


HJR



HJR 68: Requesting additional action by the United States to reduce high seas interception of Alaska-bound salmon.

COMMITTEE PACKET CONTENTS:

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U.S./Japanese Bilateral Salmon Talks
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
March 13, 1986

An agreement was concluded between the U.S. State Department and Japanese negotiators in Tokyo on March 8 after nine months of bilateral talks.

The U.S. objective has been to eliminate significant interception of North American salmon and steelhead by these fisheries. The U.S. had proposed elimination of their fishery in the central Bering Sea, reduction of their effort in our fisheries conservation zone (FCZ) and substantial movement to the west of their landbased fishery. The State Department was not able to accomplish all of these objectives in this current round of negotiations. The agreement falls well short of our original objective to eliminate all significant interceptions.

The agreement does not:

1. Reduce interceptions in the U.S. FCZ.
2. Move the landbased fishery ten degrees farther west, which current data indicates would be required to eliminate significant interceptions.
3. Get them out of the Bering Sea immediately.

The agreement only moves us part way to our objective and should not be viewed as an acceptable end point to the interception issue, although it is an improvement over the present situation and gives us some directions to pursue in further reducing the interceptions.

The agreement does:

1. Phase-out their fishery in the central Bering Sea over an eight year period of time. This has long been a U.S. goal since the chinook salmon caught in this area are nearly all from western Alaska and since this area is outside our zone, we have had serious doubts that we can adequately tell what they are catching in this area. Actually, they will have to end their fishery in the eastern part of this area after only two more years and there are provisions to prevent transfer of their effort to other areas as these fisheries close.
2. Limit their fishery in our FCZ. Currently, there is no effort limit in this area. The agreement will keep them from increasing their fishery from current levels. The agreement also specifies an improved monitoring program in this area to better verify the Japanese catch data.


3. Move their landbased fishery one degree of longitude (45 miles) farther west. We had wanted more movement in this fishery, but the Japanese maintained that this movement, plus enforcement would eliminate most interceptions. We know the fleet has chronically violated the current eastern closure line and we do not know how much of the current interceptions are due to these violations as opposed to fishing in legal areas. The agreement for the first time has provisions for specific agreed enforcement and catch monitoring measures with annual review of their adequacy and change if needed.

4. The agreement provides for a three to five year research and monitoring program to determine if these regulations really do the job. By the 1991 season, the closure line in the landbased fishery will be renegotiated if necessary.

Involved parties must see that pressure is maintained to keep moving toward elimination of interceptions. The federal government must provide the funding for research, observers and enforcement. The state is writing to Secretary of State Shultz and our Congressional delegation to request this support.

The state will continue to press for elimination of interceptions. We are dealing with a problem that has existed for more than 30 years. Significant reductions in interceptions occurred in 1978 when the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention was renegotiated to move the Japanese fisheries farther west. Now eight years later, this agreement is another step in this process and provides for further negotiations within the next five years. The state will make every effort to keep the process going.

U.S. / U.S. - Japan Salmon



MFD - 1 waterbury fishing day

Land based
 1986 More eastern boundary
 From 175 E to 174 E
 Research, enforcement, monitoring
 provisions.

USFCZ
 1986-93
 170 MFD
 1994 -
 141 MFD
 Cause 10 - only 26
 1994 -
 141 MFD
 Cause 10 - only 26
 Improved catch in 1994


Current limit
 31 MFD
 Actual use
 12-23 MFD
 Average 16 MFD

1986
 18 MFD
 1987
 18 MFD
 1988
 18 MFD
 1989
 18 MFD
 1990
 12 MFD
 1991
 12 MFD
 1992
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 2022
 12 MFD
 2023
 12 MFD
 2024
 12 MFD

Current limit
 31 MFD
 Actual use
 2-19 MFD
 Average
 12 MFD

Central Bering Sea
 E of 150







UNITED FISHERMEN OF ALASKA

Jack Cadigan
Executive Director
907-586-2820
1-800-478-FISH

17 MARCH 1986

F O R I M M E D I A T E R E L E A S E

SALMON INTERCEPTION ON THE HIGH SEAS

The recent developments towards final agreement between the Japanese and United States over the dispute of High-seas salmon interception is both "good news" and "bad news", as described today by Bob Blake, President of United Fishermen of Alaska (UFA), the umbrella organization representing virtually all commercial fishing interests in Alaska. The "good news" is that there has been an agreement reached. The "bad news" is that it only achieves in very small part what the UFA, believed to be both necessary and achievable.

Salmon is a highly valuable, highly renewable, resource. The tentative agreement between the U.S. and Japan concerning the matter of high seas fisheries is one which accomplishes little and accomplishes it too slowly. It is from that level of disappointment that any basis for optimism or rays of encouragement must be sought. "It is from being realistic that the position of UFA is one whereby although we cannot endorse the agreement or sing its praises, we realize that the miniscule gains made overall are nonetheless gains," according to Blake. According to Blake, that is why UFA does not endorse or support any efforts being made by environmental or other groups who may seek to pressure the U.S. or Canada into refusal to sign the tentative agreement. "One slice of bread off the loaf is better than no bread at all," said Blake.

What does the agreement include which provides any encouragement to UFA? The agreement moves the land based fisheries one degree (a little less than 60 miles) further west. Specifically, no salmon fishing by the land-based fleet will take place east of 174 degrees East longitude. This will help - maybe not much - but it will help. More importantly, the agreement includes provision for U.S. Coast Guard enforcement of that line. This is an important feature which United Fishermen of Alaska consider critical. We now seek to insure that in a climate of shrinking dollars in Washington D.C. we don't find that feature moot by virtue of the Coast Guard not getting the fuel money it needs to do the job. That may seem a remote possibility only to those unaware of how ridiculously restricted the service is in that regard. The Japanese have agreed to assign six of their own enforcement vessels in the area, and to permit a U.S. observer aboard. We think there should be a U.S. observer on each Japanese enforcement vessel, and that observer should be a Coast Guard officer, not a summer employment collegian. However, since the agreement requires the fishing vessels to report by radio if they are within 50 miles of the line, and assuming there will be a high endurance U.S. Coast Guard cutter on scene, plus U. S. air surveillance, as provided for in the agreement, we do not foresee difficulties in the enforcement aspects.

Another very critical part of the agreement is the increase in tagging and biological samplings by Japanese Research ships in critical fishing areas, as well as the presence of U.S. scientists aboard to insure concurrence between the two countries of the scientific data achieved. This feature, as well as the onboard observer aspects, must be fully funded by the federal government for the next three to five years to provide the needed basis for renegotiations called for in 1990 under the terms of the agreement.

Thus the most critical parts of the agreement are those that provide the data base needed by this country for meaningful negotiations to take place in five years. "Without good solid enforcement by the Coast Guard, without the presence of U.S. scientists and observers, we will be right where we were in the talks preceding this agreement - unable even to agree on the data base!" said Blake.

There are other features of the agreement which are both complex and accomplish less than expected by UFA. Specifically, there is an area commonly called "the donut" which is in the central Bering Sea and encircled by U.S. and Soviet 200 mile limits. This fairly circular region is split by the 180th meridian (International Date Line, and essentially lies within the 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention Line. The current agreement would incrementally phase out all Japanese High Seas salmon fishing on this side of 180th meridian by 1988, and all fishing in the entire "donut" by 1994. Blake said "We certainly had hoped for a speedier timetable than that, but again, at least it is a phase out!"

The area of really no movement at all is in the slot which runs near Attu (which is 173 degrees East longitude), at the end of the Aleutian Chain. This is also the area of primary concern to environmentalists. In this area fishing will continue, essentially unabated, indefinitely.

The Japanese salmon fleets are large and efficient. There are four "High Seas" companies, each owning a mothership and servicing 40 to 50 gillnetters or a total of 172 catcherboats. The land-based fleet numbers over 200 medium and nearly 700 small driftnetters. There is also a fleet of 125 driftnetters and 171 longliners which fish salmon in the Sea of Japan. The total crew of these fisheries totals over 17,000 persons. UFA concern centers upon the impact these Japanese Salmon fisheries have on North American salmon, not Asian salmon. In a closing summary, Blake said: "The crux of the dispute has been over the numbers of returning Alaskan salmon caught by these fisheries, and how the treaties can be redefined to reduce that number reasonably close to zero. Since data supported by the U.S. did not even remotely resemble the data provided by the Japanese, there was scant foundation to even begin talks. ~~Our tying in allocations of groundfish in an entirely different fisheries, and one which involves some U.S. joint venture fisheries, was a weak and ill-conceived bargaining chip.~~ The area in which we take heart focuses on the enforcement, research, and on-board observer aspects of the agreement. Even though we also consider the on-board observer arrangement weaker than it should be, we believe that if the U.S. fully uses its ability under the agreement to police the effort and achieve the necessary data for renegotiation in five years, we will have the potential capability at that time to accomplish our most reasonable goals. As the strongest voice of the fishing industry in Alaska, we now can only say "This agreement is better than nothing...but not by much!"



UNITED FISHERMEN OF ALASKA

Jack Cadigan
Executive Director
907-586-2820
1-800-478-FISH

POLICY OF UFA RE: SALMON INTERCEPTION ON THE HIGH SEAS

THE UFA TOTALLY SUPPORTS HJR 68 AND SJR 47, AND HERE'S WHY!

The recent developments towards final agreement between the Japanese and United States over the dispute of High-seas salmon interception is both "good news" and "bad news". The "good news" is that there has been an agreement reached. The "bad news" is that it only achieves in very small part what the UFA, believed to be both necessary and achievable.

Salmon is a highly valuable, highly renewable, resource. The tentative agreement between the U.S. and Japan concerning the matter of high seas fisheries is one which accomplishes little and accomplishes it too slowly. It is from that level of disappointment that any basis for optimism or rays of encouragement must be sought. It is from being realistic that the position of UFA is one whereby although we cannot endorse the agreement or sing its praises, we realize that the miniscule gains made overall are nonetheless gains. That is why UFA does not endorse or support any efforts being made by environmental or other groups who may seek to pressure the U.S. or Canada into refusal to sign the tentative agreement. One slice of bread off the loaf is better than no bread at all.

