HB
389

Shocky —

Maybe there
should be language
added which would
make "engraved parties"
[illegible]
the State

M. H.

B/C [illegible]
[illegible] would prevent
further communication

Feb 1
H. Res. Comm
HB 389

Sund: * What is Policy on Banding Authority on Sites
Want Follow-up

DEC has no banding authority
DNR has some
There has been some discussion of increasing + enforcing of banding

Sund / Cotten – well we may want to take this up separately

Springer: Do the same regs. + procedures apply to municipalities + small 2nd class cities as the private sector. Clean-up pressure
Lets not drive municipalities into bankruptcy

Devaney: The provisions in the bill don't Δ Liability. It just changes the it so state isn't last in line to collect if the responsibility party is going bankrupt.

Sund / Wertz: Why should state be ahead in line.
Public $ put up by public for public $.

Sund: Impact of ~~pay~~ this bill on private sector.

Nuzzo: $ for cleanup + impact should be

proportional to the $ that have been made from capitalizing on res. development
Right now there's too few dollars in this
May be a bill should be done on this

Sund: re: State lease land - there's another approach

Ad: How many $ in sayer fund?
How many in State clean up fund?

State level just less than $ 1 million

Ad indemnification
Mertz re: TAPS there's a special fund

Mertz 2 or 3 incidents where this law could have worked

Springer More interest in banding.
Has it been approached that the state would be the insurer for construction cost.

Peane* Also wanted to see more on banding-

(9)

HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT

Date referred: 1/22/88 FURTHER REFERRALS: Judiciary
Finance

DATE: 2-1-88

The Resources Committee has considered HB 389

"An Act relating to recovery of state costs for oil and hazardous substance releases; and providing for an effective date."

RECOMMENDS:

[ ] replace with _____ [ ] the same title
[ ] attached amendment(s) [ ] a new title
[ ] do pass
[ ] do not pass
[X] no recommendation
[ ] individual recommendations
[ ] additional referral to the _____ Committee

ADOPTS: [ ] _____ letter of intent

ATTACHES NEW FISCAL NOTE(s):

[ ] fiscal impact
[ ] zero fiscal note
[X] zero with analysis
[ ] same as previous fiscal note published _____
[ ] same as previous zero fiscal note published _____

SIGNING DO PASS:

Mildred Herrmann
~~Cliff Davidson~~

SIGNING OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

No rec
No Rec.
No Rec
No rec
No rec

Samuel R. Cotten
Chairman's signature

STATE OF ALASKA
1988 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

BILL VERSION : _____
PUBLISH DATE : _____

FISCAL NOTE

REQUEST:

Revision Date: 29 January 1988
Title : An Act Relating to Oil and Hazardous Substance Cleanup Costs
Sponsor : Governor
Requestor : House Resources

Agency Affected : DEC, Dept. of Law
BRU : DEC/Environmental Quality
Components : _____

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES: (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAPITAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
REVENUE						

FUNDING: (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

POSITIONS: None

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : (Attach a separate page if necessary)

The bill will not increase state expenditures. Over the long run, it will likely decrease state expeditures for spill cleanup.

Prepared by : Amy D. Kyle
Phone : 465-2600
Division : Commissioner's Office
Date : 29 January 1988

Approved by Commissioner : Amy D. Kyle for
Date : _____
Agency : Department of Environmental Conservation

Distribution (by preparer) :
- Legislative Finance
- Legislative Sponsor
- Requestor
- Office of Management and Budget
- Impacted Agency(ies)

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION

STEVE COWPER, GOVERNOR

POSITION PAPER
HB 389

CONTACT: AMY D. KYLE
465-2600

January 29, 1988

Title

An act relating to oil and hazardous substance cleanup costs

Effect of the bill

The bill would give the state a priority in recovering its costs for cleanup of oil and hazardous waste sites in cases where the responsible party declares bankruptcy.

Department Position

The bill was introduced at the request of the Governor upon the recommendation of the Department of Law. The Department supports the bill.

The state is seeing increasing numbers of cases where entities that are responsible for improper waste disposal declare bankruptcy. In such cases, the state would have to foot the bill for necessary site cleanup costs. This bill would give the state priority in recovering such costs in a bankruptcy proceeding.

Similar legislation has been adopted by several other states and recommended by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Fiscal Effect

There will be no additional costs associated with this bill. The legislation should reduce State expenditures for cleanup over the long term. The Department has provided a zero fiscal note.

Amy D Kyle / by

Dennis D. Kelso, Commissioner

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 83-1020

OHIO, PETITIONER *v.* WILLIAM LEE KOVACS, DBA B & W ENTERPRISES, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[January 9, 1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion and agree with its holding that the cleanup order has been reduced to a monetary obligation dischargeable as a "claim" under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. I write separately to address the petitioner's concern that the Court's action will impede States in enforcing their environmental laws.

