

SJR

55



Senate State Affairs Committee

Senator Mitch Abood, Chairman

Senator,

Sharon Anderson from
Seward telephoned your
office today.

She is unable to attend
the teleconference today,
but would like to ~~to~~
convey her overwhelming
support for the NAVY
homeport legislation.

FEB 1 1988

CITY OF SEWARD

P.O. BOX 167
SEWARD, ALASKA 99601



- Main Office (907) 224-3331
- Police (907) 224-3338
- Harbor (907) 224-3138
- Fire (907) 224-3445
- Telecopier (907) 224-3248

January 28, 1988

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE HONORABLE TED STEVENS
THE HONORABLE FRANK MURKOWSKI
THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG
THE HONORABLE JAN FAIKS
THE HONORABLE RICK HALFORD
THE HONORABLE JAY KERTTULA
THE HONORABLE MIKE SZYMANSKI
THE HONORABLE BETTE CATO
THE HONORABLE STEVE COWPER
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. SCHAEFER

FROM: LINDA S. MURPHY, CMC, CITY CLERK
CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA

SUBJ: CITY OF SEWARD RESOLUTION NO. 88-013
ENDORSING THE HOMEPORTING OF NAVY VESSELS IN ALASKA

Enclosed for your information is a copy of city of Seward Resolution No. 88-013, endorsing the homeporting of U. S. Navy vessels in the state of Alaska, approved by the City Council on Monday, January 25, 1988.

The City Council would appreciate your support of the Alaska State Senate's proposal to bring the U. S. Navy to Alaskan waters.

Enclosure

Sponsored by: Gieseler

CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA
RESOLUTION NO. 88-013

A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
SEWARD, ALASKA, ENDORSING THE STATE SENATE PROPOSAL
TO HOMEPORT U.S. NAVY VESSELS IN THE STATE OF ALASKA

WHEREAS, the Alaska State Senate is developing a proposal for the homeporting of U. S. Navy vessels in Alaska; and

WHEREAS, Alaska coastal communities and the state of Alaska will benefit economically from the homeporting of Navy vessels here; and

WHEREAS, an influx of federal dollars through Navy payroll and provisioning will have a stabilizing effect on the state's economy; and

WHEREAS, Alaskan waters will provide a strategic location for the U. S. Navy;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA, that:

Section 1. The city of Seward endorses the Alaska State Senate's proposal to homeport U. S. Navy vessels in the state of Alaska.

Section 2. The city of Seward urges our congressional delegation to work with the state of Alaska and the appropriate federal agencies to homeport an element of the U. S. Navy in the state of Alaska.

Section 3. Copies of this resolution shall be forwarded to the Honorable Senators Stevens and Murkowski; the Honorable Representative Young; the Honorable State Senators, Faiks, Kerttula, Halford and Szymanski; the Honorable State Representative Cato; and the Honorable Governor Cowper.

Section 4. This resolution shall take effect immediately upon its adoption.

PASSED AND APPROVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA, this 25th day of January, 1988.

CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA
RESOLUTION NO. 88-013

THE CITY OF SEWARD, ALASKA




HARRY E. GIESELER, MAYOR

AYES: DUNHAM, GIESELER, HILTON, MEEHAN, NOLL & SIMUTIS
NOES: NONE
ABSENT: O'BRIEN
ABSTAIN: NONE

ATTEST:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

HUGHES, THORSNESS, GANTZ,
POWELL & BRUNDIN, Attorneys
for the City of Seward, AK



Linda S. Murphy, CMC
City Clerk

Fred B. Arvidson
City Attorney

(City Seal)

Conal



Alaska State Legislature

RECEIVED
FEB 4 1988

Please enter into the record my testimony to the State affairs committee
committee name
committee on Senate joint Resolution # 55, dated 2-3-88
bill/subject

I think it is the obligation for the people of the State of Alaska to participate in this homeport project, also it is our patriotic duty to support this bill for the defense of America.

It will also be a boost to the economy for the state of Alaska, Washington and Oregon.

There are many natural harbors along the coast line of Southeast Alaska that is suitable for such a home port

I strongly support Senate joint Resolution No. 55

Signed: Debra L Shull
Testifier

Representing (Optional)

Rt 1 Box 804 Ketchikan, Alaska, 99901
Address

247-8333
Phone No.



