
HB
632

HOUSE
COMMITTEE REPORT

3/2

(9)

Date referred: 2/17/86

FURTHER REFERRALS: JUDICIARY

DATE: March 26, 1986

The RESOURCES Committee has considered HB 632

"An Act relating to a right to farm."

and recommends:

[ ] do pass

[ ] do not pass

[ ] do pass with attached amendment(s)

[ ] no recommendation

[XX] replace with CS for HB 632 (Resources) [XX] same title

[ ] new title

and recommends do pass

[ ] further referral to the _____ Committee

and attaches: [ ] letter of intent
[ ] first fiscal note
[ ] new fiscal note
[XX] zero fiscal note first

SIGNING DO PASS:

Shultz Dick Shultz

Herrmann Adelbert Herrmann

Cato Bette Cato

Jenkins Tom Jenkins

Pearce Dave Pearce

Sund

Wallis J. Kay Wallis

SIGNING OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

Thompson David W. Thompson - NO REC

Co-Chairman Dick Shultz

Bradley
3/25/86

Original sponsor: Resources Committee

IN THE HOUSE BY THE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

CS FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 632 (Resources)

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

FOURTEENTH LEGISLATURE - SECOND SESSION

A BILL

For an Act entitled: "An Act relating to a right to farm."

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

* Section 1. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. The legislature finds that agriculture makes an important contribution to the economy of the state and that the encouragement, development, improvement, and preservation of agriculture will result in a general benefit to the health and welfare of the people of the state. The legislature further finds that conflict between agricultural operations and urban and suburban land uses threatens the permanent loss of agricultural land.

* Sec. 2. AS 09.45 is amended by adding a new section to read:

Sec. 09.45.235. AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS AS PRIVATE NUISANCES. (a) An agricultural operation and an operation appurtenant to an agricultural operation is not and does not become a private nuisance by a changed condition that exists on neighboring land if the agricultural operation has been in operation for more than three years and if the agricultural operation was not a nuisance at the time the agricultural operation began.

(b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply to a nuisance resulting from improper or negligent conduct of agricultural operations or operations appurtenant to an agricultural operation.

(c) The provisions of (a) of this section supersede a municipal ordinance or regulation to the contrary.

STATE OF ALASKA 1986 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
FISCAL NOTE

Revision Date : _____

REQUEST

Bill/Resolution No. : HB 632
Title : Right to Farm

Sponsor : House Resources Committee
Requestor : House Resources Committee
Date of Request : 3/24/86

FISCAL DETAIL

Agency Affected : Natural Resources
BRU : Agricultural Management

Components : _____

EXPENDITURES/REVENUES : (Thousands of Dollars)

OPERATING	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
PERSONAL SERVICES						
TRAVEL						
CONTRACTUAL						
SUPPLIES						
EQUIPMENT						
LAND & STRUCTURES						
GRANTS, CLAIMS						
MISCELLANEOUS						
TOTAL OPERATING	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
CAPITAL	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
REVENUE	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

FUNDING : (Thousands of Dollars)

GENERAL FUND						
FEDERAL FUNDS						
OTHER						
TOTAL	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

POSITIONS :

FULL-TIME						
PART-TIME						
TEMPORARY						

ANALYSIS : Attach a separate page if necessary

Prepared by : Carol Wilson
Division : Commissioner's Office
Phone : 465-2400
Date : 3/24/86

Approved by Commissioner : by Carol Wilson - Special
Date : 3/24/86
Agency : Department of Natural Resources

Distribution (by Agency preparing fiscal note) :
Legislative Finance
Legislative Sponsor
Requestor
Office of Management and Budget
Impacted Agency(ies)

10/25/85

Right-to-farm laws: Do they resolve land use conflicts?

By Mark B. Lapping, George E. Penfold, and Susan Macpherson



Doug Wilson

UNDERLYING much of the farmland controversy are local land use conflicts between farmers and rural and suburban residents and industrial users. The irony of the situation is obvious: While farming creates and maintains the atmosphere and bucolic landscape so many wish to be part of, it is the business of agriculture, which mandates certain practices and functions, that many find offensive. The result is conflict that prompts nonfarming neighbors to attempt to restrict or eliminate agricultural practices. This often translates itself into a nonfarming majority that employs land use controls to regulate farming or that resorts to nuisance lawsuits to enjoin or restrict certain practices. What many seek, then, is farmland without farms!