To say that Kovacs' obligation in these circumstances is a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy does not wholly excuse the obligation or leave the State without any recourse against Kovacs' assets to enforce the order. Because "Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law," *Butner* v. *United States*, 440 U. S. 48, 54 (1979), the classification of Ohio's interest as either a lien on the property itself, a perfected security interest, or merely an unsecured claim depends on Ohio law. That classification—a question not before us—generally determines the priority of the State's claim to the assets of the estate relative to other creditors. Cf. 11 U. S. C. § 545 (trustee may avoid statutory liens only in specified circumstances). Thus, a State may protect its interest in the enforcement of its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims.

The Court's holding that the cleanup order was a "claim" within the meaning of § 101(4) also avoids potentially adverse

consequences for a State's enforcement of its order when the debtor is a corporation, rather than an individual. In a Chapter 7 proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code, a corporate debtor transfers its property to a trustee for distribution among the creditors who hold cognizable claims, and then generally dissolves under state law. Because the corporation usually ceases to exist, it has no postbankruptcy earnings that could be utilized by the State to fulfill the cleanup order. The State's only recourse in such a situation may well be its "claim" to the prebankruptcy assets.

For both these reasons, the Court's holding today cannot be viewed as hostile to state enforcement of environmental laws.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OHIO *v.* KOVACS, DBA B & W ENTERPRISES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-1020. Argued October 10, 1984—Decided January 9, 1985

Petitioner State of Ohio obtained an injunction in state court ordering respondent and other defendants to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site. When the injunction was not complied with, the State obtained the appointment in state court of a receiver, who was directed to take possession of the defendants' property and other assets and to implement the injunction. The receiver took possession of the site but had not completed his tasks when respondent filed a personal bankruptcy petition. Seeking to require part of respondent's postbankruptcy income to be applied to the receiver's unfinished tasks, the State filed a motion in state court to discover respondent's income and assets. At respondent's request, the Bankruptcy Court stayed these proceedings. The State then filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaration that respondent's obligation under the state injunction was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was not a "debt" or "liability on a claim" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a claim. Section 101(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code in pertinent part defines a claim as the "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured." The Bankruptcy Court ruled against the State, as did the District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State essentially sought from respondent only a monetary payment and that such a required payment was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.

Held:

1. The fact that the Army Corps of Engineers, using funds recovered from those concerns that generated the wastes in question, has removed

Syllabus

the wastes from the site does not render the case moot. The State still has a stake in the outcome of the case based on its claim that the removal of the wastes did not satisfy all of respondent's obligation to clean up the site since the ground remains permeated with toxic materials that must be removed to avoid further pollution. P. 3.

2. Respondent's obligation under the injunction is a "debt" or "liability on a claim" subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. Contrary to the State's contention, there is no indication in the language of § 101(4)(B) that the right to performance cannot be a claim unless it arises from a contractual arrangement. Moreover, it is apparent that Congress desired a broad definition of a "claim" and knew how to limit the application of a provision to contracts when it desired to do so. Where it is clear that what the receiver wanted from respondent after bankruptcy was the money to defray cleanup costs, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the cleanup order had been converted into an obligation to pay money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Pp. 3–9.

717 F. 2d 984, affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 83-1020

OHIO *v.* WILLIAM LEE KOVACS, DBA B & W ENTERPRISES, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[January 9, 1985]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner State of Ohio obtained an injunction ordering respondent William Kovacs to clean up a hazardous waste site. A receiver was subsequently appointed. Still later, Kovacs filed a petition for bankruptcy. The question before us is whether, in the circumstances present here, Kovacs' obligation under the injunction is a "debt" or "liability on a claim" subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.

I

Kovacs was the chief executive officer and stockholder of Chem-Dyne Corp., which with other business entities operated an industrial and hazardous waste disposal site in Hamilton, Ohio. In 1976, the State sued Kovacs and the business entities in state court for polluting public waters, maintaining a nuisance, and causing fish kills, all in violation of state environmental laws. In 1979, both in his individual capacity and on behalf of Chem-Dyne, Kovacs signed a stipulation and judgment entry settling the lawsuit. Among other things, the stipulation enjoined the defendants from causing further pollution of the air or public waters, forbade bringing additional industrial wastes onto the site, required the defendants to remove specified wastes from the property, and ordered the payment of $75,000 to compensate the State for injury to wildlife.

