) is the code for the agencies who have sent in the sighting reports and other information. For example, (PAUSE FOR READING)

A is the National League of Families;

B is JCRC;

C is the Defense Attache Offices;

D is the Central Intelligence Agency;

I is Congress;

L is DIA; and so on.

O is for Stony Beach -- the DIA collection effort in Southeast Asia.

21

b. The third page (VG-3) is an explanation of some of the analytical evaluations and the management review and approval categories, which are entered in code form in the SI report. We'll get back to this shortly.

c. This chart (VG-4) is a reproduction of the first page of the extract. page 163.

Your page numbering is a bit confusing because your extract concentrates only on information after Operation Homecoming. What you have is the actual document that we are using on a day-to-day basis to guide our analysis.

Each entry in the extract relates to an intelligence report that Defense Intelligence Analysts and Technicians have summarized,

coded, and entered in a computer database. I want you to look at the headings of page 163 and follow me as I take you through some examples.

There are ten columns in the heading, left to right across the top of the page.

#### **EXAMPLES FROM PAGE 163**

By way of illustration, on page 163, the first item is a live sighting report entitled POW-F/H in Kampong Speu, Cambodia; the sighting occurred in 1973; the date of the report is not shown. The sighting was reported by Stony Beach, the DIA collection group in Thailand. Of course, this was not used in our investigation because it occurred before Operation Homecoming.

Continuing the illustration, on December 12, 1989, the Interagency Committee approved the DIA evaluation of that report as a fabrication. 11 and 12 lines down, you will find the entries CAT 4 and REC CAT 9. CAT 4 refers to the code on page two and means the case remains unresolved with "no correlation or further action possible." REC CAT 9 is a Recommendation for Category 9, that is to say, that DIA has recommended that the Interagency Committee approve his evaluation that the report is a FABRICATION. CATEGORY 9 reports are approved fabrications. These entries on lines 11 and 12 are illustrations and were not used in the analysis because they occurred before Operation Homecoming.

## THE MAP

About the map. Each push-pin and flag represents one intelligence report from the SI report.

SLOWDOWN HERE (POINT TO THE LEGEND AND A FLAG) The color BLUE signifies sightings and hearsay reports that occurred in the 1970's, according to the SI Report. Thus, THESE FLAGS HERE ALONG THE CHINA BORDER INDICATE THAT PRIOR TO THE CHINESE INVASION OF VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, WE OBTAINED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS CLAIMING POW SIGHTINGS IN THIS REGION.

The color RED signifies information in the 1980s and 1990s (taken from Column Three of the SI Report). YOU CAN SEE THAT

THERE ARE NO RED FLAGS IN THIS AREA. THIS MEANS THERE WERE NO SIGHTINGS IN THE 1980S OR 1990S, AND CONFIRMS NUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT PEOPLE DETAINED IN THIS REGION WERE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE CHINESE INVASION AND DID NOT RETURN IN THE 1980'S. The Yellow flags indicate that the precise date of the sighting was not reported.

Our task, as I stated at the outset, is to examine what the substantive intelligence indicates about the possibility of American prisoners of war remaining in Southeast Asia. We posted flags only for those entries that indicated Americans in a captive environment after Operation Homecoming. This means we looked

for the presence of guards; weapons; chains and shackles; prison features and confinement; and so on.

## WHAT IS AND IS NOT REFLECTED ON THE MAP

### WE DID NOT POST FLAGS FOR:

- a. Clearly outrageous, inflated, exaggerated, or impossible reports -- such as numbers in the 1,000s;
- b. several hundred sightings that equated to Robert Garwood; sightings of Emmet Kay, Arlo Gay, Tucker Gougelman; and other known US personnel who have since returned, whether alive or dead.
- c. We did not post flags for reports of dogtags, remains, crash sites, gravesites.

b-

d. We rejected reports that plausibly equated to French, Australian, Soviet, Greek, or other foreign nationals.

e. We rejected reports of Americans living freely, or with wives and children or those we assessed to not be in confinement at the time of the sighting.

f. We rejected for posting a number of reports that we equated to sightings of stragglers.

g. We did not accept reports of yachtsmen, adventurers, and drug- or other smugglers.

h. We also excluded sightings equated to Americans detained during and after the fall of Saigon and later released.

The end product of this process is this map which contains

928 flags - each, as I said before, representing an entry from the SI report. ((The map shows only 14 percent of the entries in the extract.)) There are 215 blue and red square flags, signifying eyewitness accounts; 484 blue and red pennants and 229 yellow pennants, signifying hearsay accounts.

The pins are plotted as precisely as the map scale allows according to the GRID coordinates in the SI report, correcting for errors when we found them.

## **ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE**

We used a cluster analysis technique to investigate possible consistency and redundancy in ALL of the intelligence, both hearsay and eyewitness. We wanted to see what all of the

intelligence indicated -- to see how the content of the reporting clustered. This is a longstanding and proven method of analysis used by the US Intelligence Community. I want to stress that this is the same method of analysis used by the US Intelligence Community to track SCUD Missile firings by Iraq during the Gulf War. As you recall, Missile basket areas were identified, defined, and then targeted. A similar process also is used in tracking SS-25 mobile missile units in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This is a longstanding and proven analytical technique in the US Intelligence Community.

We want to emphasize that in this cluster analysis we have chosen to focus on the information content that the refugees and

other sources have provided during the past 19 years. The information trends which are reflected on the MAP are not dependent on one or even a handful of individual reports. Rather, the trends and patterns reflect the redundancy and the consistency in the total volume of intelligence reporting in the period under investigation.

To recap our procedure,

1. We took the DoD SI report list of over 16,000 items and filtered out all reports before Homecoming.

2. Next we filtered out all reports that we felt did not relate to Americans in a captive environment after Operation Homecoming.

