

SJR

38

(File 3)



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the \_\_\_\_\_

committee on SENATE RES.38, dated 1/27/91  
bill/subject committee name

I AM OPPOSED TO THE IFQ  
PLAN AS PRESENTED BY THE  
NORTH PACIFIC MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.  
THE IMPACT ON THE COASTAL  
COMMUNITIES OF ALASKA HAS NOT  
BEEN ADEQUATELY ASSESSED.

Signed: [Signature]  
Testifier

P/O SEQUOIA

Representing (Optional)

BOX 6384 SITKA AK.

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the \_\_\_\_\_ committee name

committee on SENATE RES 38 dated 1-27-91  
bill/subject

I support FURTHER STUDY OF SOCIALECONOMIC AFFECTS OF IFQs. I want to see small communities remain as designated ports in language of IFQs. I oppose IFQs as proposed by N.P.M.C. I'm in favor of the block proposal designed by Howard Kendall, SITKA. I encourage you to do away with dangerous 24 hr. openings ASAP - I also want to see in this plan total banning of factory trawlers.

Signed: Claire Cohen  
Testifier

\_\_\_\_\_  
Representing (Optional)

EV Squoria  
Address

P.O. 6384 - Sitka, At.

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name Committee  
 committee on SR 38 , dated 1/27/92  
bill/subject

Testimony on S.R. 38  
~~are~~ attached

Signed: Jo Ann W. Huff  
Testifier

FIN Rocky B  
Representing (Optional)

1507 Edgewood Dr, Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

(907) 747-5175  
Phone No.

NEIL AND JOANN HUFF  
1507 Edgcumbe Drive  
Sitka, AK 99835  
(907) 747-5175

January 23, 1992

To: Senate Resources Committee

RE: SJR 38

My husband has been a halibut and blackcod longline fisherman since 1976. We have lived in Alaska since 1984.

I am opposed to SJR 38. I ask you to not support a resolution which could potentially throw out alot of hard work and progress which has been made toward obtaining management over two out-of-control fisheries.

My comments today are not going to be an attempt to win your support for IFQ's. The issue is a a very complicated and emotional one. I do not expect the Senate to have grasped all the facts or understood the special interest groups involved in the short time this resolution has been presented.

I ask you to review the comments of Sheri Mayo and Eric Jordan of Sitka made during testimony on HJR 61 last week.

S. Mayo pointed out the House of Representatives (nor the Senate) should not be voting for or against IFQ's at this time. The North Pacific Management Fisheries Council has been working toward a solution since at least 1984. They, themselves, are delaying sending the proposal to NMFS until at least April. This action and the length of time the issue has been discussed should indicate to you how complicated this issue is. The resolution before you is based on emotions and does not allow for alternative solutions.

Eric Jordan, who is not necessarily in favor of the IFQ proposal as it now stands, understands the potential damage this resolution could cause.

He has suggested the following:

In lieu of passing this resolution, modify or create a new resolution to work toward a management solution:

- 1) Conduct public workshops on the IFQ plan
- 2) Have the state contract their own analysis (I would recommend doing an economic impact study determining the impact with the IFQ plan and remaining status quo).
- 3) Set up a task force. Have the task force work with NPMFC and NMFS.

Isn't it better to try to work toward a constructive solution than to tear down years of work and offer no solution in its place? Please vote no to Resolution SJR 38 and come up with a more responsive and responsible resolution to this complicated issue.

Sincerely,

JoAnn W. Huff

Lloyd Jones  
PO Box 9572  
Ketchikan, Ak. 99901

Subject IFQ = Instant Federal Quickclaim

Dear Watchdog

I want to thank those of you who responded to my previous letter. I know you're busy, never the less your attention, and quick response, speaks volumes to me. Nothing seems to unite and solidify all factions of our state as the intrusion of the federal government into our lives.

We are a member of a coalition of states. The last coast in the world with a common property resource of this type.(Fisheries). It is a healthy resource, we must have been doing something right, as status quo has worked, and perhaps change is needed, but not at the expense of constitutional freedoms, or those of our future generations. Changes should be proposed by our fishing industry, not imposed by our governments, and they should be of a nature that will evolve from our current system, retaining those elements that have been the foundation of a successful industry. Perhaps for Canada it is too late, but we should learn from her mistakes and try not to repeat them.

The loss of Home Rule of a States natural resource to a federal entity,( Federalism) deprives the State of not only the potential income, but also eventually weakens its bargaining position untill it must beg for handouts from that entity to sustain its economy. It in effect becomes a welfare state, while the entity becomes stronger in this relationship. Federalism presently removes twice as much money from Alaska as it returns.!!! That too much.!!

We have been told our oil will run out in 10 years, and our no.1 source of income will be gone. If we do not stop IFQ, our no. 2 source of income will be gone. ( owned by the fed.) This is the only resource left not impacted by Federalism. The Fed. has managed to close every avenue which might lead to economic independence, not only in Alaska, but in every state of the union. Alaska must retain control of this resource, lest it to become history as many others have under Federalism.

Today's fisherman are the stewards of this resource, not the owners. It is their duty and obligation to hand over a healthy resource industry, not to the highest bidder, but to the next generation of fisherman. That is a guarantee of our constitution, one which all watchdogs must guard!

Jerry Scholts  


PO Box 15331  
Fritz Creek, Alaska 99603 Ph. 235 7098



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the House Resources committee name  
 committee on HJR 61 , dated Jan. 22 1992  
 bill/subject

I David A. Coleman support bill HJR 61, opposing individual fisheries quotas (IFQs) for sablefish, halibut and any other Alaskan fishery.

I oppose the IFQ management plan because:

- IFQs would privatize a natural resource.
- Would result in a net loss in jobs in many coastal communities.
- Would reward cheating, especially in the halibut fishery in regards to quota awarded for past participation.
- The IFQ plan holds no hope for young or new Alaskans to access the fisheries at an entry level.
- The IFQ plan will prove very costly and is deemed unenforceable.

Signed: David A. Coleman (David A. Coleman F/Ulanos)  
 Testifier

a member of the: ATA, U.F.A., S.P.C.

Representing (Optional)

PO Box 6082 Sitka AK. 99835

Address

747 5113

Phone No.

**KODIAK LONGLINE  
VESSEL OWNERS' ASSOCIATION**



326 CENTER AVENUE, P.O. BOX 135  
KODIAK, ALASKA 99615  
(907) 486-3781 FAX (907) 486-2470

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HALIBUT • SABLEFISH • PACIFIC COD • CRAB

January 24, 1992

Senator Lloyd Jones  
Chair, Senate Resources Committee  
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

RE: Senate Joint Resolution #38

Dear Senator Jones,

We would like to express our support for SJR 38. This resolution is very important for the coastal communities and fishermen of Alaska.

The individual fishing quota (IFQ) program has been considered and debated for years. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council recently approved a preferred plan for the sablefish and halibut fisheries. This plan is not the pure "market driven" concept originally debated and analyzed. This plan has a tremendous number of bells and whistles which are designed to address the concerns of the coastal communities and small boat fleet in Alaska. The plan is complex and confusing. Many of the supporters of the plan don't understand the long-term impacts which will result.

It is important to understand that the North Pacific Council is simply an advisory body to the Secretary of Commerce. Nothing is set in stone. The Secretary of Commerce does have line-item veto power in which many of the proposed "safeguards" may be removed. The facts are that the National Marine Fisheries Service is very skeptical of the proposed program. The many restrictions were analyzed as having negative impacts on the participants. The factory trawlers are trying any way that they can to have an IFQ system where they can purchase halibut and/or sablefish as bycatch for their bottom trawl fisheries. The factory trawl lobby in Washington D.C. is very intensive as we all know. Even many Alaskan corporate owners don't like the corporate restrictions which have been proposed. It will clearly change the way these vessel owners do business. They will also lobby heavily for changes.

Even under the best case scenario, over the longterm there may only be 100 vessels fishing for sablefish and 200 for halibut. In 1990, there were 475 vessels which fished for sablefish and halibut out of Kodiak. These vessels delivered product to this community which resulted in nearly 40 million dollars being spent locally. Which of those vessels and crew will be out of work in the future? If the small boat fleet thinks they can compete for product, they are sadly mistaken. In a worst case scenario (which is highly

January 24, 1992  
Page Two

likely), the vessel classes will be removed, the ownership caps will be raised or eliminated, and factory trawlers will buy our halibut for their bycatch. The Council generated analysis points to this type of situation as "best economic efficiency".


Frankly, we are certain that if the IFQ plan is implemented, it is only a matter of time before drastic changes are made and the coastal communities are severely impacted, with thousands of Alaskan fishermen are out of work.

We have been begging for the Council to request that a social impact analysis be conducted. It is so important to see what the longterm impacts are likely to be under this program and it is beyond comprehension that the State of Alaska isn't demanding that this type of study be done.

IFQs are definitely bad business for Alaska. Those people who will benefit initially may support the plan now, but they will regret their actions in the future if this plan is implemented.

We agree that problems exist in the fishery and we agree that action needs to be taken. It is ironic that for years we have been asking for changes in the management of the sablefish and halibut resource, but nothing was done. Now that the managers have "rigged" the system to fail, they say that this is the only answer. We aren't buying that story and hope that you won't either.

Sincerely,



Linda Kozak  
Executive Director

cc: Honorable Walter Hickel  
Honorable Ted Stevens  
Honorable Frank Murkowski  
Honorable Don Young  
Honorable Fred Zharoff



# Alaska State Legislature

House & Senate

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resources  
committee on Resolutions HJR 61 + SJR 38 dated 1-22-92  
committee on Individual fish Quotas dated 1-22-92  
bill/subject

I'm speaking on behalf of A.R.R.M. and A.K.S.A. (see below)  
A.R.R.M. led a successful petition letter drive  
which resulted in the submission of over 800 signatures  
and opinions to the June and Sept. Council meetings.  
We testified in June, Sept. and Dec. as well, opposing  
IFQ'S.

The IFQ debate has unleashed an awesome display  
of public wrath. It has been described by Senator  
Murkowski in a recent letter to Rick Lauber, chairman  
of the NPFMC, as a "phenomenon." A phenomenon  
which has resulted in an extraordinary volume of  
correspondence to his office from Alaskans. Undoubtedly,  
the NPFMC, members of the legislature, and Governor  
Wickel, have experienced this as well. The point must  
be clear by now, that Alaskans, and not only those  
that earn their living on the ocean, but City Councils,  
Chambers of Commerce, businesses, and families, are  
concerned about their futures under an IFQ mgmt.  
plan.

The IFQ plan simply does not address the

→ cont'd.

Signed: Lacey Berns  
Testifier

Area K Seiners / Alaskans for Responsible Resource Mgt.  
Representing (Optional)

Box 26 Kodiak Ak. 99615  
Address

486 5091  
Phone No.

Conservation of The resource. Instead, it addresses the pocketbooks of special interests. It is an allocative scheme which will unfairly create property rights, giving a small percentage of historical users, ~~instant~~ ~~to~~ permanent, access to wealth.

In its creation, it has proven to be an unwieldy concept. Its size, inconsistency, and complicated framework will doom it to failure. We believe a plan which does not have the support of the industry, or the coastal communities will prove to be cumbersome and impossible to enforce in the mammoth waters of the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. We believe it will be disastrous for coastal communities, which thrive or collapse in relationship to their local fishing fleet's health and ability to diversify.

We support the development of a sensible and simple plan which utilizes traditional mgmt. tools. Gear + trip limits, etc. are ~~is~~ more palatable than an unproven, risky, & awkward quota plan.

Above all, we support a plan which addresses the resource. Last, are the halibut + blackcod stocks in trouble? The IPHC recently proposed raising the '92 T.A.C. (total allow. catch) by 9 million lbs. (over)

In opposing IFQ's, we are responsible for being part of the solution. We encourage the formation of a public advisory group, outside of the Council process, consisting of reps from the newly-formed statewide COALITION. These concerned individuals need to be an integral part of any future mgmt plans.

We urge the passing of HJR 61 + SJR 38

Thank you

CITY OF KODIAK  
RESOLUTION NUMBER 01-92

A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF KODIAK SUPPORTING CONTINUED OPEN ACCESS IN THE GROUND FISH FISHERIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OFF ALASKA AND URGING THE ADOPTION OF SJR 38 AND HJR 61

WHEREAS, Senator Zharoff has sponsored Senate Joint Resolution 38 and Representative Davidson has sponsored House Joint Resolution 61 opposing individual fishing quota management systems for the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries and other Alaskan fisheries; and

WHEREAS, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council is developing detailed options for limited access in the sablefish longline fishery; and

WHEREAS, groundfish, including sablefish and halibut, is important to the diversified economy of the coastal communities of Alaska and the ability to participate in multiple fisheries and adapt to changing economic and resource conditions is a vital characteristic of the Alaska fishing fleet; and

WHEREAS, individual fishing quotas may deny the opportunity for residents of coastal communities to fully diversify and maximize their fisheries; and

WHEREAS, the individual fishing quota program under consideration provides for much of the resource to be allocated to nonresident users, excluding disproportionate numbers of Alaska fishermen and precluding participation by the growing Alaska longline fishing fleet; and

WHEREAS, limited access will prohibit maximum utilization of a natural resource by depriving crew members, processors, and other support groups of full participation; and

WHEREAS, the trend will be to process groundfish offshore which will minimize the raw fish tax to coastal communities and the state; and

WHEREAS, limited access programs restrict the free enterprise system by not allowing commercial fishermen to maximize their potential in the fishery; and

WHEREAS, limited access represents a quick-and-easy, but ineffective, solution to more fundamental management problems;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Kodiak, Alaska, that the Governor is respectfully requested to take whatever action is necessary to protect the rights of Alaska fishermen and to vigorously oppose any effort to implement limited entry in the groundfish fisheries in Alaska.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the North Pacific Fishery Management Council is respectfully requested to abandon all efforts to study, plan, encourage, or recommend implementation of limited access in the groundfish fisheries in Alaska.

AND, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED BY THE Council of the City of Kodiak, Alaska, that the Alaska State Legislature complete its deliberations and adopt Senate Joint Resolution 38 and House Joint Resolution 61.

AND, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Barbara Franklin, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce; the Honorable John A. Knauss, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; the Honorable Richard G. Darman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Honorable Richard Lauber, Chair of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; Governor Hickel and all members of the Alaska State Legislature.

PASSED AND APPROVED this 23rd day of January, 1992.

CITY OF KODIAK

  
MAYOR

ATTEST:


  
CITY CLERK

SPONSOR: Hallgren/Fager


RESOLUTION NO. 91-487

BE IT RESOLVED THAT THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF SITKA REQUESTS THE NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND ALL OTHER AUTHORITIES NOT TO APPROVE THE INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTA PROGRAM FOR THE SABLEFISH AND HALIBUT FISHERIES UNTIL AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM ON THE COASTAL COMMUNITIES OF ALASKA IS COMPLETED AND SHARED WITH THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION AND AFTER PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS PROPOSED ARE HELD IN AFFECTED COASTAL COMMUNITIES


PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF SITKA THIS 29th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1991.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dan Keck, Mayor

ATTEST:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Melinda L. Jenkins  
Municipal Clerk

Testimony submitted by  
Matt Donahoe of Sitka



"OF COURSE, OUR PRIMARY CONCERN IS FOR THE RESOURCE."



THE GREATER SITKA  
**chamber**  
OF COMMERCE  
Box 638 · Sitka, Alaska 99835  
(907) 747-8604

January 15, 1992

Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher  
15th & Constitution Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher;


As a representative of the Greater Sitka Chamber of Commerce I would like to address the topic of the individual fishing quota system as proposed by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council.

The Individual Fishing Quota System as proposed by the council has the potential to deny Sitka residents the opportunity to be diverse and could possibly cause financial hardship and create an economic impact in Sitka, Southeast Alaska, and other Alaskan communities.

The Greater Sitka Chamber of Commerce asks that an economic impact analysis of the program on the municipality of Sitka and other communities of Alaska be completed and that no action or approval of the plan be taken by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council until at which time the results of the study are returned and can be analyzed by the affected communities for their consideration and comment.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

  
Edward Malewski  
President

EM/sh

cc: Senator Ted Stevens  
Senator Frank Murkowski  
Representative Don Young  
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council

Excerpts From:

# Alaska's Constitution A Citizen's Guide

GORDON S. HARRISON

Agreed upon by the delegates in Constitutional Convention assembled at the University of Alaska, this fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and eightieth.

*Wm A. Egan*  
PRESIDENT OF THE CONVENTION

|                          |                          |                           |                           |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Richard C. Gray</i>   | <i>Douglas Gray</i>      | <i>Steve McCutcheon</i>   |                           |
| <i>George J. Aune</i>    | <i>Shamus C. Hannes</i>  | <i>Samuel K. Taylor</i>   | <i>Nick C. Rivers</i>     |
| <i>Frank Barr</i>        | <i>John D. McNeil</i>    | <i>Wm A. Egan</i>         | <i>John H. Roseman</i>    |
| <i>John C. Brunell</i>   | <i>Malcolm R. Hansen</i> | <i>John A. McLean</i>     | <i>W.D. Smith</i>         |
| <i>Delmer B. Buckley</i> | <i>Hub H. Kishner</i>    | <i>Wm A. Egan</i>         | <i>B. D. Stewart</i>      |
| <i>John B. Coghill</i>   | <i>Carl H. Hummel</i>    | <i>John T. Murphy</i>     | <i>George Lundberg</i>    |
| <i>E. B. Cook</i>        | <i>James J. Hudson</i>   | <i>Lucas K. Kall</i>      | <i>George M. Anderson</i> |
| <i>James Oleason</i>     | <i>Walter J. Johnson</i> | <i>James K. Nelson</i>    | <i>Harold G. Taylor</i>   |
| <i>John W. Cross</i>     | <i>Yule F. Kelson</i>    | <i>Thomas W. Nordale</i>  | <i>H. A. J. J. J.</i>     |
| <i>Edward V. Davis</i>   | <i>Thomas H. Davis</i>   | <i>George K. Nordale</i>  | <i>W. A. J. J.</i>        |
| <i>James P. Dwyer</i>    | <i>Walter W. Dwyer</i>   | <i>John Paulson</i>       | <i>Thomas K. White</i>    |
| <i>Thomas C. Egan</i>    | <i>W. W. Egan</i>        | <i>Peter J. Rasmussen</i> | <i>Adam B. Whisenand</i>  |
| <i>John F. Fisher</i>    | <i>E. J. Lee</i>         | <i>Jack H. Lyle</i>       |                           |
| <i>Victor F. Fisher</i>  | <i>Raymond A. Lyle</i>   | <i>Rachel P. Quinn</i>    |                           |

ATTEST

*Thomas B. Stewart*  
SECRETARY OF THE CONVENTION

ORDINANCE NO. 1

VALIDATION OF CONSTITUTION

SECTION 1. The Constitution for the State of Alaska agreed upon by the delegates in the Alaska Constitutional Convention on February 5, 1956, shall be submitted to the voters of Alaska for ratification or rejection at the territorial primary election to be held on April 24, 1956. The election shall be conducted according to existing laws regarding special elections so far as applicable.

SECTION 2. Each elector who offers to vote upon the referendum shall be given a ballot by the voter registration clerk and he shall mark the ballot so that registration in the primary election and vote. Each of the propositions offered by the Alaska Constitutional Convention shall be set forth separately, but on the same ballot form. The form promulgated shall be as follows:

Should the Constitution for the State of Alaska agreed upon and agreed upon by the Alaska Constitutional Convention be ratified?

Yes   
No

\$2.00

- *Management of state resources will recognize multiple uses whenever possible.*

Article VIII requires that state land be managed in a way that allows more than one use of an area if other uses are compatible (for example, recreation and timber harvesting).

- *The methods of acquiring mineral rights and water rights traditionally used in Alaska and the other western states shall be preserved by the new state government to the extent allowed by Congress.*

The constitution continues the distinction between locatable and leasable minerals found in federal mining laws. It continues the traditional right to appropriate locatable minerals and water on a "first-come-first-served" basis.

- *No private property right may be created in any fishery.*

Whereas it would be theoretically possible (and perhaps economically efficient) for the state to lease the exclusive rights to all salmon in a bay or inlet just as it leases the exclusive rights to oil under certain tracts of land, the constitution prohibits this practice.

#### Section 1. Statement of Policy

It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.

This is a strong statement that the policy of the state is to encourage the development of its land and resources. The qualifying phrase "consistent with the public interest" is subject to broad and changing interpretation, in much the same way that the phrase "except for a public purpose" in Article IX, Section 6 may be interpreted differently at different times. However, the words "public interest" are important because they make clear that the goal of resource development should not be pursued blindly. The early history of resource utilization in Alaska was marked by flagrant exploitation that depleted the resource and made no lasting contribution to the development of the territory.

#### Section 2. General Authority

The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, includ-

ing land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.

This section is a broad grant of legislative authority to implement the policy of Section 1. Note that here, however, conservation is also added as an objective of resource management. To the authors of this section, conservation was understood in its traditional sense of "wise use." Today, the term conservation also encompasses wilderness preservation and resource protection for recreational and scientific uses.

#### Section 3. Common Use

Wherever occurring in the natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.

The purpose of this "common use" provision is to prevent the state from granting individuals or groups private rights to wild animals, fish, and water. This commentary on the section was provided by the natural resource committee of the constitutional convention:

Game fish, wildlife, fisheries and water are recognized as belonging to the state so long as in a natural state. These resources are subject to a private right only when they have been acquired or utilized as provided by law. For example, a private person has no right to buy and sell wild animals in their natural state, but once an animal is taken in compliance with law, it becomes the property of the taker, subject to use or disposition within the law. This provision does not apply to the domestication of fur-bearing animals, or other animals subject to intensive culture or to fish in private ponds.

Court decisions and opinions of the attorney general have held that this section is compatible with various resource allocations (otherwise justifiable and legal under Article I, Section 1 of the constitution) that give preference to certain user groups. Examples of such allocations are subsistence laws that give preference to rural residents and regulatory measures that control access to fish stocks by commercial, sport, and subsistence fishermen. Prior to the 1972 amendment of Section 15 of this article, this "common use" section was interpreted to bar the state from restricting the number of commercial fishermen who can participate in a fishery (see Article VIII, Section 15).

## Section 13. Water Rights

All surface and subsurface waters reserved to the people for common use, except mineral and medicinal waters, are subject to appropriation. Priority of appropriation shall give prior right. Except for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be limited to stated purposes and subject to preferences among beneficial uses, concurrent or otherwise, as prescribed by law, and to the general reservation of fish and wildlife.

This section continues the traditional right to use water on a "first-come-first-served" basis. This method differs from an early method of acquiring water rights used historically on the East Coast. Known as the "riparian method," it allocated water rights to owners of the stream bank. In Alaska and the other western states, however, water rights were traditionally acquired by actual use of the water. Under this constitutional provision, which is further developed in state statute and regulation, a prior user of water has preference to it, but his rights may be withdrawn or limited as necessary to protect public interests.

## Section 14. Access to Navigable Waters

Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the United States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may by general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial uses or public purposes.

Citizens have the right to use publicly owned lakes and streams. The state may not deny this use except by a general law that protects a public interest. For example, the state may keep people away from a lake that supplies drinking water to a town, or build a dam on a river, but it may not prevent the public from fishing in a public lake because it wants to protect the interest of nearby private fishing lodges. Disposals of state-owned land along navigable waters must reserve a public access easement.

## Section 15. No Exclusive Right of Fishery

No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.

The second sentence of this section was added in 1972 by amendment. In the mid 1960s, Alaska's major salmon fisheries were in bad shape: too few fish, too many fishermen, and low prices.

Restricting entry into the fisheries was proposed as a major reform. In 1968 a limited-entry law was passed (186 SLA 68), but it was invalidated by the courts as a violation of Sections 3 and 15 of Article VIII (a three-judge federal court found the law unconstitutional, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision on abstention grounds; then the issue was litigated in state superior court, which found the law to violate Sections 3 and 15 of Article VIII and Section 1 of Article I).

Recognizing that a limited entry system would require constitutional authorization, the legislature placed the amendment before the voters in 1972. A limited-entry law was enacted soon thereafter, creating the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (A.S. 16.43). The constitutionality of the law has been upheld by the state supreme court (*Ostrosky v. State* 667 P.2d 1181; 1983), and an initiative to repeal the law was rejected by a wide margin of the voters in 1976.

An issue raised by this section that predates the limited-entry issue was whether the leasing of tidelands for the purpose of set netting creates an exclusive right of fishery. An opinion of the attorney general on the matter in 1963 held that "while Section 15 of Article VIII prohibits the state from granting exclusive fishing rights through legislation or regulation, it does not preclude the state from granting property interests which, by their nature, lead to exclusivity of use for fishing. The fact that the motivating force behind the creation of the property interest is a desire to promote fishing is of no consequence . . ."

In 1981 the state supreme court upheld regulations of the board of fisheries that established priorities of use between commercial and recreational fishermen in Cook Inlet, against a challenge that they violated the exclusive right of fishery provisions of this section (*Kenai Peninsula Fishermen's Co-op Association v. State*, 628 P.2d 897; 1981).

## Section 16. Protection of Rights

No person shall be involuntarily divested of his right to the use of waters, his interests in lands, or improvements affecting either, except for a superior beneficial use or public purpose and then only with just compensation and by operation of law.


This section further reinforces the right of public access to state-owned resources by declaring strict conditions under which this right may be infringed or revoked. Only a superior public purpose established in law may intervene, and a fair payment must be made if a specific existing right is extinguished.

Exerpts from:



# Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

As Amended Through November 28, 1990



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
National Marine Fisheries Service

97-453, 99-659, 101-627

(b) DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS.--Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any Council, or by the Secretary, with respect to any fishery, may--

(1) require a permit to be obtained from, and fees to be paid to, the Secretary, with respect to--

(A) any fishing vessel of the United States fishing, or wishing to fish, in the exclusive economic zone or for anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond such zone;

(B) the operator of any such vessel; or

(C) any United States fish processor who first receives fish that are subject to the plan;

(2) designate zones where, and periods when, fishing shall be limited, or shall not be permitted, or shall be permitted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified types and quantities of fishing gear;

(3) establish specified limitations on the catch of fish (based on area, species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass, or other factors), which are necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery;

(4) prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear, fishing vessels, or equipment for such vessels, including devices which may be required to facilitate enforcement of the provisions of this Act;

(5) incorporate (consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this Act, and any other applicable law) the relevant fishery conservation and management measures of the coastal States nearest to the fishery;

(6) establish a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield if, in developing such system, the Council and the Secretary take into account--

(A) present participation in the fishery,

(B) historical fishing effort, and dependence on, the fishery,

(C) the economics of the fishery,

(D) the types of vessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries,

(E) the cultural and social aspects relevant to the fishery, and

(F) any other relevant considerations;

(7) require fish processors who first receive fish that are subject to the plan to submit data (other than economic data) which are necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery;

(8) require that observers be carried on board a vessel of the United States engaged in fishing for species that are subject to the plan, for the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery; except that such a vessel shall not be required to carry an observer on board if the facilities of the vessel for the quartering of an observer, or for carrying out observer functions, are so inadequate or unsafe that the health or safety of the observer or the safe operation of the vessel would be jeopardized;

16 U.S.C. 1853

(9) assess and specify the effect which the conservation and management measures of the plan will have on the stocks of naturally spawning anadromous fish in the region; and

(10) prescribe such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery.

97-453

(c) **PROPOSED REGULATIONS.**--The proposed regulations which the Council deems necessary or appropriate for purposes of carrying out a plan or amendment to a plan shall be submitted to the Secretary simultaneously with the plan or amendment for action by the Secretary under sections 304 and 305.

99-659, 101-627

(d) **CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICS.**--Any statistic submitted to the Secretary by any person in compliance with any requirement under subsections (a) and (b) shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed; except--

- (1) to Federal employees and Council employees who are responsible for management plan development and monitoring;
- (2) to State employees pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary that prevents public disclosure of the identity or business of any person; or
- (3) when required by court order.

The Secretary shall, by regulation, prescribe such procedures as may be necessary to preserve such confidentiality, except that the Secretary may release or make public any such statistics in any aggregate or summary form which does not directly or indirectly disclose the identity or business of any person who submits such statistics. Nothing in this subsection shall be interpreted or construed to prevent the use for conservation and management purposes by the Secretary, or with the approval of the Secretary, the Council, of any statistic submitted in compliance with a requirement under subsection (a) or (b).

97-453

(e) **DATA COLLECTION PROGRAMS.**--If a Council determines that additional information and data (other than information and data that would disclose proprietary or confidential commercial or financial information regarding fishing operations or fish processing operations) would be beneficial for the purposes of--

- (1) determining whether a fishery management plan is needed for a fishery; or
- (2) preparing a fishery management plan;

the Council may request that the Secretary implement a data collection program for the fishery which would provide the types of information and data (other than information and data that would disclose proprietary or confidential commercial or financial information regarding fishing operations or fish processing operations) specified by the Council. The Secretary shall approve such a data collection program if he determines that the need is justified, and shall promulgate regulations to implement the program within 60 days after such determination is made. If the Secretary determines that the need for a data collection program is not justified, he shall inform the Council of the reasons for such determination in writing. The determinations of the Secretary under this subsection regarding a Council request shall be made within a reasonable period of time after he receives that request.

101-627

**(f) RESTRICTION ON USE OF CERTAIN DATA.--**The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to restrict the use, in civil enforcement or criminal proceedings under this Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.), or the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), of information collected by voluntary fishery data collectors, including sea samplers, while aboard any vessel for conservation and management purposes if the presence of such a fishery data collector aboard is not required by any of such Acts or regulations thereunder.

**SEC. 304. ACTION BY THE SECRETARY**

16 U.S.C. 1854

97-453, 99-659

**(a) ACTION BY THE SECRETARY AFTER RECEIPT OF PLAN.--**

**(1)** After the Secretary receives a fishery management plan, or amendment to a plan, which was prepared by a Council, the Secretary shall--

**(A)** immediately make a preliminary evaluation of the management plan or amendment for purposes of deciding if it is consistent with the national standards and sufficient in scope and substance to warrant review under this subsection and--

**(i)** if that decision is affirmative, implement subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) with respect to the plan or amendment, or

**(ii)** if that decision is negative--

**(I)** disapprove the plan or amendment, and

**(II)** notify the Council, in writing, of the disapproval and of those matters specified in subsection (b)(2)(A), (B) and (C) as they relate to the plan or amendment;

**(B)** immediately commence a review of the management plan or amendment to determine whether it is consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this Act, and any other applicable law;

**(C)** immediately publish in the Federal Register a notice stating that the plan or amendment is available and that written data, views, or comments of interested persons on the plan or amendment may be submitted to the Secretary during the 60-day period beginning on the receipt date; and

**(D)** by the 15th day after the receipt date--

**(i)** make such changes in the proposed regulations submitted for the plan or amendment under section 303(c) as may be necessary for the implementation of the plan, and

**(ii)** publish such proposed regulations, including any changes made thereto under clause (i), in the Federal Register together with an explanation of those changes which are substantive.

**(2)** In undertaking the review required under paragraph (1)(B), the Secretary shall--

**(A)** take into account the data, views, and comments received from interested persons;

**(B)** consult with the Secretary of State with respect to foreign fishing; and

**(C)** consult with the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating with respect to enforcement at sea and to fishery access adjustments referred to in section 303(a)(6).

(3) (A) The Secretary shall take action under this section on any fishery management plan or amendment to a plan which the Council characterizes as being a final plan or amendment.

(B) For purposes of this section, the term "receipt date" means the 5th day after the day on which a Council transmits to the Secretary a fishery management plan, or an amendment to a plan, that it characterizes as a final plan or amendment.

97-453, 99-659

(b) REVIEW BY THE SECRETARY.--

(1) A plan or amendment shall take effect and be implemented in accordance with section 305(a) if--

(A) the Secretary does not notify the Council in writing of--

(i) his disapproval under subsection (a)(1)(A)(ii), or

(ii) his disapproval, or partial disapproval, under paragraph (2), of the plan or amendment before the close of the 95th day after the receipt date; or

(B) at any time subsequent to the 60th day after the receipt date and before such 95th day, the Secretary notifies the Council in writing that he does not intend to disapprove, or partially disapprove, the plan or amendment.

(2) If after review under subsection (a) the Secretary determines that the plan or amendment is not consistent with the criteria set forth in paragraph (1)(B) of that subsection, the Secretary shall notify the Council in writing of his disapproval or partial disapproval of the plan or amendment. Such notice shall specify--

(A) the applicable law with which the plan or amendment is inconsistent;

(B) the nature of such inconsistencies; and

(C) recommendations concerning the actions that could be taken by the Council to conform such plan or amendment to the requirements of applicable law.