Kovacs and the other defendants failed to comply with their obligations under the injunction. The State then obtained the appointment in state court of a receiver, who was directed to take possession of all property and other assets of Kovacs and the corporate defendants and to implement the judgment entry by cleaning up the Chem-Dyne site. The receiver took possession of the site but had not completed his tasks when Kovacs filed a personal bankruptcy petition.[1]

Seeking to develop a basis for requiring part of Kovacs' postbankruptcy income to be applied to the unfinished task of the receivership, the State then filed a motion in state court to discover Kovacs' current income and assets. Kovacs requested that the Bankruptcy Court stay those proceedings, which it did.[2] The State also filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaration that Kovacs' obligation under the stipulation and judgment order to clean up the Chem-Dyne site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was not a "debt," a liability on a "claim," within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the complaint sought an injunction against the bankruptcy trustee to re-

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[1] Kovacs originally filed a reorganization petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 *et seq.*, but converted the petition to a liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See 11 U. S. C. § 1112.

[2] The Bankruptcy Court held that the requested hearing was an effort to collect money from Kovacs in violation of the automatic stay provision. See 11 U. S. C. § 362. It entered a specific stay as well. The District Court affirmed, ruling that Ohio was trying to enforce a judgment obtained before filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also found the hearing barred. *In re Kovacs*, 681 F. 2d 454 (1982). In that court's view, while § 362(b) allowed governmental units to continue to enforce police powers through mandatory injunctions, it denied them the power to collect money in their enforcement efforts. Because of the later filing by Ohio of a complaint to declare that Kovacs' obligations were not claims under bankruptcy, we granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded to that court to consider whether the dispute over the stay was moot. 459 U. S. 1167 (1983). As far as we are advised, the Court of Appeals has taken no action on the remand.

strain him from pursuing any action to recover assets of Kovacs in the hands of the receiver. The Bankruptcy Court ruled against Ohio, *In re Kovacs*, 29 B. R. 816 (SD Ohio 1982), as did the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit affirmed, holding that Ohio essentially sought from Kovacs only a monetary payment and that such a required payment was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under the bankruptcy statute. *In re Kovacs*, 717 F. 2d 984 (1983). We granted certiorari to determine the dischargeability of Kovacs' obligation under the affirmative injunction entered against him. 465 U. S. (1983).

II

Kovacs alleges that the Army Corps of Engineers, using funds recovered from those concerns that generated the wastes, has removed all industrial wastes from the site and that if he has an obligation to pay those expenses, the obligation is owed to the United States, not the State. Kovacs urges that the case is therefore moot. The State argues that the case is not moot because the removal of the barrels and wastes from the surface did not satisfy all of Kovacs' obligations to clean up the site; it is said that the ground itself remains permeated with toxic materials that must be removed if further pollution of the public waters is to be avoided. We perceive nothing feigned or frivolous about the State's submission. *Sibron* v. *New York*, 392 U. S. 40, 57 (1968). The State surely has a stake in the outcome of this case, *United States Parole Comm'n* v. *Geraghty*, 445 U. S. 388, 397 (1980), which in our view is not moot. We proceed to the merits.

III

Except for the nine kinds of debts saved from discharge by 11 U. S. C. §523(a), a discharge in bankruptcy discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before bankruptcy. §727(b). It is not claimed here that Kovacs' obligation under the injunction fell within any of the categories of debts ex-

cepted from discharge by § 523. Rather, the State submits that the obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site is not a debt at all within the meaning of the bankruptcy law.

For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a claim. § 101(11). A claim is defined by § 101(4) as follows:

> "(4) 'claim' means—
>
> "(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
>
> "(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured."

The provision at issue here is § 101(4)(B). For the purposes of that section, there is little doubt that the State had the right to an equitable remedy under state law and that the right has been reduced to judgment in the form of an injunction ordering the cleanup. The State argues, however, that the injunction it has secured is not a claim against Kovacs for bankruptcy purposes because (1) Kovacs' default was a breach of the statute, not a breach of an ordinary commercial contract which concededly would give rise to a claim; and (2) Kovacs' breach of his obligation under the injunction did not give rise to a right to payment within the meaning of § 101(4)(B). We are not persuaded by either submission.

There is no indication in the language of the statute that the right to performance cannot be a claim unless it arises from a contractual arrangement. The State resorted to the courts to enforce its environmental laws against Kovacs and secured a negative order to cease polluting, an affirmative order to clean up the site, and an order to pay a sum of money to recompense the State for damage done to the fish population. Each order was one to remedy an alleged breach of

Ohio law; and if Kovacs' obligation to pay $75,000 to the State is a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, which the State freely concedes, it makes little sense to to assert that because the cleanup order was entered to remedy a statutory violation, it cannot likewise constitute a claim for bankruptcy purposes. Furthermore, it is apparent that Congress desired a broad definition of a "claim"[3] and knew how to limit the application of a provision to contracts when it desired to do so.[4] Other provisions cited by Ohio refute, rather that support, its strained interpretation.[5]

The courts below also found little substance in the submission that the cleanup obligation did not give rise to a right to payment that renders the order dischargeable under § 727. The definition of "claim" in H. R. 8200 as originally drafted would have deemed a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance a claim even if it did not give rise to a right to payment.[6] The initial Senate definition of claim was narrower,[7] and a compromise version, § 101(4), was finally adopted. In that version, the key phrases "equitable remedy," "breach of performance," and "right to payment" are not defined. See 11 U. S. C. § 101. Nor are the differences between the successive versions explained. The legislative

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[3] H. R. Rep. No.95–595, p. 309 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 21 (1978). See 2 R. Levin & K. Klee, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 101–.04, 101–16.1 (15th ed. 1984).

