

SJR

22

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REQUESTING OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE EFFORTS TO  
MAKE THE ARCTIC AND SUBARCTIC POLLUTION-FREE, AND  
REQUESTING ALASKA'S CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO URGE OUR  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO DO SO

WHEREAS our planet's polar areas are proving to be especially sensitive and vulnerable to environmental harm and pollution of many kinds and from sources in the Northern Hemisphere well outside Arctic and subarctic regions

- 1) as evidenced by the atmospheric pollution now accumulated in the Arctic which exceeds acceptable levels and which is principally from the Soviet Union and industrial Europe, ~~generally~~
- 2) as evidenced by our Arctic peoples already having body burdens of radionuclides in excess of all the world's peoples, except for the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a result of nuclear explosions and accidents which occurred prior to the current ban on atmospheric testing
- 3) as evidenced by the serious and longterm radioactive pollution of Arctic Europe by the recent Soviet civilian nuclear plant disaster at Chernobyl which has contaminated the food supply of the Saami people, *among others*
- 4) as evidenced by the complete destruction to tundra vegetation and soils which even conventional tracked vehicles can do simply by normal movement across such terrain in moderate weather
- 5) and as evidenced by a <sup>polar</sup> disappearance of our planetary atmosphere's vital ozone layer (~~which has started in the Antarctic~~)

WHEREAS any further deposition of nuclear materials in the food-chain of the Arctic and subarctic regions will result in biologically unacceptable radiation *levels* for our peoples and ecosystems  
*Arctic*

WHEREAS the storage or transportation of highly toxic materials and wastes therefore poses unusually high potential risk to the health, safety and environment of Alaskans

WHEREAS war of any kind in the Arctic or another world war anywhere — which would probably include the use of nuclear, chemical, biological or other strategic weapons of mass destruction — would environmentally devastate the Arctic

WHEREAS our Federal government's defense policy of nuclear deterrence — up-to-date nuclear weapons backed by our solidarity — has given the world over 40 years of safety from another world war of any kind and has thereby proven its effectiveness *and safety*

WHEREAS the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the legislative bodies of Yukon and Greenland have unanimously approved resolutions calling for the Arctic to be restricted to uses which are environmentally safe and conducive to world peace

RECEIVED BY LOUIS COATNEY  
MARCH 1987

AND WHEREAS the people of Alaska desire to live in a world safe from war and pollution and also desire to continue to live in freedom

BE IT RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature that we fully share the concern and outrage about the violations of the Arctic and subarctic environment, previously expressed by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the legislative bodies of Greenland and the Yukon

FURTHER RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature that our Federal government and Alaska Congressional delegation are requested to initiate and promote diplomatic efforts to

1) compel Soviet and other world governments to conduct their nuclear and other industrial activities in an environmentally safe manner or accept severe penalties for not doing so

2) hold the next ~~summit~~ USA/USSR summit conference in Alaska so that world attention and concern might be drawn to the environmental concerns of Arctic and subarctic peoples

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature asks our Federal government to redouble its efforts within our own country to protect the Arctic and subarctic environment

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature appreciates and fully supports our Federal government's continuing efforts to negotiate genuine, verifiable arms reduction treaties which will reduce the probability of war and weapons of massive environmental destruction being used anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere or world in general *in the*

FURTHER RESOLVED that, until Soviet and other governments agree to genuine and verifiable arms reduction treaties, the Alaska State Legislature asks our Federal government to continue to preserve world peace with nuclear deterrence or whatever other strategic means which will most effectively and safely achieve that noble and vital goal

COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Ronald Reagan, President; the Honorable Ted Stevens and Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; the Honorable George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State; and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USSR.



RECEIVED MAR 09 1987  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 4 1987

The Honorable Jan Faiks  
Senator  
Alaska State Legislature  
Post Office Box V  
Juneau, Alaska 99881

RECEIVED  
MAR 20 1987

Dear Senator,

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on HJR 4, relating to a nuclear-free zone in the arctic, subarctic, and the state of Alaska

For over four decades, the policy of deterrence has successfully prevented the outbreak of global war or armed conflict between nuclear powers. The integrity of the Western alliance system has been a central element in maintaining the credibility of deterrence against both nuclear and conventional attack. The United States has played a central role in this effort by maintaining the capability to project its military forces thousands of miles from its shores in order to meet the security commitments that lie at the heart of deterrence.

In the past the US has supported, on a case-by-case basis, certain international regional nuclear free zone proposals which advanced non-proliferation interests while not undermining existing security arrangements or our deterrent capabilities. Thus the U.S. supported the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Antarctic Treaty and the Seabed Treaty, while opposing proposed Nordic and Central European nuclear free zones. With regard to the Treaty of Rarotonga, generally known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), the U.S. decided recently that in view of its global security interests and responsibilities it is not, under current circumstances, in a position to sign the associated protocols to that treaty.


The US has a deep commitment to bringing about a safer strategic environment involving progressively less reliance on nuclear weapons. It shares the vision of a world freed from the incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear devastation. The US goal in arms control is to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war by reaching equitable and verifiable agreement on deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

The U.S. believes, however, that the growing number of proposals for regional nuclear free zones has the potential to undermine deterrence as the cornerstone of Western security. The proliferation of such zones, especially when unmatched by

disarmament in the Soviet bloc, clearly would be detrimental to Western security and could also limit our future ability to meet security commitments world-wide.

In view of your concerns regarding national defense, I have taken the liberty of sharing your letter with the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jayne H. Plank".

Jayne H. Plank  
Director, Intergovernmental Affairs  
Office of Legislative and  
Intergovernmental Affairs

*Jr*  
Drafted: PM/ISP:WFHickman  
Wang 7528S 3/2/87

Cleared: PM:VLehovich *ss*  
PM/ISP:CDuelfer *ss*  
PM/ISP:SButcher *ss*  
PM/PD:DMozena *ss*  
ACDA:RRochlin (subs)  
H: L Hunt *ed*  
#: M. Johnson *ed*

# THE ARCTIC WORLD




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ANALYZING CSHJR-4 AND SJR-22

9 March 87  
Bill Leighty, 586-1424

1. Does it declare Alaska a nuclear-free zone (as the City of Chicago did) or does it request Congress and the Governor to negotiate treaties for such designation?
2. Has it any legal effect on the U.S. military's ability to move equipment and personnel into or within Alaska?
3. Does it confirm and endorse Alaska voters' request to end the nuclear arms race, in their 58.4% approval of the "nuclear freeze" initiative in August '86?
4. Does it blame the President, Congress, the military, or anyone else for the nuclear arms race?
5. What IS the purpose and probable effect of this legisla?
6. What is security? How do we get it?
7. What are "weapons"? What are "nuclear weapons"? How does one use them?
8. Would ending the nuclear arms race make Alaskans, Americans, and the world more secure or less secure? Can, and should, the Alaska legislature influence our change in thinking about security in this nuclear age?
9. Three-Mile Island, Bhopal chemical plant, Challenger, and Chernobyl are complex systems that failed catastrophically. "Nuclear deterrence" is an enormously complex system of bombs, warheads, missiles, planes, ships, satellites, computers, and people. Will it also fail catastrophically? What will be the result? Will we have a nuclear war? What can the Alaska Legislature do to prevent that?
10. What is your identification and loyalty on this issue:
  - to the President and his advisers?
  - to our Congressional delegation?
  - to the military?
  - to deterrence theory or policy?
  - to the U.S.A.?
  - to our specie?
  - to life on Earth?
11. Is "peace", as the absence of war or an interlude between wars, adequate in our nuclear age? Has war become obsolete, because:
  - it doesn't work any more, for us in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, for Iraq and Iran, in Central America?
  - we're afraid to use total war, as we did in WW II?
  - any war could escalate to nuclear and threaten all life?Do we need to build a new kind of security ?
12. Is this an ethical, moral, religious issue? How do you personally justify the nuclear arms race? Is this an appropriate opportunity to speak against it?

RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1987



NATO troops on maneuvers in West Germany. In the alliance, an attack on one is an attack on all.

Hawke postponed an ANZUS council meeting planned for 1985 and said the alliance existed "in name only."

Lange credits Labor's electoral success to his strong antinuclear stance. Yet critics within his own party want it modified, while the opposition National Party says that only the Kremlin will benefit. Lange shows no inclination to yield. "Every country in the world has a compelling interest in the process of disarmament and arms control. No country can abdicate its interest in that process. . . . We pledged there will be no nuclear weapons in New Zealand, and there will not be," he said.

By itself, the loss of New Zealand from Western strategic planning would have little impact. Its forces are too small to tip even the regional power balance. Even so, New Zealand's position is highly disturbing to U.S. policymakers and to several other nations that rely on America for their security.

A big concern is the antinuclear policy of Japan, which theoretically also bars visits by either ships or planes carrying nuclear weapons. As of now, Tokyo does not ask about the vessels and planes at U.S. bases in Japan, and Washington volunteers no information.

**Rising worry.** If New Zealand carries out its plan, the Japanese government's no-questions, no-answers posture could revive pressure from the nation's antinuclear movement. Concern over a weakening of American influence also would be felt in Southeast Asia, where governments friendly to the U.S. already worry about Vietnam and the growing Soviet military presence there.

Moreover, some strategists argue that the breakup of ANZUS inevitably would weaken other alliances and mutual-defense treaties. Events already have frayed the network inspired by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when the cold war was at its most frigid three decades ago. But those that remain are central to Western defenses in the more complex 1980s. Two such pacts already have collapsed.

First to go was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, created by Dulles in 1954 to defend Indo-China against Communism. SEATO failed the test of Vietnam. In 1977, two years after the Communists occupied Saigon, the sizable organization was disbanded, its loss mourned only by bureaucrats in its Bangkok headquarters. The treaty still

## Why Another U.S. Treaty Is Going Down the Drain

**A mix of domestic politics and antinuclear sentiment spells trouble for America and the decades-old ANZUS accord.**

Stubborn opposition to nuclear weapons by one small South Pacific nation threatens to break another link in the worldwide chain of security treaties that defend America and its allies against Communist adventurism.

The immediate controversy centers on legislation introduced in New Zealand's Parliament on December 10 by the government of Prime Minister David Lange that would bar from the country's ports ships capable of carrying nuclear arms.

The Reagan administration worries that if New Zealand goes non-nuclear, there would be political fallout in a dozen or more other nations that are friends or allies of the United States. It could even affect such a strong—and so far tightly knit—security alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Lange's legislation would let him deny port access to any ship unless he was satisfied that it had no atomic weapons. Washington adamantly refuses to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear warheads aboard its warships to avoid tipping off the Soviet Union. Passage of the measure surely would end the 34-year-old ANZUS de-

fense treaty linking New Zealand with the U.S. and Australia. The U.S. State Department already has warned that enactment probably would mean "termination of our alliance relationship with New Zealand."

Lange's plan furthers a drive that began in 1984 when his Labor Party swept to power on an antinuclear platform. Last February, he refused to let a U.S. destroyer dock during ANZUS military exercises unless Washington certified that it had no nuclear arms.


The U.S. and Australia reacted firmly. Washington canceled the exercises, expressing "grave concern." A few days later, Australian Prime Minister Robert



Lange's policies imperil relations with U.S.

## U.S. Commitments, Active and Defunct

Treaties pledging United States to defend other countries—



Note: Cuba was suspended in 1962 from the Rio Pact's framework organization, the Organization of American States, but remains a signatory of the treaty itself.

exists, but there is no prospect that it will be revived.

Next to fall was the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), put together in 1958 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain to contain Soviet expansion southward into the Mideast or the Arabian Sea. Iraq opted out quickly, contributing little more than the original name of the umbrella treaty, the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. was only an associate member, but it played a dominant role in the treaty's decade-plus of reasonably vigorous life.

By the late 1970s, the interests of CENTO's full members had so diverged that the organization was a political anachronism. The treaty was dissolved in 1979 at the request of Turkey, which by then was more concerned with thwarting Greek ambitions on Cyprus than with containing Soviet expansion.

The 1947 Rio Pact covering much of the Western Hemisphere was the first product of U.S. efforts to set up multinational security systems. It still exists. So does the Organization of American States (OAS), established the next year to reaffirm the pact's security commitments and bring together 30-odd other inter-American agencies.

The OAS umbrella enabled President Johnson to send troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent a

possible Communist takeover. Yet Latin American suspicion of the U.S. prevented Washington from establishing a permanent inter-American force to deal with insurgencies.

One oddity of the group's loosely drawn provisions is that Cuba remains a signatory of the Rio Pact even though it has been "excluded" from OAS affairs since 1962 and was the target of OAS-imposed sanctions in 1964. Even more bizarre is the fact that, at least in theory, Nicaragua could call on the U.S. and other Rio Pact members to help defend against U.S.-financed *contras* fighting to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Managua.

**Honored alliances.** Of all the cold-war security pacts, only NATO and bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines remain strong enough to weather successive crises. Questions sometimes are raised, however, about the strength of the U.S. commitment to its treaty partners and about NATO's long-term ability to cope with threats outside the Central European heartland.

NATO nations are firmly pledged to regard an attack on one member as an attack on all. Direct, conventional aggression anywhere between the North Sea and Italy certainly would be met by joint action. Less certain is how other countries in the alliance, including the U.S., would respond to Soviet nibbling at NATO's Greek or Turkish flanks. Most doubtful of all is whether

NATO would counter a Soviet thrust into the Middle East.

The U.S. would be certain to fight if South Korea were attacked, if only because American troops help guard the northern frontier. Any attack on Japan also would trigger a U.S. military response. Maintaining the world's second largest economic power as a democratic ally is one of the most basic American strategic aims.

There is less certainty about whether the U.S. would defend the Philippines, especially against internal aggression. This reluctance is partly the bitter legacy of Vietnam and partly distaste for the embattled regime of President Ferdinand Marcos.

No matter what a treaty may promise, the hard facts of national interests and perceived dangers are the final determinants of whether security agreements endure or fall apart.

NATO works because its key members have common interests and see a direct threat from the Soviet Union. But to Lange in the South Pacific, according to a U.S. official, "it is not credible that Soviet tanks might someday roll onto New Zealand beaches."

Unless this view changes and international goals take preference over national interests, the curtain seems certain to ring down on ANZUS just as it did on SEATO and CENTO. □

By JAMES WALLACE with the overseas bureau and BOB HORTON in Washington

essential to ship safety, interdependent ocean commerce, and prevention of pollution from ship accidents—subjects of equal concern to all nations.

We can also see the probability of greater use of international organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, as umbrellas for cooperative marine scientific research, including that within national EEZs.

#### Closing Remarks

As you can appreciate, our government's LOS program is a replete and active one whether it is in the area of navigational freedoms, EEZ implementation, fisheries, deep seabed mining, the marine environment, maritime boundaries, or marine scientific research. The areas of activity address every major part of the LOS Convention. So when one hears the cliché that the law of the sea is dead, I think it is well to reflect upon the multiplicity of issues of oceans use and oceans law which arise and must be dealt with on a continuing, daily basis. The trend, if anything, is intensifying.

To be sure, there are those who will argue that an LOS system can only be meaningful if the United States is party to an agreed deep seabed minerals regime. And I can understand this point of view, while at the same time disagreeing with it. There are too many other aspects of oceans use and law which we must press forward. That is precisely what we have done and in an internationally coordinated fashion. We must continue to work cooperatively and diligently with other countries, especially coastal states, to ensure that the positive results of the LOS Convention are accentuated and that extensions of coastal jurisdiction are carried out in conformity with international law. I hope my remarks this evening have succeeded, at least in part, in conveying both the flavor and the detail of how our government is going about this challenging and fascinating task in this important period in the evolution of oceans law. ■

## U.S.-New Zealand Disagreement on Port Access for U.S. Ships

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
JULY 2, 1986<sup>1</sup>

In Manila Prime Minister Lange and Secretary of State Shultz discussed the ship visit problem between our two countries. The meeting concluded with a recognition that the Government of New Zealand does not feel that it can live with U.S. policy on this issue, but that we would part company as friends. We regret that the position of the United States, both with reference to that meeting and with respect to our efforts to find a satisfactory resolution, has been misconstrued.