(3) (A) If the Secretary disapproves a proposed plan or amendment under subsection (a)(1)(A)(ii), or disapproves, or partially disapproves, a proposed plan or amendment under paragraph (2), the Council may submit a revised plan or amendment, accompanied by appropriately revised proposed regulations, to the Secretary.

(B) After the Secretary receives a revised plan or amendment under subparagraph (A) or (C)(ii), the Secretary shall immediately--

(i) commence a review of the plan or amendment to determine whether it complies with the criteria set forth in subsection (a)(1)(B);

(ii) publish in the Federal Register a notice stating that the revised plan or amendment is available and that written data, views, or comments of interested persons on the plan or amendment may be submitted to the Secretary during the 30-day period beginning on the date (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the "revised receipt date") the plan or amendment was submitted to the Secretary under subparagraph (A) or (C)(ii); and

(iii) review the revised proposed regulations, if any, submitted by the Council and make such changes to them as may be necessary for the implementation of the plan, and thereafter publish such revised proposed regulations (as so changed) in the Federal Register together with an explanation of each of such changes that is substantive.

(C) (i) Before the close of the 60th day after the revised receipt date, the Secretary, after taking into account any data, views, or comments received under subparagraph (B)(ii), shall complete the review required under subparagraph (B)(i) and determine whether the plan or amendment complies with the criteria set forth in subsection (a)(1)(B). If the Secretary determines that a plan or amendment is not in compliance with such criteria, he shall immediately notify the Council of his disapproval of the plan or amendment.

(ii) After notifying a Council of disapproval under clause (i), the Secretary shall promptly provide to the Council a written statement of the reasons on which the disapproval was based and advise the Council that it may submit a further revised plan or amendment, together with appropriately revised proposed regulations, for review and determination under this paragraph.

(D) A revised plan or amendment shall take effect and be implemented in accordance with section 305(a) if the Secretary does not notify the Council, in writing, by the close of the 60th day after the revised receipt date of his disapproval of the plan or amendment.

97-453, 99-659

(c) PREPARATION BY THE SECRETARY.--

(1) The Secretary may prepare a fishery management plan, with respect to any fishery, or any amendment to any such plan, in accordance with the national standards, the other provisions of this Act, and any other applicable law, if--

(A) the appropriate Council fails to develop and submit to the Secretary, after a reasonable period of time, a fishery management plan for such fishery, or any necessary amendment to such a plan, if such fishery requires conservation and management; or

(B) the Secretary disapproves or partially disapproves any such plan or amendment, or disapproves a revised plan or amendment, and the Council involved fails to submit a revised or further revised plan or amendment, as the case may be.

In preparing any such plan or amendment, the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of State with respect to foreign fishing and with the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating with respect to enforcement at sea. The Secretary shall also prepare such proposed regulations as he deems necessary or appropriate to carry out each plan or amendment prepared by him under this paragraph.

(2) (A) Whenever, under paragraph (1), the Secretary prepares a fishery management plan or amendment, the Secretary shall immediately--

(i) submit such plan or amendment, and proposed regulations to implement such plan or amendment, to the appropriate Council for consideration and comment;

(ii) publish in the Federal Register a notice stating that the plan or amendment is available and that written data, views, or comments of interested persons on the plan or amendment may be submitted to the Secretary during the 60-day period beginning on the date the plan or amendment was submitted under clause (i); and

(iii) by the 15th day after the date of submission under clause (i), submit for publication in the Federal Register the proposed regulations to implement the plan or amendment.

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(B) The appropriate Council must submit its comments and recommendations, if any, regarding the plan or amendment to the Secretary before the close of the 60-day period referred to in subparagraph (A)(ii). After the close of such 60-day period, the Secretary, after taking into account any such comments and recommendations, as well as any views, data, or comments submitted under subparagraph (A)(ii), may implement such plan or amendment under section 305(a).

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Secretary may not include in any fishery management plan, or any amendment to any such plan, prepared by him, a provision establishing a limited access system described in section 303(b)(6), unless such system is first approved by a majority of the voting members, present and voting, of each appropriate Council.

97-453

(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF FEES.--The Secretary shall by regulation establish the level of any fees which are authorized to be charged pursuant to section 303(b)(1). The Secretary may enter into a cooperative agreement with the States concerned under which the States administer the permit system and the agreement may provide that all or part of the fees collected under the system shall accrue to the States. The level of fees charged under this subsection shall not exceed the administrative costs incurred in issuing the permits.

99-659, 101-627

(e) FISHERIES RESEARCH.--

(1) Within one year after the date of enactment of the Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, and at least every three years thereafter, the Secretary shall develop and publish in the Federal Register a strategic plan for fisheries research for the five years immediately following such publication. The plan shall--

(A) identify and describe a comprehensive program with a limited number of priority objectives for research in each of the areas specified in paragraph (2);

(B) indicate the goals and timetables for the program described in subparagraph (A); and

(C) provide a role for affected commercial fishermen in such research, including involvement in field testing.

(2) The areas of research referred to in paragraph (1) are as follows:

(A) Research to support fishery conservation and management, including research on the economics of fisheries and biological research concerning the interdependence of fisheries or stocks of fish, the impact of pollution on fish populations, the impact of wetland and estuarine degradation, and other matters bearing upon the abundance and availability of fish.


(B) Conservation engineering research, including the study of fish behavior and the development and testing of new gear technology and fishing techniques to minimize the harvest of nontarget species and promote efficient harvest of target species.

(C) Information management research, including the development of a fishery information base and an information management system that will permit the full use of data in the support of effective fishery conservation and management.

November 1991

# A Commission of Inquiry into Licensing and Related Policies of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans

*Don Cruickshank  
Commissioner*



*The Fisherman's Report*

## Chapter 3

## THE IQ TEST

## What Are Individual Quotas?

Individual quotas, resource allocations, enterprise allocations or individual entitlements — all meaning the same thing — give to an individual the right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, converting common property to private property. Currently, individual quotas are in place for the management of six Pacific fisheries:

- spawn-on-kelp
- abalone
- herring food and bait
- geoduck
- sablefish (black cod)
- halibut

The initials "IQ" stand for individual quota; "TVQ" for individual vessel quota; and "ITQ" for individual transferable quota.

*Spawn-On-Kelp:* This has been a quota fishery since 1975. The licences are issued to a person or a Native band, are non-transferable and area specific. The vessel is designated; there is a licence holder on-site requirement; and all 38 quotas are equal.

*Abalone:* A quota fishery since 1979. The licences were personal, non-transferable, and not area specific. The vessel was designated. The absence of an owner-operator provision permitted leasing and stacking. There were 26 equal quotas. The abalone fishery is described in the past tense since it was closed indefinitely on October 30, 1990, to all user groups: commercial, Native and recreational.

*Herring Food and Bait:* A quota fishery since 1985. Licences are personal and non-transferable; the vessel is designated. Issuance is by a lottery-type arrangement.

*Geoduck:* A quota fishery since 1989. Licences are assigned to a vessel and are transferable and area specific. There is no owner-operator provision. All 55 quotas are equal.

*Sablefish (Black Cod):* A quota fishery since 1990. The licences are assigned to a vessel, are transferable and not area specific. There is no owner-operator provision. The 48 quotas are variable or not equal.

*Halibut:* 1991 was its first year as a quota fishery. Licences are assigned to a vessel, are non-transferable and not area specific. There is no owner-operator provision, and the 435 quotas are variable or not equal.

## The Issues

The issue of IQs, IVQs and ITQs is one of the hottest topics in the British Columbia fishing industry today. It evokes the question of common property ownership versus privatization of the resource, and no other debate in the industry raises as much emotional or philosophical intensity.

The proponents of quotas herald the security of tenure as an advantage. The opponents counter that the system is flawed by its exclusivity and irreversibility favouring the quota recipients. Inflaming the quota debate is the opinion expressed or implied by some DFO personnel that many industry representatives are reactionary, and that the resistance to quotas is nostalgic deference to an obsolete system. Meanwhile, DFO staff are accused of seizing on quotas as the panacea of licensing policy.

The method by which quotas were introduced is also a controversial point, since the policy is widely seen as being imposed on the industry, even though it is billed as response to the demands of the majority of fishermen.

The Commission of Inquiry's research suggests there is some justice to this concern. On March 2, 1982, on the advice of Pacific Region staff and in response to the preliminary report of the Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy, the Honourable Romeo Leblanc established a committee of five halibut licence holders to develop a proposal for the implementation of a halibut vessel quota system. This committee, chaired by a DFO employee, was not asked to determine the advantages or disadvantages of quotas, but merely to set the terms for their implementation. The report was signed only by the Chairman and was submitted to the Minister on April 27, after eight separate meetings between April 2 and April 23, 1982.

The recommendations of this report were rejected by Mr. Leblanc, after the industry voiced considerable opposition. With the appointment of the next Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Pierre De Bane, the proposal resurfaced and again industry opposition quashed it. Nonetheless, several years later and several ministers later, halibut quotas are in place, "at the request of halibut fishermen."

The Department's handling of licensing and fleet rationalization issues has created an element of mistrust and bitterness among fishermen. The message was clear during this Commission's hearings that they are fed up with fighting off the Department's incessant attempts to impose licensing theories that have been repeatedly rejected by the industry.

## Pros and Cons

*Vision 2000* details the benefits as follows:

**Individual Quota (EA) licensing, perhaps operating in conjunction with area licensing, provides a direct means of controlling catch within the target set, and potentially frees managers from a complex regulatory regime (restricting vessels, gear and fishing time) which is the hallmark of a system where total catch is controlled simply by the number of licences issued. However, the outstanding advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the basic cause of overcapacity in the fishing industry. Rather than encouraging fishermen to competitively and defensively increase their fishing power, it encourages them to adapt their vessels and fishing practices to take their licensed catch as a quality product at the lowest cost.**

There are other favourable reasons for quota licensing:

- individual quotas offer the opportunity to harvest species when market demand and prices are the highest;
- once the competitive nature of a fishery is removed, fishermen need not travel nor fish in unsuitable weather conditions;
- fishermen have a better opportunity to become involved in marketing the catch;
- the accumulation or stacking of quotas can result in a reduction in fleet size.

### **Industry Reaction**

The Commission of Inquiry found industry to be generally opposed to quotas. Where a group already held a quota, the reaction was less critical, but concerns were still voiced. These statements have been excerpted from written briefs submitted to the Commission of Inquiry:

**Fisheries Council of British Columbia:** "The IQ system that has been introduced into a number of British Columbia fisheries over the past years is roundly condemned by this organization on two major counts.

"First, the policies have been introduced without the establishment of any clear guidelines for change. In effect, the old limited licensing system has been eroded. Whether you liked the system that began in 1969 or not, at least the rules were fairly clear after two decades of use. Now, fisheries for various species are taking place with the objective of providing some catch history and, therefore, insurance in case the rules of the game change again.

"Second, the process of change has been slanted towards those who wanted to see change, whether for academic or personal business reasons. The example of the manner in which DFO conducted the advisory process for the Halibut IQ system was a fraud from start to finish . . . a pretense of democracy in the name of open consultation."

**Fishing Vessel Owners Association of British Columbia:** "The past two years have seen a dramatic change in the thrust of fishery management in British Columbia. The fundamental principle of free access to a common property resource by all licence holders is being rapidly transformed into privatization of the resource through a headlong rush by DFO for the institution of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) to existing licence holders. In 1989 geoduck licence holders voted overwhelmingly for a quota system, and in 1990 sablefish licence holders also opted for ITQs. Finally, late in 1990, DFO sponsored a series of meetings with halibut fishermen to explore the possibility of a halibut quota fishery, and a quota system is now in place in this fishery as well, in theory on a two year trial basis.

"Philosophically, most fishermen are opposed to quota fisheries. The free competition for an individual's share of the harvest is a long standing tradition of our fisheries, and one of its attractions for many. With traditional fisheries, good fishermen are rewarded with good catches while bad fishermen are forced to either accept sub par earnings or to look elsewhere for a living.

"It seems that for as long as there have been commercial fisheries there have been 'too many boats chasing too few fish,' and ITQs are a way to have a fishery rationalize itself, at no cost to the government for buy back programs. Of course, the concentration of licences doesn't reduce overcapitalization — in fact ITQs increase overcapitalization — since licences tend to increase in value. The key point of course is that under ITQs, the fleet tends to be reduced *at no cost to government*. . . .

"The strongest and most often heard criticism of quota fisheries is the strong incentive they create for cheating, and the difficulty of enforcement of quota limits. DFO's response to this problem has been to devise complex and costly monitoring and enforcement systems for the geoduck, sablefish and halibut fisheries, with the costs to be borne by the licence holders. . . .

"There is overwhelming support for having licences revoked as a penalty for cheating. However, in the past when DFO has tried to enforce stiff penalties on fishermen, the courts have considered the loss of a licence as 'cruel and unusual punishment' that removes an individual's ability to earn a dishonest living. . . .

"With quota fisheries, there is an obvious incentive to high grade the catch in order to market only the higher valued fish. The recent (March, 1991) wholesale value of sablefish in Japan varied from about \$5.11 for over seven lb. fish to \$4.94 for four-five lb. fish. It is difficult to guess whether this price differential will encourage high grading, but one thing is certain: the proposed monitoring program contains no provision for monitoring high grading. This can only be accomplished by placing observers aboard a few vessels and comparing the size composition of the observed vessels' catches with the overall landings of the fleet.

"Without an observer program, the only evidence of high grading, a potentially serious problem, will be hearsay and dockside gossip.

"DFO sees ITQs as a costless (to DFO) way to 'rationalize' fleet size, particularly in the halibut fishery, which is faced with declining stocks. Of course, a smaller fleet means less employment, especially for crewmen, and this loss of employment is a legitimate concern of these fishermen and the organizations that represent them.

"Another often heard criticism of ITQs is the potential they create for the concentration of licences in the hands of a few individuals or companies. Licence concentration, and the high cost of ITQ licences . . . will make it extremely difficult if not impossible for young new fishermen to enter the fishery. . . .

"The issues of monitoring, enforcement and licence concentration need to be seriously addressed and reviewed at the end of the two year trial periods. We believe that conservation and the maintenance of opportunities for future generations of fishermen ought to take precedence over administrative convenience for DFO and over fuzzy economic rhetoric about the 'tragedy of the commons.'"

**Deep Seas Trawlers Association of B.C. (DSTA):** "Initial information available to DSTA suggests that this type of management approach would be adverse to our industry and to Canada's fisheries. DSTA will continue to keep an open mind on the issue, however. We will insist on two prerequisites for serious consideration of such a proposal. First, we would need to have complete access to all information being considered by DFO. In particular, this would include results and analysis from the 'test' geoduck and sablefish programs currently being conducted by DFO; and a broader DFO assessment of Individual Quota programs in Canada (and possibly abroad) which DSTA understands has been completed, but not publicly released. Second, and following release of this information, we would need at least two years to jointly dialogue with and consider such an option with DFO."

**Heiltsuk Tribal Council:** "We are extremely concerned that the process may result in a privately owned fisheries resource. This would greatly increase third party interests which would then have to be dealt with on an individual basis during the settlement of the Heiltsuk sea claim. The result would be an even more costly and complicated

settlement process. It simply does not make sense to consider such a change in fisheries resource management prior to the settlement of land claims. . . . maintain that Native claims must be dealt with first."

**Prince Rupert Fishing Vessel Owners' Association:** "Our organization is against some portions of *Vision 2000*, in particular ITQs, IQs and IVQs.

"Any licence changes that affect or impact on the commercial sector should have to be passed by CFIC.

"If there is need for any licensing changes, let the fishermen ask for it and let them do the implementation."

**Sunshine Coast Labour Council:** "The commercial fishing has remained viable for over one hundred years as a common property resource. The present licensing system insures that all commercial fishermen have equal access, while individual transferable quotas do not grant the same equality."

**United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union: Halibut Fishermen's Brief:** "As of May 1, 1991, the halibut longline fishery will be regulated by a so-called experimental Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) fishery. We as halibut fishermen remain concerned that IVQs and Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) will spell disaster for most of us as fishermen and for the halibut as a commercially fishable stock. . . .

"DFO officials state that ITQs will; 'increase landed values,' 'make halibut fisheries more manageable,' 'reduce overfishing' and 'reduce costs of enforcement.' There has been no attempt by the DFO to support these contentions with research and in fact, where independent research has been conducted, DFO positions have been proved erroneous.

"Suffice it to say that authoritative sources of information about ITQs and their working history exist. They should be studied carefully by all concerned before introducing a problematic ITQ/IVQ system on west coast fisheries.

"In conclusion, as a minimum demand, we insist that nothing be done by the DFO to allow IVQs to become irreversible. The DFO has stated that the current IQ system is on a trial basis for two years and we insist that they be held to their word. The IQ system must be kept easy to change to another should the fishing industry as a whole so decide."

**United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union: Principal Brief:** "It is difficult to assess where the initiative originates for privatizing Pacific fisheries resources. Peter Pearce touted ITQs but we suspect he was merely mirroring the policy initiatives of the DFO. The fisheries committee of the Canadian Senate, the Economic Council of Canada, the office of the Auditor-General and other authorities have advocated ITQs presumably as an economic measure but as a conservation and management system as well. . . .

"Various purposes are said to be served by ITQs, namely:

- conservation and management
- reduce management costs
- save the resource
- fleet reduction

"The justification most commonly given for the use of ITQs is the common property resource argument. Fishermen will deplete fisheries resources in an open fishery and make increasingly burdensome investments to compete for their share of the fish. Resource rent is therefore dissipated by overcapitalization. Some suggest that a resource must be privately owned for it to be cared for properly. No one has an interest in caring for a publicly owned resource and the 'tragedy of the commons' theory is repeated over and over again.

"As justification for ITQs, the foregoing might be believable if Pacific fisheries resources were seriously threatened by over exploitation. Such is not the case.

"In the Black Cod fishery, we see not only limited entry but ITQs as well. Holders of black cod licences and quotas will plead this is the best possible invention save and except for the wheel. Other vessel owners are critical of the programme simply because they don't own black cod quotas which are a licence to print money. There is a 5,000 ton annual quota in the black cod or sablefish fishery. There are 48 licence holders who on average would hold a quota of 200 thousand pounds. Estimations are that these quotas would sell for six-seven dollars a pound making each gift of a quota worth \$1.2 and \$1.4 million dollars.

"Like the New Zealand system, these quotas can be leased and the going rate is 50 per cent of the catch. In fact they can be and are sub-leased with the second broker taking 30 per cent of the catch leaving a mere 20 per cent for the people doing the work. We have reports that the licence/quota owner charges the fishing venture the equivalent of the lease rate which is a common practice, too, in the roe herring gillnet fishery. In other words, if the going rate to lease quotas is say \$1.50 per pound, the quota owner pockets that money as his rent before sharing the remainder with his crew. DFO planners must clearly be held in high esteem by this generation of licence quota owners who enjoy instant riches at the expense of another generation. Once again resource rent is extracted for personal gain rather than accruing to the owners of the resource, namely the people of Canada, or to the general benefit of the industry."

Pacific Black Cod Fishermen's Association (This association, understandably, is very supportive of the quota management of the black cod fishery, but it lists some weaknesses):

**"Recommendations for Change**

**"(a) The foreign ownership question**

"Our members are concerned that foreign interests will someday begin to purchase black cod licences. To prevent such a development, we wish to see the following changes in licensing requirements:

"That owners of Category K Sablefish licences be required, upon payment of their annual fee, to sign an affidavit in which they state that their licence is not owned or controlled, either wholly or in part, by foreign interests.

**"(b) Ownership and quota concentration**

"We recommend that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans develop a forum to work with this association to deal effectively with the questions of non-fisherman ownership, processor ownership, and maximum individual ownership.

**"(c) Creating smaller quotas**

"We recommend that a process be put in place to develop the concept of the permanent transfer of smaller blocks of quota."

***Economists' Comments***

Resource economists, even while usually supporting quotas, voice certain reservations.

Sol Sinclair, *A Licensing and Fee System for the Coastal Fisheries of British Columbia*, 1978: "The enforcement of the quota system can present problems. It will require very close supervision to ensure compliance with each individual's quota.

"A freely transferable individual quota can force quota prices to levels that may eliminate inefficient, part time, or lower income fishermen. Thus it can adversely affect small-scale operators in isolated fishing communities that are very dependent on fishing."

Moloney and Pearse, 1979: "Quantitative rights would be most easily adapted to fisheries that do not call for frequent, intraseasonal management intervention in the form of changes to the allowable catch."

Willen, 1980: "It is certain that such a system applied in a fishery which needs 'fine tuning' like the B.C. roe herring fishery would require a fair degree of complexity."

Fraser, 1980: "The more variable the resource stock, the more significant are the ensuing problems and the less practical are individual vessel quotas as a management technique."

Clark, 1980: "There are doubtlessly some fisheries for which allocated fishermen's or vessel quotas would be unsuitable. For example, in cases where annual recruitment is highly variable and unpredictable, there would be no basis upon which to fix annual quota levels."

### **Enforcement**

With a quota system, the potential for high grading (the practice of keeping only the higher-valued fish and dumping all low-valued fish at sea) and "quota busting" (exceeding quotas) is certainly felt to be high, but there is no mechanism available to gauge its extent and impact on the resource accurately. It is also too early to judge the effectiveness of the complex procedure now in place, at shore locations, to monitor individual quotas.

But there is evidence that a fundamental enforcement problem faces DFO.

Enforcement of quota fisheries is based on the right of DFO to monitor and enforce these fisheries by conditions attached to the licences. But it is a right subject to legal challenge. Recently, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the County Court of Prince Rupert contesting DFO's enforcement right in two cases. Challenged was the Department's right to regulate fisheries and impose restrictions as a condition of licence.

Even without court challenges, the DFO takes 16 months, on average, to develop and promulgate a regulation. It has taken as long as five years. If our present fisheries regulations cannot provide the necessary controls to monitor and enforce quota fisheries, and this situation prevails for even 16 months, the effect on the industry and on the resource will be disastrous.

Critics cite the abalone fishery as an example of failure to enforce quotas, and suggest that the Department may not have felt it had the legal grounding to do so.

### **Impact on Employment**

The issue in this area is that quota systems may put crew and vessel owners out of work, reduce wage levels and deny opportunity to entry-level fishermen. The halibut fishery is cited as an example. Speaker after speaker at the public hearings echoed the words of this fisherman: "I have fished halibut for years, and I don't have a job this spring because of the halibut quota. To fish halibut now you either have to own a quota, or work for nothing."

The Commission of Inquiry's research found that the people on board halibut boats shared in 75 to 80 per cent of the value of the catch. It was a labour-intensive fishery, and the crew shares reflected that reality. These crew members, many of them professional halibut fishermen, had "busted their butts" to catch the fish that counted as the historic portion of the vessel quota, but they received no recompense for their pre-quota efforts under the advisory process conducted by DFO. As quoted above, the Fisheries Council of British Columbia described the manner in which DFO conducted this advisory process for the halibut IQ system as fraudulent.

After the introduction of quotas and the elimination of the need for a fast, high-volume catch, vessel owners (also the quota holders) found it more profitable if crew members were also eliminated. Vessel owners now take turns fishing their quotas, one boat after the other, with their fellow quota holders taking the places of men who had served them well for years. Some quota holders do still take crews, but the share of the halibut catch accruing to the boat now runs at 40 to 50 per cent — reducing the crew's historic share to 50 to 60 per cent of a catch whose size they can no longer increase by skill and effort. The halibut quota system has effectively destroyed the livelihood of all these fishermen and made their professional skills instantly redundant.

For entry-level fishermen, if almost all halibut fishermen are vessel owners and quota holders, there is no training ground for the next generation. Entry-level fishermen cannot afford to purchase quotas and, without crew positions, they have no means of acquiring either the necessary money or the experience.

The sablefish or black cod fishery is also cited. Two crew members of a black cod boat offered the following experience of quotas in practice.

While preparing for the start of the 1990 season, the vessel owner announced that there would be a change in the crew share arrangement. Instead of sharing in the value of the catch, the crew would be paid by the pound, which made them feel they had been reduced to employees instead of co-entrepreneurs sharing the risk of the venture. They were offered five cents per pound of black cod sold and had no choice but to accept. On returning to the vessel in 1991, they found the pay offered was now three cents per pound — on fish that had been selling for up to \$5.65 per pound. In spite of many years' work in the black cod fishery, they chose to attempt to find on-shore jobs instead.

### **Quotas Abroad**

*Vision 2000* states that quota licensing is now "state of the art" in Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. The Commission of Inquiry's research found that New Zealand participants in the system gave mixed opinions.

**Robin Hapi, General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Maori Fisheries Commission, in Wellington, was generally pleased with the quota regime in the inshore fishery. The quota process is being used to transfer fishing rights to the Maori people, although only 15 percent of the fisheries have been addressed so far. Initially, these rights are being transferred to the control of the Commission; the allocation to individuals will proceed at some later date.**

**Mr. Ray Dobson, General Manager of the New Zealand Fishing Industry Board, an organization representing the interests of the New Zealand fishing industry, is a self-proclaimed advocate of ITQs, believing that quotas are the solution for New Zealand fisheries. He cites increased efficiency, increased flexibility and the advantages of market forces dictating fishing times.**

His major concern was the high cost of the initial installation of ITQs and suggested that, to be successful, quotas must be preceded by increased research in order to develop a high level of input for the establishment of the total allowable catches. He pointed out that, particularly for inshore fisheries, owner-operator provisions were vital. He said the enforcement of quota objectives was a problem — it appears high grading in the rock lobster fishery is rampant — but he claimed New Zealand fishermen are adjusting, recognizing that it is in their own best interest to fish legally.

**Mr. Brian Piner, with 30 years experience as a fisherman, 15 of them as a vessel owner/skipper, is a resident in Greymouth on the west coast of the South Island. Strongly opposed to quotas, he warns that British Columbia fishermen should resist any system**

similar to that imposed on the New Zealand industry. He said that British Columbia industry fears of corporate control were realized in New Zealand: four major companies control the majority of quotas for both the inshore and deep water resources. These companies allocate a quota to a fisherman for a lease fee. Real prices New Zealand fishermen receive for their catch are lower than pre-quota ones, as companies attempt to service debts incurred in the purchase of quotas. In Greymouth, a small coastal community, he said there are about 50 fishing boats, but only four or five of these now have their own fishing quotas. The rest lease the right to fish from company-held quota licences, and they must accept the prices offered or forgo the quota.

Ken Shirley, former Minister of Fisheries for New Zealand, was quoted in the newspaper *Grey Star* as saying, "with hindsight the government should never have introduced permanent fishing quotas." It proved impossible to get official confirmation of this statement from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries for New Zealand.

### Legality

Quotas raise a jurisdictional question that may cripple the entire proposal: Is it constitutionally legal for the Government of Canada to regulate any fishery, once access has been transferred from common property access to individual entitlement? Such privatized rights as individual quotas could be beyond the necessary legislative competence of the federal government since, as private property in the legal sense, IQs would be subject to the authority of provincial law relating to property and civil rights.

In 1985, the Faculty of Law at Dalhousie University analyzed this issue. Its report, *Individual Entitlements in The Tidal Fisheries: Some Legal Problems* by Bruce H. Wildsmith, Professor of Law, K.J. Spears, LL.B, and W.G. Wharton, LL.B, was prepared under contract for DFO.

The report defines the historic role of the federal government: under the power of the Constitution Act, 1867, Section 91 (12), the fisheries in Canada are an area of jurisdiction allotted to the federal government. It also confirms the fisheries as common property, offering the *Canadian Law Dictionary* definition: "that which belongs to the citizenry as a whole."

The report finds that individual entitlements, resource allocations, or individual quotas — all meaning the same thing — give to an individual a right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, and converts this to private property.

Calling on constitutional considerations, administrative law, and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the report acknowledges that legal interpretations recognize a provincial proprietary right and provincial legislative jurisdiction over property and civil rights. However, it considers that the federal government has the necessary legislative competence for control over the total harvest of fish in all waters recognized by international law as being within Canada's jurisdiction; further, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans can legislate to create exclusive transferable rights, ITQs, to fish in waters beyond provincial jurisdiction.

But the report points out that the Supreme Court of Canada has held the seabeds under the waters in the straits and gulfs between Vancouver Island and the Queen Charlotte Islands and mainland to be property of the Province of British Columbia. The first three miles of territorial sea could be similarly included as provincial property. Within this area, in the report's opinion, the actions of DFO in attempting to regulate IQs could be found to be *ultra vires*, that is, beyond their authority or legal power.

The report recommends that, if individual entitlements are to be granted by DFO, they should only be for fisheries in areas that are offshore, beyond provincial boundaries, unless fisheries are to be used as the vehicle for determining provincial boundaries. Alternatively, DFO should seek co-operation from the province to alleviate the necessity of drawing firm boundaries.

The Department has pursued neither of these options with British Columbia, consequently the six individual quota systems that have been implemented in Pacific fisheries may be subject to legal challenge on these jurisdictional grounds.

From the Commission of Inquiry's public hearings and written briefs, and from casual conversations with fishermen and industry workers, the points against quotas can be summarized as follows:

- they convert a common property resource to private property;
- difficulty of enforcement of high grading and the exceeding of quota limits;
- threat of foreign control;
- concentration of licences in the hands of too few individuals or corporations;
- reduces the opportunity for entry-level fishermen;
- creates unemployment through quota stacking;
- permits unfair labour practices; and
- may be constitutionally unsound and subject to legal challenge.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS

### The Problem:

Are IQs, IVQs or ITQs a method that should be continued or expanded as a management system for Pacific fisheries?

### Recommendations

Fishermen and resource managers should be aware individual quotas are not simply an alternative licensing system. The transition to IQs is a fundamental change that converts to private property that which has been a public or common property resource.

The fishing industry is prepared to accept changes, but these changes must be the result of evolution, not revolution. Fishermen will not accept changes that have been manipulated into place. They will not accept changes that are the result of balloting where licence holders are asked to vote for or against personal gain.

There are some significant disadvantages to quota fisheries, but the three personal licensed quota fisheries present no current problems: Spawn-on-kelp and herring food and bait are each unique fisheries and the present management system is adequate; the abalone fishery is closed.

**Recommendation 1:** that the spawn-on-kelp and herring food and bait fisheries continue as at present.

**Recommendation 2:** that, of the three vessel-assigned quota fisheries, geoduck, sablefish and halibut, introduced as two-year pilot projects, none be instituted as longer term quotas until the consultative process has had the opportunity to provide recommendations for change. Pending this input, the existing quota system should be extended on a year-to-year basis.

**Recommendation 3:** that, where as specified in this report individual quotas are working or can be satisfactorily amended, industry leave the question of constitutional authority to be resolved by the Government of Canada and the Province of British Columbia.

**Recommendation 4:** that, if more quota fisheries are announced for implementation, legal challenge on a constitutional basis should be considered to halt implementation, pending a Supreme Court decision.

**Recommendation 5:** that no quota, under any circumstances, should be issued for a term exceeding 10 years, an adequate time for the amortization of investments specific to each fishery.

**Recommendation 6:** that all vessel quotas, following the initial allocation, be reallocated by tender or auction with all successful tenders normalized; that is to say, with the lowest acceptable tender then being the unit price applicable to all successful tenders. A fail-safe option, or stop-loss option, should be employed, for initiation by either the fishermen or the government, to protect against abnormal market changes.

**Recommendation 7:** that the proceeds derived from the tender process be to the benefit of the government department or agency regulating quota licensing, thus recovering part of the cost of management, protection and enhancement of the fisheries. Further, the quota fee tendered should be payable at the time of landing the catch, in order to give equal opportunity to new applicants who have not had the benefit of past allocations. Further, the unit size of reallocated quotas should be governed to accommodate new entrants.

The aim of this system is to reduce overcapitalization and to encourage entry-level fishermen by reducing fishermen's investment in licences or quotas. The market price of quotas should decrease under the influence of two factors: first, prices will be lower simply because the quotas are not awarded in perpetuity; second, as each term reaches maturity, quotas transferred between fishermen can be expected to drop in price to reflect the reduced, remaining potential earnings of the quota allocation.