[4] See 11 U. S. C. § 365 (assumption or rejection of executory contracts and leases).

[5] Congress created exemptions from discharge for claims involving penalties and forfeitures owed to a governmental unit, 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(7), and for claims involving embezzlement and larceny. § 523(a)(4). If a bankruptcy debtor has committed larceny or embezzlement, giving rise to a remedy of either damages or equitable restitution under state law, the resulting liability for breach of an obligation created by law is clearly a claim which is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.

[6] H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 309–310 (House Committee print 1977), as reported September 8, 1977.

[7] See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 299 (1977), as introduced October 31, 1977.

history offers only a statement by the sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act with respect to the scope of the provision:

> "Section 101(4)(B) . . . is intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of payment for which there may be an alternative equitable remedy with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being discharged in bankruptcy. For example, in some States, a judgment for specific performance may be satisfied by an alternative right to payment in the event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled to specific performance would have a "claim" for purposes of a proceeding under title 11."[8]

We think the rulings of the courts below were wholly consistent with the statute and its legislative history, sparse as it is. The Bankruptcy Court ruled as follows, *In re Kovacs*, 29 B. R., at 816:

> "There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can render performance under the affirmative obligation other than by the payment of money. We therefore conclude that plaintiff has a claim against defendant within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that defendant owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(11). Furthermore, we have concluded that that debt is dischargeable."[9]

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[8] 124 Cong. Rec. 32393 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); see also *id.*, at 33992 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).

[9] More fully stated, the Bankruptcy Court's observations were:

"What is at stake in the pre[illegible]notion is whether defendant's bankruptcy will discharge the affirmative obligation imposed upon him by the Judgment Entry, that he remove and dispose of all industrial and/or other wastes at the subject premises. If plaintiff is successful here, it would be able to levy on defendant's wages, the action prevented by our Prior Decision, after defendant's bankruptcy case is closed and/or the stay of 11 U. S. C. § 362 as interpreted by our Prior Decision is no longer in force. The parties have crystallized the issue here in simple fashion, plaintiff stoutly insisting that the just identified affirmative obligation is not a monetary obligation, while defendant says that it is. The problem arises, of

The District Court affirmed, primarily because it was bound by and saw no error in the Court of Appeals' prior opinion holding that the State was seeking no more than a money judgment as an alternative to requiring Kovacs personally to perform the obligations imposed by the injunction. To hold otherwise, the District Court explained, "would subvert Congress' clear intention to give debtors a fresh start." App. JA–16. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, rejecting the State's insistence that it had no right to, and was not attempting to enforce, an alternative right to payment:

> "Ohio does not suggest that Kovacs is capable of personally cleaning up the environmental damage he may have caused. Ohio claims there is no alternative right to payment, but when Kovacs failed to perform, state law gave a state receiver total control over all Kovacs' assets. Ohio later used state law to try and discover Kovacs' post-petition income and employment status in an apparent attempt to levy on his future earnings. In reality, the only type of performance in which Ohio is now interested is a money payment to effectuate the Chem-Dyne cleanup."

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course, because it is not stated as a monetary obligation. Essentially for this reason plaintiff argues that it is not a monetary obligation. Yet plaintiff in discussing the background for the Judgment Entry says that it expected that defendant would generate sufficient funds in his ongoing business to pay for the clean-up. Moreover, we take judicial notice that plaintiff sought discovery with respect to defendant's earnings, the matter dealt with in our Prior Decision, for the purpose of levying upon his wages, a technique which has no application other than in the enforcement of a money judgment. There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can render performance under the affirmative obligation other than by the payment of money. We therefore conclude that plaintiff has a claim against defendant within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that defendant owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(11). Furthermore, we have concluded that that debt is dischargeable." 29 B. R., at 818.

> "The impact of its attempt to realize upon Kovacs' income or property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean up the waste he wrongfully released into Ohio waters. He cannot perform the affirmative obligations properly imposed upon him by the State court except by paying money or transferring over his own financial resources. The State of Ohio has acknowledged this by its steadfast pursuit of payment as an alternative to personal performance." 717 F. 2d, at 987–988.

As we understand it, the Court of Appeals held that, in the circumstances, the cleanup duty had been reduced to a monetary obligation.