41.  
3. Finally, we plotted what was left over on the map to see what it showed about the total volume of intelligence reporting from all sources. The clustering effects (POINT) are the output of this process.

I have labored to explain our data and our technique because our findings disagree with those of the DIA. In conducting our investigation, we were shocked to find on page 3 of your package (VG-3 RETURN) that there is no category for a POW sighting – both for the DIA analysts and the Interagency Committee. We agree with the major findings of the report written by Col Kim Gaines, USAF, for Lt Gen Perroots, Director, DIA in 1986. Copies of that report, known as the Gaines Report, are available for your

use here, but a classified SECRET and r st remain here. They will be provided to your Senator during the briefing.

We concur with these findings in the Gaines Report (VG)

We also wish to state clearly our analytical conclusion. (VG)

**THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE BEEN HELD CONTINUOUSLY AFTER OPERATION HOMECOMING AND REMAIN IN CAPTIVITY IN VIETNAM AND LAOS AS LATE AS 1989.**

**THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT NO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE SURVIVED IN CAMBODIA.**

**THE BRIEFING**

During this briefing you will see many handwritten entries in the reports. These are DIA redactions to protect sources and methods.

The detailed briefings, which we now propose to begin, will describe in detail for you some of the clusters in Vietnam and Laos that stand out on the MAP.

## MEMORANDUM

For: Senator John F. Kerry, Chairman  
✓ Senator Robert C. Smith, Vice Chairman  
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

From: Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. *JD*

Date: July 20, 1992

Subject: KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW/MIAs

Like you, I am appalled at the negligent manner in which our government has sought the return of American POW/MIAs.

I am writing this memo to bring my knowledge on this subject to your attention and to express my interest in assisting you in your efforts 1) to determine the fate of American POW/MIAs and 2) to obtain their release or the return of their remains.

Based on newspaper accounts, it appears to me that you have encountered difficulties in obtaining support and information from the KGB and GRU. I have in mind recent statements by Col.-Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov that Vietnam will be a difficult case because much of the information "has not reached the archives," by Yevgeny Primakov, that the KGB has "found no new information that missing Americans from the Vietnam conflict were held in Russia," and from reports that Russian intelligence agencies are resisting efforts to uncover files on U.S. POW/MIAs.

I have been in the defense and national security business for over twenty-five years. From 1975 to 1990 I was heavily involved in the analysis of Soviet operations and strategy. Based on this work, I believe there is a considerable information in the KGB and GRU on the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean and Vietnam Wars and other situations. I also believe there are approaches other than "searching the archives" that may be much more effective.

To explain my beliefs and to indicate why my experience may be particularly relevant to your efforts, I would like to share with you selected portions of my notes on my debriefings of a particularly important Soviet bloc defector, Jan Sejna.

Mr. Sejna is now an American citizen. When he defected in 1968, then Gen.-Maj. Sejna held a variety of top-level positions in Czechoslovakia that brought him into first-hand contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Among the positions he held were chief of staff to the Minister of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council, which was the highest decision-making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and foreign policy in the communist system.

That is, Sejna was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, in daily contact with top-level communist officials from around the world, and privy to military and intelligence plans and operations. His reports have been assessed within U.S. intelligence to be of the highest credibility and have been repeatedly confirmed as other information has become available. To my knowledge, no one has ever shown his testimony to be wrong or misleading. Let me begin with some of my notes on Mr. Sejna's recollections of the Korean War.

During the Korean War, Czechoslovak intelligence, operating under instructions from the Soviet Union, constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostensibly, the hospital was built to treat casualties of the war. In reality, it was an intelligence research facility in which Czechoslovak, Soviet, and North Korean doctors would experiment on U.S. and, to a lesser extent South Korean, prisoners of war.

Czechoslovak military intelligence operations in North Korea came under the direction of Soviet military intelligence. The Czechoslovak official who was in charge of their portion of the operations in North Korea was Colonel Rudolf Bubka of the Military Intelligence Administration (*Zpravdajská sprava* or *Zs*) of the Czechoslovak General Staff. Colonel Bubka was in North Korea under diplomatic cover. The hospital was under his authority. The Czechoslovak official immediately in charge of the hospital was Colonel Professor Dr. Dufek, who was a heart specialist. Sejna learned about the hospital directly from Col. Bubka, from various official reports on the experiments, and from briefings to the Defense Council by experts such as Dr. Dufek and Dr. Plzak, a neurologist who was also a member of the medical team at the experimental hospital in North Korea, and from other top-level officials in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The experiments were justified by the Soviet officials as preparations for the next war. The Soviet objective was to

determine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. servicemen so that the Soviets could better assess the ability of U.S. soldiers to survive and operate in the rigorous conditions of all-out global war. Special experiments were devised and run to test the psychological and physiological endurance limits of U.S. servicemen. The fate of some U.S. POWs is inextricably tied to these experiments. This is one of several reasons why the KGB and GRU are less than enthusiastic in their efforts to uncover the fate of U.S. POWs. The experiments likely would surface in the process.

Additionally, the U.S. POWs were used as guinea pigs to test a variety of chemical and biological warfare agents and drugs that were being developed for military and intelligence use. One of the series of experiments conducted on U.S. POWs was to test the effectiveness of different mind-control drugs. As it turned out, the most effective drugs were those that had been developed at the Czechoslovak Air Force Scientific Center. Many of us can still recall the radio broadcasts and filmed newsreels that were shown at the movies in the mid 1950's in which the propaganda statements of U.S. servicemen denouncing America were aired. It was the Czechoslovak mind control drugs that caused the captured U.S. servicemen to renounce America, speak of the benefits of the communist system, and subsequently refuse to return to the United States following the cease fire. I understand our defense establishment lists such people as defectors and traitors. This may be a most unjust approach to a very complex problem.

