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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
IN ESTABLISHMENT OF
ALASKA'S PERMANENT FUND

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I. INTRODUCTION

The following report was prepared under a contract between the State of Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency and the University of Alaska Institute of Social and Economic Research. Its object was to explore some of the fundamental economic questions involved in establishing the structure and policies for the permanent fund authorized by a 1976 amendment to the Alaska Constitution. Research for this report was devoted mainly to an initial exploration of the question to what extent capital markets serving Alaska are reasonably efficient, and consisted largely of unstructured and unsystematic interviews with businessmen on both sides of those markets --- officers of financial institutions and other investors and lenders, and corporate officers and entrepreneurs in Alaska industries or with Alaska interests.

In line with the contract between the Legislative Affairs Agency and ISER, the study and report were to be "...in the nature of a general reconnaissance, and need not involve the collection or processing of original quantitative data." Among the tasks of the study, however, was to prescribe "the analytical and policy issues" which deserve further investigation in depth. A number of the issues raised in this report do warrant collection and processing of original data. In line with the report's terms of reference, I have not proposed final conclusions on any of the six interrelated questions set out in the contract, but have only attempted to explore and define them sufficiently to propose how the Legislature might proceed with such investi-

gations, particularly some quantitative testing of the hypotheses offered here.

Uses of the Permanent Fund

Public officials, "experts" of various kinds and voters generally have envisioned several different purposes for an Alaska permanent fund. The constitutional amendment which authorized the fund reflects a consensus that at least one-fourth of Alaska's non-recurring mineral leasing revenue should be excluded from the regular stream of state spending. A corollary of this consensus is that the fund should be profitably invested to give state government a permanent stream of revenue independent of current mineral leasing income and independent of economic conditions in the state generally. Because state government spending is a large part of Alaska's economic base (and will grow proportionately larger as tax and royalty income from North Slope oil begins to flow), the spending of income from permanent fund investments and their responding in Alaska's private economy could have a stabilizing effect on employment and income in the state.

There is little doubt that the operation of the fund would have the effect of reducing the immediate fiscal impact of oil and gas income and a stretching out and smoothing of its long-term impact, however the fund is organized and whatever its investment strategy. But the size of these impacts will depend on how much of the permanent fund's capital is invested or lent in Alaska and on what terms. Given certain assumptions about

the size and structure of the state's economy, the revenues committed to the fund, the yields of the fund's investments and the disposition of income from those investments, we can forecast its effect on the shape of long-term growth of state product, personal income, employment and per capita income. Some elementary projections of this sort have already been made by ISER under the Man in the Arctic Program.

Beyond this, there is little agreement on the proper purposes or the long-term effects of permanent fund investment strategies, and there has been little examination of the economic fundamentals which determine whether these purposes can actually be achieved by an instrument by the fund, or what its actual effects (intended and unintended) are likely to be. Apart from the purpose of delaying and smoothing the fiscal impact of non-recurring mineral leasing revenue, other goals that have been suggested for the permanent fund are to accelerate the growth of the state's non-oil economy and at the same time to expand state government's non-oil tax base.

In pursuit of this end it is usually assumed, and there seems to be a near-consensus in the unofficial statement of legislators, that permanent fund moneys invested or lent in Alaska be confined to creditworthy projects and enterprises, and at market rates and terms. If capital markets in Alaska (and in the United States) are workably efficient, however --- and my investigation so far suggests that they are --- investment of permanent fund moneys in Alaska will have exactly the same effect on the state's economy as investing them outside Alaska.

(The quality of the fund's investment portfolio may, however, be affected by the choice.) That is, permanent fund money would tend to replace the same amount of money that otherwise would have been provided from private financial sources.

Unless it provides capital subsidies, permanent fund activity will not accelerate growth of non-oil industry and thereby diversify the state's economy. If capital markets are generally efficient, moreover, non-subsidized permanent fund outlays would not tend to smooth out Alaska's business cycle or the growth rate of employment and population, even if there were no other fundamental difficulties (treated in part IV of this report) in using state investment policy as a counter-cyclical tool. In the absence of capital subsidies, any attempt to disperse economic activity or to foster rural industries will also tend to be futile if the absence of growth in rural Alaska or in particular small communities is a result of factors other than the failure of financial institutions to bring enterprise and investors together on mutually acceptable terms. If poverty or stagnation is caused by deficiencies in natural resources, the skills or attitudes of the labor force, transportation, communications and energy costs, or an unsatisfactory institutional environment, the permanent fund cannot cure these ills, nor even mitigate them unless it is treated as a source of capital available for investments which will not meet market tests.

II. CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY

Every proposed strategy for Alaska's permanent fund depends

upon stated or unstated assumptions about the "efficiency" of national or international capital markets. The proposition that Alaska as a whole, certain regions of Alaska, or certain Alaska industries suffer a chronic capital shortage which can be remedied by permanent fund investment strategy amounts to saying that existing capital markets do not, in fact, function efficiently.

By "efficiency" in the capital market, we mean the ability of loanable or investible funds to move readily in and out of Alaska, among industries and among different kinds of capital instruments of different term and risk (common stocks, bonds, loans, etc.) in response to the differences in anticipated yields.

The most important elements of capital market efficiency are mobility, cost and information. Legal limitations on the flow of loanable funds can clearly reduce capital market efficiency as defined here (though there may be good social reasons for the restrictions). An example of a legal restriction on the mobility of capital for social reasons, the federal government limits the rate of interest payable by banks and thrift institutions on savings deposits, in order to channel funds to, and reduce interest costs for, the residential mortgage market (but it also restricts the funds available to savings institutions). The fees of brokers, underwriters, lenders, and "finders" of venture capital, and taxes such as capital gains and stock transfer taxes also increase the cost of moving funds from one investment to another. A lack of competition can both erect barriers to capital mobility and increase transactions costs.

The element of capital market efficiency most often held to be deficient in Alaska is information. If funds are to move easily and at competitive rates of return from areas or industries with cash flow surpluses to those with excess demand for capital, entrepreneurs must know where equity and debt money is available and on what terms, and potential investors or lenders must have the means to appraise the earning capacity and risk of the ventures they are asked to underwrite.

Capital mobility, transactions costs and the adequacy of information are all a function of market size and diversity (which is in turn a function of market size). A region with large and diversified capital demands will attract a large number of financial institutions of different kinds, who will serve as intermediaries between entrepreneurs and investors or lenders. They will compete among one another for business, thereby lowering capital transactions costs to ultimate borrowers and lenders. And most critically, they will make it their business to understand the industries and kinds of enterprises they serve and their local and regional economies, thereby increasing market information necessary to evaluate individual ventures.

This issue has important implications for the permanent fund's investment strategy. If capital markets serving Alaska business are workably efficient, permanent fund moneys dedicated to Alaska investment will have no impact on the aggregate level of investment (and thereby the rate of economic growth), the industrial structure, or on the profitability of investment in Alaska, unless

these moneys are offered on subsidized terms. Loans from the permanent fund at market rates would simply displace private capital that would otherwise be available at the same rates.

The only material result might be a reduction in the diversity--and thereby safety--of the permanent fund's own investment portfolio because it would be imprudently concentrated on Alaska issues and unduly sensitive to business fluctuations special to the state.

If, on the other hand, institutional barriers to capital movements, excessive fees or taxes on capital transactions, or inadequate information result in a shortage of capital for Alaska ventures at normal market terms, then it will indeed make a significant difference to Alaska's economy how much of the permanent fund is allocated to investment within the state. The conclusion that investment strategy would, in fact, make a difference need not necessarily carry with it the implication, however, that the difference would be great, or cost-effective or even in the right direction. To the extent there are demonstrated inefficiencies--barriers, costs or ignorance--in Alaska's capital markets, it may well be cheaper and more effective to remedy those problems directly rather than to offset them with permanent fund investments.

