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6

COMMITTEE REPORT

FURTHER REFERRALS:

3-89

red:

SJR 6

NO. 6 (Resources)

[HIGH SEAS SALMON INTERCEPTION]

of Alaska salmon and steelhead on the high

S SJR 6 (Res) [] the same title
[] a new title

_____ Committee

letter of intent

APPROVES PREVIOUS:

(Date/Dept)

- [] fiscal note(s) _____
- zero fiscal note(s) 7:6 1/26/89
- [] zero fn/analysis _____

SIGNING:

(Check approp. column)

	Do Not Pass	No Rec	Amend
<u>W. Gunnar</u>			
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Cliff Dunkel

Chairman's signature

**LAWS AND AGREEMENTS
HIGH SEAS SALMON AND STEELHEAD INTERCEPTION**

The Driftnet Impact, Monitoring and Control Act of 1987

Requires the Secretary of Commerce, through the Secretary of State, to negotiate agreements with Japan, Korea and Taiwan to establish enforcement, monitoring and research programs to eliminate high seas interception of salmon and steelhead. If agreements are not reached by June 1989, the foreign nations can be sanctioned under the Pelly Amendment. It also requires that the Department of Commerce report the results of the negotiations to Congress by December 29, 1988.

The Pelly Amendment

Allows for an embargo of fishery products or the prohibition of fish harvest in U.S. waters.

In April 1988, the President certified Japan under the Pelly Amendment in response to their whaling practices and imposed a 100% prohibition on directed fishing by Japanese fishing fleets.

**The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission - INPFC
US/Canada/Japan**

Governs certain time and area restrictions so as to conserve migrating North American-origin salmon stocks. The most recent meeting was held November 1 - 4 in Tokyo.

Japan has threatened to withdraw from INPFC perhaps without the one year required notice in response to being denied a marine mammal permit in 1988 for their mothership fishery.

**US/USSR Agreement - General International Fishery Agreement
(GIFA)**

Provides the framework for cooperative management of high seas fisheries and expresses mutual interest by both countries in eliminating salmon interception on the high seas.

The first meeting between the two countries occurred recently in October. No specific agreement was reached but the two countries agreed to continue to pursue enforcement and research agreements. Another meeting is scheduled in late December or early January. The Soviets expressed their concern regarding high seas salmon interception and called for a cessation of salmon interception by 1992. They proposed a new organization to regulate high seas capture of salmon similar to the organization that manages the North Atlantic Salmon. The US is still interested in pursuing a joint enforcement management program.

Actions that can be taken to eliminate high seas interception
of North American steelhead and salmon

1. Continue to pursue a joint enforcement agreement with the Soviet Union. Since all salmon caught by the squid fleets are assured to be of US, USSR or Canadian origin, with the possible exception of identifiable Hokkaido hatchery chum, such an agreement would lend itself to tremendous leverage on the high seas fleets.

- The USSR already asserts its jurisdiction over its salmon as shown by their recent seizure of two Taiwanese vessels. They have indicated that they would like to pursue a multilateral enforcement agreement with the US, Canada and possibly Japan and have proposed an organization similar to the one that exists to manage North Atlantic salmon.

2. Amend the Magnuson Act, which is up for reauthorization in 1989, to require the Secretary of Commerce to assert jurisdiction over U.S. salmon and steelhead stocks on the high seas in terms of boarding and seizing vessels found with salmon on board.

- Apparently the Department of Commerce has this authority but has not asserted it.
- A meaningful program would require adequate funding.

3. Continue to pursue monitoring, enforcement, and research agreements with Japan, Korea and Taiwan as required by the Driftnet legislation. If agreements with these squid fishing nations are not reached by June 29, 1989 then the President could enact the Pelly Amendment which would embargo fishery products or prohibit foreign fishing efforts within the 200 mile limit.