To investigate bio-chemical aspects of U.S. servicemen, which was also part of the Soviet search for vulnerabilities, autopsies were performed on dead servicemen whose bodies were taken by the North Koreans and on those POWs who did not survive the various experiments at the intelligence medical facility. To further show the coupling of seemingly disparate intelligence operations to the POW issue, it was because of these autopsies on U.S. POW/MIAs that the Soviets, Khrushchev in particular, first seized on the idea of waging war on American youth with narcotics.

The idea of using narcotics as weapons, as different from their use as intelligence tools, was a major thrust of communist China's foreign policy adopted in 1949. The Korean War was the first war in which the Chinese would push narcotics as a way to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition's military forces. This strategy would later be employed with greatly enhanced effectiveness against the French, and later the Americans, in

Vietnam. During the Korean War Soviet KGB intelligence was especially interested in the Chinese narcotics operation and followed it with great care. One of their findings was the existence of a surprisingly high incidence of use of hard narcotics, such as heroin, cocaine, and the synthetic hiropon, among U.S. servicemen when contrasted with similar use by South Korean servicemen, a factor of two greater.

It was as a consequence of the autopsies that this information came to take on strategic importance. During the autopsies, the Soviet and Czech doctors discovered that an unusually high percentage of the young U.S. servicemen had cardiovascular damage -- "mini heart attacks" was how the Soviet doctors described the damage -- a much higher percentage than among South Koreans. While several possible contributing factors were identified, such as diet, the doctors recognized the correlation between the incidence of heart damage and use of hard drugs and concluded that the drugs were probably a major cause.

When Khrushchev learned about this finding, he immediately recognized the potential of narcotics as a strategic weapon and commissioned a study to determine the potential effectiveness of narcotics trafficking as a strategic weapon for use against the West, the United States in particular. This was the origin of what would become by 1962 one of the most important Soviet-bloc intelligence operations undertaken to undermine our society, military effectiveness, and economic stability. Their primary initial targets were our youth, which are the backbone of any nation's military strength, and our colleges, because that was where our future leaders were to be found. A thorough investigation of the fate of U.S. POWs ultimately should also lead American intelligence to the sources of the narcotics plague that has grown exponentially since roughly 1959, when the Soviet trafficking strategy went operational.

What happened to the unaccounted for American POWs in the Korean War? Most are probably dead. But, some of the roughly 3,000 still unaccounted for might be alive. Were any of the American POW guinea pigs likely to have been returned? When I put this question to Sejna, his response was emphatic. "No way!" he exclaimed, adding that Czechoslovak intelligence also built a crematorium in North Korea to help dispose of the remains of U.S. servicemen following the autopsies -- the ultimate fate of a majority of the American POW guinea pigs.

Obtaining information about the fate of POWs from the Vietnam War will be even more difficult than from the Korean War because many POWs are coupled to extremely sensitive programs. Before his fall from power in September 1964, Sejna explained, Khrushchev put the wheels in motion to continue in North Vietnam the experiments that were begun in North Korea during the Korean War. The experiments had been considered extremely profitable and there were many new drugs, chemical and biological agents and possible counteracting vaccines developed in the intervening years that needed to be tested.

Accordingly, arrangements were negotiated with the North Vietnamese and medical experiments using American POWs as guinea pigs were continued. Doctors from East European countries besides Czechoslovakia were involved. Most of the experiments on U.S. POWs were conducted in military hospitals in North Vietnam. But, the most sensitive experiments were conducted in KGB and GRU facilities back in the Soviet Union. This is why the movement of U.S. POWs to Russia and their interment in prisons and psychiatric "clinics" as revealed by Mr. Yeltsin takes on added significance.

It is highly unlikely that information on these activities will ever find its way into the Russian archives. Being research operations, the activities directly relate to special capabilities that are in being today and to covert operations over the past twenty years of the highest sensitivity.

For openers, the POW experiments are coupled with efforts to develop new generations of military chemical and biological warfare agents, efforts that, according to Sejna were more sensitive and more highly classified than nuclear weapons programs. They are also coupled to the development of chemical agents and drugs for intelligence applications and their nature likely will raise serious questions about a wide variety of assassination activities, including several undertaken against a variety of the highest-level national and international leaders.

They are coupled to the development of a wide variety of mind-control drugs. One that was describe by Sejna was a follow-on to the drug used to reverse the values of selected U.S. POWs during the Korean War and cause them to disown America as described earlier. The new drug tested in the mid-1960's was covertly administered through food. It was operationally used as early as

- S E N S I T I V E -

1967 to turn influential anti-Soviet individuals in various countries into neutral and even pro-Soviet supporters.

That is, the telltale trail of U.S. POWs impinges on these, and other, extremely sensitive Soviet intelligence operations and capabilities that are still highly valued today. It goes without saying that neither the KGB nor the GRU are likely to find and volunteer such information on their own initiative!

I am convinced that the above is only a fraction of the information that is close at hand respecting the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs. The above information is just bits and pieces I collected in the process of pursuing other subjects. I have not had the time or support to conduct careful debriefings on the POW/MIA issue -- but would welcome the opportunity to do so. There is no doubt in my mind that considerably more information could be extracted from further debriefings, and that among the items of greatest interest would be the names of other officials and participants from various former communist countries who would also have detailed memories based on first-hand knowledge. Once identified, these people could be contacted and the process repeated. The result would be a mass of detail that would be most difficult to refute and which then could be used as the basis for specific discussions with President Yeltsin to obtain his assistance in a much more direct attack on the KGB and GRU bureaucracies than merely looking for needles in the archive haystacks.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the above in detail with you and address any questions you may have. An overview of my background is attached for your information. My phone number is (703) 356-5410.

Finally, I would like to caution your staff not to take any precipitous action based on the above without careful deliberation. That is, there are a number of important operational nuances that I did not discuss above because of their sensitivity.

12..

