

SJR

24

HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT

(9)

Date referred: 4/29/87

FURTHER REFERRALS:

DATE: May 7, 1987

The Resources Committee has considered CSSJR 24 (C&RA)

Relating to the establishment of a priority access zone at Unalaska for domestic fisherman and processors.

RECOMMENDS:

- replace with _____ the same title
- attached amendment(s) a new title
- do pass
- do not pass
- no recommendation
- individual recommendations
- additional referral to the _____ Committee

ADOPTS: _____ letter of intent

ATTACHES NEW FISCAL NOTE(S):

- fiscal impact same as previous fiscal note published _____
- zero fiscal note same as previous zero fiscal note published 3/18/87
- zero with analysis

SIGNING DO PASS:

SIGNING OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

<u>Adelheid Herrmann</u>	Herrmann
<u>Heinrich Springs</u>	Springer
<u>Park Shultz</u>	Shultz
<u>Cliff Davidson</u>	Davidson
<u>[Signature]</u>	Sund
<u>[Signature]</u>	Pearce
<u>[Signature]</u>	
<u>[Signature]</u>	Hoffman
<u>Mike Navarre</u>	Navarre
<u>Sen Cotten</u>	Cotten

Adelheid Herrmann Herrmann
Chairman's signature

ALASKAN JOINT VENTURE FISHERIES, INC.

310 "K" Street
Suite 310
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
(907) 276-5342
Telex: 332471 APANC
Fax: (907) 258-0155

March 11, 1987

The Honorable Arliss Sturgulewski
P.O. Box V
Juneau, AK 99911

Dear Senator Sturgulewski:

With regard to the hearing on your bill No. 6JR24 scheduled for tomorrow (3/12/87), we are enclosing a letter stating our opposition to the proposed 100-mile priority access zone around Dutch Harbor.

Alaskan Joint Venture Fisheries, Inc. is the largest and only joint venture company in Alaska with projected gross revenues in 1987 over \$30 million. Our 15 American fishermen and their vessels, valued at over \$3 million each, do not wish to be discriminated against by drawing lines in the Bering Sea.

I hope our letter sheds some light. We will be testifying at the North Pacific Fishery Management Council meeting next week on this matter. If we can answer any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

ALASKAN JOINT VENTURE FISHERIES, INC.



Annie Burnham
President

AB:td

Enclosure

ALASKAN JOINT VENTURE FISHERIES, INC.

310 "K" Street
Suite 310
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
(907) 276-5342
Telex: 332471 APANC
Fax: (907) 258-0155

March 4, 1987

Dr. Anthony J. Calio
Director
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
U.S. Department of Commerce
Herbert C. Hoover Building, Room 5128
14th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20230

RE: Proposed DAP Priority Access Zone around Dutch Harbor

Dear Dr. Calio:

On the behalf of Alaskan Joint Venture Fisheries, Inc. and the fishermen in our employ, we would like to express our opposition to the proposed establishment of a DAP exclusive access zone around Dutch Harbor. We strongly endorse any and all the arguments made in recent letters addressed to your offices by Westward Trawlers, ProFish International and the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners Association and hereby add our voice to the chorus of protest against this discriminatory proposal.

It is agreed that the idea of establishing such an exclusive economic zone has fundamental emotional appeal but with all due respect to the authors, the proposal has little basis in the realities of the current marketplace.

Members of Pacific Seafood Processors Association (PSPA) and the Mayor of Dutch Harbor either claim or infer the following in their proposal:

- 1) The inception of a 100 mile DAP priority zone is imperative in order to guarantee that domestic harvesters deliver their catch to two surimi plants in Dutch Harbor.
- 2) A joint venture company can operate just as profitably outside the peripheries delineated by such a zone.
- 3) Joint Ventures have consistently "taken the money and run", i.e. have left none of their profits behind in the coastal communities of Alaska such as Dutch Harbor.

Dr. Anthony J. Calio
March 4, 1987
Page 2

First, there are fish presently being delivered to a shore-based surimi plant by a joint venture boat. But the processing capacity of the plant is so small that this one boat has "plugged" the plant with only a few deliveries. Thus, after sporadic deliveries it must sit idle while the rest of the JV fleet delivers to the more efficient floating processors with no restraints. The upshot of all this is that it is not economically feasible for a multimillion dollar catcher boat to deliver to a shore-based plant under the current conditions of the fishery, wherein volume and price do not adequately offset the costs of insurance and maintenance of a typical Bering Sea trawler.

But will this surimi plant starve? No--tenders have been converted and are heading towards Dutch Harbor right now. These tenders will receive fish from JV catcher boats for delivery to shore-based plants and taking into account the efficiency and cost effectiveness of such an arrangement, one might conclude that this is precisely the investment these plants should have made long ago.

Second, contrary to the contentions of the authors of this proposal, joint venture companies cannot continue to run a profitable operation if access to these grounds is denied. Joint venture operators currently employ over 120 catcher boats worth from one to three million dollars each. Many of them have only just begun to make a profit after the king crab demise of 1980, and losing these grounds with the concomitant loss of their JV markets would be the coup de grace for at least 100 of them. JV managers would lose over 10 million dollars in revenues and JV boat operators and crew would lose well over 100 million dollars of potential earnings. The grounds within this 100 mile circle are that productive and we absolutely cannot afford to lose access to them, especially when it has already been demonstrated that these shore-based plants can be adequately supplied with raw product without the establishment of this or any other exclusive zone.

Third, the authors' contentions that JV operations have done nothing for Alaska's coastal communities is completely invalid. Alaskan Joint Venture Fisheries owns and manages four boats that in 1986 alone left an average of \$200,000 dollars each behind in Dutch Harbor. These monies represent fuel costs, moorage fees, groceries, parts, airline tickets and the myriad other expenses generated by such a fishing operation. In one way or another each and every citizen of Dutch Harbor was benefited by this money. Please take note that there are over 100 of these catcher boats, each leaving roughly this same amount behind both in Dutch Harbor and Kodiak.


Dr. Anthony J. Calio
March 4, 1987
Page 3

In short, we cannot let an overzealous plan prematurely kill off the goose that laid the golden egg. Joint Venture operators argue for the natural evolution of a fleet of catchers into a fleet of domestic catcher/processors and they are busy building these boats now with the all-important capital generated from JV operations. We feel these domestic catcher/processors are the wave of the future and we cannot afford to stifle such a development, especially with artificial constraints such as exclusive access zones and all their discriminatory implications.

In closing, we would like to reiterate our vehement opposition to any and all legislated solutions to economic problems, problems whose solutions are better left to the marketplace.

Sincerely,

ALASKAN JOINT VENTURE FISHERIES, INC.



Eric Maissonpierre
Operations

EM:sh

cc: Senator Brock Adams
Senator John Breaux
Senator Dan Evans
Senator Frank Murkowski
Senator Ted Steven
Congressman Don Bonker
Congressman Rod Chandler
Congressman Norman Dicks
Congressman Thomas Foley
Congressman Mike Lowry
Congressman John Miller
Congressman Sid Morrison
Congressman Al Swift
Congressman Don Young
William Evans, NMFS
Robert McVey, NMFS
Rolland Schmitten, NMFS
James Campbell, NPFMC

STATE OF ALASKA 1987 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

FISCAL NOTE SENATE

BILL VERSION: CSSJR 24 (C&RA)

PUBLISH DATE: 3/18/87

REQUEST: _____

Revision Date: _____

Agency Affected: Fish and Game

Title: Relating to the establishment of a domestic fishery zone for

BRU: Commercial Fisheries

Sponsor: Sturqulewski Unalaska

Components: _____

Requestor: C&RA

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
PERSONAL SERVICES	0					
TRAVEL	0					
CONTRACTUAL	0					
SUPPLIES	0					
EQUIPMENT	0					
LAND & STRUCTURES	0					
GRANTS, CLAIMS	0					
MISCELLANEOUS	0					
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAPITAL						
REVENUE						

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

POSITIONS:

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS

Prepared by: Roland Shanks
Division: Commissioner's Office

Phone: 465-4100
Date: 3/18/87

Approved by Commissioner: [Signature]
Agency: Fish and Game

Date: 3/18/87

- Distribution (by preparer):
- Legislative Finance
 - Legislative Sponsor
 - Requestor
 - Office of Management and Budget
 - Impacted Agency(ies)
 - Senate Secretary

Alaska State Legislature



SENATOR
ARLISS STURCULEWSKI

Chairman, Senate Community and Regional Affairs Committee
Vice-Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
Member, Senate Resources Committee

2957 SHELDON JACKSON STREET
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99508

White in Juneau
P. O. BOX V
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811
(907) 465-3818

Senate

March 13, 1987

James Campbell, Chairman
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
Box 103136
Anchorage, AK 99510

Dear Mr. Campbell:

The Senate Community and Regional Affairs Committee held a public hearing on March 12 regarding SJR 24 "Relating to the establishment of a domestic fishery zone for Unalaska." The resolution, which I sponsored and which was co-sponsored by nine other senators, urges the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to create a DAP Priority Access Zone around Unalaska.

The resolution received support from Paul Fuhs, Mayor of Unalaska; Glenn Boledovich, City Councilman from Unalaska; Ericka Tritremmel, City Administrator from Akutan; David McGlashan, President of the Akutan Village Corporation; and Rick Lauber of the Pacific Seafood Processors Association. There was no oral testimony in opposition of the resolution; although a letter was received from the Alaskan Joint Venture Fisheries, Inc. in opposition.

There were some technical amendments made to the resolution and I have enclosed a copy for your information.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Arliss Sturgulewski".

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Senate District F

Enclosure

cc: James Branson

North Pacific Fishery Management Council

James O. Campbell, Chairman
Jim H. Branson, Executive Director

411 West 4th Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99510



Mailing Address: P.O. Box 103136
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Telephone: (907) 274-4563
FTS 271-4064

March 27, 1987

Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
P.O. Box V
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Arliss:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, 1987, regarding SJR 24. The Council reviewed the proposals for a DAP (domestic annual processing) priority zone within 100 miles of Unalaska Island at its meeting last week and voted to send out the original proposal and several alternatives for public review. The "package" to be released for public comment will have six alternatives.

Alternative 1: Maintain the status quo (no area restrictions on foreign processors receiving fish from U.S. fishermen).

Alternative 2: Establish a year-round closure for joint venture and foreign directed fishing in the area bounded by 52°30' and 55°N latitude, between 164° and 169°W longitude. Fishing within that area would be allowed only for those fishing for domestic processors.

Alternative 3: Establish a year-round closure for foreign directed fishing in the area bounded by 52°30' and 55°N latitude, between 164° and 169°W longitude. Fishing within that area would be allowed for those vessels delivering to domestic processors or for those delivering to foreign processors lying outside the designated area.

Alternative 4: Establish seasonal area closures within the area described in Alternatives 2 and 3.

Alternative 5: Establish a fee structure for all foreign processors that receive joint venture fish.

Alternative 6: Spread out joint venture allocations over a number of openings within the year.

The Council will decide on a course of action at its May 20-22 meeting after reviewing the public comments.

We appreciate your interest in this matter. Ron Miller of the Council staff has been working with Frank Homan from your office and will keep him informed of further Council action.

Sincerely,

James O. Campbell
Chairman

Frank for file

OPINION 100 Mile Limit

Currently the proposed 100 mile limit around Unalaska/Dutch Harbor (U DH) has been the focus of much comment and controversy. Various groups of Joint Venture (JV) fishermen have begun campaigns to lobby against the proposal.

JV fishermen feel threatened and in some cases are reacting as if supporters of the 100 mile limit are out to eliminate U.S. trawlers rather than foreign processors. First and foremost it should be made clear that any vessel owner who is now dependent on JVs has done so by free choice. Secondly, they have done so with the knowledge that JVs were initiated as only a phase or "stepping stone" on the road to full U.S. involvement in the fishery.

There is no historical intent or goal to stop Americanization half way. The phase out of foreign harvesting includes processing as well as fishing. The JV was only part of a plan to phase out foreign fishery and processing fleets within the 200 mile fishery conservation zone.

Currently some JV fishermen are forming organizations to lobby for the preservation of JVs and against the 100 mile zone. Somehow it seems JV fishermen have forgotten that JVs were not intended to be permanent. In some cases they are even contributing large sums of money to preserve the JV and consequently inhibit and delay the entry of the U.S. processing industry into this vast fishery.

Now that they have their piece of the pie (and in some cases it is a very profit-

able piece) they are working in opposition to the very same process that created an avenue for their entry into the Bering Sea and North Pacific bottomfishery. This strikes me as rather self serving and I hope that the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) and Dept. of Commerce treat their lobbying efforts as such.

