SJR

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Bill No. Senate Joint Resolution No.

Date April 20, 1981

Title Relating to exclusion of state unemployment insurance trust funds from the federal unified budget.

Contact: Judy Knight 465-2700 JK

Funds used for unemployment compensation are generated by payroll taxes enacted by State Legislatures. These funds can be used only to pay unemployment compensation in the state in which they were collected and are held in trust by the federal government and drawn as needed to pay benefits. Since 1969, these funds have been included in the unified budget. The "bottom line" impact of inclusion of state trust funds in the unified budget is that all unemployment compensation--including benefits paid completely from dedicated state funds--appear as federal outlays. This makes unemployment insurance programs the target for budget-balancing proposals such as taxation of benefits, pension offsets, removal of extended benefit claimants from the computation of unemployment rates, and other cost-cutting proposals like those included in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of December 5, 1980.

In addition to those set out in the Resolution itself, there are a number of other reasons unemployment compensation trust funds should not be included in the unified budget, as follows:

1. The majority of the federal payroll tax is not collected from employers, but is credited if employers participate in an approved state program and are subject to contribution rates set by the state.

2. The operations of the U.S. Treasury do not require that the accounts be included in the unified budget. The Treasury currently handles accounts for several "off-budget" agencies.

3. Basic program decisions--level and duration of benefits, contribution mechanisms, eligibility, and many administrative functions--are almost entirely in the hands of state legislators.

Policy calling for removal of funds has been adopted by the National Governors' Association, the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, the Federal Advisory Council on Unemployment Insurance, and the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation. These policy positions were adopted recently and the issue is not yet well-known in Congress. One way to speed consideration of this important issue is to ensure that states' Congressional delegations recognize the impact of inclusion of state unemployment trust funds in the unified budget and are aware of the states' strong desire to remove the funds from the budget. The proposed resolution could be used to convey Alaska's sentiment on this issue to national policy-makers.

Position: The Department of Labor supports the proposed resolution and recommends immediate approval.

POSITION PAPER/Department of Labor



ISSUES & COMMENTARY

ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS SECTION APRIL 1981

SHOULD ALASKA OPT OUT OF THE FEDERAL/STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM?

By Scott T. Hannigan

The Social Security Act of 1935 established an Unemployment Insurance (UI) program in the United States under joint federal/state management. The major role of the federal partner was administration of a uniform employer tax to fund the program. States were encouraged by the Act to pass local UI legislation with the reserved right to set qualifications and standards for the payment of unemployment compensation. The Act contained provisions for employers to receive credit against the federal tax for contributions to a state UI plan and for states to receive grants to administer their programs. The availability of employer tax credits and state administrative grants were made contingent upon states' compliance with certain features in the Social Security Act. These features were generally found acceptable to the states and a nationwide federal/state UI program was in full effect by 1937. Over the ensuing years, however, numerous amendments to the Act and additional UI legislation by Congress (requiring conforming state legislation) has led to conflicts in the federal/state partnership. The federal government has generally held the upper hand in these conflicts by virtue of the enormous financial clout provided by the tax credits and administrative grants provisions of the Social Security Act. This paper will review the historical beginnings of the federal/state UI program, some of the conformity issues facing the states, and the possibility of future changes including complete separation of the federal and state systems.

Prior to 1935, states had no programs to provide assistance to the unemployed, with the notable exception of Wisconsin, which legislated a comprehensive UI law in 1934. The major obstacle to enactment of UI laws at the state level was directly related to taxes. Specifically, it was felt that a new tax burden on employers would have a detrimental effect on interstate competition. Congress eliminated this obstacle by passing (as part of the Social Security Act) Title IX, which levied a uniform tax on all employers in the country. Title IX allowed employers a 90 percent credit against the tax if they contributed to an approved state UI program. The remaining ten percent of the tax assessment was returned to the states in the form of administrative grants. These financial incentives in Title IX plus the deepening crisis of the 1930's depression strongly encouraged enactment of state UI laws and all states had unemployment insurance programs in operation by 1937. Provisions of Title IX were removed from the Social Security Act and were placed in the Internal Revenue Code by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 (FUTA).