Remarks by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Ph.D. at National Alliance of Families for the Return of Missing American Servicemen news conference July 15, 1993

### An Important Missing Dimension of the POW/MIA Search

One of the features of the search for U.S. POW/MIAs, is to focus attention on Vietnam. This is particularly evident in the final report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs which explicitly ties the resolution of the POW/MIA issue to the governments of Vietnam and its communist neighbors.

Unfortunately, this is a gross error. Both the Soviet Union and China were heavily involved in the Vietnam War (as well as in the Korean War) and many POWs are missing because they were moved to the Soviet Union and China for exploitation. This is the essence of the eye-witness testimony of the former Czech official, General Major Jan Sejna.

At the time of the Vietnam War, General Sejna was a member of the Czech decision-making hierarchy. He was Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, First Secretary of the Party at the Ministry, and a member of the Minister's Kollegium. He was also a member of the Central Committee, the Presidium and National Assembly, the Main Political Administration, and the Administrative Organs Department. His is an eye-witness account.

I have talked extensively with General Sejna about what happened to American POWs from Korea and Vietnam. His information makes it clear to me why so little definitive information has been found and why there has been no real assistance on the part of Vietnam, Russia, or China. Let me now provide the essence of his knowledge.

In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, American POWs were used as guinea pigs in military medical experiments. They were used:

- 1) to test new medical procedures for handling military casualties,
- 2) to test chemical and biological warfare agents,
- 3) to test the ability of American soldiers to withstand severe psychological and physiological stress,
- 4) to test new mind-control and behavior-modification drugs, and
- 5) to test lethality levels of nuclear radiation exposure and the long-term consequences of sub-lethal radiation exposure.

From the beginning, the Soviets stressed that the operation should be conducted so that "no one would ever know about it." Extreme secrecy measures and deception were employed to protect the operation's integrity.

During the Korean War, an experimental hospital was constructed in North Korea for this

operation. It was manned by Soviet and Czech military intelligence doctors. In one year alone, 600 American POWs were there as "patients." To the best of Sejna's knowledge, none were ever returned to the North Koreans. At the end of the war, roughly 100 remaining American prisoners at the hospital were shipped to the Soviet Union where the tests were continued. There were four shipments of about 25 POWs each. They were shipped first to Czechoslovakia, and then to the Soviet Union.

During the Vietnam War, experiments on U.S. and G.V.N. POWs were conducted in North Vietnam by North Vietnamese doctors, with Czech and Soviet doctors serving as advisors and monitoring the results. In Laos, Czech and Soviet doctors worked directly on the POWs.

Also during the Vietnam War, American POWs were shipped back to the Soviet Union where more sensitive chemical and biological agents and drugs were tested. A special dedicated network was established to collect POWs who were to be shipped to the Soviet Union. They were separated from other POWs from the instant of their capture. They were given special psychological interviews to make certain no trouble makers were selected, and then shipped by plane to Czechoslovakia. This system was designed by Soviet, Czech, and North Vietnamese military counter-intelligence officers. POWs were also shipped through North Korea and, quite possibly, through East Germany in route to the Soviet Union.

Up until Sejna left in February 1968, there were 2 or 3 shipments each year. The shipments were usually about 25 POWs, although there were several very small shipments and one in which about 60 POWs were moved to the Soviet Union. These shipments went through Czechoslovakia for security; specifically, so that the Soviets could deny that any POWs were ever shipped to the Soviet Union from Vietnam.

The POWs were shipped by air. They landed at Zatek military air base. They were then taken to a military counter-intelligence barracks in Prague, where they stayed for about a week. They were given physical exams during this time by doctors at the Central Military Hospital and then were flown on to the Soviet Union.

Sejna often witnessed the unloading of POWs at the airbase and at the barracks. He was a participant in discussions with North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Czech leaders. He was responsible for preparing many of the actual decision documents. He also monitored parts of the operation and read reports on the results of the experiments and autopsies.

This description of what happened is just a brief summary of General Sejna's first-hand knowledge. Based on our discussions, I would estimate that over a thousand American POWs got caught up in this Soviet military intelligence operation. And, I should add, the Chinese had a similar operation also using American POWs in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Clearly, if the search for American POW/MIAs is to have any prospects for success, the search must be expanded to include China and the Soviet Union. The search process must recognize that the answers are equally if not more likely to be found in those countries than in Vietnam. Moreover, the search process must take into account the simple fact that those countries are most unlikely to cooperate in finding and revealing this type of shocking information.

### Are the POWs Pawns of War?

On May 21, 1990, Harriet Lavin, United States Charge d'Affaires to Laos (the person responsible for any efforts to return POWs from Laos), said:

*There is a pretense and future in Indochina involves complex negotiations with Hanoi and other nations in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Southeast Asian allies and eventually a compromise. You should be aware that there is a greater desire for our foreign policy in Asia and the POWs are expendable in pursuit of that policy particularly when it comes to an undeclared war.*

### Are they Expendable?

There is clearly an unacceptable attitude for our government to embrace -- but it at least makes clear the priorities of the US Government on the value of American military personnel!

Major Captain Eugene "Red" McDonald, who spent six years in a Vietnamese POW camp, poignantly says:

*I was prepared to fight, I was prepared to be wounded, I was prepared to be captured, I was even prepared to die, but I wasn't prepared to be abandoned.*

Has the US Government abandoned these unfortunate American men and women? Ask yourself what you have heard of the government doing to bring them home.

*"When one American is not worth the effort to be found, we as Americans have lost."*

Former Defense Intelligence Agency Director Eugene Tighe

It is not better, as we do, that the tactics of the federal government are far more unacceptable, what is on you do in "make it happen" yourself?

