

SCOMM

74:12

MEMORANDUM

State of Alaska
Department of Law

TO: Hon. Don W. Collinsworth
Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game

DATE: August 1, 1990

FILE NO: 663-90-0327

TEL. NO.: 465-3600

SUBJECT: ADF&G authority to manage
fisheries for hatchery
broodstock and cost
recovery

FROM: *Stephen M. White*
Stephen M. White
Assistant Attorney General
Natural Resources Section

You have asked whether the Department of Fish and Game has legal authority to manage fisheries so that salmon hatcheries receive broodstock and cost recovery fish for their operations. You also asked whether the department is required to manage fisheries for these results. Your staff has also asked us to compare the department's authority with that of the Board of Fisheries.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Factual and Legal Background

There are two types of salmon hatcheries in Alaska. These are private, nonprofit hatcheries and state-owned hatcheries.

The regulation of private, nonprofit hatcheries is provided for in AS 16.10.400 - 16.10.470. These hatcheries have received a significant amount of public funds, principally in the form of loans from the state's fisheries enhancement revolving loan fund established by AS 16.10.507. 1/ Until fish raised by private, nonprofit hatcheries return to a location where they can be harvested by the hatchery operators, these fish "are available to the people for common use and are subject to regulation under applicable law in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state." AS 16.10.440(a).

The only law that deals with state-owned hatcheries is the one that gives the commissioner of the Department of Fish and Game authority to design and construct public hatcheries. AS 16.05.050(3).

1/ According to the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, the current amount owed to the state by private, nonprofit hatcheries is approximately \$63.1 million.

B. Board of Fisheries' Authority to Manage for Hatchery Returns

1. Board's authority to manage for broodstock fish

The Board of Fisheries was created "for purposes of the conservation and development of the fishery resources of the state." AS 16.05.221(a) (emphasis added). The board has authority to "adopt regulations it considers advisable in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62) for . . . regulating commercial, sport, subsistence, and personal use fishing as needed for the conservation, development, and utilization of fisheries." AS 16.05.251(a)(12) (emphasis added).

The Alaska Supreme Court has defined "conservation" as "controlled utilization of a resource to prevent its exploitation, destruction, or neglect." Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n v. State, 628 P.2d 897, 903 (Alaska 1981). We believe that the board's authority to conserve the fishery resource of the state, that is, to prevent its "exploitation, destruction, or neglect," is an expression of the constitutional requirement that fish be "utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle." Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 4.

We understand that the term "broodstock" means the portion of returning fish that a hatchery uses to provide eggs for raising its next contribution to the common-property fishery. Because broodstock helps to perpetuate the fishery resource, we believe that managing for broodstock is analogous to managing for escapement of wild fish to achieve sustained yield. It follows, therefore, that the Board of Fisheries is empowered to adopt regulations that will provide brood stock to the hatcheries. Furthermore, because management for sustained yield is required by article VIII, section 4, of the Alaska Constitution, we believe that the law directs the board to manage for this result.

2. The Board's Authority to Manage for Cost Recovery Fish

We understand that "cost recovery fish" are the portion of returning fish that a private, nonprofit hatchery harvests and sells to help meet its financial obligations. We also understand that state-owned hatcheries do not presently harvest fish for cost

Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 3

recovery. Thus, the question of managing fish for cost recovery concerns only private, nonprofit hatcheries. 2/

As noted above, the Board of Fisheries has authority to adopt regulations for development as well as for conservation of the fisheries. AS 16.05.221(a); AS 16.05.251(a)(12). The Alaska Supreme Court has defined "development" as "management of a resource to make it available for use." Kenai Peninsula, 628 P.2d at 903.

We have previously advised that this authority empowers the board to allocate fish that are beyond those needed to assure sustained yield. This power is established by AS 16.05.251(d), which mandates that the board provide "a fair and reasonable opportunity for the taking of fishery resources" by fishery user groups and by AS 16.05.251(e), which requires that the board adopt criteria for making allocations among these groups. 1990 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 12; 663-90-0227); 1989 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 7; 663-89-0465).

The courts have endorsed various forms of allocation. These have included allocations between the various overall user groups identified in the fish and game code -- personal use, sport, and commercial fishers. For example, in the Kenai Peninsula case, the Alaska Supreme Court said that the board could establish priorities of use between recreational and commercial fishers. Kenai Peninsula, 628 P.2d at 903. In other cases, the courts have upheld regulations that allocate harvest between competing subgroups of a particular user group. For example, the court upheld the board's allocation of fish between drift gillnet fishers and set gillnet fishers, both of whom are commercial users. Meier v. State, 739 P.2d 172, 174 (Alaska 1987).

Private, nonprofit hatcheries are not identified in the law as an overall user group. Nevertheless, we know of no reason why they could not be considered a subgroup of commercial users and thus be targeted for allocations like any other distinct subgroup of commercial harvesters.

The law establishes seven criteria that the board may consider when making allocations. AS 16.05.251(e). See also 05 AAC 39.205, 05 AAC 75.017, and 05 AAC 77.007. We have

2/ If state-owned hatcheries, operated by the state or by private contractors, harvest cost-recovery fish, this would raise issues that are beyond the scope of this memorandum. In that event, we would be pleased to provide you with further analyses of those issues.

Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 4

previously noted that the board is not limited to just these factors. We cautioned, however, that if the board considers additional factors, it should insure that the resulting allocation satisfies constitutional requirements of substantive due process and of equal protection. 1990 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 12; 663-90-0227). 3/

To satisfy substantive due process, an allocation cannot be arbitrary and it must further a legitimate governmental purpose. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 518 P.2d 92 (Alaska 1974). To satisfy equal protection, a distinction between competing users must be "based on a legitimate public purpose and . . . be reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the [allocation scheme]." State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983) (citation omitted).

Earlier we noted that private, nonprofit hatcheries have received substantial loans from the state. We assume that cost recovery fish are a significant, if not essential, source of income for meeting these hatcheries' debt service. If the borrowers do not receive sufficient cost recovery fish, it may not only threaten their ability to contribute to the common-property fishery, but also their ability to repay state loans. Accordingly, we believe that preventing the economic failure of borrower hatcheries would certainly be a "legitimate government purpose."

We also believe that distinguishing between private, nonprofit hatcheries, who make a direct contribution to sustained yield, and other users who do not make such a contribution bears a "fair and substantial relationship" to the goals of sustaining common-property fisheries and replenishing the loan fund. Thus, we believe that an allocation to provide cost recovery fish would satisfy the requirements of substantive due process and equal protection.

We note, however, that none of the present criteria in AS 16.05.251(e) precisely describe the positive attributes of hatcheries. Factors (5) (economic importance) and (6) (regional importance) could, under narrow circumstances, justify an

3/ We also opined that allocations must satisfy the provisions of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution. Specifically, these are section 1 (maximum use), section 2 (maximum benefit), section 3 (common use), section 15 (no exclusive right of fishing), and section 17 (equal application). 1990 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 12; 663-90-0227). We do not believe that an allocation for cost-recovery would violate any of these sections.

Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 5

allocation that provides for cost recovery. 4/ Although the board is not limited to using these criteria, they still affect the public and implement a legislative mandate. Thus, any unlisted criteria that the board wishes to use should be adopted by regulation. See Kenai Peninsula, 628 P.2d at 905, 906. In other words, if the board intends to allocate for cost recovery, it should adopt by regulation criteria that more closely describe the special attributes of private, nonprofit hatcheries.

The board's authority to allocate for cost recovery, then, is based upon characterizing private, nonprofit hatcheries as another type of commercial subgroup. But, there is nothing in the law that requires the board to allocate to a particular group or subgroup. Accordingly, we do not believe that the board is required by law to allocate cost recovery fish to this subgroup.