The United States maintains a worldwide policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. Implicit in this policy is a requirement for ambiguity about the nature of the armaments of our ships. Our other allies recognize the need for this ambiguity, and none feel constrained to make judgments about individual ships. It is on this point that the policy of the Government of New Zealand differs significantly from that of all our other allies.

If New Zealand maintains its intention to say no to ships operating under the ambiguity of neither confirming nor denying, or to nuclear-powered ships, then it is not possible for us to send Navy vessels into New Zealand's ports. This vitiates the principal contribution that New Zealand makes to the alliance.

Suggestions that the United States has refused to engage in negotiation or

consultation on this issue are at variance with the facts. The United States has made a considerable effort to work with New Zealand over the past 2 years to resolve the port ban issue and to restore normal port access. We have maintained intensive contacts and understand fully the New Zealand Government's position. Unfortunately, the New Zealand Government has as yet not put forward any proposal to restore normal port access compatible with our global neither confirming nor denying requirements.

It has been alleged that the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security pact] treaty contains only an obligation to consult. Article IV of the treaty clearly states that an armed attack on any of the parties in the Pacific area would be a danger to the other parties and that all would act to meet the common danger. The U.S. Government has consistently confirmed that it would fully and promptly fulfill its security commitments under ANZUS, by both military and nonmilitary means, as best would meet the threat.

New Zealand's withdrawal of an essential element of its ANZUS participation inevitably must alter the obligations of the United States with respect to its security responsibilities to New Zealand. We continue to hope that New Zealand will eventually restore normal port access on a basis comparable to other alliance partners.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department deputy spokesman Charles Redman. ■

DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN

# ***gist***

A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations  
Not a comprehensive policy statement  
Bureau of Public Affairs • Department of State

## Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

October 1985

Background: In response to requests by Congress, President Reagan submitted reports in January 1984 and February 1985 on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. They document the grounds for serious US concern regarding the Soviet Union's observance of the agreements. In the February 1985 report the President stated: "In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them."

Following are the key findings of the President's 1985 report:

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol: The Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of the 1972 Convention as well as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting into the atmosphere of radioactive matter and caused such matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize environmental contamination by radioactive substances.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 by conducting underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding its 150 kiloton limit. Although this treaty has not been ratified, both parties are obligated under customary international law to abide by its terms because neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Further, each country has stated it would observe the kiloton limit.

Helsinki Final Act: During the Polish crisis in 1981, the Soviet Union violated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act when it conducted a military maneuver exceeding 25,000 ground troops without providing the prior notification or other information required.

SALT II Treaty: The Soviet Union has been encrypting telemetry (radio signal) information from missile tests in a way that violates the SALT II Treaty. The treaty bans deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by the other party's national technical means. Although the US has stated its intention not to ratify SALT II, both parties in 1981 made political commitments not to undercut the treaty. Soviet encryption practices violate this commitment.

SALT II Treaty: By testing the SS-X-25 ICBM, the Soviet Union has violated the SALT II Treaty provision that permits only one new type of ICBM. The Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type of ICBM. Even if one accepts the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, the missile would violate the treaty provision prohibiting the testing of an existing ICBM with a single re-entry vehicle whose weight is less than 50% of the ICBM's throw-weight. This provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single-warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to multiple-warhead systems.

SALT II Treaty: Although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union probably has violated the SALT II Treaty's ban on deployment of the SS-16 ICBM.

ABM Treaty: A large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To preclude construction of radars that could be used for a territorial ABM defense, the treaty limits deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Krasnoyarsk radar meets neither of these requirements.

ABM Treaty: This construction and other Soviet activities suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which would entirely negate the ABM Treaty. Other activities include development of components of a new ABM system that apparently could be deployed in a mobile mode, and probable testing of components of surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) in an ABM mode. Mobile ABM components are banned by the ABM Treaty; SAMS are permitted to counter aircraft, but they may not be given the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and they may not be tested in an ABM mode.

US action: The Soviet Union thus far has failed to provide satisfactory explanations or undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate US concerns. Nevertheless, the President decided early in June to continue our policy not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements to the extent the Soviets exercise comparable restraint. He stated his determination that we go the extra mile--to try to establish a framework of mutual, interim restraint to support our ongoing effort in Geneva to reach agreement on reducing nuclear arms. We will constantly review our policy in light of Soviet conduct, including correction of violations, continued growth in Soviet strategic forces, and Soviet seriousness in the negotiations. The President has directed the Defense Department to identify specific actions the US could take to augment as necessary our strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations.

*Boys "on-site verification"*

## IN PERSON

Thomas B. Cochran

René T. Riley

Thomas B. Cochran, senior staff scientist for the Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. (NRDC), has put himself in the epicenter of the debate over nuclear testing.

The council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences agreed last May to participate in a joint nuclear test ban verification project, an undertaking intended to show that it's possible to collect and exchange testing information with the Soviets.

Cochran, one of the persons in charge of NRDC's nuclear program in the council's Washington office, subsequently traveled to the Soviet Union to set up monitoring stations 100 miles from the primary Soviet underground testing site in Semipalatinsk. Three aboveground seismic stations are currently in place; one was damaged by a fire in mid-January. Cochran is due to return in February to install more sensitive equipment and a computer system. Three seismic stations are also being set up near the primary U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada.

"We're making a statement," Cochran said. "And we've backed up our statement with some facts by putting hardware in the field."

W. J. Hannon, the assistant program manager for verification at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., says the data recorded by NRDC could "provide potentially useful information about the seismographic characteristics in the region around the [Soviet] test site." Physicist Richard Garwin, a veteran defense consultant who once worked on developing the hydrogen bomb, calls the project "a remarkable advance."

However, Frank J. Gaffney Jr., deputy assistant Defense secretary for nuclear forces and arms control policy, doesn't see much good that can come of it all. "We are under no illusions as to the mischievous and counterproductive purpose that Soviet authorities hope the NRDC experiment will serve . . ." he wrote in *The Washington Post* last summer. The Soviets are using Cochran's group, he wrote, "to confuse the domestic debate about the need for American nuclear testing and the reasons why we oppose the effort of the Soviet Union and others to



## A Physicist Blasts Away At Verification 'Myths'

promote an inequitable and unverifiable ban on nuclear testing."

In 1980, Cochran started the council's *Nuclear Weapons Databook* series, which details the world's major nuclear arsenals. He says his work on the databooks, and his related research on the environmental impact of nuclear weapons production, led him to believe that private citizens could demonstrate how a test ban might work. The Soviet's unilateral nuclear testing moratorium (which Moscow has threatened to abandon after the next U.S. underground blast, now set for early February), and the refusal of the House last year to approve funds for anything but relatively small-scale nuclear tests, provided fertile ground for Cochran's proposal.

The first year of the verification project is likely to cost NRDC more than \$2 million, most of which will be covered by foundation grants, with the council's 62,000 members providing the rest.

Cochran came to NRDC—a New York-based, nonprofit organization "dedicated to the protection of America's natural resources and the human environment"—13 years ago, planning to stay only temporarily while finishing a critical book about liquid metal fast breeder reactors.

Now Cochran says he wouldn't think of leaving. "To have the same

impact in terms of shaping federal policy, you'd have to have a very high position in government," he said. "Here you can accomplish that at a younger age."

The 46-year-old Cochran is not your typical arms control advocate. A former Navy officer, he once taught mathematics and physics at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Along the way, he earned master's and doctoral degrees in physics from Vanderbilt University. From 1969-71, while on the payroll of a private consulting firm, Cochran helped evaluate new weapons planned for the Army. That work, he said, gave him "a taste of the military-industrial complex from the industrial side."