**Recommendation 8:** that crew shares in the black cod, halibut and geoduck fisheries be encompassed as an integral part of the quota process. During the trial period there should be consultation with all parties, including crew members, to arrive at a fair allocation of quotas. In the interim, the following conditions should be put into operation to resolve the problem of unfair crew shares:

- 1) As a condition of the issuance of the annual quota licence, the Minister must have proof, by statutory declaration, that an equitable share agreement is in place for each vessel participating in these fisheries. The responsibility for proof should be on the quota holder.
- 2) For each of these fisheries, a single industry-wide agreement should be negotiated between representatives of the quota holders and representatives of the crew members.

- 3) Part of this negotiation process should be the determination of acceptable expenses that might affect crew shares. Items to be considered would include: fuel, groceries, lost gear, UIC premiums, licence fees, registration fees, amortization of licence purchases, royalties, resource rents or sectoral contributions towards enhancement, biological assessment and enforcement.
- 4) The negotiation process should include determination of the areas from which expenses may be deducted (i.e., from the gross landed value, from the gross crew share, or from individual crew shares).
- 5) Following the determination of deductions, the agreement must specify the percentage of the value to be divided among crew members, and how this sum is to be divided.
- 6) Provision should be made in this agreement for the issuance to each crew member, by the quota holder, of a detailed statement showing all data relevant to the crew shares.
- 7) Every reasonable effort should be made by both sides to arrive at this agreement by a process of negotiations. Failing a negotiated settlement, binding arbitration should prevail, but only after all other factors besides crew percentage have been determined. The arbitration method should then be by "final offer selection," or "fixed choice arbitration." These terms refer to an arbitration system whereby the representatives of the two parties submit their final offers and the arbitrator selects one or other of the two offers, whichever he deems to be the closest to being fair.
- 8) Participation in the negotiation or arbitration process should be restricted to current quota holders for each of these fisheries, and those crew members who can show proof of active participation in each fishery during the period used to determine the historic landing requirements for the quota, or participation during an actual quota fishery.
- 9) The arbitration process should be facilitated by the Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Labour and Consumer Services. The provisions of Section 95 of the Industrial Labour Act authorize the Minister of Labour to appoint an arbitrator if settlement is not reached by negotiation, and if the two sides cannot agree on an arbitrator.

**Recommendation 9:** that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans state clearly that the annual issuance of an individual vessel quota is at his sole discretion, and that this privilege grants privately guaranteed access to a common property resource. Further, it should be understood that the Minister's responsibility to fishermen is no less than his responsibility to the quota holders. Quotas should not be construed as a licence to cheat the labour component of any fishery.

**Recommendation 10:** that the Licensing Unit of Fisheries and Oceans disclose all data pertinent to the issuance of individual quotas. Citing the Privacy Act, the DFO is unwilling to provide any information of individual quotas that might make it possible to estimate personal income, but the public and fishermen have a right to know to whom the resource is being allocated. In any case, Section 3 of the Privacy Act states that "personal information" does not include "information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred

on an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit." As a condition of quota licence renewal, each licensee should be required to sign a waiver absolving DFO of any culpability or liability from disclosure of information regarding quotas. Section 27 of the Access to Information Act provides for such waivers.

Recommendation 11: that, since the threat of foreign control of privatized individual quota fisheries is too great and the leasing of quotas too repugnant to permit the operation of these licences by other than the owner, all individual quota fisheries be managed with owner-operator licences.

Some information of how halibut relates to Sitka & Southeast

Table 5.6: 1990 Population, Distribution of Halibut Permits and Landings in Southeast Alaskan Communities (Area 2C)

| Community             | Pop.<br>N     | Native<br>Pop. % | Permits<br>N | Halibut           |                   |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                       |               |                  |              | Commerc.<br>Lbs.  | Subsist.*<br>Lbs. |
| Juneau                | 26,751        | 11.2             | 213          | 390,151           | n/a               |
| Ketchikan             | 13,459        | 11.1             | 128          | 1,036,245         | n/a               |
| Sitka                 | 8,588         | 21.4             | 278          | 3,638,138         | 206,112           |
| Petersburg            | 3,207         | 10.9             | 215          | 2,283,585         | 102,303           |
| Wrangell              | 2,479         | 17.9             | 109          | 556,897           | 47,597            |
| Metlakatla            | 1,407         | 80.2             | 27           | 234,650           | 11,256            |
| Craig                 | 1,260         | 32.3             | 65           | 677,596           | 16,884            |
| Haines                | 1,238         | 18.9             | 74           | 44,198            | 18,322            |
| Hoonah                | 795           | 79.9             | 59           | 703,747           | 29,733            |
| Klawock               | 722           | 66.0             | 13           | **                | 22,815            |
| Kake                  | 700           | 84.1             | 43           | **                | 14,700            |
| Skagway               | 692           | 4.6              | 2            | **                | 4,429             |
| Angoon                | 638           | 80.6             | 53           | **                | 14,929            |
| Thorne Bay            | 569           | 2.8              | 6            | **                | 22,020            |
| Hydaburg              | 384           | 84.9             | 28           | **                | 9,178             |
| Saxman                | 369           | 71.1             | #            | **                | 3,727             |
| Gustavus              | 258           | 2.0              | 17           | 39,327            | 16,202            |
| Pelican               | 222           | 18.3             | 40           | 1,132,088         | 12,632            |
| Coffman Cove          | 186           | 0.0              | #            | **                | 5,264             |
| Klukwan               | 129           | 83.7             | #            | **                | 150               |
| Port Alexander        | 119           | 5.6              | 17           | **                | 3,713             |
| Hollis                | 111           | 18.0             | #            | **                | 1,032             |
| Hyder                 | 99            | 1.3              | 2            | **                | 4,712             |
| Tenakee Springs       | 94            | 5.1              | 5            | **                | 4,362             |
| Edna Bay              | 86            | 0.0              | 23           | **                | 5,452             |
| North Whale Pass      | 75            | 0.0              | 0            | **                | 1,586             |
| Port Protection       | 62            | 5.6              | #            | **                | 2,220             |
| Elfin Cove            | 57            | 7.1              | 19           | **                | 1,767             |
| Kasaan                | 54            | 56.0             | 1            | **                | 540               |
| Point Baker           | 39            | 5.6              | 18           | **                | 1,365             |
| Meyers Chuck          | 37            | 0.0              | 5            | **                | 2,853             |
| Excursion Inlet##     |               |                  |              | 1,052,386         |                   |
| Killisnoo##           |               |                  |              | 245               |                   |
| Misc. SE Alaska Ports |               |                  |              | 3,676             |                   |
| <b>Totals</b>         | <b>64,886</b> |                  | <b>1,460</b> | <b>11,792,929</b> |                   |

Population data are from the 1990 U.S. Census; 1990 permit and commercial landings data are from IPHC files.

\* 1990 subsistence landings data are estimated from Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game baseline studies for 1987; estimated landings are in pounds of dressed fish (H&G).

\*\* Any commercial landings were at other ports or are shown in the Misc. S.E. Alaska Ports category.

n/a Data not available.

# IPHC permit data are based upon postal zip codes; many Alaskan communities share zip codes, and CFEC data indicate that halibut permit holders reported elsewhere reside here.

## These are cannery or floating processor sites.

Table 3.28--Value of halibut and total Alaska landings by major ports and percent halibut of total, 1988-90, value in \$1,000.

| Port           | 1988    |         |      | 1989    |         |      | 1990    |         |      |
|----------------|---------|---------|------|---------|---------|------|---------|---------|------|
|                | Total   | Halibut | %    | Total   | Halibut | %    | Total   | Halibut | %    |
| Gulf of Alaska |         |         |      |         |         |      |         |         |      |
| Cordova        | 46,400  | 1,077   | 2.3  | 35,309  | 1,614   | 4.4  | 36,800  | 3,234   | 8.8  |
| Dutch Harbor   | 100,900 | 1,059   | 1.0  | 107,008 | 2,170   | 2.2  | 126,200 | 1,953   | 1.5  |
| Exc. Inlet     | 4,600   | NA      |      | NA      | 1,524   |      | *       | 1,883   |      |
| Homer          | 40,200  | 9,583   | 23.8 | 18,231  | 12,057  | 66.1 | NA      | 10,463  |      |
| Juneau         | 7,900   | 878     | 11.1 | 2,020   | 894     | 40.6 | 4,400   | 3,992   | 90.7 |
| Kenai          | 99,300  | NA      |      | 56,012  | 1,593   | 2.8  | 47,900  | 2,179   | 4.5  |
| Ketchikan      | 43,500  | 897     | 2.1  | 45,592  | 1,698   | 3.7  | 28,300  | 1,854   | 6.6  |
| Kodiak         | 166,300 | 20,756  | 17.8 | 100,220 | 24,970  | 24.9 | 101,700 | 20,600  | 20.3 |
| Pelican        | 8,400   | 890     | 10.6 | NA      | 1,705   |      | 3,030   | 2,026   | 66.9 |
| Petersburg     | 46,900  | 3,262   | 7.0  | 61,358  | 3,903   | 6.5  | 39,400  | 4,089   | 10.4 |
| Seward         | 19,500  | 5,205   | 26.7 | 23,141  | 6,743   | 29.1 | 29,100  | 9,226   | 31.7 |
| Sitka          | 37,400  | 5,343   | 14.3 | 24,150  | 5,458   | 22.6 | 22,100  | 6,512   | 29.5 |
| Yakutat        | 14,000  | NA      |      | 11,168  | 1,148   | 10.3 | 8,700   | 1,634   | 18.8 |
| Wrangell       | 7,300   | NA      |      | 5,446   | 873     | 16.0 | 8,400   | 997     | 11.9 |

\* - Confidential. NA - Not available.

Source: National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Region.

Table 3.26 Unweighted average of the exvessel value of each fishery as a percentage of the total exvessel value for all vessels with halibut landings, 1984-88.

|                                    | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sablefish Longline                 | 31.4 | 24.7 | 21.9 | 24.2 | 28.5 |
| Pacific Cod Longline               | 3.1  | 1.6  | 4.2  | 5.6  | 4.1  |
| Other Longline                     | 7.4  | 6.1  | 5.1  | 4.0  | 3.3  |
| Any Longline, excluding Halibut    | 22.0 | 18.9 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 19.8 |
| Other Groundfish                   | 3.2  | 4.2  | 2.7  | 3.6  | 4.0  |
| Salmon Troll                       | 71.1 | 63.8 | 57.2 | 54.8 | 56.9 |
| Any Hook & Line, excluding Halibut | 59.6 | 50.0 | 41.5 | 36.1 | 41.5 |
| Salmon, excluding Troll            | 73.6 | 72.0 | 68.8 | 70.4 | 76.1 |
| Herring                            | 30.2 | 38.0 | 32.9 | 38.5 | 17.2 |
| Crab                               | 46.1 | 41.9 | 34.7 | 35.3 | 33.3 |
| All Other                          | 18.2 | 14.7 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 11.8 |
| All Fisheries, excluding Halibut   | 78.2 | 72.9 | 66.0 | 68.8 | 70.3 |
| Halibut                            | 46.9 | 47.9 | 50.6 | 45.8 | 46.5 |

Table 3.27 Unweighted average of the exvessel value of halibut as a percentage of the total exvessel value of all Alaska fisheries for all vessels with halibut landings and landings in the specified fishery, 1984-88.

|                                    | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sablefish Longline                 | 29.9 | 38.8 | 43.1 | 33.3 | 31.3 |
| Pacific Cod Longline               | 33.4 | 33.8 | 41.9 | 36.9 | 33.3 |
| Other Longline                     | 29.5 | 37.4 | 42.4 | 37.3 | 35.5 |
| Any Longline, excluding Halibut    | 32.4 | 37.7 | 43.9 | 37.1 | 35.8 |
| Other Groundfish                   | 18.8 | 22.2 | 28.3 | 27.8 | 25.2 |
| Salmon Troll                       | 17.5 | 24.4 | 31.7 | 30.8 | 27.6 |
| Any Hook & Line, excluding Halibut | 24.1 | 31.6 | 40.4 | 36.7 | 34.0 |
| Salmon, excluding Troll            | 14.3 | 16.1 | 21.0 | 17.2 | 13.3 |
| Herring                            | 17.2 | 15.3 | 24.0 | 17.3 | 27.6 |
| Crab                               | 21.4 | 29.0 | 38.6 | 29.6 | 27.0 |
| All Other                          | 17.5 | 22.9 | 29.9 | 26.6 | 21.2 |
| All Fisheries, excluding Halibut   | 21.8 | 27.1 | 34.0 | 31.2 | 29.7 |
| Halibut                            | 46.9 | 47.9 | 50.6 | 45.8 | 46.5 |

**Table 3.8** Number of vessel owners landing Pacific halibut caught off Alaska during 1984-1990, based on region of owner's residency.

| Year | Region of Owner's Residency |               |        |                |             |       |         | Grand Total |
|------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|----------------|-------------|-------|---------|-------------|
|      | South-east                  | South-central | Kodiak | West of Kodiak | Wash. State | Other | Unknown |             |
| 1984 | 1,163                       | 826           | 375    | 164            | 207         | 31    | 399     | 3,146       |
| 1985 | 1,033                       | 644           | 314    | 131            | 163         | 32    | 255     | 2,537       |
| 1986 | 1,261                       | 826           | 360    | 147            | 230         | 52    | 207     | 3,081       |
| 1987 | 1,357                       | 1,021         | 439    | 234            | 290         | 68    | 189     | 3,593       |
| 1988 | 1,597                       | 1,134         | 426    | 205            | 265         | 76    | 68      | 3,769       |
| 1989 | 1,553                       | 892           | 370    | 197            | 266         | 83    | 105     | 3,463       |
| 1990 | 1,471                       | 1,188         | 472    | 281            | 316         | 103   | 195     | 4,022       |

**Table 3.9** Number of vessels landing Pacific halibut caught off Alaska during 1984-1990, based on region of owner's residency.

| Year | Region of Owner's Residency |               |        |                |             |       |         | Grand Total |
|------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|----------------|-------------|-------|---------|-------------|
|      | South-east                  | South-central | Kodiak | West of Kodiak | Wash. State | Other | Unknown |             |
| 1984 | 1,172                       | 828           | 377    | 164            | 202         | 31    | 399     | 3,173       |
| 1985 | 1,045                       | 648           | 316    | 132            | 164         | 32    | 225     | 2,562       |
| 1986 | 1,277                       | 829           | 365    | 148            | 232         | 52    | 207     | 3,100       |
| 1987 | 1,372                       | 1,702         | 442    | 237            | 295         | 68    | 189     | 3,620       |
| 1988 | 1,601                       | 1,142         | 429    | 208            | 269         | 77    | 68      | 3,797       |
| 1989 | 1,558                       | 898           | 373    | 199            | 266         | 83    | 105     | 3,482       |
| 1990 | 1,474                       | 1,203         | 480    | 286            | 317         | 104   | 195     | 4,059       |

**Table 3.12** Distribution of the 1990 commercial catch of Pacific halibut, as a percent of the 1990 total catch, by IPHC regulatory area of catch and region of owner's residency.

| Owner's Region<br>of Residency | IPHC Regulatory Area |       |        |       |       |       |       |       | Percent<br>of Total<br>AK Catch |        |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------------------------|--------|
|                                | 2C                   | 3A    | 3B     | 4A    | 4B    | 4C    | 4D    | 4E    |                                 |        |
| Southeast                      | 89.0%                | 18.3% | 9.2%   | 5.3%  | 5.3%  | 2.5%  | 5.8%  | 0.0%  | 28.4%                           |        |
| Southcentral                   | 0.1%                 | 31.1% | 15.4%  | 22.9% | 14.7% | 2.1%  | 8.1%  | 17.3% | 21.3%                           |        |
| Kodiak                         | 0.0%                 | 22.2% | 24.3%  | 10.0% | 19.7% | 1.7%  | 0.0%  | 0.0%  | 17.2%                           |        |
| West of Kodiak                 | 0.1%                 | 0.2%  | 18.6%  | 12.3% | 5.3%  | 32.3% | 0.0%  | 41.9% | 4.3%                            |        |
| Wash. State                    | 7.5%                 | 19.5% | 21.9%  | 31.8% | 42.3% | 40.5% | 78.5% | 25.1% | 20.2%                           |        |
| Other States                   | 0.8%                 | 6.2%  | 7.4%   | 13.7% | 11.8% | 11.5% | 7.6%  | 0.2%  | 6.0%                            |        |
| Unknown                        | 2.4%                 | 2.5%  | 3.1%   | 4.0%  | 1.0%  | 9.1%  | 0.0%  | 15.6% | 2.7%                            |        |
| TOTAL                          | Prct                 | 100.0 | 100.0  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0                           | 100.0  |
|                                | 000s lbs             | 9,695 | 29,054 | 8,752 | 2,517 | 1,333 | 529   | 1,005 | 60                              | 52,945 |

Halibut-E.I.S. from NPFMC.

PAGE: ITEM:

3-27 Only 7% of all Alaskans who will qualify for halibut quota fished at least five of the seven years (1984-1990) which is the basis for deciding quota.

41% of all Alaskans who will receive quota only fished one year of the qualifying years. They will receive very little quota and will immediately have to purchase quota in order to be able to fish and catch the same as their annual average. The Sablefish document says that those who only fished one year will have to increase their quota by 400%. The halibut document doesn't speculate as to the amount of increase necessary.

4-39 Of the ~~6000~~<sup>6118</sup> persons who will receive quota, ~~2000~~<sup>793</sup> owners will receive quota less than 100 pounds. ~~4000~~<sup>2003</sup> owners will receive quota less than 500 pounds.

4-42 ~~50%~~<sup>43.2</sup> of all owners who receive quota will get less than 1,000 pounds. These are the traditional small boat fleet. ~~50%~~<sup>82.7</sup> will receive less than 10,000 pounds initially.

4-51 The owners of larger vessels will likely be willing to pay more for quota shares than those of small vessels. This would result in a lower price being paid for IFQs for the smaller boats and a higher price for the bigger boats. This price difference would cause those small boats owners who wished to sell, to demand that the vessel classes be eliminated.

4-13 "By increasing the flexibility fishermen will have in determining fishing and landing strategies, an IFQ program can change the geographical distribution of landings."

"It is possible that the change in competitiveness will eliminate some ports as halibut landing sites."

4-21 IFQs will decrease the total numbers of vessels and fishermen in the halibut fishery.

4-11 The economic model predicts that the fleet size would be reduced to 288-376 vessels fishing for halibut. In 1990, there were ~~4000~~<sup>4,054</sup> boats that delivered halibut. That is over a 90% reduction in fleet size.

Equate those figures to Sitka. Over a 90% reduction in fleet size for halibut alone would be a possible number of 28 boats fishing halibut out of Sitka. What will the other 250 boats do? Even if the fleet size were reduced only by half, that still leaves 100 boats out of work in the halibut fishery.

Relates to 1st & 3rd Sections

COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION  
8800-109 Glacier Highway, Juneau, Alaska 99801

JANUARY 16, 1991

Basic Information Table #1b

Summary Data on Unlimited Fisheries, 1977 - 1989,  
Permits Issued and Fished,  
Estimated Gross Earnings and Total Pounds Landed

D61B HALIBUT LONG LINE, VESS (GE 5 M. TONS) STATEWIDE

*generally over 35%*

*\$ per lb. dressed wt.*

| Year | Permits Issued to Residents | Permits Issued to Non-res. | Total Permits Issued | Total Permits Fished | Total Gross Earnings | Average Gross Earnings | Total Pounds Landed | Average Pounds Landed |
|------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1977 | 1,147                       | 157                        | 1,304                | 702                  | \$11,460,661         | \$16,326               | 1.20 9,512,585      | 13,551                |
| 1978 | 890                         | 131                        | 1,021                | 592                  | \$17,528,040         | \$29,608               | 1.60 10,908,482     | 18,426                |
| 1979 | 1,075                       | 186                        | 1,261                | 839                  | \$24,797,141         | \$29,556               | 1.93 12,841,785     | 15,306                |
| 1980 | 1,441                       | 227                        | 1,668                | 1,063                | \$8,476,865          | \$7,974                | .89 9,526,699       | 8,962                 |
| 1981 | 1,473                       | 202                        | 1,675                | 1,168                | \$14,136,885         | \$12,103               | .96 14,659,131      | 12,551                |
| 1982 | 1,452                       | 200                        | 1,652                | 1,184                | \$18,944,027         | \$16,000               | 1.05 17,899,353     | 15,118                |
| 1983 | 1,784                       | 217                        | 2,001                | 1,547                | \$28,064,578         | \$18,141               | 1.51 26,024,337     | 16,822                |
| 1984 | 1,847                       | 226                        | 2,073                | 1,568                | \$20,297,225         | \$12,945               | .75 28,465,967      | 18,154                |
| 1985 | 1,755                       | 200                        | 1,955                | 1,497                | \$32,944,424         | \$22,007               | .89 37,819,206      | 25,263                |
| 1986 | 2,000                       | 293                        | 2,293                | 1,949                | \$67,623,987         | \$34,697               | 1.44 48,715,368     | 24,995                |
| 1987 | 2,352                       | 361                        | 2,713                | 2,348                | \$67,793,296         | \$28,873               | 1.58 47,554,303     | 20,253                |
| 1988 | 2,702                       | 411                        | 3,113                | 2,433                | \$63,328,103         | \$26,029               | 1.23 52,769,434     | 21,689                |
| 1989 | 2,850                       | 471                        | 3,321                | 2,334                | \$70,870,793         | \$30,365               | 1.53 48,676,075     | 20,855                |
| 1990 |                             |                            |                      |                      |                      |                        | 1.88                |                       |

*extrapolated*

*NPFMC figures*

\*\*\* Estimates of gross earnings not produced unless values have been determined for at least 95% of the pounds landed.

1. Data has been omitted when fewer than four people participated in a fishery.
2. 1988 and 1989 data are preliminary.
3. These data are aggregated by the type of permit fished, and thus contains both targeted species and incidentally landed species.
4. Data includes only commercial catch landed on valid permits. Data associated with test fishing, illegal landing derbies, educational permits, or unmatchable permits are excluded.
5. Dressed groundfish deliveries have NOT been converted to round weights.

Basic Information Table #1b

Summary Data on Unlimited Fisheries, 1977 - 1989,  
Permits Issued and Fished,  
Estimated Gross Earnings and Total Pounds Landed

B06B HALIBUT LONG LINE, VESS (LT 5 M. TONS) STATEWIDE

*generally under 35'*

*\$ per lb (dressed wt)*

| Year | Permits Issued to Residents | Permits Issued to Non-res. | Total Permits Issued | Total Permits Fished | Total Gross Earnings | Average Gross Earnings | Total Pounds Landed <i>extrapolated</i> | Average Pounds Landed |
|------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| 1977 | 1,292                       | 59                         | 1,351                | 444                  | \$712,274            | \$1,604                | 592,521                                 | 1,335                 |
| 1978 | 1,907                       | 60                         | 1,967                | 682                  | \$1,246,606          | \$1,828                | 761,611                                 | 1,146                 |
| 1979 | 2,755                       | 100                        | 2,855                | 1,187                | \$3,015,082          | \$2,540                | 1,577,381                               | 1,329                 |
| 1980 | 3,369                       | 181                        | 3,550                | 1,181                | \$981,255            | \$831                  | 1,106,603                               | 937                   |
| 1981 | 3,244                       | 99                         | 3,343                | 1,349                | \$1,706,497          | \$1,265                | 1,810,720                               | 1,342                 |
| 1982 | 3,503                       | 98                         | 3,601                | 1,370                | \$1,772,536          | \$1,294                | 1,723,749                               | 1,258                 |
| 1983 | 3,886                       | 95                         | 3,981                | 1,960                | \$3,086,495          | \$1,575                | 2,960,150                               | 1,510                 |
| 1984 | 3,568                       | 95                         | 3,663                | 1,638                | \$1,664,089          | \$1,016                | 2,400,720                               | 1,466                 |
| 1985 | 2,796                       | 50                         | 2,846                | 1,074                | \$2,057,864          | \$1,916                | 2,517,622                               | 2,344                 |
| 1986 | 2,269                       | 50                         | 2,319                | 1,131                | \$4,376,181          | \$3,869                | 3,188,684                               | 2,819                 |
| 1987 | 2,210                       | 67                         | 2,277                | 1,275                | \$4,819,786          | \$3,780                | 3,435,297                               | 2,694                 |
| 1988 | 2,270                       | 82                         | 2,352                | 1,352                | \$4,849,361          | \$3,587                | 4,179,149                               | 3,091                 |
| 1989 | 2,237                       | 74                         | 2,311                | 1,196                | \$4,243,757          | \$3,548                | 3,051,272                               | 2,551                 |

1990

\*\*\* Estimates of gross earnings not produced unless values have been determined for at least 95% of the pounds landed.

1. Data has been omitted when fewer than four people participated in a fishery.
2. 1988 and 1989 data are preliminary.
3. These data are aggregated by the type of permit fished, and thus contains both targeted species and incidentally landed species.
4. Data includes only commercial catch landed on valid permits. Data associated with test fishing, illegal landing, derbies, educational permits, or unmatchable permits are excluded.
5. Dressed groundfish deliveries have NOT been converted to round weights.

*NPFMC figures*

**Table 3.4 Ex-vessel price (U.S. \$), value, and annual catch of the Pacific halibut fishery for 1984 through 1990.**

| Year | Commercial Catch<br>(000s of lbs <sup>1</sup> ) | Price<br>(\$ per lb <sup>1</sup> ) | Price<br>(\$ per kg <sup>2</sup> ) | Ex-Vessel Value<br>(000s \$) |
|------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1984 | 44,970  | 0.75                               | 1.24                               | 33,698                       |
| 1985 | 56,113  | 0.89                               | 1.47                               | 49,884                       |
| 1986 | 69,632  | 1.44                               | 2.38                               | 100,270                      |
| 1987 | 69,482  | 1.58                               | 2.61                               | 109,782                      |
| 1988 | 74,351  | 1.23                               | 2.03                               | 91,452                       |
| 1989 | 66,628  | 1.53                               | 2.52                               | 101,941                      |
| 1990 | 61,186  | 1.88                               | 3.12                               | 115,029                      |

<sup>1</sup>Dressed weight.

<sup>2</sup>Round weight.

**Table 3.5 Number of processors in 1984 and 1990 purchasing Pacific halibut caught off Alaska.**

| Quantity Purchased       | Number of Processors |            |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|
|                          | 1984                 | 1990       |
| < 10,000 lbs             | 14                   | 51         |
| 10,000 to 50,000 lbs     | 28                   | 31         |
| 50,000 to 100,000 lbs    | 22                   | 14         |
| 100,000 to 250,000 lbs   | 24                   | 26         |
| 250,000 to 500,000 lbs   | 18                   | 23         |
| 500,000 to 1,000,000 lbs | 8                    | 15         |
| > 1,000,000 lbs          | 8                    | 15         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>             | <b>122</b>           | <b>176</b> |

6/3/91

COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION  
8800-109 GLACIER HIGHWAY, JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801

OCTOBER 8, 1991

BASIC INFORMATION TABLE #1B

SUMMARY DATA ON UNLIMITED FISHERIES, 1977 - 1990,  
PERMITS ISSUED AND FISHED,  
ESTIMATED GROSS EARNINGS AND TOTAL POUNDS LANDED

*generally over 35'*

C61B SABLEFISH  
LONG LINE, VESSEL GE 5 M. TONS  
STATEWIDE

| YEAR | PERMITS<br>ISSUED TO<br>RESIDENTS | PERMITS<br>ISSUED TO<br>NON-RES. | TOTAL<br>PERMITS<br>ISSUED | TOTAL<br>PERMITS<br>FISHED | TOTAL<br>GROSS<br>EARNINGS | AVERAGE<br>GROSS<br>EARNINGS | TOTAL<br>POUNDS<br>LANDED | AVERAGE<br>POUNDS<br>LANDED |
|------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1977 | 125                               | 17                               | 142                        | 69                         | \$1,112,714                | \$16,126                     | 1,665,985                 | 24,145                      |
| 1978 | 105                               | 17                               | 122                        | 72                         | \$1,614,324                | \$22,421                     | 2,329,952                 | 32,360                      |
| 1979 | 165                               | 52                               | 217                        | 139                        | \$3,265,166                | \$23,490                     | 4,515,060                 | 32,482                      |
| 1980 | 199                               | 66                               | 265                        | 107                        | \$1,381,438                | \$12,911                     | 3,404,279                 | 31,816                      |
| 1981 | 157                               | 30                               | 187                        | 76                         | \$1,051,621                | \$13,837                     | 2,676,418                 | 35,216                      |
| 1982 | 140                               | 36                               | 176                        | 95                         | \$3,046,045                | \$32,064                     | 4,384,362                 | 46,151                      |
| 1983 | 181                               | 48                               | 229                        | 134                        | \$3,229,758                | \$24,103                     | 6,077,366                 | 45,353                      |
| 1984 | 228                               | 64                               | 292                        | 194                        | \$8,193,001                | \$42,232                     | 15,728,065                | 81,073                      |
| 1985 | 403                               | 86                               | 489                        | 284                        | \$13,216,312               | \$46,536                     | 22,985,119                | 80,934                      |
| 1986 | 607                               | 154                              | 761                        | 491                        | \$23,260,757               | \$47,374                     | 38,270,439                | 77,944                      |
| 1987 | 854                               | 218                              | 1,072                      | 735                        | \$42,532,894               | \$57,868                     | 60,753,509                | 82,658                      |
| 1988 | 860                               | 192                              | 1,052                      | 689                        | \$61,693,602               | \$89,541                     | 66,151,072                | 96,010                      |
| 1989 | 855                               | 216                              | 1,071                      | 614                        | ***                        | ***                          | 79,319,631                | 129,185                     |
| 1990 | 849                               | 205                              | 1,054                      | 653                        | ***                        | ***                          | 59,776,136                | 91,541                      |

\*\*\* ESTIMATES OF GROSS EARNINGS NOT PRODUCED UNLESS VALUES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED FOR AT LEAST 95% OF THE POUNDS LANDED.

1. DATA HAS BEEN OMITTED WHEN FEWER THAN FOUR PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN A FISHERY.
2. 1989 - 1990 DATA ARE PRELIMINARY.
3. THESE DATA ARE AGGREGATED BY THE TYPE OF PERMIT FISHED, AND THUS CONTAINS BOTH TARGETED SPECIES AND INCIDENTALY LANDED SPECIES.
4. DATA INCLUDES ONLY COMMERCIAL CATCH LANDED ON VALID PERMITS. DATA ASSOCIATED WITH TEST FISHING, ILLEGAL LANDINGS, DERBIES, EDUCATIONAL PERMITS, OR UNMATCHABLE PERMITS ARE EXCLUDED.
5. DRESSED GROUND FISH DELIVERIES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ROUND WEIGHTS.

COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION  
8800-109 GLACIER HIGHWAY, JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801

OCTOBER 8, 1991

BASIC INFORMATION TABLE #1B

SUMMARY DATA ON UNLIMITED FISHERIES, 1977 - 1990,  
PERMITS ISSUED AND FISHED,  
ESTIMATED GROSS EARNINGS AND TOTAL POUNDS LANDED

*generally  
Under 35'*

C06B SABLEFISH  
LONG LINE, VESS LT 5 M.TONS  
STATEWIDE

| YEAR | PERMITS<br>ISSUED TO<br>RESIDENTS | PERMITS<br>ISSUED TO<br>NON-RES. | TOTAL<br>PERMITS<br>ISSUED | TOTAL<br>PERMITS<br>FISHED | TOTAL<br>GROSS<br>EARNINGS | AVERAGE<br>GROSS<br>EARNINGS | TOTAL<br>POUNDS<br>LANDED | AVERAGE<br>POUNDS<br>LANDED |
|------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1978 | 40                                | 2                                | 42                         | 3                          | .                          | .                            | .                         | .                           |
| 1979 | 74                                | 3                                | 77                         | 11                         | \$33,818                   | \$3,074                      | 46,720                    | 4,247                       |
| 1980 | 111                               | 9                                | 120                        | 10                         | \$38,390                   | \$3,839                      | 93,599                    | 9,360                       |
| 1982 | 84                                | 4                                | 88                         | 8                          | \$34,739                   | \$4,342                      | 55,758                    | 6,970                       |
| 1983 | 65                                | 2                                | 67                         | 10                         | \$78,216                   | \$7,822                      | 159,738                   | 15,974                      |
| 1984 | 66                                | 3                                | 69                         | 15                         | \$89,461                   | \$5,964                      | 164,790                   | 10,986                      |
| 1985 | 71                                | 5                                | 76                         | 15                         | \$87,376                   | \$5,825                      | 147,482                   | 9,832                       |
| 1986 | 58                                | 1                                | 59                         | 19                         | \$85,980                   | \$4,525                      | 133,106                   | 7,006                       |
| 1987 | 87                                | 5                                | 92                         | 32                         | \$217,230                  | \$6,788                      | 282,112                   | 8,816                       |
| 1988 | 89                                | 3                                | 92                         | 32                         | \$603,281                  | \$18,853                     | 626,012                   | 19,563                      |
| 1989 | 74                                | 4                                | 78                         | 24                         | ***                        | ***                          | 807,470                   | 33,645                      |
| 1990 | 68                                | 1                                | 69                         | 17                         | ***                        | ***                          | 215,440                   | 12,673                      |

\*\*\* ESTIMATES OF GROSS EARNINGS NOT PRODUCED UNLESS VALUES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED FOR AT LEAST 95% OF THE POUNDS LANDED.