I would think they would be grateful for the economic boon they have received from the Americanization process. They should therefore support others trying to utilize Americanization and not lobby to the detriment of U.S. processors. Their money would be better spent insuring they will have a domestic market as Americanization moves on to include U.S. processors.

The NPFMC should make it clear that JV fishermen must begin to seek domestic markets. The phase out of foreign processing is as sure as the phase out of foreign fishing. If a trawler refuses to accept this then he has nobody but himself to blame if he is left without a market.

There is not justification to be made for stopping Americanization now that U.S. fishermen are harvesting the fish. The 100 mile limit around U DH is a major step for the entry of the U.S. processing industry into the same Americanization process that JV fishermen have benefited from. The 100 mile limit leaves the vast majority of the Bering Sea open for continued JVs and yet it signals support and security for those seeking to invest in the U.S. processing industry.



by the wave.

March 3, 1987

Governor Steve Cowper
P.O. Box A
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Governor Cowper:

We were shocked to hear that the NMFS Alaska Regional Director recently recommended overturning the Council's decision to reserve the pollock resource in Shelikoff Strait for the domestic industry. We are requesting an explanation and documentation of how the Regional Director came to his decision. We attended the last Council meeting and clearly heard him say that the Regional office would take no action until new data could be presented to the Council at the March 16 meeting.

In addition, we cannot explain why the Regional Director is one of the leading opponents of our proposal for a 100 mile Domestic Fisheries Zone around Dutch Harbor. We would expect that NMFS would provide a leadership role or at least remain neutral towards efforts to Americanize the fisheries within the ECZ. There are enough enemies of Americanization already.

I refer you to the attached letter which clearly spells out the plan of a new organization, the American High Seas Fisheries Association (AHSFA) to thwart the intent of the Magnuson Act to realize full domestic utilization of the fishery resources including processing and transportation.

In that letter we finally see a forthright statement of some of the Joint Venture operator's goal of "preservation of this method or selling our harvest." The letter strips away their pretensions of claiming that Joint Ventures are a transitional phase in the Americanization process. They want to stop this process dead in its tracks at the point where they are cut in but everyone else is cut out. And they are proposing to assess themselves \$15,000.00 per boat to accomplish this.

Two of the main targets they list are the 100 mile domestic zone around Dutch harbor and reopening the Gulf of Alaska (including Shelikoff Strait) to Joint Ventures. If they can't attain their goals through defeating these proposals they will seek to accomplish them through reflagging foreign processing vessels. They state: "Without the Tenyo Maru where are we? Do we care what flag flies over the stern? Or Who owns her?"

(2)

They may not care, but we do. It is the liveliness of our coastal communities and many other Americans entitled to benefit from the fishery resources in the FCZ.

It is interesting to note that on page 2 they discuss whether they should use their Association to increase tonnages allocated to the Japanese at the expense of other countries, or to join forces with the Koreans against the Americans. The author recommends the latter.

Perhaps their most dangerous goal is the increase of total allowable catch from 2.0 million metric tons to 2.4 million metric tons to 2.4 million metric tons a year. At a time when fishermen are already expressing concern about overcapitalization of the fleet and over-exploitation of the resource, this policy could be disastrous. This idea was introduced at the last council meeting by the NMFS Alaska Regional Director. Have we learned nothing from the destruction of the fish stocks in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean?

And for what? So that there can be an "increase of Pollock tonnage available for Joint Venture operations?" What national policy could possibly be served by such a move? Not only are we losing the value of the fish to American industry by giving it to the foreign processors, but many of these fish are then imported back into the U.S. adding to our massive trade deficit, which last year in fisheries products amounted to \$5.6 billion, up 14% from the year before.

This is a true moment in history which will affect our future for many years to come. ANY assistance you could give to our proposals before the Council to Americanize the fishing/processing industry in the FCZ, would be very important at this time.

I hope you do not feel I have spoken too strongly in this letter. We are very concerned about the situation we are developing and it is our responsibility to safeguard the future prosperity of our communities.

Sincerely,

Paul Fuhs
Mayor of Unalaska/Dutch Harbor
President, Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference

cc: NPFMC Members
Dr. Tony Callio
Senator Ernest Hollings
Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Frank Murkowski
Representative Don Young
Governor Steve Cowper

WESTWARD TRAWLERS, INC.

(3)

715 N.E. Northlake Way Seattle, Washington 98105

phone: 206-547-6940

16 February 1987

To: All Westward catcher-boats & their owners

From: Hugh Reilly

Re: American High Seas Fisheries Association

Enclosed you will each find copies of organizational papers and membership application for the American High Seas Fisheries Association—which is presently in formation.

The Association was conceived late last year, principally by a number of the boats fishing in the Nissui ventures. The purpose is stated in the Articles of Incorporation (Article III):

" . . . promotion of the interests of owners and operators of commercial fishing vessels that deliver fish at sea in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea."

You have all doubtless gotten wind of this effort, either in Seattle recently or on the fishing grounds. A careful review of the enclosures will be somewhat illuminating; for example, in the BYLAWS:

Article I - Members

1.1 Qualifications. Membership in the association is limited to persons who are actively engaged as vessel owners or vessel operators and who receive 75% of their revenues from deliveries of fish to Japanese processors at sea in the North Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea.

Article II - Assessments.

2.1 Assessments. The Board of Directors shall levy assessments to be charged against each member to provide necessary operating capital for the association. An annual assessment of \$1.00 per metric ton of groundfish delivered by each vessel, up to a maximum of \$15,000 per vessel, shall be levied against each member.

Frank Bohannon, Wilhelm Jensen and others in the Nissui fleet can give you background on what has led to the formation of the organization; and they can give you their ideas on what the Association should try to accomplish, and perhaps how it should go about it.

. . . cont'd

4

But it will ultimately be up to the membership and their Board of Directors to direct the Association. That process will begin at the organizational meeting of the Association in Seattle on March 9th (see enclosed Notice).

From our point of view, the Association is an unfortunate necessity for those of us (Owners, Captains, & crews) who derive our living from these joint fishing operations with the Japanese. As a group, we have a significant financial stake in the preservation of this method of selling our harvest, but our opponents are numerous . . . and increasingly effective. We now need to pull up a fight to defend our interests, and it takes unity and money to win fights in fisheries politics.

Principal issues facing the membership and its Board of Directors in March will be organizational and philosophical in nature:

1) Should AHSFA work in concert with ventures with other countries (i.e. Korea) to preserve and extend the lifespan of ventures with both countries?

OR

2) Should AHSFA work to expand the tonnage of 'Japanese' boats by reducing the tonnage of other nations?

3) Should AHSFA pursue a 'high-visibility' role in the political arena (like NEFVOA, FONA, AFTA, Alaska Driggers (ADA), etc.)?

OR

4) Should AHSFA keep overhead, staff, and "imagery" costs at a minimum, using existing potential funds (at \$15,000/boat we are talking some serious money!), at least initially, to get things accomplished using task-specific staff (probably part-time), working with and through existing organizations (i.e. NEFVOA, ADA, JFA, etc.), scientific specialists (consultants), public relations firms, and political professionals (i.e. lawyers/lobbyists)?

Personally, I favor alternatives 1) and 4); ultimately, these questions are for the membership/Board to decide. And I would like to see development of a similar association of 'Korean' boats—with which AHSFA can collaborate on funding common needs and influencing common issues.

Some of the key issues that face our particular segment of the trawl industry, and which must be strongly and clearly addressed during 1987 are:

. . . cont'd

16 February 1987
The Westward Fleet
page -3-

- I. The 100 mile closure proposed around Dutch Harbor
- II. Pollock rod stripping operations (both Korean & Japanese)
- III. Reopening the Gulf of Alaska to J/V's
- IV. Reflagging of foreign processors (Without the TENYO MARU, where are we? Do we care what flag flies over the stern? or who owns her?)
- V. The possible increase of Bering Sea/Alouitians total allowable harvest (all species) from 2.0 million tons to 2.4 million tons . . . and with that, increase of Pollock tonnage available for J/V operations.

Again, we see the Association as an unfortunate necessity, one that will require considerable commitment of our monies, our time, and our influence. We encourage all of you to give membership in the Association the most serious consideration.

Representatives from each of the Westward catcher-boats should be coming home the end of the month and should be prepared to deal with this Association matter in behalf of everyone involved with each vessel.

We hope that everyone will be supporting the Association and will be represented at the organizational meeting on March 9th in Seattle. See the first four pages of the enclosed—which need to be filled out for membership.

copies to:

- CALIFORNIA HORIZON
- HALF MOON BAY
- SUNSET BAY
- MARGARET LYN
- HAZEL LORRAINE I
- SHARON LORRAINE
- VIKING
- SEAWOLF
- OCEAN DYNASTY
- WESTWARD I
- GREAT PACIFIC
- VAERDAL

also to:

- Dave Harvilla
- Bob Dooley
- Bill Lock
- Terry Cosgrove
- "
- Trefon Angosaer
- Phil Werdal
- Steve Huddleston

①

March 3, 1987

Governor Steve Cowper
P.O. Box A
Juneau, AK 99811

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I refer you to the attached letter which clearly spells out the plan of a new organization, the American High Seas Fisheries Association (AHSFA) to thwart the intent of the Magnuson Act to realize full domestic utilization of the fishery resources including processing and transportation.

In that letter we finally see a forthright statement of some of the Joint Venture operator's goal of "preservation of this method or selling our harvest." The letter strips away their pretensions of claiming that Joint Ventures are a transitional phase in the Americanization process. They want to stop this process dead in its tracks at the point where they are cut in but everyone else is cut out. And they are proposing to assess themselves \$15,000.00 per boat to accomplish this.

Two of the main targets they list are the 100 mile domestic zone around Dutch harbor and reopening the Gulf of Alaska (including Shelikoff Strait) to Joint Ventures. If they can't attain their goals through defeating these proposals they will seek to accomplish them through reflagging foreign processing vessels. They state: "Without the Tenyo Maru where are we? Do we care what flag flies over the stern? Or Who owns her?"

They may not care, but we do. It is the livelihood of our coastal communities and many other Americans entitled to benefit from the fishery resources in the FCZ. (2)

It is interesting to note that on page 2 they discuss whether they should use their Association to increase tonnages allocated to the Japanese at the expense of other countries, or to join forces with the Koreans against the Americans. The author recommends the latter.

Perhaps their most dangerous goal is the increase of total allowable catch from 2.0 million metric tons to 2.4 million metric tons to 2.4 million metric tons a year. At a time when fishermen are already expressing concern about overcapitalization of the fleet and over-exploitation of the resource, this policy could be disastrous. This idea was introduced at the last council meeting by the NMFS Alaska Regional Director. Have we learned nothing from the destruction of the fish stocks in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean?

And for what? So that there can be an "increase of Pollock tonnage available for Joint Venture operations?" What national policy could possibly be served by such a move? Not only are we losing the value of the fish to American industry by giving it to the foreign processors, but many of these fish are then imported back into the U.S. adding to our massive trade deficit, which last year in fisheries products amounted to \$5.6 billion, up 14% from the year before.

This is a true moment in history which will affect our future for many years to come. Any assistance you could give to our proposals before the Council to Americanize the fishing/processing industry in the FCZ, would be very important at this time.

I hope you do not feel I have spoken too strongly in this letter. We are very concerned about the situation we see developing and it is our responsibility to safeguard the future prosperity of our communities.

Sincerely,

Paul Fuhs
Mayor of Unalaska/Dutch Harbor
President, Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference

cc: NPFMC Members
Dr. Tony Callio
Senator Ernest Hollings
Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Frank Murkowski
Representative Don Young
Governor Steve Cowper

(3)

WESTWARD TRAWLERS, INC.

715 N.E. Northlake Way Seattle, Washington 98105

phone: 306-547-6940

16 February 1987

To: All Westward catcher-boats & their owners

From: Hugh Reilly

Re: American High Seas Fisheries Association

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cont'd

(4)

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Principal issues facing the membership and its Board of Directors in March will be organizational and philosophical in nature:

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OR

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3) Should AHSFA pursue a 'high-visibility' role in the political arena (like NPFVOA, FONA, AFTA, Alaska Driggers (ADA), etc.)?

OR

4) Should AHSFA keep overhead, staff, and "imagery" costs at a minimum, using only substantial funds (at \$15,000/boat we are talking some serious money!), at least initially, to get things accomplished using task-specific staff (probably part-time), working with and through existing organizations (i.e. NPFVOA, ADA, JFA, etc.), scientific specialists (consultants), public relations firms, and political professionals (i.e. lawyers/lobbyists)?