Original proponents of the Social Security Act vigorously debated the type of UI program to be recommended--a wholly federal system or a federal/state plan. Arguments for a national system included, among others, that a national system would provide uniform protection from the risks of unemployment, protect the interests of multi-state employers and workers, provide for a national pooling of reserves, and streamline reporting requirements and the payment of taxes. Those who favored a federal/state program argued that a national system would be cumbersome to operate, that centralization would tend to paralyze action, that controversial issues would not receive proper debate and discussion by the states, and that a federal/state system would allow states to tailor the program to fit their needs and would allow wide latitude for experimentation by the states and so aid in producing a better system.[1/] The federal/state plan was the one that finally emerged.

The issues of conformity have existed since the very start of the unemployment insurance program. The Social Security Act contained several provisions that the states were to comply with. Titles III and IX of the Act required state UI laws to include the following major provisions: (1) payment of UI benefits solely through public employment offices or other approved agencies, (2) opportunity for a fair hearing on denied claims, (3) payment of all tax monies collected to the U.S. Treasury (Unemployment Trust Fund), (4) expenditure of all money requisitioned from the Trust Fund for UI benefits only, (5) no benefits to be paid until two years after commencement of tax collections, and (6) several provisions protecting conditions of work acceptance by claimants. Other provisions refer to administrative and reporting requirements. To enforce state conformity to these provisions, the Social Security Act allows for the denial of all employer tax credits and the suspension of state administrative grants. On numerous occasions since the inception of unemployment insurance, Congress has passed amendments to the Act necessitating conforming legislation at the state level. A major example has been amendments that have extensively increased UI coverage to such worker groups as state and local government employees and employees of non-profit institutes.

More recent conformity issues have included pension offset provisions (P.L. 96-364) and provisions of the 1980 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (P.L. 96-499). The pension offset provision requires a reduction of a claimant's weekly benefit by the amount of any pension (attributable to a base period employer) received by the claimant. The Reconciliation Act requires conforming state legislation to deny the payment of extended benefits for voluntary quits and discharges for misconduct regardless of applicable state law for regular benefits (i.e., if state law reinstates benefit entitlement for regular benefits after a penalty period, the entitlement would be cancelled for extended benefits). Failure to accept suitable work (as defined by federal law) or failure to seek work also results in denial of extended benefits.

Even further encroachment by the federal government will occur if recent proposals of the Reagan Administration are adopted. These include (1) changes in the extended benefits program to eliminate the national trigger and to revise the methods of calculating state triggers (both of which determine when extended benefits are to be paid); (2) requirements that unemployed workers who have collected 13 weeks of state UI accept any job that meets minimum wage and safety standards if the wages are equal to or greater than their UI benefits; and (3) eliminate UI for those who leave the military voluntarily.

The rising spectre of federalism in unemployment insurance has caused concern in

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1/ William Haber and Merril G. Murray, Unemployment Insurance in the American Economy, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1966.

Alaska and many other states. In most conformity issues, the states have grudgingly complied with federal legislation because they fear to lose tax credits for their employers and administrative grants for their programs. The mere threat of sanctions has kept states in line and the sanctions have never been fully applied. A specific instance where Alaska has run headlong against the federal government has been on the issue of interstate benefits. In 1955 and again 1960 Alaska reduced the maximum weekly benefit amount to out-of-state claimants in order to curtail the amount of UI dollars leaving the state.* The state was required to retreat from this position in 1972 when Congress decided the practice was discriminat ry to the rights of workers to move from state to state seeking employment. This interstate question has become a point of concern in recent years as Alaska has seen one-third of all its UI dollars pouring out of the state, aiding the economies of other states instead of our own. An even larger problem looms in the future amid talk of federal benefit standards requiring a maximum benefit equal to 2/3 of a state's average weekly wages. Alaska traditionally pays more benefits per dollar of total wages than any other state. This standard would put employer costs through the ceiling and could possibly drain the state's trust fund.