4. Expand the sanctions under the Pelly Amendment to include the embargo of non fishery products.

- Senator Stevens tried unsuccessfully to amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act last year to broaden the Pelly Amendment to include non-fishery products. There seems to be a consensus to continue to try to broaden the sanctions.
- In April 1988, the President certified Japan under the Pelly Amendment for their whaling practices and placed a 100% prohibition on their fishing efforts in U.S. managed waters. This action was largely symbolic since the NPMC had already closed U.S. waters to foreign fishing in December 1987.
- Imposing an embargo on fishery products under the Pelly Amendment is not considered an effective negotiating lever with Japan, Korea and Taiwan because they import more fisheries products than they export.

5. The U.S. Coast Guard budget should be increased for the purposes of patrolling high seas fisheries and enforcing the laws and regulations prohibiting the harvest and retention of North American salmon and steelhead.

6. The National Marine Fisheries Service Enforcement Office (NMFS) and the U.S. Customs Service should be adequately funded to discover and prosecute U.S. companies involved in salmon shipping schemes to obscure foreign companies as sources of illegally harvested salmon.

7. Increase appropriations to NMFS to identify origin of high seas salmon and steelhead.

8. High-tech monitoring of foreign fleets including satellite systems and transponders should be negotiated into any fisheries agreement with Japan, Korea or Taiwan. Assistance from the U.S. military should be pursued.

9. The U.S. is considering offering Japan an opportunity to resume a small salmon fishery in the Bering Sea as a lever to obtain their cooperation in reducing and eliminating salmon and steelhead interceptions by their squid fleet.




Figure 8. Known distribution of North American steelhead as evidenced by recoveries of marked or tagged fish within the larger distribution of steelhead determined from catch data.

HIGH SEAS SALMON INTERCEPTION
Background Summary

ISSUE

Interception of Alaskan salmon stocks by high seas foreign fishing fleets is having major political and economic impacts on the Alaskan fishing industry. The state can play an important role in resolving this ongoing problem.

BACKGROUND-HISTORY

General

- A. Alaskan salmon migrations-general life history
 - 1. 0-3 years freshwater
 - 2. 1-5 years ocean
 - a. Far ranging ocean migrations
 - b. Susceptible to high seas harvest within and outside U.S. and USSR 200 mile zones
 - c. Order of susceptibility generally: chinook, sockeye, coho, steelhead, chum, pink
- B. Earliest record of interceptions: 1930s Japanese incursions into entrance of Bristol Bay
- C. Development of Japanese high seas salmon fisheries
 - 1. Early Fisheries onshore in Siberia, Kurile Islands
 - 2. Forced offshore in 1920s
 - 3. Cessation of fishing in WWII
 - 4. 1950s strong offshore movement/development
 - a. Total catches as high as 100 million salmon in early 1950s
 - b. Mothership fishery - Northern North Pacific and Bering Seas. 16 motherships, 400 catcher boats peak effort in 1959
 - c. Landbased fishery - North Pacific. 371 independent offshore vessels at peak in 1975
 - d. Vessels fish about ten miles of net per boat

INPFC

- A. International North Pacific Fisheries Convention signed in 1952 - US/Canada/Japan
 - 1. Abstention line (eastern boundary) at 175°W to protect North American salmon (Map A)
 - 2. Consensus required for change

B. 1952 to 1978 minimal change without Japanese concurrence

1. Scientific studies established North American stocks to west of 175°W
2. High seas gillnets dropout rate of 50 percent not reported as catch
3. Harvest of many immature salmon and even matures well short of growth potential
4. Impacts on Alaskan runs may have been as high as 10,000,000 fish per year
5. Primary known impacts on western Alaska coho and chinook, Bristol Bay sockeye and central Alaska chinook
6. In the case of western Alaska coho high seas catch may have exceeded inshore catch in some years

C. 1978 renegotiation

1. Moved Japanese fleets west over 400 miles (Map B)
2. 200 mile limit impetus
3. May have reduced interceptions as much as 70-80 percent. Some inshore runs showed dramatic increases even beyond what would be explained by better survival picture experienced throughout Alaska
4. Continuing impacts - maybe 2,000,000 fish per year
 - a. Western and central Alaska chinook
 - b. Central and western Alaska coho - reduced from prior years
 - c. Bristol Bay sockeye - although greatly reduced from prior years
 - d. Steelhead
 - e. Illegal fishing - landbased, mothership

D. 1986 renegotiation (Map B)

1. Bering Seas (donut) phaseout by 1994
2. Freeze on effort in U.S. EEZ
3. Landbased 1° line movement and enforcement
4. Research and monitoring provisions - mothership observers
5. Provisions for renegotiation
6. Would have reduced remaining interceptions by about 20 percent by 1994 if enforced, but chinook interceptions would be cut by one-half. Actually Soviet quota reductions and current ban on fishing in U.S. EEZ if INPFC guidelines are retained will have reduced remaining interceptions by 80 percent or to about 5 percent of what was occurring pre-1978.