The paradigm (pattern of concepts and theories) of capitalistic finance presented in business school textbooks is one of efficient capital markets. Within the terms of this paradigm, it is very unlikely that Alaska could suffer a chronic capital shortage. Outside investors and lenders, in their search for

the highest rates of return consistent with a given degree of security, would make an effort to discover investment opportunities in the state, while entrepreneurs with Alaska interests would shop the world's capital markets for venturers or lenders of funds on appropriate terms. Whatever lack of information existed about capital sources, the particular industry, Alaska's institutions or business conditions, or regarding the particular firm could be remedied at a price, and at least for large ventures, that price would be relatively small compared to the funds involved. A variety of financial intermediaries and investment services would compete with one another to bring together borrower and lender or entrepreneur and investor, and to furnish either side with needed information. This competition would increase capital mobility and lower both transactions costs (the spread between the yield to lenders and the cost to borrowers, for example) and the cost of information.

Capital market efficiency is obviously a relative matter. The mobility of funds is seldom totally unfettered; there are almost always fees and taxes or other transactions costs; and information itself comes only at a price and is never perfect. The relevant questions here are to what extent and for what regions and industries in Alaska are capital markets significantly less efficient than elsewhere in the national economy and to what extent, if at all, can the investment strategy of the permanent fund remedy or offset these inefficiencies.

Alaskan Capital Markets

In my conversations with businessmen inside and outside of Alaska, it appeared that bankers and officers of financial institutions generally, officers of large corporations, successful real estate developers and the most successful entrepreneurs in contracting, tourism and fishing tended to "believe in" the efficient markets paradigm and conduct their businesses as if it were an accurate view of the world. It is true that several of them spoke of a national "capital shortage"; the reference is to the aggregate effect of high taxes and inflation, and few of the businessmen in these categories seem to believe that there is a shortage of investment or debt capital peculiar to Alaska or to their own industries. The officers of banks, finance companies and other money market institutions believe that their companies actively seek out investment opportunities in Alaska and consistently denied that they insisted on higher rates of return or greater security for Alaska issues. Two West Coast bankers active in Alaska stated a belief that it was probably easier to place large issues generated by their Alaska correspondents than comparable issues from California or Washington State because of the widespread confidence in Alaska's wealth and continued industrial growth. Two corporate officials made a similar observation, one of them alluding to the "glamor" of Alaska investment.

Officers of national or multinational corporations in petroleum, mining and fish processing indicated that for them, the procedures, problems and costs involved in the financing of Alaska

ventures were for all practical purposes identical with those for financing comparable ventures in the Lower 48 or in other politically stable advanced capitalist states. Their own sources were national and international, and their ability to raise funds rested in part on the overall strength and reputation of the company, and in part on their ability to communicate to potential investors and lenders the reasons (resource base, engineering cost estimates, market factors, etc.) why they themselves believed that the proposed Alaska investment was sound. One successful developer scoffed at the notion of an Alaska information gap: "Information, salesmanship--that's what business leadership, what you call entrepreneurship is all about. It's your job as a developer to get all the information your banker needs into his hands. Make him as confident about your project as you are yourself."

Many small businessmen including, it appears, most prospectors, inventors, independent merchants, and operators of hotel, restaurant and other tourist-related businesses outside of Anchorage, and some contractors do not, however, believe in the efficient markets paradigm. I heard many complaints about treatment by banks and finance companies and a feeling that "the system" is biased against small businessmen and against Alaskan enterprise. I heard anecdotes purporting to show that even Alaska banks favor outside-owned businesses. Many persons in this group expressed a hope that the permanent fund could correct this bias and make more funds available for ventures like their own. It was especially noteworthy to me

that most state and federal civil servants in the economic development or business assistance field expressed views more consistent with the capital shortage paradigm than with that of efficient markets and believed that government should provide more financial assistance to private industrial development in Alaska. Whether or not these sentiments express an accurate view of the way in which the economy and financial markets operate, it seems likely that it is a more representative view than the more sophisticated textbook, "big business" view of capital markets, and constitutes a substantial political constituency for an activist policy by the permanent fund's managers.

In preparing this report, I encountered several instances where entrepreneurs or corporate managers were working on financing a fisheries, mining or tourist venture, a shopping center or a residential subdivision. Those in this group who seem to accept the efficient markets paradigm regarded it as the essence of their own job as a developer or manager to assemble and integrate the necessary information on resources, markets, costs, economic and environmental regulation and to draft credible profit and loss projections and pro forma financial statements acceptable to their corporate boards or to outside investors or lenders.

A common situation among small and medium Alaska business enterprises seems to be a rate of growth (with sales increasing at 20 to 100 percent per year) that leads to a need for additional fixed and working capital far outstripping internally generated

cash flow. It is "obvious" to the owners and operators of these businesses that money borrowed to sustain this growth would earn a very good rate of return, but that there is never enough credit available. Businessmen in this situation seem to express two strikingly different attitudes toward their own "capital shortages." Those who operate by the efficient markets paradigm (and these seemed generally to be the most successful) expressed their problems objectively in terms of necessary cash flow and debt-equity ratios acceptable to lenders, while there were others who attributed their cash crunch to the institutional incapacity of financial institutions to serve their kind or business, or to the laziness, ignorance or malice of particular lenders.

It is clear that there are widely contrasting perceptions among Alaska businessmen and others about the adequacy of financial institutions and the supply of capital to Alaska ventures. Curiously, the distribution of these perceptions seems to be bimodal; that is, they cluster at one extreme or the other with only a scattering of individuals in the middle. Perceptions also seem to be highly correlated by industry and by size of enterprise.

In general the bigger the firm, or the faster it is growing, the more satisfied its spokesmen are with existing capital markets. Without exception, representatives of large financial enterprises doing business in Alaska and of large national and multinational corporations spoke as if they believed in efficient markets and, without exception, they rejected the notion that lack of informa-

tion, high transactions costs or institutional barriers created a capital shortage in Alaska or in the industries with which they are connected or whose financial needs they serve.

On the other hand, hardly any local merchants, service industry operators or tourist business operators outside of Anchorage and Fairbanks, and hardly any entrepreneur or developer who was still trying to put together his first "big deal" (capitalized at \$1 million or more), believed that financial institutions operated efficiently or fairly, and most of them felt that Alaskan enterprise was at a substantial disadvantage compared with firms in the same business elsewhere. As I mentioned before, almost every public official interviewed believed that there was an Alaska capital shortage that could, and should, be treated by application of government money. Anchorage and Fairbanks merchants, contractors and real estate developers seem to fall into both groups, as do operators of independent businesses connected with forestry, fisheries and mining.

The time and resources available for preparing this report did not make it possible to separate perceptions and ideology from reality. Each group's perceptions were supported with convincing anecdotes. Nevertheless, most of the correlations between attitude and situation were predictable, and the perceptions surely contain a measure of self-interest and self-justification. Officers of financial institutions who have the job of searching out and appraising investment opportunities are likely to believe

that their jobs are useful and effective, and they are unlikely to emphasize the problems of those kinds of enterprise that they do not serve (and which may not, in fact, be served well by any sector of the capital market). And it is not surprising that public officials feel that government financial and technical assistance (like economic regulation) is essential to a healthy business economy. But among businessmen, are the first group satisfied with the status quo because it served them well, or are those who accept, understand, and work easily within the status quo the people who are for that reason most likely to succeed as corporate managers and entrepreneurs?