C. Department's Authority to Manage for Hatchery Returns

1. Department's authority to manage for broodstock

The commissioner of the Department of Fish and Game has limited tools for managing commercial fisheries independently of the board. This authority is contained in AS 16.05.060(a). It allows the commissioner to use emergency orders "when the circumstances require" to summarily open and close seasons or areas or to summarily change weekly closed periods.

The law does not define what circumstances will enable the commissioner to use his or her emergency order power. However, we have previously advised that in light of the commissioner's statutory charge to "manage, protect, maintain, improve, and extend the fish . . . resources of the state," emergency orders can be issued to protect sustained yield, based on conservation concerns. AS 16.05.020(2); 1989 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 7; 663-89-0465).

Earlier we recognized an analogy between managing escapement of wild stocks for conservation/sustained yield and managing for hatchery broodstock in order to serve the same purposes. Thus, we believe that the department, acting through the commissioner's power to issue emergency orders, can independently

4/ For example, if (1) a certain fishery were an important segment of an economy, (2) a hatchery made a critical contribution to the perpetuation of this fishery, and (3) the hatchery could not survive to make this contribution without an allocation of cost-recovery fish, the board could conclude that the allocation would be very important to that economy.

Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 6

manage fisheries to provide broodstock to hatcheries. In the same way that the Alaska Constitution directs the Board of Fisheries to manage for the return of broodstock, we believe that the law also directs the department to manage for the same result.

2. Department's authority to manage for cost recovery fish

The law is not clear on the question of whether the department, through the commissioner's emergency order power, is authorized to independently manage fisheries for cost recovery fish. It is also not clear whether it is required to do so.

On one hand, it can be argued that the commissioner's statutory charge in AS 16.05.020(2) to "maintain and improve" the resource authorizes actions that will enable private, nonprofit hatcheries to survive. Unless they are able to meet financial obligations, hatcheries will not be able to raise broodstock, and thereby not be able to contribute to the "maintenance and improvement" of the resource. It can also be argued that it is unlikely that the legislature would have created a program for financing the hatcheries and yet not intended for fisheries to be managed so that these hatcheries could pay back their loans and contribute to the fishery resource.

On the other hand, cost recovery fish, unlike broodstock fish, do not directly contribute to the perpetuation of the resource. They are sold to meet economic needs of a user subgroup. Thus, they can be likened to fish that exceed the amount needed for sustained yield and are thus available for allocation among various users.

In the past, we have opined that the commissioner probably cannot allocate fish through his or her emergency order power. Only the board can allocate fish among competing fisheries or user groups. 1990 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 12; 663-90-0227); 1989 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 7; 663-89-0465). According to this argument, the department could not independently manage fish for cost recovery because it is not authorized to allocate fish among users. 5/

5/ Although it is not clear whether the department, independent of the board, is authorized or required to allocate fish for cost recovery, we note that there are several ways that the department, in conjunction with the board, could manage for this purpose. First, under AS 16.05.270 the board could delegate to the department its own authority to allocate for certain fisheries. Next,
(continued...)

Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 7

The arguments on both sides of this question depend upon implication and analogy. The law does not clearly point to one answer or the other. Although we believe we could defend an emergency order that was issued to provide cost recovery fish, we hesitate to predict the outcome of any challenge. Accordingly, if the department wishes to independently manage for cost recovery fish, we recommend that it seek clear authority from the legislature to do so.

II. CONCLUSION

The Board of Fisheries and the Department of Fish and Game are authorized, and in fact are directed, to manage fisheries so that broodstock returns to hatcheries. The board can manage through its power to adopt regulations and the commissioner, when he or she acts independently of the board, can manage through the power to issue emergency orders. The authority of both is based upon statutory provisions for managing for conservation and on constitutional mandates for managing for sustained yield.

The board has the statutory authority to manage fisheries so that cost recovery fish return to a private, nonprofit hatchery. However, it is not clear that the present allocation criteria recognize the special attributes of hatcheries. If the board adopts such criteria, the board's regulatory authority to manage for cost recovery would be clear as well. On the other hand, there is no basis to conclude that the board is required to allocate fish for this purpose.

Absent the board's delegation of allocation authority to the department, it is not clear that the latter is authorized or required to independently manage for cost recovery, even by emergency order. Although we believe we could defend such an action, we could not predict the outcome of such suit. Therefore, we recommend that the department seek legislation that more clearly establishes this power.

We hope this answers your questions. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further help.

SMW:tg

5/ (...continued)

the board could by regulation direct the department to manage a particular fishery for this purpose. Examples of this are in 5 AAC 24.365 and 5 AAC 24.366. Finally, the board could by regulation establish an allocation framework that the department could implement through emergency orders.

8
Hon. Don W. Collinsworth, Commissioner
Department of Fish and Game
AGO file: 663-90-0327

August 1, 1990
Page 8

cc: Bonnie Harris, Assistant Attorney General
Anchorage

8

MICHAEL A. D. STANLEY

OFFICE 130 SEWARD STREET, SUITE 413
MAILING: PO BOX 020449, JUNEAU, ALASKA 99802

ATTORNEY AT LAW

PHONE: (907) 586-6077
FAX: (907) 463-2511

DATE: February 28, 1991

TO: Kate Troll, Executive Director
Southeast Alaska Seiners

FROM: Michael A. D. Stanley *mit*

SUBJ: Department of Law Opinion Re Management Of Fisheries
For Hatchery Broodstock And Cost Recovery

You have asked me to review an opinion authored by Assistant Attorney General Stephen White, dated August 1, 1990, concerning the legal authority of the Board of Fisheries ("Board") and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game ("ADF&G") to manage fisheries for return of hatchery broodstock and cost recovery.

This memo is not intended as a lengthy analysis of Mr. White's conclusions or the issues presented, but is instead meant to identify questions raised by his opinion.

Briefly stated, White's conclusions are as follows:

1. The Board has the authority and, under article VIII, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution (the sustained yield clause), the obligation to manage fisheries to provide broodstock to hatcheries.
2. The Board has the authority to allocate fish to nonprofit hatcheries for cost recovery, as a subgroup of commercial users.
3. Like the Board, ADF&G has the authority and the obligation to use its management powers -- i.e., its emergency order authority -- to assure return of broodstock to hatcheries.
4. ADF&G does not have clear authority to use its emergency order authority to manage for cost recovery, which is a form of allocation among competing users, but could achieve such result
 - a. by working in conjunction with the Board (e.g., receiving a delegation of the Board's authority or implementing a Board regulation requiring such allocation), or
 - b. by seeking legislation that clearly establishes such power.

DISCUSSION

The difficulty I have with Mr. White's opinion is not so much what he says, but what he doesn't say; that is, assumptions or legal inferences that are implicitly made but not discussed. Once these are understood, it can be seen that his conclusions regarding the Board's and ADF&G's authority to manage for broodstock and cost recovery are subject to some question.

1. Are Hatchery Stocks Subject To Article VIII?

White's memo is premised on the assumption that hatchery fish are necessarily subject to the provisions of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution. This leads him, among other things, to conclude that the Board and ADF&G are required to manage fisheries for return of hatchery broodstock, just the same as they are required to manage for escapement of wild stocks. I believe there is reason to question this assumption.

Article VIII does not use a single term for what it covers, but all seem to have a similar meaning: "natural" resources, resources in their "natural state," and "replenishable resources belonging to the state." The question is, do these terms encompass man-made hatchery fish? Put another way, does the state "own" hatchery fish in the same way as it "owns" wild fish and game. If the answer to that question is no, then it may well be that hatchery fish are not subject to the requirements of article VIII at all.