*Yes, we did. And then we remember about it.*

Let us know where about the issue by reading one or more of the following books:

#### Recommended Reading

- An Examination of US Policy Toward POW/MIA's, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 1991 (for a free copy, call 202/224-3941)
- Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POWs in Vietnam 1950-1975 by Marvin Jensen, Stevenson and William Stevenson
- The Rambon Cage 1971, by Nigel Cawston
- Hanoi 1967 by Scott Barnes
- Soldiers of Misfortune, 1972 by Mark Sauter, James Sanchez & Carl Falkowski

### The Smoking Gun has been Found!

Since the dissolution of the USSR, a treasure trove of evidence has turned up on government files in spite of the best efforts of the United States Government, the truth is coming out! For instance, in February 1993, Steve Morris, a scholar from Harvard University's Russian Research Center, discovered a Top Secret document in the files of the Central Commission, Communist Party Soviet Union, International Department (formerly known as the COMINTERM)

General Tran Van Quang, Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army, authored a report dated September 13, 1973 to the North Vietnamese Politburo which ended up in Russian intelligence archives. This document provided a detailed accounting of 1,295 live American POWs then held in 11 North Vietnamese prisons. The General's statements are quite revealing:

*"1,295 American prisoners of war located in the prisons of Vietnam -- this is a big number. Officially, we have published a list of only 544 prisoners of war, the rest we have not revealed. The government of the U.S.A. knows this well, but it does not know the exact number of prisoners of war, and can only make guesses based on its losses."*

The Senate Armed Services Committee provides **SUPPORTING EVIDENCE** from a Committee Memo for Record dated April 8, 1993: "A member of the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) Politburo, Mr. La Diab, defected in 1979. He was debriefed (informally) by DIA, and he revealed that in 1973, the Vietnamese possessed about 700 American POWs." The memo goes on to state: "Again, La Diab's statement that about 700 American POWs were kept back in a warehouse. It is consistent with the Soviet document, and it corroborates it."

Former National Security Advisors Henry Kissinger and Edgewood Bruce (L), for the Nixon and Carter Administrations respectively, have publicly and privately stated that, based on their knowledge and expertise, they believe the Vietnamese document found in the Russian archives to be accurate and authentic in its numbers of living POWs held back by Vietnam. Further, a number of well placed Pentagon military officials, administration bureaucrats, and Washington insiders have agreed with Kissinger and Bruce (L)'s appraisal of the validity of the report.

Note that this report is dated 4 months before the war ended. It only includes POWs held by North Vietnam in North Vietnam up to that point. However, it does not include Prisoners of War held in South Vietnam by the Viet Cong, those POWs held in Laos by the Pathet Lao, or those POWs held in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge.

**THE LONG DEBATE IS OVER --  
ALL THE WORLD KNOWS POWS WERE HELD BACK!**

#### YOU CAN HELP

Write and call your elected officials, including the President. Demand that the US Government

-- issue an ultimatum to the Communist governments of Vietnam and Laos to return live American POWs and account for the others, or suffer immediate dire consequences, including the use of appropriate military force

-- seek war crimes trials for any Vietnamese or Laos who may have killed American POWs

-- issue similar ultimatums to other Communist -- and former Communist -- governments demanding the return of all POWs, regardless of when captured, who are under their direct or indirect control, or face the same dire consequences.

We realize the articles suggested are very strong; however, they are fully justified because the Vietnamese report shows that Hanoi committed a major violation of the Paris Peace Accords by not returning all American POWs. Quang's report is proof positive that the Vietnamese have been lying for over 20 years to mislead American officials of the past 50 military leaders.

## TASK FORCE OMEGA INC.

14043 North 64th Avenue

Glendale, Arizona 85306

Phone & FAX (602) 979-5651

## POW ★ MIA

*Thank you for caring!*

### There are LIVE American POWs in SE Asia!!

A Senate aide confirmed that the POW issue is not a high priority because there is "no public interest." We don't believe that's true. Please support our efforts. Read the enclosed information. Then write or call your elected representative **DEMAND** that these public servants account for their inaction on this issue of vital interest!

The following information is provided for your convenience:

President William J. Clinton  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20500  
Telephone 202 654-1111  
FAX: 202/456-3441

Senator (Your Senator's Name)  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Congressman (Your Representative's Name)  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

**YOU'D DAMN WELL CARE  
IF IT WERE SOMEONE  
YOU LOVED!**

Task Force Omega, Inc. is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization.  
our ID number is 54-1243251

### There ARE Live American POWs in SE Asia!

Jan 1, 1971. London (American Forces) believe they are holding more than 100 American POWs and are prepared to give a full accounting. The US government responds 9 days later by saying they are all dead without ever talking to the families about the POWs they admit they are.

Feb 1971. Upon the terms of an unverified sum of money to the Vietnamese, the communist government of Vietnam acquired in 1970. The Vietnamese had claimed all of them had died.

Jan 1971. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Eugene Tipton testified before the House Committee on Asian Pacific Affairs that live Americans are POWs in Southeast Asia.

Jan 2, 1971. The Washington Times reports that Bobby Greenwald, released by Vietnam, was sent up to the front capture Americans long after the war ended.

Jan 2, 1971. The Washington Times reports that Director Lieutenant General Eugene Tipton stated he will hold up to at least 50-60 live American POWs.

Jan 15, 1971. The Wall Street Journal reports that National Security Advisor Robert Feltone says live Americans are POWs in Southeast Asia.

Jan 19, 1971. The Wall Street Journal reports that White House memo in 1981. Vietnamese officials will an unspecified number of live POWs for \$4 billion. The White House decided the live POWs were "and ignored it".

Jan 20, 1971. The New York Times reports a Pentagon press estimate up to 100 live POWs in SE Asia held in Vietnam alone.

Jan 27, 1971. CIA Director William Casey says "Look, the nation knows they (the POWs) are there, they know they are there, but there's no groundswell of support for getting them out. I seriously see one and the other, we pay for them, surely not saying we could do nothing that had with no public support."

