

SJR

21

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT

FIRST COMMITTEE OF REFERRAL

Date of 3/11/87 5-DAY NOTICE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULE 23

FURTHER: HESS
LABOR & COMMERCE

**FISCAL NOTE(S) ATTACHED 1 **
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AS 24.08.035
(see below)
3/3/87

DATE TURNED INTO OFFICE 4/10/87

Mr. President:

STATE AFFAIRS Committee considered SJR 21

Requesting the President of the United States to propose an international freeze on nuclear weapons, verification safeguards for the freeze, the use of nuclear weapons funds for peaceful nonnuclear uses, and nuclear disarmament by all nations; and requesting the state Congressional delegation to urge the president to make the proposals.

and recommended:

- replace with CS _____ same title
- attached amendment(s) and new title
- do pass
- do not pass
- no recommendation
- individual recommendations
- further referral to _____
- letter of intent adopted and attached

** Committee attached or adopted fiscal note(s)
 zero fiscal impact

MEMBERS SIGNING DO PASS

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Rich W.
William T. Hendley
Joe P. Josephson

Don Edwards
Chairman signature and recommendation

Committee Backup Attached

**STATE OF ALASKA 1987 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
FISCAL NOTE**

Bill Version : SJR 21

Publish Date : _____

REQUEST: _____

Revision Date: _____
 Title: Requesting the President of
the U.S. ... international freeze
 Sponsor: _____
 Requestor: _____

Agency Affected : _____

BRU: _____

Components : _____

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

CAPITAL	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
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REVENUE						
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FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL						

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

Prepared by : _____ Phone : _____

Division : _____ Date : _____

Approved by CHAIRMAN Senator, Kelly Aldred Date : 4/8/87
Commissioner

Agency : Senate State Affairs

Distribution (by preparer):

- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)
- Senate Secretary

Reagan
#1

ANNOTATED LIST OF SOURCES FOR OPPOSITION TO
THE NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE

I. The Administration's Position.

- A. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, APRIL 1982. (U.S. Department of State)
Explains reasons for Reagan Administration's opposition to nuclear arms freeze. Cites massive Soviet strategic build-up in 1970's, etc..
- B. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE CONGRESS; FEBRUARY 4, 1985, p.45.
Secretary Weinberger -- "the Pentagon" -- states, "We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'" Explains that even if we Americans don't believe nuclear war is winnable, Soviet leaders -- judging by their preparations (rather than their propaganda) -- apparently do. Further explains that to continue deterring Soviet miscalculations and nuclear war we must meet their standards of deterrence -- not just our own.
- C. SOVIET MILITARY POWER, 1986. (U.S. Defense Department)
Describes ongoing build-up of Soviet war machine and threat it poses. Describes tactical and strategic weapons systems such as first-strike SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and Soviet "star wars" weapons development.
- D. NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. (U.S. Air Force Air University)
Analysis and discussion of warnings about the risk of "nuclear winter" from members of our American scientific community.

II. 30Mar83 WASHINGTON POST editorial, "The Freeze Debate".
"But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy." Other, excellent points.

III. ARMS FREEZE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST. 1984.
Soviet Novosti Press Agency pamphlet promoting a nuclear arms freeze which I picked up in Soviet San Francisco consulate. Attacks Reagan Administration for its objections to the freeze.

IV. Soviet KGB involvement in formation of American freeze movement.

- A. Oct82 READER'S DIGEST, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" by John Barron.
Describes KGB's infiltration/manipulation of Western peace movements. Active involvement of Soviet KGB operatives Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov at March 1981 Georgetown University meeting where America's nuclear arms freeze movement was organized and operationally begun.
- B. 13Nov82 NY TIMES, "Sources are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze."
President Reagan had claimed involvement of "foreign agents" in American freeze movement. Critics howled "McCarthyism". White House cites Barron's READER'S DIGEST article as primary source. FBI says President "accurate" in describing "Soviet attempt to influence the peace movement." *[The KGB did not get involved to promote peace and disarmament.]*

V. KGB psychiatric persecution of genuine Soviet peace activists.

- A. 13Sep82 NEW YORKER magazine, "The Talk of the Town: Peace."
Russian peace activist Mikhail Ostrovsky expelled from Soviet Union, describes KGB persecution of members of the nonviolent nongovernment Soviet "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA." Asks Western peace movements to pressure Soviet leaders into releasing group leader Sergei Batovrin from KGB psychiatric prisons. Batovrin forced to take psychiatric drugs. [Batovrin later expelled from USSR.]
Ostrovsky describes how the 80 million members of the official Soviet peace organization are so government-dominated that their demonstration signs are made for them, never handmade.
- B. 21Mar86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "An Appeal for Help for Prisoners of Conscience."
Juneau peace and human rights advocate Charles Rohrbacher describes condemnation of genuine Soviet peace activists -- including two 17-year-old girls, to KGB psychiatric prison. [Under Amnesty International pressure like this KGB later released three of the prisoners.]

RECEIVED BY LOUIS COATNEY
MARCH 1987

- C. 21Mar86 JUNEAU EMPIRE editorial: "Two Faces of Soviet 'Peace'"
 Biting contrast of "Soviet Samantha Smith" Katya Lycheva's trip to Disneyland with the KGB condemnation of young Soviet peace activists to psychiatric prison.
- D. 7Jul86 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "The Trap of Arms Control", by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
 President Carter's National Security Advisor explains how Kremlin negotiates arms treaties only for propoganda and improving military superpower status -- not for genuine disarmament. Describes damage done to Western negotiating efforts for genuine disarmament by freeze movement and other anti-deterrence agitation.

VI. Soviet violations of arms treaties.

- A. Spr83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "'Yellow Rain' and the Future of Arms Agreements."
 Documents treaty-violating use of Soviet toxin weapons against civilians in Afghanistan and Indochina. Describes "bee-droppings" disinformation disseminated through Western media -- hideously obscene, considering the victims' suffering. State Department castigated for bungling the handling of this Soviet treaty violation.
- B. 30Nov83 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet Violations of Arms Treaties."
 Describes Soviet treaty violations covered in Western media, including accident in Sverdlovsk germ warfare laboratory. Explains "Catch-22" inadequacies of remote sensing -- "national technical means" -- for treaty compliance verification.
- C. ARMS CONTROL: U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, PROBLEMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE.
 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
- D. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 122: SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1Feb85
 (U.S. State Department)
 FINALLY, Reagan Administration documents and lists Soviet arms treaty violations. U.S. goal of strategic arms reduction (rather than just freeze) described.

VII. Soviet environmental disregard.

- A. 4Oct84 EMPIRE, "Once-pure Arctic Air Dirtied by Soviet, European Industry.", by David Foster, AP.
 "Despite the area's pristine image, scientists say Arctic air contains as much dirt as some rural and suburban areas, with the Soviet Union the major polluter."
- B. 21Nov84 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Other Testaments" (re-titled by EMPIRE as "Soviet System Poses Biggest Threat of All")
 Written before Chernobyl, letter describes Soviet radioactive waste disaster at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk germ disaster, etc., and now Soviet environmental policies represent a longterm threat to human survival even greater than the risk of nuclear war/winter. Says "Day After" and "Testament" films are out of context and distorting since there have been no similar dramatizations broadcast about Soviet environmental disasters, psychiatric prisons, Afghanistan atrocities, etc..

VIII. Soviet interest in Alaska.

- A. 20Feb86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet 'Ultimatum' Delivered to Senators."
 Alaska Performing Artists for Peace organizer Dixie Belcher lobbies against State Senate's Wrangel Island resolution, claiming Soviets had threatened to end plans for her musical peace tour to Siberia. Dixie never conceded that using her group as a political hammer against the Wrangel resolution was wrong or wouldn't happen again.
- B. 30Apr86 EMPIRE, "Moscow Editor Promotes U.S., Soviet Relationship."
 Kremlin propagandist Gennadi Gerasimov visits Juneau as guest of Dixie Belcher. (Later, at his World Affairs Council talk, Gerasimov promotes his book attacking U.S. star wars program. In response to my question about the Soviet killing of U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicolson (in the course of his treaty-authorized direct/on-site verification inspection duties) Gerasimov says Major Nicolson was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time" -- no regrets or Soviet commitment to prevent future killings.)