I have not studied this "ownership" question for hatchery stocks at length, but I have run across items that suggest they might be different from wild stocks. For instance, in the commentary on what became section 3 of article VIII (the common use clause), the framers indicate that it "does not apply to the domestication of fur-bearing animals or other animals subject to intensive culture, to fish in private ponds, or to registered trap lines if authorized by law." Commentary on Article on State Lands and Natural Resources, January 16, 1956, Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, Part 6, Appendix V, p. 98 (emphasis mine). Although the examples mentioned do not include hatchery fish, a common thread is creatures which man plays a substantial role in propagating.

Further, it could be argued that the legislature itself, when it passed the statutes authorizing private nonprofit hatcheries, did not view hatchery fish as subject to article VIII. As White points out, AS 16.10.440(a) provides that hatchery fish are "available for common use and are subject to regulation under applicable law in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state." However, this legislation would not have been necessary if hatchery fish were already believed to be subject to article VIII. The very fact that

AS 16.10.440 was enacted suggests that, in a constitutional sense, hatchery fish may be different from wild stocks.

Similarly, the sustained yield clause surely prohibits the Board or ADF&G from extinguishing a wild run. Yet, under certain circumstances hatchery permits may be revoked and production stopped. AS 16.10.430. Assuming hatchery fish were subject to section 4's command to sustain production, wouldn't terminating operation of a hatchery likewise be a constitutional violation? The answer may be that section 4 does not apply to hatchery fish.

The point simply is, White's conclusion that the Board and ADF&G are constitutionally mandated to manage for broodstock, just as they are required to manage for escapement of wild stocks, is subject to some question or, at the least, further analysis.

2. Are Nonprofit Hatcheries Engaged In Commercial Fishing?

In concluding that the Board can allocate fish to private nonprofit hatcheries for cost recovery, White states that "we know of no reason why they could not be considered a subgroup of commercial users and thus be targeted for allocations like any other distinct subgroup of commercial users." He conspicuously fails to refer to the definition of "commercial fishing" in articulating this premise. "Commercial fishing" is defined in AS 16.05.940(5) as

the taking, fishing for, or possession of fish, shellfish, or other fishery resources with the intent of disposing of them for profit, or by sale, barter, trade, or in commercial channels...

Nonprofit hatcheries do not take cost recovery fish "for profit." Are such fish nonetheless taken "with the intent" of disposing of them "by sale...or in commercial channels?" Although it could be argued that they are, that leads to a fairly expansive definition of commercial fishing. Salmon derbies possess fish with the intent of selling them; are they engaged in commercial fishing, too? Could the Board make an allocation to a fishing derby as subgroup of commercial users? At some point such an interpretation of "commercial fishing" becomes rather strained.

The definition of "commercial fisherman" in AS 16.10.940(4) may also provide guidance. That term is defined in terms of an "individual" -- i.e., a natural person -- and would not appear to include a nonprofit corporation.

Thus, there is a question whether nonprofit hatcheries are indeed engaged in "commercial fishing." If not, then White's conclusion that they may be the recipients of an allocation is undermined.

3. May Nonprofit Hatcheries Receive An Allocation?

The conclusion that the Board can allocate hatchery fish to a hatchery for cost recovery is, as White's memo states, "based upon characterizing private, nonprofit hatcheries as another type of commercial subgroup." I discussed above my doubts that hatcheries can really be said to be engaged in "commercial fishing."

There is another basis for questioning whether hatchery fish can be the subject of a specific allocation to a hatchery. AS 16.10.440(a) provides that hatchery fish are subject to regulation in the same manner as wild stocks "until they return to the specific location designated by the department for harvest by the hatchery operator." This suggests two things: (1) it is the department, not the Board, which is responsible for "allocating" hatchery fish to a hatchery through designation of special harvest areas, and (2) such allocation occurs only after those fish have traversed the common property fisheries and returned to the specific location designated for hatchery harvest. This statutory scheme is circumvented if the Board takes it upon itself to make an allocation to a hatchery prior to those fish returning to the designated area, while they are still in the common property fisheries.

Similarly, the statute which governs allocation of fisheries resources -- AS 16.05.251(e) -- does not really square with the idea of an allocation to a hatchery. The various factors which may be considered as allocation criteria are all tied to the term "fishery." But the definition of "fishery" in AS 16.05.940(12) does not include a hatchery. This suggests that a hatchery was never intended as the recipient of an allocation by the Board under AS 16.05.251(e).

Thus, the structure of applicable legislation suggests that hatchery operators may receive an allocation only through the procedures set forth in AS 16.10.440 (after leaving the common property fishery and in an area designated by ADF&G) and not from the Board pursuant to AS 16.05.251(e).

I must emphasize that the foregoing -- especially the discussion of the constitutional issue -- are not intended as definitive legal advice on whether the Board or ADF&G have the authority and/or the obligation to manage fisheries in order to assure the return of broodstock to nonprofit hatcheries or to provide for cost recovery. More analysis remains to be done. But I do think that this points up some significant problems with the Department of Law's opinion.

DIVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY STATE OF ALASKA

P.O. Box Y, Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-3867 or 465-2450
FAX (907) 465-2029

Deliveries to: 240 Main Street
Court Plaza, Room 500
Mail Stop 3101

MEMORANDUM

April 8, 1991

SUBJECT: Sustained Yield Management of Salmon Produced by Private Nonprofit Hatcheries (Work Order 7LS0990)

TO: Senator Dick Eliason

FROM: George Utermohle *GU*
Legislative Counsel

You have asked whether the state must manage salmon produced by private nonprofit hatcheries according to principles of sustained yield.

The Department of Law in its consideration of this issue has concluded that the sustained yield section of the Alaska Constitution (art. VIII, sec. 4) is applicable to private hatchery stocks of salmon and that the Board of Fisheries is required to manage private hatchery stocks of salmon according to sustained yield principles in order to provide broodstock to the hatcheries. Memorandum to Don W. Collinsworth file no. 663-90-0327, August 1, 1990. The Department of Law reached this conclusion by finding that the return of hatchery-bred salmon to the hatchery for use as broodstock, like the escapement of wild salmon to the spawning grounds, is necessary to achieve sustained yield of the salmon resource.

The sustained yield section can be reasonably construed as supporting the conclusion reached by the Department of Law, however the section is also open to other interpretations which would support different conclusions. Article VIII, sec. 4 states:

SUSTAINED YIELD. Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.

Of particular significance is the fact that this section applies to fish "belonging to the State" and that utilization, development, and maintenance of fish on the sustained yield principle is "subject to preferences among beneficial uses."

Fish belonging to the state are clearly to be managed according to sustained yield principles. The general rule is that salmon while in state water are property of the state and are held in trust for the benefit of all people of the state. Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 914-915 (Alaska 1961). Part of the state's trust responsibility includes the management of salmon according to sustained yield principles. However it is unclear whether the sustained yield requirement applies to salmon raised by a private nonprofit hatchery, because the ownership of hatchery salmon is uncertain.

Private nonprofit salmon hatcheries are authorized under AS 16.10.375 - 16.10.470. AS 16.10.375 - 16.10.470 that does not answer the question of who owns hatchery stocks of salmon, though a number of provisions do suggest that some property interest in hatchery salmon stocks may pass to the hatchery under the terms of the hatchery permit. There are at least four references to salmon eggs or fry being sold to or by a hatchery. AS 16.10.420(3), (7), and (8); 16.10.450. The ability to sell salmon eggs and fry implies an ability to transfer property rights in the eggs and fry.