1. DATA HAS BEEN UMMITTED WHEN FEWER THAN FOUR PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN A FISHERY.
2. 1989 - 1990 DATA ARE PRELIMINARY.
3. THESE DATA ARE AGGREGATED BY THE TYPE OF PERMIT FISHED, AND THUS CONTAINS BOTH TARGETED SPECIES AND INCIDENTALY LANDED SPECIES.
4. DATA INCLUDES ONLY COMMERCIAL CATCH LANDED ON VALID PERMITS. DATA ASSOCIATED WITH TEST FISHING, ILLEGAL LANDING DERBIES, EDUCATIONAL PERMITS, OR UNMATCHABLE PERMITS ARE EXCLUDED.
5. DRESSED GROUND FISH DELIVERIES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ROUND WEIGHTS.

STATE OF ALASKA  
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission  
Earnings Quartile Report (Project #91-182)  
Cumulative Earnings Quartile Ranked High to Low Earners

12:17 Monday, October 28, 1991

8618 - Halibut, Long Line, Any Vessel, Statewide

(over Endlow)

| Year                                    | 1989           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618           |                 |                        |                |
|---|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings     |                 |                        |                |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                        | Percent         | Average                |                |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 72<br>72       | 3.08<br>3.08    | \$17,870,221<br>\$17,870,221 | 25.11<br>25.11  | \$248,198<br>\$248,198 | actual<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 157<br>227     | 6.73<br>9.81    | \$17,747,755<br>\$35,617,976 | 24.94<br>50.04  | \$113,043<br>\$155,537 | actual<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 370<br>599     | 15.85<br>25.66  | \$17,768,848<br>\$53,386,824 | 24.97<br>75.01  | \$48,024<br>\$89,127   | actual<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,735<br>2,334 | 74.34<br>100.00 | \$17,788,119<br>\$71,174,943 | 24.99<br>100.00 | \$10,253<br>\$30,495   | actual<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                              |                 |                        | 49,210,166     |
| Unpriced pounds represented:            |                |                 |                              |                 |                        | 506,618        |

| Year                                    | 1988           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618           |                 |                        |              |
|---|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings     |                 |                        |              |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                        | Percent         | Average                |              |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 78<br>78       | 3.21<br>3.21    | \$15,866,781<br>\$15,866,781 | 25.04<br>25.04  | \$203,420<br>\$203,420 | actu<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 176<br>254     | 7.23<br>10.44   | \$15,785,928<br>\$31,652,709 | 24.92<br>49.96  | \$89,693<br>\$124,617  | actu<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 405<br>659     | 16.65<br>27.09  | \$15,875,108<br>\$47,527,817 | 25.06<br>75.02  | \$39,198<br>\$72,121   | actu<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,774<br>2,433 | 72.91<br>100.00 | \$15,828,851<br>\$63,356,668 | 24.98<br>100.00 | \$8,923<br>\$26,041    | actu<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                              |                 |                        | 52,870,193   |

| Year                                    | 1987           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618           |                 |                        |                |
|---|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings     |                 |                        |                |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                        | Percent         | Average                |                |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 87<br>87       | 3.71<br>3.71    | \$16,965,871<br>\$16,965,871 | 25.03<br>25.03  | \$195,010<br>\$195,010 | actual<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 189<br>276     | 8.05<br>11.75   | \$16,907,207<br>\$33,873,078 | 24.94<br>49.97  | \$89,456<br>\$122,729  | actual<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 411<br>687     | 17.50<br>29.26  | \$16,972,081<br>\$50,845,159 | 25.04<br>75.00  | \$41,295<br>\$74,010   | actual<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,661<br>2,348 | 70.74<br>100.00 | \$16,948,137<br>\$67,793,296 | 25.00<br>100.00 | \$10,204<br>\$28,873   | actual<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                              |                 |                        | 47,609,067     |

| Year                                    | 1986           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618           |                 |                        |              |
|---|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings     |                 |                        |              |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                        | Percent         | Average                |              |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 62<br>62       | 3.18<br>3.18    | \$16,812,130<br>\$16,812,130 | 24.86<br>24.86  | \$271,163<br>\$271,163 | actu<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 123<br>185     | 6.31<br>9.49    | \$16,995,879<br>\$33,808,009 | 25.13<br>49.99  | \$138,178<br>\$182,746 | actu<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 301<br>486     | 15.44<br>24.94  | \$16,923,745<br>\$50,731,754 | 25.03<br>75.02  | \$56,225<br>\$104,386  | actu<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,463<br>1,949 | 75.06<br>100.00 | \$16,892,233<br>\$67,623,987 | 24.98<br>100.00 | \$11,546<br>\$34,697   | actu<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                              |                 |                        | 48,797,963   |

| Year                                    | 1985           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618          |                 |                        |                |
|---|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings    |                 |                        |                |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                       | Percent         | Average                |                |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 38<br>38       | 2.54<br>2.54    | \$8,196,805<br>\$8,196,805  | 24.88<br>24.88  | \$215,705<br>\$215,705 | actual<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 82<br>120      | 5.48<br>8.02    | \$8,268,581<br>\$16,465,387 | 25.10<br>49.98  | \$100,836<br>\$137,212 | actual<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 212<br>332     | 14.16<br>22.18  | \$8,253,342<br>\$26,718,729 | 25.05<br>75.03  | \$38,931<br>\$74,454   | actual<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,165<br>1,497 | 77.82<br>100.00 | \$8,225,696<br>\$32,944,424 | 24.97<br>100.00 | \$7,061<br>\$22,007    | actual<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                             |                 |                        | 37,859,263     |

| Year                                    | 1984           |                 | Fishery Code: 8618          |                 |                        |              |
|---|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits        |                 | Estimated Gross Earnings    |                 |                        |              |
|   | Number         | Percent         | Total                       | Percent         | Average                |              |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 39<br>39       | 2.49<br>2.49    | \$5,055,133<br>\$5,055,133  | 24.91<br>24.91  | \$129,619<br>\$129,619 | actu<br>cum. |
| 2                                       | 92<br>131      | 5.87<br>8.35    | \$5,074,109<br>\$10,129,242 | 25.00<br>49.90  | \$55,153<br>\$77,322   | actu<br>cum. |
| 3                                       | 231<br>362     | 14.73<br>23.09  | \$5,090,732<br>\$15,219,975 | 25.08<br>74.99  | \$22,038<br>\$42,044   | actu<br>cum. |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 1,206<br>1,568 | 76.91<br>100.00 | \$5,077,250<br>\$20,297,225 | 25.01<br>100.00 | \$4,210<br>\$12,945    | actu<br>cum. |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |                |                 |                             |                 |                        | 28,465,967   |

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STATE OF ALASKA  
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission  
Earnings Quartile Report (Project #91-182)  
Cumulative Earnings Quartile Ranked High to Low Earners

12:17 Monday, October 28, 1991

C61B - Sablefish, Long Line, Any Vessel, Statewide

*(over 5 nations)*

| Year                                    | 1989    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 19      | 3.27    | \$11,082,746             | 24.71   | \$583,302 | actual cum. |
|   | 19      | 3.27    | \$11,082,746             | 24.71   | \$583,302 |             |
| 2                                       | 40      | 6.88    | \$11,404,273             | 25.42   | \$285,107 | actual cum. |
|   | 59      | 10.15   | \$22,487,019             | 50.13   | \$381,136 |             |
| 3                                       | 84      | 14.46   | \$11,186,908             | 24.94   | \$133,177 | actual cum. |
|   | 143     | 24.61   | \$33,673,927             | 75.07   | \$235,482 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 438     | 75.39   | \$11,182,754             | 24.93   | \$25,531  | actual cum. |
|   | 581     | 100.00  | \$44,856,682             | 100.00  | \$77,206  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 79,319,631               |         |           |             |
| Unpriced pounds represented:            |         |         | 30,435,193               |         |           |             |

| Year                                    | 1988    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 25      | 3.63    | \$15,375,163             | 24.92   | \$615,007 | actual cum. |
|   | 25      | 3.63    | \$15,375,163             | 24.92   | \$615,007 |             |
| 2                                       | 45      | 6.53    | \$15,591,636             | 25.27   | \$346,481 | actual cum. |
|   | 70      | 10.16   | \$30,966,799             | 50.19   | \$442,383 |             |
| 3                                       | 83      | 12.05   | \$15,365,109             | 24.91   | \$185,122 | actual cum. |
|   | 153     | 22.21   | \$46,331,909             | 75.10   | \$302,823 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 536     | 77.79   | \$15,361,694             | 24.90   | \$28,660  | actual cum. |
|   | 689     | 100.00  | \$61,693,602             | 100.00  | \$89,541  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 66,151,072               |         |           |             |
| Unpriced pounds represented:            |         |         | 2                        |         |           |             |

| Year                                    | 1987    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 23      | 3.13    | \$10,576,693             | 24.87   | \$459,856 | actual cum. |
|   | 23      | 3.13    | \$10,576,693             | 24.87   | \$459,856 |             |
| 2                                       | 48      | 6.53    | \$10,763,204             | 25.31   | \$224,235 | actual cum. |
|   | 71      | 9.66    | \$21,339,987             | 50.17   | \$300,563 |             |
| 3                                       | 93      | 12.65   | \$10,561,537             | 24.83   | \$113,565 | actual cum. |
|   | 164     | 22.31   | \$31,901,524             | 75.00   | \$194,521 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 571     | 77.69   | \$10,631,370             | 25.00   | \$18,619  | actual cum. |
|   | 735     | 100.00  | \$42,532,894             | 100.00  | \$57,868  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 60,753,509               |         |           |             |
| Unpriced pounds represented:            |         |         | 12                       |         |           |             |

| Year                                    | 1986    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 19      | 3.87    | \$5,796,055              | 24.92   | \$305,056 | actual cum. |
|   | 19      | 3.87    | \$5,796,055              | 24.92   | \$305,056 |             |
| 2                                       | 36      | 7.33    | \$5,884,521              | 25.30   | \$163,459 | actual cum. |
|   | 55      | 11.20   | \$11,680,576             | 50.22   | \$212,374 |             |
| 3                                       | 70      | 14.26   | \$5,786,473              | 24.88   | \$82,664  | actual cum. |
|   | 125     | 25.46   | \$17,467,049             | 75.09   | \$139,736 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 366     | 74.54   | \$5,793,708              | 24.91   | \$15,830  | actual cum. |
|   | 491     | 100.00  | \$23,260,757             | 100.00  | \$47,374  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 38,270,439               |         |           |             |

| Year                                    | 1985    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 10      | 3.52    | \$3,265,781              | 24.71   | \$326,578 | actual cum. |
|   | 10      | 3.52    | \$3,265,781              | 24.71   | \$326,578 |             |
| 2                                       | 17      | 5.99    | \$3,348,321              | 25.33   | \$196,960 | actual cum. |
|   | 27      | 9.51    | \$6,614,102              | 50.04   | \$244,967 |             |
| 3                                       | 30      | 10.56   | \$3,511,992              | 25.06   | \$110,400 | actual cum. |
|   | 57      | 20.07   | \$9,926,093              | 75.10   | \$174,142 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 227     | 79.93   | \$3,290,219              | 24.90   | \$14,494  | actual cum. |
|   | 284     | 100.00  | \$13,216,312             | 100.00  | \$66,536  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 22,985,119               |         |           |             |

| Year                                    | 1984    |         | Fishery Code: C61B       |         |           |             |
|---|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Quartile                                | Permits |         | Estimated Gross Earnings |         |           |             |
|   | Number  | Percent | Total                    | Percent | Average   |             |
| 1<br>(high)                             | 8       | 4.12    | \$2,111,636              | 25.77   | \$263,954 | actual cum. |
|   | 8       | 4.12    | \$2,111,636              | 25.77   | \$263,954 |             |
| 2                                       | 13      | 6.70    | \$1,997,573              | 26.38   | \$153,659 | actual cum. |
|   | 21      | 10.82   | \$4,109,209              | 50.16   | \$195,677 |             |
| 3                                       | 24      | 12.37   | \$2,034,598              | 24.83   | \$84,775  | actual cum. |
|   | 45      | 23.20   | \$6,143,807              | 74.99   | \$136,529 |             |
| 4<br>(low)                              | 149     | 76.80   | \$2,049,193              | 25.01   | \$13,753  | actual cum. |
|   | 194     | 100.00  | \$8,193,001              | 100.00  | \$42,232  |             |
| Total pounds represented in this table: |         |         | 15,728,065               |         |           |             |

9.6

Ex-vessel price for halibut increased from approximately \$0.75 per pound in 1984 to approximately \$1.88 per pound in 1990 (Table 3.4). Total annual ex-vessel value increased from \$34 million in 1984 to \$115 million in 1990.

The importance of halibut to individual processors varies widely. Some handle a relatively small amount, whereas others process several million pounds. Table 3.5 shows the number of processors that purchased halibut in 1984 and 1990 by several poundage classes. From 1984 to 1990, there was an increase in number of processors in all size categories but one (10,000 to 50,000 pounds). Of particular note is the more than three-fold increase in the number of processors purchasing less than 10,000 pounds. Processors purchasing over one million pounds handled 48 and 51 percent of the entire Alaskan catch in 1984 and 1990, respectively.

In many cases, fish are delivered on the fishing grounds to packers, which then transport the fish to shore processing facilities. Packing is most pronounced in the Southeast region, where 22 percent of the area harvest was delivered to packers in 1984. Overall, 5 percent of the Alaskan harvest was delivered to packers in 1984.

### 3.1.3 Marketing Sector

The only harvesters of Pacific halibut are the United States and Canada, with the majority harvested by the United States off Alaska (Table 3.6). The proportion of the total catch which is taken off Alaska has been increasing annually since 1984, reaching 87 percent in 1990.

There is a small international market for halibut, primarily Japan, but most is consumed in the United States and Canada. Some is marketed fresh but the majority of the landings are frozen for domestic consumption.

## 3.2 Social and Cultural Characteristics

This section continues the description of the halibut fishery by examining the social, cultural, and economic environment in which the halibut fishery operates.

### 3.2.1 Harvesting Sector

Regionally, Kodiak has the largest number of seafood harvesters and is most dependent on the contributions of seafood harvesting to total regional income. Other important regions are the Southeast and Southcentral regions.

Labor statistics detailing fishermen who fish for all species are available from the State of Alaska. However, these data do not count fishermen who are self-employed, thereby showing a deceptively small number of fishermen.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s halibut was the second most important fishery in the Southeast region in terms of employment, ranking just behind salmon (NPFMC, 1985b).

The residency of participants in the halibut fishery can be examined from two perspectives: (1) the homeport of the vessel and (2) the residence of the vessel owner. The distribution of vessels according to the region of vessel's homeport over 1984-1990 is presented in Table 3.7. The distribution of vessel owners and vessels by owner's region of residency over 1984-1990 is presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, respectively.

which longlines for sablefish and halibut in the southeast Alaska and East Yakutat districts moves yet further west as the season advances and continues longlining in the West Yakutat, Kodiak, and southwest districts (J. Gharrett, personal communication). The smaller vessels, that is those less than 30 feet in length, rarely fish outside southeast Alaska.

### Fishermen

(Southeast)

Langdon and Miller's survey of fishermen found that crew size on vessels in Area 2C varied with the rural or urban nature of the community in which the fishermen resided. For urban communities, from which the larger vessels fished, crew size including captain averaged 3.6 persons in 1982, while for rural communities crew size averaged 3.0 persons. If crew sizes remained equivalent to those in 1982, it is estimated that 4,768 fishermen fished commercially for halibut in 1990 in Area 2C.

A similar disparity between urban and rural residence was found in kinship and crew patterns; Langdon and Miller found that rural crews were more likely to be formed with kinfolks than those fishing from urban communities. It should be noted here that crews from Native villages tend to be larger, and with greater involvement of kin, because of the cultural basis of fishing as a family economic activity and the cultural pattern of initiating young people into traditional occupations. Since the family is the "economic firm" in subsistence activities (a "domestic mode of production"), transfer of this pattern of activity to the commercial fishery is appropriate both culturally and economically in the mixed economy of rural communities.

The fishermen of southeast Alaska participate in a number of commercial fisheries. Langdon and Miller's data showed that halibut fishermen fished for a mean of 2.62 species, with a median of 2.48 species, during the fishing year. A 45-year old non-Native fisherman, self-described as a "seiner," from Angoon reported his seasonal round of fishing in 1990 as follows: "January: bait; February: crab; March: sac roe [herring], brown crab, and get ready for black cod; April, May: black cod (2 weeks here, 6 weeks off Seward coast); June: halibut (hits third opening), get ready for seining; July, August: seining; September: one day black cod, halibut, and usually fall dogs [salmon]" (Martha Betts, 1991). According to Betts (1991), the pattern described by the seiner above is atypical; he fishes for crab and black cod "outside" the islands of the Alexander Archipelago while most seiners do not. Angoon and Kake fishermen, mostly Tlinget, seine for salmon, hand-troll for salmon (during seine closures) using skiffs, and long-line for halibut using seine boats. Some fishermen also use their boats as halibut tenders for other fishermen fishing from skiffs. Langdon and Miller (1983) reported that only 7.9 percent of the fishermen interviewed in Area 2C fished in just one fishery, while 42.9 percent fished in two directed fisheries, typically halibut and salmon. One-fifth of the fishermen in Langdon and Miller's sample fished for four or more species during the course of the year.

The demography of fishermen varies with residence in rural or urban communities. The mean age of all fishermen surveyed by Langdon and Miller in 1982 was 38.8 years, with a median of 34.6 years. Fishermen from urban communities were younger, however, with an average age of 37 years compared to the mean age of 44 years in rural communities. Urban fishermen had completed more years of formal education than those from rural communities in Langdon and Miller's sample; 13.1 years of schooling compared to 10.1 years. Both of these indicators suggest that life in urban communities offers more opportunities for training and employment.

Income from the fishery varies considerably. For the communities with a mixed cash-subsistence economy, the halibut fishery is very important. A 50-year old Tlinget hand troller from Angoon, reporting on his 1990 season, said that "Angoon just wants to make living, not be huge highliners... one quarter of total income from fishery is from halibut. It's an important fishery. There are three

(1 metric ton = 2205 lbs.)

Table 1.1 Sablefish landings (mt) off Alaska by fishery and area from 1960 to 1990.

| YEAR | GULF OF ALASKA |               |         |           | BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS |               |         |             | ALL AREAS |               |         |                 |
|------|----------------|---------------|---------|-----------|-----------------------------|---------------|---------|-------------|-----------|---------------|---------|-----------------|
|      | DOMESTIC       | JOINT VENTURE | FOREIGN | TOTAL GOA | DOMESTIC                    | JOINT VENTURE | FOREIGN | TOTAL BS/AI | DOMESTIC  | JOINT VENTURE | FOREIGN | TOTAL ALL AREAS |
| 1960 | 1,925          | 0             | 217     | 2,142     | 0                           | 0             | 1,861   | 1,861       | 1,925     | 0             | 2,078   | 4,003           |
| 1961 | 866            | 0             | 31      | 897       | 0                           | 0             | 15,627  | 15,627      | 866       | 0             | 15,658  | 16,524          |
| 1962 | 684            | 0             | 47      | 731       | 0                           | 0             | 25,989  | 25,989      | 684       | 0             | 26,036  | 26,720          |
| 1963 | 881            | 0             | 1,928   | 2,809     | 0                           | 0             | 14,370  | 14,370      | 881       | 0             | 16,298  | 17,179          |
| 1964 | 1,172          | 0             | 1,285   | 2,457     | 0                           | 0             | 5,086   | 5,086       | 1,172     | 0             | 6,371   | 7,543           |
| 1965 | 1,047          | 0             | 2,411   | 3,458     | 0                           | 0             | 6,077   | 6,087       | 1,047     | 0             | 8,498   | 9,545           |
| 1966 | 1,067          | 0             | 4,112   | 5,179     | 0                           | 0             | 10,846  | 10,846      | 1,067     | 0             | 14,958  | 16,025          |
| 1967 | 966            | 0             | 5,197   | 6,163     | 0                           | 0             | 13,350  | 13,350      | 946       | 0             | 18,547  | 19,493          |
| 1968 | 161            | 0             | 14,887  | 15,048    | 0                           | 0             | 16,047  | 16,047      | 161       | 0             | 30,929  | 31,090          |
| 1969 | 301            | 0             | 19,075  | 19,376    | 0                           | 0             | 17,682  | 17,682      | 301       | 0             | 36,757  | 37,058          |
| 1970 | 578            | 0             | 24,565  | 25,143    | 0                           | 0             | 12,985  | 12,985      | 578       | 0             | 37,550  | 38,128          |
| 1971 | 387            | 0             | 25,243  | 25,630    | 0                           | 0             | 17,942  | 17,942      | 387       | 0             | 43,185  | 43,572          |
| 1972 | 1,086          | 0             | 36,417  | 37,503    | 0                           | 0             | 16,089  | 16,089      | 1,086     | 0             | 52,506  | 53,592          |
| 1973 | 1,245          | 0             | 27,441  | 28,686    | 0                           | 0             | 8,759   | 8,759       | 1,245     | 0             | 36,200  | 37,445          |
| 1974 | 1,111          | 0             | 27,224  | 28,335    | 0                           | 0             | 6,735   | 6,735       | 1,111     | 0             | 33,959  | 35,070          |
| 1975 | 1,557          | 0             | 24,538  | 26,095    | 0                           | 0             | 4,513   | 4,513       | 1,557     | 0             | 29,051  | 30,608          |
| 1976 | 1,151          | 0             | 26,587  | 27,738    | 0                           | 0             | 4,582   | 4,582       | 1,151     | 0             | 31,169  | 32,320          |
| 1977 | 1,179          | 0             | 15,961  | 17,140    | 2                           | 0             | 4,613   | 4,615       | 1,181     | 0             | 20,574  | 21,755          |
| 1978 | 1,738          | 0             | 7,128   | 8,866     | 0                           | 0             | 2,073   | 2,013       | 1,738     | 0             | 9,141   | 10,879          |
| 1979 | 3,447          | 18            | 6,885   | 10,350    | 0                           | 0             | 2,158   | 2,158       | 3,447     | 18            | 9,043   | 12,508          |
| 1980 | 2,384          | 20            | 6,138   | 8,542     | 5                           | 39            | 2,437   | 2,481       | 2,389     | 57            | 8,575   | 11,023          |
| 1981 | 1,940          | <0.5          | 7,976   | 9,916     | 2                           | 180           | 2,955   | 3,137       | 1,942     | 180           | 10,931  | 13,053          |
| 1982 | 2,910          | 1             | 5,646   | 8,557     | 176                         | 124           | 3,839   | 4,139       | 3,085     | 125           | 9,484   | 12,694          |
| 1983 | 3,761          | 275           | 4,966   | 9,002     | 90                          | 114           | 3,178   | 3,382       | 3,852     | 389           | 8,144   | 12,385          |
| 1984 | 8,075          | 528           | 1,107   | 10,510    | 1,055                       | 348           | 1,923   | 3,326       | 9,930     | 876           | 3,029   | 13,835          |
| 1985 | 11,366         | 226           | 38      | 11,630    | 3,375                       | 110           | 312     | 3,797       | 14,741    | 335           | 351     | 15,427          |
| 1986 | 21,684         | 246           | 1       | 21,931    | 6,013                       | 430           | 109     | 6,552       | 22,770    | 675           | 110     | 23,555          |
| 1987 | 26,349         | 180           | 0       | 26,529    | 7,785                       | 123           | 33      | 7,941       | 34,136    | 304           | 33      | 34,473          |
| 1988 | 30,972         | 37            | 0       | 31,009    | 6,575                       | 14            | 0       | 6,589       | 37,565    | 51            | 0       | 37,616          |
| 1989 | 29,850         | 0             | 0       | 29,850    | 4,496                       | 3             | 0       | 4,499       | 34,346    | 3             | 0       | 34,349          |
| 1990 | 27,331         | 0             | 0       | 27,331    | 4,462                       | 0             | 0       | 4,462       | 31,821    | 0             | 0       | 31,821          |

Source: Data for 1960-1980 from Bakkala, Richard G. (editor) et al. 1988. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-139; Condition of Groundfish Resources of the Eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Region in 1987; and Major, Richard L. and Thomas K. Wilderbuhr (editors), 1988. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-149: Condition of Groundfish Resources of Gulf of Alaska Region as Assessed in 1987. Data from 1981-1989 from PacFIN source reports; March 29, 1991.

Note: Discrepancies between actual sums of component figures and totals are due to rounding.

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# Southeast Halibut Vessel participation

**Table 1a** Number of halibut vessel owners by state of residence from 1984-1990 for one of the vessel class options, and number of quota share (QS) recipients by the same regions for four quota share apportionment rules.

## IPHC REGULATORY AREA 2C

| Vessel Class   | YEAR    |          |          |          |          |          |          | Number of QS Recipients based on Apportionment Rule # |       |       |       |
|----------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---|-------|-------|-------|
|                | 1984    | 1985     | 1986     | 1987     | 1988     | 1989     | 1990     | 1   | 2     | 3     | 4     |
| % < 35 feet    | 55      | 50       | 48       | 47       | 50       | 48       | 45       | 52  | 54    | 57    | 57    |
| % 36-60 feet   | 44      | 48       | 50       | 52       | 49       | 51       | 54       | 46  | 44    | 41    | 41    |
| % 61-90 feet   | 1       | 2        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 2        | 1        | 1   | 2     | 2     | 2     |
| % > 90 feet    | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| % Freezer/LL   | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| ≤ 35 feet All  | 703     | 573      | 641      | 688      | 829      | 758      | 673      | 1,296   | 1,682 | 2,122 | 2,122 |
| Alaska         | 1.8 606 | 2.6 519  | 2.8 597  | 3.0 639  | 2.7 793  | 2.1 723  | 2.2 627  | 1,210   | 1,540 | 1,885 | 1,885 |
| Other States   | 15      | 7        | 12       | 21       | 14       | 14       | 13       | 24  | 42    | 53    | 53    |
| Unknown        | 82      | 47       | 32       | 28       | 22       | 21       | 33       | 62  | 100   | 174   | 174   |
| % Alaska       | 86      | 91       | 93       | 93       | 96       | 95       | 93       | 93  | 92    | 89    | 89    |
| 36-60 feet All | 555     | 553      | 674      | 764      | 821      | 805      | 799      | 1,146   | 1,366 | 1,527 | 1,527 |
| Alaska         | 7.9 459 | 13.1 465 | 12.1 560 | 11.1 650 | 11.1 733 | 11.6 722 | 10.0 711 | 979   | 1,122 | 1,245 | 1,245 |
| Other States   | 58      | 64       | 93       | 89       | 73       | 66       | 69       | 129   | 188   | 221   | 221   |
| Unknown        | 28      | 24       | 21       | 25       | 15       | 17       | 29       | 38  | 56    | 61    | 61    |
| % Alaska       | 85      | 81       | 83       | 85       | 89       | 90       | 88       | 85  | 82    | 82    | 82    |
| 61-90 feet All | 13      | 19       | 20       | 18       | 21       | 25       | 14       | 37  | 47    | 62    | 62    |
| Alaska         | 15.2 10 | 36.3 15  | 22.7 14  | 3 13     | 13.5 13  | 11.5 16  | 16.8 11  | 22  | 27    | 38    | 38    |
| Other States   | 2       | 4        | 6        | 4        | 8        | 7        | 1        | 12  | 17    | 20    | 20    |
| Unknown        | 1       | 0        | 0        | 1        | 0        | 2        | 2        | 3   | 3     | 4     | 4     |
| % Alaska       | 77      | 79       | 70       | 72       | 62       | 64       | 79       | 59  | 57    | 61    | 61    |
| > 90 feet All  | 0       | 0        | 0        | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 1     | 1     | 1     |
| Alaska         | 0       | 0        | 0        | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 1     | 1     | 1     |
| Other States   | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Unknown        | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| % Alaska       | 0       | 0        | 0        | 100      | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| Freezer/LL All | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Alaska         | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Other States   | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Unknown        | 0       | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| % Alaska       | 1271 0  | 1145 0   | 1335 0   | 1470 0   | 1671 0   | 1588 0   | 1486 0   | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0     |

3%

Total lbs in (X)10's caught: 5,198 9,203 10,608 10,712 11,373 9,505 9,649  
 Quota: 11,500 9,500 8,000

Pencil'd in numbers represent average catch / vessel, for each class size by year (for Alaska residents)  
 in 1000's of lbs

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Table 1b

Catch of Pacific halibut off Alaska, in thousands of pounds (net weight), by state of owner residence, during 1984 through 1990 for one of the vessel class options, and calculated amount of IFQ within each vessel class according to each of the four apportionment rates.

lbs

IPHC REGULATORY AREA 2C

| Vessel Class   | YEAR             |       |       |                  |       |                  |                  | Amount of IFQs based on Apportionment Rule # |                  |                  |                  |
|----------------|------------------|-------|-------|------------------|-------|------------------|------------------|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                | 1984             | 1985  | 1986  | 1987             | 1988  | 1989             | 1990             | 1  | 2                | 3                | 4                |
| % < 35 feet    | 21               | 17    | 18    | 20               | 20    | 17               | 16               | 19   | 19               | 19               | 18               |
| % 36-60 feet   | 76               | 75    | 78    | 77               | 78    | 80               | 83               | 78   | 78               | 79               | 78               |
| % 61-90 feet   | 2                | 8     | 4     | 3                | 2     | 3                | 1                | 3  | 3                | 2                | 4                |
| % > 90 feet    | 0                | 0     | 0     | *                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| % Freezer/LL   | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| < 35 feet All  | 1,242            | 1,566 | 1,907 | 2,104            | 2,266 | 1,628            | 1,509            | 1,428  | 1,388            | 1,391            | 1,357            |
| Alaska         | 1,091            | 1,386 | 1,707 | 1,959            | 2,177 | 1,563            | 1,403            | 1,351  | 1,301            | 1,293            | 1,263            |
| Other States   | 55               | 85    | 110   | 96               | 58    | 38               | 38               | 30   | 40               | 41               | 40               |
| Unknown        | 97               | 95    | 84    | 49               | 30    | 27               | 67               | 47   | 47               | 57               | 54               |
| % Alaska       | 88               | 89    | 90    | 93               | 96    | 96               | 93               | 95   | 94               | 93               | 93               |
| 36-60 feet All | 4,404            | 6,943 | 8,276 | 8,230            | 8,883 | 7,636            | 8,000            | 5,769  | 5,797            | 5,838            | 5,767            |
| Alaska         | 3,748            | 6,098 | 6,981 | 7,216            | 8,177 | 6,958            | 7,062            | 5,046  | 5,015            | 5,078            | 5,035            |
| Other States   | 492 <sup>1</sup> | 676   | 1,129 | 853              | 577   | 535              | 689 <sup>1</sup> | 537  | 595              | 600              | 577              |
| Unknown        | 164 <sup>1</sup> | 169   | 167   | 160 <sup>1</sup> | 129   | 143 <sup>1</sup> | 249 <sup>1</sup> | 185 <sup>1</sup>                             | 187 <sup>1</sup> | 161              | 155              |
| % Alaska       | 87               | 88    | 84    | 88               | 92    | 91               | 89               | 88   | 87               | 87               | 87               |
| 61-90 feet All | 152              | 694   | 430   | 378 <sup>1</sup> | 224   | 241              | 185              | 203  | 215              | 171              | 276              |
| Alaska         | 152              | 545   | 319   | 302 <sup>1</sup> | 173   | 184              | 185              | 156  | 163 <sup>1</sup> | 118 <sup>1</sup> | 178 <sup>1</sup> |
| Other States   | *                | 149   | 111   | 44               | 51    | 57               | *                | 47   | 52               | 38               | 71               |
| Unknown        | *                | 0     | 0     | *                | 0     | *                | *                | *  | *                | 16               | 26               |
| % Alaska       | 60               | 79    | 74    | 78               | 77    | 72               | 81               | 71   | 68               | 68               | 64               |
| > 90 feet All  | 0                | 0     | 0     | *                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | *                | *                | *                |
| Alaska         | 0                | 0     | 0     | *                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | *                | *                | *                |
| Other States   | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Unknown        | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| % Alaska       | 0                | 0     | 0     | 100              | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 100              | 100              | 100              |
| Freezer/LL All | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Alaska         | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Other States   | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Unknown        | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| % Alaska       | 0                | 0     | 0     | 0                | 0     | 0                | 0                | 0  | 0                | 0                | 0                |

90

\* indicates data not shown due to confidentiality restrictions.