My own provisional conclusions on the issue of capital market efficiency are as follows, but they are subject to modification on the basis of a quantitative study of attitudes and actual workings of the financial system in Alaska:

1. Investors and entrepreneurs, would-be lenders and would-be borrowers alike believe that the existing capital market institutions are adequate to finance large industrial or commercial developments in oil and gas, mining, petrochemicals, fisheries, timber, trade, and tourism anywhere in Alaska. I have found utterly no reason to doubt this consensus, and see no way in which the permanent fund could improve on the mobility of capital, transactions costs, or the information made available to investors by the sponsors themselves and through existing financial institutions.

It follows, therefore, that the permanent fund's investment activity in these areas will not significantly influence the profitability or growth of basic industry in Alaska unless loans are made at less than current market rates or under less secured terms (e.g., more highly leveraged, lower coverage rates, less collateral) than is customary. If the permanent fund invests in Alaska industrial ventures at market rates and terms, therefore, it will divert private capital elsewhere that would otherwise be attracted to the venture. In short, there is no need and no useful function for permanent fund investment in major industrial or commercial enterprise in Alaska, unless there are grounds to subsidize that enterprise.

2. Despite the disagreement of those who do not believe in the efficient markets paradigm, the working and fixed capital requirements of residential and commercial real estate developers, contractors, retail and wholesale merchants and purveyors of services in Fairbanks and Anchorage are being served by existing banks, thrift institutions, finance companies, mortgage brokers and the like, in exactly the same way and at approximately the same rates and under the same conditions as in other communities throughout the nation.

Some businessmen will always have grievances against their bankers (and many Alaskan businessmen have some gruesome yet convincing tales to tell) or against the financial system gen-

erally. But Anchorage and Fairbanks banks do compete aggressively for business customers, and some of the "atrocious" stories can be attributed to understandable disagreements over the creditworthiness of a particular borrower or venture rather than a systematic failing of the system. Again, apart from any argument that a particular line of business or kind of investment ought to be subsidized, there seems to be no case for the permanent fund or one of its subsidiaries to enter the commercial capital markets in these communities. I am not certain at this point how well these needs are being served in other urban places in Alaska.

3. Several alternatives exist for financing the purchase or lease of standardized machinery used in business, including motor vehicles, construction equipment, aircraft, boats, electrical generators, compressors, machine tools and the like. Commercial banks, finance companies, credit unions, manufacturers and vendors all offer some kind of financing for this kind of chattel, and one or more of these forms of financing seems to be available to creditworthy borrowers in any Alaska industry or location. Higher servicing and collection costs do tend to limit borrowers in the more remote areas of Alaska to higher interest rate alternatives, but on balance this reflects not a failure of the market to reflect true costs but the opposite, it does not constitute a case for permanent fund involvement in the install-

ment credit business, unless there is also a case for a capital subsidy to rural enterprise generally.

4. The general feeling of local businessmen in small communities and rural areas of Alaska is that they face a genuine capital shortage and that they are at the mercy of one or two financial institutions that are indifferent to their aspirations or the facts of their business situation. There seems to be some merit to these complaints. Lending in small towns or the bush is exceptionally expensive, however; the cost of investigating and servicing small commercial, real estate and installment loans and lease purchase contracts and the like, and the costs of collection, foreclosure, repossession and resale can easily exceed the potential earnings from loan fees and interest. These excess cost burdens, together with unfamiliarity with local conditions, understandably make the statewide (Anchorage and Fairbanks) banks and other financial institutions reluctant to provide capital even for the larger locally-owned development, such as resorts, hotels, apartment houses, fish processing plants, etc., and where they do make loans they are willing to finance a smaller portion of total investment. In these cases, governmental participation or guarantees (EDA, SBA, Farmer's Home, Alaska Veterans loans, etc.) have often been essential to obtaining conventional private financing. This portion of the demand for capital in Alaska may then be a legitimate area for permanent fund activity.

In sumamry, it appears that most attempts of the permanent fund to serve as a development bank for Alaska would duplicate

functions that private financial institutions (backed up in many cases by other governmental assistance programs, e.g., FHA, Farmer's Home, VA, etc.) perform or are capable of performing adequately. At this stage in my investigation, I have been able to identify only one function in which a new public financing source might function better than the current machinery of the private capital market, and that is in provision of commercial credit and financing of small and medium scale industrial and commercial enterprises in small communities and rural areas.

III. SUBSIDIES AND SOFT LOANS

Diversification of Alaska's economy is widely regarded as a desirable goal for state policy and as a proper purpose of permanent fund strategy. The benefits argued for such a policy are reduction of economic fluctuations and creation of a permanent employment, income and revenue base not dependent upon oil and gas or other exhaustible resources. The line of reasoning in the previous section of this report suggests that the existing concentration of Alaska economic activity by region tends to reflect real resource location and cost factors (such as transportation expense and small market scale) rather than capital market failures. It appears that a reduction of existing barriers to capital mobility and improving information flows would not necessarily accelerate the rate of development in Alaska fisheries, agriculture or tourist industries, for example, or in rural Alaska generally.

Making capital more readily available at lower rates to Alaska enterprise generally could be expected to increase investment in all sectors of the state's economy, but there is no reason to believe that it would influence the concentration of investment in the desired direction, that is, in favor of economic diversification or geographical dispersion (if the latter is indeed a desirable objective). Lower capital costs would likely have their biggest impact precisely where development would proceed most rapidly in any event. If investment activity is already concentrated in oil and gas-related activity, fish processing and in Anchorage residential and commercial real estate development, that is probably where more abundant, cheaper capital would go. There is a strong confirmation of this proposition in the investment behavior of the rural-based regional and village corporations.

Making capital cheaper and easier to obtain will undoubtedly have one effect which may be regarded as counterproductive; business will be given an added incentive to substitute capital for labor and the state's economy will tend to become more capital intensive than it otherwise would be. If investment policy is to be in any way directed toward "job creation," it must be highly selective and not simply a matter of lowering capital costs across the board.

If the legislature deems it desirable to influence private investment in Alaska in the direction of greater economic diversification by means of permanent fund investments, it will have to authorize the fund's managers to make loans to the favored

types of venture on terms other than those of the private market. There is a serious question, however, how many new ventures will be made feasible simply by a reduction of interest rates on borrowed capital below customary rates. There is in fact good reason to believe that investment demand in new speculative industrial, agricultural or tourist-related development are relatively insensitive to interest cost. This is because private investors are not likely to commit their own equity to such ventures unless they have a prospect of recovering their total investment in five years or less. Such an outcome requires an annual cash flow equal to 30 to 50 percent on total investment, a situation in which two or three percentage points interest expense is seldom crucial. More important parameters are the standards for the creditworthiness of the venture and requirements for equity and collateral. In other words, it is likely to be more critical for a new venture in fish processing or tourism whether it can borrow three-fourths rather than two-thirds of its total requirements, than it is whether the interest rate on that loan is 9 or 12 percent.

In this situation, subsidized loans by the permanent fund can without question have an influence on the shape and direction of economic growth in Alaska, and that influence will be greater the greater the proportion of permanent fund moneys devoted to the favored types of enterprise. The form the subsidy is likely to take to make it effective, however, will not be (and should not be) lower interest rates, but rather a

relaxation of lending standards to enhance the availability of funds. One danger here, even if the legislature deliberately authorizes the fund's managers to make such loans, is that the nature and the degree of actual subsidy may not begin to appear for many years, until it begins to show up as defaults on principal and interest payments. This danger will be aggravated if, as is often the case with governmental loan programs, there is not a rigorous policy of classifying problem loans and of promptly writing off those which are uncollectable. Banks and thrift institutions are required by law and regulation to do this, but even there the requirement is only very loosely implemented or enforced, because lending officers are reluctant to expose their own imprudence in making bad loans or to write down the capital position of their institutions.