Potential solutions to the partnership problem are varied and complex. Many people over the years have advocated complete federalization of unemployment insurance. Most states, however, take a dim view of this type of encroachment on their rights. Another course would be to maintain the present system with some sort of systematic court review of conformity sanctions.[2/] The most extreme solution would be for a state to permanently refuse to comply with federal legislation.

The remainder of this paper discusses ramifications if Alaska chooses to remove itself from the federal/state system. The most direct effect would be monetary. Shown below are cost estimates for Alaska's UI program in 1982 comparing an out of conformity situation with a conforming one.

	Estimated Costs for 1982	
	In Conformity	Out of Conformity
State Taxes	$63.6 million	$63.6 million
FUTA Taxes	7.0 million	34.0 million
UI Administration	Federal Grants (From FUTA Taxes)	11.5 million
ES Administration	Federal Grants (From FUTA Taxes)	7.9 million
Extended Benefits (50% Federal)	Federal Reimbursements (From FUTA Taxes)	4.5 million
TOTAL	$70.6 million	$121.5 million

*Ch. 5, ESLA 1955 and Ch. 60, SLA 1960.

2/ Ibid.

The comparison shows that operating the current program while failing to conform to federal requirements would result in additional costs of $50.9 million. Most of the cost ($27 million) would be levied on employers as a result of lost FUTA tax credits. Employers might also be expected to pay administrative costs as well as funding full benefit outlays. If that were the case, employer costs would increase by approximately seventy percent. This burden could be reduced if employee contributions were increased and/or the state absorbed administrative costs.

One major question of the conformity issue concerns federal responsibility if employers opt to pay the full FUTA tax. The system was designed to pay benefits equal to 2.7 percent of taxable wages. Of the three percent FUTA tax, this 2.7 percent was to be dropped if employers contributed to the benefit fund of an approved state program. The implication is clearly that the 2.7 percent was to be used for paying benefits. Further, if employers opt to pay the full FUTA tax, the implication is that no state taxes would be necessary because the federal partner should be responsible for benefits.

The system was not--at least, should not have been--designed to coerce states into setting up their own unemployment insurance programs. Since costs would be three percent of taxable wages under a state or federal system, states would obviously find it attractive to design systems to fit their own social and economic conditions rather than accept standards determined in Washington. This "logical interpretation" does not coincide with the "legal interpretation." According to an unofficial opinion of the Solicitor General, the federal government has no power to implement an unemployment insurance program in any state. In other words, the system was designed to force states to implement unemployment insurance programs via making them pay for one whether they have one or not.

Failure to maintain an approved program would result in the 2.7 percent "credit" flowing into the federal administrative account rather than a benefit account, with the state receiving no funds in return. No state has informed the federal partner that it intends to drop its own program in favor of federalization and so the position remains unchallenged. It is conceivable that the "back door" federalization now in progress will change this situation in the future. The issue is not a simple one and raises a host of questions about the federal/state relationship. Some alternative relationships that might be considered for the operation of an unemployment insurance program in Alaska are discussed below.

The discussion centers on estimates of the average employer cost per worker (with annual earnings at or above the taxable wage base of $13,300) and includes the current system for comparison purposes.

CURRENT SYSTEM		
FUTA Tax (0.7% of first $6,000)†	=	$ 42
State Tax (3.3% of first $13,300)	=	439
TOTAL TAX	=	$481

One (untested) alternative is to drop the state system in favor of a federal program funded from the maximum FUTA tax. Employers would then pay the full FUTA tax of $204 per employee and all program provisions would be determined in Washington.

FEDERAL SYSTEM		
FUTA Tax (3.4% of first $6,000)†	=	$204
TOTAL TAX	=	$204

A second alternative would supplement a federal system with a separate state system. Costs would be dependent on the level of benefits the state wishes to provide. The state system would also require administrative funds of approximately $19 million.