Personally, I favor alternatives 1) and 4); ultimately, these questions are for the membership/Board to decide. And I would like to see development of a similar association of 'Korean' boats—with which AHSFA can collaborate on funding common needs and influencing common issues.

Some of the key issues that face our particular segment of the trawl industry, and which must be strongly and clearly addressed during 1987 are:

. . . cont'd

16 February 1987
The Westward Fleet
page -3-

- I. The 100 mile closure proposed around Dutch Harbor
- II. Pollock seed stripping operations (both Korean & Japanese)
- III. Reopening the Gulf of Alaska to J/V's
- IV. Reflagging of foreign processors (without the TENYO MARU, where are we? Do we care what flag flies over the stern? or who owns her?)
- V. The possible increase of Bering Sea/Aleutians total allowable harvest (all species) from 2.0 million tons to 2.4 million tons . . . and with that, increase of Pollock tonnage available for J/V operations.

Again, we see the Association as an unfortunate necessity, one that will require considerable commitment of our monies, our time, and our influence. We encourage all of you to give membership in the Association the most serious consideration.

Representatives from each of the Westward catcher-boats should be coming home the end of the month and should be prepared to deal with this Association matter in behalf of everyone involved with each vessel.

We hope that everyone will be supporting the Association and will be represented at the organizational meeting on March 9th in Seattle. See the first four pages of the enclosed—which need to be filled out for membership.

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100-Mile Limited Access Proposed for Dutch Harbor

by John van Amerongen

Paul Fuhs, mayor of Unalaska, visited Seattle in mid-January, stumping for a proposal that would establish a 100-mile DAP priority access zone around Dutch Harbor. If passed by the Council in May and approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the plan would eliminate all joint-venture fishing for cod and pollock within the area, which includes the popular J-V full fishing grounds north of Unimak Pass.

To Fuhs, who also presides over the Southwest Municipal Conference, it's a down-home Alaskan issue.

"Ten years ago," Fuhs wrote in the proposal's introduction, "the 200-mile limit was signed by President Ford. Many people in Alaska eagerly anticipated the new groundfish prosperity that we all thought was just around the corner.

"None of us would have believed back then that we'd still be

waiting ten years later for the fish to come ashore. But we are still waiting, impatiently.

"After all, Dutch Harbor and Akutan are the major fish processing towns on the Bering Sea coast. There should be many thousands of tons of pollock processed ashore by now. But there aren't.

"We already have two large plants converted for pollock processing in Unalaska-Dutch Harbor. But they can't buy enough pollock to operate steadily. American trawlers prefer delivering to joint-venture mother-ships, instead.

"That," wrote Fuhs, "doesn't do our town any good."

"Our objective is to encourage American druggers to deliver to domestic processors in Unalaska and Akutan or to process their catches at sea aboard vessels of the United States." Winning priority access for domestic processors would accomplish this, Fuhs argued. "Their advantage will be Unalaska's advantage," he

wrote. "Their prosperity will be Unalaska's, too."

The proposal will face its first test when the North Pacific Council conducts a screening of proposed groundfish plan amendments January 21 in Anchorage. Prior to that meeting, however, the Council held a DAP workgroup session in Seattle to discuss the priority access idea and any others that might speed the "domestication" of the groundfish resource.

Workgroup member Bart Eaton was ready to extend the prosperity to the Trident plant and the community in Akutan, as well. Selling pollock to foreign processors for 6 cents a pound was wasting too much of the product's potential value, Eaton said.

A problem exists, he argued, having "two systems [domestic and foreign] trying to develop on a finite resource."

Not only could the continued competition create "a lot of catching capacity that's not going to

have a market," Eaton said, but joint-venture activity would also affect the catch-per-unit effort of DAP operations.

"If joint ventures are discriminated against [by the 100-mile zone], so be it," said Eaton. "It's a free choice. It's time to close that system."

But while the proposal may be getting a lot of support from processors and residents of Akutan and Unalaska, it didn't sit so well with the other fishermen and joint-venture operators who attended a workgroup meeting at the Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center January 13.

The closest thing to support came from Ted Evans, executive director of the Alaska Factory Trawlers Association. Evans said the spirit of the Dutch Harbor proposal was "dear to our hearts." Noting the "substantial strides" taken by the factory trawler industry in the last two years, Evans nevertheless registered disappointment that Amer-

continued on page 11

PRIORITY ACCESS

continued from front cover

canization has lagged on the processing side.

"We seem to be treating foreign processors on par with domestics," Evans said.

Speaking for the U.S.-owned floating processors, Evans said, "We too have had difficulty getting J-Vs to deliver to those vessels. One company went out and built its own (catcher) vessels."

Building one's own catcher fleet is "one very obvious option," as Evans put it, not only for operators of floating processors, but for shore plants as well. And while joint venture fishermen may now agree that processors should get into the fishing business, Evans, like Eaton, warned that a shakeout could leave some J-V fishermen without markets as their season be-

comes inevitably shorter and shorter.

Forcing processors to build catcher vessels, Evans said, "may lead to substantial overcapitalization — the short-term solution may create a longterm problem."

Despite his sympathy for the current problems in Dutch Harbor and Akutan, though, Evans wasn't ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with Fuhs and Eaton on the 100-mile boundary.

"I'm not sure we can favor this as a specific remedy," said Evans. "We would like to explore a full range of proposals that could benefit the domestic industry."

While the Fuhs plan may have been dear to the hearts of the factory-trawlers, it was far from the minds of joint-venture representatives attending the January

meeting.

"Pure economics" is how Alaska Joint Venture Fisheries spokesman Annie Burnham described the realities of Dutch Harbor's delivery problems. Noting that the Great Land plant "surely paid more" for pollock deliveries than joint-venture processors last year, Burnham said it was "not nearly enough to provide incentives" to run to town.

"Joint ventures," she said, "are a much better market for fishermen with substantial investments in their vessels."

A 100-mile zone, said Burnham, won't solve the problem, and she feared such a zone would establish "a dangerous precedent when full [domestic] utilization is accomplished." Said Burnham, "It puts one U.S. fisherman over another."

Wally Pereyra echoed Burnham's sentiments, claiming the shoreside contracts "are not

economically acceptable, for whatever reason." Acceptability, he said, was a function not only of price, but the distance fishermen had to travel and the stability of the market, as well. Speaking not only as a ProFish International joint-venture manager, but as a partner in a \$25-million domestic surimi catcher-processor now under construction, Pereyra noted that a 100-mile J-V exclusion "may force an American fishermen to get into a contract he wouldn't otherwise get into. I have some problems with that concept."

Pereyra also saw problems with the lack of available processing capacity in Dutch Harbor. "Who's going to take the fish?" asked Pereyra, assuming many of the J-V catchers were forced to deliver in town.

"These guys are left to the wolves," he said, adding in his imitation of a plugged processor,

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Hugh Reilly, manager of Westward Trawlers, a firm handling joint-ventures between U.S. druggers and Taiyo Fisheries, admitted the Fuhs proposal had "instinctive appeal," but said it had "no correlation to the problems of shore plants."

Reilly said there was "a lot of grief in everybody's heart at the failure of the Great Land plant," but there was no reason "to lay it at the feet of joint-venture boats."

"U.S. fishermen have no such obligation..." Reilly said; "they did not build that plant."

Shore-based deliveries of pollock brought \$.14 a pound in Hokkaido last year, Reilly noted. The fish now being delivered to Dutch Harbor are bringing \$.08 a pound. "That's an economic problem," he said.

"The price is up, as it should be," he continued, "but it's a question of freight." Transporting fish to Dutch Harbor, he said, "is a very expensive proposition for a \$3-4-million trawler with...winches...bells and whistles. It would be much cheaper on a \$700,000 salmon tender."

Another point to consider, Reilly said, was that only 10 to 25 percent of the joint-venture fleet could safely deliver fish to shore, given the stability requirements for bringing fish aboard versus passing cod ends.

Getting back to the idea of tenders, Reilly noted that Alyeska Seafoods intends to use large refrigerated tenders to haul pol-



lock from Westward Trawlers' joint ventures back to their new surimi plant in Unalaska. The Taiyo Fishery Company of Japan is not only a joint-venture partner of Westward Trawlers, but partners with Wards Cove in the Alyeska plant.

The subject of tenders came up once again when Pereyra and other joint-venture operators offered processors a counter-proposal to the 100-mile zone.

Pereyra suggested that ProFish

might "voluntarily agree to deliver fish to any [domestic] processor that wants to put a carrier where we are operating...a priority delivery...before delivery to J-V processors."

"We have the capacity to do that," Pereyra said, "It would augment our operations and we would welcome that."

Other J-V reps were quick to seize the idea.

"We are going to do that...with the Alyeska plant," said West-

ward's Hugh Reilly.

"We could subscribe to something like this," said Bert Larkins, general manager of Marine Resources. "With lead time we could overcontract, if there was a 500- to 1,000-ton market."

"It enhances a J-V operation," said Alaska Joint Ventures' Annie Burnham. "After roe season...it would enable us to keep catchers contracted...very viable...it could be worked out."

The counter-proposal gathered

momentum so quickly, it looked as though it might steamroll right over Fuhs and Eaton before Councilman John Peterson could throw a wedge under it.


"You're talking about an agreement between processors and fishermen," said Peterson. "We're only hearing one side at this point."

"The thing is," he continued, "that it involves substantial capital investment for a processor to build tenders, and adds on a layer of costs."

"I don't know if they could continue to operate," he said. "Maybe that's the purpose of this."

Al Burch, president of Alaska Dragger's Association, pointed out that "all transition is expensive," noting that the cost of converting his two vessels, the *Dawn* and *Dusk*, was several times the initial investment. He suggested that processors could convert mud boats to tenders a lot easier than they could convert them to trawlers.

The workgroup concluded with two proposals on the table, one of them Fuhs' 100-mile zone, the other, an offer by joint ventures operators to sell fish to domestic tenders. It didn't take a ouija board to figure out who supported what. Joint venture operators didn't want their operations pushed out of Unimak Pass, and domestic processors didn't think the option to buy fish at sea was such a new and wonderful con-



cept.

Going into it, Fuhs knew the going would be tough. But he really didn't want to come down to a battle between domestic processors and U.S. fishermen.

"There's plenty of this for all of us, and we need to work together," he said. "Division plays right into the hands of the people who are taking home almost all the marbles."

"Alaskans are stuck with the

crumbs," Fuhs said. "The people who already have a lot of money have a lot of money to fight it."

"Still," he said, "there's something about communities and towns. It's hard for people to take a shot at us. We want everybody to do well, including the fishermen."

The down-home pitch may have bombed with joint-venture interests in Seattle, but it has already won Fuhs and domestic processors an

influential friend from South Carolina. On December 6, Ernest Hollings, ranking Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, addressed a letter to the North Pacific Council.

"I understand," Hollings wrote, "that a serious situation exists for American shore-based cod and pollock processors in Alaska, especially in Dutch Harbor, due to the unavailability of harvesting capacity. Plant capacity has been idled because United States processors are unable to contract with harvesting vessels."

"...I would hope there is a way to enable these shore-based processors to continue the development of the domestic United States fishing industry," Hollings concluded, "and would appreciate hearing the Council's views on means to aid them in this important endeavor."

Whether the Council can act to solve the domestic delivery problem before it takes care of itself is a key question. Given the frantic level of conversion and even new-construction activity on the J-V side, the length of the J-V season is bound to compress. When that happens, those that can will have to deliver to domestic processors, and every delivery will shorten the life of joint ventures that much more. Whether that can happen fast enough to bail out shore-based processors and communities hungry for product remains to be seen. □

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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT/REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW/
INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
OF AMENDMENT 11 TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
GROUNDFISH OF THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS

PREPARED BY THE PLAN TEAM FOR THE
GROUNDFISH FISHERY OF THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
AND THE STAFF OF THE
NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

~~MARCO~~

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3.0 ~~ESTABLISH A 100 MILE ZONE AROUND UNALASKA ISLAND~~

3.1 Description of and need for the action

The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) outlines a priority to be used in determining fishery allocations. Domestic vessels who deliver to domestic processors (DAP) are afforded the highest priority. Domestic vessels that deliver to foreign processors (JVP) are considered next. Any amount surplus to these needs may then be allocated to foreign fishing vessels (TALFF). It has been policy to interpret this priority access or processor preference as relevant to the preseason allocation of TAC. Another interpretation of priority access is that the preference should extend to space and time, that is, that DAP should be given priority on the grounds through area closures to JVP and TALFF, or that DAP should be given priority in time through seasonal closures to JVP and TALFF.