About 30 states have "right-to-farm" laws to address these conflicts. Although they vary considerably, all of the laws attempt to do two things. First, they seek to supersede the common law of nuisance. Second, they favor agricultural uses of land above all others. The statutes thus attempt to establish a "first-in-time, first-in-right" logic whereby pre-existing agricultural uses have a primacy against all others. The presumption is this: If a farm constitutes a nuisance, it does so only as neighboring land uses change, and the owners of the neighboring land are themselves responsible for any liabilities to their property or person.

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New York the forerunner

The genesis of right-to-farm laws can be found in New York State's pioneering agricultural district law (1971). While providing a means for farmers to create a district to preserve critical masses of farmland, the law also deals with the issue of potentially restrictive controls or lawsuits:

"No local government shall exercise any of its powers to enact local laws or ordinances within an agricultural district in a manner which would unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or farming practices in contravention of the purposes of the act unless such restrictions or regulations bear a direct relationship to the public health or safety."

Similar statements occur in the agricultural district laws of Virginia (1977) and Illinois (1979). Maryland's statute (1977) is more specific, noting that the "operation at any time of any machinery used in farm production or the primary processing of agricultural products..." is acceptable so long as farm practices do not "cause bodily injury or directly endanger human health...."

The effectiveness of these sections of state agricultural district laws cannot be easily ascertained. Farmers apparently perceive them to be beneficial because conflict between neighbors is a specific, long-term concern of the farming community (*12*). This element of the New York law has seldom been used, but its existence may be enough to deter governments and individuals from pressing claims or promulgating restrictive ordinances (*3*).

North Carolina's statute (1979) has been used as a model for many right-to-farm laws. The purposes of that law are straightforward:

"It is the declared policy of the State to protect and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural land for the production of food and other agricultural products. When nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural operations often become the subject of nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease operations. Many are discouraged from making investments in farm improvements. It is the purpose of this (law) to re-

duce the loss to the State of its agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural operations may be deemed a nuisance."

The law maintains that a nuisance does not exist if three conditions can be established: the farm did not constitute a nuisance at the time of initial operation for at least one year prior to the suit; the claim of nuisance is based upon changing local land uses and does not arise from either negligence or improper operation on the part of the farmer; and the alleged nuisance does not contribute either to flooding or water pollution.

A more sophisticated approach was incorporated into Iowa's livestock feedlot nuisance law. The purpose of this law is to provide specific protection for feedlots from nuisance suits brought by neighbors who establish themselves subsequent to the feedlot's establishment. Section 2 of the act reads:

"In any nuisance action or proceeding against a feedlot brought by or on the benefit of a person whose date of ownership of realty is subsequent to the established date of operation of that feedlot, proof of compliance with sections three (3) and four (4) of this Act shall be an absolute defense, provided that the conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance are subject to regulatory jurisdiction in accordance with either section three (3) or four (4) of this Act."

Compliance with the appropriate sections of the act relate to the Iowa Department of Environmental Quality's water pollution abatement program and relevant local zoning ordinances, where they exist (6). In this way Iowa seeks to guarantee that feedlots will be brought into compliance with overall state environmental objectives and appropriate local land use controls

The State of Washington's law contains elements of both the standard North Carolina approach and some of the specificity of the Iowa law. But unlike all the other right-to-farm laws, Washington's law seeks to prevent rural land subdivisions that may trigger nuisance-like disputes and actions. Under the Washington statute any agricultural operator who "sells or has sold a portion of that land contiguous to a farm for residential uses" forfeits the right to qualify for protection under the law. Although the logic of preventing farmers from contributing to the problem through the creation of new lots appears self-evident, no other jurisdiction has enacted such a provision.