C. 12Apr86 NY Times U.S. of Soviet interest in Germany... *Still as explicit as public expressions of good faith by Soviet.*

IX. Consequences of U.S. quitting its military defense responsibilities.

"The Killing Fields" film
 Scaring depiction of mass extermination of Cambodians by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Almost half the population murdered or starved by collectivization. The typical attempt to blame Cambodian suffering on Nixon didn't wash.

*See below
1 Aug 86*

TELECOPY COVER SHEET
ANCHORAGE INFORMATION OFFICE

TO: CAROL HODS FOR: Senate State Affairs Committee -
Hearing on SJR NO. 21 - WED.
APRIL 8, 1:30 P.M. PHONE: 4105-4552

FROM: CHRISTOPHER TOAL (ALASKA FREEZE '86) PHONE: 274-4648

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: Please give a copy of this to all members of the State Affairs
Committee. I'd like it to be made part of the permanent
record, if possible

DATE/TIME SENT: _____ PLEASE ACK. RECEIPT: _____

DISPOSAL OF ORIGINAL: _____ THROW AWAY

_____ HOLD FOR PICK UP

NUMBER OF PAGES: 3 (NOT COUNTING COVER SHEET)

BY: _____

THE ALASKA FREEZE

Because Nobody Wants A Nuclear War

419 Barrow Street, Suite B
Anchorage, AK 99501

Board of Directors
Dorothy Jones, Chair
Ed Davis, Co-Chair
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Charcy Craft

Chris Toal,
Coordinator

April 6, 1987

TESTIMONY ON BEHALF SJR NO. 21

Sen. Mitch Abood
State Affairs Committee
Alaska State Senate
Pouch V (MB 3100)
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Sen. Abood,

Some folks be surprised to discover that three of the four sponsors of SJR NO. 21 are Republicans, but they shouldn't be. The concept of a mutual and verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production and deployment originated with an amendment to the SALT II Treaty introduced by Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield in 1979. Since then, 62 out of 36 Freeze referendums have passed around the country including those in 10 out of 11 states. Over 370 city councils and ten state legislatures have passed resolutions endorsing the Freeze. Five other states have passed a Freeze resolution in the House or Senate (including the Alaska State Senate in 1982).

These legislative endorsements reflect broad public support for the Freeze. For example, according to the Gallup Report # 229 78% of the American people favor an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for an immediate, verifiable freeze on the testing and production of nuclear weapons (Republicans favor it by 74%). Another poll taken by the Los Angeles Times of delegates at the 1984 Republican National Convention showed support for the Freeze at 77% from Moderates and 62% from Conservatives.

Last summer, our non-partisan statewide group of volunteers and citizen-activists campaigned successfully for an initiative which made the promotion of a mutual and verifiable bilateral nuclear freeze followed by reductions the official policy of the state of Alaska. Endorsements of the Freeze initiative came from such diverse political figures as Sen. Arliss Sturgulewski, Gov. Steve Cowper, Dick Randolph and former governors Walter J. Hickel and Bill Sheffield. To the best of my knowledge, at least three of the five members of the Senate State Affairs Committee voted for the Nuclear Freeze initiative. This sort of bi-partisan support is entirely appropriate. After all, peace and security in a safer world are things everyone should be able to relate to.

Advanced verification technology and important recent concessions from our Soviet adversaries have finally given us an opportunity to make nuclear disarmament a reality. Indeed, it seems that the President has also reached this conclusion.

Against the advice from the hardliners in his administration President Reagan offered bold new proposals for disarmament and peace at the Reykjavik Summit last fall.

The nuclear freeze resolution sponsored by senators Eliason, Kelly, Josephson and Jones is in the spirit of the President's best instincts at Reykjavik. It recognizes that burgeoning nuclear weapons expenditures increase the U.S. budget deficit and might be used more wisely for peaceful pursuits. It calls for a freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production and deployment but demands stringent verification safeguards. In effect, SJR NO. 21 reaffirms Alaska's mutual and verifiable freeze policy and outlines a future goal of complete nuclear disarmament. It is not a panacea, but rather a modest first step towards a vision shared by most Americans. We urge you and your colleagues in the Senate to support SJR NO. 21.


Sincerely,

Christopher Toal

Christopher Toal
Coordinator, Alaska Freeze '86;
President, SANE/ALASKA

274-4648 (H)

272-0621 (O)



DOT CHART

1 dot - represents the firepower contained in all the aerial bombing by all the combatants during World War II (1939 - 1945), including the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 3 megatons (3 million tons TNT).

8 dots - represent the firepower contained in the nuclear missiles of 1 Trident submarine: 24 megatons. This is enough firepower to destroy every major city in the northern hemisphere.


6,000 dots - represent the explosive power in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers today: 18,000 megatons. The United States and the Soviet Union share this firepower with approximately equal destructive capability.

Detonation of a little more than one square could cause a "nuclear winter".

Source: Center for Defense Information, 303 Capitol Gallery West, 600 Maryland Ave. S.W., Washington D.C. 20024

(3)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CHART



The dot in the center represents all the firepower of World War II—three megatons. The other dots represent the world's present nuclear weaponry, which equals 6,000 World War II's (18,000 megatons). The U.S. and the Soviets share this firepower with approximately equal destructive capability.

The top left-hand circle, enclosing nine megatons, represents the weapons on one Poseidon submarine—equal to three World War II's, enough to destroy more than 200 of the largest Soviet cities. The circle in the lower left-hand square (24 megatons, eight World War II's) represents one new Trident sub with the power to destroy every major city in the northern hemisphere.

Just two squares (300 megatons) represent enough firepower to destroy all the large- and medium-sized cities in the world.

The amount in the shaded area—100 megatons, or less than 1% of the U.S. or Soviet arsenal—represents the amount necessary to bring on the "nuclear winter." The dust lofted into the air by the explosion of this small amount would block out sunlight and make temperatures drop so dramatically that our planet would be uninhabitable for plants, animals and humans.

This chart, which has been reviewed for accuracy by U.S. Senate staff members, appears in *The Trinitab Factor: How Business Executives Can Help Solve the Nuclear Weapons Crisis* by Harold Willens.

BY ED DAVIS
TESTIMONY FOR THE SENATE STATE AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE REGARDING ALASKA'S NUCLEAR

4/8/87 FREEZE RESOLUTION (SJR-21) (Pg 2 of 2)

SURVIVABLE, THE FREEZE GIVES US A STRONG
DEFENSE.

THE FREEZE REDUCES THE CHANCE OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR
WAR. WE NEED AMPLE WARNING OF AN ATTACK TO CHECK FOR
FALSE ALARMS. BY STOPPING FASTER WEAPONS, THE FREEZE
WOULD PRESERVE OUR 30 MINUTE WARNING TIME. THE
ALTERNATIVE CUTS IT TO UNDER 15 MINUTES.

TODAY, A SOVIET ATTACK ON OUR LAND BASED MISSILES WOULD
HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED FROM THE SOVIET MAINLAND. SUCH AN
ATTACK WOULD TAKE ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

WITHOUT A FREEZE, SOVIET SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC
MISSILES WILL BECOME SO ACCURATE THAT THEY WILL
THREATEN OUR LAND BASED MISSILES. LAUNCHED FROM OUR
COASTS, SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD TAKE 15 MINUTES.

WITH SHORTENED WARNING TIME AND FEAR OF SUDDEN
ATTACK, THE DECISION TO LAUNCH MAY BE LEFT TO COMPUTERS.
COMPUTERS MAKE MISTAKES.