It is in the spirit of the second interpretation of processor preference that the mayors of Unalaska and Akutan propose a regulatory change to allow only DAP fishing to occur in an area within 100 miles of Unalaska. The proposal is to correct an access problem whereby local shoreside processing facilities in the communities of Unalaska/Dutch Harbor and Akutan have had difficulties securing a steady supply of groundfish. It is the presumption, therefore, that such priority access would help to correct their supply problem.

The zone is a circle, with a radius of 100 miles centered upon Unalaska (Figures 3.1, 3.2). There would be no foreign or joint venture fishing allowed in the zone; fishing access would be restricted to domestic vessels delivering either to shore-based plants or to domestic at-sea processors. Domestic vessels which both catch and process groundfish would also be allowed to fish in the zone.

There are currently approximately 130 U.S. trawlers operating in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands management area (Table 1.1). Of these, a substantial number (= 120) deliver the catch to foreign processing vessels (joint venture). For the most part, these vessels are not able to easily and safely deliver fish shoreside. First, a substantial proportion are not able to hold fish onboard. Rather, these vessels deliver fish to at-sea processors through transfer of the cod end of the trawl. Second, even for those few vessels that have sufficient hold capacity to match their considerable harvesting capacity it is difficult to ensure shoreside delivery of product because the vessel may not have sufficient stability to carry fish any great distance, particularly in poor weather.

There is also the question of reduced product quality during the time it takes to deliver fish shoreside. Again, many of the trawlers have no refrigeration onboard, and, on average, face a running time of 10 hours to Dutch Harbor. Thus, there is some product deterioration during the period. More important than travel time to the decline in product quality, according to some joint venture operations (Annie Burnham, pers. comm.), is that delivery to shoreside would necessitate one or more pumping operations to transfer the fish, and it is the suctioning of fish that is most detrimental to quality.




Figure 3.2. Alaska Peninsula/Aleutian Islands: Foreign closures currently in effect (Bristol Bay Pot Sanctuary, Winter Halibut Savings Area, and Davidson Bank) and proposed closed zone.




Figure 3.3. Areas (Zones) closed to fishing and DAH flatfish fishing under Amendment 10.




Figure 3.4. 100-mile zone proposed for closure to foreign and joint venture fishing. Circle is originally proposed area. Outer square (entire figure) is Zone 2. Inner square (—•—) is Zone 1.

vessel operational costs and processing costs for domestic and foreign processors (Lynca, 1981; NRC, 1981).

3.3 Biological and Physical Impacts

The likely impacts of adoption of each of the three alternatives to the status quo are examined in this section. Impacts are examined from, first, an environmental perspective, that is, how the measure might affect the non-human and human part of the ecosystem. Impacts are then examined from an economic perspective, viz., how the proposed change would affect the economics of fishing, and of processing; how the quantity and price to the consumer might be changed; and how management, information and enforcement costs might change. The approach taken is one of relative analysis, that is, the effect of each alternative is examined relative to the status quo.

The environmental impacts of each of the identified alternatives and sub-alternatives will therefore be presented in sequence with the economic impacts of each presented in a subsequent section. The concluding section, "cost-benefit" conclusion, will attempt to summarize the analysis.

3.3.1 Description and estimate of the number of small entities affected

The numbers of harvesting vessels operating in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands management area and in the Gulf of Alaska for DAP, JVP, and TALFF are discussed in Section 1.3. All alternatives could restrict JVP, and TALFF fishing operations and could enhance DAP fishing operations. Since the focus of this proposal is on domestic processors the regional distribution of shore-based processing plants, capacity, employment, investment, (Table 3.1) and the current capability of domestic at-sea processing vessels (Table 3.2) is also presented.

harvest than under the status quo. For the purposes of this analysis significant means a change in biomass which is: 1) measurable within the noise of the survey data and the precision of the population estimation procedure; and 2) of a long-term rather than transient nature.

To analyze the potential biological and socioeconomic impacts of closure of the 100 mile zone to joint venture and foreign fishing recent fishery performance data were examined. The data used were catches, by species, by month, by $1/2^\circ$ by 1° square, for the years 1984 and 1985. These are the most recent available data, since detailed 1986 catch data will not be available until later this year. The data are the best available, but it is important to point out two limitations of the current analysis.

First, as is evident from the 1984 to 1985 trend, from overall 1986 fishing performance, and from what is being reported concerning the 1987 fishery, very rapid changes in the structure of the fishery are taking place. The most obvious trends are a rapid decline in the amount of directed foreign harvest and the concomitant increase in joint venture harvest. Also notable is a rapid increase in the amount of allocations to DAP. It follows, therefore, that trends shown in the 1984 and 1985 data have continued, or even accelerated, in 1986 and 1987. This means that the impacts considered using data from 1984 and 1985 may misrepresent the present fishery to a greater or lesser extent depending on the rate of change.

Second, the $1/2^\circ$ by 1° square catch data are based on raw observer data. Since the observer coverage on fishing vessels is not 100% it is necessary to expand the raw catch data to predict actual total catch in a square. Data which would allow expansion on a square by square basis are not available, therefore, it is necessary to expand all squares by the uniform factor used to produce the "best blend" estimates. These estimates are made at the INPFC area level (Bering Sea I, Bering Sea II, etc.) hence the expanded square estimates assume a constant level of coverage across the INPFC area. To the extent that this assumption is invalid and to the extent that catches differ in composition from square to square the estimates presented herein will be in error.

Keeping these caveats in mind, the 1984 and 1985 joint venture and foreign fishery performance data are presented in Table 3.3. The Shumagin INPFC area, which is the same as the western Gulf sub-area in the Gulf of Alaska, is also included, as the 100 mile zone would extend southward of Unimak Pass. Aggregating the catches by $1/2^\circ$ by 1° square for 1984 and 1985 for Block 1 (small closure), Block 2 (larger closure), and for the remainder of the Bering Sea and Shumagin areas allows comparison of the relative contribution of each area to total catch in the two years (Table 3.4).

To facilitate that comparison the relative proportion of catch in each zone versus the total catch in the relevant management area (BSAI - all areas; GOA - Shumagin area) is shown in Table 3.5. Some general conclusions can be drawn from examination of these data.

First, the Gulf of Alaska portion of the closed zones was of great significance to joint ventures operating in the Shumagin district in 1984 and 1985. Catches of all groundfish combined in the proposed closed areas

BSAI/GOA Amendment 11/17. Table 3.4

Table 3.4. 1984 - 1985 Joint Venture and Foreign Catches in the BSAI Management Area and Shumagin Sub-management Area in mt. (1,2)

Block/Area (Joint Ventures)	Pollock	P. Cod	A. Mackerel	Flatfish	Rockfish	All Groundfish
<i>1984</i>						
Block 1 - BSAI	44,035	11,192	10	1,458	131	57,925
1 - GOA	7,636	198	227	510	359	9,467
Subtotal	51,671	11,390	237	1,968	740	67,392
Block 2 - BSAI	124,412	13,699	51	1,751	136	141,294
2 - GOA	7,647	205	249	512	658	9,611
Subtotal	132,059	13,904	300	2,263	844	150,905
Outside - BSAI	11,424	17,451	35,164	48,615	399	224,476
- GOA	34	15	5	9	63	147
Subtotal	11,478	17,466	35,169	48,624	462	224,623
<i>1985</i>						
Block 1 - BSAI	57,405	12,065	1	1,614	174	72,389
1 - GOA	1,369	313	1,997	333	369	14,042
Subtotal	59,274	12,378	1,998	1,947	543	86,431
Block 2 - BSAI	155,635	13,576	1	2,196	176	173,020
2 - GOA	2,626	328	1,997	340	369	14,323
Subtotal	158,261	14,004	1,998	2,536	545	187,843
Outside - BSAI	214,176	29,259	37,660	175,956	393	484,786
- GOA	14	3	3	3	1	25
Subtotal	214,190	29,262	37,663	175,959	394	484,811
<i>(Foreign)</i>						
<i>1984</i>						
Block 1 - BSAI	102,031	2,130	219	1,676	46	106,272
1 - GOA	23,506	818	6	193	124	24,766
Subtotal	125,537	2,948	225	1,869	170	131,038
Block 2 - BSAI	119,265	2,556	299	1,973	60	124,353
2 - GOA	24,124	1,506	7	199	140	26,164
Subtotal	143,389	4,061	306	2,172	200	150,517
Outside - BSAI	818,630	54,612	165	159,588	2,158	1,036,473
- GOA	51,821	12,156	595	915	2,695	68,902
Subtotal	870,451	66,768	761	160,503	4,853	1,105,375
<i>1985</i>						
Block 1 - BSAI	109,919	397	0	1,463	11	112,307
1 - GOA	8,236	90	2	26	0	3,353
Subtotal	118,154	986	2	1,489	11	120,660
Block 2 - BSAI	114,174	1,291	0	1,632	15	117,133
2 - GOA	8,240	237	2	29	0	3,559
Subtotal	122,414	1,577	2	1,661	15	125,692
Outside - BSAI	726,684	55,975	2	131,417	293	914,516
- GOA	17,718	6,338	7	438	270	24,788
Subtotal	744,402	62,314	9	131,855	563	939,304

1/1. Blocks are as shown in Figure 3.3. Block 1 is the "small" 100 mile closure--the area between 164° W and 169° W; 55° 00' N and 52° 30' N. Block 2 is the "large" 100 mile closure--the area between 163° W and 170° W; 55° 30' N and 52° 00' N. "Outside" is the area not included in Block 2.
 1/2. Source: Foreign observer database, NWAIFC. Data used are catches by 1/2° x 1° square expanded to account for 5% observer coverage and aggregated over the relevant area; therefore, the sum of these catches may not exactly match those catches reported in Table 3.3.

range from 95% to 100% of the total Shumagin catch and, in 1985, the catch in the larger block was essentially the same as total joint venture catch in the sub-area. Second, the contribution of the GOA portion of the zones to total foreign catch in the Shumagin district is much less than that seen with the joint venture fleet with catches in Block 1 and 2 of all species combined in the range of 26-27% of the Shumagin total harvest. Third, the Gulf part of the closed areas is much less significant in terms of contribution to total Alaskan catch than the Bering Sea portion of the zones. Fourth, for the BSAI management area, the proposed closed areas are relatively more important to the joint venture fleet than the foreign fleet.

Lastly, and, perhaps most significantly, for the BSAI management area, the portion of each species catch in the proposed zone ranges from nearly 0 for Atka mackerel (joint ventures - 1984 and 1985; foreign - 1985) to in excess of 90% for pollock (joint venture - Block 2 - 1984). Overall, the catch that occurred in the smaller zone is in the order of 2-3% for the foreign fleet and 60% for the joint venture fleet. For the larger proposed closure, the appropriate proportions are 3-4% and 60-65%, respectively.

What is important for this analysis, however, is not what the catch was in 1984 or 1985 but what the distribution and total amount of harvest would be if the proposed blocks were in fact closed to joint venture and/or foreign fishing. This is difficult to assess since, as mentioned above, the current and, presumably, the future fisheries will be much different than what occurred two or three years ago. Second, assuming that all catch occurring in the zones would be unavailable to harvesters upon closure is a "worst case" scenario in which the catch foregone would not be made up by fishing in the remaining open area. The opposite "best case" scenario would be to assume that all catch foregone could be harvested elsewhere in the remaining open areas. Under this latter assumption there is no biological impact resulting from the closure of the zone to joint venture and foreign fishing.

Obviously, reality lies between these two extremes and, hence, the impact lies between nil and that implied by the numbers in Table 3.5. Note that even under the assumption that total catch is unaffected by closing the 100 mile zones, because of the fleet's potential to make up the lost catch, there would be a potential biological impact since the spatial distribution of the harvest will change. This is not deemed biologically significant under the definition given above.

The question of biological impact hinges, then, on the amount of catch that can be made up if either of the proposed closures are enacted. The answer depends on the distribution of the biomass of the various species both in space and time. Foreign catch data for pollock and cod in 1984 (Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6) indicate that there are fish of these species caught outside the closed areas (see also Table 3.3), although there is some indication that the proposed closures represent the most productive grounds for these species. The seasonality of the data is hidden by these annual totals, however. Also, fishery performance does not necessarily reflect biomass distributions.

Table 3.6. 1984 joint venture and foreign catches in the BSAI Management Area and Shumagin Sub-management Area, by month, in metric tons.