Subsequently hired by Resources for the Future Inc. in 1971, Cochran concentrated on the environmental effects of the nuclear power industry in general and the liquid metal fast breeder reactor in particular. "The Atomic Energy Commission people were fudging the information to make the breeder look good, when really it looked terrible," he recalled. "It took 12 years to take that program from the highest energy priority program in the nation to the lowest priority in the nation. I don't think it will take 12 years to accomplish a test ban because the major obstacle has now been resolved." □

was not sound. It resulted in the illegal award of the parking garage contract, and other ensuing violations.

Now, the city-borough assembly has hired outside legal assistance. Mr. Gross is being paid at the rate of \$150 per hour of citizens' funds to fight a "citizen," i.e. Ms. Breck. This action raises a few new questions. Why was Mr. Gross selected? What was the procedure used to hire his services as opposed to those of many attorneys who may be more competent and available? Is the present legal staff of the city deemed not competent to represent the city in the lawsuit? If not, is it time the deadwood be weeded out?

After the results of (recent) elections the citizens have expressed themselves by not returning most of the members back to the assembly. I am hopeful, that our newly elected members as well as the existing members will take the sentiments of the citizens into account and be more responsive.

Most of us would like to see a parking facility for the downtown area, but it has to be done right.

Personally, I'd like to express my gratitude to Ms. Breck for reminding us that the municipality and the assembly are accountable to the people. We need to realize the power and the role of the citizen, and be constantly alert for a productive and better government.

SUBMITTED - BEFORE  
CHERNOBYL - AS  
"OTHER  
↓  
'TESTAMENTS'  
cerely,  
audhry  
d Court  
in 99801  
2/Nov 84  
EMPIRE

Dear Editor:

It was indicative that Steve Dahl couldn't even get the date of my 5 Nov. 1984 Empire letter right in his clumsy attempt to distort it. It is more than ironic when anti-defense activists (who have made a fine art of terrifying us with the specter of nuclear holocaust) start accusing others of "paranoia." However, this does raise an interesting aspect of the arms race ques-

tion. "Paranoia" is falsely imaginig or grossly exaggerating danger. "Denial," on the other hand, is denying or irresponsibly minimizing danger which actually does exist. A classic example of this was Churchill's "paranoia" about Hitler before World War II. History proved his critics to be suffering "denial."

I do not deny that there is a continuing possibility of a USA-USSR war occurring, that there is a probability that nuclear germ-gas weapons would be used in such a war — although probably not in the "all-out" manner that anti-defense activists want us to believe — and that there is therefore a (smaller but nonetheless significant) possibility of a "nuclear winter." However, the inability of people like Steve to realize that the Soviet system itself poses an even greater danger to humanity typifies the denial and self-deceit underlying anti-defense agitation in the West.

It is not only that nuclear and biological environmental disasters in the Soviet Union have been worse than what have occurred in the West. More importantly, the automatic cover-ups by the Soviet government have largely succeeded because there is no free press to expose them. (There is literally "no telling" of what more disasters than the few known to us have occurred within the Soviet Union.)

Most importantly (and thanks to KGB slave labor camps, psychiatric prisons, etc.) Soviet government and industry are not accountable to or controllable by the Soviet people. Soviet abuses of human rights, world peace, wildlife and the environment have only been able to be seriously questioned (and sometimes restrained) by external pressures from the West. (This still does not hinder the Soviet Union's killing of whales and its principal contribution to Arctic pollution.) The Soviet commitment to ever-advancing technology means that ever more catastrophic and eventually terminal environmental disasters are inevitable unless the Soviet system is controlled and reformed. Just allowing that system to continue is an intolerable environmental risk.

Massive strategic military power is

all Soviet leaders have or need to give them superpower status and political control. (As Stalin once said, "...and how many divisions does the Pope have?") They are not going to concede any of that power merely out of any kindly concern for humanity. The only genuine hope for us — let alone for Soviet-Bloc peoples — is to compel Soviet leaders to accept real disarmament and political reform by confronting them with the prospect of us strategically dominating them if they don't.

The television film "The Day After" shown a year ago was fundamentally out of context and deceiving simply because it visually confronted people with the horror of the nuclear war we must risk, while overlooking the even more terminal alternative. (I have seen no television dramatizations of KGB psychiatric prisons or Soviet environmental disasters.) This is an artistic (?) form of terrorism.

When we watch reruns of "China Syndrome" we might think of the permanently and radioactively contaminated and quarantined region near Kyshtym in the Soviet Union. (The KGB expended quite a few political prisoners in the clean-up attempt.) Watching "The Andromeda Strain" can also remind us of the future implications of a treaty-violating germ war laboratory accident in Sverdlovsk in 1979 which resulted in the anthrax infection of up to 3,000 Soviet people — many of whom died horribly.

KTOO-TV will be soon showing yet another aftermath film, "Testament." (The 14 Nov 83 Newsweek pans it better than I ever could.) Reminiscent of "On the Beach," the last post-war moments of some American families awaiting a cloud-delivered radioactive death in their strangely untouched middle class surroundings are savored in morbid detail. For those who do enjoy wallowing in this sort of thing, it might be more plausible to imagine the plot delivered by a radioactive or germ-laden cloud generated by the final Soviet environmental disaster.

Respectfully  
Lou Coatney  
9706 Trappers Lane  
Juneau 99801

BY GARRY TRUDEAU

NOW, REMEMBER, PEOPLE, NO PAIN, NO GAIN! I WANT YOU OUT ON THE VOLLEYBALL COURT IN FULL SWEATS EVERY DAY TO GO ON TO MAKE TIME TO CALIFORNIA

DUUUKE!  
DUUUKE!  
SO LETS GET OUT THERE

LOOK AT THAT. THEYRE DOING THE WAVE. THEY

**NUCLEAR-  
FREE  
ZONES  
MUST  
BECOME  
A REALITY**



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


Measures aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world hold an important place in the struggle for the reduction of the sphere of nuclear preparations... We believe that the creation of such zones is not wishful thinking or idealistic day-dreaming. It is a positive phenomenon of international life, reflecting the will of ordinary people to promote peace, cooperation and detente.

*Mikhail GORBACHEV*

## STOP THE NUCLEAR MADNESS





**H**ow can we remove the threat of nuclear war? There is no greater problem facing mankind today. Such quantities of nuclear bombs and shells have been stockpiled in the world that they are enough to destroy all living things on earth many times over. And besides nuclear weapons, chemical, biological, climatic, space-based and other mass destruction weapons have been or are being developed. This is a monstrous distortion of the meaning of human civilization.

This madness was started by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. By using the greatest discovery in nuclear physics for the destruction within seconds of cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, the United States brought mankind to the brink of nuclear suicide.

Common sense revolts against such prospects and demands that nuclear weapons be banned and their appearance where they do not yet exist be prevented. No one should use or threaten to use them, and instead of confrontation there should be peaceful cooperation of nations for the common good.

One of the ways to a non-nuclear world is to create **ZONES FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS**. Thus, villages, towns and vast regions in dozens of countries have declared themselves nuclear-free zones in order to protect themselves from possible nuclear devastation. The activists of this movement have come up with ingenious ways of fighting against the common evil. They put up road signs and posters and devise mottoes warning against the nuclear danger, draft appeals, hold rallies and festivals. They have sponsored international rallies and conferences in Britain, Bulgaria and Spain. The participants in these forums spoke on behalf of tens of millions of people who stand for nuclear-free zones.





## NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

The idea is not a new one. It was put forward by the Soviet Union at a session of a subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on March 27, 1956, as a means of geographical limitation of the sphere of proliferation of nuclear weapons. At that session the Soviet delegate proposed that a zone of nuclear arms limitation and inspection be set up in Europe, more specifically, that the stationing of nuclear-armed units and any atomic and hydrogen weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the neighbouring countries be banned.