We do not disturb this judgment. The injunction surely obliged Kovacs to clean up the site. But when he failed to do so, rather than prosecute Kovacs under the environmental laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings, the State secured the appointment of a receiver, who was ordered to take possession of all of Kovacs' nonexempt assets as well as the assets of the corporate defendants and to comply with the injunction entered against Kovacs. As wise as this course may have been, it dispossessed Kovacs, removed his authority over the site, and divested him of assets that might have been used by him to clean up the property. Furthermore, when the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover Kovacs' assets from the receiver, the latter sought an injunction against such action. Although Kovacs had been ordered to "cooperate" with the receiver, he was disabled by the receivership from personally taking charge of and carrying out the removal of wastes from the property. What the receiver wanted from Kovacs after bankruptcy was the money to defray cleanup costs. At oral argument in this Court, the State's counsel conceded that after the receiver was appointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the payment of money. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20. Had Kovacs furnished the necessary funds, either before or after bank-

ruptcy, there seems little doubt that the receiver and the State would have been satisfied. On the facts before it, and with the receiver in control of the site,[10] we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for concluding that the cleanup order had been converted into an obligation to pay money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy.[11]

IV

It is well to emphasize what we have not decided. First, we do not suggest that Kovacs' discharge will shield him from prosecution for having violated the environmental laws of Ohio or for criminal contempt for not performing his obligations under the injunction prior to bankruptcy. Second, had a fine or monetary penalty for violation of state law been imposed on Kovacs prior to bankruptcy, § 523(a)(7) forecloses any suggestion that his obligation to pay the fine or penalty would be discharged in bankruptcy. Third, we do not address what the legal consequences would have been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed and a trustee had been designated with the usual

[10] We were advised at oral argument that the receiver at that time was still in possession of the site, although he was contemplating terminating the receivership. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 56–57. We were also advised that it was difficult to tell exactly who owned the property at 500 Ford Boulevard and that although the trustee did not formally abandon the property, he did not seek to take possession of it. *Id.*, at 55, 58.

[11] The State relies on *Penn Terra, Ltd.* v. *Department of Environmental Resources*, 733 F. 2d 267 (CA3 1984). There, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the automatic stay provision of 11 U. S. C. § 362 did not apply to the State's seeking an injunction against a bankrupt to require compliance with the environmental laws. This was held to be an effort to enforce the police power statutes of the State, not a suit to enforce a money judgment. But in that case, there had been no appointment of a receiver who had the duty to comply with the state law and who was seeking money from the bankrupt. The automatic stay provision does not apply to suits to enforce the regulatory statutes of the State, but the enforcement of such a judgment by seeking money from the bankrupt—what the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded was involved in this case—is another matter.

duties of a bankruptcy trustee.[12] Fourth, we do not hold that the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises or against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's waters is dischargeable in bankruptcy; we here address, as did the Court of Appeals, only the affirmative duty to clean up the site and the duty to pay money to that end. Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the site—whether it is Kovacs or another in the event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee—must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or

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[12] The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Act creates an estate which, with limited exceptions, consists of all of the debtor's property wherever located. 11 U. S. C. § 541. The trustee, who is to be appointed promptly in Chapter 7 cases, is charged with the duty of collecting and reducing the property of the estate and is to be accountable for all of such property. 11 U. S. C. § 704. A custodian of the debtor's property appointed before commencement of the case is required to deliver the debtor's property in his custody to the trustee, unless the bankruptcy court concludes that the interest of creditors would be better served by permitting the custodian to continue in possession and control of the property. 11 U. S. C. § 543. After notice and hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 11 U. S. C. § 554. Such abandonment is to the person having the possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 92 (1978). Property that is scheduled but not administered is deemed abandoned. 11 U. S. C. § 554(c). Had no receiver been appointed prior to Kovacs' bankruptcy, the trustee would have been charged with the duty of collecting Kovacs' nonexempt property and administering it. If the site at issue were Kovacs' property, the trustee would shortly determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the buyer would clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation Kovacs might have had to clean up the property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability.

firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. As the case comes to us, however, Kovacs has been dispossessed and the State seeks to enforce his cleanup obligation by a money judgment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

CONNECTICUT

1 (c) of section 22a-56. Any
is section shall be deposited in
r this section and shall be used
issioner pursuant to subsection
or mitigation.