IN A RECENT 18 MONTH PERIOD, OUR OWN SOPHISTICATED
COMPUTERS SOUNDED MORE THAN 100 FALSE ALARMS OF
ATTACK. SOVIET COMPUTERS ARE LESS RELIABLE THAN
OURS. PLEASE SUPPORT NUCLEAR SANITY.

SUBMITTED TO

MITCH ABOOD

JAN FAIKS

RICK UENLING

WILLIE HENSLEY

JOE JOSEPHSON

FROM ED DAVIS
BOX 1616
FAIRBANKS, AK 99707
PH. 907-353-7559

4/8/87

BY ED DAVIS

(PG 1 OF 2)

RIGHT NOW, AMERICA IS THE STRONGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. WE HAVE VERY CAPABLE, SURVIVABLE FORCES. OUR ICBM'S ARE NOT VULNERABLE TO QUICK ATTACK, OUR BOMBERS HAVE ENOUGH WARNING TIME TO TAKE OFF, AND OUR SUBMARINES ARE SAFE, HIDDEN AT SEA.

HOWEVER, SHOULD WE FAIL TO CURTAIL SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILE IMPROVEMENTS, WE WILL BE VULNERABLE TO SURPRISE ATTACK.

THE FREEZE STOPS THE PROGRESS OF NEW SOVIET WEAPONS WHICH COULD WIPE OUT OUR ICBM'S AND BOMBERS IN ONE QUICK STRIKE. WITH MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS COULD DESTROY OUR HARDENED MISSILE SILEAS. WITH FASTER WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS COULD DESTROY OUR BOMBERS BEFORE THEY COULD TAKE OFF. IF OUR OUR FORCES BECOME VULNERABLE TO NEW GENERATIONS OF SWIFT WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT FEEL THAT A SNEAK ATTACK OFFERS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES.

THE FREEZE STOPS THE ATTACKER AND FAVORS THE DEFENDER. BY STOPPING ADVANCES IN MISSILE ACCURACY AND SHORTER FLIGHT TIMES, THE FREEZE STOPS THE ATTACKER. HE NEEDS TO BE VERY SURE OF DESTROYING HIS ENEMY'S ABILITY TO RETALIATE; HE NEEDS SWIFT, ACCURATE, VERY RELIABLE WEAPONS.


BY STOPPING FASTER, MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS, THE FREEZE FAVORS THE DEFENDER. OLD WEAPONS WORK JUST FINE FOR RETALIATION, BUT ONLY IF THEY SURVIVE, BY MAKING OUR FORCES MORE

ARMS
FREEZE:
Who Is For
Who Is Against

The peaceful assurances of the US government would be much more credible if it accepted the proposal mutually to freeze American and Soviet nuclear arms. So much weaponry has already been accumulated that this step would not create the slightest threat to the security of either side. But it would considerably improve the general political atmosphere, and, one would assume, make it easier to reach agreement on a reduction of nuclear arsenals.

KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO
*General Secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee,
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet*

ARMS
FREEZE:
Who Is For
and
Who Is Against



The word "freeze" has firmly established itself in the international political lexicon. And this is quite understandable, as the idea of a freeze of armed forces and armaments is closely linked with the central problem of today—the attainment of disarmament.

The need to freeze military potentials, nuclear potentials first and foremost, is dictated by common sense itself. In order to begin genuine disarmament, it is necessary to prevent a new upswing in the arms race, which threatens to make the world less stable and more fragile and to make much more difficult the drawing up of international arms limitation accords. The possibility of getting the process of genuine disarmament under way by means of a freeze of armed forces and armaments as a first step stems from the existing balance of nuclear forces and the overall approximate military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which was made clear at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The USSR's Constructive Approach

The early 1980s witnessed powerful antiwar movements in the USA, Western Europe and the world over. They showed dramatically the extent of the world public's alarm over the mounting threat of nuclear war and the catastrophic consequences of a new upswing in the arms race, launched by the US Administration. It is highly significant that, regardless of their political affiliation and social status, many peace campaigners feel that in order to improve the international situation it is essential first of all to freeze nuclear arms at their present level. It would be no exaggeration to say that this demand has become one of the main demands of the antiwar movement. Other proposals, including those about the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the north of Europe and in the Balkans, have clearly the same aims.

In the early 1980s the Soviet Union made the pioneering step of proposing a qualitative and quantitative freeze on Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

Thus, in 1981 the 26th CPSU Congress proposed "coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be imposed on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, freezing the existing quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region."

In order to facilitate an equitable agreement on a major reduction of nuclear weapons by the two sides in Europe, on March 16, 1982, the Soviet leadership unilaterally declared a

moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. Weapons already stationed were frozen quantitatively and qualitatively, and the process of replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles by the more advanced SS-20s was halted.*

On May 18, 1982, the Soviet Union announced its preparedness to impose a quantitative freeze on American and Soviet strategic weapons and maximal restrictions on their modernization.

In June 1983, in accordance with an instruction of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet government proposed to the governments of the USA, Great Britain, France, and China that a qualitative and quantitative freeze of nuclear weapons be imposed by the nuclear weapon states.

In October 1983 the Soviet Union submitted to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly as an urgent and important item on the agenda a proposal on freezing nuclear weapons. In an accompanying letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Andrei Gromyko, first Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: "The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that one of the most urgent tasks today is to end the nuclear arms buildup, to stop the new upswing in the arms race, which the world is being drawn into ever more rapidly. Implementation of this task would be a major contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear war now facing the peoples."

In a resolution adopted by the 38th UN General Assembly session on the initiative of the Soviet Union it is proposed that all nuclear states stop the buildup of all components of their nuclear arsenals, including all means of delivery and all types of nuclear warheads, refrain from the deployment of

* This moratorium was in effect until the United States actually started deploying the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles on the European continent. While renouncing its unilateral commitments in this sphere the Soviet Union at the same time declared that they would again enter into effect if the USA and the other NATO countries show a readiness to return to the status quo prior to the deployment of the medium-range American missiles in Europe.

new type of nuclear weapons, institute a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and their new means of delivery, and discontinuing the production of fissionable materials to be used in nuclear weapons.

Taking into account the fact that the nuclear potentials of states are unequal and that two countries possess the biggest nuclear arsenals, the resolution provides for a simultaneous bilateral freeze of nuclear arms by the USSR and the USA as a first step and as an example for other nuclear-weapon states to follow. The latter are expected to freeze their own nuclear arms as soon as possible. This is the gist of the resolution.

The Soviet Union's adherence to the idea of an arms freeze was reiterated on March 2, 1984, by Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in his speech at a meeting with voters of the Kuibyshev district in Moscow. He said:

"Curbing the nuclear arms race is, of course, of key significance for peace and international security. The USSR's stand on this issue is clear. We are against rivalry in the buildup of nuclear arsenals. We have been and remain in favour of the prohibition and destruction of all types of these weapons. We have long since tabled our relevant proposals, both at the UN and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, but the United States and its allies are blocking their discussion."

Why Washington Doesn't Agree to a Freeze

A nuclear freeze would open up favourable prospects for creating a healthier political climate in the world. However, this idea should not be allowed to be distorted by warmongers who still hope either to emasculate it or to make it serve their own interests.

It is common knowledge that in the 1960s the USA put forward a proposal to freeze certain components of nuclear arsenals, but in doing so it pursued goals which had nothing in common with a desire to secure peace on earth. On September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower said that the United States was prepared, on the basis of reciprocity with the USSR, to shut down one major facility producing fissionable materials after another under international inspection and verification. At the UN Commission on Disarmament the USA also proposed that the USA and the USSR should each place 30 tons of weapons-grade fissionable material under international inspection. However, it was not disclosed what amount of fissionable material the USA was going to keep at its disposal. It was obvious that the implementation of that proposal would not have reduced the nuclear war threat because this remaining amount was clearly substantial.