What does the agreement include which provides any encouragement to UFA? The agreement moves the land based fisheries one degree (a little less than 60 miles) further west. Specifically, no salmon fishing by the land-based fleet will take place east of 174 degrees East longitude. This will help - maybe not much - but it will help. More importantly, the agreement includes provision for U.S. Coast Guard enforcement of that line. This is an important feature which United Fishermen of Alaska consider critical. We now seek to insure that in a climate of shrinking dollars in Washington D.C. we don't find that feature moot by virtue of the Coast Guard not getting the fuel money it needs to do the job. That may seem a remote possibility only to those unaware of how ridiculously restricted the service is in that regard. The Japanese have agreed to assign six of their own enforcement vessels in the area, and to permit a U.S. observer aboard. We think there should be a U.S. observer on each Japanese enforcement vessel, and that observer should be a Coast Guard officer, not a summer employment collegian. However, since the agreement requires the fishing vessels to report by radio if they are within 50 miles of the line, and assuming there will be a high endurance U.S. Coast Guard cutter on scene, plus U. S. air surveillance, as provided for in the agreement, we do not foresee difficulties in the enforcement aspects.

Another very critical part of the agreement is the increase in tagging and biological samplings by Japanese Research ships in critical fishing areas, as well as the presence of U.S. scientists aboard to insure concurrence between the two countries of the scientific data achieved. This feature, as well as the onboard observer aspects, must be fully funded by the federal government for the next three to five years to provide the needed basis for renegotiations called for in 1990 under the terms of the agreement.


Thus the most critical parts of the agreement are those that provide the data base needed by this country for meaningful negotiations to take place in five years. Without good solid enforcement by the Coast Guard, without the presence of U.S. scientists and observers, we will be right where we were in the talks preceding this agreement - unable even to agree on the data base!

There are other features of the agreement which are both complex and accomplish less than expected by UFA. Specifically, there is an area commonly called "the donut" which is in the central Bering Sea and encircled by U.S. and Soviet 200 mile limits. This fairly circular region is split by the 180th meridian (International Date Line, and essentially lies within the 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention Line. The current agreement would incrementally phase out all Japanese High Seas salmon fishing on this side of 180th meridian by 1998, and all fishing in the entire "donut" by 1994. UFA certainly had hoped for a speedier timetable than that, but again, at least it is a phase out!

The area of really no movement at all is in the "Slot" which runs near Attu (which is 173 degrees East longitude), at the end of the Aleutian Chain. This is also the area of primary concern to environmentalists. In this area fishing will continue, essentially unabated, indefinitely.

The Japanese salmon fleets are large and efficient. There are four "High Seas" companies, each owning a mothership and servicing 40 to 50 gillnetters or a total of 172 catcherboats. The land-based fleet numbers over 200 medium and nearly 700 small driftnetters. There is also a fleet of 125 driftnetters and 171 longliners which fish salmon in the Sea of Japan. The total crew of these fisheries totals over 17,000 persons. UFA concern centers upon the impact these Japanese Salmon fisheries have on North American salmon, not Asian salmon. The crux of the dispute has been over the numbers of returning Alaskan salmon caught by these fisheries, and how the treaties can be re-defined to reduce that number reasonably close to zero. Since data supported by the U.S. did not even remotely resemble the data provided by the Japanese, there was scant foundation to even begin talks. The area in which we take heart focuses on the enforcement, research, and on-board observer aspects of the agreement. Even though we also consider the on-board observer arrangement weaker than it should be, we believe that if the U.S. fully uses its ability under the agreement to police the effort and achieve the necessary data for renegotiation in five years, we will have the potential capability at that time to accomplish our most reasonable goals. As the strongest voice of the fishing industry in Alaska, we now can only say: "This agreement is better than nothing...but not by much!"

UFA considers it important that Alaskan legislators fully understand what this issue is about, and why it is **IMPERATIVE** that a united position be established. We must all try to insure that the federal government provide the required law enforcement and scientific support needed, or else the agreement is useless!



STATE OF ALASKA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
JUNEAU

March 14, 1986

~~The Honorable Frank Murkowski~~
United States Senate
709 Hart Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Frank,

~~Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have just sent to Secretary~~
~~of State George P. Shultz regarding the recently concluded~~
agreement between the United States and Japan on the salmon
interception issue. As reflected in the letter, we are very
disappointed that the State Department was unable to achieve
our objective of eliminating significant interceptions of
Alaskan salmon in this current round of negotiations. I
believe that we must continue to work on further measures to
reduce these interceptions.

The agreement does contain measures which will assist Alaska
fishermen if properly implemented. This implementation will
require that the provisions of the agreement are adequately
enforced and that the research and monitoring provided for
in the agreement are carried out as a basis for further
negotiations on the reduction of interceptions.

I have requested that the State Department seek funding to
support these activities. I have enclosed a copy of a
research and monitoring proposal drafted jointly by the
University of Washington, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game which
gives their assessment of the program which would be re-
quired to fulfill the U.S. obligations under the agreement
and put us in the best position for future negotiations
regarding regulation of these fisheries. I do not have a
specific proposal related to enforcement funding. However,
as indicated in my letter to the Secretary, I believe that
the presence of a U.S. Coast Guard vessel in the eastern
part of the land-based fishing area for the entire season is
essential to both the enforcement of the line and monitoring
of the activities of this fleet. Provisions in the agree-
ment call for an exchange of observers only if we have an
enforcement presence in the area.

I would like to request that you support State Department
funding of these activities. I know that we all want to see

March 14, 1986

Page 2

an end to the interceptions of our salmon by Japan on the high seas, and that this agreement takes us only part way toward this objective. However, even this movement will have no value either directly to our fisheries or in terms of supporting future negotiating positions unless we can assess to what degree these measures reduce interception levels. This can be done only if, in fact, the United States can hold up our end of the cooperative research, management, and enforcement provisions called for in the agreement.

I believe that the agreement currently before us must be viewed only as a partial step toward our ultimate objective of eliminating significant interception of North American salmon. We still have a long way to go. While we certainly want the enforcement and other limitations imposed on the Japanese fisheries this summer, we must immediately start to focus on what our direction should be, both within and outside the terms of this agreement, to continue the campaign to end interceptions. To this end, I would like to propose forming a work group to advise us on strategies to follow in this campaign. I believe the Alaska members of our delegation to this last ten months of talks could form the nucleus of such a group since it included congressional staff, Alaska fishermen, state officials, and industry representatives. Interested Alaska legislators may also wish to take part or have staff participate. I would hope such a group could meet within the next month so that we can initiate required action as soon as possible. Programmatic support and planning for the 1986 season, for example, need to be accomplished in the immediate future.

I plan to initiate this type of brainstorming session within the state and hope that you or your staff will be available to participate. I would appreciate any suggestions you might have on timing relative to your ability to participate.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,



Bill Sheffield
Governor

Enclosure

(Identical letter sent to Senator Ted Stevens and
Congressman Don Young.)

March 14, 1986

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cc: Senator Arliss Sturgulewski
Senator John C. Sackett
Representative John Binkley
Representative Kay Wallis
Representative Adelheid Herrmann
Representative Peter Goll
Representative Richard Shultz
Commissioner Don W. Collinsworth
Mr. Ron Jolin
Mr. James Campbell
Mr. Deming Cowles
Mr. Clement V. Tillion
Mr. Harold Sparck
Mr. Henry Mitchell
Mr. Rick Lauber

Brief Outline of FY 86-87 U.S. High Seas Salmonid
Research Program Under Terms of U.S./Japan Agreement
Initialed March 8, 1986

Additional funding for U.S. high seas salmonid research is required to intensify continent-of-origin research in response to the new research mandate included in the March 8, 1986 U.S./Japan bilateral agreement on salmon interceptions and scheduled to be included in a new INPFC Annex, Memorandum of Understanding or Agreed Minutes.

Additional funding of \$80K for FY 86 will provide the following activities:

1. Hiring of two scientific observers who will travel to Japan and board Japanese salmon research vessels to collect supplementary scale samples and biological data during June cruises of the vessels in the landbased fishery area and vicinity.
2. Purchase of an image analyzer system to facilitate more rapid measurement of scales and simplify statistical analyses. The new, "state-of-the-art" system will also possibly be purchased by Japan's Far Seas Fisheries Research Lab; coordination of scale studies between the two agencies will be greatly enhanced if they both have the same scale measurement equipment.
3. Purchase of IBM-compatible micro-computers for use in data management, statistical analysis, word processing and report preparation, graphics preparation, and project administration.
4. Necessary travel to attend the extraordinary meeting of the INPFC; the present project budget does not provide for the unforeseen travel expense.
5. Collection of whole-fish steelhead from 1986 Japanese commercial and research operations.
6. Intensified efforts to increase high seas tag recovery from Asian and North American coastal fisheries.

In general, the major features permitted by supplementary funding in FY 86 will be limited (due to late timing) observer participation in Japanese salmon research vessel cruises, and gearing-up for intensified scale pattern analyses in 1986-90.

Funding of \$400K for FY 87 will provide for the following activities in addition to those routine and ongoing activities covered by existing, base-level funding:

1. Two scientific observers on two cruises of Japanese salmon research vessels in 1987, for the purpose of collecting supplementary scale samples and data, and possibly tissue samples for parasitological and electrophoretic analysis.
2. A trip by a senior staff member to Kamchatka for, in part, collection of high quality scale samples for use in new scale pattern analyses, and communication with Soviet personnel regarding scale sampling requirements. Such a trip would be made under provisions of the 1986 U.S./U.S.S.R. Bilateral Talks on Fisheries Assessments, and would be contingent on cooperation and invitation from the U.S.S.R.
3. New scale pattern analyses (with special emphasis on coho, chinook, and sockeye salmon) to determine continental origins of salmonids migrating in the high seas fishery area. These studies will be largely contingent on the success of obtaining improved scale samples for the U.S.S.R.
4. Full laboratory analysis of 1985-86 whole-fish steelhead samples, including parasitological and food habitat analyses, and initial efforts to obtain gene frequency data for stock groups not sampled previously, and data on infestation rate of origin indicating parasites in Pacific Northwest steelhead.
5. Further intensified efforts to increase high seas tag recovery, including perhaps television advertisements.
6. Continued collection of whole-fish salmonid samples from Japanese commercial and research vessel operations.

Bilateral USG/GOJ Salmon Accord, 1986
Estimated Funding Requirements for Research Annex II

Projected addition to FY 86 budget to begin intensified continent of origin studies on salmonids.