In any event, there is sure to be some opportunity for the permanent fund to influence the sectoral and geographic direction of economic development in Alaska by manipulation of credit terms. The most aggressive (and in conventional terms, imprudent) lending policy cannot, however, create an industry where resources, markets, skilled labor and other requisites are missing, and the fund's managers should never become so "soft" as to finance enterprises whose promoters are not taking a substantial risk themselves, or which do not have convincing prospects of long-term viability.

The most relevant model of a development bank for Alaska is not the IBRD (the World Bank) or the regional development banks, but the International Development Agency, the World Bank's "soft

loan" subsidiary. If the permanent fund is to direct the shape of economic growth in Alaska, it will not be through normal commercial investments on normal commercial terms, but through a postponed or hidden subsidy in the form of higher loss rates in future years. This is not the appropriate place to judge the desirability or assess the ultimate beneficiaries of capital subsidies directed at changing the structure of Alaska's economy, but the Legislature may well wish to assure that those implicit subsidies are not totally hidden, by setting out (or requiring the fund's managers to set out) explicit and rigorous standards for the granting, servicing, classification and writeoff of soft loans, and by requiring a rigorous annual audit of the fund's loan quality.

There is another dimension to the capital subsidy issue which the Legislature should keep in mind as it authorizes any soft or subsidized loan program under the permanent fund. Granting credit at terms more liberal than the market will almost certainly make some enterprises viable that would not otherwise be so, but it is difficult to draw lending standards in such a way that other ventures which would be viable anyway do not receive a windfall that serves no social purpose. This consideration suggests a policy that might be adopted toward the soft loan program --- that loans under this program be made at rates perceptibly above market rates (as is appropriate to the greater risk). If my earlier observation is correct that speculative investment in Alaska is more sensitive to the degree of leveraging permitted than to interest rates as such, higher interest rates would

screen out some of those enterprises which did not need assistance from the fund and would at the same time help build up a reserve for loan losses to offset the subsidy aspect of the program.

IV. COUNTER-CYCLICAL INVESTMENT

There are several possible concepts of the permanent fund as an economic stabilization device for Alaska. The one basic concept of the fund on which there is a near-consensus is that it is to be regarded as a savings account for a "rainy day." That is, Alaska's government is about to experience an extraordinary surge of income from oil and gas royalties that is not likely to be sustained. Since petroleum revenues will not only be the main source of general government income but will for some time be a principal support for the private economy and the main engine of economic growth, the permanent fund would be used to reduce the injection of income into the state's economy during the boom phase, and then the income from investing these revenues would be used to sustain state expenditures and their fiscal impacts after the boom has ended.

It has also been suggested that the permanent fund could help even out short-term business fluctuations in Alaska, or maintain long-term economic growth (as measured by the growth of state product, real personal income or employment) at some optimum rate. Such stabilization policies could in principle operate through varying appropriations to the permanent fund, working through the fiscal impacts of general fund expenditures;

through varying the permanent fund's rate of new lending in Alaska, working through the fiscal impact of investments supported by these loans; or with both appropriation and investment policy. The basic principle is simple: when the state's economy was booming, larger appropriations would be made to the permanent fund (thereby reducing revenue available to the Legislature for general fund outlays) and/or a smaller proportion of permanent fund assets would be invested within Alaska. When the state was in a recession, the flows would be reversed: less revenue would be appropriated to the permanent fund and more to the regular capital and operating expenses of state government, and/or the permanent fund would inject more investment money into the Alaska economy (presumably by selling off non-Alaska investments in its portfolio).

There are, however, both conceptual and practical problems with using the permanent fund as a stabilizing device on any more sophisticated basis than is implied by the "savings account" notion. One of them has been identified previously --- to the extent that existing financial institutions make up a reasonably efficient capital market, the volume of unsubsidized loans or investment the fund makes in Alaska may not have a significant effect on economic activity in the state.

Even if there were significant capital market deficiencies which gave permanent fund outlays a real effect on aggregate investment in Alaska, or even if the fund had a policy of subsidizing Alaska business (thereby expanding the level of investment

beyond what it otherwise would be), it is still not obvious whether a policy of varying state expenditures or permanent fund investment in response to economic conditions would in fact reduce business fluctuations in the state, increase them or be on balance neutral. The crucial question here is the relationship between our ability to forecast economic conditions or recognize cyclical turning points, and the time it takes for a change in appropriations or in lending policy to show up in unemployment rates or rates of economic growth.

Some very gross economic changes, such as the buildup and decline of pipeline construction activity, obviously could be anticipated and their fiscal effects projected with some degree of confidence. But the Alyeska pipeline is likely to be historically unique in size and specific gravity in the state's economy. Future ups and downs are more likely to be the resultant of a number of smaller influences, many of which (general business confidence, for example) cannot be mapped out in advance and are difficult to quantify even retrospectively. If booms and recessions often cannot be recognized clearly until after they have been with us awhile, and their turning points recognized only after they have passed, it is also true that significant delays are inevitable between the recognition of a new trend, the fiscal action that is appropriate and the actual movement of new dollars into (or out of) the private economy. Depending upon the relative lengths of the various lags, attempts to stabilize Alaska's economy or smooth its growth rate might be successful, but it seems equally likely that state fiscal policy would zig when it

should be zagging, that the amplitude of the business cycle would thereby be increased, or even that the permanent fund's intervention could create oscillations in the state's economy where otherwise there would be none.

It is not obvious which of these outcomes would in fact result from an attempt to use the permanent fund as a stabilizing influence. The effect would depend in part on whether it was appropriations, lending or both which were being varied, and what economic indicators were being used to trigger policy changes. A business cycle model could be developed which would simulate the behavior of Alaska's economy under the influence of various decision rules.

Intuitively, I expect that such a model would show that the various lags in recognizing trends and implementing policy, and in the actual economic impact of that policy, would preclude using the permanent fund to offset economic fluctuations with a term of less than about three years. If the fund is to be useful as a stabilizing device, it will probably be only as an instrument to regulate growth rates in very gross terms and only in the very long run. If, for example, the social impacts of a continuing growth rate in employment below 2 percent per year or above 8 percent were determined to be unacceptable, the legislature might conceivably key permanent fund appropriations or investment policy to the average growth of employment in Alaska over the previous five years, with the understanding that no individual year's growth is ever likely to be on track because of the fund's policies, and that excessive growth in one year might be offset by

stagnation in another, or vice versa. It is likely, in other words, that long-term stability in growth rates might be achieved at the expense of greater instability in the short run.

The practical problems in establishing a stabilization policy for the permanent fund are political and administrative. If permanent fund appropriations (and their complement, operating expenditures from the general fund) are to be varied, it is the Legislature which would have to vary them. While there would be little difficulty persuading the executive branch to propose and the Legislature to authorize increases in capital and operating expenses during a recession if money is readily available to be committed, it may be too much to expect a sharp reduction in outlays to offset an economic boom in the state, particularly when revenues and "needs" have both been increasing at exceptional rates precisely because of the boom. The fate of the state government's announced interest to "stockpile" public works projects until the end of the Alyeska construction boom should be instructive on this point. It is not clear, moreover, that the managers of the permanent fund would be immune from similar pressure with respect to their lending and investment policies, if they were granted the discretion to alter those policies according to economic conditions in the state.

V. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Another suggested use for permanent fund moneys is to finance public works projects. The works most often proposed are hydro-electric plants and fisheries improvements such as hatcheries and

habitat enhancement. These two examples are of course quite different; electrical generating facilities can be and usually are self-supporting from the sale of power. The principal reason for governmental investment in such facilities, ideology aside, is the exemption from federal taxes of the income of a public utility and of the interest it pays on its debt. This very consideration suggests that revenue bonds of the Alaska Power Authority or other governmentally owned utilities would not be an appropriate permanent fund investment, because the permanent fund (whose own income is tax exempt) could be expected to earn a higher rate of return from investments in taxable federal or corporate bonds than the Power Authority would have to pay in interest on its own tax-exempt bonds, assuming that the securities were equally rated. This consideration does not, however, necessarily foreclose the permanent fund from providing all or a part of the equity component of Power Authority capital (and in earning a rate of return appropriate to the risk taken by an equity investor), or from providing a guarantee of Power Authority bonds, or from subsidizing electric power development.

The crucial characteristics of some public works, such as hatcheries and habitat improvement, is that they cannot be financed conventionally. Benefit-cost analysis may well show that the new benefits to society exceed the capital and operating outlays, but the burdens and the benefits may not fall on the same people, and it may be impractical (or impolitic) to collect a user charge from the beneficiaries. In the case of these fishery-related investments, however, costs could be allocated at

least roughly among the beneficiaries through a surcharge on fishing licenses, entry permits or raw fish taxes. If such capital improvements are not to be funded this way, however, they seem more appropriate subjects for general fund appropriations than as "investments" by the permanent fund.

VI. ISSUES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS

This report has identified a number of questions whose answers are crucial if the Legislature is to develop appropriate policies for operation of the permanent fund. At most, however, the author has been able to give only tentative answers to these questions. The following is a list of issues that warrant further investigation, together with some discussion of methods and sources.

1. Capital market structure, costs and efficiency. A survey is necessary of the number, size and aggregate Alaska activity (e.g., loans made, loans outstanding, loans being serviced) for various institutions in the financial market, with offices both inside and outside of Alaska. Questionnaires and interviews would be used to determine the relative weight of each of these institutions in financing different industries in Alaska and their policies regarding various types of Alaska business.

A survey is necessary to determine just what is the price of money in Alaska and how does this price (together with other credit conditions) differ from those elsewhere in the United States. A large body of aggregate data comparing Alaska conditions with those in other states is available in the commercial bank call reports; some information is available by major loan

categories (real estate, commercial and installment). The absolute level of these rates is less indicative than their relation to rates in other Western states and particularly the trend of any Alaska rate differential. Any differences in other loan terms (for example, requirements for compensating balances) would have to be based upon questionnaires or systematic interviews with lending officers.

Similar questions can appropriately be asked about differences in the rates and conditions for various categories of credit as between the urban centers of Alaska, and small communities and rural areas. The quickest approximation to an estimate of geographic differentials could be obtained by comparing loan statistics for the outlying branches of statewide banks with those of their urban offices. A hypothesis that deserves investigation is the proposition that retail credit markets are more competitive and more efficient than "wholesale" markets in Alaska. If this is the case, channelling the permanent fund's Alaska lending through existing financial institutions could result in large, unearned windfalls to the banking system without significantly benefitting Alaska borrowers. It would be instructive to see what happened to the "spread" between the interest cost of public deposits to Alaska banks and their interest earnings on real estate loans, for example, as a result of the Alaska preference provision in management of the state's North Slope bonus money. A similar question can be asked about the actual effect of the state's purchases of residential mortgages, after loan fees are taken into account.

2. Demand for investment and for loanable funds. A sample survey and detailed case studies should be undertaken of the financial structure and the procedure of financing fish processing plants, hotels and other relevant investment projects in Alaska. The contrasts, if any, in structure, procedures, costs of capital for individual components of financing (interim construction, working capital, etc.) should be noted and the appropriate implications drawn. The importance of capital financing costs to overall project costs is an important element in judging the potential sensitivity of investment demand to interest rates.

The investment demand schedule for individual industries ought to be investigated. The question here is to what extent will a reduction in the interest rate to a particular group or for a particular purpose result in an increase in the level of investment. The question is difficult to answer generally because the shape of the curve relating investment outlays to interest rates will differ for each subcategory of investment and will be affected by a large number of other factors. Builders of national econometric models have spent much time trying to specify investment demand functions with only limited success, however. The data base modeling Alaska investment demand is very limited because there are almost no satisfactory statistics that can be used as indicators of investment activity, with the partial exception of residential construction. The more productive approach would be to model individual projects--even fictional projects--in the way the Delta barley project was analyzed.

3. Aggregate impacts of different policies toward permanent fund appropriations and investments. The percentage of eligible funds that should be channelled into the permanent fund is of central importance. Not only will the future growth of the state's economy be determined to some extent by the choice of eligible permanent fund investments, but perhaps more importantly, it will be determined by the amount of money remaining in the general fund for unrestricted use. Specifically, Department of Revenue analysis of state revenues presented in February, 1977, projected a permanent fund balance of \$1.8 billion in 1985 based upon a 25 percent contribution rate. The same source projected a general fund balance in excess of \$6 billion in the same year. Increases in spending above the historical pattern of state government expenditures would have a downward effect on the total remaining in the general fund, but the balance can be expected to remain substantial.

The possibility of such a large general fund balance requires that the choice of the percentage of oil revenue dedicated to the permanent fund reflect the expected impacts of the uses of the general fund balance as compared with the impacts of administration of that money through the permanent fund.

For example, one way to make use of the general fund balance would be to reduce the personal income tax. The ISER MAP analysis shows that this would indeed cause a significant reduction in the general fund balance. At the same time, it would have a highly stimulative effect on the private sector as the increase in

disposable income stimulated private sector demands. Employment and population would increase. Additional revenues would be generated, but these would not be sufficient to maintain constant per capita government expenditures. Either the level of services would have to decline or the general fund balance would be depleted more rapidly than initial calculations indicated, or both. If the permanent fund is to be a buffer against the depletion of the general fund, or is interpreted as a fund to benefit Alaskans, the expansion generated by the income tax could be the worst possible use of general fund money.

The growth implications of any constant percentage permanent fund contribution needs examination. Lumpy additions into the general fund caused by lease sales on state lands may be accompanied by bursts in general fund spending activity by the state. This erratic behavior could result in uneven growth and its problems. A formula for permanent fund contributions, which minimizes fluctuations in the general fund, might be a more appropriate rule than a fixed percentage.

Projections of the state fiscal position are important in the formulation of permanent fund policy in another way. Knowledge of what is happening to the general fund can determine permanent fund objectives. A large general fund balance, for example, tends to reduce the force of the argument that certain industry should be stimulated because of the tax base it provides.

The MAP model can be of assistance in the formulation of permanent fund policy in this regard because it can be used to project "futures" under varying assumptions of general fund policy given a "neutral" permanent fund. The state model can be used for this purpose.

A related issue is what policy should be established with regard to disposition of interest from the permanent fund. It is important not only what uses should be made of permanent fund interest but to a certain extent, what should be the target interest rate considering the uses of the interest. That is, if the interest is not put to good use, there should be relatively little concern with a high interest rate.

The basic issue, however, is whether the interest should be returned to the general fund without strings, should remain in the permanent fund for some period, or should be distributed to Alaska individuals who, in a sense, become the owners of the permanent fund.

The implications of each alternative on the growth of the economy and its fiscal condition will be considerably different. Reinvestment in the fund would have minimum impact in the short run. Transfer to the general fund would result in increased expenditures on state and local government which would have a stimulating effect on the economy with the impetus on increase in public sector activity. A transfer payment directly to individuals under some form of Alaska, Inc., project would provide an economic increase with a private sector impetus.