<sup>1</sup> Includes landings from adjacent vessel class(es) and/or residencies.

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Table 2.4a--continued

Vessel owner participation  
Southeast/E. Yakutat blackcod fishery

| SEO/EY**     | 1984  | 1985  | 1986  | 1987  | 1988  | 1989  | 1990  | Rules |       |       |       |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|              |       |       |       |       |       |       |       | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     |
| % < 60'      | 77.8% | 79.2% | 89.7% | 91.1% | 91.5% | 93.0% | 94.5% | 88.4% | 89.1% | 88.7% | 93.0% |
| % > 60'      | 22.2% | 20.8% | 10.3% | 8.9%  | 8.5%  | 7.0%  | 5.5%  | 11.6% | 10.9% | 11.3% | 7.0%  |
| < 60'        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| All          | 98    | 95    | 217   | 316   | 354   | 361   | 311   | 633   | 573   | 689   | 541   |
| Alaska       | 2468  | 12580 | 171   | 254   | 295   | 302   | 267   | 497   | 453   | 542   | 441   |
| Other states | 30    | 15    | 46    | 62    | 59    | 59    | 49    | 136   | 120   | 147   | 100   |
| % Alaska     | 69.4% | 84.2% | 78.8% | 80.4% | 83.3% | 83.7% | 84.2% | 78.5% | 79.1% | 78.7% | 81.5% |
| > 60'        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| All          | 28    | 25    | 25    | 31    | 33    | 27    | 18    | 83    | 70    | 88    | 41    |
| Alaska       | 31510 | 31513 | 34115 | 35221 | 32222 | 34317 | 36211 | 39    | 35    | 39    | 26    |
| Other states | 18    | 12    | 10    | 10    | 11    | 10    | 7     | 44    | 35    | 49    | 15    |
| % Alaska     | 35.7% | 52.0% | 60.0% | 67.7% | 66.7% | 63.0% | 61.1% | 47.0% | 50.0% | 44.3% | 63.4% |

Total lbs caught in pot. 3382 1978 3765 3587 6265 5463 6116

SEO/EY\*\* = Southeast outside/East Yakutat 6180 5680 5680

Quota -

Total participants - 126 120 242 347 389 388 329

Percented in figures represent average catch/vessel in metric tons for each class size by year (for Alaskan residents)

Table 2.5a-continued


~~1215~~ *pounds in metric tons*  
*So.E/E. Yakutat blackcod fishery*

| SEO/EY**     | 1984  | 1983  | 1986  | 1987  | 1988  | 1989  | 1990  |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| % < 60'      | 68.5% | 60.3% | 78.3% | 84.6% | 83.6% | 86.0% | 90.7% |
| % > 60'      | 31.5% | 39.7% | 21.7% | 15.4% | 16.4% | 14.0% | 9.3%  |
| < 60'        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| All          | 2318  | 1193  | 2948  | 4725  | 5236  | 4697  | 5545  |
| Alaska       | 1594  | 1000  | 2202  | 4019  | 4117  | 3814  | 4427  |
| Other states | 724   | 193   | 746   | 706   | 1119  | 883   | 1118  |
| % Alaska     | 68.8% | 83.8% | 74.7% | 85.1% | 78.6% | 81.2% | 79.8% |
| > 60'        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| All          | 1064  | 785   | 817   | 862   | 1029  | 766   | 571   |
| Alaska       | 345   | 410   | 512   | 743   | 731   | 584   | 400   |
| Other states | 719   | 375   | 305   | 119   | 298   | 182   | 171   |
| % Alaska     | 32.4% | 52.2% | 62.7% | 86.2% | 71.0% | 76.2% | 70.1% |


SEO/EY\*\* = Southeast outside/East Yakutat

9.13

Figure 4.2 Estimated number and percentage of vessel owners by the ratio of IFQs to average landings for QS apportionment rules 3 and 4.



Rule 3: Best 5 of 7 years for 1984-90 (closest to approved option)




Rule 4: Best 6 of 7 years for 1984-90


Note: The average landings for each owner is for the number of years fished from 1984-90.

Halibut

Figure 4.4 Estimated number and percentage of vessel owners by the ratio of IFQs to 1990 landings for QS apportionment rules 3 and 4.



Rule 3: Best 5 of 7 years for 1984-90 (closest to approved option)



Rule 4: Best 6 of 7 years for 1984-90

Note: Only owners with 1990 landings are included.

*Halibut*

**Table 3.21** Number of vessel owners participating in the halibut fishery off Alaska, by vessel class and the number of years fished during 1984-1990.

| Participation by:         | Number of Years Fished |       |       |     |     |     |     | Total |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
|                           | 1                      | 2     | 3     | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   |       |
| All Owners                | 4,054                  | 1,748 | 1,117 | 828 | 637 | 444 | 507 | 9,335 |
| % of Total Owners         | 43%                    | 19%   | 12%   | 9%  | 7%  | 5%  | 5%  | 100%  |
| Owners of Vessels ≤ 35'   | 2,877                  | 1,076 | 597   | 380 | 253 | 162 | 127 | 5,472 |
| % of Vessels ≤ 35'        | 53%                    | 20%   | 11%   | 7%  | 5%  | 3%  | 2%  | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | 31%                    | 12%   | 6%    | 4%  | 3%  | 2%  | 1%  | 59%   |
| Owners of Vessels 36-60'  | 958                    | 564   | 457   | 401 | 347 | 251 | 343 | 3,321 |
| % of Vessels 36-60'       | 29%                    | 17%   | 14%   | 12% | 10% | 8%  | 10% | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | 10%                    | 6%    | 5%    | 4%  | 4%  | 3%  | 4%  | 36%   |
| Owners of Vessels ≤ 60'   | 3,835                  | 1,640 | 1,054 | 781 | 600 | 413 | 470 | 8,793 |
| % of Vessels ≤ 60'        | 44%                    | 19%   | 12%   | 9%  | 7%  | 5%  | 5%  | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | 41%                    | 18%   | 11%   | 8%  | 6%  | 4%  | 5%  | 94%   |
| Owners of Vessels > 60'   | 219                    | 108   | 63    | 47  | 37  | 31  | 37  | 542   |
| % of Vessels > 60'        | 40%                    | 20%   | 12%   | 9%  | 7%  | 6%  | 7%  | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | 2%                     | 1%    | 1%    | 1%  | <1% | <1% | <1% | 6%    |
| Owners of Vessels 61-90'  | 185                    | 88    | 53    | 38  | 32  | 28  | 33  | 457   |
| % of Vessels 61-90'       | 40%                    | 19%   | 12%   | 8%  | 7%  | 6%  | 7%  | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | 2%                     | 1%    | 1%    | <1% | <1% | <1% | <1% | 5%    |
| Owners of Vessels > 90'   | 34                     | 20    | 10    | 9   | 5   | 3   | 4   | 85    |
| % of Vessels > 90'        | 40%                    | 24%   | 12%   | 11% | 6%  | 4%  | 5%  | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | <1%                    | <1%   | <1%   | <1% | <1% | <1% | <1% | 1%    |
| Owners of Freezer Vessels | 1                      | 5     | 3     | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 9     |
| % of Freezer Vessels      | 11%                    | 56%   | 33%   | -   | -   | -   | -   | 100%  |
| % of Total Owners         | <1%                    | <1%   | <1%   | -   | -   | -   | -   | <1%   |

# Halibut - IFQ Recipients

**Table 4.2** Number of halibut vessel owners during 1984 through 1990 and calculated number of quota share (QS) recipients according to each of four quota share apportionment rules, by vessel class and region of owner residence.

*rule #1 = correct # of recipients*

| Vessel Class Set     | YEAR  |       |       |      |      |      |      | Number of QS Recipients by Apportionment Rule |      |      |      |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|
|                      | 1984  | 1985  | 1986  | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1   | 2    | 3    | 4    |
| All                  | 3149  | 2538  | 3082  | 3597 | 3770 | 3464 | 4024 | 6118  | 7702 | 9335 | 9335 |
| Alaska               | 2518  | 2118  | 2593  | 3050 | 3361 | 3010 | 3410 | 5240  | 6475 | 7711 | 7711 |
| Other States         | 201   | 163   | 230   | 290  | 265  | 266  | 316  | 452   | 577  | 658  | 658  |
| Unknown              | 430   | 257   | 259   | 257  | 144  | 188  | 298  | 426   | 650  | 966  | 966  |
| % Alaska             | 80    | 83    | 84    | 85   | 89   | 87   | 85   | 86  | 84   | 83   | 83   |
|                      |       |       |       |      |      |      |      |   |      |      |      |
| % < 35 ft            | 66.0  | 59.7  | 55.3  | 54.3 | 49.5 | 46.3 | 44.8 | 51.2  | 54.6 | 58.6 | 58.6 |
| % 36-60 ft           | 30.7  | 36.1  | 39.4  | 40.4 | 45.0 | 47.9 | 48.8 | 42.5  | 39.2 | 35.6 | 35.6 |
| % ≤ 60 ft            | 96.6  | 95.8  | 94.7  | 94.7 | 94.5 | 94.2 | 93.5 | 93.7  | 93.8 | 94.2 | 94.2 |
| % > 60 ft            | 3.6   | 4.6   | 5.5   | 5.5  | 5.9  | 6.1  | 6.8  | 6.3   | 6.2  | 5.8  | 5.8  |
| % 61-90 ft           | 3.4   | 4.1   | 5.0   | 4.9  | 5.0  | 5.2  | 5.7  | 5.2   | 5.2  | 4.9  | 4.9  |
| % > 90 ft            | 0.2   | 0.5   | 0.6   | 0.6  | 0.8  | 0.9  | 1.1  | 1.1   | 1.0  | 0.9  | 0.9  |
| C/B                  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 99.9 | 99.8 | 99.8 | 99.8 | 99.8  | 99.8 | 99.9 | 99.9 |
| F/L                  | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.1  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2   | 0.2  | 0.1  | 0.1  |
|                      |       |       |       |      |      |      |      |   |      |      |      |
| <b>&lt;35 ft</b> All | 2077  | 1516  | 1705  | 1954 | 1865 | 1604 | 1801 | 3131  | 4206 | 5472 | 5472 |
| Alaska               | 1634  | 1260  | 1457  | 1709 | 1741 | 1462 | 1595 | 2819  | 3675 | 4618 | 4618 |
| Other States         | 53    | 31    | 35    | 60   | 37   | 38   | 48   | 68  | 94   | 120  | 120  |
| Unknown              | 390   | 225   | 213   | 185  | 87   | 104  | 158  | 244   | 436  | 734  | 734  |
| % Alaska             | 79    | 83    | 85    | 87   | 93   | 91   | 89   | 90  | 87   | 84   | 84   |
|                      |       |       |       |      |      |      |      |   |      |      |      |
| <b>36-60 ft</b> All  | 966   | 915   | 1215  | 1454 | 1696 | 1658 | 1963 | 2600  | 3019 | 3321 | 3321 |
| Alaska               | 817   | 784   | 1020  | 1213 | 1485 | 1420 | 1655 | 2174  | 2491 | 2736 | 2736 |
| Other States         | 118   | 107   | 158   | 180  | 167  | 170  | 195  | 279   | 353  | 398  | 398  |
| Unknown              | 31    | 24    | 37    | 61   | 44   | 68   | 113  | 147   | 175  | 187  | 187  |
| % Alaska             | 85    | 86    | 84    | 83   | 86   | 86   | 84   | 84  | 83   | 82   | 82   |

TABLE 2.2.1 Distribution of Vessel Owners by Vessel Size Class and the Number of Years Fished

*Sable fish IFQ Recipients*

Vessel categories associated with Alternative 2.1

| Number of Years Fished            | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6  | 7  | Total |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-------|
| <b>ALL OWNERS</b>                 | 680 | 267 | 196 | 126 | 116 | 80 | 51 | 1,496 |
| % of total                        | 45% | 18% | 13% | 8%  | 8%  | 4% | 3% | 100%  |
| <b>Owners of Vessels &lt;50'</b>  | 420 | 162 | 114 | 68  | 75  | 31 | 23 | 893   |
| % of vessels <50'                 | 47% | 18% | 13% | 8%  | 8%  | 3% | 3% | 100%  |
| % of total                        | 28% | 11% | 8%  | 5%  | 5%  | 2% | 2% | 60%   |
| <b>Owners of Vessels 50-100'</b>  | 177 | 92  | 79  | 55  | 37  | 27 | 28 | 495   |
| % of vessels 50-100'              | 36% | 19% | 16% | 11% | 7%  | 5% | 6% | 100%  |
| % of total                        | 12% | 6%  | 5%  | 4%  | 2%  | 2% | 2% | 33%   |
| <b>Owners of Vessels &gt;100'</b> | 24  | 12  | 3   | 3   | 4   | 2  | 0  | 48    |
| % of vessels >100'                | 50% | 25% | 6%  | 6%  | 8%  | 4% | 0% | 100%  |
| % of total                        | 2%  | 1%  | 0%  | 0%  | 0%  | 0% | 0% | 3%    |

Vessel categories associated with Alternative 2.2


*- most similar to method chosen by Council*

| Number of Years Fished              | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6  | 7  | Total |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-------|
| <b>ALL OWNERS</b>                   | 680 | 267 | 196 | 126 | 116 | 60 | 51 | 1,496 |
| % of total                          | 45% | 18% | 13% | 8%  | 8%  | 4% | 3% | 100%  |
| <b>Owners of Vessels &lt;50'</b>    | 420 | 162 | 114 | 68  | 75  | 31 | 23 | 893   |
| % of vessels <50'                   | 47% | 18% | 13% | 8%  | 8%  | 3% | 3% | 100%  |
| % of total                          | 28% | 11% | 8%  | 5%  | 5%  | 2% | 2% | 60%   |
| <b>Owners of Vessels 50-75'</b>     | 131 | 62  | 89  | 43  | 33  | 24 | 24 | 386   |
| % of vessels 50-75'                 | 34% | 16% | 18% | 11% | 9%  | 6% | 6% | 100%  |
| % of total                          | 9%  | 4%  | 5%  | 3%  | 2%  | 2% | 2% | 26%   |
| <b>Owners of Vessels &gt;75'</b>    | 55  | 28  | 9   | 11  | 8   | 5  | 2  | 114   |
| % of vessels >75'                   | 48% | 23% | 8%  | 10% | 5%  | 4% | 2% | 100%  |
| % of total                          | 4%  | 2%  | 1%  | 1%  | 0%  | 0% | 0% | 8%    |
| <b>Owners of Freezer/Longliners</b> | 16  | 16  | 4   | 4   | 2   | 0  | 2  | 44    |
| % of freezer/longliners             | 36% | 36% | 9%  | 9%  | 5%  | 0% | 5% | 100%  |
| % of total                          | 1%  | 1%  | 0%  | 0%  | 0%  | 0% | 0% | 3%    |

Continued --

Sablefish

Figure 2.5.2 Ratio of IFQ Pounds to Average Landings



*closest to approved option*

**Notes:** Rule 2A: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use all 6 years (84-89).  
Rule 2B: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use best 5 of 6 years (84-89).  
Rule 2C: Must have made landings in 1987-89; use best 4 of 6 years (84-89).  
Ratios of less than 1 indicate owner will receive a smaller amount of IFQ lbs. than his average landings over the years in which he participated.  
With few exceptions the individuals that fished only one year are included in the first cluster. Those who fished two years are in the second cluster, etc.

range of the number of vessels that are consistent with the characteristics of the fishing trips that are expected to occur for each vessel class and area, the number of vessel and fishermen is indeterminate.

The cost model estimates of the total number of vessel operating days and the total number of fisherman days are 27,769 to 37,135 and 109,147 to 144,948, respectively, with partial adjustment to an IFQ program compared to 68,138 vessel operating days and 265,328 fisherman days without an IFQ program (Table 4.1). If each vessel is fully employed in the halibut fishery, there would be 147 to 192 halibut vessels and 584 to 756 halibut fishermen. However, if on average, each vessel spends only 50 days per year in the halibut fishery, there would be 588 to 768 halibut vessels and 2,336 to 3,072 halibut fishermen. These are in comparison to estimates of 3,769 vessels and 14,721 fishermen without an IFQ program.

#### 4.1.12 Effects of an IFQ Program on Harvesting Costs due to a Redistribution of Effort and Catch to More Profitable Fishing Operations

An IFQ program will decrease harvesting costs by providing each fishing operation with substantially more flexibility in determining how and when to harvest halibut. An IFQ program will also decrease harvesting costs by redistribution fishing effort from high to low cost fishing operations. It has been estimated that this redistribution would have reduced total harvesting cost in 1990, by approximately \$9.8 to \$12.7 million in total (Table 4.1). This is about \$0.20 to \$ 0.26 per pound of halibut. Combined with the cost saving due to increased flexibility, the model's estimate of the total harvesting cost saving with an IFQ program is \$45.8 to \$52.8 million, excluding the bait and gear loss savings included elsewhere.

#### 4.1.13 Effects of an IFQ Program on Harvesting Activity due to a Redistribution of Effort and Catch to More Profitable Fishing Operations

With one exception, the cost model estimates that the 61-90 foot vessel class is the lowest cost vessel class in each area. The exception is that in Area 2C, with a 50% reduction in catch per fishing day, the 36-60 foot vessel class has the lowest cost per pound of halibut landings.

With the redistribution of all effort and catch to the low cost vessel class in each area, it is estimated that there would have been 13,961 to 18,468 fishing vessel operating days and 72,842 to 96,977 fisherman days compared to 27,769 to 37,135 vessel days and 109,147 to 144,948 fisherman days with the partial adjustment to an IFQ program or compared to 68,138 vessel days and 265,328 fisherman days without an IFQ program.

As noted above, a range of numbers of vessels or fishermen could be associated with these estimates of vessel and fisherman days. If each vessel is fully employed in the halibut fishery, there would be 72 to 94 halibut vessels and 376 to 494 halibut fishermen. However, if on average, each vessel spends only 50 days per year in the halibut fishery instead of 200 days, there would be 288 to 376 halibut vessels and 1,504 to 1,976 halibut fishermen. These are in comparison to estimates of 3,796 vessels and 14,721 fishermen without an IFQ program. The redistribution of catch and effort to the most profitable vessel class for each area reduces the required numbers of vessel and fisherman days because landings per vessel day or fisherman day are higher for the most profitable vessel class than for most other vessel classes.

1990 levels

There are two reasons why the model may under estimate the effect of an IFQ program on employment opportunities in the halibut fishery. First, no adjustment is made in the number of crew members for a vessel class. Currently, there may be additional crewmen, who are only justified by

The following discussion of issues, costs and benefits of possible adoption of an IFQ program are based on a qualitative assessment of social impacts. As noted previously, it has not been possible to conduct a social impact study and this assessment is based on a survey of available literature.

### 5.3.1 Assessment of impacts

The discussion of impacts is organized by issue so that the reader can refer to the discussion of economic impacts in Sections 4.1 and 7.

#### 5.3.1.1 Provision of a harvest share

- a. The allocation of a QS to an individual is the allocation of a fishing privilege and not the allocation of a piece of real property. Further, the yearly poundage represented by the ratio of the QS to the TAC will fluctuate as the stock biomass changes. Currently, the biomass appears to be decreasing and thus the annual poundage of the IFQ will also decrease until the stock recovers and TAC is increased.
- b. The Council proposes to allocate QS and IFQ to vessel owners and qualified bareboat charterers who landed halibut in designated years. In so doing the Council will recognize the capital investment and risk taken by these individuals and/or companies. Crew and hired skippers have also invested time and labor as co-venturers paid through the vessel share system, but these investments are not recognized in the allocation of harvest shares proposed.
- c. Since the IFQ is proportionate to historic catches, and these have been declining over time (see Table 5.1), an individual vessel owner will not see any immediate increase in catches and will forgo the opportunity of "striking it rich" through fishing skill or luck, for the opportunity to expand fishing operations through the purchase of additional QS or IFQs. However, the vessel owner is assured of the opportunity to take the full poundage of an IFQ during the season, and not be subject to the need to take unnecessary risks in bad weather or in fishing practices in order to maximize harvests during an opening. Further, mechanical or other vessel problems can be resolved without missing the opportunity to fish for halibut, as was the case with, for example, engine failure at the beginning of an opening. A significant social and cultural impact of the introduction of an IFQ program is the switch from a "hunting and fishing" culture to a "farming" culture. For many the attraction and satisfactions of fishing as a life-style will fade with the introduction of quotas and the lessening of feelings of competitiveness and independence.
- d. The initial allocation of QS and IFQs will fix the maximum social parameters of the fishery. Access to the fishery, unless the Council and Secretary change the IFQ program through an FMP amendment, will be by purchase or lease of QS and IFQ or through inheritance in years after implementation of the program. Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 288 to 376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976 fishermen. This economically efficient fleet would be similar in numbers to that operating in the halibut fishery in 1978 (Langdon and Miller, 1984b), but with increased fishing power due to improved technologies. Since much of the rural Alaskan fishery operates within a mixed cash-subsistence economy, with different criteria of efficiency, availability of QS and IFQs to the present operators of the fleet of skiffs and medium-sized vessels will permit continuance of traditional fishing, but will not encourage economic growth in rural communities.

not true. according to AK. Comm. Fish. Entry Com. 5-48 in 1978 1274 halibut permits were fished. (which is equivalent to 4000-5000 fishermen)

As noted above, this analysis is based upon a study of the literature related to the halibut fishery. The most recent survey of halibut fishermen, carried out in 1982 by Langdon and Miller, showed that 7 percent of the fishermen were residents of Washington State; 37.5 percent lived in Southeast Alaska (including Yakutat); 3.2 percent lived in Prince William Sound communities; 35.6 percent resided in Cook Inlet communities; 11.1 lived on Kodiak Island, and 3 percent in the Lower Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Of the Alaskan fishermen, 72 percent lived in urban communities.

The crews are typically paid on a crew-share/boat-share basis. This pattern of payment extends back to the early days of the halibut fishery. The Deep Sea Fishermen's Union (DSFU) founded in 1912, has represented the Puget Sound fishermen in negotiations about pay and conditions with the Fishing Vessel Owner's Association (FVOA) since 1914. This is the only example of organized labor-owner agreements in the fishery.

### 5.2.3 Relative economic importance of the halibut fishery

The literature survey has not provided sufficient specific information to assess the economic importance of the halibut fishery to communities. In general, there are few employment opportunities other than commercial fishing available to residents of rural Alaskan communities described in Section 5.1. In consequence, any change in the allocation of harvest rights to a fishery will have impacts on rural Alaskan fishermen and their communities. The commercial fishing industries of Kodiak, Seward and Sitka will be impacted by an allocation scheme, but it is difficult to predict from the literature survey what that impact will be; much will depend on developments in the halibut marketing and processing sector. The communities of the Upper Cook Inlet/Kenai Peninsula and Seattle have diversified urban economies, and changes in the allocation of halibut harvests will have little or no effect on the social and cultural systems of these urban areas. Seattle may benefit from an allocation scheme since it, and other Northwest ports, may regain landings lost to Alaskan ports. Other Pacific Northwest communities in Washington and Oregon will have some social impacts from an allocation program, but these will be relatively minor and will primarily affect vessel owners resident in those communities.

### 5.3 Analysis of the Alternatives

Two alternatives are being considered for the future management of the halibut fishery. Alternative 1 is the existing status quo in the fishery; that is, the fishery would continue as an open access fishery with harvest controlled through area-specific seasonal quotas. The fishery would continue as described in Section 5.1 above; increasing numbers of vessels and gear, leading to ever-shorter seasons and decreasing catch per unit of effort. The problems and issues related to continuation of the status quo fishery have been identified and listed in Section 4.0 above.

The second alternative under consideration by the Council is the introduction of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program for halibut fishery in the waters off Alaska. The Council is considering three variants of an IFQ program. However, all would allocate quota shares (QS) in the fishery to participants proportionate to their historical fishing records. After the total allowable catch (TAC) for a given fishing year has been specified, IFQs would be set. The IFQ would be the poundage equivalent of the proportionate ratio of QS to the TAC. Thus the amount available for harvest under an IFQ would vary each year with the size of the TAC. IFQs would be transferable under all variants of the program. In two variants of the program, portions of the TAC would be set aside for community development.

It is important to note that there are many rural Alaska coastal communities that rely heavily on halibut for subsistence purposes. These communities also rely, to some extent, on halibut for income in a commercial sense. Chapter 5 of this document provides a detailed description of these communities and their reliance on the halibut resource.

#### 4.1.18 Effects of an IFQ Program on the Economic Stability of the Halibut Fishery and Fishing Communities

On a year to year basis, industry members have no firm idea of whether or not they will be able to secure sufficient product. This is the case in terms of both short and long-term planning. In areas with only a few very short openings, if a vessel breaks down, a fisherman might miss all or a substantial portion of the season. Likewise, increased fishing effort does not allow processors to plan for consistent or orderly processing. The short-term discontinuities make planning difficult. Long-term plans can be made but, unlike some other industries, participants are not guaranteed access to halibut. Several towns in southeast Alaska, especially Petersburg, traditionally had longline fleets. These fleets now are partially diversified into other fisheries as a result of short halibut and sablefish seasons. Likewise, with an increase in the number of halibut vessels and stable or decreasing stocks, fishermen who had relied on halibut have had to turn to other fisheries in order to maintain their income. In some instances, increased effort or decreased stocks will cause fishermen to leave the fishery or the occupation. As fishermen switch fisheries or occupations their living standards may suffer. This is especially true in communities which offer few alternatives to fishing. In these communities, especially along the Alaskan coast, communities could experience reduced income and population.

The data presented in Table 3.20 demonstrates the volatility of participation in the halibut fishery. Of the 9,335 different vessel owners who participated between 1984 and 1990, 43% have done so for only one year while only 5% have participated all seven years.

The implementation of an IFQ program would result in significant changes in the halibut fishery. Initially, these changes would increase uncertainty and decrease stability. However, once the adjustments are made, IFQs would decrease uncertainty and increase the ability of fishermen and processors to plan their participation in the halibut fishery. By reducing the level of overcapitalization, an IFQ program will also tend to dampen the fluctuations in income and employment associated with changes in quotas and landings.

#### 4.1.19 Effects of an IFQ Program on Other Fisheries

By relieving pressure on the halibut fishery, a halibut IFQ program would tend to increase participation in other fisheries for two reasons. One reason is that participation in the other fisheries would probably increase as fishermen attempt to create a record of participation in the expectation that IFQs would eventually be used in those fisheries. The increased participation in the other fisheries would impose costs on fishermen who are already participating in those fisheries.

Another reason is that those who chose not to participate in the halibut fishery might be more likely to participate in the other fisheries. However, this redirected effort would likely be minimal due to the fact that most halibut fishery participants are already participating in other fisheries. The halibut season openings in the major halibut landing areas are only two days long currently and most fishermen are engaged in other fisheries during the rest of the year. Those that cease to fish halibut would be freeing up only a very limited amount of fishing time to direct at other fisheries. Additionally, most of the boats that fish halibut are small vessels under 50 feet in length whose

i.e.:  
fishermen  
dropout

opportunities to participate in other fisheries are very limited. This is particularly true of the vessels that would most likely not find it viable to continue in the halibut fishery; i.e., those that receive QS which amounts to substantially less than their average past landings.

There are other factors involved which may tend to increase pressure on other fisheries under a halibut IFQ program. If longline fishermen in other directed fisheries, such as Pacific cod and rockfish, are able to retain their halibut bycatch with IFQs, then their directed fishery for the other species may be more economically viable than before when they had to discard incidentally caught halibut. The marginal costs of harvesting halibut as bycatch are much lower than in a directed fishery situation. The attractiveness of this situation may induce additional participation in these fisheries as fishermen grasp an opportunity at a more economically efficient operation. In the recently instituted Canadian Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) program this situation apparently has occurred with respect to rockfish. Additional effort has been exerted in the directed longline fishery for rockfish, resulting in the total allowable catch of this species to be taken in a much shorter period of time than has previously been experienced (Zyblut, personal communication). Actually, there is a two-fold reason that the TAC was taken quicker this year than usual. Fishermen in the IVQ halibut fishery are now retaining the incidentally caught rockfish that were previously discarded in the fast-paced, open access fishery for halibut. These retained rockfish are now being reported and counted against the TAC.

A similar situation could likely occur in the Southeast Area off Alaska under a halibut IFQ system. Additional effort could be exerted against rockfish stocks, assuming an ability to retain incidentally caught halibut. Without the derby style "race for fish", unreported (and discarded) bycatch of rockfish in the directed halibut fishery would likely be reduced and these species would now be landed and the landings counted against the TAC. These combined factors would likely increase the possibility that the TAC for these rockfish species would be reached earlier than traditionally occurs. On the positive side, the IFQ program would result in much better accounting of the actual mortality of these species. The demersal shelf rockfish complex has a low TAC of 425 mt (1991) and mortality of this species in the directed halibut fishery is currently unknown. The IFQ system would likely result in fisheries managers having a more accurate understanding of demersal shelf rockfish stocks.

#### 4.1.20 Effects of an IFQ Program on Groundfish Discards in the Halibut Fishery

When there is a premium on the rate of harvest, the costs of taking the time to retain bycatch are higher. As a result, the bycatch of rockfish and other groundfish that might otherwise be retained is discarded in the current open access fishery. The mortality rate for the discarded rockfish is almost 100%, but much lower for other species. An IFQ program is expected to decrease the premium on the rate of harvest and to increase the amount of bycatch that is retained by halibut fishermen.

This will provide two types of benefits. It will increase the exvessel value of total catch because more will be retained. It will also result in less uncertainty concerning total fishing mortality for the species taken as bycatch in the halibut fishery.

Because rockfish typically have been discarded, it is not known what the rockfish bycatch rate has been in the halibut fishery. If a bycatch rate of 10% is assumed, as was done for the Canadian halibut fishery, approximately 7.0 million pounds of rockfish were taken in the Alaska halibut fishery in 1990. Using the average 1990 exvessel price of rockfish of \$0.24 (\$/lb round weight) for all gear or \$0.41 for longline gear, the potential exvessel value of the rockfish bycatch in the halibut fishery was from \$1.7 million to \$2.9 million.

## Effects Of NPFMC IFQ Plan On Coastal Communities

01/06/92

### Fleet Characteristics

In general, the fishing fleets of the coastal communities of Southeast, and certainly Sitka, are diversified, well-stratified small (less than 60') boat fleets that provide a living to many people. Stratified here means that there are vessels of all sizes included in the make-up of the fleets with the highest concentrations in the 35-50' range. Diversification refers to the fact that most fishermen depend on more than one fishery to provide the income needed to keep their business afloat. "Langdon and Miller (1983) reported that only 7.9% of the fishermen interviewed in Area 2C (Southeast) fished in just one fishery, while 42.9% fished in two directed fisheries, typically halibut and salmon. One-fifth of the fishermen in Langdon and Miller's sample fished for four or more species during the course of the year" (Council's Analysis, p. 8). Diversification has increased through the 1980s.

We believe that these characteristics are vital to the economic well being of the fleet and the communities they help support. Diversification helps stabilize income (and boat values) as it mitigates the effects of annual fluctuations within the different fisheries due to market conditions, stock conditions, etc. This year, for example, the low price of salmon would have been much more devastating locally had it not been for the fact that most salmon fishermen in Southeast participate in other fisheries. Well balanced stratification ensures an entry level in the fisheries, economic mobility, and a wide base of participation (jobs). "In the late 1970s and early 1980s, halibut was the second most important fishery in the Southeast region in terms of employment, ranking just behind salmon" (p. 7). This importance has not diminished through the 1980s. We believe that stratification and continued opportunities for diversification are critical to the well being of the coastal communities.