The Soviet Union stressed at the time that it would have been a different matter altogether if the USA agreed to discuss the question of eliminating existing stockpiles and a ban on nuclear weapons simultaneously with stopping the production of fissionable materials. Since it was clear that the USA was not ready to do so, this meant that its proposal was a propaganda ploy designed to perpetuate US superiority in the number of nuclear warheads and to place the whole of the Soviet Union's nuclear industry under US control.

In the 1960s the United States tried hard to preserve its superiority in nuclear weapons, to stop or at least slow down the growth of the Soviet Union's nuclear missile potential. With this in mind, in January 1961 President Johnson put forward a proposal about a "controlled freeze" of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

A detailed plan of such a controlled freeze was submitted to the Committee of 18 on Disarmament by a special US representative on August 27, 1963. What the proposal amounted to was the United States' desire to find out the exact nature of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, their deployment, and the scale and character of the Soviet missile industry, as well as to try and slow down the production and modernization of such weapons by the Soviet Union. The intent of the proposal was thus patently clear: to "freeze" further progress of the USSR in the deployment of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and to impose strict control over the USSR's activities in this sphere.

Past experience shows that the United States put forward nuclear-freeze proposals only when it wanted to secure its superiority in certain components of military arsenals and to block off those channels in weapons development which would have enabled the Soviet Union to achieve parity in the corresponding types of weapons. At the same time the USA has never put forward or supported the idea of a comprehensive nuclear freeze. What is more, when military and strategic parity was achieved between the USSR and the USA, the US leadership subjected this idea to especially fierce attack.

An example of this is provided by the April 18, 1982, statement of the US Department of State. In it the idea of a comprehensive nuclear freeze is roundly condemned. For example, it is said that a nuclear freeze at the existing levels would perpetuate the military inferiority and vulnerability of the United States and its allies (despite the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, admitted by many prominent political and military leaders, some of them in the United States itself), would thwart efforts to reach agreement on substantial reductions of the two sides' nuclear arsenals and arouse serious doubts about America's leading role in the NATO alliance, and so on. Steering a course toward brightening international tensions, the US Administration has stepped up its propaganda campaign against a nuclear freeze. The newspaper *Novydyz* (October 19, 1982) carried an article by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in which he assured the readers that a

freeze would not reduce the possibility of war. It would run counter to the first and primary objective of arms control, he said, because it would leave the USA and its allies in a position of permanent military inferiority. This, he went on, would undermine the deterrent which has kept the peace. At a subsequent press conference the Pentagon chief asserted that the adoption of a resolution on the freeze would lead to a greater threat of war and this would cause the Russians to stay away from the negotiating table. The US Secretary of Defense also touched upon the problem of verifying the nuclear freeze. He stressed that the Soviet Union had never agreed to on-site inspection and that in the case of a complete freeze verification could be effected only on the condition that it would be possible as a minimum requirement to carry out inspection on the spot, that is, a very thorough verification in the country itself. In contrast to the US conception of verification as an end in itself, isolated from the freeze, the Soviet Union has been consistently advocating verification as a means of enforcing the observance of agreements in this field. This, in the USSR's view, is the sole purpose of control. In Soviet proposals verification is regarded as being inseparably linked with the process of disarmament. It cannot and must not play an independent and overriding role, while its extent, forms and methods must be determined by the nature and volume of disarmament measures. Without underestimating the importance of verification, the Soviet Union nevertheless believes that it should play a subordinate role in relation to a nuclear freeze. Therefore, verification can only be a part of a freeze agreement, serving as an instrument contributing to its implementation. The Soviet Union considers that verification should be effected primarily with the help of national technical means. These might also be used for effective control of the countries' commitments under the freeze. However, the USSR is prepared to discuss certain additional measures to be agreed upon through negotiations with the participants in a nuclear freeze. It is quite possible to resolve this

problem on the basis of cooperation. This means that Weinberger's "arguments" against the freeze are completely groundless.

Addressing in March 1983 the annual conference of the national evangelical association in Orlando, Florida, the US President rejected the idea of any negotiations with Moscow aimed at attaining an early nuclear freeze. The US Administration also turned down the Soviet government's proposal of June 1983.

Thus, the White House's stand on the nuclear freeze is entirely clear. It is part and parcel of the US militarist policies aimed at attaining military supremacy over the USSR. A freeze would preserve the existing rough parity between the Soviet and American nuclear arms; that is why it does not suit the US leadership which, despite its recent, increasingly frequent claims that it seeks dialogue with the USSR, is still staking on military confrontation with the socialist world.

Politically Isolated

The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, adopted on January 5, 1983, at their meeting in Prague, points out that a vast majority of states and an increasingly representative cross-section of the world public support a freeze on nuclear arsenals.

Indeed, at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly, as at the previous one, such countries as India, Mexico and Sweden submitted draft resolutions on freezing nuclear weapons. For example, India proposed calling on all nuclear states to agree to a freeze which among other things would provide for a simultaneous complete cessation of further production of nuclear weapons and a complete halt to the production of fissionable materials for weapons manufacture.

Mexico and Sweden tabled a draft resolution calling for a nuclear freeze, addressed first and foremost to the USSR and the USA as the two biggest nuclear-weapon states whose example would be followed by other nuclear-weapon states. It is proposed that the freeze should be announced simultaneously in two unilateral declarations or in a joint declaration. The resolution's preamble expresses the belief that the existing conditions are most favourable for such a freeze since the USSR and the USA have at present equal nuclear might and, as it seems obvious, there is an approximate parity between them.

The discussion of these draft resolutions convincingly exposed the absurdity of US arguments against a freeze, according to which such a measure is allegedly an obstacle to disarmament talks. As Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere justly noted in his speech at the session, a nuclear freeze would be the basis for successful, serious

disarmament talks, inasmuch as at present new weapons are produced more quickly than agreement on control of old weapons is reached. The way to an all-encompassing programme in the disarmament sphere, stressed M. Qionibaravi, the representative of Fiji, should begin with a nuclear freeze. It is our belief that a nuclear freeze would constitute not only a major step in the disarmament process, but would also create favourable conditions for conducting such negotiations as the START talks in a spirit of good will and mutual trust, he said.

The 38th Session of the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrated that in spite of differences in approach, the nuclear freeze idea is shared by a majority of states. Only the USA and its NATO allies, which found themselves in political isolation, voted against the freeze resolutions.

The World Public Says "Yes"

However, the US leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to pursue an obstructionistic policy on the question of a nuclear freeze. This is largely due to the fact that a powerful antiwar movement has emerged in the USA, with its central demand being a halt to the nuclear arms buildup. The movement is a nationwide one, representing virtually all age groups, social strata, political groups and religious trends. Its participants are united by a profound conviction that urgent measures to curb the arms race are needed, as well as by an awareness of the dangers inherent in the US foreign policy designed to achieve military-strategic superiority over the USSR.

The movement already has a history of its own. In April 1980 Randall Forsberg, Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Brookline (Mass.), issued a memorandum calling for the freezing of American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. A year later Washington was the venue of a national conference of peace forces which brought together representatives of tens of public organizations with a membership of several million. The conference approved an Appeal for an End to the Nuclear Arms Race which stressed the need for the immediate conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement in this field. At the same time the National Campaign to Freeze Nuclear Arms, a coalition movement, was set up with the aim of coordinating the activities of all peace forces in the country.

The nuclear freeze movement grew rapidly. According to public opinion polls its aims are supported by more than 70 per cent of Americans.

The impact of mass antiwar actions which swept the country and the resolutions of state legislatures in favour of the freeze was felt on Capitol Hill. At first a small group of legislators cautiously voiced support for the freeze

campaign: in late 1981 the idea was endorsed by 25 legislators. Later on, draft resolutions were tabled in Congress. The first one, sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield, called on the President to seek a freeze on the nuclear armaments of the USA and the USSR. Soon dozens of Senators and more than 150 Congressmen supported the resolution.