P.A. 76-9, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-605, S. 5, 17;
1; 84-370, S. 1, 6; P.A. 85-177, S. 1, 2;

to study pesticide pollution of groundwaters

added proviso allowing assessment of treble
water resources commission and its chairman
l that provisions applicable in cases where
s, substituted "negligently caused" for "gross
e and one-half times the costs and expenses
ibility to cases where damages would exceed
ces to emergencies, to uncontrolled losses of
tes, deleted provision setting forth allocation
ended Subsec. (d) to authorize expenditures
nse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
waste disposal sites, and to specify limits on
cifically subjected hazardous waste owned by
ntial threat to health or environment, to the
d by requiring that not more than $80,000 be
.A. 84-81 amended Subsec. (d) by limiting
r costs for short-term provision and capital
uthorization of funds for the hazardous waste
l years involved and by imposing limit on
-07 amended Subsec. (d) by deleting language
le drinking water, requiring the commissioner
tablishing the cap on the amount that can be
the limit on expenditures under Subdiv. (5) to
5) of Subsec. (d) by authorizing expenditures
rizing double damages if pollution was wilful;
y the Hazardous Waste Management Service in
f potable drinking water and a pesticide study

ne second Wednesday after the
assembly, the commissioner of
joint standing committee of the
g to the environment, which sets
(1) the amount of income to and
tablished by section 22a-451, and
ing the status of said fund for the

bursement for containment or
issions. (a) Any person, firm,
, or otherwise mitigates the effects
or gaseous products or hazardous
olled loss, seepage or filtration of
o reimbursement from any person,
for such containment, removal, or
quids or solid, liquid or gaseous
ition or other emergency resulted
, firm or corporation. When such

pollution or contamination or emergency results from the joint negligence or other actions of two or more persons, firms or corporations, each shall be liable to the others for a pro rata share of the costs of containing, and removing or otherwise mitigating the effects of the same and for all damage caused thereby.

(b) No person, firm or corporation which renders assistance or advice in mitigating or attempting to mitigate the effects of an actual or threatened discharge of oil or petroleum or chemical liquids or solid, liquid or gaseous products or hazardous materials or which assists in preventing, cleaning-up or disposing of any such discharge shall be held liable, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for civil damages as a result of any act or omission by him in rendering such assistance or advice, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct, unless he is compensated for such assistance or advice for more than actual expenses. For the purpose of this subsection, "discharge" means spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage or filtration and "hazardous materials" means any material or substance designated as such by any state or federal law or regulation.

(c) The immunity provided in this section shall not apply to (1) any person, firm or corporation responsible for such discharge, or under a duty to mitigate the effects of such discharge, (2) any agency or instrumentality of such person, firm or corporation or (3) negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle.

(1969, P.A. 765, S. 5; 1971, P.A. 872, S. 105; P.A. 79-605, S. 6, 17; P.A. 83-374, S. 1, 2; P.A. 86-239, S. 12, 14.)

History: 1971 act replaced reference to water resources commission in Subsec. (b) with reference to environmental protection commissioner; P.A. 79-605 clarified provisions by adding references to containment or mitigation of pollutants, to "solid, liquid or gaseous" products, to hazardous wastes, etc.; Sec. 25-54ff transferred to Sec. 22a-452 in 1983; P.A. 83-374 replaced existing provisions re liability of persons, firms and corporations assisting in cleaning up or disposing of discharges with new provisions and defined "discharge" and "hazardous material" and added Subsec. (c), excluding from the immunities provided those responsible for the discharge or those who are negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle; P.A. 86-239 amended Subsec. (a) by authorizing municipalities to be reimbursed for clean-up expenses.

Sec. 22a-452a. State lien against real estate as security for amounts paid to clean up hazardous waste. (a) On and after June 3, 1985, any amount paid by the commissioner of environmental protection pursuant to subsection (b) of section 22a-451 to contain and remove or mitigate the effects of a spill shall be a lien against the real estate of the person causing such spill in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(b) A lien pursuant to this section shall not be effective unless (1) a certificate of lien is filed in the land records of each town in which the real estate is located, describing the real estate, the amount of the lien, the name of the owner as grantor and the name of the person causing the spill, if known, and (2) the commissioner mails a copy of the certificate to such persons and to all other persons of record holding an interest in such real estate over which the commissioner's lien is entitled to priority.

(c) Such lien shall take precedence over all transfers and encumbrances recorded on or after June 3, 1985, in any manner affecting such interest in such real estate or any part of it on which the spill occurred or from which the spill emanated, or real estate which has been included, within the preceding three years, in the property description of such real estate and is contiguous to such real estate. This subsection shall not apply to real estate which consists exclusively of residential real estate, including but not limited to, residential units in any common interest community, as defined in section 47-202.

(d) In the case of all other real estate, including real estate which consists exclusively of residential real estate, including but not limited to, residential units in any common interest community, as defined in section 47-202, the lien shall take precedence over any transfer or encumbrance recorded after the commissioner files with the town clerk notice of intent to file a lien on the land records in the town in which the real estate is located.

