

SJR

43

COMMITTEE REPORT
SENATE

FURTHER:

Date _____

Mr. President

The Committee on _____ considered _____

and (a majority of the committee) (the committee) reports it back with the following recommendations:

- do pass
- do pass with attached amendment(s)
- replace with/or adopt CS for _____
- new title
- same title and recommends _____
- and attached a "LETTER OF INTENT" NEW FISCAL NOTE
- reports it back without recommendation
- recommends referral to _____ Committee

MEMBERS SIGNING
DO PASS

MEMBERS HAVING
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman

Chairman recommendation

SENATE AMENDMENT

By SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

To: _____ SENATE BILL No. 870 27

To: _____ HOUSE BILL No. _____

PAGE: 2 LINE: 2

After the word "law" insert "who shall be subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of each house of the legislature in joint session"

TO: Senator Ray
FROM: Paula d. Scavera
DATE: March 6, 1984
RE: SJR 43

This resolution would put before the voters of Alaska a constitutional amendment which would allow the Legislature to confirm the members of the board of the Alaska Railroad Corporation. In addition to the confirmation of the board the resolution would provide that board members could only be removed "for cause".

Section 1

Adds language to Article 3 Section 23 of the Alaska Constitution which would create a new section in the constitution (Section 28) and that section would allow for a new kind of state entity.

Section 2

Creates Section 28 in the constitution and provides for confirmation and removal of the Alaska Railroad Board by the Legislature. The process for appointment and confirmation of the board is set out in this resolution, but not the process for removal.

Section 3

States that this constitutional amendment will be put before the voters at the next general election.

LAW OFFICES
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February 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senate Transportation Committee
FROM: Gross & Burke ~~GG~~ JAB
RE: Organization of Public Corporation to
Operate the Alaska Railroad

At your request, we have reviewed the drafts of SB 10 and SB 352, with a view toward determining the extent to which those bills create a valid legal structure to operate the Alaska Railroad after its proposed purchase. Initially, we were asked whether the legislature had the power to require that gubernatorial appointments to the governing authority^{1/} of the railroad be confirmed by the legislature. Both SB 352 and SB 10 presently require confirmation of executive appointments. At a second committee hearing we were requested to advise you of the minimum number of executive branch controls which must be placed on any entity created by law to operate the railroad to insure that the entity would be a part of the executive branch and, therefore, constitutionally sound. We shall answer the questions in the order posed.

SB 10 and SB 352 both provide that appointments made by the Governor be confirmed by the legislature in joint session.

1/ SB 10 speaks of an "Authority" while SB 352 creates a similar organization but describes it as the "Railroad Corporation." Purely for the purposes of simplicity, we will refer to the basic organizational structure at issue here as an "Authority."

We assume that if a similar section remains in a bill, which passes the legislature, the Governor will probably choose to submit the names of his appointees for confirmation just as he submits his appointees to a host of other boards and commissions in state government. It is our opinion, however, that should an occasion arise when the Governor decides not to submit a name or names for confirmation, the legislature would have no legal right to insist he do so.

Our conclusion is based both on the words of the Alaska Constitution and a decision of the Alaska Supreme Court.

The constitution provides in Art. III, sec. 25 that:

The head of each principal department shall be a single executive unless otherwise provided by law. He shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session . . .

Sec. 26 of the same article states that

When a board or commission is at the head of a principal department or a regulatory or quasi-judicial agency, its members shall be appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session . . .

The wording of the constitution is clear on its face. The legislature may confirm the heads of all departments, whether they are single executive officers or a board. The legislature may also confirm boards or commissions which are "regulatory or quasi-judicial" agencies. A regulatory authority is, as it implies, one whose basic function is to regulate a particular public activity. The Fish and Game Board is a classic example of such a regulatory board. A quasi-judicial

agency is one in which individual rights are adjudicated. An example of such a board would be the Public Utilities Commission, where contested proceedings determine rates.

The Railroad Authority as established in SB 352 or SB 10 fits under none of these definitions. It is not at the head of a department^{2/} nor is it a quasi-judicial or regulatory agency. Under the constitution, then, the legislature has no power to confirm executive appointments to the Authority, unless the legislature can add to the powers of confirmation which are granted in the constitution.

The legislature attempted to do just that in 1975 when it passed a statute authorizing confirmation of a whole list of lesser executive branch officials, including deputy commissioners and certain division directors. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute granting the legislature the additional confirmation power was unconstitutional. Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Ak. 1976) In the Supreme Court's view, the power to appoint to positions in the executive branch is a power reserved to the Governor under the doctrine of separation of power, except as the constitution permits the legislature to participate in the process through confirmation. If the constitution does not specifically

2/ We recognize that SB 352 provides, "The corporation shall be considered a principal department only for the purposes of Art. III, sec. 26, Constitution of the State of Alaska." (emphasis added) In our view, however, the courts would almost certainly view this purely nominal designation as one purely of form, since the bill does not actually establish a new department with the kinds of gubernatorial controls normally associated with a principal department of state government. This issue of gubernatorial controls is addressed in detail later in this memorandum.

authorize confirmation, there is no legal power to do so and the Governor's power of appointment can not be subjected to confirmation by the legislature. Put another way, the Bradner case holds that the constitution states the outer limits of legislative powers of confirmation; the legislature may not expand that power by statute. While neither SB 10 or SB 352, as presently structured, would withstand constitutional challenge on the issue of confirmation, there are options available to the legislature which would provide a valid legal basis for the confirmation of appointments. We will set these options out briefly for your consideration.