The Soviet Union has from the very start attached special importance to lowering the level of nuclear confrontation, especially in those regions where it is the most dangerous, that is, where only a narrow strip of land divides the opposing military-political groupings and where the concentration of armaments and armed forces is very great. Europe was and remains such a region. For the Soviet Union the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe is an important part of the struggle for strengthening peace and reducing the war danger in this continent, a way towards freeing Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet position is appreciated by millions of people around the world. They realize that the creation of nuclear-free zones is not only a means for preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons, but also a sure way leading to:

freeing Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet position is appreciated by millions of people around the world. They realize that the creation of nuclear-free zones is not only a means for preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons, but also a sure way leading to:

- ) AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORLD POLITICAL CLIMATE,
- ) CONSOLIDATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
- ) A CURBING OF THE ARMS RACE, AND
- ) THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

For millions of people the creation of nuclear-free zones also provides a real possibility of not being drawn into a nuclear conflict, of warding off the threat of a nuclear attack, and at least partly reducing for their countries the horrible and unpredictable consequences of a world nuclear conflagration.

The idea of setting up nuclear-free zones has been welcomed with enthusiasm by large numbers of people in dozens of countries, the governments of most of the Balkan states, legislators and local government bodies, by thousands of populated localities—from large European cities to a tiny village on the Fiji Islands, by the inhabitants of vast regions—from the Middle East to the Korean peninsula, who have declared that they do not want to have anything to do with nuclear weapons, and by the residents of individual city districts, villages and even streets.





# PEACE TO OUR HOMES!

In the autumn of 1983 the residents of Zillestrasse in West Berlin unanimously signed a declaration proclaiming their street a nuclear-free zone.

The authors of the declaration made no calculations about the military and technical chances of surviving in a nuclear war. There is no need to do that

on the scale of a street or a city district. The assessments of these West Berliners were of a different nature. By joining their voices to those of millions of like-minded people, they help shape public opinion and the world political climate. In this way they protect their homes.

To desire peace means to work for the removal of the threat of nuclear war, for the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

This is how the Japanese, the only nation that had experienced the fury and blaze of nuclear weapons, look at the matter. More than 600 cities and small towns in Japan have declared their territories nuclear-free. Half of the population of JAPAN, which stands at 120 million, live there.

A similar picture is found in AUSTRALIA, which has a population of 15 million. Many merchant fleet crews have declared their ships peaceable, thus giving them a nuclear-free status.

The city council of NEW YORK is going to carry out a referendum on the question of declaring the largest US city a nuclear-free zone. The call for such a referendum is

contained in a special petition signed by 25,000 New Yorkers—a number far exceeding that required by law.

Residents of the MANITOBA province, the first Canadian province to declare itself a nuclear-free zone,

have put out a proclamation with a striking emblem calling for the banning of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada.

NEW ZEALAND has adopted the same US and British



first Canadian province to declare itself a nuclear-free zone, have put out a proclamation with a striking emblem calling for the banning of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada.

ICELAND has refused to allow US and British nuclear-powered vessels and ships with nuclear weapons on board to call at its ports. The city council of LEEDS,

one of hundreds of British cities and towns that have declared themselves nuclear-free, has issued a booklet calling on its fellow-citizens to face the truth: once a nuclear conflict breaks out, Britain will cease to exist.

The "No to Atomic Weapons" movement in NORWAY, with 300 branches located all over the country, has launched a campaign for setting up a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and against nuclear militarization of the North Atlantic region.

in LISBON, representatives of all political parties, from Catholics to Communists, as well as delegates of different trade unions—teachers, physicians' and journalists' unions—have held a conference under the motto "For an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons".

Five largest communities of the Greek province of LARISSA, which have declared themselves nuclear-free zones, have organized a peace march to the provincial centre where a meeting was held under the slogans for curbing the arms race and turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone.





# SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY



Fighters for peace and against nuclear death are moved by a deep conviction that their cause is a just one. They have the support of all people of goodwill, all peace-loving states.

Their position is also understood and supported by the whole powerful socialist community.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries regard it as their main foreign-policy task to avert the threat of nuclear war. All their initiatives in the world arena are aimed at promoting this goal.

The Soviet Union has been making unremitting efforts in this field.

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, aware of the fatal consequences which the manufacture of superweapons would have,

the USSR proposed banning the use of nuclear arms and eliminating them altogether. The United States, then the sole possessor of these weapons, rejected the proposal, thereby ushering in a wasteful and dangerous arms race.

Soviet peace proposals are reflected in several resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. One of them,

a Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1961.

In 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was signed in Moscow.

Underground nuclear weapon tests are still being carried out, but demands to ban them are being voiced all over the world ever more forcefully with every passing year.

The Soviet Union has set a good example by unilaterally stopping all nuclear weapon tests.

In 1968 an international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded. Under the treaty those states which possess such weapons are not to transfer them to anyone.

...and that the states ...  
...of the manufacture ...  
...of these weapons ...  
...of the world ...  
...of the world ...

The Soviet Union has set a good example by unilaterally stopping all nuclear weapon tests.

In 1968 an international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded. Under the treaty those states which possess such weapons are not to transfer them to anyone,

and non-nuclear states are not to manufacture or acquire such weapons.

Both treaties have been signed and are being observed by an overwhelming majority of countries of the world.


Persistent efforts on the part of the USSR to curb strategic arms race led to the signing of two Soviet-US treaties: SALT-1 in 1972 and SALT-2 in 1979.

They set certain limits for strategic arms, the most destructive and dangerous types of nuclear weapons.

Special mention should be made of the unilateral commitment undertaken by the Soviet Union, in June 1982, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A similar pledge has been made by the People's Republic of China.

If the other nuclear powers follow this example, the most dreadful weapon in the history of mankind will never be used.

Finally, in connection with the Soviet-US talks in Geneva, the USSR has put forward a series of initiatives and proposals covering all the basic issues whose solution is indispensable for halting the arms race and normalizing the international situation.





## FIRST SUCCESSES

Only then do ideas become a real power when they grip the minds of people, said the great Lenin. The idea of nuclear-free zones has caught the imagination of millions of people, breaking down prejudices and resistance and showing the way to a peaceful world.

The first continent to be protected against military rivalry and nuclear weapons was the ice continent in the South pole. In December 1959 an international treaty on the continent of Antarctica was concluded, which provides for the use of its territory solely for peaceful purposes. The treaty bans militarization of the continent and prohibits nuclear tests and burial of nuclear waste there.

In 1964 the idea of turning the vast continent of Africa into a nuclear-free zone was put forward. The newly created Organization of African Unity, which unites all the free and independent states on the continent except the racist Republic of South Africa, announced its readiness to sign a treaty under the aegis of the United Nations on not producing nuclear weapons and not trying to acquire such weapons. Unfortunately, the extremely complex situation within this organization, which is systematically undermined by direct interference of colonialists and international reactionary forces, prevented the signing of such an agreement. However, the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Africa is very much alive. The leaders of many African states have once again put as one of the priority tasks that of freeing the continent from nuclear weapons.

In 1967 the Treaty of Tlatelolco banning nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed in Mexico City. This document of truly historic significance is accompanied by two protocols. According to one of them, signed and ratified by all nuclear powers, they are to observe the nuclear-free status of Latin America and not to infringe it in any form.

This was a real breakthrough in the struggle to make the world nuclear-free. For the first time a populated and rapidly developing region of the world has established for itself an internationally recognized regime prohibiting the acquisition, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. This nuclear-free status is extended to 23 Latin American states

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This was a real breakthrough in the struggle to make the world nuclear-free. For the first time a populated and rapidly developing region of the world has established for itself an internationally recognized regime prohibiting the acquisition, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. This nuclear-free status is extended to 23 Latin American states with a total population of about 200 million.

For almost two decades the signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have not been burdened with nuclear arms problems: there are no nuclear weapons in Latin America. The status of a nuclear-free zone is being observed on a vast territory.

In August 1985 thirteen countries of the South Pacific Forum—Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Niue, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa i Sisifo and Solomon Islands—approved, and the majority of them signed, a Treaty Declaring the South Pacific a Nuclear-Free Zone.





## TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES

In its effort to avert the war threat the Soviet Union ardently supports the idea of creating nuclear-free zones, first of all in Europe.

\* The Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to work for a Europe free from both nuclear (medium-range and tactical) and chemical weapons.

\* The Soviet Union supports proposals by other states on setting up a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons along the line dividing the forces of the two opposing blocs on the European continent, on removing step-by-step nuclear arms from the continent and on creating regional nuclear-free zones and peace zones in Northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic Sea, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

\* The Soviet Union firmly believes that states which do not possess or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories should be given reliable international guarantees as regards their security, guarantees that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.

\* The Soviet Union is prepared to recognize the status of a nuclear-free zone even in the case where not all nuclear powers give such guarantees.

\* As the biggest European power the Soviet Union is ready to consider undertaking

## TO A CRUCIAL ISSUE

a utopian dream, but a real and effective means of strengthening security is confirmed in practice by the above-mentioned Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 signed by the overwhelming majority of states. This treaty, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the treaty of the thirteen island states of the Pacific, promotes the movement for nuclear-free zones and creates the material prerequisites for the setting up of such zones in other regions. The idea of nuclear-free zones, which is sensible and threatens no one, has its enemies—those to whom life is unthinkable without a continual military buildup and who mainly stake on nuclear weapons. Specifically, these are the United States, some of its NATO allies and such militarist states as Israel and the Republic of South Africa.

Nuclear-free zones, zones of peace do not correspond to their policies and are in conflict with their objectives and aspirations. Such zones reduce the possibilities of applying pressure, of intimidation, direct military interference, terror and

guarantees that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.


its NATO allies and such militarist states as Israel and the Republic of South Africa.

• The Soviet Union is prepared to recognize the status of a nuclear-free zone even in the case where not all nuclear powers give such guarantees.

• As the biggest European power the Soviet Union is ready to consider undertaking certain obligations concerning that part of its territory adjacent to a future nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. That the creation of nuclear-free zones is not

Nuclear-free zones, zones of peace do not correspond to their policies and are in conflict with their objectives and aspirations. Such zones reduce the possibilities of applying pressure, of intimidation, direct military interference, terror and aggression. That is why the United States and those who follow its course seek to discredit the idea of nuclear-free zones and hamper its implementation.

*NOTE:  
- No spot*





## WHAT WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE TELL US

There is an old Oriental fairytale about a peasant whose only treasure was his hard-working and beautiful wife. Once he acted in a cowardly way in a critical moment and he lost his faithful wife. For a long time he wandered about the world in search of his treasure. The last of his adventures was an encounter with a huge ferocious tiger. He saw his beloved, whom he had been looking for everywhere, in the tiger's jaws. He threw himself at the tiger, caught his fangs and a miracle happened—the tiger turned into a mountain overgrown with trees where the happy couple built their new home.

The fairytale is called *Dwelling in a Tiger's Jaws*. It comes to mind when one thinks about the threat of nuclear war which can instantly destroy our planet and put an end to all living things on earth—such a colossal destructive power has been accumulated in its monstrous arsenals. Now we ask ourselves: what is to be done—to run away or to call someone for help?

Wisdom and experience tell us that we must catch the monster by its fangs. Our goal and salvation lie in tearing out those fangs, eliminating once and for all nuclear weapons so that this monster, poised for a strike that spells disaster to all living things, would disappear completely.

This evil must be driven out of one's home, street, town and country now.

Such actions will help to break the resistance of those opposed to nuclear-free zones and to prevent loopholes for nuclear weapons in the zones that are closed to them.

The Soviet Union, which is in favour of setting up nuclear-free zones, will support measures for the observance of the nuclear-free status of such zones and for protecting this status.

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"Don't you think  
I'm in bad need  
of a shave?"

## NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES ARE A

RELIABLE WAY TOWARDS THE  
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON  
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**NUCLEAR-  
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БЕЗЪЯДЕРНЫЕ ЗОНЫ ДОЛЖНЫ СТАТЬ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬЮ

*на английском языке*

Цена 10 к.

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Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1986

## Sources Are Cited for Charge Of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze

By LESLIE MAITLAND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — The White House today cited Government reports and magazine articles as documentation for President Reagan's contention that "foreign agents" had helped "instigate" the movement in the United States to freeze nuclear arms.

Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary, said the State Department had issued reports on the Soviet infiltration of the peace movement and said further documentation was contained in articles in *The Reader's Digest*, *Commentary* and *The American Spectator*.

President Reagan's remark at his news conference Thursday night came in response to a question as to whether evidence existed of foreign involvement in the movement to freeze the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Mr. Reagan said he could not discuss "intelligence matters," but that "plenty of evidence" existed. He said that the "overwhelming majority" of those who supported nuclear freeze proposals were "sincere and well-intentioned."

But he added, "There has been, in the organization of some of the big demonstrations, the one in New York, and so forth, there is no question about foreign agents that were sent to help instigate and help create and keep such a movement going."

### Remarks Called 'McCarthyism'

Some critics of the President's remarks accused him of trying to stifle debate on the issue.

"It is disheartening to see an American President returning to the tactics of McCarthyism," said Morton H. Halperin, speaking for the American Civil Liberties Union. "Charges of secret manipulation by foreign agents poison the well of public debate."

"Americans must be free to debate issues on their merits and speak out without being subject to red-baiting," Mr. Halperin asserted.

Leslie Cagan, one of the coordinators of the disarmament rally held in New York June 12, said: "The President is hypocritical when he argues for increased military spending to help 'defend democracy' while at the same time he undermines our democratic right to public protest. The assertion that the American people are being manipulated by 'foreign agents' only serves to divert our energies away from the real issues: the clear and present dangers presented by our nuclear arsenals."

However, Roger S. Young, assistant

director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Congressional and public affairs, said that the President was "accurate" in describing "the Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." Mr. Young said, "The F.B.I. has received that information and has furnished it for the White House."

"We are not casting aspersions on the peace movement," he said, "but we know the Soviets have targeted it as the place to exert influence, not just in the United States, but in other parts of the world."

The *Reader's Digest* article cited by the White House as a source of documentation for Mr. Reagan's remark — "The K.G.B.'s Magical War for 'Peace'" — appeared last month and was written by John Barron. In it, Mr. Barron wrote that the "objective" of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, is "to secure military superiority for the Soviet Union by persuading the United States to abandon new weapons systems." The name of its campaign, he says, is "nuclear freeze."

Another article mentioned by the White House, "Perspective on the Peace Movement," by William E. Griffith in last June's *Reader's Digest*, stated, "The Soviets have fed funds and propaganda materials to some European peace groups and that 'a Soviet-front organization has allied itself to the movement.'"

Other sources listed by the White House included:

"The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," by Vladimir Bukovsky in *Commentary* last May; "The Counterfeit Peace Makers: the Atomic Freeze," by Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, in *The American Spectator* of June 1982; a State Department report of last July entitled "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," and hearings of February 1980 before the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which involved testimony from the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet covert actions abroad.

But some critics of the President were not satisfied. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, speaking in New Orleans at a meeting of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen, said that as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he would "challenge the President to produce" information supporting his statement "in closed session, if he so chooses."

# The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

## The Freeze Debate

A SA VEHICLE of generalized protest, the nuclear freeze proposal has had one immediate effect: it has helped induce Ronald Reagan to start adjusting some of his arms control positions. He has toned down his statements on nuclear war and began to explore compromise in the Euromissile talks. The freeze proposal has also become an agent of nuclear education for Congress. But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy.

It is time to be calm despite the improvements made in the freeze resolution in the House debate. It will require six to eight weeks.

It is good that the current strategic oval now inserted in the resolution is "essential equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities"—a more formulaic phrase than the "mutual and most comprehensive" one. The resolution is now more in line with what Mr. Reagan has said in the past. It is a good sign that Mr. Reagan is willing to consider an immediate mutual freeze on the production of new weapons that would be subject to a "no first use" policy.