Characteristics of right-to-farm laws

State	Type of Agricultural Operation Protected*	Farm Must Predate Other Land Uses	Must Predate by 1 Year Minimum	Supercedes Local Ordinances
Alabama			X	X
Arizona	agricultural operations	X		
Connecticut			X	
Delaware			X	
Florida			X	X
Georgia			X	X
Idaho	agricultural operations		X	X
Illinois	farms		X	
Indiana	agricultural operations		X	
Kentucky	agricultural operations		X	X
Maryland	agricultural operations		X	
Massachusetts				X
Michigan	farms, farm operations	X		
Mississippi	agricultural operations		X	
Missouri	agricultural operations		X	
New Hampshire	agricultural operations		X	
New Jersey	commercial farms			X
New Mexico	agricultural operations		X	
New York	agricultural activities	X		
North Carolina			X	X
North Dakota	agricultural operations		X	X
Oklahoma	agricultural activities			
Oregon	farms			X
Rhode Island	agricultural operations			
South Carolina			X	
Tennessee		X		
Vermont	agricultural activities	X		
Virginia	agricultural operations		X	X
Washington				
Wisconsin	agricultural practices	X		

*Note: Agricultural operations include farming, processing, and all manner of agriculturally related enterprises; agricultural activities appear to be more farm-related and less food industry-oriented.

The matter of scope

A variety of farming and farm-related operations are covered under the right-to-farm statutes. In some cases, "farms" receive protection. In others, "agricultural operations" are covered. Some laws protect food processing and related commercial enterprises. Most of the laws require that protected agricultural operations predate competing land uses, though a majority specify only a minimum of one-year prior operation. Nearly all note that appropriate state and federal laws, such as environmental regulations, cannot be superseded even though local ordinances that are contrary to agriculture are nullified.

While farms and related operations receive protection under these statutes, the laws almost uniformly require that the farms and related operations be managed properly. The most common requirement is that farms maintain "good farming practices," though these are rarely defined. Some laws do not cover farm operations that pollute or "change" water conditions, are run in a negligent or improper manner, or that negatively affect health and safety standards.

Because most right-to-farm laws are relatively new, few have been tested in the courts. An exception is Connecticut's statute, which was held valid in *De Capua v. Cella et al* (7, 11). In this case, the judge noted that the "plaintiff came to the nuisance" and that "the total inconvenience... is relatively small in comparison with the nature and conditioning of defendents' operation as dairy farmers." Moreover, because the farm was operated "in a proper manner," as specified by an inspector for the state's agricultural department, the plaintiff was "not entitled to an injunction" or "an order for monetary damages."

The matter of trespass

Right-to-farm laws are aimed, in the main, to protect farmers against nuisance suits and local ordinances that would make farms nuisances because of changes in neighborhood land uses. Another aspect of the problem, that of trespass, has not been

Conditions not protected under right-to-farm laws.

State	Negligent Management	Improper Management	Water Pollution or Changed Condition	Affects to Health/Safety
Alabama	X	X	X	
Arizona	X			X
Connecticut	X			
Delaware	X	X		
Florida				X
Georgia				
Idaho	X	X		X
Illinois	X	X	X	
Indiana				
Kentucky	X	X	X	
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Mississippi				
Missouri	X	X	X	
New Hampshire	X	X		X
New Jersey				X
New Mexico	X			
New York				
North Carolina	X	X	X	
North Dakota	X	X	X	
Oklahoma				
Oregon	X			X
Rhode Island	X	X		
South Carolina	X	X	X	
Tennessee				
Vermont				X
Virginia	X	X	X	X
Washington				
Wisconsin				

adequately dealt with in the context of these laws. Historically, trespass requires a physical invasion of property. In recent decades, however, at least 10 jurisdictions have rendered judgments that accord dust, noise, and odors—traditional nuisance externalities—trespass status. As one commentator noted of Oregon's right-to-farm law, "Without protection against trespass, the right-to-farm is virtually ineffective" (*10*).

An evaluation

What, then, are we to make of right-to-farm laws? First, right-to-farm laws are popular with state legislatures and the agricultural community. Even granting the newness of these laws, it is surprising that so few court tests have arisen as a result of their promulgation. This may suggest that such laws are long on rhetoric and short on impact and delivery. Perhaps further court tests are needed (*4*).

Second, whereas most policies in the past were directed toward the solution of certain basic land use issues and problems, right-to-farm laws respond to site-specific concerns and particular agricultural practices.

Third, right-to-farm laws tend to ignore the contemporary practice of nuisance law. Court-inspired remedies are seldom either/or judgments. Instead, they often force the nuisance generator to use technological mitigation techniques to reduce or eliminate externalities so that both parties can carry on their activities with a minimum of economic and spatial disruption. If we follow the practice established by the nonpoint pollution program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, this is very likely to mean that the costs of mitigation must be absorbed overwhelmingly by farmers. This invariably raises a number of important equity questions, especially given the dubious nature of the types of nuisances involved.