Alaska State Legislature

Please enter into the record my testimony to the State Affairs Committee
 committee name
 committee on Navy Home Port SIR-55, dated 2-3-88
 bill/subject

I would like to offer my full support to the Navy, including financial support from the state - Alaska is desperately in need of a more diversified economy - At present our Alaskan waters are not being used to 1/10 of their potential - It would continually enhance our peoples opportunities for a decent living, if we had strong Navy presents

Signed: Bell J Smart
 Testifier

Representing (Optional)
414 Grant - Box 8200 KTN AK 99901
 Address
225-5568
 Phone No.

STEVE COWPER
GOVERNOR



STATE OF ALASKA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
JUNEAU

January 22, 1988

The Honorable Jan Faiks
President of the Senate
Alaska State Legislature
P.O. Box V
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Senator Faiks:


Under the authority of art. III, sec. 18 of the Alaska Constitution, I am transmitting a joint resolution on establishing a United States Navy homeport in Alaska.

As the presence of foreign powers in Alaska waters expands, it is particularly appropriate that the state and its communities offer feasible and attractive incentives to homeport Navy operations. Our extraordinary coastline and strategic geographical position for trade and defense makes Alaska a vital region for Naval presence.

Alaska can offer the Navy meaningful and substantive incentives to bring personnel and operations to our shores. I am confident that once those specific options are identified we can secure Navy presence. Such participation will bring great benefits to our economy.

I welcome your support of this resolution which officially invites the Navy to station personnel, vessels and support services in Alaska.

Sincerely,


Steve Cowper
Governor

STATE OF ALASKA
1988 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL VERSION: _____
PUBLISH DATE: _____

FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: _____
Title: Relating to Establishing a U.S. Navy
Home Port in Alaska
Sponsor: Rules Committee
Requestor: Governor

Agency Affected: Military & Veterans Affairs
BRU: _____
Components: _____

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0

CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---

REVENUE	0	0	0	0	0	0
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL						

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Passage of this resolution will have no direct fiscal impact on state agencies. However, the development of an infrastructure to support whatever Alaskan port(s) the U.S. Navy selects for home porting will require a considerable investment of state funds. The funds needed for this purpose will need to be appropriated by the Legislature.

Prepared by: Jeff Morrison *J Morrison* Phone: 465-4600
Division: Administrative and Support Services Date: January 21, 1988

Approved by Commissioner: MG John W. Schaeffer *J Morrison* Date: January 21, 1988
Agency: Military and Veterans Affairs

Distribution (by preparer):

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)

Original sponsor: Rules/Governor

1 IN THE SENATE BY THE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
2 CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 55 (State Affairs)
3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
4 FIFTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

5 Relating to establishing a United States
6 Navy homeport in Alaska.

7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

8 WHEREAS naval activities in the North Pacific and Arctic Ocean have
9 increased dramatically in recent years to the extent that more foreign
10 vessels now operate in these waters than the United States registers or
11 deploys worldwide; and

12 WHEREAS Alaska, the United States and Canada are vulnerable to econom-
13 ic and military pressures from the potential foreign capability to operate
14 in northern oceans with nuclear and conventional polar class icebreakers
15 and other ice-strengthened ships; and

16 WHEREAS Alaska's coastline of approximately 6,640 miles is longer than
17 that of the rest of the continental United States; and

18 WHEREAS Alaska is opening to international trade and exchange that
19 supports greater naval presence; and

20 WHEREAS Alaska occupies a pivotal position in relation to the Pacific
21 and Arctic Rims; and

22 WHEREAS Alaska contains vast quantities of natural resources that are
23 of strategic importance to the United States; and

24 WHEREAS, in addition to its strategic geographical location, Alaska
25 can offer the United States Navy state land and resources and a willingness
26 to work cooperatively and to expend at least \$100,000,000 to develop
27 infrastructure and capital improvements necessary for the establishment of
28 a major, long-term Navy homeport in Alaska; and

29 WHEREAS establishing a Navy homeport at one or more Alaskan

1 communities could provide greater sustainability for naval operations in
2 the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans;

3 BE IT RESOLVED that the Governor and the Alaska State Legislature
4 strongly urge the United States Navy to consider establishing a homeport at
5 a community on the coast of Alaska.