There are some key phrases you frequently hear repeated to justify the measure being proposed by the NPFMC in their approved Sablefish and Halibut Fixed Gear IFQ management plan. One that Clem Tillion is fond of is "too many boats chasing too few fish". Another is "overburdened with participants". The implication is that the pie is being cut into such small pieces that nobody really gets enough for sustenance. Figures from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (p. 1 and 2) show that yearly average gross earnings for participants in the halibut fishery fluctuates with price but, if you average out the most recent six years reported (1984-1989) and compare that with the previous seven years (1977-1983), (even if you eliminate 1980 - a very poor year), you can see an increase of over 30% in gross earnings, from \$20,289 to \$30,983. Yearly average pounds landed shows the same trend. In the black cod fishery, the figures are much more dramatic (p. 3 and 4). The increase is in the order of 250%. It is worth noting here that the black cod fishery has only recently become a domestic fishery. Until 1977 and creation of the 200 mile limit, it was primarily a foreign fishery which phased out over the next seven years. There had been minimal involvement in the fishery by domestic fleets until 1984 from which point domestic participation has increased to fill the void. In light of the above information and the perspective offered by Table 1a (p. 10) and 2.4a (p. 12) of the fisheries in Southeast, we find no evidence of plummeting catch rates and/or income but rather indications of economically viable fisheries that have provided many with a reliable source of at least part of their fishing income.

#### Impact of Initial Allocation

To be eligible for an allocation of quota share one must have landed halibut or black cod in one of the years 1988, 1989, or 1990. Quota shares are to be calculated based on one's average of their best 5 of 7 years (1984-1990) for halibut and the best 5 of 6 years (1985-1990) for black cod. An individual's average is then converted to a percentage of all qualifying pounds and one's quota share is represented by that percentage. One of the ironies of this method of allocation is that it tends to reward those most responsible for the "over-capitalization" so often cited as one

of the major problems associated with open access. According to Council figures there will be approximately 6,118 initial halibut IFQ recipients (compared to 4,059 permits fished in 1990) and 1,081 black cod IFQ recipients (compared to 670 permits fished in 1990).

Because of the method chosen for determining initial allocation of IFQs, quota share recipients with the least number of years as vessel owners with halibut and/or black cod landings (regardless of their overall history of participation in the fisheries) are put at a distinct, in some cases severe, disadvantage as to continuing and upgrading in the fishery.

Why would anyone sell? According to figures from the NPFMC analysis, over 40% of initial recipients in both the black cod and halibut fisheries will receive no more than 20% of their average landings and an additional 26% will receive less than 40% of their average (fig. 4.2, rule 3, p. 4-48 and fig. 2.5.2, p. 2-56 from the Council Analysis). Some of these recipients will be persons no longer active in the fishery or only casual participants. This is significant though as it creates a certain number of quota shares that will most likely be up for sale immediately;. It also impacts the initial allocations of those still active in the fishery. Fig. 4.4, rule 3, (p. 4-50) gives an indication of the impact of initial allocation to 1990 halibut participants. It shows that 28% of QS recipients will receive less than 21% of their 1990 landings and another 20% will receive less than 41% of their 1990 landings. Thus, about half of all halibut QS recipients will receive less than half of their 1990 landings and about 67% will receive less than half their average. Only about 28% of halibut QS recipients will receive better than 80% of their 1990 landings and less than 5% will receive 80% or better of their 5 year average. How many businesses will be able to survive that kind of impact to a significant block of their income? Without the ability to buy more quota shares, the impetuous to sell will be great. To quote the NPFMC analysis, "Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 288-376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976

fishermen (p. 5-48, for halibut fishery). This is in contrast to 4,059 vessels and 14,721 fishermen in the 1990 halibut fishery (NPFMC figures).

There will be tremendous competition for quota shares as they come on the market and that those able to pay the most will by and large be those vessel owners more favored by the initial allocation and with the more capitalized vessels. This effectively eliminates an entry level to all but the wealthy and assures further consolidation as fishermen retire and/or cash out of the fishery. There is not sufficient data in the Council Analysis to know exactly how initial allocation will impact Sitka (see p. 5-47, 5.2.3) but, if Sitka falls anywhere close to the averages, the impact to many vessel owners could be severe enough in the short term to see immediate fall-out and in the long run a steady decline in vessel participation (and boat values) as consolidation continues. In addition to this, there will be an immediate reduction of crew members, probably on an average of at least one per boat that remains in the fisheries, then 1-3 more as vessels drop out.

#### Protection Against Extreme Consolidation?

There is but one provision in the sablefish and halibut management plan (copy attached) approved by the NPFM Council that limits consolidation (fleet reduction) and that is the ownership and use caps for quota shares. The plan specifies that no individual or person (corporation, partnership, etc.) may own or utilize more than 1% of the combined Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands quota for sablefish and 0.5% for halibut and the same for any of the combined areas 2C; 3A and 3B; or 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E, and that, in areas 2C (Southeast), no more than 1% of the black cod or halibut quota shares or IFQs. Taken to the limit, this represents 100 vessels in the halibut and black cod fisheries in Southeast, as compared to 1990 levels of 1,486 and 329 respectively - a 93% reduction of participation in halibut and 69% reduction in black cod. In 1990, 278 Sitkans held halibut permits and 114 held black cod permits, with an average of 3.6 persons per boat (NPFMC figures).

The provisions that some like to call "protection to the coastal communities" are that quota shares or IFQs initially allocated "for any vessel category or any management area may not be transferred to other vessel category or any other management area" (Sec. C-3-iv of plan). The vessel categories are as follows: halibut - 1) freezer/longliner, 2) catcher boats, a) vessels less than or equal to 35', b) vessels more than 35 feet but less than or equal to 60', c) vessels more than 60'; sablefish is the same but without the less than 35' class break. Upon inspection, it is hard to find any protection from these provisions. For this to be significant, you would have to assume that boats in the two smallest size classes would be capable of harvesting much less than 1% of the quota. In area 2C, 1% amounts to (at 1990 quotas) 80,000 pounds of halibut and 125,244 pounds of black cod. There is no shortage of vessels in the less than or equal to 60' class capable of this level of annual harvest. As for the less than or equal to 35' class which applies only to halibut, look at Table 1b (p. 11). You will find that vessels in this size class took, on an average of the years 1984-1990, 18.4% of the annual quota for halibut in area 2C. At 1990 levels, that represents 1,472,000 pounds. If, for argument sake, you assume that initial allocation keeps this percentage (which it probably will not) and that it is only practical for a vessel in this class to harvest at most 1/2 to 1/3 of the 1% limit in Southeast (40,000-26,666 pounds), you are still talking about only 36-55 vessels in comparison to 673 vessels in 1990. Where is the protection against extreme consolidation?

The other measures of "protection" offered are that the owner of the IFQs must, in most cases, be aboard the vessel fishing the quota shares and that quota shares can only be sold or transferred to a U.S. citizen who is a "bona fide fixed gear crew member". (This is also ironically the "recognition" given to fishermen whose participation in these fisheries has been primarily as crew members.) A bona fide fixed gear crew member is "any person that has acquired commercial fish harvesting time at sea (i.e. fish harvesting crew) that is equal to 5 months of any commercial fish harvesting activity. Additionally, any individual who receives an initial allocation of QS will be considered a bona fide crew member" (Sec. 1-1 of plan). This is an effort to keep quota shares from

becoming owned and controlled by corporate interests. (The corporations being allocated QS are current fishing operations.) Though this may slow the process of consolidation down, what is the difference in the long run to the economic well being of the small boat fleet and the coastal communities if the rights to harvest in all the federally managed waters off the coast of Alaska are controlled by a few hundred very wealthy vessel owners or a handful of corporations, as is the case in New Zealand? It should be added that according to the Magnuson Act (Sec. 304-97-453, 99-659a, b, and c), the Secretary of Commerce has ultimate control over the final version of this plan and it is without a doubt that there will be heavy lobbying in Washington; D.C. to have as much of the "restrictive language" (i.e. 1% cap, vessel size classes, bona fide crewman provision, etc.) as possible removed.

#### IFQ VERSUS LIMITED ENTRY

This is not just another limited entry system. "Fishermen and managers should be aware individual quotas are not simply an alternative licensing system. The transition to IQs is a fundamental change that converts to private property that which has been a public or common property resource" (from A Commission of Inquiry into 'Licensing and Related Policies of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada), p. 36).

In the limited entry system instituted in the State of Alaska, the first thing that is done is to set a maximum number of permits to be issued based on the highest number of participants in any single year of the four most recent previous years. That number of permits is then issued. Eligibility is dependent on deliveries in a set base period. Permit recipients are then determined from those eligible through a point system whose criterion include, but not limited to, past participation as captain and/or crew, investment in fishery (ownership of vessel and gear), availability of alternative occupation, and income dependence (fishing versus non-fishing). The State is now just beginning the second stage of the limited entry process which is to set an optimum number (which could be either higher or lower than the maximum number) of vessels for each

limited fishery. The criterion for finding this number are being worked on now but must, according to the limited entry enactment law, reflect a reasonable balance of conservation concerns; an economically healthy and reasonable fishery; and hardship to fishermen.

The only thing this IFQ plan and the State limited entry system have in common is that eligibility is dependent on a set base period. There are no similarities beyond that point. State limited entry permit recipients are determined on a variety of criterion and then given equal access; this IFQ allocation is determined solely on poundage delivered. State limited entry gives only access to harvest; IFQs give absolute control over a certain percentage of the quota. State limited entry protects fleet participation; this IFQ plan is designed to reduce fleet participation through quota share consolidation. **One of the glaring omissions of this plan is the lack of any parameters for optimum fleet size and an attempt to achieve that with as little disruption as possible.**

### Conclusion

There is an endless variety in IFQ management schemes currently in effect. Many were imposed on fisheries already under a limited entry program, a much different scenario than using an IFQ system as a limited entry scheme. Some are freely transferrable, some are attached to vessels, some are non-transferrable, some are leasable, many are not. The formulas for determining quota share vary greatly, few rely solely on historic landings, some are all equal. Most, with New Zealand and Iceland being the main exceptions, have been applied to fisheries involving at most a few hundred participants (some less than 100) and more localized areas. Nothing of this magnitude has yet been implemented. Though there are benefits to individuals granted IFQs (which managers and beneficiaries are quick to applaud) high-grading and black marketing remain a problem in nearly all QS fisheries and some have seen radical quota reductions or even closure because of crashing stocks. It is also clear that, where allowed, consolidation is the rule and where uncontrolled, it is extreme. New Zealand is a good example of this. "Economists of the New Zealand Fishing Industry Board suggest that the

top 5-7 firms control between 70% to 85% of the quota (by weight)" (from Council Analysis, p. 1-22). (For more information on this, see "Quota Quagmire" attached.) Maybe the real test of the benefit of this plan will be how disruptive it will prove to be to the economic structure of the fishing fleets; how many people in the long run will be displaced or suffer extreme hardship. We believe this plan will lead to the fishing equivalent of agribusiness and the exclusion of the coastal communities from the fisheries.

There is no doubt that with the "derbies", fishermen take increased risk, that over-capitalization is encouraged, and that the grounds are overcrowded - all of which are the major causes of the problems associated with the fisheries (bi-catch, lost gear, etc.). These problems need to be addressed. Increased participation needs to be addressed, especially in light of falling quotas. But, the Council has chosen not to use the management tools set forth in the Magnuson Act (see Sec. 303 97-453, 99-659, 101-627) to address these problems. Many plans have been submitted to the Council which could go far to alleviate the problems associated with derbies but the Council has chosen instead to support a plan which amounts to economic allocation. This is totally unjustified and threatens to rip apart the complex economic fabric of the small boat fleets and radically reshape the fishery. Some will say this is only speculation and not the intent of the Council. If this is not the Council's intent, where is the language defining intent and preventing this from becoming reality? The Council's own analysis shows it is a distinct possibility.

prepared by Donna Donohue  
747-6467  
Bx 2993  
Sitka Ak 99835

The following coastal communities have all passed resolutions requesting analysis of the economic impact of this plan on the affected communities. The Council voted to approve the plan with <sup>out</sup> the analysis sought by the coastal communities and required by the Magnuson Act.

Anchorage

City of Seward

City of Homer

Whittier

Valdez

Kenai Borough

Cordova

Kodiak City and Borough

Soldotna

Alaska State Chamber of Commerce

South West Municipal Conference

Alaska Municipal League

Sand Point

Bristol Bay Borough

Unalaska

Ounalashka Corporation (Native Corporation Unalaska)

Sitka

April 16, 1992

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I believe the following questions should be brought up in opposition to the proposed I.F.Q. system.

Why has the "Economic Analysis on Coastal Alaska Communities" NOT been addressed in the March 27, 1992 "Supplemental Analysis" issued by N.P.M.F.C.? It was specifically requested by every city council to be impacted in Alaska.

Why did the N.P.M.F.C. amass a book of data, some of which was not previously made available, using three months to do so and gave the hard working layman one week to digest and comment on it?

The composition of the analysis that was supplied is deceiving. If you dig the pertinent statistics out of it and place them on a graph it is easy to see that boats 60' and above, though fewer in number and most of which will not deliver in Alaska, will be guaranteed a major portion of quota shares. The boats under 60', their crews and communities will be drastically impacted.

Many Alaskan communities are made up of and service fishing related enterprises. No resource has ever been attacked on the free enterprise scale.

Most of us Alaska resident fishermen cannot combat political attack on our livelihood. Many of us also believe the N.P.M.F.C. is not acting in a non-bias manner or with any consideration for Alaska's people except for two of the members. What is the motivation of the remainder?

Why is the Seattle Longliners Union given credit for a multitude of support votes and the State of Alaska only credited for one vote against?

We need help to stop the eminent destruction of our coastal communities. It is no secret that our stocks have declined since the factory trawl fleet increased.

Why are corporation able to lobby and sway government into taking positions detrimental to the working fisherman's right to work?

There should be legitimate concern for how our towns and people will be affected by this before it is done to us.

Please consider this a very small portion of opposition that exists.

Sincerely, *Harvey R Jones*  
*Box 7286*  
*Nikishka, Alaska*  
*99635*

March 24, 1992

Dear Sir

I wish to express to you my support of HJR 61 and SJR 38, which is before you regarding the individual fishing quota program for halibut and sablefish. You must understand and be aware that there are many Alaskans all over this state who are opposed to this plan, with just a few people, in a few areas in favor of it. This plan, if put into place, will mean much economic hardship for Alaskan fisherman and coastal communities.

In view of the declining state revenues from the oil industry, our state government leaders should be doing all that is possible to increase the economic benefits from the fishing industry. The IFQ program as proposed by the NPFMC is completely unfair to the vast majority of Alaskan fisherman.

A quota system, or trip limit system would be welcomed by Alaskan fisherman, but only if all Alaskan halibut and sablefish commercial fisherman are allowed to participate in the fishery.

Please help us in any way you can to stop the individual fishing quota program as proposed by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council. Thank you

Sincerely,  
Joseph C. Wierzbicki

# BIO ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

NORMAN STADEM  
ECONOMIST

1826 E. 26th Ave.  
Anchorage, AK 99508  
(907) 272-0908

April 16, 1992

Honorable Walter J. Hickel, Governor  
Office of the Governor  
State of Alaska  
Third Floor, State Capitol  
P.O. Box 110001  
Juneau, AK 99811-0001

Dear Governor Hickel:

## IFQs -- AN UNNECESSARY ENCROACHMENT ON FREE ENTERPRISE

The Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) management of sablefish and halibut is a shortsighted solution to extremely complex fishery management problems.

The key to "rationalizing" open access resources is to assign property rights and responsibilities to them. In the first instance, IFQ management program fails to completely "privatize" the fishery; secondly, it is redundant because other major issues can be resolved within the open access framework. These include weather related safety problems and year round supply of "fresh" fish.

Supporters claim that IFQs will deliver benefits similar to those achieved from privatizing farmland, timberland, oil wells, etc. But comparing the property rights vested in IFQs to those vested in land ownership is like comparing apples to oranges. In the first instance, IFQs will not privatize the fishery -- the fisheries will still remain "open access." IFQs will only privatize the right to leave the dock, to go on to the ocean and to harvest a given quota of fish. This is no different than licensing an airplane or a truck to haul freight -- the government issues annual licenses to haul freight. Once on the ocean, the "race for fish" will still dictate behavior.

The analogy of a "chain saw massacre" in the Chugach National Forest, used by Mr. Dean Adams in the April

5th issue of the Anchorage Times, is excellent. Paraphrased, the open access logging season opens and each logger is compelled to race to cut as many trees as possible (rule of capture) during the short season. This "race to cut trees" problem is easily eliminated in the forest by selling stumpage rights to parcels of timber. Each logger can then husband her/his own parcel and manage the harvest of her/his trees. If there are better trees on the neighbors' parcels, s/he can't just go and cut and take them. Property rights are clearly defined and readily enforceable -- each logger knows which trees belong to her/him and where her/his boundaries are.

If the IFQ concept were applied, however, each logger would be given a stumpage quota. Those who qualified for a quota could cut trees anywhere in the forest. Clearly, the incentive would be to race in and cut the best trees before other loggers get them (rule of capture is still operating). In this way the logger maximizes the market value of her/his limited quota.

Property rights to parcels of land work quite well because it gives the individual certain rights to use, and to enforce these rights to use, a specific location (location rights). IFQs do not give usage rights to location. Thus, we see that the attempt to privatize ocean fisheries, using a reasonably successful land-based model, fails. The IFQs do nothing to encourage husbandry of the resource. They will not eliminate the "rush for fish" that is associated with "open access." In fact IFQs encourage "high grading" in order to maximize value of ones quota.

So, we are left with a contrived and experimental application of property rights, the impact of which are unknown. We can show how private ownership of land has benefited society, but how will this hybrid work?

Two of the most often quoted reasons for imposing IFQ management is to improve safety and to make fresh halibut and sablefish available to consumers year round.

But the open access system can be structured to achieve these two objectives. A magnetized plastic "credit

card" accounting system (proposed for the IFQ program) would allow total flexibility under open access. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) or the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) would define the seasons in terms of two parameters. First, the individual fishers would be given a period and/or a quota. Then the time period in which the individual would be required to fish her/his period/quota is specified. For example, let's say a 24 hour halibut period could be fished any time from April 1 to June 30. The individual could then fish when the weather and the market conditions were deemed suitable. Check-in and check-out procedures would have to be specified.

The fish stocks are protected and managed by the NPFMC and the IPHC using the best scientific information available. Therefore, IFQs are not necessary for conservation purposes.

The safety issue is resolved because fishers will not feel compelled to fish in hazardous weather. "Fresh" fish will be more prevalent on the market year round. In addition, small boats will be able to achieve parity with the larger boats. Such an open access plan would avoid all the inequities of initial allocations which bias the IFQ plan against small boats; especially those that have suffered weather related set backs during the critical qualifying years.

The legacy of IFQ management will be to have given away Alaska's birthright to these ocean resources. Most Alaskans will not be able to buy quota shares (QS). (Please refer to page 3 of my February 6, 1992, paper for more detail.) Only operators with large initial QSs will be able to buy them by averaging the cost. The Division of Investment, Section A, permit loan is limited to 80% of the lesser of appraised value, or cost, up to a maximum of \$300,000. At \$10 a pound of QS, this will buy around 37,500 round weight pounds of quota. Just the down payment will be \$75,000, hardly pocket change to most coastal villagers. The debt service on \$300,000 at 10% over 15 years is \$39,500, annually. At \$1.60 per pound dressed weight, assuming 75% recovery, the total revenue from a 37,500 pound quota is \$45,000. This leaves the fisher with \$5,600 to pay all her/his other expenses including 30% crew

April 16, 1992


shares of \$13,500. Clearly, negative profit is an impossible situation.

We all would like to be handed a retirement package such as this. Many "high liners" will receive quota shares worth millions of dollars. This is what folks dream of when they go to Las Vegas. But, it is unconscionable that the State of Alaska should be a party to such a program, especially when it stands to deprive future Alaskans of economic opportunities.

Unless the Alaskan members of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council vote to rescind their December 1991 action, next week, Alaskans will be preempted from this "backyard" resource. Please urge them to do so.

The existing management program must be upgraded, but the IFQ program is not the answer for Alaska.

Sincerely yours,



Norman Stadem  
Economist

Copy to:

Senator

Adams  
Collins  
Cotten  
Duncan  
Eliason  
Fischer  
Frank  
Halford  
Hoffman  
Jones  
Kerttula  
Menard  
Pearce  
Pourchot  
Rodey  
Shultz  
Sturgulewski

IFQs -- UNNECESSARY

April 16, 1992

Uehling  
Zharoff  
Representative  
Baker  
Barnes  
Brown  
Bruckman  
Carney  
Choquette  
Davidson  
Davis  
Davis  
Donley  
Ellis  
Finkelstein  
Gruenberg  
Grussendorf  
Hanley  
Hudson  
Jacko  
Kubina  
Larson  
Mackie  
Martin  
Navarre  
Parnell  
Phillips  
Phillips  
Taylor  
Ulmer  
Zawacki



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Fisheries  
committee name  
committee on Sea Res #38, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Maria Rapone  
Testifier  
FV/Rosy Alice  
Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
Address  
747-3722  
Phone No.

10/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource & Fisheries committee name

committee on Sen Res # 30, dated 1-29-92

As a native of Alaska I've been advised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.Q proposal, the years chosen were those when I was just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota, (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed: Robin A. Lee

Testifier

Representing (Optional)

415 Monastroy St. Apt. X.

Address

747-3722 (message)

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptomise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and halibut.

I am opposed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no guarantee that individuals ~~involved~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~proposal~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea~~ ~~such~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch. I am against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource.

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK  
Address  
747 8902  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate Resource Fisheries  
committee name

committee on

Senate Res 38  
bill/subject

dated

1/29/92

I'm opposed to IFQ's. I've been part of the black cod + Halibut Fisheries since the middle ~~of the~~ 1970s. The IFQ plan will eliminate me from the fishery as well as the majority of people ~~and~~ who have taken risks and worked hard as crew members more than 1/2 my income is directly related to these fisheries. I am a boat owner making payments - will not survive with IFQ. I support SENATE Res 38.

Signed:

Thomas D. Wiley F/U SORRY  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

231 KATHLAN M-25 SITKA, AK, 99835  
Address

Address

747-5570

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the \_\_\_\_\_

committee name

committee on SENATE RES. 38 dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

1/27/91

I AM OPPOSED TO THE IFQ  
PLAN AS PRESENTED BY THE  
NORTH PACIFIC MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.  
THE IMPACT ON THE COASTAL  
COMMUNITIES OF ALASKA HAS NOT  
BEEN ADEQUATELY ASSESSED.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Testifier

PL. SEQUOIA

Representing (Optional)

BOX 6384 SITKA AK.

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the LABOR, COMMERCE & RESOURCES  
committee name

committee on HOUSE BILL HJR 61, dated JANUARY 28, 1992  
bill/subject

I favor House Bill HJR # 61. Too many unknowns if IFQ should ever be imposed on the small fisherman. IFQ is designed to eventually eliminate the small timer and the village and would be a bonanza for the larger vessels. It appears to <sup>be</sup> a scheme to hurt Alaskan fisherman.

Signed: Mark Jacobs Jr  
Testifier

Sitka Aleut, Gwich'in & Haida Tribes  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 625 Sitka Alaska 99835  
Address

(907) 747-8168  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

SENATE

Please enter into the record my testimony to the RESOURCES, FISHERIES  
committee name

committee on SENATE RESOLUTION # 38, dated JANUARY 28, 1992.  
bill/subject

I FAVOR THIS RESOLUTION IN THAT IF IFQ IS EVER IMPOSED  
ON OUR FISHERMAN, THE SMALL FISHERMAN AND MOSTLY VILLAGERS WILL  
BE SEVERLY IMPACTED AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATED. THIS IFQ  
IS DESIGNED TO HELP ONLY THE LARGER VESSELS, THERE ARE TOO  
MANY UNKNOWNNS IF IFQ BECOMES LAW.

Signed: Mark Jacobe Jr  
Testifier

Litka Oberster of Allegut of Haida tribes  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 625 Sitka, Alaska 99835  
Address

(907) 747-8168  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource  
 committee name  
 committee on SR 68 / IFQ management dated 1-24-92  
 bill/subject

Dear Senator Jones,

I very strongly support SR 68. I am without doubt that the approved IFQ plan passed by the NPFMC will be disastrous to the coastal communities, and a tragedy to all of Alaska. I am enclosing a copy of some information I put together for the Sitka Chamber of Commerce, along with the documentation for the analysis.

In addition I will say the more I read about & investigate quota share schemes around the

Signed: Donna Benohoe  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 2993

Address  
Sitka AK 99835

Phone No.

World I become increasingly convinced that IFQ's are a very dangerous management tool. Privatization to this degree is extremely attractive to big money interests and plans too easily manipulated to be protective of the ~~interests of~~ <sup>interests of</sup> the citizens. I find this contrary to the spirit of the Alaska State Constitution & the Magnuson Act.

2/17/92

Senator Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee

Dear Senators.

I was quite disturbed when I heard that my participation and that of many other voters in your recent teleconference on IFQ's was going to be a waste of our time and effort. If it is known to you that one of the committee members has killed the resolution by political manipulation, why put us through a charade as if you desire our opinions and information? I speak of the Seward Downtown Merchant's Association meeting of 2/14/92 at which Mr. Clem Tillion, the Fish Czar, stated that Senator Dick Eliason has the resolution Dead no matter what action you take. Even if some would wish to abandon the constitution, I ask that you assume what responsibility you can, and I reiterate my position below.

IFQ's "give to an individual the right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, converting common property to private property." A system that converts a public resource to private property does not fall within the definition of limited entry for the State of Alaska, i.e. limited access to a public resource.

The Alaska Constitution Article VIII section 15 reads "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State". The only exception is the amendment passed in 1972 creating limited entry - but IFQ's are not limited entry under the definitions of the State of Alaska. The proponents of IFQ's are not working on a constitutional amendment to allow ITQ's to be legal, they just ignore the law. The Attorney General's Office on January 15, 1992 wrote "...if an IFQ proposal is made which would violate the "open access" clauses of the state constitution we will recommend against its adoption." There can be no doubt that the IFQ proposal violates open access since that is the exact purpose for which it has been proposed.

X I call on you to honor your oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the State of Alaska and oppose any effort to impose this unconstitutional system on the citizens of Alaska.

*Paul K. Seaton*

Paul K. Seaton  
HC-67 Box 1253  
Anchor Point, AK 99556  
907 235-6342

X PS. I think it quite important that the wording preventing any State money, agencies or property be prevented from being used to implement or enforce ITQ's be retained in the final resolution.

This was sent to Gov. Hickel as  
well as the NPFMC, Murkowski,  
Stevens etc.

2/21/92

Dear Governor Hickel

I wish to inform you that I oppose an Individual Fish Quota management system.

I support House Joint Resolution 61 and Senate Joint Resolution 38, and participated in the state-wide hearings on those two resolutions. The testimony was overwhelmingly IN FAVOR of these resolutions.

As an Alaskan resident, I ask you to utilize your position, as a representative of the people, to derail the attempts of Clem Tillion--the "chief instigator" behind the IFQ plan. Clem Tillion is an unpopular choice for a fisheries consultant, and in fact, espouses controversial and negative theories for fishermen. You are being misled and not given adequate information concerning this issue, by Mr. Tillion. I predict, as do others, that if the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council does NOT rescind its decision to go forward with IFQ's, YOU, Governor Hickel, will be held responsible--because you appointed Mr. Tillion.

IFQ's are not supported by the majority of Alaskan fishermen. They ARE supported by a small percentage of Seattle vessel owners and a handful of traditional Alaskan longliners---these people are a small fraction of the total fleet who will gain permanent access to a public resource. A resource that should belong to ALL Alaskan fishermen.

I encourage you to take note of the mounting opposition to IFQ's in the coastal communities. Fishermen are a major force in Alaskan politics and deserve your attention in this matter.

Mr. Tillion has not provided the "full story" to you, Mr. Hickel, if you believe that IFQ's are the ONLY solution. Enclosed, are some statistics, which you will find most enlightening.

Sincerely,

Chris and Lacey Berns  
Alaskans for Responsible Resource Management  
Box 26  
Kodiak, Alaska 99615

HALIBUT IFQ RECIPIENT STATISTICS

The following was tabulated by Linda Kozak and was based on preliminary tables provided by the staff of the NPFMC. The numbers are all for the preferred option which the Council adopted at the December, 1991 meeting. Percentages are rounded off.

|  |            |     |
|--|------------|-----|
| Alaskan vessels who qualify for quota: | 5,240      | 86% |
| Non-Alaskans and unknowns:             | <u>876</u> | 14% |
| Total vessels who qualify:             | 6,118      |     |

\*\*\*\*\*

|                                    |              |     |
|------------------------------------|--------------|-----|
| Alaskan vessels under 35':         | 2,819        | 54% |
| Alaskan vessels 36'-60':           | <u>2,174</u> | 41% |
| All Alaskan vessels 0 - 60':       | 4,993        | 95% |
| Alaskan vessels over 61':          | 247          | 5%  |
| Total Alaskan vessels who qualify: | 5,240        |     |

*878 = non Alaskans*

\*\*\*\*\*

The following information is taken from the tables provided by the NPFMC staff and is preliminary. All extrapolations are utilizing the 1992 Alaska halibut quota. This number is not quite correct, as CDQs are not factored in.

|   |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| 1992 Alaska Halibut Quota:                        | 42,000,000 pounds |
| Total Alaska share of quota:                      | 30,240,000 pounds |
| <u>Average</u> Alaskan quota initially allocated: | 5,771 pounds      |
| Total Non-Alaskan share of quota:                 | 11,760,000 pounds |
| <u>Average</u> Non-Alaskan allocation:            | 13,425 pounds     |

*2500  
AK's Fished  
84,700  
will not  
qualify at all  
for quota*

NOTE: The average allocation for non-Alaskans is more than double what the average Alaskan will get.

\*\*\*\*\*

The following information is taken from tables provided by the NPFMC staff and is preliminary. It is for both Alaskan and non-Alaskan owners. There is no breakdown of Alaskans vs. non-Alaskans for the following statistics.

2,003 (32.7%) of total recipients will get quota under 500#  
 2,645 (43.2%) of total recipients will get quota under 1,000#  
~~5,208~~ (82.7%) of total recipients will get quota under 10,000#.

*5058*

Utilizing the basic assumption that Alaskans represent the majority of the recipients of small amounts of quota, the following information is helpful:

|                                 |                                     |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Total Recipients under 500#:    | 98% Alaskan = 1,963                 |
| Total Recipients under 1,000#:  | 95% Alaskan = 2,513                 |
| Total Recipients under 10,000#: | 90% Alaskan = 4,552 <i>10% non-</i> |

NOTE: Remember that these are assumed numbers and the actual numbers are not available in the tables.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on 51238, dated 2-21-92  
 bill/subject

See attached sheet

Signed: Michael Reif Michael Reif  
 Testifier  
Listening C. Bd. Sitka Assembly / Speaking  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 2346, Sitka AK 99835  
 Address  
907-747-6005  
 Phone No.

February 21, 1992

My name is Mike Reif a member of the City & Borough of Sitka Assembly

Organizations that represent a broad cross section of this community have serious concerns about this IFQ plan. This concern is evident by the following passing resolutions demanding a socio economic study: The City and Borough of Sitka Assembly, The Sitka Chamber of Commerce, and The Alaska Native Brotherhood of Sitka

Now I speak to you as an individual. I am against this IFQ plan and support SJR38.

The issue in front of us is fishing harvest rights. The question is for whom and in what form. In answering that question we must remember that whatever we do for black cod and halibut, will probably set the precedent for all the other fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. A renewable multi billion dollar resource in an area twice the size of the state of Alaska. It is not difficult to determine why politically an IFQ was developed for black cod and halibut first and not pollock.

The founding fathers of this country had in front of them the issue of rights for a new nation. The solution that they found was based on principals that have served this nation well generation after generation. We have a single right - fishing harvest right - let be certain that we base that right on principals that will serve future generations well and not just solve today's problems.

What is the principal this IFQ plan is based on? It is based on the privatization of the harvest rights of public resource to eventually a few with no direct benefit to the public owners. Eventually according to NPFMC own study where we had 10 fishermen we will have 1 - a 90% fleet reduction. Future generation to enter these fisheries must capitalize it is estimated at 4 times the ex vessel fish price. Money has a cost! Lets say the annual harvest in the EEZ is 1B then the IFQ's will be worth approximately 4B. Today's fishermen are given 4 billion and tomorrow's generation must pay 4B just for the right to fish. Money has a cost! That cost will be paid by future fishermen to their banker and foreign and domestic investors. At 10% interest that amounts to 400M in debt serves annually.