Another resolution, sponsored by Senators John Warner and Henry Jackson, also spoke of a nuclear freeze, even a reduction of nuclear weapons. Its real objective, however, was quite different: it was designed to calm the waves of mass protest and to take the edge off the main demand of the movement. As a precondition for a freeze the resolution proposed eliminating the "strategic vulnerability" of the USA. This means that the call for a freeze was but a camouflage for the continuation of the arms race.

Nevertheless, the resolution shows that nowadays even some "hawks" are trying to take advantage of the mass antinuclear protest movement which has attained such a scale that it can no longer be ignored by Congress and the Administration. The growing movement against the nuclear arms race and the threat of a suicidal war has become a tangible political factor in the USA.

Speaking in the US Senate, Edward Kennedy said that the demand for the freezing of nuclear arsenals was meeting with growing support in the United States and that steps in this direction were essential because they might represent the country's last hope for putting an end to the arms race.

In May 1983 the US antiwar forces won a definite victory when the House of Representatives endorsed a resolution calling for a nuclear freeze. It recognized an approximate parity of the nuclear potentials of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the possibility for monitoring a mutual freeze and reduction of nuclear armaments.

The resolution was to be discussed in the Senate. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, clearly under pressure from the White House, decided after lengthy delays not to put it to a vote.

Still, many realistic politicians in the USA are aware of the fact that the present round of war preparations initiated by the US Administration is leading to a drastic deterioration of the international political climate. The deployment of MX and D-5 missile systems (the latter are to be installed on Trident-2 submarines) along with plans of extending the arms race to outer space may lead to a heightening of the first-strike capabilities of the two sides, thus sharply increasing the vulnerability of the strategic forces of retaliation. Some US politicians believe that this in turn will create a strategic situation radically different from that prevailing in the 1970s. In these new conditions each of the sides will have greater incentive to deliver a first nuclear strike out of the fear of being forestalled by the enemy. In stating their views, the proponents of an immediate end to the nuclear arms buildup say that at the present level of military confrontation it would be most advantageous to put an end to the nuclear arms race because the nuclear might of the USA and the USSR is in balance. They estimate that in the next five years a freeze would save \$90,000 million and even more if it is followed by arms reductions. But what is most important is that the freeze is neither a service nor a gift to the USSR. It needs the freeze no more and no less than the USA does. The two sides need it equally, because a nuclear war, which the freeze is called upon to ward off, would destroy both.

The advocates of the freeze also reject the logic according to which "in order to have less one must have more", considering this to be profoundly wrong: the USA does not have to build up arms and make the Russians feel more vulnerable in order to induce them to enter into serious negotiations, they declare.

Unfortunately, the present US Administration has paid no heed to this sober point of view. It finds more pleasure in its liking the views of the bosses of the military-industrial complex and right-wing Senators and in cooperating with politicians in the USA. It is no accident that the US President has described the nuclear freeze movement as

being dangerous and contrary to US interests, adding that the movement was organized by those who would like to see America weakened.

The idea of a nuclear freeze has taken root worldwide. It is noteworthy that in the United States more and more people, both prominent politicians and rank-and-file Americans, are coming to support the idea. Senator Gary Hart, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the 1984 Presidential elections, Senator John Glenn (Democrat) and others have expressed themselves in favour of a freeze. Senator Cranston, for instance, observed that the vast majority of the people, in contrast to their leaders, continue to see an acute need for an end to the arms race. This view is best borne out by the impressive demonstrations in support of a nuclear freeze, which took place on October 1, 1983, in 200 cities and towns at a time when the White House continued to whip up the anti-Soviet hysteria.

The situation is very similar in Europe. Towards the end of September 1983, 300 prominent British scientists called for a nuclear freeze. A decision was taken at a congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany last November, which contained an appeal to the USA and the USSR "to begin at an agreed-upon time a controlled freeze of the testing and deploying, and then of the production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles".

Neither has the nuclear freeze movement on both sides of the Atlantic subsided in the least after the USA and NATO started the deployment of new American missiles on the European continent. Proof of this is the setting up in the USA last December of a new national antiwar organization: Electors in Support of a Freeze—1984. The primary task of the new organization is to draw American peace advocates into the election campaign in the country, to put the problem of curbing the arms race, freezing nuclear arsenals and averting a thermonuclear catastrophe in the focus of this campaign.

The West European public is resolutely coming out against the new round of the arms race being launched by the USA

and NATO. Demanding an immediate end to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles there, it is also calling for urgent measures to freeze nuclear arsenals. The scope of this struggle is steadily growing.

In today's world the proposal for a nuclear freeze has become a sort of a litmus paper with the help of which one can accurately identify the proponents and the opponents of the arms race.

The Soviet Union's attitude to the nuclear freeze movement is set forth in the statement of the Soviet delegation at the 2nd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament of June 15, 1982: "In search of measures that could effectively put an end to the arms race many politicians and public figures of different countries have turned lately to the idea of a freeze—an end to the further buildup of nuclear potentials. Although there are differences in views on the subject, on the whole they seem to be in the right direction. We regard them as a reflection of the profound concern of the peoples about their fate. Figuratively speaking, the peoples have cast their votes in favour of preserving the most precious thing in the world—human life".

Editing completed on April 12, 1984

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ЗАМОРАЖИВАНИЕ: КТО ЗА И КТО ПРОТИВ

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Department of State

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1. FOR SPEAKER AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE ALASKA HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES:

PLEASE DO NOT PASS H. J. RES. 4: ANY KIND OF NUCLEAR
FREEZE VOTE FROM ALASKA WILL DO SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY
DAMAGE. NOW MORE THAN EVER WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT.

SHULTZ

UNCLASSIFIED

Sources Are Cited for Charge Of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze

By LESLIE MAITLAND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — The White House today cited Government reports and magazine articles as documentation for President Reagan's contention that "foreign agents" had helped "insurgate" the movement in the United States to freeze nuclear arms.

Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary, said the State Department had issued reports on the Soviet infiltration of the peace movement and said further documentation was contained in articles in The Reader's Digest, Commentary and The American Spectator.

President Reagan's remark at his news conference Thursday night came in response to a question as to whether evidence existed of foreign involvement in the movement to freeze the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Mr. Reagan said he could not discuss "intelligence matters," but that "plenty of evidence" existed. He said that the "overwhelming majority" of those who supported nuclear freeze proposals were "sincere and well-intentioned."

But he added, "There has been, in the organization of some of the big demonstrations, the one in New York, and so forth, there is no question about foreign agents that were sent to help instigate and help create and keep such a movement going."

Remarks Called 'McCarthyism'

Some critics of the President's remarks accused him of trying to stifle debate on the issue.

"It is disheartening to see an American President returning to the tactics of McCarthyism," said Morton H. Halperin, speaking for the American Civil Liberties Union. "Charges of secret manipulation by foreign agents poison the well of public debate.

"Americans must be free to debate issues on their merits and speak out without being subject to red-baiting," Mr. Halperin asserted.

Leslie Cagan, one of the coordinators of the disarmament rally held in New York June 12, said: "The President is hypocritical when he argues for increased military spending to help 'defend democracy' while at the same time he undermines our democratic right to public protest. The assertion that the American people are being manipulated by 'foreign agents' only serves to divert our energies away from the real issues: the clear and present dangers presented by our nuclear arsenals."

However, Roger S. Young, assistant

director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Congressional and public affairs, said that the President was "accurate" in describing "the Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." Mr. Young said, "The F.B.I. has received that information and has furnished it for the White House.

"We are not casting aspersions on the peace movement," he said, "but we know the Soviets have targeted it as the place to exert influence, not just in the United States, but in other parts of the world."

The Reader's Digest article cited by the White House as a source of documentation for Mr. Reagan's remark — "The K.G.B.'s Magical War for 'Peace'" — appeared last month and was written by John Barron. In it, Mr. Barron wrote that the "objective" of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, is "to secure military superiority for the Soviet Union by persuading the United States to abandon new weapons systems." The name of its campaign, he says, is "nuclear freeze."