6 COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Frank
7 Carlucci, Secretary of Defense; to the Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., Secre-
8 tary of the Navy; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank
9 Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
10 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Original sponsor: Rules/Governor

1 IN THE SENATE BY THE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
2 CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 55 (State Affairs)
3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
4 FIFTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

5 Relating to establishing a United States
6 Navy homeport in Alaska.

7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

8 WHEREAS naval activities in the North Pacific and Arctic Ocean have
9 increased dramatically in recent years to the extent that more foreign
10 vessels now operate in these waters than the United States registers or
11 deploys worldwide; and

12 WHEREAS Alaska, the United States and Canada are vulnerable to econom-
13 ic and military pressures from the potential foreign capability to operate
14 in northern oceans with nuclear and conventional polar class icebreakers
15 and other ice-strengthened ships; and

16 WHEREAS Alaska's coastline of approximately 6,640 miles is longer than
17 that of the rest of the continental United States; and

18 WHEREAS Alaska is opening to international trade and exchange that
19 supports greater naval presence; and

20 WHEREAS Alaska occupies a pivotal position in relation to the Pacific
21 and Arctic Rims; and

22 WHEREAS Alaska contains vast quantities of natural resources that are
23 of strategic importance to the United States; and

24 WHEREAS, in addition to its strategic geographical location, Alaska
25 can offer the United States Navy state land and resources and a willingness
26 to work cooperatively and to expend at least \$100,000,000 /to develop
27 infrastructure and capital improvements necessary for the establishment of
28 a major, long-term Navy homeport in Alaska; and

29 WHEREAS establishing a Navy homeport at one or more Alaskan

1 communities could provide greater sustainability for naval operations in
2 the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans;

3 BE IT RESOLVED that the Governor and the Alaska State Legislature
4 strongly urge the United States Navy to consider establishing a homeport at
5 a community on the coast of Alaska.

6 COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Frank
7 Carlucci, Secretary of Defense; to the Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., Secre-
8 tary of the Navy; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank
9 Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
10 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Original sponsor: Rules/Governor

1 IN THE SENATE BY THE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
2 CS FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 55 (State Affairs)

3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

4 FIFTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

5 Relating to establishing a United States
6 Navy homeport in Alaska.

7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

8 WHEREAS naval activities in the North Pacific and Arctic Ocean have
9 increased dramatically in recent years to the extent that more foreign
10 vessels now operate in these waters than the United States registers or
11 deploys worldwide; and

12 WHEREAS Alaska, the United States and Canada are vulnerable to econom-
13 ic and military pressures from the potential foreign capability to operate
14 in northern oceans with nuclear and conventional polar class icebreakers
15 and other ice-strengthened ships; and

16 WHEREAS Alaska's coastline of approximately 6,640 miles is longer than
17 that of the rest of the continental United States; and

18 WHEREAS Alaska is opening to international trade and exchange that
19 supports greater naval presence; and

20 WHEREAS Alaska occupies a pivotal position in relation to the Pacific
21 and Arctic Rims; and

22 WHEREAS Alaska contains vast quantities of natural resources that are
23 of strategic importance to the United States; and

24 WHEREAS, in addition to its strategic geographical location, Alaska
25 can offer the United States Navy state land and resources and a willingness
26 to work cooperatively and to expend at least \$100,000,000 /to develop
27 infrastructure and capital improvements necessary for the establishment of
28 a major, long-term Navy homeport in Alaska; and


29 WHEREAS establishing a Navy homeport at one or more Alaskan

1 communities could provide greater sustainability for naval operations in
2 the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans

3 BE IT RESOLVED that the Governor and the Alaska State Legislature
4 strongly urge the United States Navy to consider establishing a homeport at
5 a community on the coast of Alaska.

6 COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Frank
7 Carlucci, Secretary of Defense; to the Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., Secre-
8 tary of the Navy; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank
9 Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
10 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

*navy
homeporting*



2

ANDERSON TUG & BARGE CO.