(e) When any amount with respect to which a lien has been recorded under the provisions of this section has been paid or reduced, the commissioner, upon request of any interested party, shall issue a certificate discharging or partially discharging such lien, which certificate may be recorded in the same office in which the lien was recorded. Any action for reduction or discharge of such lien or any appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with the provisions of sections 49-35a to 49-35c, inclusive, except that the forms prescribed in section 49-35a shall be modified as the court deems appropriate. Any action for the foreclosure of such lien shall be brought by the attorney general in the name of the state in the superior court for the judicial district in which the property subject to such lien is situated, or, if such property is located in two or more judicial districts, in the superior court for any one such judicial district, and the court may limit the time for redemption or order the sale of such property or make such other or further decree as it judges equitable.

(P.A. 84-535, S. 2; P.A. 85-443, S. 2, 5.)

History: P.A. 85-443 divided section into Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (a) to apply section to amounts paid after June 3, 1985, instead of October 1, 1984; inserted new provisions as Subsec. (b) to require filing of the lien in the town clerk's office; amended Subsec. (c) to give the lien precedence over transfers and encumbrances to property on which the spill occurred or emanated from three years prior to the spill except residential real estate; inserted new provisions as Subsec. (d) to give the lien precedence over all transfers after filing, and amended Subsec. (e) to authorize the commissioner to issue a certificate partially discharging the lien.

Sec. 22a-452b. Exemption. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, a mortgagee who acquires title to real estate by virtue of a foreclosure or tender of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, shall not be liable for any assessment, fine or other costs imposed by the state for any spill upon such real estate beyond the value of such real estate, provided such spill occurred prior to the date of acquisition of title to such real estate by such mortgagee.

(P.A. 85-443, S. 3, 5.)

Sec. 22a-452c. Definition of spill. For the purposes of sections 22a-452a and 22a-452b, "spill" means the discharge, spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage or filtration of oil or petroleum or chemical liquids or solid, liquid or gaseous products or hazardous waste.

(P.A. 85-443, S. 1, 5.)

Sec. 22a-453. (Formerly Sec. 25-54gg). Coordination of activities with other agencies. Contracts for services. The commissioner shall represent the state in its relations with the federal government and with any municipality and with any regional or interstate authority in all matters relating to oil or petroleum or chemical liquids or solid, liquid or gaseous products or hazardous wastes pollution or contamination or emergency resulting from the discharge, spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage or filtration of such substance or material or waste. Said commissioner may enter into agreements with the federal government, such municipalities or authorities, to coordinate supervisory activities and, subject to adequate appropriations, share reasonable costs. The

compel cleanup or containment consistent with regulations and guidelines established by the secretary.

E. (1) When a site has been declared an abandoned hazardous waste site, the secretary is authorized to undertake the physical control, containment and cleanup, or closure of the abandoned hazardous waste site and may retain personnel for these purposes who shall operate under his direction.

(2) In all cases in which the secretary proposes to treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes at the abandoned hazardous waste site, he shall prepare a closure plan setting forth how the site will be closed. The secretary shall provide an opportunity for the public to submit comments about the plan. The secretary shall provide adequate notice to the public of any public hearings on the closure plan by placing a notice in the general circulation newspaper of the parish in which the hearing is to be held. If the secretary determines that immediate action is required to secure the site or dispose of any waste in order to protect the health or safety of persons affected by the site or its contents or to protect the environment, he may take such action prior to submission of the plan and may subsequently submit a plan detailing emergency actions taken and those actions which he will be taking in the future.

(3) The secretary shall have authority to implement the closure plan and to take all actions including erecting fences, signs, gates, levees, and monitoring devices as are reasonably necessary to secure the site and prevent unauthorized or inadvertent entry.

F. (1) The secretary, by recording the declaration of abandonment in the mortgage records of the parish where the property is located, may create a lien against property declared to be abandoned to the extent of the expenditures by the state necessary to remedy the problem or to the extent of the appraised value after said expenditures, whichever is less. The secretary may provide in the declaration that the lien is limited to certain portions of property declared to be abandoned and may provide that a lien shall not be recorded against property of a person that the commission finds was in no way responsible for the spill or accident causing the damage requiring the expenditure of money from the fund. The filing of a sworn statement of the amount expended perfects the lien retroactively to the date of the recordation of the declaration.

(2) Subsequent to a declaration of abandonment, a person whose property has been declared to be abandoned and against which a lien has been created thereby may apply to the secretary or file an action in the district court to require that the clerk erase the lien from the records if the secretary or the court finds that the spill was in no way caused by any action or negligence on the part of the person who is the owner of the property subject to the lien or may file an action to have the debt reduced to the appraised value of the property.

Added by Acts 1984, No. 674, § 1.