All of these kinds of expenditure programs can be analyzed with the MAP model framework. For this kind of analysis, which attempts to provide a picture of the relative impact of alternatives, specific program details are not necessary. The qualitative impacts would be the same regardless of whether a specific dividend amount were paid out as Alaska, Inc., payments or the available interest on the fund were distributed in that fashion. Here also, the state economic model can be used.

On the assumption that permanent fund investment will somehow be directed to the growth of certain industries, there is also a need for econometric simulations of the effects of expanding various Alaska industries on the state's economy as a whole, particularly on its employment and tax base.

4. Performance of soft loan programs. There are a number of existing state loan programs directed to social and economic development objectives. In general, they have loaned money at lower than prevailing commercial interest rates (but not necessarily at less than the state's "opportunity cost" of money). The actual quality of these funds' portfolios is unknown, however, and the actual rate of subsidy taking into account prospective future loan losses cannot, therefore, be determined. A systematic study should be made of this issue and its implications explored for administration of any soft loan program under the permanent fund.

Similar studies would be useful with respect to federal loan programs such as EDA and SBA, particularly concerning their Alaska activities. The experience and performance of International Development Agency programs and subsidized loan programs of other nations and states would also suggest problems which might be expected from any Alaska soft loan program established under the permanent fund.



Alaska State Legislature

House

XXXXXXXXXX

528 W. 5th Ave., Suite 270
Anchorage, AK 99501
2 September 1977

Professor Barbara Bergman
6700 Selkirk Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Professor Donald Gordon
2201-9500 Erickson Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V3J 1M8
Canada

Dear Professors:

We are happy that you will be able to take part in our symposium on the economic issues that arise with different investment goals for the Alaska Permanent Fund. Actually, no wide exposure of the issues has yet taken place.

I find it useful to group them under two broad headings: What is the long-run purpose(s) of the Permanent Fund and where should it be invested?

As for the first, the major argument made for the Fund as it went before the voters was that it would slow the growth of the budget, which had risen 400% since the North Slope oil lease sale in 1969. It was further argued that the Fund would be a savings account for a rainy day or, more commonly, that it would replace oil revenues as they declined. This latter aim has lead some to consider placing a ceiling on budget growth such as holding spending constant in real per capita terms, with all or part of the other revenues to go into the Permanent Fund.

It was also hoped, often by the same people, that the Fund could restructure Alaska's economy --- diversifying it, reducing its cyclical and seasonal nature, and bringing down unemployment, especially among the Native and other rural populations.

Clearly, all these purposes are consistent with the language of the constitutional amendment that principle be used for "income producing investments". Just as clearly, dividing the Fund among the public (on the basis, say, of residency) has been ruled out.

It should be noted here that Fund earnings are to be sent to the general fund "...unless otherwise provided by law..." To date, the unusual proposals have included one by the Governor to pay 50% of the earnings to residents on the basis of every five years in

Alaska, one to pledge earnings (and principle) as security for state and local debt or even the loans of rural credit unions, and one (private suggestion) to provide an annuity to Alaskans reaching age 55 based on their years in the state.

Where to invest the Permanent Fund seems to be the question of whether a developing economy (isolated, with leakage of an estimated 64¢ on the dollar, but mostly literate and skilled), based largely on a depleting resource (transfer payments from the oil and gas industry), and having few apparent options for some time should have a policy of government intervention. In short, a policy of loans at the going market rates, or subsidized loans, or even subsidized infrastructure loans (which may be possible in some cases) versus a policy of free trade.

The discussion thus far has been cast in the catch phrases listed below and not all of them are strictly economic, of course.

Invest here to:

- Offer home, business, and personal loans on preferred terms
- Remove gaps in the existing, especially rural, capital markets
- Create jobs, diversify the economy, etc. (but at market rates)
- Enlarge the private tax base
- Increase Alaskan ownership and control of business

Invest Outside to:

- Have greater safety of principle and higher earnings (given the failure rate of new businesses and the problems of present state loan programs)
- Reduce population growth (congestion, increased demand for public services)
- Avoid influence-peddling
- Maintain the quality of the environment
- Reduce inflationary pressures
- Allow benefits for a wide cross-section of the public

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

James B. Rhode
AA to Rep. Cowper, Chairman
House Finance Committee

Professors Bergman, Gordon Con't.

3

cc: Rep. Hugh Malone, Speaker of the House
Rep. Clark Gruening, Chairman, Special House Committee
on the Permanent Fund
Rep. Steve Cowper, Chairman, House Finance Committee
Mr. Mike Doogan, AA to Rep. Gruening
Dr. George Rogers
File

PETER B. McDOWELL

61 KNIGHTSBRIDGE
LONDON SW1X 7RA

9th February 1977

Dear Jim,

I spoke with Jim Edenso yesterday concerning several suggested revisions and was pleased to learn that discussions of the enabling legislation are moving ahead. Jim also mentioned that Hugh is strongly supporting a carryover until 1978, following public hearings in the interim. This, of course, would defer making the Fund operational until mid-1978. We then discussed the subject, and I told him I would write you a private letter along these lines.

As we have discussed many times, it occurred to me that there might be a "third way". There seems to be a "third way" to both let the Fund get started, assuming of course that it is important to not delay the time at which the Fund begins to have an impact on self-determination by Alaska on the pattern of investments in the state, and carry out the interim hearing process. This would be to move the legislation through this year, and direct the interim hearings to gather grass-roots input about sectoral priorities and specific investment opportunities.

This would complement the more scientific sectoral analyses that should be prepared simultaneously. The results of both would then be merged by the Fund to produce the first long-term investment program proposed to the Policy Board.

As we observed during the SIAC process, public input in the early meetings was not concerned with technical structure matters, but rather with sectoral priorities and potential specific investments.

Mr Jim Rhode


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9th February 1977

It would be most useful to develop a state wide consensus on those matters, which combined with a scientific analysis, would provide one of the best possible bases for the future investment program.

I hope these personal thoughts are useful. Please share them with Hugh and Clark if you like.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Peter". The signature is written in dark ink on a light background.

PS When can I expect to see you in London?

WHITE, WELD & CO.
INCORPORATED

ONE LIBERTY PLAZA
91 LIBERTY STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10003

THEODORE P. SWICK
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT
212/285-2153

CABLE ADDRESS "WHITEWELD"

December 9th, 1977

Mr. Clark Gruening, Chairman
House Permanent Fund Committee

Since the House Special Committee on the Permanent Fund is in the final stages of structuring legislation for consideration by the 1978 legislature, it is time to consider the use of the income of this "Permanent Fund".

The provisions of the Permanent Fund Constitutional Amendment include that "the income from the Permanent Fund shall be deposited in the General Fund unless otherwise provided by law". According to the best estimates of the Department of Revenue, the minimum amount (25%) of the funds received as mineral lease rentals, royalties and other payments will result in an accumulation by 1985 of some \$1.8 billion. The investment income from that amount, at an average 7% rate of return, would produce approximately \$126,000,000 in any one year. As the Permanent Fund continues to grow, its increased capital will provide additional annual income in excess of the aforementioned figure, however, for the sake of perspective, the ensuing discussion will be confined to the \$126,000,000 projected income.

If the estimates are correct as to the principal accumulated in the Permanent Fund by 1985 at a 25% rate, the remaining balance accumulated in the General Fund should amount to some \$5.4 billion. The effect of the addition of \$126,000,000 to such an accumulation would increase the 1985 accumulation by approximately 2%. Such an increase is minimal in relation to a General Fund accumulation of the magnitude as anticipated.

Therefore, the income of the Permanent Fund should be dedicated to doing more than just adding a small increment to the General Fund. Even though it may eventually return to the Permanent Fund, it should be channeled into projects with revenue producing capability that provide benefits for the majority of Alaskans, and simultaneously allow for long-term financings at the lowest possible interest rate.