Month	<u>Joint Venture</u>					All Groundfish
	Pollock	P. Cod	A. Mackerel	Flatfish	Rockfish	
Jan	38	212	0	25	0	280
Feb	607	3,739	0	411	0	5,068
Mar	28,757	6,937	0	809	0	37,196
Apr	43,111	3,679	1,842	4,653	108	55,059
May	1,974	2,688	7,656	7,574	281	21,044
Jun	31,340	3,971	10,018	11,300	115	58,051
Jul	68,855	3,963	9,655	5,797	407	89,922
Aug	50,553	2,550	6,159	9,938	157	73,667
Sep	11,196	2,417	0	9,636	65	26,550
Oct	6,937	216	140	750	172	8,559
Nov	131	0	0	1	1	133
TOTAL	243,499	31,372	35,470	50,894	1,306	375,579

Table 3.7. 1985 joint venture and foreign catches in the BSAI Management Area and Shumagin Sub-management Area, by month, in metric tons.

Month	<u>Joint Venture</u>					All Groundfish
	Pollock	P. Cod	A. Mackerel	Flatfish	Rockfish	
Jan	110	140	0	15	0	267
Feb	1,743	4,297	0	527	0	6,979
Mar	45,197	6,864	8	1,067	3	53,822
Apr	61,474	3,327	4,031	11,102	32	84,842
May	7,214	3,069	17,518	36,463	232	67,872
Jun	20,530	5,898	8,614	30,486	218	71,307
Jul	126,349	8,029	7,563	36,318	30	185,415
Aug	59,591	5,318	0	31,798	145	101,572
Sep	41,027	4,345	1,099	20,006	108	67,852
Oct	15,286	1,846	822	10,669	166	29,584
Nov	2,929	126	9	61	7	3,145
TOTAL	381,450	43,269	39,655	178,502	941	672,387

Table 3.8. Percentage of 1984 and 1985 Joint Venture and Foreign Catches in the BSAI Management Area, January - June, by block

Block/Area	Pollock		P. Cod		A. Mackerel		Flatfish		Rockfish		All Groundfish	
	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985
(Joint Ventures)												
Block 1	17.3%	3.0%	34.8%	27.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.8%	9.9%	0.4%	10.0%	3.8%
Block 2	59.1%	12.5%	42.2%	30.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	1.0%	9.9%	0.4%	26.3%	9.5%
All of BSAI	77.9%	36.6%	68.0%	54.9%	55.1%	79.9%	49.0%	44.7%	22.4%	64.1%	48.1%	43.2%
(Foreign)												
Block 1	0.1%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%	1.6%	0.1%	0.0%
Block 2	0.2%	0.0%	0.4%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.8%	0.3%	1.6%	0.2%	0.0%
All of BSAI	21.9%	12.3%	25.1%	31.5%	2.8%	0.0%	17.9%	29.0%	43.3%	5.2%	21.5%	15.5%

The environmental impacts of potential reductions in catch were discussed in Section 3.3.2. Obviously, harvest reductions also have economic impacts. The most obvious perspective for examination of these impacts is one of reduced ex-vessel gross receipts in response to the reduction in harvest. Potential revenue losses arising from the proposed block closures are examined in Tables 3.9 and Table 3.10, which present total ex-vessel revenue in a zone, and percentage of total revenue in a zone, respectively. These are "worst case" scenarios of the likely revenue impact on the harvesting sector for the reasons argued above. The opposite "best case" scenario would assume no catch is foregone and that, therefore, ex-vessel receipts would not decline.

In contradistinction to the environmental analysis, however, the possibility of no reduction in receipts does not mean there is no economic impact on the fleet. This is because the displacement of the fleet from normally productive grounds to areas which may be less productive and involve greater running time from port will necessarily increase operational costs. This is not only due to increases in fuel costs because of increased running time, but also a consequence of increased "searching costs"--money and time spent locating productive grounds. Also, the distance to the new grounds or the timing of the new season may be such that some vessels will be unable to participate at all.

Representative costs for three sizes of joint venture trawlers are shown in Table 3.11. Costs per metric ton of groundfish range from \$88 to \$95 depending on vessel size. Fuel costs constitute between 12% and 18% of total operating costs, thus, if trip length were to double because of increased running time, fuel costs would be expected to double, everything else remaining equal. This means that fuel costs may increase by as much as \$15.45 per mt of groundfish harvested, increasing total operational costs by approximately 17%.

One important question to be answered, however, is does everything else remain equal? In particular, will CPUE change to the extent that there is a change in gross revenue, an increase or decrease in operating costs, or both, should vessels relocate to less productive grounds? This is a relevant question if vessels which would have fished in areas of high CPUE were forced to fish elsewhere. This would certainly be the case in the closure of the two proposed zones in Unimak Pass because the total requirements of the shoreside plants, = 825 mt/day (Table 3.1), are much less than the total catching capacity of the joint venture fleet, 400-600 mt/day per vessel (Alaska Dragger's Association, pers. comm.), which in terms of a fleet of 120 vessels, is about 60,000 mt/day. Thus, the daily catches of two or three vessels could satisfy the requirements of the shore based plants.

If there is a "CPUE effect" which increases cost to vessels fishing for joint ventures when they are forced to move to inferior grounds, there is a corresponding opposite positive effect to those vessels that remain in the area. This benefit would accrue primarily to domestic at-sea

7. This may be a high estimate. Reports from the joint venture roe pollock fishery indicate current maximum fishing rates are about 10,000 mt/day.

Table 3.9.2. 1984 and 1985 Ex-vessel Revenue for Joint Venture and Foreign Fisheries in the BSAI Management Area, January - June, by block (\$1,000s)

Block/Area	Pollock		P. Cod		A. Mackerel		Flatfish		Rockfish		All Groundfish	
	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985	1984	1985
(Joint Ventures)												
Block 1	\$2,463	\$1,150	\$2,371	\$2,568	\$0	\$0	\$173	\$198	\$15	\$1	\$4,316	\$7,359
Block 2	\$8,430	\$4,873	\$2,875	\$2,822	\$0	\$0	\$208	\$243	\$15	\$1	\$11,343	\$7,359
All of BSAI	\$11,108	\$14,224	\$4,610	\$5,165	\$2,929	\$4,545	\$3,309	\$10,671	\$35	\$97	\$20,771	\$33,519
(Foreign)												
Block 1	\$117	\$8	\$46	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$12	\$2	\$2	\$1	\$175	\$12
Block 2	\$173	\$8	\$49	\$18	\$0	\$0	\$263	\$142	\$2	\$1	\$247	\$23
All of BSAI	\$21,535	\$10,875	\$3,145	\$3,918	\$2	\$0	\$3,882	\$5,170	\$254	\$1	\$3,496	\$18,905

Table 3.11. Cost Structure of Joint Venture Trawlers

	85 ft.		108-115 ft.		120 ft.	
	\$/lb.	%	\$/lb.	%	\$/lb.	%
Variable Costs						
Labor	\$0.015	37.5%	\$0.014	33.3%	\$0.013	30.2%
Fuel	0.007	17.5	0.005	11.9	0.005	11.6
Total Variable Costs	0.022	55.0	0.019	45.2	0.018	41.8
Fixed Costs						
Interest	0.002	5.0	0.003	7.1	0.004	9.3
ROI @ 30%	0.003	7.5	0.004	9.5	0.005	11.6
Insurance	0.004	10.0	0.004	9.5	0.004	9.3
Maintenance	0.006	15.0	0.007	16.7	0.007	16.3
Depreciation	0.003	7.5	0.005	11.9	0.005	11.6
Total Fixed Costs	0.018	45.0	0.023	54.7	0.025	58.1
TOTAL COSTS \$/lb.	0.040	100.0	0.042	99.9	0.043	99.9
TOTAL COSTS \$/mt	\$88.20		\$92.61		\$94.80	

Other Information:

Crew size	4.02	5.02	4.95
Catch/Man/Day (lbs)	30,000	35,000	40,000
Catch/Day	121,000	176,000	198,000
Days/Fishing Year	150	190	200
Total Catch/year (lbs)	18,150,000	33,440,000	39,600,000
Total Catch/year (mt)	8,231	15,147	17,959

Source: NRC, "A Strategy for the Americanization of the Groundfish Fisheries of the Northeast Pacific," V.2, p. 128 (1985).

CPUE of approximately 98%. If effort were instead reduced by 25% then CPUE would increase approximately 33%.

The profitability of this increase in CPUE can be examined by assuming that inputs (labor, time, etc.) are fixed. Then, an increase in CPUE would lead to an increase in catch (output) at the original level of inputs. From this perspective gross revenue has increased in the same proportion that CPUE has increased. If the returns to the vessel owner are 50% of net revenue (after the payment of all costs including crew shares) then the increase in profitability would be one half of increase in net revenue.

For example, calculations using the data of Table 3.11 for a fishing vessel of 108-115 ft., indicate that total costs per day are about \$93/mt and total annual catch is 15,000 mt. If daily catch had been 100 mt and CPUE increases such that catch is increased to 150 mt/day then gross revenue would increase by 50% and net revenue would increase from \$700 per day to \$2,850 per day.⁹ If this gain were experienced by 30 vessels, the total increase in profitability would be \$64,500.

The increase in profitability could therefore be substantial for those vessels able to fish in the DAP only zone, given the potential displacement of effort as indicated in Table 3.4. As mentioned above those benefits would accrue to the remaining vessels; perhaps 3 to 6 fishing vessels who had been operating as joint venture catcher vessels and up to 25 domestic catcher/processors or mothership/processors (Table 3.1, 3.2).

At the same time the opposite phenomenon would occur for the displaced vessels. CPUE could be expected to decrease for two reasons. The first is a consequence of the assumption that the closed areas represent the most productive fishing grounds. This is certainly true as far as past fishery performance is concerned although the survey data presented in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 indicate that there may be potentially productive grounds for pollock in other areas of the Bering Sea. If these concentrations are available to the fishery it remains true that the increased running time and search time will increase costs. It is also possible that the spawning aggregations of pollock which are so attractive to roe and surimi processors do not occur in areas further north and west of the Unimak Pass area.

The second reason for an expected decline in CPUE is a consequence of the model presented above. A relation such as (1) or (2) would predict that as new effort is put into an area CPUE will decline, all else equal. The decline in CPUE experienced by the displaced joint venture vessels may be much less in percentage terms than that predicted as an increase for vessels allowed to fish in the zone since the percentage changes in effort are less. The actual decline will depend on the concentrations of target species on the new grounds and the percentage increase in total effort in the area. If both of these factors are modest the decline in CPUE will also be modest. However, the numbers of vessels involved (= 120) imply that the total loss in profits could be significant.

9. Assuming an ex-vessel price of \$100/mt.

in the environmental impact section, a seasonal closure of either of the suggested zones would be intermediate in impact between the no action alternative and the year round closure alternative (Alternative 2). Thus, the preceding discussion on costs and benefits to the fishing fleet overstates the impact of a six month closure of the Unimak Pass fishing grounds to joint venture and foreign fishing.

Likewise, Alternative 3b, which would impose a January 1 to June 30 closure on joint venture fishing Bering Sea wide, is predicted to have potentially a greater impact on the fishing vessels operating in the Bering Sea because of the large amount of catch likely to be foregone.

In sum, the economic impact of Alternative 2, Alternative 3a, and Alternative 3b are qualitatively the same. The magnitude of the impacts will stand in direct proportion to the amount the harvest is reduced in the closed zones, or in the entire Bering Sea. Short term benefits will accrue to those vessels delivering shoreside (to the extent that shoreside capacity exists to process fish) and to domestic vessels processing at-sea. Costs will be borne by the owners and crews of joint venture vessels who are not able to deliver shoreside, or who experience increases in costs, decreases in revenue, or both, and by joint venture service companies.

In the longer term, all the Alaskan harvest will be processed domestically, with or without establishing a zone for priority access, or a seasonal closure of all or a portion of the Bering Sea management area. The question to be answered is what is the best course for this Americanization--where best is taken to mean that course of action which results in the greatest stream of benefits to the U.S. economy. The answer depends on the investment climate, and the relative costs of various types of operation. This last issue--relative costs--is the topic of the following discussion concerning the imposition of fees or assessments on foreign processors receiving product from domestic catcher vessels.

Alternative 4: fees on foreign processors in the joint venture fishery

Much of the analysis of the preceding alternatives has been concerned with the changes in expected harvest, either in the physical sense for the environmental analysis, or in terms of ex-vessel revenue for the economic analysis. It is clear, however, from the debate surrounding this controversial issue and from the discussion above that one key factor is the relative cost advantage of foreign at-sea processing, versus domestic at-sea processing versus domestic shoreside processing.