An independent state program is a third alternative. The cost figures below assume that the FUTA tax is paid and that the state receives no funds in return. Obviously the combined cost of running a state system and paying penalty FUTA taxes could exceed the capabilities of many employers to pay. Some form of state assistance may be necessary (especially in light of expected increases in the taxable wage base for FUTA which will probably become effective in 1983 or 1984). The most plausible forms of state assistance are assumption of the liability for FUTA taxes and/or administrative costs and state support of benefits through appropriations to the UI Trust Fund.

INDEPENDENT STATE SYSTEM		
State Tax (3.3% of first $13,300)	=	$439
FUTA Tax (3.4% of first $6,000)	=	$204
Administrative Costs		$120
TOTAL TAX	=	$703

There are a number of areas where Alaska could effect some cost savings if the state were running an independent UI program. Some cost saving areas and approximate dollar amounts are listed below:

†The FUTA tax is set at 3.0 percent of the first $6,000 of each employees wages. The rate was temporarily increased to 3.4% to reduce the national debt in the FUTA account. If a state's UI law is in conformity with federal law, then employers receive a 90 percent credit on their FUTA taxes and pay in effect 0.7 percent (10% of 3.0% = 0.3 + 0.4 added tax = 0.7%).

Potential Cost Savings

(Projected on basis of Alaska's 1980 UI law)

1. Eliminate dependents benefits for out-of-state claimants (140,000 interstate payments X $8.55 [average interstate dependent payment])	$1.2 million
2. Eliminate extended benefits for out-of-state claimants (assuming Washington, Oregon and California still triggered on) 25% of estimated EB payments of $4.75 million state share)	$1.2 million
3. Reduce interstate benefit to 50 percent of calculated WBA (140,000 interstate payments X $116 [average interstate payment X 50%]) (excludes amount in #1)	$8.1 million
4. Eliminate interstate benefits entirely (140,000 interstate payments X $124.50 [average interstate payment] (includes amount in #1)	$17.4 million
5. Withdraw from interstate wage combining plan (net figure from 1980)	$0.3 million
6. Withdraw from unemployment compensation plan for ex-federal employees and ex-servicemen (5% of administrative costs)	$0.8 million

As indicated, some of these savings overlap. The maximum savings would be about $18.5 million, which is approximately equal to expected administrative costs. The possibilities are limitless in creating an independent state UI system. No state UI program (with the exception of the original Wisconsin plan) has existed outside the federal/state system, so no previous experience is available to formulate such a program. Opportunities exist for Alaska to tailor a UI program to the unique conditions of the state. Alaska's concerns with chronic unemployment, high wages, seasonal jobs, an itinerant labor force, and undiversified industries have not been satisfactorily addressed under the federal/state UI system.

Many legal and political questions arise in relation to separating the state's UI program from the federal/state structure. Would (and can) the federal government permit the state to break away? Would the national system disintegrate if other states wanted to drop out? Is the nature of unemployment beyond the capabilities of any one state to cope? Would the courts become involved in issues of "equal protection" and "due process" on behalf of denied out-of-state claimants? These and a host of other questions can only be answered by the legislature and the courts and are beyond the scope of this paper.

Opting out of the system is an issue that has gained prominance due to recent expansion of the federal partner's role in this cooperative system. It is a radical step and is likely to be accompanied by high costs and by legal battles.

Discussion of opting out is often the result of frustration with the expanding role of the federal partner and of a realization that this expansion cannot be successfully countered by piecemeal resistance to individual intrusions on state prerogatives.

Before taking a radical step, alternatives should be considered. The level of interference by the federal partner has increased substantially since the unemployment insurance trust funds were placed in the federal unified budget in 1969. In attempts to reduce budget deficits, Congress has enacted several changes to the UI system. Although the changes may have been proposed primarily for their budgetary effect, they have had profound impact on the program and on the nature of the federal/state cooperative arrangement. The key to a return to true partnership may lie in removal of state trust funds from the federal unified budget. Alleviating budgetary pressure may accomplish many of the desirable goals of opting out without some of the negative aspects. That is, removal of the trust funds from the budget could reverse the tendency toward federal intervention and would not carry the potential to destroy the existing federal/state partnership.