BOX 1315 • SEWARD, ALASKA 99664
(907) 224-5506

February 4, 1988

Senator Mitch Abood
Pouch V
Juneau, Ak. 98111

Dear Senator Abood,

Please include the following page as our favorable testimony towards Navy homeporting in the State of Alaska and hopefully in Seward.


Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sharon Anderson

Mrs. Sharon E. Anderson

RECEIVED
FEB 8 1988



ANDERSON TUG & BARGE CO.

BOX 1315 • SEWARD, ALASKA 99664
(907) 224-5506

John C. & Sharon Anderson
P.O. Box 1315
Seward, Ak. 99664
224-5506

RECEIVED
FEB 8 1988

We have been working since May, 1985 to strengthen ties between the Navy and Alaska and encourage the use of our ports for R&R stops and somewhere down the line for ships to be permanently based in Alaska.

Our community has greatly enjoyed the minesweepers, destroyers, frigates, subtender and SSBN USS ALASKA visits and would certainly welcome any on a permanent basis. Many people have stopped in our office these past few weeks wondering what they could do to help get the momentum moving towards 1988 instead of waiting until the 1990's for a decision by the Dept. of Navy.

We are highly encouraged at the swift action being taken by the State and the Navy regarding homeporting in Alaska. The Anderson's are 100% for it!

(Homeporting) RECEIVED
FEB 10 1988

Submitted by:

CHRIS TOAL, Executive Director SANE/Alaska
3605 Arctic Blvd., #1717
Anchorage, AK 99503 272-0621

Statement of

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.),

Deputy Director,

Center for Defense Information

before the

Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee

House Armed Services Committee

February 26, 1986

Prepared Statement of Rear Adm. Eugene J. Carroll Jr., USN (Ret.)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The Center for Defense Information, a private military research organization led by retired flag and general officers, wishes to express its opposition to the U.S. Navy Strategic Homeporting plan.

The Center believes that there is no military justification for Strategic Homeporting, that the additional costs and personnel requirements are unwarranted, and that it creates safety risks where they are unnecessary.

Militarily Unwise

Strategic Homeporting is the Navy's plan to disperse ships around the nation in order to make them less vulnerable to attack and place them closer to areas of potential conflict. However, in my opinion the concept is utterly without military utility.

The "strategic dispersal" policy does little to make warships less vulnerable to nuclear attack. The new bases create at most one dozen new naval targets which could easily be obliterated by two dozen nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union would have little difficulty assigning 24 of its 9,500 strategic nuclear weapons to the new targets.

Strategic dispersal makes even less sense in a conventional war. The Soviet surface navy poses no threat to U.S. ports. Soviet submarines could conceivably conduct limited minelaying operations to block access to the sea from U.S. ports. However, dispersing the fleet does not resolve this potential problem

and, in fact, complicates it by adding more ports to clear of mines. It makes no sense to disperse our Navy's ships to many different bases when we don't have sufficient mine countermeasure ships (MCM) to clear more than one port at a time. The Navy plans to expand its fleet of MCMs and minesweeper hunter ships to a total of only 31 ships. This is totally inadequate to break out naval forces even from existing bases.

The Navy has also claimed that dispersing ships would make them less vulnerable to sabotage or terrorism. This contention is absurd on its face. Protecting nuclear-capable ships from terrorism in New York City, or other metropolitan areas, is a base commander's nightmare.

Dispersing the fleet will not, in most cases, speed naval response to areas of potential conflict. In the event of a growing crisis or of significant conflict, effective naval forces must be assembled from major bases nationwide, in order to perform required military tasks. The U.S. will never merely send warships that are closest to the area of concern. It must send a naval force adequate to operate effectively against hostile or potentially hostile forces. In addition, steaming time to areas of potential conflict from the proposed new bases would not be significantly shorter than from already existing facilities.

The Navy has also contended that homeporting on both coasts would provide an opportunity "to train and operate in a variety of environments." The climatic and geographical differences between Corpus Christi and Staten Island hardly merit a \$1 Billion expense. In addition, training at the new bases

will not eliminate the need to conduct naval exercises worldwide nor the need to conduct formal training at existing fleet training facilities in the Caribbean and Hawaiian areas.