Fourth, an evaluation of right-to-farm laws indicates that many of these legal instruments use vague terminology, are ambiguous, and may be open to due-process challenges. And, as Ed Thompson of the American Farmland Trust has noted, "creative legal draftsmanship by county and township commissions might very easily result in local ordinances which are entirely consistent with 'right-to-farm' laws, but which significantly restrict agricultural operations" (*9*).

For all their weaknesses, however, right-to-farm laws represent an attempt to deal with some of the problems associated with changing land use and community values brought about, in part, by the "counterstream" or return migration to rural areas (*1*). Perhaps not unlike the restoration of some urban neighborhoods, there is more than a trace of class conflict involved in what may be seen as "the gentrification of the countryside." Certainly this phenomena can be observed in a number of local ordinances and plans that erect barriers against the siting of mobile homes and mobile home parks in many rural regions of the country (*5*). If anything else, right-to-farm laws attempt to educate a public long separated from the processes of food production.

Perhaps the best solution to these problems was suggested by Noel Perrin in his essay "The Rural Immigration Law." "The solution" to the problems of newcomers with new values who seek to change rural areas is "a good, thorough immigration law. It wouldn't actually keep Don and Sue out, it would just require them to learn rural values before they were allowed to stay" (*8*). Sometimes that which is said in jest may be more astute and appropriate than the laws of the land. In terms of the right to farm, this may indeed prove to be the case.

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CHAPTER 5

INCENTIVES: RIGHT-TO-FARM LEGISLATION*

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a basic incompatibility between many types of agricultural activity and residential use. As city people begin to move into rural areas, they object to the smells, noises, dust, pesticides, and other by-products of operating a modern farm. These complaints can take several forms. A landowner may sue the farmer, claiming that his farm operations are a nuisance. He may try to persuade the local government to pass an ordinance limiting various farm activities. He may report the farmer to a county or state agency that is responsible for enforcing air or water pollution control laws for the purpose of getting an order to end the offending farm practices.

Farmers find that defending themselves against such actions can be expensive, time-consuming and aggravating, even if they are successful. They have turned with increasing frequency to their state legislators for protection. The laws that have been passed in response have been called "right-to-farm" laws. They recognize that just as new residents in a rapidly urbanizing area should be protected against the unhealthful and offensive odors of a nuisance, such as a large feedlot, that has become "a right thing in the wrong place—like a pig in the parlor, instead of the barn,"[1] so too must farmers in agricultural areas be protected against legal actions by their neighbors and local governments arising from the fact that homes have been built in the wrong places—so that parlors open out on pigpens.

II. PURPOSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RIGHT-TO-FARM LEGISLATION

At least seventeen states, listed in Table 5-1, have adopted some form of right-to-farm legislation.[2] They fall into four major groups, each of which is based to a greater or lesser extent on a different prototype.

A. Laws Based on New York's Statute

New York's law was enacted in 1971 and has served as a model for the Illinois, Oregon, Virginia, and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area legislation. It provides:

> No local government shall exercise any of its powers to enact local laws or ordinances within an agricultural district in a manner which would unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or farming practices in contravention of the purposes of the act unless such restrictions or regulations bear a direct relationship to the public health or safety.

As reported in Chapter 4, little explicit use has been made of the law, and there have not been any judicial interpretations of its language. Regulations that restrict farm structures and practices in support of the purposes of the act are permitted, as are regulations of lot size, subdivision, and partitioning that do not restrict farm structures or practices. Regulations that bear a direct relationship to the public health or safety are permitted by the law even though they unreasonably restrict farm structures and practices in contravention to the purposes of the act. (However, it is not clear how a local regulation could be constitutional if it regulates farm structures and practices in an unreasonable way.) Only regulations that protect the public morals or general welfare, such as certain provisions of zoning ordinances, are curtailed by the law, and even then are permissible if the restrictions they impose on farming are reasonable. This is specifically recognized in Virginia's legislation. It is not clear exactly how a farmer would avail himself of the protection provided by the act. Presumably, he could use it in a political way to persuade his local government not to adopt restrictive regulations. If he were unsuccessful in doing so, he might be able either to bring a declaratory judgment action to have the resulting ordinance declared invalid, or to use the law as a legal defense should the local government seek to enforce the ordinance against him. In such an event the judge would have to address the central and most difficult question presented by the act: How will the balance be struck between, on the one hand, the extent to which the ordinance restricts a farming operation in contravention of the purposes of the agricultural districting law

* The principal author of this chapter was John C. Keene.