Salary (including benefits)

1.	Perm. Biol. II	6,630
2.	2 observers to work 1 month at sea on FAJ research vessels	4,000
3.	Student helpers to process 1985 steelhead parasite samples	4,320
		<u>14,950</u>

Travel

1.	To attend extraordinary INPFC meeting, April 1986	3,000
2.	2 observers to travel to and from Japan for boarding research vessels	3,400
		<u>6,400</u>

Supplies and Services

1.	Transport of 1986 steelhead whole fish	5,000
2.	PC software	1,000
3.	Fisheries Cost Center	1,200
4.	Misc.	1,286
5.	Extra CDC computer time	2,000
		<u>10,486</u>

Equipment

1.	Image analyzer for scale processing	25,000
2.	PC and ancillary hardware	11,000
		<u>36,000</u>

Indirect Costs

12,164

FY 1986 Total = \$80,000

Projected Budget for FY 87

Salaries

Faculty	7,000
Biologist 5 FT	129,640
Res. Asst. (steelhead parasites and electr.)	10,800
Temp. Biol. I (U.S.S.R.)	2,369
Temp. Biol. J (2 for FAJ RV's for 2½ months)	8,459
Student hourly:	<u>5,000</u>
	163,468

Benefits 33,387

Travel

U.S.S.R.	3,000
Japan Observers	3,500
INPFC Meetings	3,000
Alaska	4,000
Alaska + local for R.A.	3,000
Misc.	<u>3,500</u>
	20,000

Supplies and Services	41,000
Cost Center	18,000
CDC Computer Time	6,000
Equipment (misc. micro hardware)	<u>4,000</u>
Total Direct Costs	\$285,855

Indirect Costs \$114,586

Total Budget \$400,441

STATE OF ALASKA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
JUNEAU

March 14, 1986

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The recently concluded agreement between negotiators regarding U.S./Japan high seas salmon relationships falls far short of our ultimate goal of eliminating significant interceptions of North American salmon and steelhead by the high seas fleets of Japan. By our calculation, the agreement in its present form will provide no more than a 20 to 30 percent reduction in the interceptions currently being made by these fleets over an eight year period.

The agreement does not reduce interceptions in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. It does not move the land-based fishery ten degrees farther west as required to eliminate significant interceptions, nor does it remove the Japanese from the central Bering Sea as quickly as we desired.

I am extremely disappointed that you were unable to achieve greater reductions in Japan's time and area of fishing, particularly in the land-based fishery. Although an improvement over the current situation, the agreement is not an acceptable end to the interception problem. We must continue to seek further movement in reducing interceptions.

While the phase-out of Japanese fishing in the central Bering Sea has long been an objective of ours, I believe that the primary value of this agreement is the improved enforcement, research, and catch monitoring programs jointly agreed to by the two countries. These aspects of the agreement serve as the basis for future evaluation of what further measures will be required to eliminate significant interceptions.

The agreement contains the appropriate language regarding research and monitoring, but the governments of both countries

Secretary Schultz

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March 14, 1986


must commit resources to ensure that this program goes forward. Since the U.S. State Department has committed to this process in lieu of immediate regulatory relief from interception, I believe that it is the obligation of the State Department to help secure the funding to support this agreement.

The National Marine Fisheries Service, Fisheries Research Institute at the University of Washington, and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game are cooperating in drafting proposals for research and monitoring, including the presence of U.S. observers on Japanese research and enforcement vessels. These proposals will be provided to Ambassador Ed Wolfe for his information.

I respectfully request that you strongly support Administration funding of these proposals. I also request that you support funding of the presence of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in the eastern part of the land-based fishery during the entire season that this fishery is open. I believe only by this type of cooperative research, monitoring, and enforcement presence can we ensure that the government of Japan will reciprocate and that any long-range benefits of this agreement can be realized.

Thank you for your consideration of my views.

Sincerely,



Bill Sheffield
Governor

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

ALASKA

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS
AFFAIRS
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INDIAN AFFAIRS
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 27, 1986

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BUREAU OFFICE

FEDERAL BUILDING, BOX 1847
(202) 536-7400

The Honorable Adelheid Herrmann
Alaska State Legislature
Pouch V (MS 3100)
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Dear Adelheid:

Thanks for sending me a copy of your letter to Secretary Shultz concerning ongoing negotiations between Japan and the United States on the salmon interception issue. Despite recommendations from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, the Alaska Congressional delegation, and most Alaskan groups, the State Department has thus far not been willing to effectively withhold bottomfish allocations from Japan. After seven rounds of bilateral talks Japan still does not appear willing to sit down and work out a solution.

However, that battle is not over yet. I met this week with Ambassador Negraponte, who is directing the State Department negotiations on this issue and expressed my disappointment over their inability to use allocations to bring about a solution to this problem. I told him that I have not lessened my resolve to solve the problem and that I expected the State Department to be a tough negotiator and come up with a winning solution.

The State Department's reluctance to withhold bottomfish allocations has disturbed me, and it is apparent that they are weighing the salmon interception issue with other foreign policy questions. I am also aware of the extent to which Japan is willing to retaliate if we withhold allocations. I believe that Japan may try to disrupt our salmon industry if the State Department does completely withhold bottomfish allocations. I will continue to resist the State Department's attempts to trade away this issue, and Japan's delaying tactics.

This is a very complicated and difficult issue. It has risen to a high level of visibility within the governments of both Japan and the United States, and we are now closer to a resolution than at any time since 1978. It is important not only

The Honorable Adelheid Herrmann
February 27, 1986
Page 2

for Alaska's salmon fishermen whose fish are being intercepted, it also addresses very important questions regarding high seas resource management. The resolution of the interception problem will also affect future Japan-U.S. fishery development plans, both directly and indirectly.

Please be assured that I will continue to work to resolve the salmon interception issue.

Sincerely,

Frank H. Murkowski
United States Senator

CITY COUNCIL OF MOUNTAIN VILLAGE

P.O. BOX 204 • MOUNTAIN VILLAGE, ALASKA 99632

Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Honorable Stevens,

I am writing you and asking for support for Western Alaskan Fishermen.

Fishing is the only source of income for our village, fishermen within my village, and others. The fish is also the major source of food for our families.

We would like to see all interceptions fisheries on the 200 mile area removed immediately. This includes all gill net fisheries and trawl fleets.


We immediately request that the United States and other foreign trawlers be deaced within the South Unimek Shumgin Islands.

I am requesting this due to the reason that the Western Alaska Fishermen are suffering from hardship this summer season. The majority of the fishermen did not make enough monies this summer to pay for their winter and summer bills.

Majority of the fishermen would not like to depend on welfare to make ends meet with their families.

We need your immediate assistance and support for our Western Alaska Fishermen. Quyana.

Sincerely,



Harry Wilde, Sr.,
Chairman of AVCP

cc: Honorable Governor Sheffield
Honorable Frank Murkowski
Honorable Donald E. Young
Sen. John C. Sacket
Sen. Frank Ferguson
Rep. Kay Wallis
Rep. John Fuller
Rep. Albert Adams
Rep. Adelheid Herrmann
Pres. AVCP Gene Peltola
Calista Fisheries Ray Christiansen

HW/las

REPRESENTATIVE
PETER GOLL



POUCH V
JUNEAU, ALASKA 99811
(907) 465-1925

STATE OF ALASKA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MEMORANDUM

May 8, 1985

TO: All Legislators

FROM: Representative Peter Goll *Peter*

SUBJECT: High Seas Interceptions of Alaska Salmon

Attached are three letters of support for House Joint Resolution 43, which requests the federal government to take quick action to halt the interception of Alaska salmon on the high seas by Japanese gillnet fleets. The widespread support for this effort is reflected in the letters from the state's two largest sportfishing associations and Alaska's largest group representing commercial fishermen.

Renegotiation of the treaty with Japan affecting the high seas fisheries is currently under consideration in Washington, D.C. Quick passage of this resolution will help trigger a decision.

I respectfully request your support of this resolution in the waning days of the session.



Alaska Sportfishing Association

3605 Arctic Blvd., Suite 300 • Anchorage, Alaska 99503

TO: All Alaska Legislators DATE: May 7, 1985

SUBJECT: HJR 43

The Kenai River Sportfishing Association urges your support of HJR 43 which calls for a halt to the High Seas interception of Alaska Salmon by Japanese fishing fleets.

The most recent figures estimate that the Japanese mothership and the landbased salmon gill net fleets intercepted one million, ninety-nine thousand Alaska bound salmon in 1983. These interceptions include 106,000 King Salmon from South Central Alaska spots; more than the combined sport, commercial, and subsistence catches in Cook Inlet that year. An end to these destructive fisheries would greatly enhance recreational sportfishing opportunities in Cook Inlet.

We urge immediate passage of this important resolution.

Hunter Fisher



KENAI RIVER SPORTFISHING ASSOCIATION

3301 "C" Street Suite 202
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
Phone (907) 276-1451



May 7, 1985

Kenai River Sportfishing Association urges your support of HJR #43 which calls for a halt to the high seas interception of Alaska salmon by Japanese fishing fleet. The most recent figures estimate that the Japanese mother ship and the land based salmon gill net fleet intercepted 1,990,000 Alaska bound salmon in 1983. These interceptions include 106,000 King Salmon from southcentral Alaska spots more than the combined Sport, Commercial and Subsistence catches in Cook Inlet that year.

An end to these destructive fisheries would greatly enhance recreational sportfishing opportunities in Cook Inlet. We urge immediate passage of this important resolution.

by Bob Gerdon, Jr.
acting President of Kenai River Sportfishing Association



UNITED FISHERMEN OF ALASKA

319 Seward Street, Suite #10
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1198
(907) 586-2820

Cass M. Parsons
Executive Director

May 8, 1985

Honorable Peter Goll
House of Representatives
Pouch V
Juneau, AK 99811

Dear Representative Goll:

The United Fishermen of Alaska (UFA) wish to inform you of our position and recommendations regarding the interception of Alaskan salmon on the high seas. The UFA is the largest association of commercial fishermen in the United States, and represents fishermen throughout Alaska. The UFA are strongly opposed to any foreign interception of Alaskan salmon, since interception decreases the ability of our hardworking members to earn a living.

Of course, it is not just the fishermen who are hurt by the loss of Alaska bound salmon. The over 40,000 people employed in the seafood industry, and the many thousands of other people employed in the transportation and service industries which support the commercial fishing harvest, are all negatively impacted. This needless loss of Alaskan salmon also translates into a loss of revenues to the State and local governments.

Just one example of interception is the 106,000 king salmon which have been denied to commercial, recreational, and subsistence users in Southcentral Alaska. The UFA would like to know what, if any, benefit the State of Alaska enjoys in exchange for this subsidization of the foreign fleet?