E. Current and future status

- 1. Marine mammal suit - ban on EEZ fishery
 - a. Japanese threats - INPFC withdrawal (?)
 - b. Alternate fishing areas request
- 2. MMPA reauthorization
 - a. Request for foreign exemption
 - b. Quid pro quos
 - c. Environmentalist interests - cooperative opportunities
- 3. Mothership - landbased economic/political situation. Mothership; fishery may be economically defunct but landbased still viable and a strong political force on Japan.

USSR - GOJ Salmon

A. Treaty since 1956, annual negotiations

- 1. Initially regulated areas, times, gear
- 2. Evolved to quotas by species by fishery in mid-1970s
- 3. Banned fishing in USSR 200 mile zone in 1977
- 4. Bans fishing in some areas outside USSR 200 mile
- 5. Total quota reduced to only 14.5 million salmon in 1988 compared to longer term historical catches in the 40-to-65-million range
- 6. Charged Japan for fishing privileges (\$26.8 million in 1988)

B. Current Impacts

- 1. Quotas are for all salmon - North American and Asian not differentiated
- 2. Quotas dramatically reduced 1985-1988 to about 20 percent in mothership, 70 percent in landbased
- 3. Mothership fleet reduced from a high of 16 motherships and 400 catcherboats in 1959 to one mothership and 43 catcherboats in 1988
- 4. Landbased fleet reduced from 371 offshore vessels in 1975 to 157 in 1988
- 5. New Joint venture strategies
 - a. Processing for USSR catcherboats
 - b. Hatchery joint construction and harvesting

US/USSR GIFA

- A. Negotiated spring 1988, will be ratified in November

- B. Provides for consultative committee member and alternate each side. Meet at least annually
- C. Article VII deals with salmon
 - 1. Cooperation in management of high seas fisheries
 - 2. Agree on undesirability of high seas fisheries
- D. Reciprocal fishing agreements
 - 1. Paves the way for industry ventures in each others zones
 - 2. Crab ventures in USSR EEZ being planned
- E. Provides for management cooperation in other high seas fisheries management
 - 1. Donut
 - 2. Squid fisheries

Donut Fisheries

- A. Trawl harvests have expanded from nothing to nearly 1,300,000 mt (reported) in last four years
- B. Observed illegal fishing in U.S. EEZ from vessels supposedly operating in international waters of donut. Total catch may be underestimated - little or no monitoring
- C. Observer data on donut trawl very fragmentary
 - 1. No herring observed
 - 2. Salmon bycatch rates quite variable. Mainly chinook
 - a. Number of observations minimal
 - b. Expansion of samples to total chinook catch results in 2,000- 20,000/year total in five of six years and 200,000 in 1988 (small sample)
 - c. Impacts could be significant
- D. Sitka multilateral pollock science conference
 - 1. Inconclusive on donut stock composition as far as any consensus between nations
 - 2. In our view, data sufficient for management conclusions
 - a. Most probably major stock interactions between U.S. EEZ and donut

- b. Present level of harvests will probably have a negative effect on U.S. fisheries and EEZ pollock stocks
- c. There is a need for more research to better define pollock biomass and stock migrations