TABLE 5-1
STATES WITH RIGHT-TO-FARM LAWS**

Laws Protecting Against Local Government Regulations

Alabama (1980)	New York* (1971)
Delaware (1980)	North Carolina (1979)
Illinois* (1979)	Oregon (1973)
Kentucky (1980)	Tennessee (1979)
Louisiana (1978)	Virginia* (1977)
Maryland* (1977)	
Minnesota (Twin Cities)* (1980)	

Laws Protecting Against State Regulations

Tennessee (1979)	Oregon* (1973)

Laws Protecting Against Private Nuisance Lawsuits

Alabama (1980)	Mississippi (1980)
Delaware (1980)	North Carolina (1979)
Florida (1979)	Oklahoma (1980)
Georgia (1980)	Tennessee (1979)
Kentucky (1980)	Washington (1979)
Louisiana (1978)	

* The statute applies only in agricultural districts or, in the case of Oregon, in exclusive farm use zones.
** Some states provide more than one form of protection.

and, on the other, the degree to which the ordinance protects the public's health and safety? The statute gives no guidance to assist in this delicate balancing process.

Oregon's law does not extend its protections to farm practices that generate odor, dust, or other materials that interfere with the use of lands outside the exclusive farm use zone. It also contains a specific disclaimer of any intent to limit the powers of all levels of government to protect the public's health, safety, and welfare.

B. Laws Based on North Carolina's Statute

North Carolina's right-to-farm law takes a different approach in that it seeks to modify traditional principles of the common law of nuisance. Some or all of its provisions have been adopted by Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, and Kentucky and Louisiana. The law provides as follows:

Section 106-700. It is the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural land for the production of food and other agricultural products. When non-agricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural operations often become the subject of nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease operations. Many others are discouraged from making investments in farm improvements. It is the purpose of this Article to reduce the loss to the State of its agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural operations may be deemed to be a nuisance.

Section 106-701. (a) No agricultural operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality thereof after the same has been in operation for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began; provided, that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such agricultural operation or its appurtenances.

(b) For the purposes of this Article, "agricultural operation" includes, without limitation, any facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.

(c) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not affect or defeat the right of any person, firm, or corporation to recover damages for any injuries or damages sustained by them on account of any pollution of, or change in condition of, the waters of any stream or on the account of any overflow of lands of any such person, firm, or corporation.

(d) Any and all ordinances of any unit of local government now in effect or hereafter adopted that would make the operation of any such agricultural operation or its appurtenances a nuisance or providing for abatement thereof as a nuisance in the circumstance set forth in this section are and shall be null and void; provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such agricultural operation or any of its appurtenances. Pro-

vided further, that the provisions shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from an agricultural operation located within the corporate limits of any city at the time of enactment hereof.

(e) This section shall not be construed to invalidate any contracts heretofore made but insofar as contracts are concerned, it is only applicable to contracts and agreements to be made in the future.

In order to understand the North Carolina approach, it is necessary to know some rudimentary facts about the common law of nuisance.

Nuisance law has been recognized as a confused and confusing area of the law. Still, it is possible to set out some general principles that are widely accepted.[3] First, it is necessary to distinguish between private nuisance and public nuisance. Private nuisance law protects a property owner's right to the use and enjoyment of his land and gives him remedies against someone who interferes improperly with that right. Public nuisance is a crime and involves actions which cause injury to the public on a whole, such as serious air pollution, the storage of explosives in a city, and so forth.[4] Some acts that are private nuisances may affect so many people that they also constitute public nuisances. Even though they have the same name, private and public nuisances rest on distinctly different legal theories.

In determining whether one activity so interferes with another person's activities and enjoyment of his land that it constitutes a private nuisance, a court will determine whether its utility is outweighed by the gravity of the harm it causes. In doing so, the court will consider all the circumstances, including the locality and character of the surroundings, the nature of both activities and the manner in which they are conducted, the value to the community of both activities, the actor's ability to reduce the harm, and the extent to which the actor would be damaged by an injunction and the landowner damaged by the failure to enjoin. The court can also consider priority of use.[5] Whether or not the person causing the alleged nuisance was there first is only one of many considerations that must be weighed. Courts have had to decide whether an activity that was creating significant air pollution or otherwise interfering with the enjoyment of nearby land was to be insulated from liability simply because it was there first or whether, even though at one time it affected few people because of its remoteness, it should now be deemed a nuisance because the growth of an urban area has brought new homes into its vicinity whose owners are being injured by its operations.