AS 16.10.440, which provides for the common use of hatchery fish while the fish are in the natural water of the state, is silent as to whether hatchery fish belong to the state. AS 16.10.440(a) provides

Fish released into the natural waters of the state by a hatchery operated under AS 16.10.400 - 16.10.470 are available to the people for common use and are subject to regulation under applicable law in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state until they return to the specific location designated by the department for harvest by the hatchery operator.

The phrase "occurring in their natural state" used in AS 16.10.440(a) mirrors the language of the common use section of the state constitution (art. VIII, sec. 3) in order to assure that while in the water of the state hatchery fish are to be subject to common use. However providing that hatchery fish are available for common use neither implies state ownership of the hatchery fish nor entails a concomitant responsibility to manage hatchery fish for sustained yield, because the requirements for common use and sustained yield are separate provisions of the constitution.

AS 16.10.440(a) does not use the important phrase "belonging to the state" which would invoke the sustained yield section. According to AS 16.10.440(a), hatchery fish are to be treated "in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state until they return to the specific location. . ."; this language does not say that hatchery fish are a common property resource belonging to the state, but only that they are to be treated as though they were a common property resource until they return to the designated location, at which time the fish become subject to private use by the hatchery. This language suggests some form of lingering private property interest in

hatchery fish by the hatchery even after the hatchery releases the fish into the wild. If there is a latent private property interest in hatchery fish while they are in the wild, then those fish may not necessarily be fish belonging to the state. If the fish do not belong to the state then they are not subject to the requirements for sustained yield management under the state constitution. This could permit the state through the Board of Fisheries and the Department of Fish and Game to manage fisheries through which hatchery fish pass without regard to assuring a sustained yield escapement to the hatchery.

Even if the hatchery fish do belong to the state for the purposes of the sustained yield section, the requirement of the sustained yield section of the state constitution is not absolute, because the management of fish and other replenishable resources belonging to the state shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses. The delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention considered this qualifying language to be necessary because they found that the sustained yield principle becomes meaningless and ineffective, if it is not qualified by the concept of beneficial use. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, Delegate Riley, p. 3054-55. The delegates to the convention did not discuss in detail how they felt the concept of preferences among beneficial uses would be applied in the context of sustained yield management of replenishable resources, except to say that certain kinds of resources (e.g. predators and parasites) should not be maintained on a sustained yield basis. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, Delegate Riley, p. 2451; Commentary on Article on State Lands and Natural Resources, 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention at 98. However the delegates did discuss the concept of beneficial uses in regard to water rights. Section 13 of article VIII, relating to water rights, contains the same "subject to preferences among beneficial uses" language that is contained in the sustained yield section. The delegates understood preference among beneficial uses to allow the state to choose among competing beneficial uses of water in order to achieve the greatest public good, even if it meant eliminating other existing, vested beneficial uses of water, provided that the owner of those rights are compensated for the loss of the rights. Commentary on Article on State Lands and Natural Resources, 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention at 102. Thus the delegates understood that the concept of preferences among beneficial uses would also allow the state to make reasoned decisions to prefer certain renewable resources over other renewable resources to achieve a more beneficial public purpose. The authority to establish preference among beneficial uses may permit the state to harvest hatchery fish without providing for a sustained yield from the hatchery, provided that those who have vested rights in hatchery fish are compensated for those rights that are taken by the state.

The ability of the state to establish preferences among beneficial uses is reflected in AS 16.10.430(b) which allows the commissioner of fish and game to terminate the

Senator Dick Eliason
April 8, 1991
Page 4

operation of a hatchery in the best interests of the public, if the adverse effects of the operation of the hatchery are irreversible and cannot be mitigated.

If I can provide further assistance, please advise.

GU:pl
91-235.plm

ASHBURN AND MASON

LAWYERS

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

1130 WEST SIXTH AVENUE, SUITE 100
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501

MARK E. ASHBURN
LEWIS F. GORDON
JULIAN L. MASON III
JOHN C. McCARRON
DONALD W. McCLINTOCK III
A. WILLIAM SAUPE
KIRSTEN TINGLUM

TELEPHONE
(907) 276-4331
—
TELECOPIER
(907) 277-8235

October 17, 1991

Mr. John McMullen, President
Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation
Box 1110
Cordova, AK 99574

PRINCE WILLIAM
SOUND AQUACULTURE

OCT 21 1991

RE: Proposed Hatchery Regulations
Our File No. 91-7618

Dear John:

Enclosed is the long memorandum that I promised on the cost recovery and production limitations issues that you raised. I would be happy to discuss these matters with PWSAC at any time that is convenient for you.

In addition to the questions addressed in the enclosed memorandum, you also asked whether the Board of Fisheries could change the Prince William Sound Allocation Policy this year, out of its normal sequence. My understanding is that the policy has been implemented in the form of regulations, which are codified at 5AAC 24.370. To my knowledge, there is no absolute bar that would prevent the Board from amending or repealing its regulations at any time, so long as it fulfills the statutory requirements for promulgating regulations. Those detailed requirements are included in the Administrative Procedures Act.

However, any new regulations must be consistent with existing statutes, within the scope of the authorizing statute, and reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the statute. As with any law or regulation, any amending regulations must also be "reasonable and not arbitrary." Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1971).

Given the substantial public testimony in favor of the allocation policy, and the exhaustive back-up documentation that supported the allocation regulations adopted last year, it seems highly unlikely that the Board could make significant amendments that would be "reasonable and not arbitrary." An extensive record would have to be developed showing a dramatic change in circumstances and public support in order to support a change in the policy.

Mr. John McMullen

Page 2


October 17, 1991

Even if such a record were to be made, any new regulations would have to preserve PWSAC's ability to continue a reasonable level of broodstock and cost recovery, for all of the reasons stated in my memorandum. For the same reasons, any new policy that attempted to limit PWSAC's salmon production would be vulnerable to legal challenge.

If you have further questions, please give us a call.

Very truly yours,

ASHBURN & MASON



A. William Saupe

AWS/nk

ASHBURN AND MASON

LAWYERS

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION


1130 WEST SIXTH AVENUE, SUITE 100
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501

MARK E. ASHBURN
LEWIS F. GORDON
JULIAN L. MASON III
JOHN C. McCARRON
DONALD W. McCLINTOCK III
A. WILLIAM SAUPE
KIRSTEN TINGLUM

TELEPHONE
(907) 276-4331
—
TELECOPIER
(907) 277-8235

MEMORANDUM

TO: John McMullen, President
Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation

FROM: A. William Saupe
Ashburn & Mason 

DATE: October 16, 1991

RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries

I. Issues Presented

You have asked us to research several legal issues that go to heart of PWSAC's ability to conduct its business as it has for the past 14 years. First, you asked for the legal basis for of PWSAC's right to conduct broodstock and cost recovery harvests, and an analysis of the degree to which the Department of Fish and Game (the "Department") and the Board of Fisheries (the "Board") can regulate broodstock recovery and cost recovery by private non-profit hatcheries. In that connection, you requested an analysis of an Attorney General's Opinion by Stephen White (Op. No. 663-90-0327, August 1, 1990) and two other opinions on the same topic. One is a memorandum written to Senator Eliason by George Utermohle, Legislative Counsel, dated April 8, 1991, and the other is a

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

February 28, 1991 memorandum from Michael A. D. Stanley to Kate Troll, Executive Director of the Southeast Alaska Seiners.

You also asked for an evaluation of the extent of the Board's authority to regulate hatchery production levels on a regional or individual hatchery basis, with specific reference to AS 16.05.440(b), regarding salmon egg take.