The UFA supports HJR 43 because the complete elimination of high seas interception is long overdue. For this reason, we recommend that the State of Alaska request the U.S. State Department to immediately begin negotiations which will bring an end to high seas interception.

Sincerely,

Cass M. Parsons
UFA Executive Director

Introduced: 5/2/85
Referred: House Special Committee
on Fisheries and Resources

1 IN THE HOUSE

BY GOLL

2 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 43

3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

4 FOURTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

5 Relating to the interception of Alaska
6 salmon on the high seas.

7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

8 WHEREAS Alaska's salmon represents one of the state's most important
9 renewable resources; and

10 WHEREAS more than 40,000 people are employed in commercial fish pro-
11 cessing and harvesting jobs in the state during the salmon season, and
12 thousands of other people in the transportation and service industries in
13 the state benefit from this economic activity; and

14 WHEREAS the Alaska commercial salmon industry contributes millions of
15 dollars annually to state and local government treasuries through taxes,
16 assessments and fees, and salmon fishing and processing represent the
17 economic backbone of many coastal communities in the state; and

18 WHEREAS salmon is a mainstay in the diets of state residents who
19 harvest the great fish by rod and reel, net, and fishwheel for personal and
20 family consumption; and

21 WHEREAS recreational fishing for salmon is an experience enjoyed by
22 most state residents each year; and

23 WHEREAS an estimated 1,099,000 salmon originating in the state were
24 harvested on the high seas by Japanese fishing fleets during 1983; and

25 WHEREAS these high seas interceptions deprived state residents of
26 commercial fishing opportunities valued at \$16,100,000 to fishermen, and
27 \$30,500,000 to seafood processors; and

28 WHEREAS this lost opportunity cost the state treasury between \$482,452
29 and \$804,086 in lost fisheries business tax revenue alone; and

1 WHEREAS the interception figures include 106,000 chinook salmon from
2 South Central Alaska stocks, more than the combined catches of recreation-
3 al, commercial and subsistence fishermen in Cook Inlet in 1983; and

4 WHEREAS Japanese fishermen catch billions of pounds of fin and shell-
5 fish in the state's 200-mile fishery conservation zone each year;

6 BE IT RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully requests
7 the U.S. Department of State to immediately begin negotiations that will
8 lead to complete elimination of high seas interceptions of salmon of Alaska
9 origin; and be it

10 FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully
11 requests U.S. Congress to adopt amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conser-
12 vation and Management Act preventing nations that intercept Alaska-bound
13 salmon on the high seas from receiving allocations to harvest groundfish in
14 the United States' 200-mile fishery conservation zone.

15 COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Ronald
16 Reagan, President of the United States; the Honorable George Schultz,
17 Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert Dole, U.S. Senate Majority Leader;
18 the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the U.S. House of Repre-
19 sentatives; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank
20 Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
21 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; to Mr. William Gordon, assis-
22 tant administrator for fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service; and to
23 Mr. James Campbell, chairman, North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

These areas of concern are enclosed.

Each issue paper with supporting documents for each one of

U.S. groundfish fisheries.

such interdependencies while allowing for full development of

groundfish treaty fisheries and possible means of reducing

and (4) assessment of incidental salmon catches in

salmon catches by the "squad fisheries" of Korea and Taiwan

data and regulation of high seas incidental and/or discarded

salmon by the high seas squid fishery of Japan; (3) better

Department (2) improvement of the data on incidental catches of

discarded land-based and non-relationship salmon fishing fleets of

elimination of high seas salmon interceptions by the

limitation of high seas salmon interceptions are: (1)

The primary issues currently being considered relative to

High Seas Salmon Interception Issues

Attending Paper

2/25/88 Dmtt

Japanese High Seas Salmon Fisheries


Two Japanese high seas salmon gillnet fisheries operate in the north Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea. The Japanese mothership fishery operates primarily in the Bering Sea, both within our fisheries conservation zone and outside it. The Japanese landbased fishery operates in the north Pacific Ocean south of the area of operation of the mothership fleet. (Map 1 enclosed).

Between them, these two gillnet fisheries catch 20-25 million salmon annually, the preponderance of which are of Asian origin (mostly U.S.S.R.). The Japanese pay a fee to Russia to fish Asian salmon on the high seas, but the Soviets do not allow them to fish within their fisheries conservation zone.


The combined harvest of these two fleets used to be in the 40-60 million catch range prior to the renegotiation of the International North Pacific Fisheries convention and harvest limit reductions in the Japan/U.S.S.R. salmon agreement.

MAP 1

Annex C - Map of the Japanese High-Sea Salmon Fishery



INFPC SUBAREAS



CHARLES McTHERS FISHING AREAS

MAP 2

° The recent renegotiation of International North Pacific Fisheries convention between Canada, Japan, and the United States in 1978 resulted in a substantial reduction in the harvest of North American salmon by the Japanese. Japanese mothership fishery had to pull back ten degrees of longitude to the west and incurred further time and area restrictions (Map 1 and 2). Landbased fisheries likewise pulled back ten degrees farther to the west (to 175° east longitude). Interceptions of Bristol Bay sockeye salmon in the mothership fishery alone had been estimated to average at least 2½ million salmon per year. Losses were probably quite a bit higher due to unreported dropout loss from the gillnets. These catches have been reduced to about 200-400 thousand per year. Reductions in catches of coho, chinook and chum salmon of Alaskan origin were also realized by these changes in fishing area.

° Levels of interception in the landbased area were less clearly defined prior to the renegotiation of INPFC, but were known to be significant. The western pullback of ten degrees did move this fleet out of areas of known concentrations of North American sockeye and coho salmon, mostly from western Alaska.

While the renegotiation did reduce interceptions, it was known that North American salmon were still being caught in both the landbased and mothership fleets in the new fishing areas. We knew, for example, that western Alaskan chinook were vulnerable to harvest in the mothership fishery. Four years ago, the Japanese undertook voluntary measures after discussions with fishermen from western Alaska to limit their chinook harvest in the mothership fleet to an average of 110,000 chinook per year to prevent peak catches of the sizes that occurred in 1980 when 704,000 total chinook were taken, of which over half were of western Alaskan origin. This agreement, however, did not reduce the average level of chinook harvest that has been experienced since 1973, with the exception of the 1980 season. There were also problems with ensuring that it was being enforced, particularly in regards to discard of chinook from catcher boats fishing outside our fisheries conservation zone. Discarded fish would still be lost to the U.S. harvest, but it would not count against the Japanese quota. We initially had problems in getting adequate observer coverage on catcher boats within our fisheries conservation zone and the Japanese would not allow observers on catcher boats outside our FCZ (in the central Bering Sea).

Recent information from a study conducted by the department to the Fisheries Research Institute, University of Washington, showed that substantial number of chinook in both the landbased and mothership fleets were of Alaskan origin and, surprisingly, a large proportion were from central Alaska, as well as western Alaska. The catch of central Alaska salmon may average about 100,000 chinook per year, which exceeds the annual catch for recreational, commercial and subsistence fishermen in this area. Again, these figures do not take into account unreported loss due to dropout from the gillnets. Also, these fish are being taken as immatures weighing an average of only five or six pounds compared to an inshore average as adults of 20 pounds or more.

The United States has consistently maintained that high seas salmon fisheries should be eliminated for a variety of reasons, including the fact that stocks are fully utilized in coastal areas, stocks are broadly mixed on the high seas, making management for conservation difficult, and significant wastage occurs in high seas salmon fisheries because of the harvest of immature fish and the dropout from high seas gillnets.

Prior to the INPFC meeting November 1984, the Governor sent letters and issued press releases regarding this

interception with a request that INPFC take action to halt it. Since INPFC is composed of United States, Canada, and Japan, and the action has to have concurrence of all three parties, no specific action was possible at this meeting. The U.S. did, however, informally indicate to the Japanese that it thought that bilateral discussions should be started as soon as possible to reduce these interceptions. The U.S. also made formal strong statements regarding its position on the elimination of high seas salmon interceptions. Resolutions in this regard were also forthcoming from the Board of Fisheries and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council.

Subsequently, the State Department has indicated interest in initiating an appropriate bilateral with Japan, but no specific dates have been set. The North Pacific Council, at its February meeting in Sitka, passed a motion that the initiation of such a bilateral should take place as soon as possible and that successful culmination of discussions was a prerequisite to future Japanese allocations of groundfish species.

While we have not taken an official negotiating position on this issue, an appropriate phased reduction would take care of most of our concerns. Obviously,

timetables and degree of cutback would be areas of negotiation, but the thrust would be to eliminate all areas of known salmon interception on the high seas. We have no problem with the Japanese harvesting Asian salmon if the Russians and their own coastal fishermen want them to do so. They should be able to conduct those harvests adequately within their own and the Russian 200 mile zones.

adhere to their own northern boundary limitations on U.S. scientists estimate that Japanese vessels

low.

Salmon incidental catch is unknown, but reported to be The fishery in 1981 caught 22,000 tons of squid.

be marked.


known is prohibited and that the vessels and gear must salmon abundance, catching or possession of salmon or fishing effort south of the cooler waters of high the northern boundary shifts by month to keep the squid is limited between 145° west and 170° east longitude, Japanese regulations for this fishery include that it

harvest salmon.

far as we can determine, the jig fishing does not of a net which of a size that will retain salmon. It consists of over 500 vessels fishing over 10,000 miles of 170° east in the North Pacific. The gillnet fishery fishery for squid has existed for some time to the west squid in the north Pacific (map enclosed). A jig The Japanese initiated in 1978 a high seas gillnet for

Japanese High Seas Squid Fishery

MAP 3
Japanese Squid Fishery



with their enforcement.

with the Japanese squid fishery regulations. Similarly
in general, we, at this stage, have no major questions

salmon.

this place to determine the presence or absence of
research efforts to test fish in the area occupied by
area, and; (3) that where possible, we radiotelemetry
press for better data on catch and effort by time and
current management scheme; (2) that we continue to
should be that: (1) they adhere to and enforce their
Our position on the Japanese squid fishery

not been very comprehensive.

in very low volume. These observations, however, have
appeared to be for crew members personal use, and that
revealed any retention of salmon except what has
Observation of vessels landing squid in Japan have not

is not very good in this fishery.

outside the Japanese prescribed areas, that enforcement
We know from observation of some squid vessels fishing

temperature.

our knowledge of salmon distribution relative to water
their fisheries, salmon catches would be minimal, based on

- ° There is a problem with derelict gear from all gillnet fisheries that has been the subject of recent workshops, but no final solution.