This IFQ is bad social policy! It is a good thing we did not allow the oil companies to IFQ or privatize Prudhoe Bay. It is a good thing we did not allow the timber companies to IFQ or privatize our National Forest.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated? The principal are two

1. All the public owners are allowed access if they so desire with rational management.

2. If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few all the public owners should receive a direct benefit.

Alaskans better than most people should understand that principal.

The harvest rights to the public oil in Prudhoe Bay has benefited all owners of the resource and only a few entities harvest that resource.

Do not give the public multi billion dollars renewable harvest rights in an area twice the size the state of Alaska to eventually a few - the future Exxon of the the fishing grounds. Governor Hickle talks about the owner state owned by all Alaskans, and not the give away State owned eventually by a few large entities.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR 38, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

I Am For This. MEASURE AGAINST  
I.F.Q.'S. THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO  
MANAGE THESE FISHERIES FOR ALL  
FISHERMEN, INSTEAD OF A CHOSEN FEW.  
THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE I.F.Q. PROGRAM  
HAS LED TO THE COUNCIL IGNORING ANY  
OTHER TYPES OF MANAGEMENT. I FEEL THE  
IDEA OF ACTUALLY DIVIDING UP A NATURAL RESOURCE  
AND AWARDED THAT RESOURCE TO FISHERMEN  
WHO HAVE LOBBIED LONG AND HARD TO GET IT  
AWARDED ONLY TO THEM IS NOT A FAIR OR  
EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO OUR PROBLEMS  
THANKS,

Signed: Ernie Matteson

Testifier

E.G. MATTESON, Daughters Fish Co.

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6089 Sitka 99835

Address

747-4803

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on SSR 38, dated FEB. 19, 1992  
 bill/subject

I oppose IFQ implementation at this time because I do not believe that an adequate socio/economic study has been made. Moreover, I believe that an independent ~~socio/economic~~ company be contracted to do a socio/economic study. NOT NMFS who is ~~not~~ biased!

Signed: Susan Jeffrey Susan Jeffrey  
 Testifier

Myself  
 Representing (Optional)  
P.O. Box 3363, Kodiak Alaska  
 Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the SENATE RESOURCES  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 38, dated 2/19/92  
 bill/subject

I SUPPORT SJR 38. I BELIEVE  
 THE <sup>STATE</sup> ADMINISTRATIVE COST OF TRACKING  
 FISH FOR TAX PURPOSES WILL HELP CRIPPLE  
 THE STATES ECONOMY FOR FISHERIES.

Signed: JOHN SEVIER  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 1933- Kodiak 99615  
 Address  
486 4886  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38-, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

I support sjr 38  
for REASONS to NUMEROUS  
to LIST

Signed: Chris Berns  
Testifier Chris Berns

Representing (Optional)  
Box 26

Address  
486-5291

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the SENATE  
RESOURCES  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 30, dated 2-19-92  
 bill/subject

- WE SUPPORT SJR 30.  
 - WE OPPOSE HALIBUT & SABLEFISH  
 IFQ'S:

Signed: Jeffrey R. Stephan JEFFREY R. STEPHAN  
 Testifier  
UNITED FISHERMEN'S MARKETING ASSOCIATION,  
 Representing (Optional) INC.  
BOX 1035, KODIAK AK 99615  
 Address  
907-486-3453  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 38, dated 2/19/92  
 bill/subject

I support SJR 38 because I believe whether or not IFQ's are good or bad in concept, IFQ's in the context of the plan approved by the NPFMC in December spells economic disaster to many fishermen & the communities they live in. I am submitting along with this a summary of some of the points that are central to this issue. What is needed is a plan that has as its intent & clearly stated goal a ~~the~~ way to address the

Signed: Aurora Worshoe

Testifier

myself & all concerned with continued access to the resource by citizens of the Coastal Communities.

Representing (Optional)

Box 2993

Address

Sitka AK 99835 (907) 747-6467

Phone No.

problems in these fisheries (which is the focus of any management plan) that assures continued access to the resource to the general citizenry, and a continued wide base of participation by fishermen in the coastal communities. NOT a plan that is designed to see fleet reductions, and encourages dramatic reductions, toward the ultimate end of an "economically efficient fishery" (that is - the fewest number of boats <sup>needed</sup> to harvest the resource, as opposed to many people making a living from the resource.)

problems in these fisheries (which is the focus of any management plan) that assures continued access to the resource to the general citizenry, and a <sup>continued</sup> wide base of participation by fishermen in the coastal communities. NOT a plan that is designed to see fleet reductions, and encourages dramatic reductions, toward the ultimate end of an "economically efficient fishery" (that is - the fewest number of boats <sup>needed</sup> to harvest the resource, as opposed to many people making a living from the resource.)

There is NOT a resource crisis. According to IPHC and NMFS biologists the halibut and blackcod stocks are in a healthy state. The declines being experienced are part of the natural cycles of the stocks. Halibut remains well above equilibrium levels. Blackcod is coming down from the all time highs of the mid '80's. *There are indications from 1991 halibut stock assessments that the decline may be decreasing.*

Figures from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission indicate the longline fisheries are economically healthy and viable. The years 1985-89 show a significant increase in fishermen's average annual gross earnings and pounds landed in both fisheries from the years 1980-84.

Ownership and use caps <sup>for</sup> the blackcod fishery are 1% of the total combined quota for the Gulf of Alaska/Bering Sea; for halibut .5% of the combined quota. This translates to 100-200 boats respectively, as compared to 1990 levels of 670 blackcod vessels and 4059 halibut vessels, a reduction of 85% in blackcod and 95% reduction in halibut participation. In 1990 there were 14,721 fishermen; this number is expected to be reduced to 1500-2000.

*(poundage)*  
For halibut, Alaskans will receive 72% of the quota; they represent 86% of initial recipients. Though these percentages seem to favor Alaskans, remember that the majority of Alaskans are receiving very small shares. The average Alaskan share is less than 1/2 the average non-Alaskan share. The significance of this will be seen as shares begin to change hands. "Since many of the initial allocations will be small, it is predicted that the number of vessels and fishermen will decrease as unprofitable QS and IFQs are sold or transferred. The economic model suggests that an economically efficient fishery would contain 238-376 vessels with 1,504 to 1,976 fishermen" (Halibut EIS, p.5-48) Who will be in the best position to buy up "unprofitable" quota? Generally those more favored by initial allocation. For blackcod the outlook is even more ominous. 51% of the quota will go to non-Alaskan fishermen who represent only 28% of initial recipients.

This plan does NOT solve the bicatch problem. IFQs are not required by vessels to cover their bicatch in other fisheries. The Council has eliminated the halibut bicatch cap for non-directed fisheries for the first two years of implementation. There is no bicatch cap for rockfish or greycod and retention is required. It is reasonable to predict that this will eliminate the directed rockfish fishery.

This IFQ plan is NOT a conservation measure. It is an attempt to "rationalize" the fisheries that amounts to economic allocation.

*Donna Donohoe*

3



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Committee Senate  
committee name  
committee on SJR 38, dated 2-19-92  
bill/subject

The issue in front of us is fishing harvest rights. This IFQ will probably set the precedent for all the fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. A renewable multi-billion \$ resource in an area twice the size of the state of Alaska.

The Founding Fathers of this country had in front of them the issue of rights for a new nation. The solution that they found was based on principals that have served this nation generation after generation. We have a single right - "Fishing Harvest Right" - Lets be certain that our fishing harvest rights are based on principals that will serve future generations of Alaskans well.

What is the principal this IFQ Plan based on? It is based on the privatization of harvest rights of a public resource to a few with no direct benefit to the public owners. Eventually according to NPFMC where we had 10 fisherman we will have 1 - a 90% fleet reduction.

That is bad social policy; another public resource managed under that principal is the mining law of 1872. That law allows large entities (foreign & domestic) to harvest public minerals with no direct benefit to the public owners. The principals of this IFQ will not serve us well over the generations.

Signed: Michael Reif (over)

Testifier

Listening in Assembly City of Sitka Writing as  
Representing (Optional) Individual

PO Box 2346, Sitka, AK  
Address

907-747-6005  
Phone No.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated?

The principal are 2.

1) All the public owners are allowed access if they so desire with rational management

OR  
2) If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few, all the public owners should receive a direct benefit.

Alaskans better than most people should understand that principal. The harvest rights to the public oil in Prudhoe Bay has benefited all the owners of that resource; only a few entities harvest that oil.

Do not give the public multi-billion ~~\$~~ dollar renewable harvest rights in an area twice the size of the State of Alaska to a few. Governor Hickel talks about the owner state (owned by all Alaskan residence) and not the give away state owned by a few larger entities.

Thank you  
Mike Ref



# Alaska State Legislature

Senate  
Resource Fisheries

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

committee name

committee on

<sup>SJR</sup>  
SR 38

dated

1-29-92

bill/subject

I am a Sitka resident and newcomer to the sablefish and halibut fisheries. I am opposed to the current IFQ proposal for the following reasons:

1) The divvying up of such a major resource into the hands of a few individuals I feel will have a very detrimental effect on the economies and lifestyles of the Coastal Communities of Alaska these fisheries support.

2) These individuals who, under the current proposal, would receive the lion's share of the resource, are rather arbitrarily chosen - they happened to be vessel owners in the qualifying years. Many fishermen who did not happen to fish their own vessels in those years actually have participated in the fisheries for as long as, or longer than, these vessel owners, yet receive no ~~portion~~ portion of the quotas.

~~I~~ I strongly support conservative long term management of the resource itself, but do not feel the current IFQ plan is an acceptable way to achieve this.

Signed:

Testifier

Laurie Mastrella

Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6407 Sitka AK

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature



Please enter into the record my testimony to the

Senate  
Resources, Fisheries  
committee name

committee on Senate Resolution 38, dated  
bill/subject

1-29-92

I am in favor of Resolution 38. I am Retired from Civil Service. I work as a deck hand on Commercial fishing Boats. I also Hand trace and Halibut fish pulling Halibut gear by hand. Fishing supplements my income. Also Native People would depend more on State Government handouts if they are no longer able to fish Halibut if the IFQ Pass. Alaskans are losing their Right to fish Commercially. It's begining to be an out of state fishery.

Signed:

Pete J. Karras  
Testifier

Pete J. Karras

Self  
Representing (Optional)

Address

930 Stogunton Sitcho AK

Phone No.

747-3978



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the S.P.F.S.  
committee name

committee on S.I.P. 38, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

I am against S.F.R.  
because should put a lot of small  
Boats out of work  
and a lot of deck hands out to.  
That's what we don't need right  
now. I oppose I.F. 2.

Signed: Gene Whitson  
Testifier

opposing IED Management System  
Representing (Optional)

Burl # 1818  
Address

SITKA AK  
Phone No. 747-3342



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the

<sup>Senate</sup>  
RESOURCE Fisheries  
committee name

committee on

SENATE Res 38, dated  
bill/subject


1/27/92

NINE years deckhanding BLACKCOD + HALIBUT

I will miss this season and now HAVE A TAX PROBLEM AS A RESULT. I'll TAKE MEY lumps.

I WORKED FOR A SHARE (ONE SHOULDER'S WORTH)

There HAS to BE A COMPROMISE:  
NO IFQ Unless deckhands get in IFQ the percent relation to crew share off gross stock from those years and got proof of TAXES PAID on crew SHARES

Signed:  SCOTT SALINE  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Bx 3183 Sidka

Address  
747 5570

Phone No.

To: Senate Resources, FSM  
on Senate Joint Resolution No. 39

As a commercial fisherman, owner-operator, who has also crewed, from Sitka, Alaska I wish to comment on the I.F.Q. (Individual Fisheries Quota) management scheme recently passed by the N.P.F.M.C. (North Pacific Fisheries Management Council). I am in opposition I.F.Q.'s for the following reasons:

**Job loss and job displacement** - There will be significantly less need for as many crew members. A boat which carries a 6-person crew might be able to do the job with a 3-person crew. A boat like mine which needs 3 persons on board to harvest halibut would only need 2 or I can possibly do the work myself. To maximize profits, Quota holders would certainly use less crew members.

**Seafood processing workers** - Since there would be a minimal amount of delivery ports, the remaining ports would lose employment. Seattle would also receive much more product which would take jobs away from established Alaskan ports leaving job loss and job displacement in its wake.

**Quota availability and centralization of quota** - My ability to purchase Quota share will be very limited because of the exceeding high (potential) cost of quota shares. I'd be competing against fisherman with funds made from selling their quota poundage who would have considerable backing from banks and other sources.

**Crew member and new-comers** who would like to purchase Quota shares would also be at a great disadvantage. The price per pound will likely be highly inflated.

**Centralization of Quota shares** is sure to happen. Fisherman who want to maximize their Quota are only limited by percentage of quota held. I believe by creative leasing or other angles Quota will be centralized in the years to come. With monopoly of the resource a probability.

This centralization will certainly harm Alaskan's, especially in small towns and villages. Their buying power is generally no match against established fisherman who would have funds on hand from harvesting their I.F.Q. and many will have financial backing also.

Stressing my points again - crew members, new-comers, fisherman with limited buying power, villagers and others who live on a lower and or different monetary system or scale, will find it very difficult to obtain I.F.Q.'s. This will lead to centralization and probable monopolies.

I.F.Q.'s are not the only alternative available!! Therefore, I'm asking the Secretary of Commerce to reverse the decision by the N.P.F.M.C. on this historic and detrimental management scheme.

As my representative I ask you to support the many individuals and communities in opposition to I.F.Q.'s.

Sincerely,

John Murray  
F/V Dorothy  
P.O. Box 6031  
Sitka, AK 99835

372



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resources, Fisheries  
committee name

committee on SENATE Resolution 38, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

SITKA ALASKA NATIVE BROTHER HOOD  
SUPPORTS SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 38,

THE I.F.Q. SYSTEM WILL LOCK LITTLE  
BOATS AND HAND LINE BOATS TO A VERY SMALL  
QUOTA. LITTLE BOATS WILL NOT BE ABLE  
TO ADVANCE TO LARGER BOATS UNDER THE  
SMALL QUOTA THEY WILL BE LOCKED INTO  
UNDER THE I.F.Q. SYSTEM

THE LARGER BOATS FROM LOWER 48 STATES  
WILL TAKE OVER THE FISHERIES UNDER I.F.Q.  
MANAGEMENT, LIKE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SEINE  
AND TROLL FISHERIES. ONLY LARGE LIMIT BOATS NOW  
DOING THE SEINING AND TROLLING IN ALASKA FROM  
LOWER 48, NO MORE SMALL BOATS LEFT IN ALASKA.

*Herman Kitka*

Signed: HERMAN KITKA SR

Testifier

SITKA ALASKA NATIVE BROTHER HOOD

Representing (Optional)

109 METLAKATLA S SITKA AK. 99835

Address

(907) 747-8119

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resources  
committee name

committee on SSR 38, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

I am for SSR 38 & Against the IFA presented by the NPFMC.

Under what principal should public resources be allocated  
The Principal are 2.

1) All the public owner are allowed access if they so desire with rational management

or

2) If the public harvest rights are allocated to a few all the public owners should receive a direct benefit like the oil from Prudhoe Bay to Alaska.

This IFA is a giveaway to a few with no direct benefit to the public owners  
This is bad social policy

Signed: [Signature]  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
PO Box 2346, Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

7476005  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38, dated 1-29-1992.  
bill/subject

I am for STR38, because basically I feel it is wrong to give a public resource to a few individuals.

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately cause extreme consolidation, this in turn would erode the income base to many small fishermen.

This in turn would cause financial hardship on them and many coastal communities.

Moreover it would be virtually impossible for the average newcomer to get into fishing.

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman - E/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114th HPR. Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

747-7452  
Phone No.

10/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Recessed Fisheries  
 committee name  
 committee on Sen. Res # 38, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Marla Rapone  
 Testifier

FV / Rosy Alice  
 Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address

747-3722  
 Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource  
committee name

Committee on HJR 61, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

I am for HJR 61 - because basically I feel  
it is wrong to give a Public Resource to a  
few individuals

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately  
cause extreme consolidation, this in turn  
would eliminate the income base to many  
small fishermen.

This in turn will cause financial hardship  
to them and many coastal communities  
moreover it would be virtually impossible  
for the average Newcomer to get into fishing.

Also it will pose problems in legality and  
then too it will open the door for  
bribe-marketing

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisher & Sons F/V Marden  
Representing (Optional)

3114 H. H. P. R. Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

247-7452  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptom ise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and Halibut.

I am oppossed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no guarantee that individuals ~~is~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~the~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea fish~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch I AM against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK

Address

747 8902

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource & Fisheries committee name

committee on Sen Res # 30, dated 1-29-92

As a native of <sup>bill/subject</sup> Alaska I've been raised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.Q proposal, the years chosen were those when I was ~~just~~ just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota, (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed: Robin A. Lee  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
415 Monastory St. Apt. X.  
Address

747-3722 (message)  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource  
committee name

committee on HJR 61, dated \_\_\_\_\_  
bill/subject

I am for HJR 61 - because basically I feel  
it is wrong to give a Public Resource to a  
few individuals

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately  
cause extreme consolidation, this in turn  
would eliminate the income base to many  
small fishermen.

This in turn will cause financial hardship  
to them and many coastal communities  
moreover it would be virtually impossible  
for the average newcomer to get into fishing.

Also it will pose problems in legality and  
then too it will open the door for  
black-marketing

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman F/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114th H.P.R. Sitka, AK 99935  
Address

217-7452  
Phone No.

10/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Resource Fisheries  
 committee name  
 committee on Seafood #38, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

Although I will qualify for a small amount of IFQ's in the Halibut Fishery I am totally opposed to whole plan as it is proposed. This management program is bound to destroy hundreds of jobs if not thousands. In fishing as well as processing positions. Also I don't agree that a person who has been in this fishery as a deckhand for a dozen years or so is not entitled to share in the quota. I also think we should look into either trip limits, gear limits or exclusive registration areas or a combination of above.

Signed: Marie Rapone  
 Testifier

FV/Rosy Alice  
 Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 6204 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address

747-3702  
 Phone No.

16/1



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on STR38, dated 1-29-1992  
bill/subject

I am for STR38, because basically I feel it is wrong to give a public resource to a few individuals.

Also I feel that IFQ's would ultimately cause extreme consolidation, this in turn would eliminate the income base to many small fishermen.

This in turn would cause financial hardship on them and many coastal communities.

Moreover it would be virtually impossible for the average newcomer to get into fishing.

Signed: John B. Thompson  
Testifier

Fisherman - F/V Maiden  
Representing (Optional)

3114th HPR. Sitka, AK 99835  
Address

747-7452  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

*J.F.G. and unfair to most fishermen,  
too much gear is on the ground by some boats.  
Why not limit the amount of gear a boat can have  
on board, regardless of size of boat & make a boat  
bring in the gear that he goes out with.*

Signed: John A. Smith  
Testifier

"FV Melody's"  
Representing (Optional)

P.O. Box 2462 Sitka AK. 99835  
Address

1-907-747-6975  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated Jan 29, 1992  
bill/subject

I am opposing IFQ's. IFQ's will hurt me & my family. I do support some kind of management program like limited entry with non transferable permits. With non transferable permits the NPFMC could eventually obtain over time a manageable number of permits. IFQ's will take many jobs from crew members

Signed: Kevin S. Mulligan Kevin Mulligan  
Testifier

F/V Sylvia  
Representing (Optional)

#1 Breathless Inc.  
Address

907-568-2246  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on SJR 38, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

Comptom ise : The Pro's and Cons of IFQ's

I support the idea of IFQ's where fishermen <sup>are</sup> being able to fish when they want to fish and keep the fish they catch. However I am against the financial unfairness of the initial allocation of sablefish and halibut.

I am oppossed to the private ownership of a public resource. this will only encourage big operations to buy large chunks of IFQ's. Once IFQ's are bought and sold there is no gutantee that individuals ~~involved~~ involved in longlining will be able to afford to buy IFQ's.

Under the present ~~the~~ proposal of the NPFMC there are no provisions for crew members involved in longlining, also I would like to see the SITKA Block Proposal included. Again I am for the ~~idea~~ ~~fish~~ idea of fishing when you want, keeping the fish you catch I AM against the financial inequities and the initial allocation of a public resource

Signed: William J. Curtin (William J. Curtin) <sup>thank you</sup>  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
1604 DAVIDOFF #5 SITKA AK  
Address  
747 8902  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource & Fisheries committee name

committee on Sen Res # 30, dated 1-29-92

As a native of Alaska <sup>bill/subject</sup> I've been raised with the main family income being fishing.

Although I will qualify for the I.F.O proposal, the years chosen were those when I was ~~just~~ just beginning as a skipper.

So my quota, (or share) will probably be less than what will be able to substantiate my family.

Although all my family doesn't fish, and some work in Fish plants... still there will be a decrease in work available because of less need of workers without bulk deliveries.

Our family will be definitely hurt by this proposal.

Signed: Robin A. Lee  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
415 Monastery St. Apt. X.  
Address  
747-3722 (message)  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resource Fisheries committee name

committee on Senate Res 34 , dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

Let IT be known that I am opposed to the I.F.Q. Plan. I was crewmember during the time that most of the people who will benefit from I.F.Q.'s had smaller vessels such as my self now. They were ~~not~~ allowed to venture into these fisheries to become aggressive and prosperous members of this community. Why should I be denied the right of this? Because ~~it~~ IT took me years just as IT did these people as an aggressive ~~fisherman~~ fisherman to move onward to my own vessel. Remember when they were making there way me and many others were there right working for our share of the fish also.

Signed: Charlie J Bower

Testifier Charlie BOWER

F/O Esther

Representing (Optional)

P.O. 6407

Address

MESSAGE - 747-6662

Phone No.

1.31.92

I am opposed to the proposed IFQ system. I do not believe IFQ's are not the solution to the problems in the Halibut and Sablefish fisheries.

Limiting fishermen to a certain number of pounds is limiting his ability to make a living. Gear restrictions are a better method of control. By limiting fisher's gear to 20 skates for boats under 60 feet and to 40 skates for boat over 60 feet, the fishermen are able to catch more fish but aren't using so much gear that they can't get it all back.

Another thing to look at is how much money gets back into the economy from 1 large catcher compared to several small boats. The majority of large boats return to Seattle with their fish or the money from the sale of their fish. The proceeds from several small boats is returned to the economy of the state.

Another way to do this would be limited entry. Seeing how well the Salmon limited Entry program has worked. should tell us that method could work for Halibut and Sablefish also. Our ability to make a living is not limited, but the amount of gear fished would be limited and as a result so much gear would not be left on the grounds.

over

I feel we are over ridden by far too many government agencies and regulations. The state should be in charge of waters to 200 miles.

If Jim to diversify, as Clem Tillion told us we must do, last year during Bristol Bay strike, Drift Gillnet salmon to other fisheries, I cannot be limited to my present 1970 under 35' boat. I must be allowed to upgrade to a newer, larger boat.

I've been fishing Halibut since I purchased my boat and Cook Inlet drift permit in 1983. Prior to 1983 I worked as a boat puller in Cook Inlet.

My whole life is invested in fishing. Jim not going to give up without a fight.

Jim St. Peter  
 Jim St. Peter  
 47356 DIACHRIM LANE  
 PO Box 1458  
 Kenai AK 99611



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
committee name

committee on SJR 38 - IFQ'S, dated 1-29-92  
bill/subject

The Kodiak Chamber of Commerce supports SJR 38  
in opposition to any individual fishery quota plan.  
We urge the legislature to adopt this Resolution  
and bring pressure to bear on the North Pacific  
Fishery Management Council and the National Marine  
Fisheries Service to complete an in depth socio-economic  
Impact study prior to this plan moving any further  
in the council process. Additionally, we urge  
the council and NMFS to complete an in depth study  
on the cost of implementation and enforcement of  
this IFQ proposal. ~~But~~ until these studies are  
completed we urge the council to hold in abeyance  
any further action on the IFQ proposals.  
PLEASE PASS IN THE AFFIRMATIVE SJR 38

Signed: WAYNE A. STEVENS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
Testifier  
KODIAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE  
Representing (Optional)  
BOX 1485 KODIAK AK 99615  
Address  
486-5557  
Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name  
committee on IFQs, dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

I am a 10 year resident of Homer. I live here with my wife and two boys. I have fished for 15 years and would like to continue to fish. However, the IFQ proposal threatens my future as fisherman and completely eliminates any chance my boys might have had to fish commercially.

I also believe it is foolish for the state to relinquish any control over to the Federal government. And that is exactly what would happen if IFQs are adopted. Another Federal Bureaucracy would ~~lose~~<sup>gain</sup> a stranglehold on an Alaskan resource.

I urge you to Pass SJR no. 38 Thank you

Signed: MAKO HAGGERTY  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

PO Box 737 Homer 99603

Address

235-6410

Phone No.

B Hendrickson  
295 E Fairview  
Homer, Ak 99603  
235-2748  
1-29-92

Alaska Senate  
Juneau, Ak

Dear Sirs:


Whereas my family returned to Alaska again 10 months ago in order to be able to afford a living in diversified fishing, after 10 years in Ballard;

Whereas freezer trawlers will more than likely be able to pay 50 years' worth of halibut or blackcod value in order to grant themselves fishing extensions at six digits per day, thereby eliminating longliners and pot fishermen; and,

Whereas the Ballard schooner fleet survived as an economically viable fishery from the turn of the century to the present through long periods when not only were there no limited access or IFQ's, but there were no restrictions whatsoever on unlimited foreign fleets which pounded our resources;

I salute the Senate resolution, SJR 38, the courage and wisdom of its authors, Zharoff, Adams, and Hoffman; and, I thank each one of you from the bottom of my heart.

Best Regards,



Bruce Hendrickson

F/V Cora Dee

(She ain't much, but she's paid for-- which is a heck of a lot more than you can say for the giant freezer trawlers, many of which were overcapitalized for their average daily fishing range from the day they were deployed.)

*House Resource  
Senate Resource*

Anna M. Berland  
P.O. Box 2219  
Homer, AK 99603  
(907) 235-5955  
January 30, 1992

State of Alaska  
State Senators and Representatives  
Re: HJR No. 61 and SJR No. 38

Good afternoon,

I am an Alaskan resident, have been halibut longlining for 8 years, and employed in commercial fishing for 17 years. I support HJR No. 61 and SJR No. 38 against the PPFMC's ITQ advisory proposal. This proposal is unethical and possibly illegal. It would privatize a public resource forever, creating a tiny class of wealthy fishermen and a huge class of "have never" fishermen, resulting in the devastation of coastal communities around Alaska.

Traditional fishing management techniques need to be examined and executed before such drastic measures as ITQ's are made law. Trip limits, gear restrictions, outlawing crucifiers, use of only snap on gear, shorter more frequent openers--these are just a few partial solutions to the problems faced by the present day derby system.

If there must be a quota share system implemented it should be absolutely NON-TRANSFERABLE and EQUITABLE TO ALL HISTORICAL PARTICIPANTS in the fishery. Under this type of system all vessel owners, hired skippers, and deckhands would receive an equal share, then when a person left the industry the share would be returned to a fund and be issued to the next deserving person working in the industry. Hired skippers and deckhands are self-employed contractors earning a share of the catch. The vessel owners have not paid taxes, unemployment benefits, nor workmen's compensation on us so why shouldn't our share be recognized as ours in a quota share policy? Any closure of the free access system should be a right to fish earned by working in the industry not a marketable private resource.

I implore you to do what ever possible to avoid the fast-food chain scenario; one rich owner and some minimum-wage employees. This proposal can make the difference between a wealthy middle class fishing population and a series of coastal ghost towns.

Thank you,

*Anna Berland*

PRO SJR 38 - CON IFQ's

Jan. 30, 1992

Senate Resources Committee & House Resource Center  
Re: SJR 38

John DeSylva  
PO Box 584  
Homer, 99603  
235-3827

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Resources Committee;

I have fished shellfish out of Homer for twenty one years. Both in Kachemak Bay and Cook Inlet. First as a deckhand and since 1973, owner/ operator of my own boats.

I am opposed to any individual quota system for Alaska's fisheries. These IFQ systems have very little to do with protecting the resource and a lot to do with protecting the pocketbooks of a few. I do however, believe we do need limited entry for Alaska's fisheries.

I'm not asking for a limited entry permit worth "A lot of money", but I am asking for a level playing field. I am a crab fisherman surrounded by salmon fishermen and their limited fisheries. The system worked fine when each fishery had product to catch and everybody tended to their own knitting. It started to unravel when the salmon fishermen made so much money they needed a tax write-off. They bought crab pots. Any prudent person has to realize that these Federal fisheries being discussed are going to be limited under some form of limited entry within a few years. When this happens, I am going to be in the unhappy situation of watching everybody fish "my" crab, but on a bad year I can't fish their stocks.

A prime example of this is the 1992 Tanner crab season here in Area H, just recently ended. Last year we had sixty eight boats fish for a 250,000 pound quota. That was bad enough. This year we had one hundred seven (107) boats fish for 350,000 pounds. We had an eighteen hour fishery. One opening for ten hours and four days later, another eight hour opening. One merely has to look at fishing effort and fleet size versus economic return and stock protection to see how astonishingly similar our crab fisheries especially here in Area H are to what the salmon industry was going through twenty years ago.

Twenty years ago when a fishery was placed under limited entry, the displaced boats and crews could move on to another area or fishery. Now areas or viable fisheries are precious few now. We come to the basic problem confronting Alaska's fisheries now. We have a huge fleet of boats without any permits for limited fisheries or much of a catch record in any fishery. This huge fleet is causing economic chaos as they rush back and forth between unlimited fisheries trying to build a catch history. Any unlimited fishery in Alaska now has so much effort only the very skillful or very lucky (cheaters ?) are making a living at these fisheries. Those established fishermen with permits are getting richer and everybody else is getting poorer.

Painful as it is going to be, the total size of the fleet has to be cut. We need to have all of Alaska's fisheries placed under limited entry. Only in this manner can the fishermen and communities involved know where they stand and will be standing in years to come. There simply are not enough fishery products in the sea for everyone.

John DeSylva

The Limited Entry Act needs to be amended to allow for all species and or fisheries in Alaska to be limited. It matters not that a fishery here or a fishery there is limited now. The displaced boats simply move on and cause problems somewhere else. The Limited Entry Commission needs to determine which fisheries are economically distressed and be able to declare a moratorium in those until this mess can be figured out.

Please fund the Limited Entry Commission so that they can draw up a comprehensive plan as to whether or not various fisheries need or want to be limited. This present flap over IFQ's in the halibut and sable fisheries will only be repeated if nothing is changed, everytime some fishery is proposed to be limited. We need a system implemented that will show where everybody will stand in all of Alaska's fisheries. This should have been done twenty years ago as proposed under the original Limited Entry proposal, but better late than never. I sometimes wonder whether us longtime fishermen in established fisheries that have not been limited have grounds for a civil suit against the state.

Thanks for your attention,

*John DeSylva*

Sitka, Ak  
Feb. 2, 1992

Lloyd Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee  
Alaska State Senate

Dear Lloyd,

Individual Fishing Quotas, (IFQ's), are an experimental program developed in Australia, adopted in Canada, and seized on by Clem Tillion as the answer to the growing fleet management problem in the Gulf of Alaska. It has little in common with the Alaska limited entry system he had a part in developing in the 70's.

This program gives ownership rights to two major resources, halibut, and blackcod. Many of us grew up with these fisheries, pulled in our belts when the foreign fleets decimated them and waited until they were rebuilt. The IFQ concept has made it imperative to all fishermen to maximize production in these fisheries at the expense of other more rational fishing decisions. Creating the most poundage has been the top job priority for those with the wit to see that if we catch lots we will own lots. This "race" to maximize poundage has been used to justify all kind of excesses from running too much gear, fishing in unsafe weather, and even fishing illegally. Not only did you sell the catch for a profit but you improved your stake in a free distribution of fish not even living yet. When confronted with their excesses otherwise reasonable fishermen shrugged and exclaimed, "what else could we do?"

Many of us who have spent our lives fishing within the framework of the law and an ethic to fish safely in a manner to conserve resources feel violated by the greed fostered by this proposal.

I say No! The objectives Governor Hickel is seeking will have to be sought another way.

It appears that social engineering of this nature in Canada has put the resource in the hands of a few Corporations. To me, this is a major social failure.

Management of the fisheries is a completely different ball game. Besides not wanting the resources in the hands of people that have played loosely with the system, I am concerned with the fact that the factory trawl fleet believes they need these very same IFQ's for halibut to offset their bycatch problem that is costing them millions each year. What do you think an IFQ share of halibut is worth to a factory trawler who needs a few pounds of halibut to harvest tons of sole or flounder? \$1,000 or \$2,000 a pound? Where would the bidding begin Lloyd?