The analysis and arguments that we would make follow.

II. Brief Conclusion

Based upon the relevant provisions of the Alaska Constitution, applicable statutes, and related legislative history, we would argue that PWSAC has a constitutional and statutory right to continue a reasonable level of broodstock and cost recovery harvest. Any regulation by the Board or Department that significantly restricted PWSAC's ability to continue its present broodstock and cost recovery practices would be inconsistent with an extensive statutory scheme that explicitly authorizes broodstock and cost recovery by private non-profit hatcheries and regional aquaculture associations. Any such restriction would also conflict with Article VIII, Section 4, of the Alaska Constitution (requiring fish resources belonging to the State to be "utilized,

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle"), Article VIII, Section 15 of the Alaska Constitution (prohibiting any exclusive right or special privilege of fishery, except insofar as limited entry may be imposed by the State "to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State").

On the related question of the Board's authority to restrict hatchery production (as distinct from its authority to regulate harvests), the Board is statutorily authorized to regulate such things as the "propagation and stocking of fish" (AS 16.05.251(7)), and the "source and number of salmon eggs" taken by a hatchery (AS 16.10.440(b)), which suggests that it might have some measure of control over individual hatchery output. However, the available legislative history strongly suggests that the legislature never intended to give the Board the power to limit hatchery production on either a local, regional or statewide basis. Nothing in the current law would permit regional production ceilings designed to restore historical market share percentages, which we understand to have been proposed.

If the Board does have power to regulate production, at some point it would come into conflict with the constitutional provisions mentioned above and the numerous other statutes, such as

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

the statutes creating the FRED Division, the Limited Entry Act, and the State Hatchery Loan Program, which together evidence a strong policy in favor of hatchery development as well as enhancement and extension of the State's fisheries. Because there are no court decisions interpreting the Board's power to regulate propagation or egg take, and because the Alaska Supreme Court has not elucidated either the meaning of the constitutional reference to "efficient development of aquaculture," or the meaning and application of the sustained yield concept, there is no sure way to know precisely where the collision might occur until a specific restriction is imposed and challenged in court.

It would seem reasonable to conclude, however, that in the absence of a strong factual showing that hatchery production posed a serious genetic or disease threat to wild salmon stocks or perhaps was causing severe economic distress, neither the Department nor the Board could legally restrict PWSAC's output below a level necessary to sustain hatchery yields, to efficiently develop aquaculture, to repay state loans and to recover its costs.

III. Discussion

A. The Board And The Department Are Required By The

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

Alaska Constitution And Numerous Statutes To Manage
For Broodstock Recovery

In its August 1990 opinion, the Attorney General's Office advanced the argument that the Board is obligated to manage Alaska's fisheries to provide for broodstock recovery by hatcheries. Analogizing broodstock fish to wild stock escapement, the Assistant Attorney General Stephen White reasoned that Article VIII, Section 4 of the Alaska Constitution mandates that conclusion. That section provides as follows:

Sustained Yield. Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, §4. White implicitly assumes that hatchery fish "belong to the State" and argues that without broodstock harvests, hatchery stocks obviously could not be sustained.

In an opinion on this subject requested by Senator Eliason, Legislative Counsel George Utermohle questioned White's conclusion that the sustained yield principle applies to hatchery

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

fish, on the grounds that they may not "belong to the State." He bases his argument entirely on AS 16.10.440(a), which provides:

Fish released into the natural waters of the state by a hatchery operated under AS 16.10.400 - 16.10.470 are available to the people for common use and are subject to regulation under applicable law in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state until they return to the specific location designated by the department for harvest by the hatchery operator.

AS 16.10.440(a).

Utermohle points out that the phrase "occurring in their natural state" used in this section mirrors the language of the common use clause of the constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 3).¹ He then argues that merely providing that hatchery fish are available for common use "neither implies state ownership of the hatchery fish nor entails a concomitant responsibility to manage hatchery fish for sustained yield, because the requirements for common use and sustained yield are separate provisions of the constitution." Next, Utermohle asserts that AS 16.10.440(a) does not use the phrase "belonging to the state," which would invoke the sustained

¹Article VIII, Sec. 3 provides: "Common Use. Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use."

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

yield clause. Instead, he argues that the statute requires only that hatchery fish be treated in the same way as fish occurring in their natural state until they return to the specific hatchery location. Utermohle Memo. p. 2.

From this phrasing in AS 16.10.440(a), Utermohle reasons that there may be "some form of lingering private property interest in the hatchery fish even after the hatchery releases the fish into the wild." Id. at 3. If the fish do not "belong to the State," Utermohle concludes that they are not subject to the sustained yield requirement and neither the Board nor the Department is required to manage hatchery fish to assure a sustained yield escapement to the hatcheries.

Utermohle's ownership argument does not stand up to closer analysis and is contradicted by the available legislative and constitutional history. Certainly PWSAC has understood since its creation in 1975 that once it releases its fish, it no longer owns or controls them. From the point of release forward, they are "fish occurring in their natural state" and, as Utermohle acknowledges, Article VIII, Section 3 of the constitution reserves them to the people for common use. This is consistent with the general rule, which he also cites, that salmon while in state water

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

are property of the state and held in trust for the benefit of all people of the state. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 914-915 (Alaska 1961).

That hatchery fish belong to the State is also consistent with the views of the legislature that created the nonprofit hatchery program. In her July 31, 1991 memorandum to Senator Eliason, Linda J. Snow, a Legislative Analyst, wrote as follows:

Consensus is that the legislature had always intended that the fish from PNP hatcheries belong to the common property fishery until such time as they return to the hatchery, and then they belong to the hatchery for broodstock and cost recovery. Testimony by Senator Dick Eliason at a 1975 Senate Resources Committee hearing on SB 180 indicates that the initial concept of a private hatchery system considered profit-making corporate ownership. However, a profit-making corporation might advance a claim to exclusive ownership of everything it produced. Thus, it was felt that private, nonprofit ownership of hatcheries would be more consistent with the concept of publicly owned hatchery fish. This opinion is echoed by former Representative Terry Gardiner.

At a March 7, 1977 House Resources Committee hearing, Jack Milnes, executive director of Southern Southeast Regional Aquaculture Association testified: "I wish to recognize the fact that these are common property fish, that they belong to the state of Alaska and to the people of Alaska and therefore they should be protected by the representatives of the

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

people of the state of Alaska." At a 1979 Senate Resources Committee hearing on HB 48, Don Clockson, an attorney with Alaska Legal Services discussed the question of ownership of hatchery fish. In his testimony, he asked "When are fish no longer common property fish?" He felt that constitutionally, they were considered to be common property at all times. Consequently, it appears there was never any question that hatchery fish were common property of the people of the state while in Alaska waters, and they may or may not be the property of the PNP hatchery operator at the hatchery, but that he is allowed to harvest a sufficient number for broodstock and cost recovery.

Snow Memo. p. 14 (attached as Attachment A) (emphasis added). These statements effectively answer the "ownership" issue. When the legislature created private hatcheries, it intended that the fish would belong to the State, contrary to Utermohle's supposition.

The commentary of the Committee on Resources of the Alaska Constitutional Convention is also significant on this point. Referring specifically to the "common use" clause, which Utermohle seeks to distinguish from the sustained yield clause, the commentary states in relevant part as follows:

Game fish, wildlife, fisheries, and water are recognized as belonging to the state so long as in a natural state. These resources are subject to a private right only when they have been acquired or utilized as provided by law.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings, Part 6, p. 98 (emphasis added). Thus, the framers of the common use clause thought that the fish being reserved for common use "belonged" to the State. Hatchery fish are reserved for common use by AS 16.10.440(a) and the common use clause itself. Therefore, they must belong to the State and be subject to the sustained yield principle.