Squid Fisheries

- A. Japanese jig fisheries in western North Pacific are longstanding with little interaction with U.S. EEZ resources. Jig fisheries moved offshore in 1974
- B. Japanese gillnet vessels proliferated to around 500 in last ten years largely based on transfers from mothership and landbased fleets as Soviet quotas decreased
 - 1. Korea and Taiwan later entries - 1980 and 1982 respectively
 - 2. Over 700 vessels total with over 10,000 miles of gillnet of a size which will capture salmon
 - 3. Know fishing area larger than the continental U.S. (Map C)
 - 4. Squid catches with drift gillnets average 180,000-260,000 metric tons per year
- C. Japanese management - domestic regulation
 - 1. Area fishing restrictions with western boundary at 145°W and northern boundary movable by month to keep vessels out of colder salmon waters. 46°N is upper boundary
 - 2. Ban on retention or sale of salmon
 - 3. No evidence of significant salmon bycatch or retention
 - a. Little observer data. Plans for expanded coverage cancelled when Japan denied mothership MMPA permit for 1988
 - b. Only fragmentary observations of landings in Japan. No salmon observed
 - c. Many observations of illegal fishing north of boundary even with minimal U.S. observation capability
 - d. Domestic enforcement minimal
- D. Taiwanese management - domestic regulation
 - 1. Under U.S. pressure adopted generally same regulations as Japan
 - 2. No enforcement we are aware of
 - 3. Many indications of illegal salmon catch and sale

- a. Same fleet mounted a directed salmon fishery in Asian waters three and four years ago. Three to four million catch per year. Japanese banned Taiwanese salmon imports
- b. Major Hong Kong/Singapore illegal transshipment through Tacoma to Japan of salmon probably caught by Taiwanese fleets uncovered three years ago, about 4,000,000 pounds were involved, mostly chums
- c. Unspecified origin coho on European market
- d. Very few observations of Taiwanese fishing - fleet operation an unknown

E. Korean management

1. No known regulations
2. Are cooperating to some degree on observers
3. One observer trip recently - no salmon, but significant catches of albacore and billfish


F. Squid - salmon overlaps

1. Definitely area of overlap on northern boundary
2. Generally Japanese regulations would be acceptable if enforced
3. 1988 salmon run problems in some areas of Alaska have heightened interest in interceptions
 - a. Reports of net marked fish in Bristol Bay
 - b. Southeast coho run shortfall
 - c. USCG budget cuts, minimal patrol - feeling that squid fleets could be fishing anywhere

G. Driftnet legislation


1. Passed by Congress last spring. Stevens a prime sponsor
2. Requires Secretary of Commerce to negotiate observers, monitoring and research programs by 1989 or foreign nations can be sanctioned under Pelly Amendment
3. Talks with Korean and Taiwan scheduled for this fall
4. Japanese not indicating interest

Map A Japanese High Seas Salmon Fisheries 1952-1977




Map B
Japanese High Seas Salmon Fisheries

- Area removed from Japanese salmon fisheries by 1986 agreement
- 200 mile zone
- 1959-1976 Japanese high seas salmon fisheries
- 1978-85 Japanese high seas salmon fisheries



Map C
High Squid Fisheries
Northern, Eastern, and Western
Regulatory Boundary for Japan and Taiwan



FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: _____
 Title: Relating to the interception
 of Alaska salmon on the high seas
 Sponsor: Binkley, et al
 Requestor: Senator Binkley

Agency Affected: Fish and Game
 BRU: Commercial Fisheries
 Components: Commercial Fisheries
Special Projects

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0

CAPITAL						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

REVENUE						
---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Prepared by: Roland Shanks Phone: 465-4100
 Division: Commissioner's Office Date: 1/23/89
 Approved by Commissioner: *Donnell* Date: 1-23-89
 Agency: Fish and Game

Distribution (by preparer):

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)

Salmon analysis supports charge of fish pirating

Juneau Empire 11/3/89

By BILL EBY

WASHINGTON - The analysis of a four-pound chum salmon taken from a Singapore warehouse last month supports allegations a decline in U.S. salmon runs are the result of illegal catches of immature salmon on the high seas by foreign vessels, Sen. Frank Murkowski, R-Alaska, said Thursday.

U.S. Embassy personnel obtained the salmon from a Singapore wholesaler while Murkowski was touring Pacific Rim countries seeking support from governments there to put an end to what he has called an "illegal salmon laundering network."

According to a report provided to Murkowski by the National Marine Fisheries Service, the fish analyzed was most likely from the Puget Sound area or the Soviet Union.