Another article mentioned by the White House, "Perspective on the Peace Movement," by William E. Griffith in last June's Reader's Digest, stated, "The Soviets have fed funds and propaganda materials to some European peace groups and that 'a Soviet-front organization has allied itself to the movement.'"

Other sources listed by the White House included:

"The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," by Vladimir Bukovsky in Commentary last May; "The Counterfeit Peace Makers: the Atomic Freeze," by Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, in The American Spectator of June 1982; a State Department report of last July entitled "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," and hearings of February 1980 before the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which involved testimony from the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet covert actions abroad.

But some critics of the President were not satisfied. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, speaking in New Orleans at a meeting of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen, said that as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he would "challenge the President to produce" information supporting his statement "in closed session, if he chooses."

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Freeze Debate

A SA VEHICLE of generalized protest, the nuclear freeze proposal has had one immediate effect: it has helped induce Ronald Reagan to start adjusting some of his arms control positions. He has toned down his statements on nuclear war and begun to explore compromise in the Euro-missile talks. The freeze proposal has also become an agent of nuclear escalation for Congress. But in our view

the freeze proposal itself amounts to a public vote on the issue. It has to be said: despite the improvements in the freeze resolution in the House debate, it still remains in the weeds.

It is true that the freeze resolution now includes a "no first use" formula in general nuclear war, and a "no first use" formula in general nuclear war. The resolution is not as good as it could be. The resolution is not as good as it could be. The resolution is not as good as it could be.

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more "stability." The term "arms race" can be very limited: weapons that are less vulnerable and therefore less prone to being fired first in a crisis can settle the superpowers down. If the freeze people are serious about the perils of "destabilizing weapons," they must do more than add to their resolution a paragraph inconsistent with its basic proposition.

The Stratton amendment, barely defeated on the House floor, illuminated a second crippling defect of the freeze—its equivocation concerning what new weapons would be permissible during the time it took (one year, several) to negotiate this freeze. The Reagan administration proposals make that question urgent. To the extent that they have addressed it, freeze advocates tend to say that each new system should be judged on its merits. But it is not easy to find new systems in which there is merit. The letter of the government is not as good as it could be. The letter of the government is not as good as it could be.

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LETTERS TO

Sent by State Dept
June 1986

A Nuclear Freeze

--While the U.S. Government shares the concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end costly competition in nuclear arms, a nuclear freeze is not an effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives.

--A nuclear freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military buildup and lock in Soviet advantages. A freeze would preserve existing Soviet advantages in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that have resulted from the massive Soviet buildup of the last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised considerable restraint.

--About three quarters of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over half the the total Soviet strategic weapons are on launch systems five years old or less; only four percent are on systems over 15 years old. Thus a freeze would ensure that the U.S. strategic systems would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet systems.

--A freeze would undercut the US commitment of the NATO Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring 1985) in LRINF warheads.

--A freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and many elements would be unverifiable. It would require extensive and complex negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of the proposed freeze, especially those involving production and testing of certain systems, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement for genuine arms reductions.

--By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.

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**THE
NUCLEAR
FREEZE**

April 1982



The Nuclear Freeze

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- *Produce significant reductions* in the arsenals of both sides;
- *Result in equal levels of arms on both sides*, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- *Are verifiable*, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- *Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war*, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*.

What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- *A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- *A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- *A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult.* The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating

Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
 SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
 SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
 ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile




table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- *A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- *A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

ICBMs. Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

Sea-Based Forces. The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

Bombers. When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

The chart on pages 4 and 5 compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced 12 new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

quest for lasting peace. And, over time, as the nations mutually reduce their nuclear armaments (again, in a way that can be scientifically verified by all concerned) the threat of atomic holocaust will significantly diminish.

If the world fails to achieve this kind of nuclear disarmament is there any doubt that sooner or later, either by design or accident, one nation or the other will use its nuclear weapons?

And if that happens it is foregone that other nations will respond without restraint.

The result would have to be near-total destruction of life on earth. (Just recall the panic, loss of human life, damage and contamination of food hundreds of miles away when a single accidental melt-down occurred recently in the Soviet Union.)

But nuclear destruction need not happen. We have the capacity, through verifiable agreements such as the initiative proposes, to make the threat of nuclear war obsolete.

What would be the State of Alaska's role in this? The initiative calls upon the governor to conduct our Alaskan affairs in ways that conform with this policy. It directs the lieutenant governor to deliver copies of the Act to Congress and to the President of the United States. It lets our national leaders and policymakers know that Alaskans stand for common-sense peace.

Similar initiatives have already passed in local Alaska elections. Now Alaska, alone of all the states, has a nuclear freeze initiative on the ballot this fall. This is our chance to speak and act positively on the issue of peace not only statewide but nationally through press attention to our unique ballot question.

Mike M. Miller, Alaska State Representative & prime sponsor.

Statement OPPOSING the Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition

Your vote on this resolution sends a message—an international message. Unfortunately, this resolution aims the wrong message at the wrong people. It is also a naive, simplistic and cruelly false solution to a complex and deadly problem which it would only aggravate.

Chernobyl and Bhopal show that the ultimate danger to human survival is technology itself, not just the risk of nuclear war. Future energy or biogenetic disasters could terminate life on our planet even more certainly than "nuclear winter", and the Soviet system suppresses genuine environmental activism. A primary source of Arctic air pollution is the USSR. Nuclear weapons ended the "conven-

tional" holocaust of World War II, and Deterrence has been one of the few successes in curbing Soviet militarism and mistakes.

A "freeze" of the research, development and production of nuclear weapons cannot be verified. Our spy satellites may read license plates, but the Soviets have nonetheless succeeded in seriously violating existing nuclear and biological weapons treaties. The Soviets' unrepented murder of Major Arthur Nicolson demonstrates that even their signed guarantees of on-site treaty verification inspections mean nothing.

Our government has heard our concern about the cost and dangers of the arms race. It has tried to negotiate fair, verifiable disarmament treaties which will also continue deterring war. The Soviets refuse these and break others. Genuine Soviet peace activists attempting to petition their government are condemned to KGB psychiatric prisons.

Soviet leaders do not feel threatened by the terror and terrible costs of the arms race. They see Western "peace" activism as only a tool for nuclear terrorism, to demoralize our resistance to their increasingly aggressive militarism. Our FBI verified KGB involvement in the formation of the American freeze movement.

When unilateral agitation like this resolution undercuts our government's bargaining position and even leads Soviet leaders to think the arms race may be winnable, they have no use for genuine disarmament. While the Kremlin promotes a nuclear arms freeze, even the **Washington Post** has editorially opposed it as bad policy.

This resolution tells the Kremlin that nuclear terrorism works on Alaskans. Such fear and weakness precipitated Hitler's invasion of Poland and the Pearl Harbor attack. Such agitation led to our desertion of the Cambodians and Vietnamese and to the genocide which resulted.

Despite Kremlin propaganda, Soviet military preparations betray a doctrine that nuclear war is "winnable". (Even our Pentagon has renounced that.) Strategic advantage goes to the attacker, and Soviet development and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems surpassed us in the 1970's. Freezing our attempt to restore deterrence encourages Soviet attack.

Judging by their fast reaction to our State Senate's Wrangel Island resolution and Gennady Gerasimov's recent visit here, Soviet leaders realize Alaska's military and geopolitical importance and monitor us closely.

If you want to do something to help deter another world war, to express solidarity with our government's struggle for genuine disarmament and to send the Kremlin a strong and clear message that Alaskans can't be snowed, then please help vote this down.