Also significant is the commentary to the sustained yield clause, which states in relevant part:

Sustained yield is recognized as a principle applicable to the administration of plant and animal life subject to the immediate authority of the state.

Id. (emphasis added). Because hatchery fish are subjected to the authority of the State by AS 16.10.440(a), among other provisions, it follows that they are subject to the sustained yield clause.

This conclusion also comports with common sense. If they did not belong to the State, it could not reserve hatchery fish for use by others without paying for them. Moreover, if the mere expectation that a hatchery will later be allowed to harvest some unidentified fraction of the returning fish constitutes an ownership interest in all of its fish, then every other limited entry permit holder could be said to have the same "lingering

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

property interest," leading to the false conclusion that none of the fish in Alaska's waters ever belong to the State or are subject to the sustained yield principle of management.

A more reasonable interpretation of these related statutory and constitutional provisions is that, once released, hatchery fish become like wild stocks in every legal respect. They belong to the State, are reserved to the people for common use and must be managed for sustained yield. Therefore, broodstock recovery must be permitted by the Board and the Department at a level sufficient to produce a sustained yield of hatchery stocks.

Even if this is true, Utermohle goes on to argue that the sustained yield principle in Article VIII, Section 4 is not absolute and is "subject to preferences among beneficial uses." He suggests that this phrase implies the power on the part of State regulators to deny hatchery harvests altogether, in order to achieve a "more beneficial public purpose." According to Utermohle, the ability of the State to establish preferences among beneficial uses is reflected in AS 16.10.430(b), which allows the Commissioner of Fish and Game to terminate the operation of a

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

hatchery if its adverse effects are irreversible and cannot be mitigated. Utermohle Memo., p. 4.²

A more plausible interpretation of AS 16.10.430(b) is that the listed conditions under which a hatchery operation may be terminated are the only bases upon which termination is permitted. In other words, unless there are irreversible adverse effects that cannot be mitigated, a licensed hatchery operation cannot be terminated, directly through a termination order, or indirectly through a denial of broodstock or cost recovery funds.

Utermohle's argument also overlooks, among other things, Article VIII, Section 15 of the constitution, which provides:

²AS 16.10.430(b) provides as follows: "If the commissioner finds that the operation of the hatchery is not in the best interests of the public, the commissioner may alter the conditions of the permit to mitigate the adverse effects of the operation, or, if the adverse effects are irreversible and cannot be mitigated sufficiently, initiate a termination of the operation under the permit over a reasonable period of time under the circumstances, not to exceed four years. During the period of time that the operation is being terminated, the permit holder may harvest salmon under the terms of the permit but may not release additional fish."

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.

This provision strongly suggests that the framers of our constitution considered the efficient development of aquaculture to be an important value to be protected. It also indicates read to mean that the efficient development of aquaculture is one of the purposes of limited entry, a principle that is central to fisheries management in Alaska.

Hatchery harvests for broodstock (and cost recovery) are absolutely essential to conservation of the resource and to the efficient development of aquaculture. If deprived of broodstock (or the funds generated by cost recovery), PWSAC could not continue in existence, much less develop efficiently. Furthermore, other beneficial uses, such as the harvest of PWSAC produced fish by commercial, sport and subsistence users, would be seriously harmed, not helped by a restriction on broodstock harvest. Over the past 14 years, PWSAC has harvested an average of less than 30% of the

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

salmon returning to its hatcheries. During the period from 1986 through 1990, PWSAC fish constituted 50 percent of the total commercial harvest. During that period PWSAC contributed an average of approximately \$15.4 million annually in value to the common property fishery, while costing the State little or nothing. PWSAC harvests have consistently sustained other user groups throughout the region, while causing no demonstrable harm to wild stocks. Short of the extreme situation envisioned by AS 16.10.430(b), it is hard to conceive how denial of a reasonable hatchery harvest in favor of other beneficial uses could achieve a greater public purpose.

Any regulation that severely limited or denied PWSAC's right to harvest a reasonable number of fish would violate both Section 4 (sustained yield) and infringe on the values reflected in Section 15 (limited entry and efficient development of aquaculture) of Article VIII and the Limited Entry Act, of which hatchery harvests are an integral part.

Utermohle's argument also overlooks an extensive web of statutory provisions that evidence an unwavering legislative intent to sustain and expand hatchery operations through hatchery harvests. A good example is the very provision that Utermohle

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

cites, AS 16.10.440(a), which provides that hatchery fish are available for common use "until they return to the specific location designated by the department for harvest by the hatchery operator." This indicates a legislative expectation and intent that hatchery harvests are necessary.

The obligation of the Department to affirmatively assist with broodstock recovery is embodied in AS 16.10.443, which states:

Department assistance and cooperative. (a)
Before and after permit issuance under AS 16.10.440 - 16.10.470, the department shall make every effort, within the limits of time and resources, to advise and assist applicants or permit holders, as appropriate, in the planning, construction, or operation of salmon hatcheries.

As explained above, broodstock recovery is essential to hatchery operations. Without it, they could not exist. The Department is obligated under AS 16.10.443 to assist in the operation of hatcheries. Any departmental regulation, action or order that denied broodstock recovery would be inconsistent with this obligation and would be invalid.

Other relevant statutory provisions that establish the obligation of the Department and the Board to manage for hatchery harvests are discussed below, in relation to cost recovery.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

B. The Board And The Department Must Also
Manage For Cost Recovery Harvests

Assistant Attorney General White concluded that the Board and the Department "are authorized, and in fact directed, to manage fisheries so that broodstock returns to hatcheries." Both the reasons given by White and the additional reasons set forth above support this conclusion. On the related issue of whether the Board and the Department must manage for cost recovery, White is less certain. He believes that the arguments on both sides of the question "depend upon implication and analogy" and concludes that "the law does not clearly point to one answer or the other." White Memo., p. 7. However, we would argue that the Alaska Constitution and an extensive statutory scheme require the Board and the Department to manage for hatchery cost recovery.

As an initial matter, it is important to remember that the Board and the Department manage the fisheries primarily through regulations and orders. In order to be valid, a regulation must be within the scope of the authorizing statute and it must be "consistent with standards prescribed by other provisions of law." Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska App. 1985), citing AS 44.62.020. In Beran, the court struck down a Board regulation on

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

the basis that it was inconsistent with other provisions of law and therefore invalid. Id. at 1289. If the Board or the Department were to issue regulations that curtailed PWSAC's ability to conduct a cost recovery harvest, the regulations would be inconsistent with numerous provisions of law and could be successfully challenged in court.

The first section of this memorandum focused on the requirements of Article VIII of our constitution. The same constitutional provisions that protect broodstock recovery also protect cost recovery, because cost recovery is also absolutely essential to sustain hatchery yields (Section 4) and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture (Section 15). This discussion will not repeat those arguments, but will focus instead on the legislative mandate for cost recovery. Numerous statutes express the legislative intent that hatcheries must be permitted to conduct cost recovery harvests in order to generate funds for operation, debt retirement, and expansion.

The most obvious such provision is AS 16.10.450(a), which could hardly be clearer on this point. It states:

Sale of salmon and salmon eggs by hatchery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in a contract for the operation of a hatchery under

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

AS 16.10.480, a hatchery operator who sells salmon returning from the natural waters of the state, or sells salmon eggs to another hatchery operating under AS 16.10.400 - 16.10.470, after utilizing the funds for reasonable operating costs, including debt retirement, expanding its facilities, salmon rehabilitation projects, fisheries research, or costs of operating the qualified regional association for the area in which the hatchery is located, shall expend the remaining funds on other fisheries activities of the qualified regional association.