Taiwanese "Squid" Fishery

Dramatic growth has occurred in this fishery. It has gone from 12 vessels in 1980 to 140 vessels in 1983. Since the Taiwanese are not part of any formal international body (such as INPPC) with the United States and do not have formal diplomatic relations with the United States; there has been no standard mechanism for exchange of data. We have some data on catch effort and area of fishing, but it is not complete or consistent by year.

This fishery obviously targeted to some degree on salmon in both 1983 and 1984. In 1983, reports received in the United States indicated that some 50-60 Taiwanese vessels switched from squid to target on salmon and in the latter part of the season may have landed as much as 100 tons of salmon per boat. Apparently these salmon were mostly pink and chum salmon, presumably of Asian origin. Steps were taken to encourage Japan to ban imports of salmon to Japan from Taiwan. These efforts supposedly met with a varying amount of success.

In 1984, the Taiwanese announced their intention of prosecuting a directed high seas salmon fishery supposedly in areas similar to the western parts of the Japanese landbased and mothership fisheries. A storm of controversy ensued and the United States was successful in getting Japan and Korea to ban import of salmon from Taiwan. No specific data on catch effort and location of harvest has been provided us for this summer's fishery, either for squid effort or salmon. One industry estimate was that up to 4 million salmon may have been taken. Probably most of these were of Asian origin, but undoubtedly North American salmon were present in the catch.

The Taiwanese have recently presented a proposal to the United States government on the conduct of their squid fisheries in response to the U.S. concerns. They are willing to adopt a series of domestic regulations that they believe will reduce salmon harvest of North American stocks to an acceptable level. We have reviewed this proposal, both in the form discussed at the council meeting in Sitka and in the final document recently presented to the State Department in Washington, D.C. We believe this to be a major step in the right direction, but the measures proposed are not adequate.

° We believe that the Taiwanese should adopt the same restrictions that the Japanese government has in place for their squid fishery. Of particular importance is that the northern boundary of this fishery be kept south of the colder waters normally inhabited by salmon, in the same way the Japanese squid fishery is required to do. We believe that retention of salmon of east or west of 170° east should be prohibited. Our North American salmon occur to the west of 170° east and to allow their retention would be inconsistent with our desire to move directed high seas salmon fisheries completely off the high seas back within each nations 200-mile zone. Moreover, vessel licensing, documentation of gear identification, which are all parts of the Japanese regulations, should also be adopted by the Taiwanese.

We should also demand better data on catch and effort by time and area in this fishery.

° Further discussions on the Taiwanese proposal are ongoing in Washington, DC with our State Office and congressional delegation. They may suggest modifications of their proposal along the lines suggested above.

Korean Squid Fishery

This fishery has a minor amount of effort compared to either the Taiwanese or Japanese fisheries and does not receive as much attention as the other two. We have no documentation that this fishery is targeting on or taking significant numbers of salmon incidentally. As a matter of fact, we have very little information on the fishery catch, effort or area of fishing.

We need to obtain better information on the Korean squid fishery and should request that this information be provided through the appropriate diplomatic channels. If necessary, the request for this type of information should be tied to the allocation process in the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council.

It seems appropriate that Korea should be requested to adopt the same regulations that govern the Japanese high seas squid fishery, including the non-retention of salmon. Although they are not a party to the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission or other international fisheries conventions, they must come to the United States for joint venture and directed groundfish fisheries within our fisheries

conservation zone. Adoption of the Japanese regulatory scheme for squid fishery should be made part of the total package.

Incidental Salmon Harvests in Joint Ventures
and Foreign Groundfish Fisheries

The aggregate harvest of salmon, particularly chinooks, in the various groundfish fisheries off Alaska is substantial. Although it varies by year, incidental harvests in the Gulf of Alaska, largely in association with pollock fisheries, probably average 20,000 to 50,000 salmon per year (mostly chinook). Harvests in the Bering Sea are probably the same order of magnitude. In 1984, it is estimated that 76,000 salmon (mostly chum) were taken incidentally in Bering Sea foreign and joint ventures trawl fisheries. Although foreign fisheries salmon harvests have been reduced by agreement with the North Pacific Council, domestic and joint venture salmon harvests are not clearly regulated. The aggregate chinook incidental harvest in the Gulf and Bering Sea may be over 75,000 fish in some years.

The state should continue to pursue with the Federal Government the need to collect better statistics on this salmon by-catch and to explore means to reduce it.

Governor's Presentation at October 9
Senate Hearings on Pelagic Gillnetting

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on the issue of high seas pelagic gillnetting. This issue is of vital importance to the conservation and management of our marine resources, but even more importantly, it is vital to the economic and social well-being of Alaskans.

The interception of Alaskan salmon on the high seas by the pelagic gillnets of the landbased and mothership fleets of Japan costs the citizens of our state approximately 20 million dollars per year in lost harvest opportunity. This massive economic loss is made even more severe by the fact that it disproportionately falls on the citizens of western Alaska, and particularly the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim region, which is one of the most economically depressed regions in the United States. The average annual individual income of fishermen in the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim is only about \$5,000. Additionally, because of their low cash income, citizens of this area are extremely dependent on these salmon resources for subsistence use.

In addition to the conservation/allocation concerns for our salmon fishery, these high seas fisheries are also destructive to other marine resources such as marine birds and marine mammals. The number of these animals destroyed

by high seas gillnets, both when fishing and when lost at sea, is staggering.

The legal justification for this foreign fishing is found in the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (INPFC). The treaty, first signed in 1952, by the United States, Canada, and Japan, established a line at 175° W. longitude in the north Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea as the eastern limit of Japanese fishing. The United States, at that time, thought the line would be an effective division point between stocks of Asian origin and stocks of North American origin. Subsequent research, conducted under the auspices of INPFC, conclusively proved that this was not true, and in fact, massive interceptions of North American, primarily Alaskan, salmon were occurring each year. The INPFC required concurrence of all three national sections to implement any change in the so-called abstention line. Consequently, for 26 years, these interceptions continued over the protest of the United States.

Upon the enactment of the Magnuson Act in 1976, the INPFC, which allowed a foreign fishery on our domestic salmon stocks in our fisheries conservation zone, automatically came into conflict with domestic law. Under the terms of the Magnuson Act, the INPFC had to be renegotiated, and this was done in 1978. From the U.S. perspective, the new protocol was negotiated in order to allow the Japanese to

continue its harvest of Asian salmon on the high seas without impacting Alaskan (and Canadian) stocks. The result was the movement of the Japanese fleets westward towards the Asian coast and out of what were known at that time to be the most important interception areas, particularly those areas affecting Bristol Bay sockeye salmon. Future relationships regarding groundfish harvests off our coast and pressure by the Soviets to reduce the Japanese salmon quota probably contributed to the success of this renegotiation.

This 1978 renegotiation of the convention moved the abstention line ten degrees farther to the west (an average of 450 miles). The Japanese mothership fishery was allowed to continue fishing in the far western part of our fisheries conservation zone in exchange for concessions made on the high seas outside of the zone. There is no doubt that this movement substantially reduced interceptions of North American salmon, but it did not eliminate them.

While the renegotiation in 1978 was a step in the right direction, it was not intended by the United States, or the State of Alaska, to be the end of the journey toward rational management of Alaska's salmon stocks. That goal was, and continues to be, an end to interception of North American salmon on the high seas. These fish stocks are fully utilized and intensely managed. The State of Alaska,

alone, spends over \$40 million annually on management and enhancement of its salmon resources. The salmon fishery forms the backbone of our largest industry and is the basic sustenance of life in many of our rural communities.

Alaska has had a long and productive relationship with Japan. Our fisheries resources have supplied Japanese markets, and we believe this relationship is beneficial to both our country and theirs.

However, we cannot accept a situation under which resources managed and nurtured by our citizens are harvested for gain by others without our direct involvement or agreement. The magnitude of the impacts is difficult to assess accurately, due to the mixed stock nature of the fishery, ~~drop~~ dropout ✓ deadloss from gillnets and resource damage from derelict gear. Enforcement is extremely difficult, and catch reporting accuracy in some of these fisheries is problematic with regards to both species and area of catch. This makes an annual management regime responsive to regional needs unlikely.

While a great deal of research has been done on the continent of origin of salmon in the high seas fishing areas, every new study reveals interception impacts we previously had not imagined. Research conducted since the renegotiation of INPFC in 1978 shows that the Japanese

landbased and mothership fisheries still intercept a significant number of Alaskan salmon. Last fall, in Alaska, the publication of a study, funded jointly by the State and federal government and conducted by the University of Washington caused considerable furor. That study concluded that not only western Alaska chinook were being intercepted, but also chinook from central Alaska, southeast Alaska, and British Columbia. While Japanese scientists may debate the exact level of these interceptions, every new study simply confirms that the interceptions are worse than previously expected. The only answer is to develop a specific stock management plan that ensures that these salmon of North American origin return to Alaskan waters to benefit Alaskans instead of being intercepted by Japanese fishermen on the high seas.

Historically, the Japanese salmon fisheries were coastal and concentrated on Asian salmon. When Japanese fishery operations were forced to leave Soviet soil, they moved offshore. In addition, Japan's own natural salmon runs were depleted by overfishing and habitat destruction, forcing the Japanese industry to look elsewhere for a new source of fish. The logical solution was to move further offshore where the same salmon, often as immatures, could be harvested.

From our viewpoint, any high seas fishery is wasteful and a poor management alternative. However, if Japan and the U.S.S.R. agree on such management of Asian stocks, that is their concern. The Japan-Soviet agreement has moved Japanese fleets further offshore, out of the Soviet zone and even out of major high seas areas outside their zone, causing the Japanese to expand their effort in areas where North American salmon occur, and resulting in our involvement in the issue.

At the same time its Asian fleets were being moved offshore, Japan was working to become a world leader in aquaculture. Japan's hatchery-bred salmon runs are the envy of many nations, with coastal harvests of hatchery salmon now exceeding the total harvests by the high seas salmon fleets. These hatchery returns did not exist when the high seas fleets first put to sea. If maintenance of Japanese high seas ~~fisheries~~ ^{fishery fleets} is a high priority, as has been claimed, why are they not given access to their own resources? Obviously, the answer is that Japanese coastal fishermen and their cooperatives are no more receptive to high seas interceptions of their managed stocks than are Alaskans to theirs.