Comparative cost information is limited but a recent study by Natural Resource Consultants (NRC, 1986) indicates that, for a pollock filleting operation, total processing costs shoreside and at-sea are roughly equivalent (Table 3.12). The cost comparison does not, however, include shoreside delivery cost.

A similar comparison of processing costs for surimi operations reveal a rough parity between domestic shorebased and at sea processors, with an estimated cost differential of between 4 and 11 cents per pound (Table 3.13). The Japanese catcher/processor of surimi faces costs similar to

Table 3.13. Surimi Processing, Shore Based v. Sea Based
(cents/lb.)

<u>Cost Element</u>	<u>Alaska^{1/} Shoreside Plant</u>	<u>American^{1/} Operated Mothership</u>	<u>American^{1/} Catcher/ Processor</u>	<u>Korean Mothership</u>	<u>Japanese Catcher/ Processor</u>
Fish	30-35	23-25	-	23-25	-
Other Materials					
Packaging	3	3	3	3	3
Labor	17	23	27	6	34
Fuel/Energy	1	1	4	1	4
Freight	10	10	10	10	10
Insurance	.5	.5	1.5	.5	1
Depreciation	3	2	6	2	7
Maintenance	.5	1.5	3	.5	2
Other	2	2	2	2	2
Return on Capital (16%)	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>18</u>
Total	77-82	71-73	73	53	81

Assumptions:^{1/}

Annual Production Volume (millions of pounds)	23	63	24
Initial Capital cost (millions of dollars)	\$13	\$18	\$22

Source: Natural Resources Consultants, Fletcher & Co. Analysis (Summer 1986 estimates).

If, however, the rationale for imposition of the fee is to counteract the advantage accorded to foreign processors via the combination of national subsidies and the non-imposition of costs related to U.S. legal system (landings taxes, MFCMA assessments, OSHA requirements, etc.) it is more appropriate to consider only the relevant proportion of differential costs. A full analysis of the relative advantage of subsidies and the relative disadvantage of mandated costs is beyond the scope of this analysis, however, a rough approximation using information in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 is that U.S. processors are at least disadvantaged 2-3% due to the landings taxes. This translates to a differential of 6 to 9 cents per lb (for surimi processing, Table 3.13) which is equivalent to a per mt assessment of \$130-200. If one wished to factor in transportation costs of fish shoreside (estimated earlier at 6-11 cents/lb) to level the playing field for Alaskan shorebased plants a total assessment of 12-20 cents/lb (\$265-440/mt) would be appropriate.

Operationally, the assessment estimation, and collection procedures could be handled in the same way that the current fees on directed foreign fishing operations are administered. Note that the MFCMA permits the collection of fees

at least in an amount sufficient to return to the United States an amount which bears to the total cost of carrying out the provisions of the [Magnuson] Act during ... fiscal year 1986 the same ratio as the aggregate quantity of fish harvested by foreign fishing vessels within the fishery conservation zone during 1985 bears to the aggregate quantity of fish harvested by both foreign and domestic fishing vessels within such zone and the territorial waters of the United States during [1985].¹³

This alternative does have price implications, however. That is, the new cost structure may affect the basic market pricing mechanisms, potentially raising prices at the secondary processing, wholesale and retail levels. Price responses will depend on the willingness and ability of the seller to pass on cost increases (i.e. the relative price elasticities of supply and demand).

3.4.2. Reporting Costs

The closed zone alternative(s) or the closed season approach may require imposition of new check in/check out procedures for all fishing vessels. If the reporting burden is placed on the foreign processing vessels existing regulations should suffice. Imposition of fees on foreign processors will not require any changes in the status quo reporting requirements.

3.4.3. Administrative, Enforcement, and Information Costs and Benefits

The administrative cost of the area closure relates to the cost of any reprogramming on the part of the observer program and PacFIN. These costs are not likely to be substantial. The administrative cost of the seasonal

13. 16 U.S.C. 1824(b)(10)(B)

alternatives (closure of the larger Block 2, a January - June closure of the entire Bering Sea to joint ventures and foreign fleets) will have significant positive impacts on the domestic at-sea processing component and significant negative economic impact on the joint venture fishery.

It is impossible to conclude, however, that the closures will result in more product delivered shoreside than would otherwise be the case. Certainly, all alternatives increase the likelihood of this happening by improving the competitive position of the shorebased plants. What actually happens is completely dependent on the ability of the displaced fleet to make up the foregone catch, and on the ability of the domestic at-sea processing component to preferentially capture the benefits. Cost reductions and increases also depend, in part, on the magnitude of the CPUE effect. If costs are reduced enough to allow vessels to lose fishing time by delivering shoreside or to operate (or charter) tendering vessels to complete the transfer of product while still enhancing profitability the supply problem for shorebased processors will cease over the near term. If the cost reduction on the grounds is not large enough to cover the transportation costs closures will not rectify the problem.

Whether the net benefit exceeds net costs in terms of the total U.S. economy will depend on the size of the closure (in space and time), the costs of displacement and the ability to make up catch potentially foregone because of the closures, and the quantitative relationship relating CPUE to profitability. All three items require estimation which has the usual attendant errors, however, our ability to predict the probable catch in new fishing areas is very limited, and it is this prediction of catch changes that is critical to the whole prediction process.

Worst and best case predictions are possible, however, using results presented earlier. The smaller block closure (Alternative 2a) would reduce joint venture gross ex-vessel revenue by \$8-10 million if none of the catch foregone is made up (Table 3.9.1). Likewise, the worst case for the larger block closure indicates a revenue loss of \$18-22 million (Table 3.9.1). Worst case scenarios for the foreign fisheries indicate potential losses in gross revenue of \$14-18 million for the two alternative closures (Table 3.9.1). The corresponding best case scenarios would predict no ex-vessel revenue declines although profits would be expected to decline because of increased costs.

In the same manner, the worst case for the seasonal closure indicates a loss in ex-vessel gross revenue of \$21-34 million for joint ventures, and \$3-19 million for the foreign fisheries for a six month closure of the entire Bering Sea management area (Table 3.9.2). Corresponding worst case declines in ex-vessel revenue for seasonal closures of the blocks are, for the smaller closure, \$3-4 million and \$12-175 thousand for joint ventures and foreign fisheries, respectively; and, for the larger closure, \$7-11 million and \$23-250 thousand, respectively (Table 3.9.2). Again, the best case scenario would predict no revenue decline.

The best and worst case scenarios for DAP revenue would predict the maximum and minimum gains to DAP due to the closures (area or area/season). The worst case would be that DAP is unable to increase its share of the landings. Revenue increases would then be \$0. This is very unlikely, as

JUSTIFICATION
FOR
THE DOMESTIC FISHERY ZONE
WITHIN
100-MILES OF UNALASKA

A Supplementary Report
to
James Campbell, Chairman
North Pacific Fishery Management Council

by

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INTRODUCTION

In Unalaska and Akutan, fish is our future. No fish, no future. During 1986, our processors had difficulty buying a steady supply of pollock and cod, even though they were paying 25% more than joint venture motherships offered.

To help us overcome this shortage, we request that the North Pacific Council set aside the grounds inside a 100-mile radius of Unalaska, not just for us, but for all DAP fishermen and processors.

The time-area closure concept of fishery management and allocation is the essence of our proposal.

When Congress was deciding how to stimulate the American fishing business ten years ago, it chose the time-area closure as its preferred instrument of change.

Congress drew the 200-mile boundary line and notified the world that access to the fish inside that line would be granted on a clearly-stated, priority basis: DAP fishermen and processors first, JVP fishermen second and TALFF last.

Our proposal is a legitimate descendant of the 200-mile limit line.

Congress anticipated that Americans like us would request such lines in the future as the domestic fishing business developed.

Our proposal seems to have given JVP fishermen boundary anxiety, though. They claim that drawing lines in the ocean is impractical and that it sets a dangerous precedent.

This is peculiar for two reasons. First, if Congress had not drawn a 200-mile line along the American coast in 1976, many of these people would not be in the groundfish business today. There would be no incentive for foreign fishing companies to participate in joint ventures. Directed foreign fishing would still dominate the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. Second, many JVP fishermen who oppose the 100-mile line around Unalaska did not oppose, nor seek to repeal, the boundary lines that kept foreign fishermen out of the Shelikof Strait pollock fishery, where many JVP fishermen made their first, big money.

There's an obvious double standard here where there shouldn't be.

We all understood the rules under the Magnuson Act. Competition for the pollock and cod in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands should be conducted according to those rules. To suddenly deny the rules or to thwart them suggests an unwillingness to share the wealth from these fisheries.

Those who have already profited from priority access cannot reasonably deny DAP fishermen and processors the same advantage.

This paper will describe how much pollock and cod has been harvested from this area in 1983, 1984 and 1985, how that amount compares to the DAP processing capacity in the area, and if JVP fishermen could find pollock and cod in commercial abundance elsewhere.

CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVE

Why did Congress pass the 200-mile limit law in 1976?

On page 3 of the Magnuson Act, Congress describes exactly why it passed that law.

- (1) To prevent overfishing;
- (2) to rebuild overfished stocks;
- (3) to insure conservation;
- (4) to realize the FULL POTENTIAL of the nation's fishery resources; and
- (5) to assure that our citizens benefit from the EMPLOYMENT, FOOD SUPPLY and REVENUE which could be generated by a national program for the development of fisheries.

Congress had a clear commercial motive. It intended to stimulate new jobs and new sales for American fishing companies, American fish processing companies, American shipyards, companies that supply hardware and services to the American fishing industry, American companies that transport processed fish to market, secondary fish processors throughout America and American fishing towns, too.

How much of the potential employment, food supply and revenue did Congress intend domestic fishermen and processors to capture?

". . . The full potential of the nation's fishery resources." One hundred percent.

Full potential is unambiguous. It means everything.
No holdbacks.

That's the goal of our proposal. To capture the full potential of the BSAI pollock fishery for domestic fishermen, domestic processors and domestic businesses associated with the fishing industry.

We think there will be many benefactors of the 100-mile zone around Unalaska in addition to processors and fishermen. Our proposal will boost the volume of pollock and cod handled by DAP processors. That will generate new demand for the services of other Americans such as those listed below.

(1) Shipyard workers in Washington, Oregon, California, Louisiana, Alabama and Florida.

(2) Longshoremen and truck drivers in Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California.

(3) U. S. merchant seamen and ship owners transporting processed fish from Western Alaska to the Orient or the West Coast.

(4) Processing workers from Anchorage, the Pacific Northwest and California who will come to Unalaska, Akutan and King Cove for the new jobs.

(5) Airlines serving Seattle to Anchorage and Anchorage to Cold Bay and Unalaska.

(6) Surimi analog manufacturers around Puget Sound and in California.

(7) Cold storage owners and workers around Puget Sound.

HOW CONGRESS JUDGES
THE VALUE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY
TO AMERICA'S ECONOMY

How important does Congress think a totally domestic fishing industry is to our nation?

Congress says just how important on page 2 of the Magnuson Act.

"Commercial and recreational fishing constitutes a major source of employment and contributes significantly to the economy of the Nation."

Unalaska is one of the capitol cities of the domestic fishing industry. If commercial fishing "contributes significantly to the economy of the Nation", then Unalaska should contribute significantly, too.

To make that significant contribution to the American economy, Unalaska needs priority access for DAP fishermen and processors. That appears to be the most cost effective and reliable way to improve the odds of getting fish to our processors and our town.

We are not asking for any guarantees. All we need is a level playing field on which to compete with other DAP processors for the fish. For several reasons, stated

WHY DAP PROCESSORS NEED PRIORITY ACCESS.

DAP processors are at a distinct competitive disadvantage with joint venture processors in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.

(1) The joint venture product enjoys virtually free access to some important Asian and European markets. DAP product faces public and hidden trade barriers abroad.

(2) Where the joint venture product is subject to import quotas and duties, DAP product commonly faces stiffer ones. In Japan, for example, we understand JVP surimi enjoys a 5¢ to 8¢ per pound lower import duty than DAP surimi does.

(3) The social costs of producing DAP product are much higher than they are for JVP product.

In the process of becoming one of the most civilized nations on earth, the United States has adopted some of the highest human rights standards, sanitation standards, environmental quality standards, occupational, safety and health standards and pure food standards in the world.

Meeting these standards is a direct cost to American manufacturers; in our case, DAP processors.