§ 1149.7. Hazardous Waste Assessment Report; requirements; submission

A. The secretary is hereby authorized and mandated to develop a comprehensive evaluation of hazardous waste in Louisiana, and to issue such evaluation in the form of a report as provided for herein. The office of solid and hazardous waste shall assist the secretary in the development and on-going update of the report.

B. Prior to January 31, 1986, the secretary shall present a report as authorized in Subsection A of this Section to the Senate and House Natural Resources Committees. The report shall, at a minimum, provide the following information:

(1) An inventory of the known hazardous waste sites in Louisiana, including:

(a) The types of wastes as determined by the secretary to be present in the waste sites.

(b) An estimate of the amount of each type of waste in a waste site as may be reasonably determined by the secretary.

water by the department of health and environment or the federal environmental protection agency under the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act. All such tests shall be paid for by such county. [Acts 1983, ch. 423, § 8.]

Compiler's Notes. Concerning the Safe Drinking Water Act referred to in subsection (b), the federal act by that name is compiled in U.S.C. in various sections throughout titles 5, 21, and 42, and the Tennessee act of the same name is codified in part 7, chapter 13 of this title.

Section to Section References. This section is referred to in § 68-46-210.

68-46-209. Liens on property. — (a) Whenever a hazardous substance site is placed on the list of hazardous substance sites pursuant to § 68-46-206(e), or whenever the commissioner otherwise begins to expend money for investigation, identification, containment or clean up of a particular site under this part, the commissioner may file a notice with the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the property lies.

(b) Within one (1) year after the completion of a project to contain or clean up the hazardous substance at a particular site under this part, the commissioner shall itemize the money so expended and shall file a statement thereof in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the property lies, together with notarized appraisals by an independent appraiser of the value of the property before and after the clean up work performed at the site, if the money so expended shall result in a significant increase in property values. Such statement shall constitute a lien upon such land. The lien shall not exceed the amount determined by the appraisal to be the increase in the market value of the property as a result of the clean up work.

(c) If the property owner is aggrieved by the amount of the lien filed under subsection (a), the property owner may cause another appraisal to be performed by an independent appraiser and may submit the matter to the chancery court of the county in which the property is located to determine the appropriate amount of the lien. A decision of that court may be appealed according to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(d) The lien provided in this section shall be entered in the records of the register of deeds of the county in which the property lies. Such statements shall constitute a lien upon such property as of the date the notice is filed pursuant to subsection (a), and shall have priority as a lien second only to tax liens. Such a lien shall be satisfied to the extent of the value of the consideration received at the time of transfer of ownership, and if the lien is not fully satisfied at the time of transfer, it shall remain a lien on the property until it is fully satisfied.

(e) A form of notice substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with subsection (a):

NOTICE OF LIEN UNDER
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1983

Name of titleholder(s) .....
Property address .....
Description of property subject to possible lien sufficient to identify such property .....

Date, signature, and address of the Commissioner or his authorized designee .....

The register of deeds shall note the date and time of filing, and an appropriate registration number, and shall record the notice in the lien book in the office of the register.

(f) The effective date of all prior liens claimed under this chapter shall be unaffected by the 1986 amendment to this section if a notice is filed in accordance with subsection (a) of this section on or before December 31, 1986, which notice shall set forth, in addition to the information required by subsection (e) hereof, the claimed effective date of the lien if earlier than the date of the filing of the notice. After December 31, 1986, all claimed liens shall be effective as of the date the notice is filed pursuant to subsection (a). [Acts 1983, ch. 423, § 9; 1986, ch. 528, § 1.]

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1986, ch. 528, § 1. added (a), (e), and (f) and amended (d).

68-46-210. Responsible waste disposal incentive fund. — (a) There is created a special agency account in the general fund to be known as the "responsible waste disposal incentive fund."

(b) There is appropriated to the responsible waste disposal incentive fund the sum of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for fiscal year 1983-1984 and there shall be appropriated the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000) for fiscal year 1984-1985.

(c) Interest accruing on investments and deposits of such fund shall be returned to it and remain a part of such fund.

(d) Any unencumbered and any unexpended balance of this fund remaining at the end of any fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund, but shall be carried forward until expended in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(e)(1) The board shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, to establish eligibility requirements for a local government to receive the money deposited in the responsible waste disposal incentive fund.

(2) At a minimum, for a local government to be eligible to receive such funds, the commercial facility must be located within the jurisdiction of such local government, such facility must have a permit to operate pursuant to the provisions of § 68-46-108, such facility must be constructed and operational and the following standards must be met:

(A) The facility is multi-purpose with both land disposal capability and facilities for advanced technology, high-temperature thermal treatment;

(B) The facility has a minimum design capacity to operate for twenty (20) years;

(C) The facility is operated pursuant to the provisions of part 1 of this chapter; and

(D) The local government with jurisdiction over the facility does not have any zoning requirement, subdivision regulation, ordinance, regulation or