The North Carolina right-to-farm law and its progeny attempt to elevate the principle of first-in-time, first-in-right to a position of preeminence in the law of nuisance as it affects agricultural operations.[6] The law provides that a court cannot declare a farming operation a nuisance if it finds the following:

1. The agricultural operation was not a nuisance at the time it began,

2. The only basis for the claim that it is a nuisance is that conditions have changed in or about the locality where the farm is located,

3. The agricultural operation had been in operation for at least one year before the lawsuit was brought,

4. The alleged nuisance did not result from negligent or improper operation of the agricultural activity, and

5. The alleged nuisance does not involve water pollution or flooding.

It should be noted that the law applies both to farmers and to producers of livestock and poultry products, such as slaughterhouses.

This law presents several questions to which there are currently no authoritative answers because of the lack of judicial interpretation. First, we should be clear as to the central objective and effect of this law and its progeny: to make it possible for certain farms and food-processing industries that would otherwise be declared to be nuisances because communities have grown up around them, to continue their nuisance-producing activities without interference.

Second, there are several questions arising out of the first requirement above: who has the burden of proving that the farm operation was not a nuisance at the time it began, the neighbor or the farmer? How will he provide it if the operation started ten, twenty, or more years ago? What legal principles will govern those in effect

at the time of commencement of the farm operation, or those in effect now?

Third, it can be assumed that plaintiffs' lawyers will allege that the agricultural activity is a nuisance for reasons other than changed conditions in the locality. For instance, if they have been unable to show that it was a nuisance when it started, they will attempt to demonstrate that the operation is using different farming techniques, different fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, and generally that its technology has evolved over the years so that it is now a nuisance without regard to changed conditions nearby. Thus, much of the protection hoped for will be lost.

Fourth, the statute provides neighbors with a one-year period after the commencement of a farming operation within which to attempt to have it declared a nuisance. The statute does not make it clear, however, whether this same right would be available in the event that a farmer adopts drastically different farming techniques that produce a lot more noise, dust, or other environmental pollution. If this right is not available, then the statute exposes neighbors to serious health risks; if it is available, the law may have the effect of restricting the ability of farmers to improve their farming techniques, and in any case, presents the issue of how much change is necessary before the farmer loses the protection accorded by the law.

Fifth, the North Carolina statute and some of its progeny withhold their protections from agricultural operations that cause injury to others because of "negligent" (Kentucky) or "negligent or improper" (North Carolina, Alabama) conduct. Negligence is a different type of wrong from nuisance and has a completely different legal basis from the one on which nuisance is based, although certain acts may result in liability for both negligence and nuisance. To put it simply, one person can recover damage from another for injuries resulting from negligence if he can prove that the other did not act as a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. The main part of the statute concerns only nuisance liability and does not attempt to limit liability for damages caused by negligence, so the language concerning negligence is superfluous. Furthermore, it is not clear what the legislators meant by "improper." The word has no established legal meaning and could cover all kinds of morally reprehensible actions. Thus, for example, if pesticides were causing a neighbor's family to be sick, he might be able to recover damages from the farmer even though he could not prove negligence. In fact, maintaining a nuisance is a good example of "improper" activity which is not negligent.

Finally, the law extends its protection to agricultural operations even after the land on which they operate has been annexed by a city, if the annexation takes places after the effective date of the act. The legislature made the judgment that even if the land around an agricultural operation becomes so urbanized that it is politically desirable to incorporate it into a city, the protection against municipal regulations based on change of conditions should continue. Such a long-term, universal protection for nuisance-like activities seems not to take into account the varying conditions which will be found across a state.

C. Tennessee's Statute

Tennessee's right-to-farm law is itself derived from feedlot laws that have been enacted in states such as Wyoming and Iowa. It recognizes that air, water, and noise pollution are now governed by complex sets of federal and state regulations, as a result of the enactment of laws such as the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, and their state counterparts. The Tennessee statute applies only to feedlots, dairy farms, and egg production houses — agricultural activities that are important to its economy and can generate serious concentrated air and water pollution. It provides that any such activity that is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the state department of health is insulated against liability for private nuisance if the activity is in compliance with state regulations and if the agricultural activity started operations before the complaining neighbor bought or started using his property. If the operations are expanded, the original activity maintains its priority date and the new activity receives a priority date as of the time it was established.