The House Special Committee, during the conduct of public hearings, has received many proposals for the use of Permanent Fund's income. Many of these proposals appear to be meritorious from numerous points of view. However, in turn, many of these same proposals would seem to be better responded to through

-2-

the actions of the legislature and addressed through the General Fund as opposed to the Permanent Fund's income.

Essential to the lifestyle of all modern societies is the availability of electric power. Advocates of no growth, modest growth, rapid growth or controlled growth all share a need for power. The availability of power often determines whether desirable economic growth can take place. The cost of such power is of course, an important element. All other things considered, the cost of power influences the future direction in any modern society.

Whether power generation occurs through capital-intensive projects (hydro-electric) or fuel-intensive projects (coal or gas-fired) its financing is generally through issuance of long-term debt. Production costs of hydro are generally stable since the fuel (water) costs are practically non-existent. Production costs of coal or gas-fired facilities are subject to continually escalating costs of the fuel necessary for the electric generation.

Long-term debt sold for the construction of either type of facility, without regard to the operation and maintenance expense of each, must be amortized through the service of debt; principal and interest payments annually until the debt is extinguished. The total cost of the debt service is affected by the rate of interest which investors demand for the long term loan of money.

A 40 year debt instrument in the amount of \$100,000,000, bearing an interest rate of $6\frac{1}{2}\%$ will require a level debt service (principal and interest) of \$7,069,400 annually to liquidate the debt. If the interest rate is $5\frac{1}{2}\%$, the annual debt service requirement is \$6,232,000. This represents a difference of \$837,400 per year and over a 40 year period involves a saving of \$33,496,000.

Since debt service is a major factor in determining the rates users must pay for electric usage, the rate of interest at which a debt instrument is financed is a significant element in the total cost to the consumer. Bonds payable solely from the revenues of the utility are judged by investors on their credit-worthiness. The more credit-worthy, the lower the interest rate, the less credit-worthy, the higher the interest rate.

Alaska possesses many sites which are suitable for hydro-electric generating facilities. However, in some instances, these sites are not located near the population centers which require the power generated. Due to its topography, long-range transmission lines bringing power to the load-centers are often not feasible. In other instances, the best development of such capital-intensive projects may require large-scale projects which in the near-term, produce a surplus of power. Smaller scale generation facilities using coal or gas-fired power production are required in those areas without large load demands or without good potential hydro sites. The fact that the latter use a precious commodity which is non-renewable is not the point. If the power is needed, it must be produced. Nevertheless, if the project can be financed at a lower interest cost, a benefit will accrue to the user through a lower cost of service.

It is suggested that the future power needs of Alaskans can be delivered at a lower cost whether such power is provided through hydro or fossil fuels. The ability to affect the interest rate on whatever long-term project is financed, can accomplish this. The following paragraphs suggests how this can be done without depriving the Permanent Fund of other uses of its income.

The income from the Permanent Fund will be derived from "investment grade" securities and as such represents a highly reliable and secure cash flow. This annual cash flow can be dedicated to assuring that principal and interest requirements on bonds issued to construct revenue producing power projects are met in the event of a revenue short-fall from the revenue producing project. The effect will make it possible for the revenue bonds to receive a high credit rating and high evaluation in the market place which will result in a significantly lower cost of borrowing for the project construction. At the end of a given period, (debt service year or monthly), income from the Permanent Fund dedicated to the revenue bonds debt service requirements not needed is released to the General Fund or for any other purpose directed by law.

The dedication of Permanent Fund income to revenue bond debt service would not be accomplished in the legislation itself, but rather in a "guarantee agreement" between the Permanent Fund and the entity issuing the revenue bonds and the "guarantee agreement" would actually appear on the face of the debt instrument. From the investor and rating agency point of view, if the guarantee is in the legislation it is legally subject to change by succeeding legislatures. If the guarantee is in an agreement as part of the revenue bond issue it is dedicated for as long as the bonds are outstanding.

It must be assumed for the purpose of this guarantee arrangement that the Permanent Fund will receive 25% of the oil and gas income because of the terms of the Constitutional Amendment. Based on that assumption, estimates (by the State) of the size of the Permanent Fund in 1985 will be \$1,800,000,000.

A reasonable assumption of 7% income from investment produces an annual cash flow available for guarantees of \$126,000,000. An annual cash flow of this magnitude, assuming a 6% interest cost on guaranteed bond issues, will support approximately \$1,800,000,000 of bonds.

The various projects to be supported by the guarantee would be financed by revenue bonds of any state agency or any subdivision of government in Alaska for electric generation and transmission. Each bond issue would capitalize interest during construction and fund its own debt service reserve to conform to the demands of the market for such bonds at the time of financing.

The act providing for a guarantee should be broad in form. The covenants relating to, and provisions of, each project will be structured into each bond issue.

There might be some merit in including in the act certain findings and directives to the Board of the Permanent Fund, but it probably is more appropriate for the Board to outline its own guidelines as it relates to such guarantee on bonds of projects to be financed in its administrative rules and regulations. By this is meant, for example, considerations by the legislature in its deliberations leading to the approval of a project such as economic need, economic feasibility, geographic locations, social benefit, impact on locality, etc.


A draft of a bill has been provided to your committee which would, subject to redraft to conform to custom, constitutional requirements, the Permanent Fund Act and language usage in Alaska, creates the mechanism for such a debt guarantee program. A brief analysis of this draft follows.

- Section 1. Creates the mechanism by authorizing the Board of the Permanent Fund to enter into guarantee agreements. Limits the guarantee to income only. Provides for agreements with any entity of state or local government. Provides guarantee of principal payments, sinking fund payments and interest but prevents use of Permanent Fund income for optional early retirement of guaranteed debt. Limits the guarantee to electric generation and transmission. Leaves the details of guarantee agreements to the Board of Trustees.
- Section 2. In effect limits the amount of debt that can be guaranteed. This adds to the credit-worthiness of the guarantee from the lenders point of view. Depending somewhat on the actual portfolio of investments in the Permanent Fund, it is important to consider whether or not to limit the total of guarantees to something less than 100% of the Fund income. This could be done in the Act, which does not happen in this draft, or it could be a policy matter of the Board of the Fund.
- Section 3. Provides that the guarantee article appear on the debt instrument which clearly establishes that it survives as long as the bonds are outstanding. This definitely is stronger and distinguishes the guarantee from any similarity to the so called "moral-obligation" pledge.
- Section 4. Provides that a guarantee agreement can be entered into on the debt of projects only after approval by the legislature. Part of the thrust of this section is in contemplation of a centrally controlled State-wide power development plan that considers the needs and best interest of all of Alaska.

Sections 5 & 6 These sections are simply "boiler-plate" provisions.

The draft bill clearly does not contemplate any subsidy of electric costs to energy consumers. However, there is no prohibition that any subsidy to energy users deemed to be appropriate by the State can be accomplished by the legislature through appropriation from the General Fund or other sources which would not interfere with the value of this guarantee program to finance the capital costs of meeting the power needs of Alaska.


Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Theodore P. Swick', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Theodore P. Swick

TPS/vmr

The Role of the Permanent Fund in Alaska's Future



**A Preliminary Report by
the House Special Committee
on the Alaska Permanent Fund**

There will be a public discussion of goals of the Permanent Fund beginning at 10:00 a.m., September 15 in Room 402 of the State Court building. If you wish to present testimony, please contact the Committee at 528 West Fifth Avenue, Suite 270, Anchorage, Alaska 99501. Phone: 276-3433.