AS 16.10.450(a).³

The Limited Entry Act, AS 16.43.400, et. seq., permits the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission to issue "special harvest area entry permits" to holders of private, nonprofit hatchery permits issued by the Department. Section 420 of the Act, noted above in connection with the ownership issue, specifically authorizes cost recovery harvest by permit holders, such as PWSAC:

Disposition of fish. Fish caught under the authority of a special harvest area entry

³The intent of this provision is reiterated in AS 16.40.210, the recently enacted statute that bans mariculture. It provides in section (b)(2) that "this section does not restrict the ability of a nonprofit corporation that holds a salmon hatchery permit under 16.10.400 to sell salmon returning from the natural waters of the state, as authorized under 16.10.450, or surplus salmon eggs, as authorized under 16.10.420 and .450."

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

permit are the property of the permit holder.
The permit holder may sell the fish if the
proceeds are used in the manner described in
AS 16.10.450.

AS 16.43.420. PWSAC, of course, holds a special harvest area entry permit under AS 16.43.400, and its cost recovery funds are used for the purposes listed in AS 16.10.450. It thus has a statutory right to cost recovery that cannot be curtailed through regulation.⁴

PWSAC also conducts cost recovery harvests at Main Bay and Cannery Creek under authority of contracts entered pursuant to AS 16.10.480, enacted by the legislature in 1988. That section authorizes the Department to enter into hatchery management contracts for certain state-owned hatcheries, which allow harvest of adult salmon "in a quantity sufficient to allow the contractor to recover all or part of the contractor's costs of operating the hatchery." While this provision is permissive, rather than

⁴It could also be argued that cost recovery is guaranteed to permit holders such as PWSAC by the Limited Entry Act itself. In Johns v. CFEC, 758 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Alaska 1988) the court stated: "The Limited Entry Act has two purposes - enabling fishermen to receive adequate remuneration and conserving the fishery," citing, Art. VIII, Sec. 15, Alaska Const., AS 16.43.010; CFEC v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1255 (Alaska 1980). Without cost recovery, PWSAC would not receive adequate remuneration or be able to help conserve the fishery.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

mandatory, it is further evidence of the legislature's expectation and intent to permit cost recovery harvests at state-owned but privately operated hatcheries.⁵

Another statutory provision that is quite clear on this point is AS 16.10.430(b), discussed above. This provision permits the Commissioner of Fish and Game to terminate a hatchery permit if he finds that continued operation is no longer in the public interest. Presumably, termination could be ordered if a hatchery failed to sustain itself economically, or more likely, if it produced diseased or genetically damaged fish that might threaten other stocks. See Snow Memo., pp. 12-13, 16. In any case, the relevant point is that termination is to be phased over time.

During the period of time that the operation is being terminated, the permit holder may harvest salmon under the terms of the permit but may not release additional fish.

AS 16.10.430(b). Logically, this provision can only contemplate cost recovery harvest. In the context of hatchery termination,

⁵Both the Main Bay and the Cannery Creek contracts provide that PWSAC shall have the right to conduct cost recovery harvests during the terms of the contracts.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

broodstock harvest would not be necessary since no new fish could be released.

Under AS 16.05.020, the Commissioner of Fish and Game is required to "manage, protect, maintain, improve, and extend the fish, game... of the state in the interest of the economy and general well-being of the State." The FRED Division has been charged with the duty, "through rehabilitation, enhancement and development programs" to do everything "necessary to insure perpetual and increasing production and use of the food resources of Alaska's waters and continental shelf areas." AS 16.05.092. Also significant is AS 16.10.443, cited above, which requires the Department to do everything possible to assist hatchery operations. Any regulation or order that prevents a reasonable level of cost recovery would hardly be consistent with the duties on the part of the Commissioner or with the intent of other statutes that authorize cost recovery harvests by hatcheries. Under Beran v. State, supra, and numerous other cases, regulations are invalid if they are inconsistent with other provisions of law.

The statutory provisions discussed above lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended cost recovery harvest to be the primary method of funding private nonprofit hatcheries. The

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

Snow Memorandum on the legislative history of the hatchery program supports this conclusion:

At this time [1973-974], legislators were coming to the view that the private sector would be more efficient than the government in the operation of hatcheries. Also, nongovernmental hatcheries had much to recommend them from the perspective of public finance issues: the operation of private hatcheries could be funded from the harvest of returning fish and from tax assessments on the fishermen who had access to hatchery production, thus shifting the cost of the facilities from the shoulders of the general public to the people who derived benefits directly from them.

Snow Memo., p. 5. (emphasis added). Snow goes on to point out that in 1974 "there was great enthusiasm about the prospect of PNP hatcheries from fishermen's groups, education centers, Native corporations, and the legislature itself." Id.

An attorney for the Southeast Alaska Seiners, Michael D. Stanley, seems less enthusiastic about cost recovery. He has approached the issue from a different direction, acknowledging the Department's primary responsibility for control of hatchery harvests, but questioning whether the Board has the statutory authority to allocate fish to private hatcheries. See Memorandum from Michael Stanley to Kate Troll, Executive Director Southeast

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

Alaska Seiners, dated February 28, 1991. Stanley bases his argument on AS 16.05.440(a), cited above at page 5. He focuses on the statutory language subjecting hatchery fish to regulation in the same manner as wild stocks, "until they return to the specific location designated by the department for harvest by the hatchery operator." From this he concludes (1) it is the Department, not the Board, which is responsible for "allocating" hatchery fish to a hatchery through designation of special harvest areas, and (2) such allocation occurs only after those fish have traversed the common property fisheries and returned to the specific location designated for hatchery harvest. Stanley Memo., p. 4.

One flaw in this reasoning is that it confuses allocation of fish to be harvested with designation of a special harvest area and harvest timing. There is no logical reason that the Board cannot allocate a portion of the return to a hatchery and the Department designate the specific time and place for the harvest of that allocation. In fact, my understanding is that that is how the system has always worked.

This scheme also appears to be in harmony with subsection (b) of AS 16.10.440, which gives the Board the authority "to amend by regulation... the terms of the permit relating to the harvest of

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

fish by hatchery operators, and the specific locations designated by the department for harvest." This provision gives the Department primary responsibility to regulate cost recovery harvests, but also confers sufficient statutory authority on the Board to allocate fish to be harvested. The legislative history of AS 16.10.440, quoted at length below, indicates that the role of the Board extends to regulating the harvest of "those fish which are returning as a result of releases from natural systems and also from hatchery releases." House Journal, March 15, 1979, pp. 601-602.

Another difficulty with Stanley's theory that the Board does not have the power to allocate fish for hatchery harvest is that it seems to be inconsistent with two specific provisions of the Limited Entry Act, under which hatcheries are granted limited entry permits. AS 16.43.440 provides that: "use privileges granted under AS 16.43.400 - .440 are subject to the regulations of the Board of Fisheries." Also, AS 16.43.950 states that "... Holders of ... entry permits issued under this chapter are subject to all regulations adopted by the Board of Fisheries." These provisions

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

also could be read to authorize the Board to allocate fish to hatcheries.⁶

As a final point in response to the Stanley Memorandum, the Board's primary authorizing statute, AS 16.05.251(a), is quite broad and seems to give the Board ample authority to allocate fish for cost recovery and broodstock harvest. Examples of the types of regulations the Board may adopt are found in Section 251(a)(6) (classifying as commercial fish, sport fish, personal use fish, subsistence fish, or predators or other categories essential for regulatory purposes); Section 251(a)(12) (regulating commercial, sport, subsistence, and personal use fishing as needed for the conservation, development, and utilization of fisheries); Section 251 (a)(14) (establishing nonexclusive, exclusive, and superexclusive registration and use areas for regulating commercial fishing.) See also, AS 16.05.251(e) (Board shall establish criteria for allocation of fishery resources among personal use,

⁶As we have argued elsewhere, the power of the Board to allocate to hatcheries does not include the power to deny a reasonable allocation altogether.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

sport and commercial fishing). These provisions are broad enough to allow the Board to allocate to hatcheries.