The first and most obvious manner for the legislature to obtain confirmation power is to pass a joint resolution placing before the voters a constitutional amendment that would specifically authorize the legislature to confirm appointments to the Railroad Authority. This amendment could be placed before the voters during this year's election. If the amendment passed, the first appointees of the Governor to the authority or commission would be constitutionally subject to confirmation; if it did not pass, the situation would remain as it is today -- confirmation if and when the Governor chooses to submit the names. We should note that following the Bradner case a constitutional amendment granting broad additional confirmation powers to the legislature was put before the voters and failed, but whether that would be the fate of a more narrowly drawn provision would be difficult to predict.

The second option to insure confirmation would be to create an entirely new department of state government, which would be headed by the Railroad Authority. The sole purpose that new department would be to the railroad. In such an instance, the Authority would be at the head of a department and under Art. III, sec. 26 of the Alaska Constitution, the members of the Authority, would be subject to confirmation. There are, however, certain serious problems which might result from this approach. One of the basic purposes of the present bills creating an independent public corporation or authority (located nominally within a department) is to permit the Railroad Authority to raise money for operations without involving the general credit of the state. If, however, the authority which manages the railroad is a full department of state government there is some real question about its ability to successfully perform this fundraising activity without the involvement of state credit. Art. IX, sec. 8 of the constitution provides that no state debt may be incurred unless (1) it is authorized by law; (2) is for capital improvements; and (3) is ratified by the voters. Sec. XI of the same article provides that the restrictions of sec. 8 do not apply to debts incurred through revenue bonds issued by public corporations or public enterprises of the state when the only security is the revenue of the enterprise or the corporation. Whether or not an entire department of state government can be made a "public corporation" or whether

or not the entire activity of a department of state government would qualify as a "public enterprise" are questions that have never been decided in this state by any court. While the committee can certainly receive advice from legal counsel as to the possible or probable outcome of litigation on these subjects, it would at best be an educated guess. The result might well be that in order to obtain confirmation powers the committee would create a department which, in the end, might be subject to the same bonding restrictions applicable to all other departments of state government. I gather there is no disagreement within the committee that such a result would be highly undesirable. We cannot recommend this method of insuring confirmation powers because the risks are simply too great -- the legislature would be in totally uncharted waters and the magnitude of the questions involved is simply too great to accept that degree of risk.

Having discussed the issue of confirmation, we now move to the second issue posed by the committee. Specifically, that question involves the extent to which a public corporation may be established independently of the authority of executive branch and yet be a part of that branch of government. Art. III, sec. 22 of our constitution requires that all agencies of state government and their respective functions shall be allocated within no more than 20 principal departments.

The only exceptions provided are for "regulatory, quasi-judicial, and temporary agencies." As we view the functions of the operation of the Railroad -- whatever form of entity is chosen -- those functions are not primarily "regulatory" or "quasi-judicial." Further, the railroad operation would not necessarily be "temporary." Although conceivably the railroad could be sold or leased at some point in the future to a private corporation, the existence of the operating entity could well be permanent.

We think it is clear that the Alaska Supreme Court would view the Railroad Authority as performing operational or executive functions and would, therefore, require that the Authority be either a separate principal department or located within one of the already established principal departments. We have already reviewed the problems that would be created if the Railroad Authority would be made the head of an entirely separate principal department. Therefore, we are left with the conclusion that the only other constitutionally sound option is to place the governing board or authority within an existing department of state government.

Simply stated, then, the legal issue you have asked reduces itself to this. On the one hand, the legislature seeks to create an "independent" authority -- one which has financial and political autonomy and is not subject to direct gubernatorial control. On the other hand, the constitution

requires that all executive or managerial functions be a part of the executive branch, which, in turn, is under the supervision and control of the Governor. What then are the limits -- how much gubernatorial control is required to make the "independent" authority a constitutionally valid part of state government?

The cases that the Alaska Supreme Court has reviewed concerning the requirements of Art. III, sec. 22 make it clear that more than mere nominal placement of an independent corporate entity within a department in the executive branch is required. For example, in De Armond v. Alaska State Development Corporation, 376 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1962), it was claimed that the legislation creating the Alaska State Development Corporation was unconstitutional because it sought to create an independent agency that was nominally within the Department of Commerce, but which the challengers claimed was not in actuality within that department. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected this contention and upheld the constitutionality of the Development Corporation. In doing so, the court enumerated a number of features contained in the enabling legislation for the corporation, which demonstrated sufficient ties with the Department of Commerce to justify the conclusion that the corporation was (at least for constitutional purposes) truly within the Department of Commerce.