The Congressional General Accounting Office (GAO) in a 1985 report also challenged the military utility of dispersing the fleet. The "strategic and operational need for the new homeports is questionable," the report said, and dispersing ships "may not improve the survivability of the 600 ship Navy"

Another specious argument is that Strategic Homeporting will increase "unit integrity." Quite the opposite is true. Spreading ships around the three coasts of the United States in small increments of one to 13 ships will degrade the ability of fleet commanders to build unit integrity and to supervise the training of effective battle groups and battle forces. In truth, "unit integrity" is an impossible Navy dream under any circumstances because various classes of warships have different overhaul cycles. Unit composition is always in a state of uncontrollable flux as individual ships are removed and replaced to meet the overriding demands of the overhaul schedule.

Spreading Ships and Spreading Influence

The Navy's intentions have more to do with spreading its influence than dispersing its fleet. This was partially acknowledged by Navy Secretary John Lehman who has called the dispersal plan a "consciousness raiser" for legislators who might not have paid adequate attention to naval issues. The Navy, under the current Administration, has been particularly interested in currying political favor as it presses ahead with

its ambitious plan for a 600 ship navy.

Nowhere has this attempt to gain political favor been more bald-faced than on the Gulf Coast where nearly every municipality that lobbied for the battleship Wisconsin was awarded some naval vessel as a consolation prize.

Unnecessarily Costly

The wisdom of the homeporting plan has been challenged on many fronts. "Fiscal conservatives" were among the leaders of the effort that resulted in Congress's temporary ban on further spending on ship dispersal.

The GAO has also harshly criticized the plan, estimating that costs of the program nationwide could exceed \$1 Billion with annual operating costs of some \$30 million for each new base. For the money we plan to spend on new support facilities for carrier battle groups and surface action groups, we could instead build and operate enough minesweepers to ensure that our ships can sail out of existing ports safely in the event of a conflict.

The Navy has said that the new naval bases are needed to accommodate the additional 130 ships to be added to the fleet under the current expansion to 600 ships. During the Vietnam War, however, the U.S. operated a 1,000 ship Navy with essentially the same number of bases we have now. Since then we have added major new submarine bases on both coasts and now homeport one carrier and supporting surface ships in Japan.

The GAO contends that existing naval facilities could easily support the new ships that are proposed at little cost. For example, the ships planned for Corpus Christi could be ported at

the existing naval facility in Norfolk, Virginia where the battleship Iowa is now berthed. The aircraft carrier planned for Pensacola could be accommodated in Mayport, Florida where two carriers are currently ported. According to the GAO, both of these facilities could accommodate the new ships immediately if that were necessary. In addition, many of the new sites are entirely "barren land" and would require construction from the ground up, a construction program which will take years to complete.

The greatest cost of Strategic Homeporting will be in additional personnel requirements. Each new facility must be provided with a security force, communications personnel, logistics support elements, housing and family support activities, maintenance personnel, and people for a myriad of other functions which are already available at existing bases. Faced with a shrinking pool of eligible recruits in the coming years plus increased requirements to man the 600 ship Navy, unnecessary increases in shore support personnel cannot be justified. As personnel shortfalls develop late in this decade, Congress will be asked for even greater increases in recruiting and retention incentives to protect our huge investment in new ships. Adding unneeded shore support personnel will aggravate the pressure for these incentives and raise total compensation requirements at the same time Congress is looking for ways to cut budget deficits, not increase them. Demographics at the end of the decade will make it extremely difficult even with regular pay raises, to maintain recruitment of high quality young people.

Another substantial personnel cost not addressed by the Navy will be training costs. Because most of the new homeports will

be for a very few ships, it will not be feasible to provide technical and professional training support at each site. The consequence will be a continuous stream of people travelling to and from the Strategic Homeport ships to established bases where such support already exists. The travel and per diem costs associated with such training will be high. This Committee should require the Navy to submit a positive plan to accommodate these increased costs in budgets where Congress is already looking for ways to reduce military travel costs.

A Floating Nuclear Arsenal

Approximately 85% of U.S. Navy warships are equipped to carry and employ nuclear weapons. Such warships are said to be "nuclear capable," meaning that when trained and armed for combat they will carry nuclear weapons.