Jan 27, 1971. A letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President states that during General West's visit to Hanoi, "The Vietnamese people were prepared to turn over 7 or 8 live American POWs if they held them what they would be have. All the prospective releases were willingly held in a situation on the last side of the border."

Jan 30, 1971. The Washington Post reports a Japanese source released after 13 years in a Vietnamese prison had Americans in POWs who were held in North Vietnam.

Jan 31, 1971. The Soviet Foreign Relations Committee's Interim Report on POW/MIA's in Vietnam states that despite public statements in 1973 that no POWs remained in the hands of Hanoi, "In April 1973 concluded beyond a doubt that several hundred American POWs remained in captivity in Southeast Asia."

Jan 31, 1971. Senate Issue House. "The deeper story may be that there was a deliberate effort to convince people in the government to disregard all information or reports about the POW/MIA's. It there could be even one American over there and for gain by the country, it could be worth it for a small find him and bring him back home."

### Our Government Leaders Know...

October 1989. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thuan admits Vietnam will hold American POWs but is willing to release "as many as 10 live American POWs." His offer, like others before it, is ignored by Secretary of State James Baker III.

February 1991. Colonel William Felt, Chief of the Pentagon's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, reports in protest of being ordered by policy makers in the POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group not to investigate intelligence reports of American POWs.

April 25, 1991. Senator Bob Smith addresses the Senate and reveals that of more than 1,400 prisoners of war of live POWs, NONE has ever received an official investigation!

May 22, 1991. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Examination of US Policy Toward POW/MIA's concludes that the US has ignored thousands of American POWs, and left them to rot in Soviet slave labor camps and North Korean and Vietnamese prisons. "Any evidence that is established as MIA might be alive was uniformly and arbitrarily rejected."

September 1991. A flood of new evidence of live POWs from Southeast Asia: pictures, handwriting samples, hair samples, blood samples, fingerprints, smears, and other physical proof. The Bush administration "disregards the evidence, and attempts to discredit it by rumor and innuendo. Some of the photos are scientifically validated, however — and have never been scientifically disproved!"

August 2, 1991. President Bush says "Until we can account for every person missing, we have to run down these leads to prove that nobody is held." (That's right. Bush won his duty in proving the Vietnamese hold scores of our men and women!!! Who does he work for?)

November 1991. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Danforth Burns: "I think we're going to see, probably, that a lot more POWs were left at large... It's been true in other situations of both wars — where the agreements were made, and they were anxious to get agreements at the time — there were people involved that simply wanted to get the agreements and they didn't want to have all the questions raised at that time... It was too embarrassing. The longer it went, the more embarrassing it got to be... A lot more information is going to come on line... It's things that happened over time. Personnel directives that came about over a 10 year period of time. Then, once when somebody found and knew that it was, nobody wanted to take the blow. They always thought, well, I'd heard that on so the next guy so believe that we really made a big mistake... Those who know the truth kept knowing it on. There are people, obviously, in the military and elsewhere, in the foreign policy establishment, who feel they're going to be embarrassed, now, if this comes out. And so, they keep it secret... It has to come out and it will."

June 3, 1991. Lieutenant Peter R. Hudson, USAF, gives his secret subcommittee code — CX31317 — outside the prison camp.

June 1991. Major Henry M. Brown, USAF, gives his last secret and secret subcommittee code — 737488 — right outside the prison wall of a second prison camp where he was being held.

Both operations were photographic because of what the intelligence reports of US POWs being held in these facilities. Furthermore, these are just the latest credible photographic evidence made public of LIVE AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR held captive in South Vietnam since the mid-1970's.

### Who Is Hiding What? And

Why would the Vietnamese and Laotians still hold American POWs? On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. POWs were returned by the Vietnamese.

On February 1, 1973, President Nixon agreed to pay \$12 million to the Vietnamese to return the money.

The Laotians also wanted reconstruction money but the US denied it. So why should we have expected them?

Credible evidence has been presented that some Americans are being held in exchange for uranium and other materials. "Special Forces" such as electronic, communications, etc. are being held. At least six prisoners of war are held up in the mountains of Laos, possibly given to the North.

Why hasn't the United States Government done more on this? It's probably for AOT to bring them home? Very few in the government know about it. One theory, made possible by the CIA, holds that some of the POWs held by the Vietnamese were captured years after the war in SE Asia.

According to this theory, our intelligence agencies were in collusion in SE Asia following the end of the war. Though legitimate and reasonable, Congress was refused to be involved in anything more about that!

Some believe the CIA used the "propaganda" — private! — Agency Head Grant that provided "cover" for their activities throughout the "Operation Triangle" and "Lambert" — the plot to assassinate the President.

It is easy responsible to assume that some of the POWs and MIA's are being held in the hands of our enemies. There is evidence that some of the POWs are being held in the same prison camps as the ones in North Vietnam.

If any of these original POWs came home talking about it in 1973 or 1975, it would be the end of a number of public investigations during some of the 1970's.

Fast or Fiction? Only the government knows.

Don't you find it strange that the government "let" POWs who are fingerprinted samples to come out of South Vietnam? Why not just one more?

What has that police in the middle, and the...?

America's P.O.W.'s  
The PROUD... THE BRAVE... TI

# Dealing with the haunting legacy

AL SANTOLI

TASK FORCE OMEGA, INC.  
14043 North 64th Drive  
Glendale, Arizona 85306  
Phone & Fax (602) 979-5651

The debate over a Soviet intelligence document has refocused attention on the haunting legacy of American prisoners missing in Southeast Asia. A U.S. mission to Hanoi to investigate the documents has ended in a familiar pattern of denials by Vietnamese officials, token "just discovered" information and claims of "progress" by American negotiators. However, significant questions remain unanswered.