A more realistic proposal, however, is the "no first use" resolution, which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. This is a more realistic proposal. The resolution is to be passed by the House in the next few days.

more "stability." The term "arms race" can be very loaded: weapons that are less vulnerable and therefore less prone to being fired first in a crisis can settle the superpowers down. If the freeze people are serious about the perils of "destabilizing weapons," they must do more than add to their resolution a paragraph inconsistent with its basic proposition.

The Stratton amendment, barely defeated on the House floor, illuminated a second crippling defect of the freeze—its equivocation concerning what new weapons would be permissible during the time it took the world several years to negotiate this freeze. The Reagan administration proposals make this question urgent. To the extent that they have addressed it, freeze advocates tend to say that each new system should be judged on its merits. But it is not easy to find new systems in a time of great uncertainty. The letter of the movement is to prohibit negotiations. But its spirit is to negotiate. It is time to do more. A freeze on the production of new weapons would prevent not only Mr. Reagan from negotiating but also the freeze itself.

The freeze resolution welcomes "negotiated and comprehensive arms control proposals." Sounds fine. In fact, however, the freeze resolution is a "no first use" resolution. It is a "no first use" resolution. It is a "no first use" resolution. It is a "no first use" resolution.



LETTERS TO

Sent by State Dept  
June 1986

## A Nuclear Freeze

--While the U.S. Government shares the concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end costly competition in nuclear arms, a nuclear freeze is not an effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives.

--A nuclear freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military buildup and lock in Soviet advantages. A freeze would preserve existing Soviet advantages in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that have resulted from the massive Soviet buildup of the last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised considerable restraint.

--About three quarters of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over half the the total Soviet strategic weapons are on launch systems five years old or less; only four percent are on systems over 15 years old. Thus a freeze would ensure that the U.S. strategic systems would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet systems.

--A freeze would undercut the US commitment of the NATO Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring 1985) in LRINF warheads.

--A freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and many elements would be unverifiable. It would require extensive and complex negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of the proposed freeze, especially those involving production and testing of certain systems, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement for genuine arms reductions.

--By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.

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
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**THE  
NUCLEAR  
FREEZE**

April 1982



# The Nuclear Freeze

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

## What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- *Produce significant reductions* in the arsenals of both sides;
- *Result in equal levels of arms on both sides*, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- *Are verifiable*, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- *Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war*, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*.

## What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- *A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- *A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- *A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult.* The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating

# Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
 SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile  
 SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine  
 ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile




table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- *A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- *A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

#### A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

**ICBMs.** Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

**Sea-Based Forces.** The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

**Bombers.** When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

The chart on pages 4 and 5 compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced 12 new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

### Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

quest for lasting peace. And, over time, as the nations mutually reduce their nuclear armaments (again, in a way that can be scientifically verified by all concerned) the threat of atomic holocaust will significantly diminish.

If the world fails to achieve this kind of nuclear disarmament is there any doubt that sooner or later, either by design or accident, one nation or the other will use its nuclear weapons?

And if that happens it is foregone that other nations will respond without strait.

The result would have to be near-total destruction of life on earth. (Just recall the panic, loss of human life, damage and contamination of food hundreds of miles away when a single accidental melt-down occurred recently in the Soviet Union.)

But nuclear destruction need not happen. We have the capacity, through verifiable agreements such as the initiative proposes, to make the threat of nuclear war obsolete.

What would be the State of Alaska's role in this? The initiative calls upon the governor to conduct our Alaskan affairs in ways that conform with this policy. It directs the lieutenant governor to deliver copies of the Act to Congress and to the President of the United States. It lets our national leaders and policymakers know that Alaskans stand for common-sense peace.

Similar initiatives have already passed in local Alaska elections. Now Alaska, alone of all the states, has a nuclear freeze initiative on the ballot this fall. This is our chance to speak and act positively on the issue of peace not only statewide but nationally through press attention to our unique ballot question.

Mike M. Miller, Alaska State Representative & prime sponsor.

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## Statement OPPOSING the Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition

Your vote on this resolution sends a message—an international message. Unfortunately, this resolution aims the wrong message at the wrong people. It is also naive, simplistic and cruelly false solution to a complex and deadly problem which it would only aggravate.

Chernobyl and Bhopal show that the ultimate danger to human survival is technology itself, not just the risk of nuclear war. Future energy or biogenetic disasters could terminate life on our planet even more certainly than "nuclear winter", and the Soviet system suppresses genuine environmental activism. A primary source of Arctic air pollution is the USSR. Nuclear weapons ended the "conven-

tional" holocaust of World War II, and Deterrence has been one of the few successes in curbing Soviet militarism and mistakes.

A "freeze" of the research, development and production of nuclear weapons cannot be verified. Our spy satellites may read license plates, but the Soviets have nonetheless succeeded in seriously violating existing nuclear and biological weapons treaties. The Soviets' unrepented murder of Major Arthur Nicolson demonstrates that even their signed guarantees of on-site treaty verification inspections mean nothing.

Our government has heard our concern about the cost and dangers of the arms race. It has tried to negotiate fair, verifiable disarmament treaties which will also continue deterring war. The Soviets refuse these and break others. Genuine Soviet peace activists attempting to petition their government are condemned to KGB psychiatric prisons.

Soviet leaders do not feel threatened by the terror and terrible costs of the arms race. They see Western "peace" activism as only a tool for nuclear terrorism, to demoralize our resistance to their increasingly aggressive militarism. Our FBI verified KGB involvement in the formation of the American freeze movement.

When unilateral agitation like this resolution undercuts our government's bargaining position and even leads Soviet leaders to think the arms race may be winnable, they have no use for genuine disarmament. While the Kremlin promotes a nuclear arms freeze, even the **Washington Post** has editorially opposed it as bad policy.

This resolution tells the Kremlin that nuclear terrorism works on Alaskans. Such fear and weakness precipitated Hitler's invasion of Poland and the Pearl Harbor attack. Such agitation led to our desertion of the Cambodians and Vietnamese and to the genocide which resulted.

Despite Kremlin propaganda, Soviet military preparations betray a doctrine that nuclear war is "winnable". (Even our Pentagon has renounced that.) Strategic advantage goes to the attacker, and Soviet development and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems surpassed us in the 1970's. Freezing our attempt to restore deterrence encourages Soviet attack.

Judging by their fast reaction to our State Senate's Wrangel Island resolution and Gennady Gerasimov's recent visit here, Soviet leaders realize Alaska's military and geopolitical importance and monitor us closely.

If you want to do something to help deter another world war, to express solidarity with our government's struggle for genuine disarmament and to send the Kremlin a strong and clear message that Alaskans can't be snowed, then please help vote this down.

Lou Coatney, Juneau

## BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1

### Initiative No. 83-03

# NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

The initiative would officially recognize that the prevention of nuclear war is the greatest challenge facing the Earth and that the nuclear arms race dangerously increases the risk of a war that would destroy humanity. The initiative would promote mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze, to be followed by nuclear weapons reduction. The initiative would direct the governor to conduct the state's affairs in conformity with the initiative's goals.

A vote "FOR" adopts the initiative.

FOR

A vote "AGAINST" rejects the initiative.

AGAINST

## NEUTRAL SUMMARY—83-03

### Prepared by the Legislative Affairs Agency

This initiative would declare as the policy of the state the promotion of a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze to be followed by a reduction in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The initiative bases this policy on its recognition that the greatest challenge facing the earth is the prevention of nuclear war by accident or by design and that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that could be humanity's final war. The governor is directed to conduct the affairs of the state and to carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

## FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSITION

**For An Act Entitled:** "An Act relating to the establishment of a nuclear freeze as the policy of the State."

### BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

Section 1. **DECLARATION OF POLICY.** It is the policy of the State of Alaska: (1) to recognize that the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occur-

rence of nuclear war by accident or design;

(2) to recognize that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war;

(3) to promote a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Section 2. **IMPLEMENTATION.** (a) The governor shall conduct the affairs of state and carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

(b) The lieutenant governor shall deliver copies of this Act to Congress and the President of the United States.