The factors that the court cited were as follows:

(1) the Commissioner of Commerce had a permanent seat on the board of directors and thus had "considerable influence" on the board;

(2) the other six members of the board were appointed by the Governor, and served at his pleasure;

(3) the board was required to submit comprehensive annual reports to the Governor and legislature;

(4) the financial records were to be audited annually by the legislative auditor; and

(5) the state's bank examiner was required to examine the corporation's records each year.

Additionally, although the court did not make clear what significance this fact had, it noted that the corporation was "temporary" and could be dissolved by a majority vote of the board subject to legislative approval.

Four years later, the court reviewed a similar challenge to the constitutionality of the Alaska State Mortgage Association; i.e. that it was only a nominal rather than a legitimate part of the department of state government in which it had been placed. Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Association, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966). The court, however, noted that the mortgage association legislation contained most of the same features which it had cited in De Armond to support its conclusion that the development corporation was properly established within a department of state government. Like

the development corporation in De Armond, the mortgage association members were appointed by the Governor and served at his pleasure. The commissioner of Commerce had a permanent seat on the board of the association. Additionally, the court noted that as further evidence of gubernatorial control, the mortgage association was required to submit detailed annual reports to the Governor and legislature, the financial records were subject to an annual legislative audit, and certified copies of the minutes of every meeting of the association were required to be sent to the Governor.

Neither of these decisions, unfortunately, provide any guidance on the question of the minimum number of factors that will be required in order to meet the constitutional requirements of executive supervision or control. In both cases, however, the court seemed to emphasize two factors over and above all the others. The first was that board members served at the pleasure of the Governor. The second was that the Commissioner of the department within which these independent entities were located served on the board and was a full voting member. These two features were emphasized by the court to demonstrate that the Governor exercised at least partial control over the activities of the board. The court, for instance, noted that while the commissioner was only a single member of a multi-member board his position as a cabinet member would give him

substantial influence. The court further emphasized that the Governor was in a position to exercise influence on an otherwise independent board through the fact if there were a real disagreement in policy, he could exert control over the board members through his ultimate power to reeve them. The court, in Walker, cited with approval language from the Superior Court decision in the case to this effect:

If the Governor is dissatisfied with the executive director in either his capacity as a member of the Alaska State Housing Authority or the Alaska State Mortgage Association, he can assert his authority over the board members to effect the director's removal, and should they disregard his wishes, his alternative is to appoint members to the board who will appoint an executive director satisfactory to the Governoi.

Walker, at 250 n.19.

At the same time, the court recognized that there may be important and legitimate reasons for the legislature to insulate a board or authority from direct gubernatorial influence over particular decisions. In the courts words:

It is true that the Commissioner of Commerce can not dictate the decisions of the Board. Nor can any other state official It is quite apparent that the legislature intended the board to be free from outside control in making decisions on particular loans.

De Armond, at 724 (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, it is clear from the decisions that there are limits to the degree of insulation that the court will

tolerate and still uphold the constitutionality of the placement of the independent corporation nominally within a department of state government.

Accordingly, it is our view that to insure constitutionality of this bill the legislature should, at an absolute minimum:

1. create an independent authority which is part of an enumerated department of state government;

2. provide that the board for the public corporation or authority be comprised of persons appointed by the Governor and who serve at his pleasure;^{3/} and

3. that the commissioner of the department in which the authority is placed serve as a voting member of the board.

^{3/} There is a secondary, but perhaps no less important, reason why the appointees to the governing body of the railroad should serve at the Governor's pleasure. As a constitutional matter, there is a serious question as to whether any appointee of the executive branch with the exception of those who serve in regulatory or quasi-judicial positions can be subject to any other restrictions but that they serve at the Governor's pleasure. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted that under the federal constitution, if an office is "executive" in nature, legislative efforts to restrict the president's power to remove an official are invalid. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 178. That opinion has been modified slightly in Humphries Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, as the court held that a member of the Federal Trade Commission could have his term set by Congress and be insulated from removal by the president, but the court was clear to limit its opinion to quasi-legislative or judicial agencies, i.e. those that were actually passing regulations or resolving legal disputes as their prime function. The Railroad Authority would fall in neither of these categories, but would be within a traditional executive agency structure.

We raise this issue because we can be reasonably sure that the content of this bill will be litigated in the courts, if there is any reasonable basis to do so. The appointment of commissioners to the Railroad Authority who serve at the Governor's pleasure would reduce the possibility of legal attack on yet another basis.

It would be advisable, as well, to include at least some of the kinds of provisions (such as the annual reports to the Governor and legislative audits) which the court in De Armond cited as significant, although these may not be essential. Beyond that, the legislature may, in our view, limit the application of acts such as the Executive Budget Act, Administrative Procedures Act and others which impact most executive branch agencies, but are not, in our view, critical to upholding the constitutionality of this public corporation structure.

AMG/SAB/yw