According to Congressional testimony and documents released by the Chief of Naval Operations, two new carrier battle groups of nine ships each and three surface action groups will be added to the Navy's force structure as part of Strategic Homeporting. In all, 65 active and reserve vessels in 14 different cities will be assigned ships under the dispersal plan. CDI has determined that at least 28 of the warships in eight locations will be nuclear capable. These locations are: Corpus Christi, Everett, Mobile, New York, Pascagoula, Pearl Harbor, Pensacola, and San Francisco.

Moreover, it is the experience of the retired naval officers at CDI that all U.S. warships which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, do, in fact, carry nuclear weapons. At a

minimum, the nuclear capable ships in the Strategic Homeporting plan will carry the ASROC anti-submarine missile--a weapon with both a conventional and nuclear capability. The nuclear capable ASROC is armed with short-range, low-yield tactical warheads. The attack aircraft carriers scheduled for Pensacola and Everett will be equipped and trained to employ aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs and anti-submarine depth charges.

In addition, congressional testimony over the past three years indicates that each of the refurbished battleships will be certified to carry the long-range and more potent nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missile. Other ships planned for strategic homeporting are also likely to carry these nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles.

Because the presence of nuclear weapons from time to time is certain, CDI urges Congress to address the issues of safety posed by the porting of nuclear capable ships in heavily trafficked areas. To date, the Navy has not considered questions of nuclear safety in the draft and final environmental impact statements (DEIS and EIS) that it has completed. CDI believes studies that omit this information are incomplete and therefore do not meet the standards required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

The presumption that nuclear weapons will be present in many of the new ports requires that responsible local and state authorities have the information they need to plan for a possible accident or other emergency involving nuclear weapons. Planning and training for a nuclear accident must be done in

advance. Waiting until an accident occurs is irresponsible.

"Neither Confirm Nor Deny"

The Navy's policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on particular ships is not primarily designed to protect sensitive military information from a potential enemy, as the Navy has claimed. Prudent planning requires a potential enemy to assume the presence of nuclear weapons on nuclear-capable ships at all times. The Navy policy has little to do with confusing the Soviet Union. It has a great deal to do with confusing the populations of those towns and cities where the weapons are to be stationed. By not conceding that our warships do carry nuclear weapons, the Navy hopes to frustrate efforts at stirring local opposition to the nuclear capable ships.

Don't Fund Strategic Homeporting

In closing, CDI notes that one of the primary boosters of Strategic Homeporting is Texas Senator Phil Gramm who is also co-sponsor of recently passed legislation bearing his name aimed at balancing the federal budget by 1991. By CDI's estimate the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation will require that defense appropriations be cut by as much as \$240 Billion dollars over the next four years. CDI recommends that Congress begin the task of cutting the military budget by not funding the costly and unnecessary Strategic Homeporting plan.



Center for Defense Information

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)

Rear Admiral Eugene J. CARROLL, Jr., was commissioned as an Ensign in April 1945. His early service as a Naval Aviator included ten months flying AD Skyraiders from aircraft carriers in the Pacific during U.N. operations in Korea. Following a series of assignments in the Atlantic Fleet, he commanded two light jet attack squadrons of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. Transferred to the Pacific Fleet in 1965, he served a total of six years with units engaged in the Vietnam campaign. His assignments there included command of the amphibious assault ship, USS OGDEN (LPD-5) and the aircraft carrier, USS MIDWAY (CVA-41).

Promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1972, he served as Commander of Task Force 60, the carrier striking force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Admiral Carroll served on General Alexander Haig's staff in Europe from 1977 to 1979. He was the first naval officer to serve as Director of U.S. military operations for all U.S. forces in Europe and in the Middle East. His last assignment on active duty was in the Pentagon as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. In this capacity he was engaged in U.S. naval planning for conventional and nuclear war.

During his 37 years of active service Admiral Carroll was awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with three gold stars, the Bronze Star Medal with combat "V" and gold star, the Air Medal with four gold stars and numerous campaign ribbons for service in World War II, Korea and Vietnam.

A graduate of both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army War Colleges, Rear Admiral Carroll holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in International Relations from George Washington University. He is now serving as Deputy Director of the private, non-governmental Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. He is actively engaged in research and analysis concerning major defense issues and is writing and speaking on the need for rational military programs which will meet the long-term national security interests of the United States.