Lou Coatney, Juneau

BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1
Initiative No. 83-03

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

The initiative would officially recognize that the prevention of nuclear war is the greatest challenge facing the Earth and that the nuclear arms race dangerously increases the risk of a war that would destroy humanity. The initiative would promote mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze, to be followed by nuclear weapons reduction. The initiative would direct the governor to conduct the states affairs in conformity with the initiative's goals.

A vote "FOR" adopts the initiative.

FOR

A vote "AGAINST" rejects the initiative.

AGAINST

NEUTRAL SUMMARY—83-03

Prepared by the Legislative Affairs Agency

This initiative would declare as the policy of the state the promotion of a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze to be followed by a reduction in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The initiative bases this policy on its recognition that the greatest challenge facing the earth is the prevention of nuclear war by accident or by design and that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that could be humanity's final war. The governor is directed to conduct the affairs of the state and to carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSITION

For An Act Entitled: "An Act relating to the establishment of a nuclear freeze as the policy of the State."

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

Section 1. **DECLARATION OF POLICY.** It is the policy of the State of Alaska: (1) to recognize that the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occur-

rence of nuclear war by accident or design;

(2) to recognize that the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war;

(3) to promote a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Section 2. **IMPLEMENTATION.** (a) The governor shall conduct the affairs of state and carry out state programs in conformity with this policy.

(b) The lieutenant governor shall deliver copies of this Act to Congress and the President of the United States.

Section 3. **EFFECTIVE DATE.** This initiative shall be effective when enacted according to law.

**Statement IN SUPPORT of the
Nuclear Arms Freeze Proposition**

Alaskans have a wonderful opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to world peace when they vote August 26. They can do this by casting their vote in the "For" (meaning "yes") column on the Nuclear Freeze Initiative question they'll find on the ballot.

It is important, however, to realize several things the initiative does **not** do:

The initiative does **not** encourage or obligate the U.S. to any sort of **unilateral** or "go-it-alone" policy regarding a freeze or reduction of nuclear warheads. It calls, instead, for a **mutual** freeze and reduction of such weapons. If other nations--particularly the Soviet Union--will not participate, then there is no obligation for the U.S. to do so.

And, the initiative does not call for any sort of "blind trust" toward the Soviets or any other nation. Instead it specifies that any agreement must be not only mutual but **verifiable** before we agree to participate. In other words we have to have arrangements in place to scientifically verify that no one is cheating, or there's no deal.

Truly, we have nothing to lose by adopting this policy.

But what will we gain?

For starters, just the freezing of production of nuclear weapons, just the limiting of arsenals to their present strength—which is already sufficient to destroy civilization as we know it today, many times over—will be a significant step forward in the

(CONTINUED ON BACK SIDE)

I. The Administration's Position.

A. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, APRIL 1982. (U.S. Department of State)

Explains reasons for Reagan Administration's opposition to nuclear arms freeze. Cites massive Soviet strategic build-up in 1970's, etc..

B. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE CONGRESS; FEBRUARY 4, 1985, p.45.

Secretary Weinberger -- "the Pentagon" -- states, "We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'" Explains that even if we Americans don't believe nuclear war is winnable, Soviet leaders -- judging by their preparations [rather than their propaganda] -- apparently do. Further explains that to continue deterring Soviet miscalculations and nuclear war we must meet their standards of deterrence -- not just our own.

C. SOVIET MILITARY POWER, 1986. (U.S. Defense Department)

Describes ongoing build-up of Soviet war machine and threat it poses. Describes tactical and strategic weapons systems such as first-strike SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and Soviet "star wars" weapons development.

D. NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. (U.S. Air Force Air University)

Analysis and discussion of warnings about the risk of "nuclear winter" from members of our American scientific community.

II. 30Mar83 WASHINGTON POST editorial, "The Freeze Debate".

"But in our view the proposal itself still amounts to bad public policy." Other, excellent points.

III. ARMS FREEZE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST. 1984.

Soviet Novosti Press Agency pamphlet promoting a nuclear arms freeze which I picked up in Soviet San Francisco consulate. Attacks Reagan Administration for its objections to the freeze.

IV. Soviet KGB involvement in formation of American freeze movement.

A. Oct82 READER'S DIGEST, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" by John Barron.

Describes KGB's infiltration/manipulation of Western peace movements. Active involvement of Soviet KGB operatives Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov at March 1981 Georgetown University meeting where America's nuclear arms freeze movement was organized and operationally begun.

B. 13Nov82 NY TIMES, "Sources are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze."

President Reagan had claimed involvement of "foreign agents" in American freeze movement. Critics howled "McCarthyism". White House cites Barron's READER'S DIGEST article as primary source. FBI says President "accurate" in describing "Soviet attempts to influence the peace movement." *[The KGB did not get involved to promote peace and disarmament.]*

V. KGB psychiatric persecution of genuine Soviet peace activists.

A. 13Sep82 NEW YORKER magazine, "The Talk of the Town: Peace."

Russian peace activist Mikhail Ostrovsky expelled from Soviet Union, describes KGB persecution of members of the nonviolent nongovernment Soviet "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA." Asks Western peace movements to pressure Soviet leaders into releasing group leader Sergei Batovrin from KGB psychiatric prisons. Batovrin forced to take psychiatric drugs. [Batovrin later expelled from USSR.]

Ostrovsky describes how the 80 million members of the official Soviet peace organization are so government-dominated that their demonstration signs are made for them, never handmade.

B. 21Mar86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "An Appeal for Help for Prisoners of Conscience."

Juneau peace and human rights advocate Charles Rohrbacher describes condemnation of genuine Soviet peace activists -- including two 17-year-old girls, to KGB psychiatric prison. [Under Amnesty International pressure like this KGB later released three of the prisoners.]

- C. 21Mar86 JUNEAU EMPIRE editorial: "Two Faces of Soviet 'Peace'"
 Biting contrast of "Soviet Samantha Smith" Katya Lycheva's trip to Disneyland with the KGB condemnation of young Soviet peace activists to psychiatric prison.
- D. 7Jul86 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "The Trap of Arms Control", by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
 President Carter's National Security Advisor explains how Kremlin negotiates arms treaties only for propaganda and improving military superpower status -- not for genuine disarmament. Describes damage done to Western negotiating efforts for genuine disarmament by freeze movement and other anti-deterrence agitation.

VI. Soviet violations of arms treaties.

- A. Spr83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "'Yellow Rain' and the Future of Arms Agreements."
 Documents treaty-violating use of Soviet toxin weapons against civilians in Afghanistan and Indochina. Describes "bee-droppings" disinformation disseminated through Western media -- hideously obscene, considering the victims' suffering. State Department casigated for bungling the handling of this Soviet treaty violation.
- B. 30Nov83 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet Violations of Arms Treaties."
 Describes Soviet treaty violations covered in Western media, including accident in Sverdlovsk germ warfare laboratory. Explains "Catch-22" inadequacies of remote sensing -- "national technical means" -- for treaty compliance verification.
- C. ARMS CONTROL: U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, PROBLEMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
- D. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 122: SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1Feb85 (U.S. State Department)
 FINALLY, Reagan Administration documents and lists Soviet arms treaty violations. U.S. goal of strategic arms reduction (rather than just freeze) described.

VII. Soviet environmental disregard.

- A. 4Oct84 EMPIRE, "Once-pure Arctic Air Dirtied by Soviet, European Industry.", by David Foster, AP.
 "Despite the area's pristine image, scientists say Arctic air contains as much dirt as some rural and suburban areas, with the Soviet Union the major polluter."
- B. 21Nov84 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Other Testaments" (re-titled by EMPIRE as "Soviet System Poses Biggest Threat of All")
 Written before Chernobyl, letter describes Soviet radioactive waste disaster at Kymitym, Sverdlovsk germ disaster, etc., and how Soviet environmental policies represent a longterm threat to human survival even greater than the risk of nuclear war/winter. Says "Day After" and "Testament" films are out of context and distorting since there have been no similar dramatizations broadcast about Soviet environmental disasters, psychiatric prisons, Afghanistan atrocities, etc..