Most JVP processors enjoy a much lower cost of compliance with these standards. In many cases, the JVP processor is not required by its government to meet many of these standards.

This difference is obvious if you compare the DAP cost of production to the JVP's.

(4) DAP product faces unfair price competition on international markets from some JVP processors. The USSR, Poland and the PRC are command economies whose state enterprises are not required to sell their products at a price that would be break-even or profitable for DAP processors. Top priority for these countries may often be hard currency generation, not profit.

(5) JVP processors pay no user fees for the fish they acquire in the 200-mile zone. If those same processors were receiving deliveries under TALFF, they would be paying permit and user fees to the U. S. government.

DAP shore processors pay a raw fish tax to the State of Alaska, local resource taxes on landed fish and numerous conventional business and sales taxes in their communities.

(6) DAP processors must comply with certain federal laws that do not restrict JVP processors. American fishermen have the option of selling to domestic processors or JVP

processors. Domestic processors do not have the same flexibility. They can only receive direct deliveries from domestic fishermen. The Nicholson Act obstructs foreign deliveries to domestic processors.

The Jones Act effects the DAP processors in many ways. It does not seem to restrict the JVP processor at all.

U. S. federal anti-trust laws isolate DAP processors and promote auction-style pricing in the U. S. Many JVP processors are not subject to anti-trust laws in their homelands. In fact, most of the countries represented in the JVP processing fleet assume that the sale price of their products will not be determined by American-style competition, but by consultation and planning between producers.

(7) We have been told by businessmen in the American fishing industry that JVP processors may enjoy some national subsidies for their fuel, labor and marketing expenses, preferential interest rates on their business loans and distinct tax preferences and deferrals. The magnitude of these advantages to JVP processors is hard to determine.

We suspect that magnitude is greater for JVP processors than it is for DAP processors. If any evidence to the contrary is available, we'd like to see it.

PURSUING THE FULL-POTENTIAL
OF THE BERING SEA-ALEUTIAN ISLANDS POLLOCK FISHERY

How close are domestic fishermen and processors to capturing the "full potential" of the Bering Sea-Aleutian Islands pollock fishery?

Let's concentrate on determining the "full potential" wholesale value, first.

To estimate the "full potential" wholesale value of the 1987 pollock fishery we must make several conservative assumptions.

(1) The recovery rate of surimi from raw pollock is at least 20% annually.

(2) The average wholesale price of surimi produced in Alaska by foreign motherships and domestic plants and factory trawlers is \$1 per pound.

(3) American joint venture operating companies earn the equivalent of \$10 per ton for their services.

(4) All of the DAP pollock is processed into surimi and consumed domestically. (This is assumable because pollock fillet recovery rates are similar to surimi recovery rates. Likewise, wholesale pollock fillet prices approximate surimi wholesale prices.)

(5) Approximately 150 million pounds of surimi will be consumed in the U. S. during 1987. Domestic processors will provide 30 million tons (if they can get the fish). Imports will provide 120 million pounds, or 54,000 tons.

The "full potential" wholesale value of this pollock fishery to the American economy in 1987 will be approximately \$568 million.

DAH BS	1,200,000	MT	
DAH AI	<u>88,000</u>	MT	
TOTAL	1,288,000	MT	
	X <u>20%</u>	surimi recovery	
	257,600	MT surimi	
	X <u>\$2,205</u>	MT wholesale value (\$1 per pound)	
TOTAL	\$568,000,000		

How much of this will DAP fishermen and processors earn in 1987, if processors can acquire the fish?

DAP BS	190,000	MT	
DAP AI	<u>57,000</u>	MT	
TOTAL	247,000	MT	
	X <u>20%</u>	surimi recovery	
	49,400	MT surimi	
	X <u>\$2,205</u>	wholesale value (\$1 per pound)	
TOTAL	\$108,927,000	DAP wholesale value (includes ex-vessel price paid DAP fishermen)	

To this amount, we must add the amount likely to be earned by JVP fishermen and JVP company operators from the 1987 JVP allocation.

BS	Final JVP	1,010,000	MT
AI	Final JVP	<u>30,790</u>	MT
TOTAL		1,040,790	MT

JVP fishermen will be paid approximately \$125 per ton for their catch this year.

1,040,790	MT
X <u>\$125</u>	per MT
\$130,000,000	JVP fishermen's income

American JVP companies will earn approximately \$10 per ton for their services. (If there is a better estimate, we welcome it.)

1,040,790	MT
X <u>\$10</u>	per MT
\$10,040,790	JV operators' income

The total domestic income from this pollock fishery in 1987 will be approximately \$248 million.

\$108,927,000	wholesale DAP value
130,000,000	JVP fishermen's income
<u>10,041,000</u>	JVP operators' income
\$248,968,000	TOTAL

Is this \$248 million the net wholesale value to the American economy in 1987?

No, because American importers are projected to pay \$120 million for U. S. surimi imports in 1987.

By subtracting the cost of the imports from the value to DAP processors, JV fishermen and JV operators, we can estimate the net wholesale value of Bering Sea-Aleutian Islands pollock fishery to the American economy.

\$249,000,000	domestic pollock income
<u>-120,000,000</u>	cost of imports
\$129,000,000	net wholesale value to U. S. economy

In the Findings Section of the Magnuson Act, Congress writes --

(7) A national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the U. S. is necessary . . . to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery resources.

How close is the Nation to realizing the full potential of this pollock fishery in 1987?

Based on our assumptions, we can calculate that.

\$568 million is the "full potential" wholesale value of the 1987 pollock fishery.

\$129 million is the net wholesale value to the U. S. economy.

$$\frac{\$129 \text{ million}}{\$568 \text{ million}} = 23\frac{1}{2}$$

That's how much of the "full potential" of this pollock fishery is being captured by the domestic economy in 1987.

This means the U. S. economy will receive less than one-quarter of the wholesale value generated by that pollock fishery in 1987.

How much motivation is there for the United States to fully utilize that pollock business as soon as possible?

\$439 million worth of motivation in 1987 alone, and that's just wholesale value.

By establishing a priority access zone within 100-miles of Unalaska, the North Pacific Council will send a clear signal

to DAP processors and investors:

"Gear up and compete for the \$439 million wholesale value the U. S. economy hasn't yet captured from this pollock fishery. We recognize the DAP processor's competitive disadvantage against JVP processors. To counter-balance that, we've set aside productive fishing grounds where DAP fishermen and DAP processors can compete for the fish."

This policy will lead America to the full potential of the Bering Sea and Aleutians pollock fishery faster than any other.

POLLOCK MIGRATION AND THE
100-MILE ZONE AROUND UNALASKA

"Since pollock are ectotherms, with body temperatures in equilibrium with their surroundings, on- and off-shelf migrations appear to be an adaptive response to the extremely cold temperatures (0.0° to -1.7° C) of the shelf domain during winter. Along the shelf edge at depths of 200-300 m, water temperatures are relatively constant -- 3-5° C throughout the year, providing a warm winter refuge (i.e., freezing avoidance) layer. Dispersal from this layer out onto the continental shelf during summer presumably maximizes the exploitation of different food resources by different size and age classes."

NWAFIC Processed Report 79-20
Fisheries Oceanography-
Eastern Bering Sea Shelf
Felix Favorite
October 1979

Pollock and codfish are born with tails. They move around the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands all their lives. Attempts to corral them are futile. Their behavior is not exactly predictable. But fishermen have developed some ideas about where to find them during the spring, summer, fall and winter. See Appendix I - IV.

One of the best places fishermen find pollock and cod is along the 100-fathom curve near Cape Sarichef. The curve comes up from the Aleutians toward Sarichef, makes a sharp turn to the west and runs up towards the Pribilof Islands. This area

is known as the Horseshoe, because the 100-fathom curve is shaped like one there. Foreign and domestic fishermen have noticed that pollock and cod school up in this hot spot during several months of the year. Later they disperse and the majority of them apparently move to other grounds.

How valuable has this area been to pollock and cod fishermen lately?

We calculated that by drawing a 100-mile radius around Unalaska, then comparing the monthly catch by foreign and JVP fishermen inside the zone to their total monthly catch of pollock and cod.

From NMFS Foreign Fishery Observer Office in Seattle, we received monthly catch data by one-degree longitude, half-degree latitude blocks in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.

After drawing the 100-mile radius on a navigation chart, we determined which blocks were within the area.


Some blocks were not completely inside the radius. Those that appeared to be mostly-inside the area we added to the blocks that were entirely inside the radius.

The chart on page 21 shows which blocks we judged to be inside the radius and mostly-inside the radius.

168 00W

163 00W

158 00W



BLOCKS INCLUDED IN THE 100-MILE RADIUS

Using NMFS data, we determined the monthly observed JVP catches in 1983, 1984 and 1985. Then we calculated what percent of JVP pollock and cod was caught inside the 100-mile radius. Table I shows those figures.

Table II combines the three annual JVP catches and shows that 36% of the observed JVP pollock catch and 31% of the observed JVP Pacific cod catch came from inside the 100-mile radius.

"Observed" is the key word here. Table III shows what percent of the annual JVP pollock and cod catch was actually observed by NMFS in 1983 - 1985.

Any conclusions drawn from Table I must be refined by data in Table III. For example, Table III shows that there was 100% observer coverage of the JVP pollock catch in 1984 and only 44% observer coverage in 1985. Any conclusions about the monthly pattern of JVP pollock and cod fishing in 1984 are probably more valid than those for 1985. Fuller observer coverage allows us to be more certain about exactly where the JVP catch came from.

Table IV shows the monthly observed foreign harvest of pollock and cod in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands. It also shows what percent was harvested within 100 miles of Unalaska.

Table V combines the three annual foreign catches and shows that overall 15% of the pollock and 6% of the Pacific cod was taken inside the 100-mile zone. This implies that JVP fishermen need not fish inside the 100-mile zone to catch their pollock and cod allocations. There are commercial abundances elsewhere that supported the foreign fleets. Since there's very little TALFF anymore, JVP fishermen will not have to compete against foreign fishermen outside of the 100-mile zone.

Table VI shows what percent of the foreign directed pollock and cod fishery was observed by NMFS in 1983-1985.

TABLE I

PERCENT OF THE MONTHLY
BSAI OBSERVED JVP HARVEST TAKEN
WITHIN A 100-MILE RADIUS OF UNALASKA

		<u>WALLEYE POLLOCK</u>		<u>PACIFIC COD</u>	
		Total Observed JV Catch MT	Percent Harvested Inside 100-mile Radius	Total Observed JV Catch MT	Percent Harvested Inside 100-mile Radius
Jan	1983	0	0	0	0
	1984	50	82	293	97
	1985	12	90	16	44
Feb	1983	74	96	455	94
	1984	478	95	2,957	97
	1985	601	12	1,331	96
Mar	1983	300	15	322	63
	1984	28,314	23	5,562	78
	1985	22,178	7	2,965	92
Apr	1983	4,207	89	571	10
	1984	39,653	45	2,896	48
	1985	20,373	21	1,544	39
May	1983	10,677	28	1,250	1
	1984	1,437	3	1,961	3
	1985	2,989	11	1,100	1
Jun	1983	20,247	18	1,251	2
	1984	30,123	34	3,745	1
	1985	9,682	3	2,083	0
Jul	1983	24,133	48	3,142	3
	1984	72,514	4	4,032	3
	1985	46,063	29	2,578	0
Aug	1983	19,995	55	2,019	2
	1984	41,578	5	2,631	8
	1985	31,912	49	2,208	4
Sept	1983	10,038	100	120	100
	1984	10,111	97	1,991	5
	1985	19,335	74	1,508	15
Oct	1983	116	100	34	100
	1984	5,457	94	192	84
	1985	7,895	85	722	17
Nov	1983	0	0	0	0
	1984	260	27	0	0
	1985	1,963	93	79	89
Dec	1983	0	0	0	0
	1984	0	0	0	0
	1985	0	0	0	0

TABLE 11

SUMMARY

	<u>WALLEYE POLLOCK</u>			<u>PACIFIC COD</u>		
	Observed JVP Harvest MT	Observed JVP Harvest Inside 100- Mile Radius MT	Percent of JVP Harvested Inside 100- Mile Radius	Observed JVP Harvest MT	Observed JVP Harvest Inside 100- Mile Radius MT	Percent of JVP Harvested Inside 100- Mile Radius
3-year Total	482,765	174,876	36	51,558	15,874	31

Source: NMFS Foreign Fishery Observer Program
(206) 526-4194

11
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TABLE III

OBSERVED BERING SEA-ALEUTIAN ISLAND
JVP HARVEST AS A PERCENTAGE
OF ACTUAL JVP HARVEST

	<u>WALLEYE POLLOCK</u>			<u>PACIFIC COD</u>		
	Observed MT	Actual MT	% of JVP Observer Coverage	Observed MT	Actual MT	% of JVP Observer Coverage
1983	89,787	146,000	61	9,110	9,662	94
1984	230,025	230,314	100	26,260	24,382	107
198.	162,991	370,000	44	16,134	35,634	45
Average			68			82

** Since not all of the JVP harvest during these three years was observed by NMFS, it is useful to determine how much coverage NMFS did g. t. This will help the Council assess the validity of the monthly numbers in Table I and Table II.