The idea that hatchery harvests do not qualify as "commercial fishing", and therefore not covered by these statutory sections, is directly contrary to the plain meaning of the definition found in the statute.

"Commercial fishing" means the taking, fishing for, or possession of fish... with the intent of disposing of them for profit, or by sale, barter, trade, or in commercial channels;

As 16.05.940(4). There can be no doubt that PWSAC takes and possesses fish with the intent of disposing of them by sale in commercial channels, and is thus engaged in commercial fishing within the meaning of AS 16.05.251. Commercial fishing is precisely what a cost recovery harvest is. PWSAC's conduct in this regard is indistinguishable from that of any other commercial fisherman. (Ironically, one of the objections that is raised by hatchery opponents is that it is inappropriate, for some reason, for hatcheries to "compete" in the commercial market with other fishermen trying to sell their fish to the same customers).

If PWSAC is engaged in commercial fishing, AS 16.05.251 and the case law cited in the White Memorandum (e.g., Meier v.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

State Bd. of Fisheries, 739 P.2d 172 (Alaska App. 1987)) support the conclusion that the Board has ample power to make allocations for hatchery harvests. The Board not only has the authority, but it also has an obligation to do so. See, AS 16.05.251(d) (requiring the Board to provide a fair and reasonable opportunity for the taking of fishery resources by personal use, sport and commercial fishermen).

C. The Board's Power To Restrict Hatchery Output Is Unclear, But Must Be Limited By The Same Constitutional And Statutory Restrictions That Apply To Cost Recovery

Your second question concerns the extent of the Board's authority to regulate hatchery output, as opposed to allocation of harvests. The Snow Memorandum (Attachment A) addresses this issue. It directly responds to a question posed by Senator Eliason as to whether the legislature ever considered limiting hatchery production because of: (1) adverse impacts on wild stocks; or (2) adverse impacts on salmon market prices. Snow's answer is revealing. Her memorandum states as follows:

We found no discussion in the legislative record that hatchery production should be restrained to a predetermined level for either biological or economic reasons. While the legislature was presumably prepared to take whatever corrective measures were necessary in the face of persuasive evidence that the hatchery program

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

was causing serious biological problems, there appears to have been no discussion of establishing a ceiling on the production of fish from hatcheries.

There also appears to have been no contemplation of imposing a ceiling on the production of hatchery fish to support market prices. According to Terry Gardiner, salmon stocks were so depressed in the 1970's that there was no thought given to the possibility of oversupply.

* * * * *
Clem Tillion told us that the legislature did not anticipate dependence on hatchery salmon by Alaska's commercial fishermen, and if adverse impacts on salmon market price were suspected by any legislators, it was not a widespread feeling, for they did not take steps to be able to limit production if that occurred.

Snow Memo., pp. 13-14 (emphasis added).

Consistent with Snow's conclusions, a review of the Board's authorizing statute as well as the other statutes relating to hatcheries finds little or no basis for regulation of hatchery output by the Board.

You specifically asked whether AS 16.10.440(b), which provides, among other things, that the Board has the authority to regulate "the terms of [a hatchery] permit relating to the source and number of salmon eggs...",⁷ authorizes the Board to limit

⁷Section 440(b) goes on to say that the Board may not "adopt regulations or take any action regarding the issuance or denial of any permits required in AS 16.10.400 - 16.10.470." This suggests that the Board does not have the power to completely deny a cost

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

hatchery production levels. The legislative history of this provision indicates that it does not. The Resources Committee's letter of intent on HB 359, which included the language in question, states as follows:

There are three other major changes made by the bill:

(1) Section 2 of the bill amends AS 16.10.440(a)(b). The amendment clarifies the role of the Board of Fisheries. The role of the Board of Fisheries as envisioned by the original legislation was to regulate the harvest of salmon returning to the waters of the state. That role extends to regulating those fish which are returning as a result of releases from natural systems and also from hatchery releases. There are provisions in other portions of the non-profit hatchery Act which allow the designation of specific locations for the harvest of salmon by the hatchery operator for sale, and use of the money from that sale, for the specific purposes as stated in AS 16.10.450. The added language clarifies that the Board of Fisheries may adopt regulations relating to the harvest of the fish by hatchery operators at the specifically designated locations. The Board of Fisheries in the past year or two has enacted regulations relating to those harvests for several of the private non-profit hatcheries in the state.

recovery harvest permit.

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

House Journal, March 15, 1979, pp. 601-602 (emphasis added). The exclusive reference to regulation of harvest, and the absence of any mention of production controls, corroborates the conclusion reached by the Snow Memorandum that the legislature never intended to authorize the Board to limit hatchery production. The Board's traditional function has always been to allocate harvests.

The only other statutory provision that suggests otherwise is found at AS 16.05.251(7), which authorizes the Board to regulate the "propagation and stocking of fish," which tends to suggest the power to regulate production, not just harvest levels and allocations. The most plausible explanation of this language is that it was included to permit regulation of such activities as stocking lakes with trout or perhaps even raising fish in ponds. There is regrettably no legislative history available to aid in the interpretation of this language. Because it runs counter to the Board's traditional role and is inconsistent with the conclusions in the Snow Memorandum, it would be wrong to assign much importance to this provision.

Apart from the issue of whether the Board could regulate hatchery output on a local basis, you have asked also whether the Board has the authority to set regional production limits for the

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

purpose of adjusting relative market shares between different regions of the State. Can the Board, for example, legally cap hatchery sockeye output in Prince William Sound to keep it at the historical position it has held in relation to Bristol Bay sockeye production?

There is no short and simple legal answer to this question. The authority to regulate propagation and stocking is a very slender thread from which to hang an unprecedented, statewide regulatory program of production allocation, which has not been specifically authorized or even contemplated by the legislature. Certainly any such regulatory regime would raise serious questions as to its consistency with the Board's statutory duty to "conserve and develop" the State's fisheries. Such a policy might further conflict with a number of the other statutory provisions already discussed. It would also run up against the sustained yield concept (Section 4) and the maximum use (Section 1) and maximum benefit (Section 2) policies at the heart of Article VIII of our constitution.

Perhaps more significant than the legal impediments, which are considerable, there would be serious practical and policy problems with any attempt by the Board to allocate production

John McMullen, President
RE: Regulation of Private Hatcheries
October 17, 1991

between regions of the State. For example, which historical moment would serve as the reference point for assignment of regional quotas? Would it be before or after establishment of the hatchery program? Would new hatchery programs (such as the Main Bay sockeye facility) be automatically precluded if they would alter the historical balance of harvest levels between regions? How could hatcheries plan their budgets and production levels from year to year, given the inherent unpredictability of natural returns? Would a direct consequence of such a policy be to reward stagnant regions and to stifle initiative on the part of any region that is efficient, well-organized and capable of growth? Would the anticompetitive aspects of regional limits outweigh the asserted benefits? What are the asserted benefits? Do they go beyond mere regional jealousy and have some statewide economic rationale? While the answers to these questions are unknown, it may be very difficult for the Board to identify a defensible, rational basis for any such plan.