VIII. Soviet interest in Alaska.

- A. 20Feb86 EMPIRE Ltr-Ed: "Soviet 'Ultimatum' Delivered to Senators."
 Alaska Performing Artists for Peace organizer Dixie Belcher lobbies against State Senate's Wrangal Island resolution, claiming Soviets had threatened to end plans for her musical peace tour to Siberia. Dixie never conceded that using her group as a political hammer against the Wrangal resolution was wrong or wouldn't happen again.
- B. 30Apr86 EMPIRE, "Moscow Editor Promotes U.S., Soviet Relationship."
 Kremlin propagandist Gennadi Gerasimov visits Juneau as guest of Dixie Belcher. (Later, at his World Affairs Council talk, Gerasimov promotes his book attacking U.S. star wars program. In response to my question about the Soviet killing of U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicolson (in the course of his treaty-authorized direct/on-site verification inspection duties) Gerasimov says Major Nicolson was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time" -- no regrets or Soviet commitment to prevent future killings.)

IX. Consequences of U.S. quitting its military defense responsibilities.

"The Killing Fields" film

Searing depiction of mass extermination of Cambodians by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Almost half the population murdered or starved by collectivization. The typical attempt to blame Cambodian suffering on Nixon didn't wash.

Handwritten signature and date:
 [Signature]
 1 Aug 86



Senate Rules Committee

Senator Richard I. (Dick) Eliason, Chairman

RECEIVED

MAR 06 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Mitch Abood

FROM: Senator Dick Eliason

RE: Nuclear disarmament

Please read the resolution to which Secretary of State Shultz refers in his telegram and read SJR 21 which I introduced.

SJR 21 is an expression of support for the goals which the Secretary of State has been pursuing in Geneva for the past two years on behalf of the Reagan administration.

I would appreciate a hearing on SJR 21 as soon as possible, so that we may send our message of support to Washington, D.C. It seems timely in light of recent developments in negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

All excerpts from Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy, (emphasis added throughout)

Excerpts from "Prospects for World Peace" by President Reagan, an address before the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in New York City on Sept. 22, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, November 1986:

"It is for this reason that I wrote last summer to Mr. Gorbachev with the new arms control proposals. Before discussing the proposals, let us be clear about which weapons are the most dangerous and threatening to peace. The threat does not come from defensive systems, which are a shield against attack, but from offensive weapons -- ballistic missiles that hurtle through space and can wreak mass destruction on the surface of the earth, especially the Soviet Union's heavy, accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple warheads, which have no counterparts in size or number in any other country.

"That is why the United States has long urged radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these offensive systems. Note that I said reduction; for this is the real purpose of arms control; not just to codify the levels of today's arsenals, not just to channel their further expansion, but to reduce them in ways that will reduce the danger of war. Indeed, the United States believes the prospect of a future without such weapons of mass destruction must be the ultimate goal of arms control.

"I am pleased to say that the Soviet Union has now embraced our idea of radical reductions in offensive systems. At the Geneva summit last November, we agreed to intensify work in this area. Since then, the Soviets have made detailed proposals which, while not acceptable to us, appear to represent a serious effort. So, we continue to seek a 50% reduction of American and Soviet arsenals -- with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. If the Soviet Union wants only a lesser reduction, however, we are prepared to consider it but as an interim measure. In other provisions, as well, we have sought to take account of Soviet concerns. So, there has been movement.

"Similarly, in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States seeks the total elimination of such missiles on a global basis. Again, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing such a goal in stages, we are prepared to conclude an interim agreement without delay."

"As the United States has repeatedly made clear, we are moving toward a future of greater reliance upon strategic defence. The United States remains prepared to talk about how -- under what ground rules and process -- we and the Soviet Union can do this cooperatively. Such strategic defenses, coupled with radical reductions in offensive forces, would represent a safer balance and would give future statesmen the opportunity to move beyond it to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth."

Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations
White House Statement excerpt
Aug. 31, 1986
Department of State Bulletin, November 1986

The United States and the Soviet Union will begin a new round of discussions on arms control in Geneva on September 18. An interagency arms control group has been meeting during the past several weeks to prepare for this round of talks. The United States considers this new round to be important in the process of reaching an agreement for meaningful arms control leading to total elimination of nuclear weapons. The September discussions come at a critical juncture in the process.

The recent exchanges between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have served to underscore the seriousness of the discussions. We are pleased that the Soviet Union has moved from a position of limiting the expansion of the arms race to a discussion of reducing the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

U.S. Policy on Arms Control: Purpose, Prospects, and Process
by Allen Holmes (Ambassador Holmes, Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs) Excerpt from address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on June 2, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Sept. 1986:

"The objective of this Administration is to enhance security and reduce the risk of war, to ensure strategic stability at the lowest feasible level, and ultimately -- some day -- to do away with nuclear weapons."

Excerpt from letter from President Reagan to the Congress, August 5, 1986, accompanying unclassified version of classified report on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Sept. 1986:

"I want again to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to receive my highest priority. This is the most direct path to achieving greater stability and a safer world."

Excerpts from Unclassified Report to the Congress on U. S. Interim Restraint Policy and Representative Soviet and U.S. Dimantlement and Strategic Force Projections With and Without SALT I and II, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, Oct. 1986

From I. Introduction: U.S. Interim Restraint Policy and U. S. Responses to Soviet Noncompliance

"In his May 27 statement, the President emphasized that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and will continue to receive, his highest priority. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed to focus, in particular, on areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, as well as an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world."

From IV. Soviet Political and Negotiating Responses

"No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

"Our objectives in Geneva remain the same as stated at the summit: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals."

Excerpts from remarks delivered by President Reagan in Glassboro, New Jersey, June 19, 1986, appearing in Dept. of State Bulletin, September 1986:

"When I met Mr. Gorbachev last November in Geneva, he and I agreed to intensify our effort to reduce strategic arms...And we both spoke of the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons."

"In this essay on peace, then, we can assert that the time has come to move forward. Let us leave behind efforts to seek only limits to the increase of nuclear arms and seek instead actual arms reductions -- the deep and verifiable reductions that Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed to negotiate. The goal here is not complicated. I am suggesting that we agree not on how many new, bigger, and more accurate missiles can be built, but on how to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear missiles.

"Let us leave behind, too, the defense policy of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, as it's called, and seek to put in its place a defense that truly defends. You know -- let me interrupt right here and say that possibly you haven't considered much about this system. This MAD policy, as it's called -- and incidentally, MAD stands for mutual assured destruction, but MAD is also a description of what the policy is. It means that if we each keep enough weapons that we can destroy each other, then maybe we'll both have enough sense not to shoot those weapons off. That's not exactly the way for the world to go on, with these massed terribly destructive weapons aimed at each other and the possibility that some day a madman somewhere may push a button and the next day the world starts to explode."

ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE - SENATE

SENATOR RICHARD I. ELIASON

RULES COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN
LABOR & COMMERCE COMMITTEE, VICE-CHAIRMAN
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
RESOURCES COMMITTEE
FISHERIES SUBCOMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN



(C)

See me plz

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M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Senate State Affairs Committee
Senator Mitch Abood, Chairman
Senator Rick Uehling, Vice-Chairman
Senator Jan Faiks
Senator William Hensley
Senator Joe Josephson

FROM: Senator Dick Eliason *Dick*

DATE: March 30, 1987

RE: SJR 21 -- Requesting the President of the United States to propose an international freeze on nuclear weapons, verification safeguards for the freeze, the use of nuclear weapons funds for peaceful nonnuclear uses, and nuclear disarmament by all nations; and requesting the state Congressional delegation to urge the president to make the proposals.

Attached you will find some information which I turned up in a cursory review of some U.S. foreign policy bulletins. The information identified here, in my opinion, is specifically what Senate Joint Resolution 21 addresses.

Attachments

RECEIVED
MAR 31 1987