Source: Resource Assessment Document for Bering Sea-Aleutian Groundfish, 1986
Pages 20 & 29

TABLE IV

PERCENT OF THE MONTHLY
BSAI FOREIGN DIRECTED HARVEST TAKEN
WITHIN A 100-MILE RADIUS OF UNALASKA

		WALLEYE POLLOCK		PACIFIC COD	
		Total Foreign Directed Catch MT	Percent Inside 100-Miles	Total Foreign Directed Catch MT	Percent Inside 100-Miles
Jan	1983	12,330	0	1,375	0
	1984	14,558	0	617	31
	1985	11,219	0	741	0
Feb	1983	49,061	0	2,514	0
	1984	63,845	0	2,671	0
	1985	11,877	0	3,646	0
Mar	1983	36,113	0	3,007	0
	1984	14,328	0	1,514	0
	1985	11,682	0	1,322	0
Apr	1983	36,810	0	3,030	0
	1984	6,568	0	2,381	1
	1985	1,352	0	2,265	0
May	1983	34,670	0	2,700	0
	1984	21,681	0	511	8
	1985	4,053	0	1,504	0
Jun	1983	113,391	7	2,563	0
	1984	80,125	2	5,265	0
	1985	46,209	0	877	0
Jul	1983	147,794	13	3,802	6
	1984	144,687	1	3,437	0
	1985	126,887	0	1,732	0
Aug	1983	154,005	16	3,602	15
	1984	142,637	4	4,649	1
	1985	156,396	0	4,026	0
Sept	1983	129,233	31	2,690	28
	1984	156,224	14	4,654	1
	1985	135,110	0	3,749	0
Oct	1983	87,167	60	3,300	42
	1984	97,058	35	6,633	8
	1985	137,171	36	9,027	6
Nov	1983	42,162	49	4,223	42
	1984	93,507	51	11,109	7
	1985	93,254	68	9,625	1
Dec	1983	20,153	0	5,128	17
	1984	67,841	0	11,839	5
	1985	74,651	0	3,945	1

TABLE V

SUMMARY

	<u>WALLEYE POLLOCK</u>			<u>PACIFIC COD</u>		
	Observed Foreign Harvest MT	Observed TALFF Harvest Inside 100- Mile Radius MT	Percent Harvested Inside 100- Mile Radius	Observed Foreign Harvest MT	Observed TALFF Harvest Inside 100- Mile Radius MT	Percent Harvested Inside 100- Mile Radius
3-year Total	2,575,809	389,231	15	145,722	9,028	6

Source: NMFS Foreign Fishery Observer Program
(206) 526-4194

TABLE V

TABLE VI

OBSERVED BERING SEA-ALEUTIAN ISLAND
FOREIGN HARVEST AS A PERCENTAGE
OF ACTUAL FOREIGN HARVEST

	<u>WALLEYE POLLOCK</u>			<u>PACIFIC COD</u>		
	Observed MT	Actual MT	% of Foreign Observer Coverage	Observed MT	Actual MT	% of Foreign Observer Coverage
1983	862,889	982,363	88	37,984	93,167	41
1984	903,059	1,093,783	83	52,279	133,161	39
1985	809,861	1,179,787	69	52,459	145,426	36
Average			80			39

Source: Resource Assessment Document for Bering Sea-Aleutian Groundfish, 1986
Pages 20 & 29

OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATA

(1) In all three years, the observed JVP pollock and cod catch was low during the months of November, December, January and February. We think that's because JVP trawlers were in the shipyard in November and December and in Shelikof Strait in January and February. Since Shelikof is closed to JVP fishing this year, we expect much more JVP effort in the Bering Sea and Aleutians.

(2) That increased JVP pollock and cod fishing need not come from within 100-miles of Unalaska, though. In 1983-85, only 15% of the total observed foreign pollock harvest was taken inside the 100-mile radius. See Table V. The areas where TALFF was taken in the past are wide open now that the Council has nearly eliminated foreign fishing. JVP fishermen can catch their pollock allocation outside of the 100-mile zone and JVP processors can cruise with them to those alternative hot spots. Our shore plants cannot. They are much more dependent on the catch from the 100-mile zone around Unalaska.

(3) DAP processing capacity in Unalaska and Akutan is approximately 930 MT per day or 26,040 MT per 28-day operating month. We estimate that DAP floating capacity is approximately 700 MT per day. If the Council has a better estimate, we welcome it.

Estimated 1987 total DAP processing capacity in our area is 1,630 MT per day or 45,640 MT per 23-day operating month.

Table I shows that from January through August, the total observed monthly JVP catch exceeded the current DAP capacity only once in 1983-1985.

We recognize that JVP catch capacity has risen since then. But we think that DAP processors would use many tons of pollock and cod from the 100-mile zone if they could get priority access to it.

Is that just wishful thinking?

Not after what happened in Unalaska last December.

POLLOCK FOR CHRISTMAS

By December 1986, all joint venture fishing was over for the year. Two large American trawlers, the Aldebaron and the Arcturus from Anacortes, Washington, agreed to deliver pollock and cod to Great Land Seafoods in Unalaska. During the previous 11 months, Great Land was unable to buy enough fish for surimi production because most American trawlers preferred delivering to joint venture motherships.

From December 9 to December 16, Great Land processed 2.7 million pounds of pollock delivered by these two trawlers. That's 153 tons per day processed by approximately thirty people. One of the managers at Great Land told us that if they could count on pollock deliveries like that all year, they'd put in another filet line and boost daily production substantially. (They already have the plant space for it.) That would put an additional fifteen to twenty people to work processing surimi.

Great Land did receive more deliveries from these trawlers during the two weeks right after Christmas. The problem is that the Great Land managers were notified that the two trawlers will return to joint-venture fishing later in January.

The shortage of pollock in Unalaska is inhibiting new investment in the plant and the creation of new jobs there, too.

We're looking for a practical way to get pollock and cod to Unalaska in the same magnitude it arrived just before Christmas. Our whole town was excited about those first eight days of prosperity. With the North Pacific Council's help we'll have many more days like them, soon.

It's not pleasant being low man on the fishery allocation totem pole -- especially when the Magnuson Act says DAP processor needs should be provided for first, not last.

CONCLUSION

There's been a serious shortage of pollock and cod in Unalaska and Akutan during 1986. Most American trawlers have delivered all of their catch to joint venture processing ships at sea. Even though one Unalaska processor offered a 25% higher price for pollock, he wasn't able to attract many deliveries last year. Consequently, DAP shoreplants will be deploying several tenders in 1987; hoping to buy pollock and cod on the grounds from U. S. fishermen. Even if they can acquire some fish this way, creation of a 100-mile domestic fishery zone around Unalaska will still be vital to them. It will give all DAP fishermen and processors several important competitive advantages over their JVP counterparts (as the Magnuson Act intended.)

(1) The DAP fishermen's CPUE within the zone will be maximized in the absence of simultaneous JVP fishing nearby. DAP fishermen will be able to load up faster, thereby maximizing their catch per month.

(2) The fuel cost and running time for DAP fishermen will be minimized since most of the hot spots within the 100-mile zone are only 10 hours from Unalaska and Akutan. Minimizing run time helps maximize deliveries and income per month.

(3) Pacific cod bycatch in DAP pollock deliveries will be maximized by the absence of the JVP fleet. Cod filet sales really improve the DAP processor's monthly income statement. They make him more competitive with JVP processors.

For these reasons, we ask the North Pacific Council to accept our proposal as Amendment 11 to the Bering Sea - Aleutian Islands Groundfish Management Plan for 1988, send it out for public review and adopt it at the May meeting.

The Council may receive other proposals to solve the pollock shortage in Unalaska and Akutan.

We only request that they not be substituted for ours in the amendment cycle.

APPENDIX I

CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT
IN THE SUMMER SURVEY

These following three CPUE charts show the relative abundance of pollock during the NMFS summer surveys.

In 1983 and 1984, all ten best CPUE's were outside the 100-mile radius of Unalaska.

In 1985, only two of the ten best CPUE's were inside the 100-mile radius of Unalaska.

Most of the best summer pollock fishing appears to be outside the 100-mile radius of Unalaska.

In 1983 and 1984, several of the ten best CPUE's were just beyond the 100-mile radius of Unalaska.

CPUE's change from month to month. Like many fishermen, we believe some of the best January to May and September to December CPUE's for pollock and cod are probably found inside the 100-mile radius or just beyond it.

Those CPUE's can be maximized by allowing DAP fishermen only inside the zone. Simultaneous fishing by JVP fishermen in the same area will probably reduce the CPUE for the DAP fleet.

During the spring months, Pacific cod school up inside the 100-mile radius. Cod is very valuable to DAP processors in our area. Receiving pollock deliveries with a high

percentage of Pacific cod bycatch is a bonus to them.

Large-scale JVP trawling inside the 100-mile zone will probably diminish the Pacific cod tonnage delivered to DAP processors.






Figure 31.--Catch per unit effort (lbs/hr trawled) of walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) from 1982 research survey data.



--Catch per unit effort (lbs/hr trawled) of walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) from 1983 research survey data.



--Catch per unit effort (lbs/hr trawled) of walleye pollock (*Theragra chalcogramma*) from 1984 research survey data.




Figure 9.--Foreign-reported catch (thousands of metric tons) of walleye pollock in 1983. T = less than 500.

SHADDED AREA INSIDE 100-MILE ZONE




Figure 13.-Foreign-reported catch (thousands of metric tons) of Pacific cod in 1982.




Figure 11. Foreign-ported catch (thousands of metric tons) of halibut in 1983.
 T = 1000 or more metric tons
 1 = 1000 or less metric tons
 Hatched area = AREA WITHIN 100-MILE ZONE

APPENDIX III





Figure 3.—Total distribution of fishing effort in 1984, by month.

Circle is 100-mile radius from Unalaska





Figure 3(cont.)—Total distribution of fishing effort in 1984, by month.

Circle is 100-mile radius from Unalaska





Figure 3(cont.)—Total distribution of fishing effort in 1984, by month.

Circle is 100-mile radius from Unalaska





Figure 3(cont.)—Total distribution of fishing effort in 1984, by month.

Circle is 100-mile radius from Unalaska







Figure 3 (cont.)—Total distribution of fishing effort in 1984, by month.

Circle is 100-mile radius from Unalaska

APPENDIX IV




Feb. 51



FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN

March, 85



11/11/81

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

61 00N

61 00N

59 00N

59 00N

57 00N

57 00N

55 00N

55 00N


53 00N

53 00N

51 00N

51 00N

CIRCLE IS 100-MILE ZONE



179 00E

176 00W


171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

MAY

12.1.85



JUNE 1985

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

61 00N

61 00N

59 00N

59 00N

57 00N

57 00N

55 00N

55 00N


53 00N

53 00N


CIRCLE IS 100-MILE ZONE

FOREIGN FISHING EFFORT IN THE BERING SEA - JUNE 1985

51 C




July, 50



FOREIGN FISHING EFFORT IN THE NORTH PACIFIC JULY, 1950.

August 1985



SEPT. 1985

500 miles

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

61 00N

61 00N

59 00N

59 00N

57 00N

57 00N

55 00N

55 00N

53 00N


53 00N

51 00N

51 00N

CIRCLE IS 100-MILE ZONE

FOREIGN FISHING EFFORT IN THE BERING SEA - SEPT. 1985



01 25

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

61 00N

61 00N

59 00N

59 00N

57 00N

57 00N

55 00N

55 00N

53 00N

53 00N

51 00N

51 00N

CIRCLE IS 100-MILE ZONE

179 00E


176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

Map 85



May 50

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

61 00N

61 00N

59 00N

59 00N

57 00N

57 00N

55 00N

55 00N

53 00N

53 00N

51 00N

51 00N

179 00E

176 00W

171 00W

166 00W

161 00W

CIRCLE IS 100-MILE ZONE