June 1986

Gene R. La Rocque
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Director

William T. Fairbairn
Major General, USMC (Ret.)
Associate Director

Kermit D. Johnson
Major General, USA (Ret.)
Associate Director

James A. Donovan
Colonel, USMC (Ret.)
Associate Director

James T. Bush
Captain, USN (Ret.)
Associate Director

that it is quite possible—and indeed this is supported by Soviet literature—that there could be a confrontation between the superpowers, a period of rising tensions and a conventional exchange.

□ 2100

Our naval brass argues that in that kind of scenario our naval forces would be more secure if dispersed and the job of our adversary more complicated in terms of mining, interdiction and the interception of our ships as they go to deep waters.

There is some credibility to that argument. But is that a likely scenario? I think not. Navy officials themselves have indicated that a conventional threat is relatively low. If the threat is low, it is difficult for me to see the gain of dispersing this fleet. Certainly it is not compulsive.

In fact, I would suggest to my colleagues that dispersing our naval forces may very well reduce ship survivability. For example, these proposed new home ports are open commercial ports, and they freely welcome all the shipping in the world. Not so in Hampton Roads and San Diego. As a condition for maintaining a fleet presence in those ports we have closed our ports to Eastern bloc shipping because it represents a very clear danger to those naval forces.

I remember many years ago being petitioned by the chamber of commerce in Hampton Roads area saying no other ports have to live with that kind of limitation and loss of economic opportunities. Let us open it up, our port they argued. Well, Congressman BILL WHITEHURST, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee and I received an in-depth Navy briefing on the threat posed by Eastern bloc shipping to our naval forces. It is a very real one. And that real threat will now exist in all these new home ports that are open to the commercial shipping of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. Surveillance, sabotage, mining, and other risks will be imposed. Mr. President, strategic homeporting does not make our forces more secure; this program will make our naval ships and personnel more vulnerable.

Let me address one other argument.

It is argued that the dispersal of our naval forces will in some way aid our industrial base and add to our ship repair capability. This argument for strategic homeporting simply defies all logic. Existing home ports and private shipyards have more than adequate ship repair capability to meet the Navy's demands. There is no reason to increase ship repair capability in new home port areas when existing yards—like the outstanding shipyards in Hampton Roads—can meet those needs and need the work. Our industrial base will be maintained, Mr. President, by building more ships, not by spreading around an inadequate

amount of work to additional shipyards.

Let me bring all of this to a close by simply saying that I cannot support the homeporting proposal. Not only is the cost of strategic homeporting unacceptably high, but it yields operational improvements of a marginal value. Our scarce and valuable taxpayer dollars should be spent for other more pressing national requirements.

I urge the adoption of this amendment.

Mr. PELL and Mr. GOLDWATER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I rise to support this amendment. I want to speak very, very briefly as to why.

Mr. President, tonight we have heard from Colonel GLENN, or Senator GLENN, a man who has been trained as a fighter pilot, as a fighter, as an officer by the Marine Corps. He knows what he is talking about. We have also heard from Senator DENTON, who is trained in military at the Naval Academy. He has had a distinguished war record of which we are all very proud.

So when I eliminate Senator GLENN, who is voting with me on this amendment, it is very difficult for me to stand up and oppose so many of my friends. I think of Senator WARNER, Senator CHAFFE, Senator STENNIS, one of my oldest friends in this body, and it is not easy to take this position. But it would be very difficult for me to live with my conscience if I voted any other way tonight.

A number of months ago I made the statement that this is one of the biggest political boondoggles I ever heard of. I used the word "boondoggle." It has been referred to tonight in some other way. But it all adds up to the same thing.

We have 13 States, Mr. President, that are indebted to the Secretary of the Navy. That is 26 votes for anything that the Secretary of the Navy happens to want. I think it was a brilliant political idea, probably one of the best that we are ever going to be confronted with while we are in the U.S. Senate. We have had the fact driven home to us that there has been no opposition from the Navy admirals. Who expects a Navy admiral to complain? Would an Air Force officer complain if this were an Air Force matter or an Army person complain if it were an Army matter? Lord knows what the Marines would do.