This is the situation we face: to catch Asian salmon under an Asian salmon agreement, and under a fee schedule quota system for Asian salmon, the Japanese fleets fish in the

U.S. zone, the central Bering Sea, and areas to the east of 160° longitude in the north Pacific. These areas would not be necessary to catch Japan's Asian salmon catch quota, except that Japan has agreed with the U.S.S.R. to stay out of the most logical areas to harvest Asian salmon.

The time has come to phase out this anachronistic approach to salmon management. Japan claims it is not harvesting Alaskan salmon on purpose, but only to claim its share of Asian salmon based on a historical right to these stocks. Since there is a Japanese fishery in the U.S. zone, but not in the Soviet zone, these arguments have apparently not persuaded the Soviet government. All three countries recognize the legitimate right of the state of origin to manage its anadromous resources, even on the high seas. The time has come to match these legal principles with action.

We are sympathetic to the economic dependence of Japanese high seas salmon fishermen in this fishery created by years of Soviet agreements and under the INPFC. We believe a phased approach to eliminating interceptions is acceptable to give Japan time to seek a more Asian-oriented salmon fishery regime from the Soviets, or the movement of Japan's fleets into alternative fisheries. This process must not, however, be allowed to drag on indefinitely. We believe that there are solutions to allow continued harvest of Asian stocks without significant interception of North American

salmon, but they will require considerable change in the present arrangement including movement of Japanese fleets farther to the west.

Towards this end, the United States this year has initiated bilateral discussions with the government of Japan on ways to reduce or eliminate North American interceptions. To date, the Japanese have not responded with any constructive proposals or actions which they are willing to take to eliminate these interceptions. While further talks are scheduled, continued adamant refusals to recognize our concerns and our legal authority to manage these stocks must be taken into account when considering other cooperative programs with Japan on the harvest and development of the non-salmon fisheries off our coast. As Japan is the largest harvester of groundfish resources from the continental shelf off Alaska, further allocations of these other fisheries to Japan should certainly take into account Japanese cooperation, or the lack of it, on the salmon interception issue.

I must emphasize that the high seas interception of Alaskan salmon resources is one of the most aggravating political issues in Alaska. We continue to get communications on almost a daily basis from Alaskan fishermen complaining about high seas interceptions. Progress must be made toward

solution of this issue. The economic well-being of many of our residents is at stake.

Thank you for this opportunity to express our views.



Official Business

Alaska State Legislature

House of Representatives

Special Committee on Fisheries

Pouch V
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Phone:
(907) 465-4924

January 24, 1986

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Main State Department Building
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The House Special Committee on Fisheries and other members of the Alaska House of Representatives are extremely disappointed at the collapse of bilateral negotiations with Japan on the high-seas interception of Alaska salmon.

Despite the best efforts of the state and federal governments to convince the Japanese that the interceptions represent a serious foreign policy issue, the Japanese government and fishing industry apparently are refusing to negotiate in good faith.

Our concern is compounded by the Japanese threats to impose sanctions against U.S. seafood imports. We find this situation particularly distressing since Japan is a most important trading partner with both the U.S. and Alaska. The possibility of Alaska seafoods being embargoed is of great concern to all Alaskans, but our resolve in the interception issue is not lessened by threats.

The State of Alaska has been extremely careful to manage its commercial fisheries to avoid interceptions of salmon stocks destined to Japan, even though many of these fish pass through our waters. At the same time, the Japanese have been allowed to catch and purchase billions of pounds of groundfish in our 200-mile zone each year.

Last May, members of the Alaska Legislature approved a resolution urging the federal government to withhold allocations of groundfish from the Japanese if they should fail to negotiate in good faith on the interception issue. This position was endorsed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council in December when it recommended a withholding of all groundfish allocations to the Japanese until progress has been made in the salmon interception talks.


Honorable George Shultz
January 24, 1986
Page Two


We believe that now is the time for the United States to hold firm on the interception issue. We urge you to withhold the Japanese groundfish allocations until real progress has been accomplished toward a cutback in the high seas take of Alaska salmon by Japan's high-seas gillnet fleets.


Furthermore, we endorse Governor Sheffield's proposal to deduct 10,000 metric tons of groundfish already allocated to the Japanese as an expression of the U.S. dissatisfaction with the breakdown of the negotiations. These 10,000 ton penalties should continue on a monthly basis until the Japanese return to the bargaining table.


In conclusion, Mr. Secretary, we urge you to withhold all further groundfish allocations to the Japanese until the salmon interception issue is resolved.


Sincerely,



Rep. Peter Goll
Chairman
House Fisheries Committee



Rep. John Binkley
Member
House Fisheries Committee


Rep. Katie Hurley
Member
House Fisheries Committee



Rep. Roger Jenkins
Member
House Fisheries Committee



Rep. Andre Marrou
Member
House Fisheries Committee


Rep. Mike Navarre
Member
House Fisheries Committee



Rep. Dave Thompson
Member
House Fisheries Committee


Rep. Ben Grussendorf
Speaker of the House




Rep. Adelheid Herrmann
Co-Chairman
House Resources Committee

Rep. Richard Shultz
Co-Chairman
House Resources Committee




Hi Uncle George

Honorable George Shultz
January 24, 1986
Page Three

F. Kay Wallis
Rep. F. Kay Wallis

Al Adams
Rep. Al Adams

Bette Cato
Rep. Bette Cato

Virginia Collins
Rep. Virginia Collins

Mike Davis
Rep. Mike Davis

Steve Frank
Rep. Steve Frank

Max Gruenberg, Jr.
Rep. Max Gruenberg, Jr.

Niilo Koponen
Rep. Niilo Koponen

Terry Martin
Rep. Terry Martin

Mike W. Miller
Rep. Mike W. Miller

Fritz Pettyjohn
Rep. Fritz Pettyjohn

Marco Pignalberi
Rep. Marco Pignalberi

Steve Rieger
Rep. Steve Rieger

John Sund
Rep. John Sund

Robin Taylor
Rep. Robin Taylor

Jack Fuller
Rep. Jack Fuller

H.A. Boucher
Rep. H.A. Boucher

Don Clocksin
Rep. Don Clocksin

Sam Cotten
Rep. Sam Cotten

Jim Duncan
Rep. Jim Duncan

Walter Furnace
Rep. Walter Furnace

Alyce Hanley
Rep. Alyce Hanley

Ronald J. Larson
Rep. Ronald Larson

M. Mike Miller
Rep. M. Mike Miller

Drue Pearce
Rep. Drue Pearce

Randy Phillips
Rep. Randy Phillips

Pat Pourchot
Rep. Pat Pourchot

John Ringstad
Rep. John Ringstad

Mike Szymanski
Rep. Mike Szymanski

Rick Uehling
Rep. Rick Uehling

RESOLUTION 11-22-85-05
ESKIMO WALRUS COMMISSION

WHEREAS, the Eskimo Walrus Commission is made up of 17 walrus hunting communities from Northern, Northwestern, and Western Alaska; and

WHEREAS, the villages are depending on the renewable resources, like salmon and marine mammals to sustain their needs and to acquire their livelihood; and

WHEREAS, the Bering Sea is used by the marine mammals for breeding, pupping and is a prime habitat; and

WHEREAS, the foreign and American fisheries in the Bering Sea, within the 200 mile limit, has a high salmon fisheries and interception, both with salmon and marine mammals, with no penalties and no rules;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the State of Alaska and the United States government make restrictions so the foreign incidental catch for salmon fisheries and the take of marine mammals be zeroed out and that domestic fisheries for salmon be reduced to a level that do not affect the coastal residents and that marine mammals are not taken.

ATTEST:



Jonah K. Tokeinna, Chairman

Table 7. Economic impact to the western Alaskan commercial fisheries from Japan's highseas salmon gillnet fisheries, 1983.

Species	Catch estimates		Exvessel Value (1)	First Wholesale Value
	Japanese	Intercepted		
Chinook	265,000	100,000	5,886,000	11,183,000
Sockeye	2,483,000	427,000	4,121,000	7,831,000
Coho	1,419,000	355,000	3,041,000	5,778,000
Chum	5,476,000	44,000	229,000	435,000
Total	9,643,000	926,000	13,277,000	25,227,000

(1) Calculated using yield per pound multiples from INPFC Document 2558 and inshore price per pound data

Note 1. Western Alaska interceptions were derived from figures for the United States by applying factors of 0.5 for chinook, and 1.0 for the sockeye, coho and chum data of Table 8.

Note 2. Salmon originating from the drainages of the Arctic, Yukon Yukon and Kuskokwim (A-Y-K) contribute only part of the western Alaska totals which also include salmon from Bristol Bay. Very roughly, 67% of the chinook, 0.05% of the sockeye, 67% of the coho and 80% of the chum of western Alaska come from A-Y-K drainages.

Table 8. Economic impact to the United States commercial fisheries from Japan's highseas salmon gillnet fisheries, 1983.

Species	Catch estimates		Exvessel Value (1)	First Wholesale Value
	Japanese	Intercepted		
Chinook	265,000	200,000	11,772,000	22,366,000
Sockeye	2,483,000	427,000	4,121,000	7,831,000
Coho	1,419,000	355,000	3,041,000	5,778,000
Chum	5,476,000	44,000	229,000	435,000
Pink	15,632,000	?	?	?
Total	25,275,000	1,026,000	19,163,000	36,410,000

(1) Calculated using yield per pound multiples from INPFC Document 2558 and inshore price per pound data

MEMORANDUM

TO: Representative Herrmann
FROM: Janet Fries
DATE: May 3, 1985

RE: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SALMON INTERCEPTION BY FOREIGN FLEETS

The April 25 memorandum on salmon interceptions prepared by the House Research Agency presents a somewhat low estimate of the number of Alaska salmon intercepted by foreign fleets in the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) off the coast of Alaska and on the high seas. The following information should be taken into account, when evaluating this data.

With the growth of the joint venture fleet in the FCZ, in which U.S. trawlers are delivering groundfish to foreign processors, an increasing number of salmon interceptions has been reported in recent years. In 1984, the total number of salmon intercepted in foreign and joint venture trawl operations in the FCZ, all of which are estimated to be of Alaska origin, was 144,200. This is up from an estimated 56,600 reported for 1983 in the House Research Agency (HRA) report; thus, the rate of reported salmon interceptions in the FCZ has more than doubled in one year. This increase may be due, in part, to an increase in reporting by joint ventures over foreign fishing vessels, indicating that the actual number of interceptions is even higher than this. The majority of those fish that were intercepted in the Bering Sea were chums, while the majority of those intercepted in the Gulf of Alaska were king salmon. Table 1 shows the breakdown of these figures.

Table 1.