The statute also provides limited exemptions from state environmental regulations and local zoning and farm nuisance regulations. Feedlots, dairy farms, and egg production houses must comply first with regulations and standards applicable under a permit from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System created by the federal Clean Water Act, second, with regulations of the state Health Department and local governments that were in effect on April 12, 1979, the effective date of the act, and third, with any such regulations that take effect before the agricultural activity is established. The activities are exempt from rules and regulations that are passed after the effective date of the law and the date they began operation. The protected agricultural activities are also exempted from post-1979 zoning and anti-nuisance regulations that become applicable to them because a city has annexed the land on which they are conducted.

Tennessee's approach recognizes that effective control over certain types of agricultural pollution rests in the hands of the state Department of Health. On the one hand it applies a limited first-in-time, first-in-right principle that protects certain activities from changed state regulations. The only issue that this seems to raise is whether the state can permit certain types of pollution that federal laws prohibit. On the other hand, the statute protects agricultural activities that are complying with state rules from most private nuisance suits and hostile local regulations. The law incorporates by reference the detailed environmental standards established by the Department of Health. Operators of the designated agricultural activities must meet them in order to avoid nuisance liability and local regulation.

D. Laws Based on Washington's Statute

The laws of Washington and Oklahoma provide:

> Agricultural activities conducted on farmland, if consistent with good agricultural practices and established prior to surrounding non-agricultural activities, are [conclusively, in Washington] presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a nuisance unless the activity has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and safety.
>
> If that activity is undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws and regulations, it is presumed to be good agricultural practice and not adversely affecting the public health and safety.

This approach incorporates by reference all the relevant federal, state, and local standards and insulates farm activities that are meeting them from nuisance liability to property owners who buy land or begin activity after the start of the agricultural activity. Obviously, an operation that was not would be exposed to administrative action as well. It does not attempt to deal with overly restrictive local ordinances. Even though federal and state environmental protection laws have largely supplanted local regulation and established minimum water and air quality standards, it is still possible that local governments may have the power to set standards that could have a serious impact on agricultural activities without providing commensurate protection of the public health and safety. This possibility should be addressed in right-to-farm legislation.

E. Other Approaches

Some states, such as California, have not attempted to create a right to farm but have simply exempted certain types of agricultural activities, such as burning, aerial spraying, and the use of pesticides, from certain requirements of their air pollution control laws.[8] Mississippi's law provides only that an agricultural operation that has been in existence for a year is immune from liability for public or private nuisance if the conditions alleged to constitute a nuisance have existed substantially unchanged since the date the operation started. Expansions are entitled to their own priority date, as is the case in Tennessee.

In a recent proposal for a program for farmland retention in New Jersey,[9] it was suggested that the state should develop specifications of acceptable farm management practice that would both tell farmers what they could do without exposing themselves to liability for environmental pollution or nuisance, and at the same time protect the health and safety of the state's residents.

The proposal stressed that all of the following activities should be covered by right-to-farm legislation: growing crops and raising poultry and cattle; processing and marketing produce; applying fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides; clearing woodlands; installing water and soil conservation facilities; designing farm structures; using water; burning in the open; disposing of organic wastes on the farm; and providing supplies, processing facilities, and markets near farming areas. The report suggested that a special, non-adversary arbitration process be established that would handle complaints about farm nuisance

III. EFFECTIVENESS

There is, at the time of writing, little evidence bearing on the effectiveness of the various types of right-to-farm legislation. This is at least partly true because much of it has been enacted in the last year and a half. Serious questions of a practical and legal nature arise concerning many of the statutes. Much can be learned from the experience with feedlots, where the environmental problems are severe and the need for protection against local regulation and nuisance suits is great. Tennessee's approach of identifying a small number of particularly onerous or nuisance-like activities and granting them limited protections if they comply with state and federal environmental regulations has much to commend it. It recognizes, as does New Jersey's farmland retention proposal, that to protect farmers against unreasonable environmental regulations and lawsuits, while at the same time protecting the public's health and safety, requires a cooperative public and private effort involving careful data-gathering and analysis, and preparation of a statement establishing balanced state level farm management practices. Conditions will vary from state to state and from one part of a state to another. Clearly it is not an appropriate undertaking for a judge in a private nuisance suit to determine what best management practices are and to balance the needs of farmers against the needs of the non-farm public. Farm organizations and agricultural extension programs must play an important role in developing the kinds of protection that farmers are demanding.

FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER 5

1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, (1926). See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P. 2d. 700 (1972).

2. Ala. Code, Section 6-5-127 (Cumm. Supp. 1980); Del. Code tit. 3 Section 1401; Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 823.14 (1980 Supp.); Ga. Laws, 1980 Sess. Act 1297; *Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 5, Section 1018 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 413 (Ky Acts 1980 ch. 214); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 51:1202 (Supp. 1981); *Md. Ann. Code, Agriculture, Section 2-513 (Supp. 1980); *Minn. 1980 Session Laws, ch. 566, Section 473H.12; Miss. Code 95-3-29 (Cumm. Supp. 1980); *N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law Section 305(2) (McKinney 1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 106-700 and 106-701 (Supp. 1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, Section 11 (1980 Session Laws, 2d. Sess., ch. 189); *Ore. Rev. Stat. Section 215.25 (Repl. 1979-80); Tenn. Code Ann. Sections 53-6701, 53-6704 (Supp. 1979); *Va. Code Ann., Section 15.1-1512B (Cumm. Supp. 1980); Wash. Rev. Code, Sections 7.48.300, 7.48.305, and 7.48.310 (Supp. 1980). Several local governments have passed right-to-farm ordinances, and it is possible that other states have too.

* In states marked with an asterisk, the statute applies only to land in agricultural districts or, in the case of Oregon, in exclusive farm-use.

3. See William L. Prosser, *The Law of Torts* (St. Paul, Minn., West Pub. Co., 1971, 4th ed.) p. 571.

4. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P. 2d 700 (1972).

5. McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., 25 Ariz. App. 312, 543 P. 2d 150 (1975). See also, *Restatement of Torts, 2d* (St. Paul, Minn., American Law Inst. Publishers, 1979) Sections 821A -840E.

6. See Edward P. Thompson, "Right to Farm Laws Examined," *Aglands Exchange*, Nov.-Dec., 1980 (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties Research Foundations) for a thoughtful discussion of these laws.

7. The law is taken from the same model as statutes such as those of Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. ch. 39, Sections 11-39-101 to 11-39-104), and Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. Sections 172D.1 to 172D.4) that apply only to feedlots. They, in turn, build on older feedlot laws such as that of Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 47-1505) which provides that feedlots operated in compliance with the statute are deemed not to be nuisances. Parenthetically, the Attorney General of Iowa gave an opinion that a proposed law placing limitations on maintaining nuisance actions against the operation of feedlots was of questionable constitutionality. Iowa Code Ann., Section 172D.1, annotation (Supp. 1980)

8. Cal. Health and Safety Code, Section 41704(b).

9. "Grassroots: An Agriculture Retention and Development Program for New Jersey," N.J. Departments of Agriculture and Environmental Protection (1980).

CHRONOLOGY OF STATES WITH

RIGHT-TO-FARM LAWS

1979

ALABAMA
FLORIDA
MASSACHUSETTS
NORTH CAROLINA
TENNESSEE
WASHINGTON

1980

DELAWARE
KENTUCKY
MISSISSIPPI
OKLAHOMA
SOUTH CAROLINA
PILESGROVE TOWNSHIP,N.J.

1981

GEORGIA
NEW JERSEY
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CONNECTICUT
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
VIRGINIA
INDIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
COLORADO
MONTANA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NORTH DAKOTA
TEXAS
UTAH
VERMONT
OREGON
NEW YORK
MICHIGAN

1982

RHODE ISLAND

OTHER STATES LAWS PASSED
DATE UNKNOWN

NEW MEXICO
CALIFORNIA

PENDING IN LEGISLATIVE
POSSIBLE PASSAGE NOW

OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
NEVADA
MISSOURI
WISCONSIN
MINNESOTA

IOWA--HAS PASSED A LIVESTOCK
FEEDLOT NUISANCE LAW

STATES WITHOUT RIGHT-TO-FARM
OR NUISANCE LAWS

LOUISANA
KANSAS
NEBRASKA
ALASKA
HAWAII
WEST VIRGINIA
SOUTH DAKOTA
WYOMING