High-seas salmon fisheries are illegal except by agreement with the country in which the fish originate, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has authorized high-seas fishing for salmon originating from their streams.

Murkowski has alleged that a sophisticated network is in place under which Taiwanese, Japanese and possibly South Korean vessels, under the guise of fishing for squid, are taking salmon illegally on the high seas.

To avoid prosecution under the laws of their own countries that ban the unloading of fish illegally caught, the vessels transfer the salmon to boats that offload the fish at safe ports, such as Hong Kong or Singapore.

From there, said Murkowski, the salmon are either moved directly to market as frozen fish or to another port, such as Bangkok, Thailand, for canning.

"In both cases, their eventual goal is markets in Europe and Australia, where they compete with

legal salmon caught in compliance with international agreements," the Alaska senator said in a statement issued by his office.

In a trip to Bangkok two months ago, Murkowski visited a cannery where large quantities of Pacific salmon obtained in Singapore had been canned this year. Processors in Singapore, however, denied shipping large amounts of salmon to Thailand, prompting Murkowski to ask the U.S. Embassy in Singapore to follow up on his investigation.

In a tour of local cold storage facilities and seafood processors, embassy personnel found a large quantity of salmon at one of the facilities and obtained the chum salmon for analysis.

The age and size, among other characteristics, made it clear the chum salmon was caught on the high seas, the fisheries service reported.

Murkowski said the analysis offers proof of violations of international agreements and principles set out by the Law of the Sea Convention.

The illegal taking of salmon, said Murkowski, "is leading to a substantial loss of revenue for those fishermen and processors who follow the rules."

The Pacific Seafood Processors Association estimated that 22 million pounds of salmon, valued at about \$18 million, was illegally caught through the first 10 months of 1988.

The Alaska Department of Fish and Game predicted late last month some 19.5 million pink salmon are available for harvest in Southeast Alaska, more than the 11.2 million caught in the region in 1988 but far less than the 80 million pink salmon that had been predicted for 1987.

In recent months, Murkowski and fellow Republican Sen. Ted Stevens have increased efforts to force Pacific Rim governments to curb the al-

Please turn to Salmon, Page 8

Salmon...

Continued from Page 1
leged high-seas fishing violations.

Murkowski visited Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and said last month that top government officials there were more concerned "for the rights of their fishermen."

But Murkowski said he was less concerned about the rights of any country's fishermen than he was about the possibility "there may not be any fish left if we don't control this situation. And if there aren't any fish left, then no fisherman has rights."

Stevens urged State Department

officials last month to take a tough stand on a Japanese government proposal to convert its mothership salmon fishery to a land-based catcher boat operation, arguing that the conversion will diminish American capabilities to observe Japanese salmon catches.

Because high-seas fisheries operated by the Pacific Rim countries have the potential to take large numbers of non-squid species, including salmon, Congress last year passed legislation requiring agreements to better monitor and control them.

Any country that has not signed such an agreement by June 30 of next year may be subject to trade sanctions.

BUSINESS

looks for 'laundered' salmon

NTHAL

— The State Department nations to help investigate spread illegal salmon fishing, including the possibility of "laundered" through can- in Thailand.

ing groups have told the at that the Taiwanese, Japa- South Koreans are catching er the guise of fishing for n are unloaded in Singapore, frozen, or in Bangkok, where and sold on the European y half the cost of U.S. canned

ell organized and we believe involved as well," said Barry of the Pacific Seafood Pro-

cessors Association. "We believe all three countries are laundering the fish in the same manner."

The Seattle-based processors association estimates that 22 million pounds of salmon, or 6 million to 7 million individual fish worth about \$18 million, have been illegally caught so far this year.

The association, which represents 80 percent of the seafood processors in Alaska and Washington state, fears the illegal catches already are having a "major negative impact" on Northwest and Alaska salmon runs and also are undercutting sales of U.S. canned salmon abroad.

U.S. processors export about \$500 million worth of salmon annually.

"The industry allegations are being taken very seriously by the department and we are investigating them aggressively," Ed Wolfe,

the State Department's ambassador for oceans and fisheries, said Friday.