The Soviet documents, quoting a 1972 speech by a high-ranking Vietnamese general, Tran Van Quang, became known by the Pentagon last February. A month later, at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, thousands of original historical and investigative records — vital to resolving the MIA mystery — were destroyed in a shredder. The document destruction reportedly was overseen by Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham, commander of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting, which is responsible for conducting MIA investigations throughout Indochina.

Protests about the incident from Sen. Robert Smith, New Hampshire Republican, and MIA families led the Pentagon to order an internal investigation. However, veterans organizations are calling for an independent inquiry. President Clinton created another controversy by dispatching retired Gen. John Vessey to Hanoi.

Gen. Vessey was a distinguished artilleryman and staff officer. However, as President Bush's MIA envoy he gained a reputation as too willing

to accept Hanoi's duplicity. For example, in 1991 testimony before the U.S. Senate, Gen. Vessey supported Vietnamese claims that "worms" ate their POW records. A year later, Hanoi admitted to possession of a vast collection of POW archives and historical records. They still deny access to records of the Enemy Proselytizing Department, the key organization responsible for foreign prisoners, claiming they were "destroyed in a fire." The communists maintained meticulous records in

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*A full and honest resolution can be achieved only by a hands-on commitment by both the executive branch and Pentagon leadership.*

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duplicate, with copies stored in more than one office.

Documents just handed to Gen. Vessey mention only 368 prisoners held or deceased before 1973. This is a mere fraction of the 591 living and 500 bodies already returned, and the 2,200 who are still missing.

Field investigations are repeatedly staged with coached witnesses and animal bones planted at excavation sites. Since 1991, of 80 flag-draped caskets returned from Vietnam, only 13 have proved to be Americans. This charade has cost taxpayers \$100 million. Unfazed, Gen. Vessey continued to praise Vietnamese cooperation and advocate giving away the administration's only negotiating leverage — the trade embargo.

This is not the first Vessey-Quang meeting. On Jan. 30, 1992, they sat across a table in Hanoi, where Gen. Vessey conveyed a gift of \$1.3 million, primarily to assist communist war veterans. They did not discuss withheld American prisoners. The current mission is clouded by the presence of Gen. Needham, State Department official Ken Quinn — a member of the 1977 Woodcock Commission that declared all U.S. prisoners dead — and Andre Savageot, who is under contract with a U.S. corporation that is lobbying to lift the trade embargo.

Hanoi has denounced the Soviet document by claiming that Gen. Quang was a minor figure as commander of Military Region 4. However, volumes of official records show that between 1958 and 1974 he was also a deputy chief of staff of the army. His previous role as chief of the Enemy Proselytizing Department made him an expert on prisoner exploitation. As commander of Military Region 4, he controlled areas of Laos where a secondary prison system was located.

Pentagon debunking artists claim that some of Gen. Quang's prisoner count could have been South Vietnamese or Thai. However, Gen. Quang's language specifically states "Americans." The Vietnamese language is very precise. In all communist documents, South Vietnamese are referred to specifically as "puppets." There is no record of South Vietnamese mixed in with Americans in North Vietnamese prisons.

Recently declassified U.S. intelligence documents support claims of a secret prison system. Some 80 percent of American prisoners in Laos were captured by the Vietnamese or held in areas under their authority. Post-1975 satellite imagery of prison areas in Laos and Vietnam contain pictures of distress signals and au-

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*Al Santoli is the author of two histories of the Vietnam War and its aftermath. He is a former assistant to the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives POW-MIA Task Force.*

# SANTOLI

From page F1

thenticator codes identified to specific MIAs. A compelling authenticator and distress symbol and the names of two missing pilots were stamped out in high grass during June 1992 outside of Dong Mang prison in Vietnam. Despite numerous Senate inquiries, Gen. Needham's Hanoi-based task force has yet to visit the prison site.

The Moscow archive documents demonstrate intense Soviet interest in the American prisoners. U.S. officials continue to deny evidence of Soviet involvement. However, Senate investigators concur with Gen. Quang that some Americans with technical expertise were taken to secret prisons. There, Soviet advisers extracted their knowledge.

A series of secret State Department cables between January and June 1967 describe two to six "wounded U.S. fliers captured in Vietnam and currently held in an East German hospital ... including a double amputee," being offered in trade for a Soviet spy team imprisoned in England. After five months of negotiations, the British refused to cooperate. The disabled Americans disappeared.

MIA families disagree with Gen. Vessey's and the task force's near-exclusive emphasis on crash-site excavations. They believe Hanoi should first be required to provide real answers for the nearly 200 last-known-alive and 1,100 missing men who may have been seen alive. The real answers are in the records of Vietnam's Enemy Proselytizing Department and General Political Directorate. Similar records are contained in the Soviet archives.

The destruction of thousands of pages of U.S. investigators' handwritten analyses — dating back to 1970 — by Gen. Needham's task force further complicates research. The task force has been severely criticized for a glaring lack of investigative standards. Detachment chiefs and field team leaders in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are primarily young infantry and artillery officers without previous intelligence training, no POW-MIA re-

search experience and rudimentary language ability.

Task force teams often rely upon Vietnamese or Laotian government translators and conduct interviews in the presence of communist cadres. They simply do not have the ability to perform quality research or evaluate the status of individual cases. On the other hand, Garnett Bell, the Pentagon's most respected MIA expert and Vietnamese linguist, was transferred to a desk in Bangkok after he spoke honestly at Senate hearings regarding problems with Vietnamese cooperation. He is no longer involved in field investigations.

Archival research in Hanoi is led by a Defense Intelligence Agency official whose testimony at Senate hearings was discredited by serious inconsistencies. The agency's MIA office is controlled by career bureaucrats whose performance was described in internal evaluations as "unprofessional ... never employing the most basic analytic tools ... (possessing) a mind-set to debunk (reports of live Americans)." Numerous family members believe the DIA's primary objective is to protect two decades of coverup.