Estimated Numbers of Salmon Intercepted by Joint Ventures and Foreign Fishing Operations in the Fishery Conservation Zone off Alaska in 1984¹

	Bering Sea	Gulf of Alaska	Total
Joint Ventures	60,573	58,900	119,473
Foreign Trawlers	12,627	12,100	24,727
TOTALS	73,200 (mainly chums)	71,000 (mainly kings)	144,200

1. Source: Jim Glock, North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Telephone communication, 5/3/85.

MEMORANDUM
May 3, 1985
PAGE TWO

In addition, the estimates given in the HRA report for the Japanese high seas fishery may be conservative, due to the potential inaccuracy of reporting by the Japanese. Also, as noted in the report, estimates do not include those salmon intercepted by the Taiwanese and other foreign fishing fleets, which may be considerable.

When evaluating these figures, it is important to look at them in comparison to the Alaska statewide salmon catch. The current interception estimates of Alaska king salmon by the Japanese high seas salmon fisheries² and the trawl fisheries³ in the FCZ, combined, is approximately 350,000. That⁴ is about 42% of the statewide king salmon catch of 830,000 king salmon⁴ in 1983. This represents a significant loss of a valuable resource to every salmon user group in the state.

2. Using 1983 estimates, since 1984 estimates are not yet available.
3. Using 1984 estimates.
4. Using 1983 figures, since 1984 figures are not yet available.

MEMORANDUM
May 3, 1985
PAGE TWO

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When evaluating these figures, it is important to look at the historical perspective, as well. In 1980, an estimated 734,000 salmon were caught in the high seas by the Japanese mothership fleet alone, 50% of which were determined to be of western Alaska origin. That figure represents more salmon than the entire western Alaska salmon catch for 1980. While the mothership interceptions have been reduced somewhat, through international negotiations, they still represent a significant loss of a valuable resource to every user group in the state.

The current interception estimates of Alaska king salmon by the Japanese high seas salmon fisheries² and the trawl fisheries³ in the FCZ, combined, is approximately 350,000, i.e. 42% of the statewide king salmon catch of 830,000 king salmon in 1983.

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MEMORANDUM

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TOTALS	73,200 (mainly chums)	71,000 (mainly kings)	144,200

1. Source: Jim Glock, North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Telephone communication, 5/3/85.



ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RESEARCH AGENCY

Pouch Y, State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811
(907) 465-3991

April 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO: Representative Peter Goll

FROM: Katherine Hazard *KH*
Legislative Analyst

RE: Salmon Interception by Foreign Fleets
Research Request 85-321

You requested information about the economic value of Alaska-bound salmon intercepted by the foreign fishing fleets. You asked specifically for: 1) the estimated ex-vessel value of the intercepted fish based upon the average weight and price per pound of commercially caught salmon; 2) the estimated wholesale value of the intercepted fish; 3) the estimated revenue which would accrue to the State of Alaska through the Fisheries Business Tax if these fish were processed in Alaska; and 4) the area of origin and number, by species, of salmon intercepted by the foreign fishing fleets.

Steve Pennoyer and Charles Meacham Jr., of the Department of Fish and Game, provided information for these estimates. They are preparing a table of their calculations which will be forthcoming.

SUMMARY

Estimates of the economic loss to Alaska from interception of Alaska-bound salmon by Japanese mothership and landbased driftnet fisheries are:

Ex-vessel value	\$ 16.1 million
First wholesale value	\$ 30.5 million
Fisheries Business Tax Loss	\$643,000

The ex-vessel values for all salmon sold to processors in 1983 was \$320.6 million. The first wholesale value for salmon in the state in 1983 was \$726.4 million. Thus the estimated loss from interception of salmon is approximately 5 percent of the ex-vessel value, and approximately 4 percent of the first wholesale value.

INTRODUCTION

The calculations of estimated losses are based solely on Japanese mothership and landbased driftnet fisheries interceptions. Estimates of the number of Alaska-originating salmon intercepted by the foreign fishing fleets are incomplete because much of the information is still unknown. The greatest number of salmon are caught by the Japanese mothership (MS) and Japanese landbased driftnet (LB) fisheries. It is for these two fisheries that the most data are available. There are two other fisheries of relevance; the Taiwanese fishery and the foreign and joint-venture trawlers.

Very little is known about the number of salmon caught by the Taiwanese fishery. There is no information on the species composition or origin of these fish. Foreign and joint-venture trawlers caught an estimated 19,700 chinook, 36,400 chum and 400 other salmon during 1983. Mr. Meacham said that although there are no data on the origin of these fish, probably all of them are Alaska-bound.¹ Nothing is known of the size or age composition of these fish, so for several reasons, there is not currently a reliable means of calculating how many of these fish could, if not intercepted, be caught by Alaska fisheries.

According to Mr. Meacham,² estimates of salmon catches in 1983 for the North Pacific foreign fleets were:

Japanese mothership	9.4 million
Japanese landbased	15.8 million
Taiwan	3.5 to 4 million
Foreign and Joint- Venture Trawlers	56,500

¹An outline entitled "High Seas Salmon Interception Fisheries", included in the packet of information submitted to us with your research request, had incorrect figures listed for intercepted salmon. The outline had no source listed. Steve Pennoyer, of the Department of Fish and Game, said that 16,000,000 is the number of salmon caught by the Japanese landbased fisheries, and 8-9,000,000 is the number of salmon caught by the Japanese mothership fisheries. These are not the number of intercepted fish. He did not know the origin of the data for the Taiwanese and Other fisheries.

²Charles Meacham, Alaska Department of Fish and Game in Anchorage: Telephone number, (907) 267-2112.

JAPANESE MOTHERSHIP AND LANDBASED DRIFTNET FISHERIES

Number Caught

Estimates of the number of salmon caught by Japanese mothership and landbased driftnet fisheries fleets are listed in Table 1. These catch data are reported in the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission documents.

Number Intercepted

Estimates of the number of salmon intercepted are also shown in Table 1. The interception figures for sockeye are based on the mean percentage intercepted of the total catches for the years from 1978 to 1981, in which studies were done. These percentages were applied to the 1983 sockeye catch to derive an interception estimate. Estimates for chinook are based on studies done from 1982-84 by the Fisheries Research Institute on contract to Fish and Game.³

Mr. Meacham provided estimates of the number of chums intercepted by the MS fisheries, but there are no estimates of chum intercepted by the LB fisheries. However, Dr. Harris said that essentially none of the chum caught by the LB fisheries are of North American origin.

Although total catch figures are available from the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission documents, there are no estimates of the number of pinks intercepted. Mr. Meacham and Dr. Harris both said that an insignificant amount of the pink salmon caught by the Japanese fleets are of North American origin.

Dr. Colin Harris of the Fisheries Research Institute at the University of Washington, would not make estimates of the number of cohos intercepted.⁴ He said that significant numbers are taken by the mothership fishery, but he did not know of a reliable way to estimate the numbers. Mr. Meacham provided rough estimates of cohos intercepted.

³Rogers, Donald E. et al. 1984, "Origins of Chinook Salmon in the Area of the Japanese Mothership Salmon Fishery", FRI-UW-8408, Final Report to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Contract No. 84-0152, Fisheries Research Institute, School of Fisheries, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

⁴Dr. Colin Harris, Fisheries Research Institute, University of Washington, (206) 543-7281.

Dr. Harris also stated that most of the cohos intercepted by the LB fleet are of western origin. He said, however, that many of the Bristol Bay cohos are unexploited anyway, so that it would be hard to say that cohos intercepted by the Japanese fleet yield an economic loss to Alaska. For this reason cohos are excluded from the values reported in the summary on page one of this memorandum.

Area of Origin

Studies by the Fisheries Research Institute provide estimates of the area of origin for chinook salmon caught by mothership and landbased driftnet fisheries. In 1983, an estimated 200,000 Alaska-bound chinook salmon were intercepted by the Japanese MS and LB fisheries. Of these an estimated 75,000 (37%) were from western Alaska stocks, 106,000 (53%) from central Alaska and 19,000 (9.5%) were of Southeast Alaska or British Columbian stocks.⁵

According to Dr. Harris, the great majority of the 427,000 sockeye, 44,000 chum and the cohos intercepted by the Japanese fleets are of western or central Alaska origin.

Estimated Loss of Salmon to Alaska Due to Interception

An estimated 1,099,000 salmon of Alaska origin are intercepted by Japanese mothership and landbased fisheries. To calculate the pounds of salmon available inshore if these salmon had not been intercepted, the natural mortality, drop-out rate and growth rate must be applied to the numbers intercepted. Together these factors comprise the yield loss multiplier.⁶

Natural Mortality: Not all of the fish caught on the high seas would have survived to return to Alaska waters, particularly since many of the fish intercepted are immature and would have several years on the high seas before returning to their origin.

⁵The Bristol Bay area is in the Central Region, as classified in the Alaska 1983 Catch and Production Commercial Fisheries Statistics, Statistical Leaflet No. 36.

⁶These factors and the formula are described by Richard J. Major in greater detail in the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Document 2558.

Drop-out Rate: The drop-out rate accounts for fish which are caught in the Japanese fisheries nets, but drop-out as the nets are hauled in. These salmon die as part of the fishery, but are not included in the catch figures. For the drop-out rate, a multiplier of between 1.33 and 2.00 is used by Fish and Game.

Growth Rate: Many salmon caught on the high seas are immature. The growth rate accounts for the estimated increase in size between the time the salmon are caught on the high seas and the time they would have been caught if allowed to progress to inshore waters.

The formula used by Fish and Game is:

interception number x mean wt. on high seas for each species x yield loss multiplier = total lbs. available inshore.

This formula yields the estimated total pounds of salmon that would be available inshore. These figures are presented in Table 2. Because, as indicated by Dr. Harris, interception of cohos may have no economic effect on the Alaskan fishery, two sets of calculations were made: one without intercepted cohos and one including intercepted cohos.

There is an estimated loss of 10.14 million lbs. of chinook salmon. Assuming that 90 percent of these are of western or central origin, 9.12 million lbs. of the intercepted chinook were from this region. In 1983 the commercial catch of chinook in central and western Alaska was 11.06 million lbs.

There is an estimated loss of 5.85 million lbs. of sockeye; 296.11 million lbs. were landed by the commercial fleet in central and western Alaska in 1983. For chum, an estimated .72 million lbs. were intercepted by the Japanese fleet; 68.49 million lbs. were landed by the commercial fishery in western and central Alaska.