Mr. President, this whole thing to me is ludicrous. I think it is a terrific waste of money. I make this prediction. I will not be here to see if it is true or not because I will be out home, and I read the papers. This is going to cost over \$10 billion before you are through fooling around with this homeporting. Somebody might say, "Why didn't you get a home port in Arizona?" [Laughter.]

I thought about it. But we would have to truck them quite a ways. [Laughter.]

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield on that, we are going to try to arrange for the Navy's new tall ship to be stationed in Arizona. We hear you have a lot of wind there.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We have more wind than we know what to do with. In fact, we have a lot of dry air out there, and, in fact the trees chase the dogs. [Laughter.]

So, Mr. President, I am glad all of this debate and this argument and all of that is over. We have spent 5 hours on this helping 13 States, but in particular 2 States. I am particularly opposed in every way, strategy, economics, any way you want to look at it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment before us. In my view, the issue before the Senate is not one of funding nor of politics but one of maritime necessity. No one disputes that the \$141 million contained in the defense bill for homeporting will benefit specific localities. Appropriations always help someone.

The important point, though, is that military experts are agreed that dispersing the fleet is a strategic necessity. Some have said that this concept was a fine idea for World War II but has no relevance for the nuclear age. I would say that just the opposite is true. If war should occur, nuclear escalation is possible but not inevitable. This terrible prospect is inversely related to our conventional capabilities and strategic options—the less able we are to fight at a conventional level, the more likely that nuclear escalation will occur. Strategic homeporting, as devised by Secretary Lehman, enhances our conventional posture and flexibility thereby raising the nuclear threshold. Thus no concept could be more relevant to the nuclear age than strategic homeporting. Moreover, in addition to increasing survivability, strategic homeporting will result in decreased sailing time in order to form battle groups, enhancing our flexible response and deterrence and allowing us to prosecute a war more effectively at the conventional level.

I am particularly pleased, Mr. President, to see that the Navy is making the very same arguments today about dispersing the fleet that my senior colleague (Mr. Pastore) and I made 13 years ago when the Navy regrettably, and wrongly, pulled out of the Northeast to concentrate its forces in the ports of Norfolk, Charleston, and Mayport.

I remember at that time 13 years ago making the argument that by withdrawing to southern ports the Navy was increasing the steaming time to the North Sea area from between 12 to 41 hours. Hours are critical at a time when a rapid response is neces-



Alaska State Legislature

1

Please enter into the record my testimony to the State Affairs Committee
 committee name
 committee on SJR No 55 , dated 2/2/88
 bill/subject

My name is Don Dietz, President of U.S. Navy League Council 151 Alaska, whose membership is over 200 strong throughout the state. The Navy League Council in Alaska, as have other Navy League Councils throughout the other states, has strongly supports the efforts of Navy homeporting. Therefore we strongly support the passage of SJR-55. This is Alaska's first legislative action, a positive step in the necessary direction to welcome the Navy to Alaska.

homeporting Navy vessels in U.S. Ports and in foreign ports is an ever changing evolution of Naval Progress. Just as we learn today that the city of San Diego finds it is

Signed: Donald L. Dietz
 Testifier

DONALD L. DIETZ, U.S. NAVY LEAGUE
 Representing (Optional)
6133 STAEDEM DRIVE, ANCHORAGE, AK 99504
 Address
337-1258
 Phone No.

RECEIVED
 FEB 4 1988

② loosing the homeporting of 6 Frigate class Navy vessels, due to old age - Alaska finds itself on the leading edge to gain the homeporting of Navy vessels. The Navy's operational requirements are ever changing and now renewed homeporting in Northern latitude waters, Alaska is becoming a new requirement. →

The question and challenge to Alaska therefore is... will Alaska be ready to accommodate this change? Will Alaska have upgraded selected port facilities which make Alaska attractive? Will we have invested the up-front dollars which will be repaid back to Alaskan economies many times over?

We in the Navy League stand beside and support our Congressional delegation in Washington, our State Legislators, our Governor, our Mayors and other state officials in order to bring their opportunity to pass. As a strong unified team, with one common goal, which is to prepare Alaska for the Navy's next decision, we can do it.

Let's now get ~~the~~ ^{state level} actions underway, set a purposeful course leading the Navy towards Alaska and call for flank speed.
Thank you