After any war, there can never be a complete accounting for all of the missing. However, to resolve the

heartache of MIA families and obtain an honest accounting, the Clinton administration should expedite the following actions:

- The Vietnamese must produce live men, their remains, or an explanation that withstands intense scrutiny, before they receive any U.S. aid or international financing or the trade embargo is lifted.

- Gen. Quang is a lifelong communist who cannot be expected to provide sincere testimony. Instead, the Vietnamese must provide full on-site access to Enemy Proselytizing Department and General Political Directorate archives. These records must be scrutinized by a no-nonsense linguist and POW-MIA expert, preferably Garnett Bell.

- A full and impartial investigation must be conducted into the destruction of the Bangkok embassy documents and immediate replacement of those responsible, whether at the Pentagon or at CINCPAC in Hawaii.

- The Defense Intelligence Agency MIA office must be revitalized by replacing those managers and analysts chastised in the Brooks and Gaines reports and those whose performance and Senate testimonies have proved disingenuous.

- Replace task force infantry and artillery officers in Indochina with qualified investigators, and employ Indochinese-American translators. Each discrepancy case must be approached like an FBI investigation from the time of capture until his release or the return of his remains. All means of human and technical intelligence must be fully integrated.

- Task Forces Russia and Full Accounting must be permitted to consult and share information related to Indochina on a regular and timely basis.

- A new presidential envoy should be appointed who is above politics and will not permit duplicity by Vietnam and Laos.

A full and honest resolution can be achieved only by a hands-on commitment by both the executive branch and Pentagon leadership. This effort will not only end the suffering of grieving families. It may help to prevent American servicemen from being left behind again.

POW ★ MIA  
YOU'D DAMN WELL CARE  
IF IT WERE SOMEONE  
YOU LOVED



House of Representatives  
State of Michigan

96TH DISTRICT  
STATE REPRESENTATIVE  
**ALAN L. CROUSEY**  
STATE CAPITOL  
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48913  
(517) 373-1778

COMMITTEES  
JUDICIARY  
EDUCATION  
LABOR  
CORRECTIONS

November 17, 1993

This is a short update on the status of the POW/MIA resolution as per the other states.

At the present time there are no other states which have formally passed a resolution, but Virginia, Connecticut, Kansas and Florida are close. There are another twenty-seven states which are working on it but we will have nothing to report about them until January 1994.

It is possible that you could obtain more complete information from Task Force Omega Inc. in Arizona. The number is 602-979-5651. If you have more information than we do, please write and update us.

We urge you to contact your Legislators and encourage them to consider this Resolution using ours as your model.

House of Representatives  
State of Michigan

96TH DISTRICT  
STATE REPRESENTATIVE  
ALAN L. CROPSEY  
STATE CAPITOL  
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48913  
(517) 373-1778

COMMITTEES  
JUDICIARY  
EDUCATION  
LABOR  
CORRECTIONS

September 30, 1993

Commander  
American Legion  
P.O. Box 1055  
Indianapolis, IN 46206

Dear Legionnaires:

Thank you for your interest in Michigan House Concurrent Resolution No. 185. This resolution requests the Michigan Attorney General to file a lawsuit in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the Vietnam War era Michigan POW/MLAs. The Attorney General told me that we need other states to join with us before we file the lawsuit.

Enclosed is a copy of the Michigan resolution. I would suggest that you use this resolution as a basis for a resolution in the other states. Obviously you would change the names of the people to those who are POW/MLA status to the other specific states. The resolution should end by requesting that the state join with Michigan in pursuing this issue in front of the United States Supreme Court.

It is extremely important that this lawsuit move forward. President Clinton has already allowed the IMF to give loans to Vietnam. Even though the U.S. still has a trade embargo in effect, American businesses are allowed to participate in the building of Vietnam using these IMF loans.

Unless the American people demand that the POW issue be resolved, full normalization with Vietnam will soon take place. Vietnam and Laos have held on to the POWs to use them as pawns in getting aid from the United States. If Vietnam's relationship with the United States is normalized and aid flows to Vietnam without the release of the POWs, Vietnam and Laos have no further use for the POWs. In fact, the POWs would become a liability to Vietnam and would probably be killed.

I strongly urge the Legionnaires to encourage other states to pass a resolution joining with Michigan asking that our United States Supreme Court hear this issue. If the U.S. Supreme

Court allows the states to have standing to bring this lawsuit, then we would demand discovery of government documents that have not been released to the public.


If any Legionnaire or other interested persons have questions they may write me at:

State Representative Alan L. Cropsey  
Michigan House of Representatives  
P.O. Box 30014  
Lansing, MI 48913

Or you may call me at (517) 373-1778 or send a fax to (517)373-5780.

Please do all you can and keep me informed.

Sincerely Yours.



Alan L. Cropsey  
State Representative

As of 5 October 93

- 1) Wisconsin -
- 2) Colorado - Been contacted by Legislator and Mayor of Colorado Springs.
- 3) New York - Is being taken right to Gov. Cuomo.
- 4) Texas -
- 5) Indiana -
- 6) New Hampshire -
- 7) Alabama - Had a lot of contact from individuals, but no Legislators.
- 8) Florida - Went before State Legislature 4 Oct 93. No word as yet.
- 9) California - Introduced by State Sen. Wyman. Also being taken right to Gov. by Fran Masterson.
- 10) New Jersey -
- 11) Ohio -
- 12) Vermont - Been contacted by Gov. of VT. He is son of MIA.
- 13) Utah -
- 14) Illinois - Been in contact with Senate President Phillips. Springfield.
- 15) Washington State -
- 16) Connecticut - Going before Special Session 20 Oct 93.
- 17) Pennsylvania - Been contacted by State Legislator
- 18) Georgia -
- 19) Kansas -
- 20) Missouri -
- 21) North Carolina - Linda Gurganus has an appointment with Speaker of the House and State Attorney General.
- 22) Minnesota -