For six years I have been writing about the abuse of our fishery resources and their habitat by the factory trawlers. I say the North Pacific Fisheries Management

Council has spent too much time and resources trying to do what only a few people want. Why? I thought the IFQ program went down last year and the Council would begin the hard work of regulating and conserving the fisheries. Instead a resurrected fish Czar, (Tillier?), has resurrected it and travelled to various fishing organizations offering glowing pictures of the future if they supported his program. I SAY NO!!!!

Ralph Guthrie

Ralph Guthrie

P/V Illahee

Gen Del

Petersburg, Alaska 99833

CC. Rep. Davidson, Chair  
House Resources Committee

Loyd - there isn't another  
renewable resource that is given  
away - we can lose anything not  
managed I.F.C. aren't manage  
ment - it's a give away.  
R. Gv

Where?

Where the hell are we  
No Anchor to hold in the wind and tide  
The Spirit of our Ancestors no longer rustle  
No longer in ancient home abiding

The powerful winds and strong voices  
of the forever landless  
Now rule without the family  
sans moiety or real people

Whence race, spirit, and land  
were tied as one

Now the heart and eyes  
color coded and cold

Wind, Tide, Ship and  
People empty.

Where then the future alone?  
Stranded floating without?

Or together? with many  
colors and shades of meaning

The Ship fully manned  
not soulless and careening.

R G

P.O. Box 181  
Kasilof, AK 99610  
24 February 1992

Senator Lloyd Jones  
Chair, Senate Resources Committee  
Alaska State Legislature  
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Senator Jones:

I wish to express to you my support of HJR 61 and SJR 38 which is before you regarding the individual fishing quota (IFQ) program. As I am sure you are aware, Alaskans throughout the entire state are opposed to this plan. There are only a few people in a few areas who are in favor of the plan. This plan, if put into place, will mean the ruin of Alaskan fishermen and bring disaster to coastal communities. All areas of Alaska will then be impacted by this. Please help us by passing the resolution. Thank you.

Sincerely,



Paul Joseph Lints

April 13, 1992

Dear Governor Hickel,

I am writing to express my concern regarding the currently proposed IFQ plan before the Council. It is my belief that this system would be extremely detrimental to Alaskans particularly those residing in the coastal communities. I appreciate the fact that the Governor has expressed his concern about the effects of this system, and I would like to urge the State of Alaska to become more involved in encouraging the Council to rescind the current preferred alternative IFQ plan.

Throughout the analysis provided by the Council and in most of the other available data on the IFQ plan, reference is made to the problem of too many boats in the fishery and the fact that IFQs will solve this problem. There is a basic flaw in this theory which calls for IFQs to shrink the fleet and decrease the race for fish. According to the Council's own data, in the halibut and sablefish fisheries combined, the top 10 percent of the vessels take 73% of the fish and the top 20% of vessels take 85% of the fish. The top 4% of the vessels take over 50% of the total catch. Over and over it is stated that there are too many vessels in the fishery when in fact it is the increase in efficiency of the top producers which is responsible for the race for fish. If the bottom 80% of the fleet were eliminated, there would only be a minimal increase in the length of openings. And the average poundage on which quota shares would be based is much higher for non-Alaskans than for Alaskans. Under the heading Excess Harvesting Capacity, on page 2-52, the Council's analysis alludes to the hope that the less efficient vessels would leave the fishery. Many of these less efficient vessels are active in one or more other fisheries and would add to excessive pressure on other fish stocks if they were to retire from the halibut and sablefish fisheries. And in these times of relatively high unemployment, if they do not have other fisheries to turn to, do they join the ranks of the unemployed or utilize other social services provided by the State of Alaska. The federal management people often talk about the need for efficiency in the fisheries and seem to mean that the least number of vessels harvesting the fish provides the utmost efficiency, and perhaps in the narrow sense this is true. The State of Alaska's Limited Entry Program seems to utilize the opposite perspective by guaranteeing a level of participation in the fishery and thereby assuring the best chance for economic and social well being of the coastal communities.

In the Council analysis, on page 3-7, the final paragraph of 3.2 reads, "Finally, the IFQ program is expected to increase the benefits that can be derived from the fisheries by increasing retained catch, increasing exvessel and wholesale prices, decreasing harvesting and processing costs. Much of the benefits will be captured by the initial

recipients of the Qs and some of the benefits will go to those who acquire QS subsequent to the initial allocation. These benefits will increase the wealth of these individuals and, thereby, tend to benefit the communities in which they live." How can it possibly be seriously proposed that increasing the wealth of a few individuals would be of more benefit to a community than having a large number of people gainfully employed in the fishery. For instance, where once you had a hundred people fishing and now you have one, that one individual might continue to live in the community and if he did, he might go out to eat more often and he might buy more toys for his children. But in my experience, many of the big producers tend to do more of their buying in bulk from stores down south. Can there be any question that having 100 vessels active in the fishery would have a more positive effect on the community. And while some of the fishermen are realizing less profit than they had in the past few years, in the Southeast halibut fishery, the catch per unit effort has remained essentially stable in all but the largest boat class. And the Southeast halibut fishery should be used as an indicator because it reached maximum utilization prior to any of the other areas.

Spreading the fleet out over a period of time, perhaps 10 different openings divided by using the last number on the fisherman's gear card in conjunction with trip limits or gear restrictions could address the very real problems in the fishery such as gear conflicts, dead loss, flooding the markets with improperly treated fish and the resultant price problems. This method of managing the harvest, along with a number of other alternatives which have not been given adequate consideration, could alleviate the problems without invoking the economic upheaval and social disturbances found with an IFQ program.

On page 3-11 #4 "... there should be a much better understanding of what one is giving up when he sells his Qs. Therefore, the initial outflow with an IFQ program would tend to be substantially less than that which occurred with the salmon permits." This has not been shown to be true with the newly created Chatham sablefish permits. A number of these permits have already sold and not by "marginal" fishermen.

Unless the Governor's office becomes involved in encouraging the Council to rescind the current preferred alternative, we are about to be locked into an essentially irreversible system of management which is almost certain to have far reaching, negative impacts on the coastal communities and on the economy of the State of Alaska. I've been fishing for halibut and sablefish both as crew and as a permit holder for the last ten years and I strongly agree that there needs to be a change in the management system however, I would urge the consideration of other systems rather than the adoption of IFQs.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

*Patricia J. Kehoe*

Patricia J. Kehoe  
PO BOX 1615  
Sitka, Ak. 99835

cc. Mr. Rick Lauber  
Sen. Dick Eliason  
Sen. Lloyd Jones  
Sen. Frank Murkowski  
Dr. Bill Fox, NMFS  
Ms. Barbara Franklin  
Rep. Don Young  
Sen. Ted Stevens

P.O. Box 1971  
Sitka, AK 99835

The Honorable Lloyd Jones  
Alaska State Legislature  
P.O. Box V  
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Senator Jones:

I'm writing to urge your support of SJR 38 opposing individual fishing quota management systems.

The resolution language lays out the case against ITQ's well. ITQ's would ruin the coastal communities of Southeast Alaska by concentrating the right to catch fish to those with the greatest wealth and power. Because of the instant wealth created, it would be an irreversible decision.

According to the NPFMC's own analysis, there would be an eventual ninety percent reduction in the longline fleet as quota blocs conglomerate. A fishery which has historically supported a large middle-class population would become one owned by a wealthy few, leaving the ninety percent in the cold.

It would be a crime to put in place such a gargantuan effort at social engineering without a thorough study of the consequences. Please give your support to SJR 38 and help stop this disaster.

Gratefully yours,



Michael Litman

cc: Representative Don Young  
Senator Frank Murkowski  
Senator Ted Stevens  
Governor Walter Hickel  
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council

Pro SJR 38 / Con IFQ

2/17/92

Senator Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee

Dear Senators,

I was quite disturbed when I heard that my participation and that of many other voters in your recent teleconference on IFQ's was going to be a waste of our time and effort. If it is known to you that one of the committee members has killed the resolution by political manipulation, why put us through a charade as if you desire our opinions and information? I speak of the Seward Downtown Merchant's Association meeting of 2/14/92 at which Mr. Clem Tillion, the Fish Czar, stated that Senator Dick Eliason has the resolution Dead no matter what action you take. Even if some would wish to abandon the constitution, I ask that you assume what responsibility you can, and I reiterate my position below.

IFQ's " give to an individual the right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, converting common property to private property." A system that converts a public resource to private property does not fall within the definition of limited entry for the State of Alaska, i.e. limited access to a public resource.

The Alaska Constitution Article VIII section 15 reads "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State". The only exception is the amendment passed in 1972 creating limited entry - but IFQ's are not limited entry under the definitions of the State of Alaska. The proponents of IFQ's are not working on a constitutional amendment to allow ITQ's to be legal, they just ignore the law. The Attorney General's Office on January 15, 1992 wrote "...if an IFQ proposal is made which would violate the "open access" clauses of the state constitution we will recommend against its adoption." There can be no doubt that the IFQ proposal violates open access since that is the exact purpose for which it has been proposed.

X I call on you to honor your oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the State of Alaska and oppose any effort to impose this unconstitutional system on the citizens of Alaska.



Paul K. Seaton  
HC-67 Box 1253  
Anchor Point, AK 99556  
907 235-6342

X PS. I think it quite important that the wording preventing any State money, agencies or property be prevented from being used to implement or enforce ITQ's be retained in the final resolution.

Please share with the following:

Fred Zaroff, Lloyd Jones, Richard I. Eliason, Jerry Mackie, Cheri L. Davis, Robin Taylor, Ben Grussendorf and Cliff Davidson.

I support HJR 61 and SJR 38. I feel that if implemented this IFQ plan will have extreme long-term detrimental effects on Alaska's Coastal Communities. IFQ's "rationalize" the fisheries by giving a Public Resource held in common trust to a few privileged fishermen. This IFQ plan will eventually replace small family owned fishing businesses, the backbone of Alaska's Coastal Communities with a form of agribusiness. Rick Lauber, chairman of the NPFMC, has testified that the halibut and blackcod stocks are generally healthy. IFQ's will not solve the bycatch or wastage problems. There is no biological reason for IFQ's. They are economic allocations. I urge the House/Senate to pass HJR 61 and SJR 38.

Thank You,

Name (printed)

Jamie James

Signature

Jamie James

Address

P.O. Box 3007  
Palmer, Alaska  
99645

Personal Testimony

Limited entry is un-American - Impeach Clem Tillison!

Mail to:  
Legislature's  
Alaska State Legislature  
State Capitol  
Juneau, AK 99801

Paul K. Seaton  
HC-67 Box 1253  
Anchor Point, AK 99556  
907 235-6342

Dear Senator Jones,

IFQ's " give to an individual the right to harvest a definite quantity of fish, expressed either as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the total allowable catch. Privatization of the resource in this manner removes the right of public access to a common property, converting common property to private property." A system that converts a public resource to private property does not fall within the definition of limited entry for the State of Alaska, i.e. limited access to a public resource.

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I call on you to honor your oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the State of Alaska and oppose any effort to impose this unconstitutional system on the citizens of Alaska.

Date, 2/7/92

Sincerely,

Signed Paul K. Seaton

PS On 2/5 at the Kenai Chamber of Commerce in response to this question, Clem Tillion told the audience that the Attorney General doesn't know what he is talking about and is just wrong. He also said that since most sablefish have been harvested in federal waters in the past, federal law will supersede State law (the State Constitution). Apparently he is willing to give all the State fish to the feds - but that still will not allow ITQ's to be "authorized in the natural waters of the State" unless he is proposing ceding all State waters to the Feds as well as the fishery resources!

Mr. Tillion obviously has a much stronger federal than State interest in our fisheries and I hope you will have someone with greater State interest on the Council in the future!

Sitka, Ak  
Feb. 2, 1992

Lloyd Jones, Chairman  
Senate Resources Committee  
Alaska State Senate

Dear Lloyd,

Individual Fishing Quota's, (IFQ's), are an experimental program developed in Australia, adopted in Canada, and seized on by Clem Tillion as the answer to the growing fleet management problem in the Gulf of Alaska. It has little in common with the Alaska limited entry system he had a part in developing in the 70's.

This program gives ownership rights to two major resources, halibut, and blackcod. Many of us grew up with these fisheries, pulled in our belts when the foreign fleets decimated them and waited until they were rebuilt. The IFQ concept has made it imperative to all fishermen to maximize production in these fisheries at the expense of other more rational fishing decisions. Creating the most poundage has been the top job priority for those with the wit to see that if we catch lots we will own lots. This "race" to maximize poundage has been used to justify all kind of excesses from running too much gear, fishing in unsafe weather, and even fishing illegally. Not only did you sell the catch for a profit but you improved your stake in a free distribution of fish not even living yet. When confronted with their excesses otherwise reasonable fishermen shrugged and exclaimed, "what else could we do?"

Many of us who have spent our lives fishing within the framework of the law and an ethic to fish safely in a manner to conserve resources feel violated by the greed fostered by this proposal.

I say No! The objectives Governor Hickel is seeking will have to be sought another way.

It appears that social engineering of this nature in Canada has put the resource in the hands of a few Corporations. To me, this is a major social failure.

Management of the fisheries is a completely different ball game. Besides not wanting the resources in the hands of people that have played loosely with the system, I am concerned with the fact that the factory trawl fleet believes they need these very same IFQ's for halibut to offset their bycatch problem that is costing them millions each year. What do you think an IFQ share of halibut is worth to a factory trawler who needs a few pounds of halibut to harvest tons of sole or flounder? \$1,000 or \$2,000 a pound? Where would the bidding began Lloyd?

For six years I have been writing about the abuse of our fishery resources and their habitat by the factory trawlers. I say the North Pacific Fisheries Management

Council has spent too much time and resources trying to do what only a few people want. Why? I thought the IFQ program went down last year and the Council would begin the hard work of regulating and conserving the fisheries. Instead a resurrected fish Czar, (Tillion), has resurrected it and travelled to various fishing organizations offering glowing pictures of the future if they supported his program. I SAY NO!!!!

*Ralph Guthrie*

Ralph Guthrie  
P/V Illahee  
Gen Del  
Petersburg, Alaska 99833.

CC. Rep. Davidson, Chair  
House Resources Committee

*Lloyd - there isn't another  
renewable resource that is given  
away. we can lose anything not  
managed I.F.Q. aren't manage  
ment - its a give away.  
R. G.*

Where?

Where the hell are we  
No Anchor to hold in the wind and tide

The Spirit of our Ancestors no longer rustle  
No longer in ancient home abiding

The powerful winds and strong voices  
of the forever landless  
Now rule without the family  
sans moiety or real people

Whence race, spirit, and land  
were tied as one

Now the heart and eyes  
color coded and cold

Wind, Tide, Ship and  
People empty.

Where then the future alone?  
Stranded floating without?

Or together? with many  
colors and shades of meaning

The Ship fully manned  
not soulless and careening.

R G

Danny Graham  
F/V ELDAN  
P. O. Box 1342  
Kodiak, AK 99615

February 5, 1992

Senator Lloyd Jones  
Chair, Senate Resources Committee  
Alaska State Legislature  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

RE: SJR 38

Dear Senator Jones:

I would like to go on record as strongly supporting SJR 38, which opposes the IFQ plan currently proposed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

I have lived and commercially fished in Kodiak for years and have long been opposed to the proposed IFQ plan for halibut and sablefish. This plan, if implemented will mean the ruin of the traditional small boat fleet in Alaska and will devastate the coastal communities.

Why is a social impact analysis not being done? Are people afraid of what the results will be? I can tell you clearly that the coastal communities which have depended on deliveries of halibut and sablefish will lose out. It is important that the State of Alaska demand that a social impact analysis be completed. I am seriously concerned that since National Marine Fisheries Service strongly supports IFQs, that any study coming from that agency will be biased and not show the true picture. We need an independent study which is either contracted by the State of Alaska, or at least approved by the State.

We are begging you as our elected representatives to help us on this issue. In my view, it is the most important issue facing us today.

Sincerely,

  
Danny Graham

cc: Senator Fred Zharoff  
Representative Cliff Davidson  
Governor Walter Hickel  
Alaska Congressional Delegation  
North Pacific Fishery Management Council

RICHARD POWELL  
F/V ICELANDER \* F/V ECHO BELLE \* F/V KATIE S \* C/P PATRICIA LEE  
P. O. BOX 2074  
KODIAK, ALASKA 99615

February 5, 1992

Senator Lloyd Jones  
Chair, Senate Resources Committee  
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

RE: SJR 38


Dear Senator Jones,

I would like to express my support for SJR 38, the resolution opposing the implementation of IFQs. This IFQ plan is just plain bad news for Alaska and needs to be stopped.

I have been attending North Pacific Fishery Management Council meetings for some time and have followed their progress for many years. The IFQ plan was brought up by fishery managers and they have been the ones to continue promoting it to the exclusion of any other management options. This plan is currently being opposed by the large majority of fishermen and communities in Alaska.

We are asking that you quickly approve this resolution and spend time convincing our Governor that this is bad business for Alaska. While we are the majority on this issue, the Governor's advisors seem to be insulating him from public opinion. It is imperative that he get the true story on this issue.

Sincerely,



Dick Powell  
Vessel Owner

cc: Senator Fred Zharoff  
Representative Cliff Davidson  
Governor Walter Hickel  
Senator Ted Stevens  
Senator Frank Murkowski  
Congressman Don Young  
Rick Lauber, Chairman NPFMC

JON SMEE  
F/V TENACIOUS  
P. O. BOX 2116  
KODIAK, ALASKA 99615

February 6, 1992

RE: SJR 38 and HJR 61

Dear Sir:


I would like to go on record as supporting the House and Senate resolutions which oppose the IFQ plan currently proposed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

It is extremely important for the people of Alaska to realize that this plan spells disaster for not only the halibut and sablefish resource, but that fishermen and coastal communities will be severely impacted. If we think that we can compete with large corporate interests in buying quota, we are dreaming.

The conservation implications of this plan are frightening. This plan simply does away with the traditional halibut bycatch cap in order to eliminate the race for fish. There is nothing to protect the vast amount of wastage that will result. The black market sales and highgrading of product is a given and this will result in problems with the stocks.

Please understand that we realize there are problems in the current fishery, but that there are solutions within our grasp in the traditional management which have not been discussed at length by the Council or even analyzed. Why take this radical approach which will completely eliminate small boat fishermen, when there are things we can do right now that will be effective.

Sincerely,



Jon Smee  
Vessel Owner

cc: Senator Fred Zharoff  
Representative Cliff Davidson  
Governor Walter Hickel  
Alaska Congressional Delegation  
North Pacific Fishery Management Council

1-29-92

Area K Seiners Association  
 P.O. Box 2399 Kodiak, Alaska 99615  
 Phone 907/486-4686 FAX 907/486-7655



Written Testimony  
 for SJR 38

Lacey Berns

On behalf of Alaskans for Responsible Resource Management and Area K Seiners Association, I urge the passage of SJR 38. A.R.R.M. led a successful petition and letter-writing campaign from May thru Dec. '91, resulting in <sup>well</sup> over 700 signatures from crewmembers, families, operators of vessels, vessel owners, and businesses. The ensuing volume of letters to various officials and agencies opposing IFQ's, has been enormous. The opposition to IFQ's is in all communities -- people are tremendously concerned about their futures, if IFQ's are passed.

The IFQ concept, in its current framework and design, is unwieldy and cumbersome. A scheme which does not have the support of the fishing industry, will prove difficult to manage and enforce. Many fishermen are resentful about the way this scheme has been forced down ~~our~~ <sup>their</sup> throats, under the guise of safety, or, fresh halibut year around - it (simply) is a fallacy that IFQ's will provide fresh fish 365 days a year.

Area K Seiners Association  
P.O. Box 2399 Kodiak, Alaska 99615  
Phone 907/486-4686 FAX 907/486-7655



The halibut / blackcod stocks are currently healthy; so the conservation of the resource is not an issue.

The issue is, that managers and the "fish czar" would rather see "100 prosperous & wealthy fishermen than 1000 fishermen" competing on the grounds. IFQ's are designed to eliminate numbers of boats, which in turn eliminates crewmembers, operators, and JOBS, from our coastal communities.

We support a simplified, sensible management plan which utilizes traditional management tools -- Year & trip limits, time & area closures, etc. need to be utilized before a drastic, plan such as IFQ's, is needlessly forced onto our fisheries --

The N.P.F.M.C. needs to consider public opinion before making such a monumental decision -- especially before socio-economic analyses are studied by the public.

Sincerely,  
Lacey Berns  
(interim Director, A.K.S.A.)



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources Committee  
 committee name  
 committee on SJR 38 - IFQ'S, dated 1-29-92  
 bill/subject

The Kodiak Chamber of Commerce supports SJR 38  
 In opposition to any individual fishery quota plans.  
 We urge the Legislature to adopt this Resolution  
 and bring pressure to bear on the North Pacific  
 Fishery Management Council and the National Marine  
 Fisheries Service to complete an in depth Socio-Economic  
 Impact Study prior to this plan moving any further  
 in the Council process. Additionally, we urge  
 the Council and NMFS to complete an in depth study  
 on the cost of implementation and enforcement of  
 this IFQ proposal. ~~For~~ until these studies are  
 completed we urge the Council to hold in abeyance  
 any further action on the IFQ proposals.  
 PLEASE PASS in the affirmative SJR 38

Signed: WAYNE A. STEVENS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
 Testifier  
KODIAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE  
 Representing (Optional)  
BOX 1485 KODIAK AK 99615  
 Address  
486-5557  
 Phone No.

2-7-92

Honorable Senator Lloyd Jones,

I am James Brown and live in Anchorage and have fished in Kodiak waters since 1969.


I oppose the IFQ system that is currently proposed and ready for implementation in the Alaskan halibut fishery for the following reasons.

1. As proposed it will, over time, reduce the current halibut fleet from some 4000 vessels to as few as a couple hundred vessels. This poses a great economic loss to Alaskan communities that support this sizable fleet.
2. As proposed the granting of quotas is based on a flawed system which rewards those who have cheated by the use of prohibited crucifiers to speed the retrieval of gear and fish at a great cost to juvenile halibut and other species of by catch. It also rewards those who have set gear early and fished after the scheduled closures. As proposed it favors large boats that were able to fish the foul weather of early spring and fall when the openings were scheduled.
3. As proposed the small boat quotas will be acquired over time by larger vessel interests who are capable of taking their catch directly to points south, by passing Alaskan shore facilities altogether.

Once the proposed IFQ system is implemented the halibut resource as a block in the Alaskan economic foundation will be irretrievably lost. I urge you to pass SB 38 and to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent this economic disaster to Alaskan coastal communities and to Alaska as a whole.

I believe that there are numerous avenues that can be taken to maximize the the economic benefit to our communities while still addressing the negatives that are so apparent in the current derby system without adopting such a flawed system as the proposed IFQ system.

Thank you for your time.

  
James E. Brown  
6824 Timothy St.  
Anchorage, AK 99502



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name  
 committee on Senate Res #38, dated 1/29/91  
bill/subject

I'm opposed to IF Qs.  
 They'll put me out of the  
 Business And they will be very  
 bad for Almost All Fisherman  
 ALASKA ~~Doesn't~~ Doesn't need this  
 I support Senate Resolution #38

Signed: Aune Randa  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
Box 6336 Sitka AK 99835  
 Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name  
 committee on Senate Res #38 - dated 1/29/92  
bill/subject

I'm apposed to I.F.Q.'s, They will  
 put me out of Business, and alot  
 of people like me.

I support senate Res. #38

Signed: Ron Blake  
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)  
POK 633 G Sitka AK 99574  
 A ESS

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name

committee on Senate Res #38, dated 1-27-72  
bill/subject

I AM OPPOSED TO IFQS AS THIS IS NOT A GOOD MANAGEMENT TOOL. IT WILL HURT THE FISHERMEN & THE FISHERY. I SUPPORT SENATE RES. #38.

Signed: Kris Hoffman  
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

PO BOX 6780 SITKA AK 99835

Address

Phone No.



# Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the Senate Resources  
committee name  
 committee on Senate Res #38, dated 1/27/92  
bill/subject

I AM OPPOSED TO IFOs. THERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
 TO BEGIN WITH. I FISHED FOR 35 YRS & I  
 HAVESAVED MY FISH FOR MY POSTERITY NOT  
 FOR A SPECIAL GROUP OR INTEREST.  
 I SUPPORT SENATE RES #38

Signed: *[Signature]*  
Testifier  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Representing (Optional)  
Box 6336 SITKA, ALASKA 99835  
Address  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Phone No. \_\_\_\_\_

WALTER HICKEL  
STATE OF ALASKA  
Box 110001 - JUNEAU

FEB 11, 1992

DEAR GOV. HICKEL,

I AM 60 YEARS OLD AND HAVE BEEN COMMERCIAL FISHING SALMON AND HALIBUT SINCE 1963.

I AM REALLY ANGRY ABOUT THE IFQ PROGRAM BEING FORCED THRU THE NPFMC WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE MAJORITY OF FISHERMAN! IN 28 YEARS OF HALIBUT FISHING, I HAVE NEVER BEEN ASKED FOR MY INPUT, NEVER BEEN SENT A QUESTIONNAIRE. WHY DON'T THIS COUNCIL WANT MY INPUT?

I WOULD LIKE AN IMMEDIATE EXPLANATION FROM YOU WHY CLEM TILLION IS VOTING AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF ALASKANS?

THERE ARE MANY WAYS TO CONTROL THE HALIBUT FISHERY AND DELIVER FRESH FISH TO MARKET A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. FOR YEARS THE NPFMC HAS IGNORED THESE SOLUTIONS, BECAUSE A SMALL NUMBER OF LARGE BOATS HAVE INPUT TO THE BOARD.

HERE ARE SOME IDEAS WHICH WILL CONTROL THE HALIBUT FISHERY AND DELIVER FRESH FISH ALL SPRING AND SUMMER.

#1 - GEAR LIMITS. A MAJORITY OF FISHERMEN I KNOW FAVOR BEING ABLE TO MAKE LESS PER FISHING PERIOD OVER THE EXISTING SYSTEM.

GEN. LIMITS ARE NOW BEING USED IN PAGE 2  
ALMOST ALL ALASKA FISHERIES.

#2 - TRIP LIMITS - THIS RESTRICTION ALONE  
COULD SAVE THE FISHERY!

#3 CREATE A COASTAL FISHERY, INCLUDING ALL  
WATERS INSIDE THE 12 MILE LIMIT, USE SEVERE  
GEAR LIMITS, MAYBE 6 SKATERS ON BOARD.

HAVE EXCLUSIVE REGISTRATION FOR THIS FISHERY  
EACH YEAR. ASSIGN A PERCENTAGE OF QUOTA, MAYBE 40%.

#4 - DIVIDE THE FLEET IN 4 GROUPS,  
EACH GROUP FISHING 1 WEEK OUT OF 4.  
EACH FISHERMAN AND BOAT WOULD HAVE TO  
REGISTER IN 1 AREA EACH YEAR.

I KNOW YOU HAVE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES  
TO DEAL WITH, BUT PLEASE MAKE GOOD ON  
YOUR STATE OF STATE ADDRESS PLEDGE TO STOP  
FEDERAL INTRUSION INTO STATE RIGHTS AND KEEP  
THESE SMALL MINDED GUYS FROM TAKING  
AWAY OUR LIVELIHOOD WE HAVE HAD FOR  
SO LONG!!

THANKS

CC: SEN LLOYD JONES  
REP BEN GRUSSDORF  
NPFMC - RICK LAUBEL

M. L. Mullin  
M. L. Mullin  
BOX 967  
KASLOF, AK 99610  
262-7262

3 Feb 1992

Dear Legislators:

The halibut fishery is a good example of how big money has controlled our fisheries in the recent past, sometimes subtly and sometimes blatantly.

Although I am as concerned about the other fisheries, I shall confine most of my remarks to halibut.

I'll start with a thumbnail historical sketch of the recent halibut fishery.

Open seasons have been getting shorter and shorter due to the increasing number of participants.

What is not so well known by those who are not connected closely to the Alaskan fishing industry, is that [except for 2 areas where the total allowable catch is low] openings have ~~been~~ progressively been timed so that large boats are favored more each succeeding year. This has happened by timing the openings in early spring and fall

(2)

when the weather is traditionally rough, with less openings each year during summer when the weather is traditionally more calm. Until we arrived at 1991 when there were only 2 openings; spring and fall (at least in Area 3A).

IN 1991 AREA 3A had  
48% of the TOTAL U.S. & CANADIAN <sup>ALLOWABLE</sup> CATCH  
or 56% of ALASKA'S T.A.C.  
& APPROXIMATELY 50% OF ALASKA'S POPULATION

The IFQ's are based on the catches in these years of less and less openings, so the catch rates (or IFQ's) are already skewed in favor of the larger boats.

This IFQ proposal is an economic issue. Because, if implemented, it will create instant riches for some. And it will mean the end of an income to many small boat fishermen & women, and to the businesses and communities they support.

However, we are told that the IFQ

(3)

proposal is: 1. to conserve the resource;  
2. to make it safer for fishermen & women;  
and 3. to supply fresh fish to the  
consumer more often.

Now!

If fresh fish to the consumer were  
the issue, trip limits, area registration,  
and opening timing could solve it!

If safety were the issue, timing could  
solve it!

If conservation were the issue, it could  
be accomplished by such things as,  
gear limitation, trip limits, area  
registration, and maybe non-transferable  
limited entry (with a waiting list for  
those who wish to enter the fishery)!

And if the Council were really  
concerned about conservation, how about  
outlawing trawlers and crucifiers? That's  
where most bycatch mortality comes from.

According to the International Pacific

Halibut Commission, for 1990 the legal commercial limit was 58.4 million pounds of halibut. The allowed halibut mortality thru bycatch in other fisheries was 18.0 million pounds. That's more than 1 pound out of 5 that was thrown back into the sea, dead, ... wasted!

Few people, if any, will argue that our present system is ok. and should not be changed. But I am totally convinced that IFQs are not the answer. They have not performed well in the two countries that have adopted them!

Besides that, the tools are available right now to control the fisheries, without such a public resource giveaway.

To sum up: I repeat; the IFQ proposal is not a safety, fresh fish, or conservation issue; it's an

③

economic issue. And I am one, among many who are against IFQs.

Thank you:

Kenneth R. Hoisington

an Anchorage fisherman

KEN OR SUE HOISINGTON  
408 E. MANOR AVE.  
ANCHORAGE, AK 99501

Copies to:

ALASKA STATE House Resources Committee  
ALASKA STATE SENATE Resources Committee  
U.S. SECRETARY of Commerce  
ALASKA STATE GOVERNORS office  
NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES MANAGEMENT Council  
U.S. SENATOR FRANK MURKOWSKI  
U.S. SENATOR Ted STEVENS  
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE Don Young  
ALASKA Commercial FISHERMAN (newspaper)  
ANCHORAGE Times (newspaper)  
ANCHORAGE Daily News (newspaper)

LIONEL HAAKENSON  
P.O. BOX 242  
ANCHOR POINT, AK 99556  
(907) 235-8401

March 12, 1992

Senator Lloyd Jones  
Chair, Senate Resources Committee  
Alaska State Legislature  
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Sir,

I have lived in Alaska 54 years and have fished halibut for 20 years. I am opposed to the present halibut I.F.Q. plan. I believe it would be bad for thousands of Alaskan small boat owners and crewman. The vast majority of people oppose it. The ones who do favor it are mostly outside big boat owners. Also I believe it violates our State Constitution.

I am also opposed to the present two 24 hour per year periods. In place of this "kamakazie derby", I'd like to suggest a radical reduction in the amount of gear permitted on a boat. My suggestion would be to allow no more than 10 hooks per foot of boat length.

This would virtually eliminate the present disgraceful waste resulting from the untold miles of lost and abandoned gear which continues to catch and kill fish for no one knows how long. Fish could be properly cared for in a timely manner. Instead of the present method of piling thousands of pounds of uncleaned fish into holds to be cleaned days later.

Many more people could profit from the fishery rather than a few big boat owners. There could be many more fishery periods. Fresh fish would be available more of the season. It would be constitutional since no one would be denied access to the fishery.

I hope no one says it would be too difficult to enforce! Since when do we say we can't do something simply because its difficult. It would require laws with teeth that would discourage anyone from cheating. But I think that this beats anything else that has been suggested.

Sincerely,

Lionel Haakenson