Wolfe is scheduled to talk with Japanese officials in Tokyo about the reports of illegal salmon fishing next week. In addition, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, comprising representatives from the United States, Canada and Japan, meet in Tokyo next week and Wolfe said he expects salmon will be discussed.

The State Department two weeks ago asked the U.S. embassies in Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Japan and South Korea to ask those governments for assistance in the investigation.

The cable to the embassies told the U.S. officials to stress the "serious nature" of the reports of illegal salmon fishing and that if

See Page C-14, SALMON

SALMON: U.S. investigates laundering

Continued from Page C-7

true, they represented a "potential multimillion-dollar loss to the U.S. industry."

The State Department has also asked the American Institute in Taiwan to

contemplated, but added the Soviets were "very concerned" about the North Pacific salmon fishery.

In the early 1980s, American fishermen had complained that Japanese and Taiwanese fishermen were taking large quantities of salmon

FORUM

State fights back against salmon interception

By GOV. STEVE COWPER

Picture in your mind a nearly invisible fishing net drifting five miles long just below the surface on the vast North Pacific. It's intended catch squid — a staple on dinner tables in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Japan.

But the nets are deadly effective against anything they encounter — seals, birds and other fish. The nets kill tens of thousands of marine mammals each year, and millions of seabirds. They are also quite effective in taking salmon and steelhead on their way back to Alaska rivers and streams.

This past summer, some 700 Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese fishing boats laid out 20,000 miles of monofilament gill nets across the North Pacific each day. There's convincing evidence they caught millions of pounds of Alaska-bound salmon — worth tens of millions of dollars — and damaged thousands of other salmon that managed to strug-

COMPASS

gle free of the huge nets.

This high seas interception of Alaska salmon and steelhead is probably illegal, and it causes considerable harm to Alaskans. Not only do Alaska fishermen lose those fish, but Alaska's coastal communities lose revenues they would otherwise receive through the Alaska fish tax.

Much of the salmon is funneled to European markets, which depresses the price for legally caught Alaska salmon.

For the past two years, this administration has been pushing on several fronts to eliminate the high seas interception of Alaska salmon. A couple of weeks ago, we decided it was time to turn up the heat. This is what we're doing:

- Pushing the federal government

to reduce high seas interceptions. Federal agencies have been slow to flex their muscle, so last month I asked Secretary of State George Shultz to help bring these interceptions to an end and I laid out a detailed strategy on how to do that. I've also asked the governors of other Western states to follow my lead.

- Urging Congress to pass new laws to improve enforcement and extend American jurisdiction. The Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, which gives the U.S. jurisdiction over American-origin salmon, is up for reauthorization next year. We may need to strengthen it to get the clout we need to fight interceptions.

- Pursuing an agreement with the Soviet Union for joint management and enforcement of the "donut hole" and high seas salmon fisheries. Such an agreement would be a major step to end high seas salmon interceptions.

- Pushing for regulation of the squid driftnet fishery by Asian countries. These growing fleets are largely unmonitored and regulations, where they exist, are poorly enforced. We need to get the squid fleets out of waters populated by salmon.

- At a minimum, foreign fishing boats should be equipped with transponders; observer programs should be adopted and prohibitions on the possession and sale of illegally caught salmon must be enforced.

- Collecting better information about catches and the impact of high seas interception on the long-term health of the fishery. There are plenty of allegations about foreign interests dumping salmon on world markets and first-hand reports of hot-marked fish, but hard facts are needed.

- Working within existing treaties to monitor and enforce fisheries agreements. Already the International North Pacific Fisheries Con-

vention has reduced the Japanese interceptions by more than 70 percent since 1978 and ordered fleets to stay at least 450 miles from Adak. Any new foreign fishery agreements should include provisions for the elimination of high seas interception.

- Participating in scientific conferences aimed at heightening awareness of the problems of high seas interception. We're sending top state fisheries scientists to Taiwan and Korea this month and hope to host a salmon symposium here in Alaska early next year.

High seas interception is not an economic problem for Alaska. It's a moral problem too. It's the goal of this administration to stop it once and for all.

□ Steve Cowper is governor of Alaska.