Section 3. **EFFECTIVE DATE.** This initiative shall be effective when enacted according to law.

## Statement IN SUPPORT of the Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition

Alaskans have a wonderful opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to world peace when they vote August 26. They can do this by casting their vote in the "For" (meaning "yes") column on the Nuclear Freeze Initiative question they'll find on the ballot.

It is important, however, to realize several things the initiative does **not** do:

The initiative does **not** encourage or obligate the U.S. to any sort of **unilateral** or "go-it-alone" policy regarding a freeze or reduction of nuclear warheads. It calls, instead, for a **mutual** freeze and reduction of such weapons. If other nations—particularly the Soviet Union—will not participate, there is no obligation for the U.S. to do so.

And, the initiative does not call for any sort of "blind trust" toward the Soviets or any other nation. Instead it specifies that any agreement must be not only mutual but **verifiable** before we agree to participate. In other words we have to have arrangements in place to scientifically verify that no one is cheating, or there's no deal.

Truly, we have nothing to lose by adopting this policy.

But what will we gain?

For starters, just the freezing of production of nuclear weapons, just the limiting of arsenals to their present strength—which is already sufficient to destroy civilization as we know it today, many times over— will be a significant step forward in the

(CONTINUED ON BACK SIDE)

## I. The Administration's Position.

### A. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, APRIL 1982. (U.S. Department of State)

Explains reasons for Reagan Administration's opposition to nuclear arms freeze. Cites massive Soviet strategic build-up in 1970's, etc..

### B. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE CONGRESS; FEBRUARY 4, 1985, p.45.

Secretary Weinberger: -- "the Pentagon" -- states, "We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'" Explains that even if we Americans don't believe nuclear war is winnable, Soviet leaders -- judging by their preparations [rather than their propaganda] -- apparently do. Further explains that to continue deterring Soviet miscalculations and nuclear war we must meet their standards of deterrence -- not just our own.

### C. SOVIET MILITARY POWER, 1986. (U.S. Defense Department)

Describes ongoing build-up of Soviet war machine and threat it poses. Describes tactical and strategic weapons systems such as first-strike SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and Soviet "star wars" weapons development.

### D. NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. (U.S. Air Force Air University)

Analysis and discussion of warnings about the risk of "nuclear winter" from members of our American scientific community.

### II. 30Mar83 WASHINGTON POST editorial, "The Freeze Debate".

"But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy." Other, excellent points.

## III. ARMS FREEZE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST. 1984.

Soviet Novosti Press Agency pamphlet promoting a nuclear arms freeze which I picked up in Soviet San Francisco consulate. Attacks Reagan Administration for its objections to the freeze.

## IV. Soviet KGB involvement in formation of American freeze movement.

### A. Oct82 READER'S DIGEST, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" by John Barron.

Describes KGB's infiltration/manipulation of Western peace movements. Active involvement of Soviet KGB operatives Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov at March 1981 Georgetown University meeting where America's nuclear arms freeze movement was organized and operationally begun.

### B. 13Nov82 NY TIMES, "Sources are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze."

President Reagan had claimed involvement of "foreign agents" in American freeze movement. Critics howled "McCarthyism". White House cites Barron's READER'S DIGEST article as primary source. FBI says President "accurate" in describing "Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." *[The KGB did not get involved to promote peace and disarmament.]*

## V. KGB psychiatric persecution of genuine Soviet peace activists.

### A. 13Sep82 NEW YORKER magazine, "The Talk of the Town: Peace."

Russian peace activist Mikhail Ostrovsky expelled from Soviet Union, describes KGB persecution of members of the nonviolent nongovernment Soviet "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA." Asks Western peace movements to pressure Soviet leaders into releasing group leader Sergei Batovrin from KGB psychiatric prisons. Batovrin forced to take psychiatric drugs. [Batovrin later expelled from USSR.]

Ostrovsky describes how the 80 million members of the official Soviet peace organization are so government-dominated that their demonstration signs are made for them, never handmade.

### B. 21Mar86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "An Appeal for Help for Prisoners of Conscience."

Juneau peace and human rights advocate Charles Rohrbacher describes condemnation of genuine Soviet peace activists -- including two 17-year-old girls -- to KGB psychiatric prison. [Under Amnesty International pressure like this KGB later released three of the prisoners.]

- C. 21Mar86 JUNEAU EMP'IRE editorial: "Two Faces of Soviet 'Peace'"  
 Biting contrast of "Soviet Samantha Smith" Katya Lycheva's trip to Disneyland with the KGB condemnation of young Soviet peace activists to psychiatric prison.
- D. 7Jul86 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "The Trap of Arms Control", by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
 President Carter's National Security Advisor explains how Kremlin negotiates arms treaties only for propaganda and improving military superpower status -- not for genuine disarmament. Describes damage done to Western negotiating efforts for genuine disarmament by freeze movement and other anti-deterrence agitation.

VI. Soviet violations of arms treaties.

- A. Spr83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "'Yellow Rain' and the Future of Arms Agreements."  
 Documents treaty-violating use of Soviet toxin weapons agr'inst civilians in Afghanistan and Indochina. Describes "bee-droppings" disinformation disseminated through Western media -- hideously obscene, considering the victims' suffering. State Department casigated for bungling the handling of this Soviet treaty violation.
- B. 30Nov83 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet Violations of Arms Treaties."  
 Describes Soviet treaty violations covered in Western media, including accident in Sverdlovsk germ warfare laboratory. Explains "Catch-22" inadequacies of remote sensing -- "national technical means" -- for treaty compliance verification.
- C. ARMS CONTROL: U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, PROBLEMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE.  
 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
- D. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 122: SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1Feb85  
 (U.S. State Department)  
 FINALLY, Reagan Administration documents and lists Soviet arms treaty violations. U.S. goal of strategic arms reduction (rather than just freeze) described.

VII. Soviet environmental disregard.

- A. 40Oct84 EMPIRE, "Once-pure Arctic Air Dirtied by Soviet, European Industry.", by David Foster, AP.  
 "Despite the area's pristine image, scientists say Arctic air contains as much dirt as some rural and suburban areas, with the Soviet Union the major polluter."
- B. 21Nov84 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Other Testaments" (re-titled by EMPIRE as "Soviet System Poses Biggest Threat of All")  
 Written before Chernobyl, letter describes Soviet radioactive waste disaster at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk germ disaster, etc., and how Soviet environmental policies represent a longterm threat to human survival even greater than the risk of nuclear war/winter. Says "Day After" and "Testament" films are out of context and distorting since there have been no similar dramatizations broadcast about Soviet environmental disasters, psychiatric prisons, Afghanistan atrocities, etc..

VIII. Soviet interest in Alaska.

- A. 20Feb86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet 'Ultimatum' Delivered to Senators."  
 Alaska Performing Lobbyists for Peace organizer Dixie Belcher lobbies against State Senate's Wrangal Island resolution, claiming Soviets had threatened to end plans for her musical peace tour to Siberia. Dixie never conceded that using her group as a political hammer against the Wrangal resolution was wrong or wouldn't happen again.
- B. 30Apr86 EMPIRE, "Moscow Editor Promotes U.S., Soviet Relationship."  
 Kremlin propagandist Gennadi Gerasimov visits Juneau as guest of Dixie Belcher. (Later, at his World Affairs Council talk, Gerasimov promotes his book attacking U.S. star wars program. In response to my question about the Soviet killing of U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicolson (in the course of his treaty-authorized direct/on-site verification inspection duties) Gerasimov says Major Nicolson was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time" -- no regrets or Soviet commitment to prevent future killings.)

IX. Consequences of U.S. quitting its military defense responsibilities.

"The Killing Fields" film

Searing depiction of mass extermination of Cambodians by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Almost half the population murdered or starved by collectivization. The typical attempt to blame Cambodian suffering on Nixon didn't wash.

*Handwritten signature and date:*  
 1 Aug 86