Ex-vessel Value

The ex-vessel value was calculated by multiplying the estimated number of pounds of each species by the statewide average price in 1983.⁷

⁷Alaska 1983 Catch and Production Commercial Fisheries Statistics, Statistical Leaflet No. 36, December 1984, Alaska Department of Fish and Game.

Wholesale Value

The wholesale value was calculated by multiplying the ex-vessel value by 1.9. The prices to fishermen and the wholesale values vary from year to year. In 1983, the wholesale value for all salmon was 2.26 times greater than the ex-vessel value. Prices to fishermen were low in 1983, and the ratio was higher than usual. Between 1978 and 1983 the ratio has varied from 1.88 to 2.26.

Fisheries Business Tax

The Fisheries Business Tax on salmon ranges from 3 percent to 5 percent of the ex-vessel value, depending upon how the fish are processed. It is not possible to estimate how fish currently intercepted by foreign fleets would be processed if allowed to progress to Alaska waters. Based on the estimates of ex-vessel values, revenue from the Fisheries Business Tax would range from \$482,452 to \$804,086.

In 1983, revenue from the Fisheries Business Tax was \$20,516,686. In 1984 revenue from the Fisheries Business Tax was \$18,979,226. The mean estimated value of lost revenue is 3.3 percent of the mean revenue from 1983 and 1984.

* * * * *

Time constraints for completion of this memorandum precluded more detailed analysis and literature review. Statistics for 1984 are not currently compiled, but could be obtained through further research effort. Please let us know if you have further questions or would like a more detailed analysis.

KH

Attachments

Table 1. Total Catches and Interception of Salmon by Japanese Fleets in Thousands of Fish -- 1983

Species	Japanese Mothership Only		Japanese Landbased Only		Japanese MS and LB		% of Total Catch Intercepted
	Intercepted	Total	Intercepted	Total	Intercepted	Total	
sockeye	336	1,655	91	828	427	2,483	17.2
chinook	67	87	133	178	200	265	75.5
chum	44	3,081	0	2,395	44	5,476	0.8
pink	0	4,324	0	11,308	0	15,632	0.0
coho	74	297	354	1,122	428	1,419	30.2
total	521	9,444	578	15,831	1,099	25,275	4.3

Source: Department of Fish and Game.

Prepared by the House Research Agency, April 1985

Table 2

Estimated Value of Salmon Intercepted by Japanese Mothership and Landbased Driftnet Fisheries

	Salmon Loss in Pounds			Mean Price Per Pound	Ex-vessel Value	Wholesale Value
	MS	LB	Total			
Sockeye	4,680,000	1,172,000	5,852,000	.70	\$ 4,096,000	\$ 7,782,400
Chinook	3,001,000	7,134,000	10,135,000	1.16	11,756,600	22,337,540
Chum	716,000	NA	716,000	.60	229,120	435,328
Coho	1,162,000	3,907,000	5,069,000	.60	3,041,000	5,777,900
Subtotal (w/out cohos)	8,397,000	8,306,000	16,703,000		\$16,081,720	\$30,555,268
Total (w/ cohos)	<u>9,559,000</u>	<u>12,213,000</u>	<u>21,772,000</u>		<u>\$19,122,720</u>	<u>\$36,333,168</u>

Source: Department of Fish and Game.

Prepared by the House Research Agency, April 1985

JAPANESE FISHERIES


	SQUID GILLNET	SALMON LANDBASED GILLNET	SALMON MOTHERSHIP GILLNET
VESSELS	534	209	172
MESH SIZE	4 1/2 INCH	4 1/2 INCH	4 1/2 INCH
MILES NET (APPROX.)	10,000	² 3,000	1,500
SEASON	JUNE-DEC.	MAY-JULY	JUNE-JULY
CATCH (1981)	82,000 TONS SQUID	16 MILLION SALMON	10 MILLION SALMON

Table . Salmon catch (in thousands) by the Japanese mother-ship (MS) and landbased driftnet (LB) fisheries, 1957-1984.

Year	Sockeye		Chinook		Chum		Pink		Coho		Total	
	MS	LB	MS	LB	MS	LB	MS	LB	MS	LB	MS	LB
1957	20,000	494	31	33	11,908	4,081	27,881	35,551	442	526	60,358	40,685
1958	12,026	888	46	45	18,787	9,155	15,546	24,833	3,393	785	49,798	35,706
1959	9,125	832	68	42	12,859	9,045	18,856	35,129	1,423	1,178	42,331	46,226
1960	12,879	1,601	180	113	10,517	8,684	1,885	20,129	962	1,346	26,423	31,873
1961	12,998	1,173	31	79	6,128	6,104	3,263	34,559	284	1,454	22,704	43,369
1962	10,590	154	122	124	6,372	7,577	1,139	14,021	1,532	1,289	19,755	23,165
1963	8,903	18	87	102	5,858	7,538	6,732	31,255	1,895	1,492	23,475	40,405
1964	7,097	108	410	195	8,641	8,956	2,281	17,247	3,535	1,624	21,964	28,130
1965	12,038	159	185	93	6,036	8,330	4,429	29,142	1,177	1,913	23,865	39,637
1966	7,254	703	208	112	8,562	11,848	2,553	16,032	469	1,458	19,046	30,153
1967	8,087	2,566	128	110	6,837	11,078	7,781	23,051	226	1,329	23,059	38,134
1968	6,373	2,769	362	88	8,107	8,457	3,823	15,899	898	1,421	19,563	28,634
1969	5,935	2,495	554	83	7,721	4,908	6,972	23,610	1,306	3,328	22,488	34,424
1970	6,944	2,966	437	101	9,638	6,585	1,726	13,403	180	2,259	18,925	25,314
1971	3,554	3,026	206	134	9,968	6,250	8,202	16,977	454	2,373	22,384	28,760
1972	3,184	3,711	261	103	13,373	8,598	3,795	14,839	614	2,421	21,421	29,672
1973	2,613	3,308	119	162	7,857	7,614	12,018	20,650	989	3,794	23,596	35,528
1974	2,282	3,155	361	186	9,283	12,179	7,756	11,242	1,085	3,559	20,767	30,321
1975	2,171	2,969	162	135	7,367	11,480	14,654	15,347	356	3,550	24,710	33,481
1976	2,266	3,291	283	201	10,436	10,646	7,207	10,879	828	2,751	21,020	26,690
1977	1,508	1,289	93	146	5,996	6,230	9,100	15,041	79	1,722	16,778	24,428
1978	1,882	1,292	105	210	3,802	3,488	1,853	7,846	609	2,512	8,251	15,349
1979	2,186	756	126	161	3,277	2,661	3,405	11,190	281	1,199	9,275	15,349
1980	2,412	787	704	160	3,098	2,697	561	11,612	656	1,205	7,431	16,461
1981	2,224	859	88	190	2,539	2,509	4,094	11,292	615	1,209	9,560	16,059
1982	1,738	723	107	165	3,217	2,930	1,654	11,035	1,183	1,201	7,899	16,054
1983	1,655	828	87	178	3,081	2,395	4,324	11,308	297	1,122	9,445	15,831
1984	1,597	305	82	92	3,276	2,214	1,430	9,727	786	894	7,170	13,233


MAP 1

Annex C - Map of the Japanese High-Sea Salmon Fishery




MAP 2

JAPANESE MATERNITY FISHING AREAS



INPFC SUBAREAS



Introduced: 5/3/85
Referred: Resources

1 IN THE SENATE

BY SACKETT

2

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 27

3

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

4

FOURTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

5

Relating to the interception of Alaska

6

salmon on the high seas.

7

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

8

WHEREAS Alaska's salmon represents one of the state's most important
9 renewable resources; and

10

WHEREAS more than 40,000 people are employed in commercial fish pro-
11 cessing and harvesting jobs in the state during the salmon season, and
12 thousands of other people in the transportation and service industries in
13 the state benefit from this economic activity; and

14

WHEREAS the Alaska commercial salmon industry contributes millions of
15 dollars annually to state and local government treasuries through taxes,
16 assessments and fees, and salmon fishing and processing represent the
17 economic backbone of many coastal communities in the state; and

18

WHEREAS salmon is a mainstay in the diets of state residents who
19 harvest the great fish by rod and reel, net, and fishwheel for personal and
20 family consumption; and

21

WHEREAS recreational fishing for salmon is an experience enjoyed by
22 most state residents each year; and

23

WHEREAS an estimated 1,099,000 salmon originating in the state were
24 harvested on the high seas by Japanese fishing fleets during 1983; and

25

WHEREAS these high seas interceptions deprived state residents of
26 commercial fishing opportunities valued at \$16,100,000 to fishermen, and
27 \$30,500,000 to seafood processors; and

28

WHEREAS this lost opportunity cost the state treasury between \$482,452
29 and \$804,086 in lost fisheries business tax revenue alone; and

1 WHEREAS the interception figures include 106,000 chinook salmon from
2 South Central Alaska stocks, more than the combined catches of recreation;
3 al, commercial and subsistence fishermen in Cook Inlet in 1983; and

4 WHEREAS Japanese fishermen catch billions of pounds of fish and shell-
5 fish in the state's 200-mile fishery conservation zone each year;

6 BE IT RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully requests
7 the U.S. Department of State to immediately begin negotiations that will
8 lead to complete elimination of high seas interceptions of salmon of Alaska
9 origin; and be it

10 FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully
11 requests U.S. Congress to adopt amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conser-
12 vation and Management Act preventing nations that intercept Alaska-bound
13 salmon on the high seas from receiving allocations to harvest groundfish in
14 the United States' 200-mile fishery conservation zone.

15 COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Ronald
16 Reagan, President of the United States; the Honorable George Schultz,
17 Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert Dole, U.S. Senate Majority Leader;
18 the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the U.S. House of Repre-
19 sentatives; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank
20 Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
21 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; to Mr. William Gordon, assis-
22 tant administrator for fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service; and to
23 Mr. James Campbell, chairman, North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

Introduced: 5/2/85
Referred: House Special Committee
on Fisheries and Resources

1 IN THE HOUSE

BY GOLL

2 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 43

3 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

4 FOURTEENTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

5 Relating to the interception of Alaska
6 salmon on the high seas.

7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

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9 renewable resources; and

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11 cessing and harvesting jobs in the state during the salmon season, and
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14 WHEREAS the Alaska commercial salmon industry contributes millions of
15 dollars annually to state and local government treasuries through taxes,
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21 members of the Alaska delegation in Congress; to Mr. William Gordon, assis-
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24
25
26
27
28
29