Special Committee on
The Alaska Permanent Fund
(907) 276-3433
528 W. 5th, Suite 270
Anchorage, AK 99501
[Pouch V, Juneau, AK 99811]
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Members
Rep. Clark Gruening, Chmn.
Rep. Terry Gardiner, V. Chmn.
Rep. E. J. Haugen
Rep. Russ Meekins
Rep. Bill Miles
Rep. Leo Schaeffer
Rep. Rick Urion

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I Introduction

An overwhelming majority of Alaska voters approved an amendment to the state constitution in November 1976 which provides that at least 25 percent of certain state nonrenewable resource revenues be placed in a permanent fund. The amendment requires that the fund's "principal shall be used only for those income-producing investments" the legislature designates as eligible for permanent fund money. The amendment also provides that income from the investments will go into the State's General Fund (where all other revenues and taxes are deposited) unless the legislature designates that income for other purposes.

In 1978 the Tenth Alaska Legislature will consider several different proposals for management and organization of the fund and use of the fund's earnings. Three bills introduced in the 1977 session were referred to the House Special Committee on the Alaska Permanent Fund. Our task is to find out what Alaskans want the fund to achieve and to recommend legislation for a permanent fund that can best attain those goals.

The intent of this report is to inform Alaskans about the Alaska Permanent Fund—how it evolved, present management, possible future roles, and investment and management options for

its principal and earnings. This report also allows committee members to state what they feel are the main issues to be resolved in the permanent fund enabling legislation.

We hope that you will take the time to study this booklet, jot down your comments and questions as you read, and send us your views by filling out and mailing the questionnaire on the back cover. You may obtain further information about the Alaska Permanent Fund by calling or writing:

House Special Committee
on the Alaska Permanent Fund
528 West 5th Avenue, Suite 270
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Phone: (907) 276-3433

Above all, please watch for and participate in the public meetings and forums on the Permanent Fund to be held throughout the state beginning in September. If we have your comments by then, we can incorporate your ideas in the Public Forum program. Legislators will attend each forum to discuss the Permanent Fund, answer your questions, and find out what you want your Permanent Fund to be.

c) Many local development organizations were involved in initiating and managing projects such as rental housing and community service facilities, which improved the living conditions of their constituents. Most of these projects required property development, which in turn required equity to leverage construction loans and mortgages. The organizations themselves were seldom able to generate such equity, and the major institutional sources of equity--the Federal Government and private foundations--were cutting back such funding.

Thus, categories of enterprises which could operate, or, in the case of housing and services, should operate in depressed areas were identified. All three types needed financing which did not impose an inflexible repayment schedule, and all observers of the financial scene agreed that this kind of financing was unavailable through conventional private channels.

The use of State funds to provide such financing was further justified on the basis that the Commonwealth would capture pecuniary benefits in addition to conventional return on investment. These would consist of increased income sales and business tax collections and decreased welfare and unemployment insurance payments amounting to about \$3000/year per job created or retained.

II. SOURCES OF FUNDS/CAPITALIZATION

CDFC's source of investment funds is the proceeds of a \$10 million state general obligation bond issue. These funds will be transferred to CDFC in a lump sum. Increments to this capital would require further legislative bond authorization. The interest and principal on the bonds will be paid out of general state tax revenues as opposed to operating revenues of CDFC.

This form of capitalization is justified by the following argument:

1) According to the analysis of the economic conditions in depressed areas presented above, equity financing of enterprises is the most potentially productive form of capital assistance to businesses in these areas. So far, CDFC is the only state financial intermediary designed to provide equity financing.

2) CDFC cannot count on a regular stream of returns from these investments. Therefore, it could not meet its own financial responsibilities if it were forced to pay off its investment capital on an inflexible schedule demanded by debt financing. The experience of SBIC's and MESBIC's demonstrate that intermediaries charged with making equity investments cannot fulfill their mandate if they themselves rely on loans for their

investment funds. One response of these institutions to their capitalization has been to invest conservatively, usually through debentures, in order to assure a regular income stream. The other has been to make equity investments and run the risk of going broke, which several SBIC's have. In neither case is the statutory function, for which these institutions have been granted special borrowing rights, been carried out.

3) The use of general tax revenues to pay off the bonds issued in behalf of CDFC is justified on two counts:

- a) It matches the sources of costs and prospective benefits. In the long run, it is hoped that the increased employment provided by CDFC-financed enterprises will generate benefits to the general fund in terms of increased tax collections and decreased welfare payments.
- b) It matches costs and benefits on the time dimension. Debt service costs will be paid over a period of 20-30 years, and the benefits described above should accrue over a similarly long period.

III. USES OF FUNDS/OPERATIONS

A. General Powers

In order to tailor its services to the specific financial

needs of each project, the CDFC Board has been granted a panoply of financial powers and broad discretion over their use. CDFC may finance all costs of a project which the directors deem recoverable and necessary to the carrying out of the act's purpose. Thus, money to finance market surveys, product planning, early staffing and working capital could be advanced as well as more traditional finance secured by physical assets. CDFC may also provide directly or pay for technical advisory services to the venture. CDFC may advance such finance in the form of purchase of equity, convertible debt instruments or straight loans. It may formulate and readjust the terms for loan repayment or payment of dividends to accommodate the venture's cash flow as it evolves. CDFC may also acquire, hold and transfer real property where necessary to further the establishment or expansion of an enterprise.

Although CDFC has the statutory flexibility to advance money on longer and less onerous terms than private financial institutions of any type, it is constrained to seek some return on its investments if it is to continue operations. The way in which financial returns must be realized and the constraints thus imposed on CDFC financing operations are discussed in section D.

B. Targeting

There are two sets of targeting requirements involved in the statutory directions to CDFC investment activity: one defines eligible sponsoring agencies as Community Development Corporations (CDCs) not dissimilar to regional and local development corporations in Alaska; another defines eligible geographic areas.

Targeting to CDCs - All CDFC financing is advanced to CDCs, which then transfer the funds to the ventures. The statutory requirements for eligible CDCs have been formulated to assure that they are accountable to their constituents.

In the legislation, a CDC is defined as, "a quasi-public, non-profit corporation organized under the General Laws to carry out certain public purposes and with by-laws providing that:

- 1) it is organized to operate within a specific geographic area coincident with existing political boundaries;
- 2) that membership in the corporation shall be open to all residents of said area who are eighteen years or older;
- 3) that at least a majority of its board of directors shall be elected by the full membership with each member having an equal vote;

- 4) that the by-laws of the Community Development Corporation shall provide that any other directors be either appointees of elected state or local government officials or appointees of other non-profit organizations having as a purpose the promotion of development in the designated geographic area;
- 5) that said elections shall be held annually for at least one-third of the members of the Board of Directors so that each elected director shall serve for a term of at least three years;
- 6) that the designated geographic area shall be consistent with some existing, or combination of existing, political district, provided that the aggregate population of such geographic area shall not exceed one hundred and fifteen thousand people based on the most recent appropriate census."

In addition to these formal requirements, observers and supporters of the bill have suggested that several further criteria be incorporated into CDFC's operating guidelines. These include:

- 1) The organization should be active in the community prior to CDFC funding, although not necessarily in economic development. Involvement in social service

provision or political organizing provides a community group with the opportunity to develop stable leadership, strategy and visibility that may contribute to its ability to manage a subsidiary or ensure community support of a sponsored venture. Evidence of prior activity also indicates that the CDC is not a "front" set up by private interests merely to take advantage of CDFC financing. Finally, prior experience provides the CDFC Board with some basis for judging the competence of the CDC's management to oversee the use of state funds.

- 2) There should be paid management and/or professional staff responsible to the CDC board. This might insure continuity and stability of venture oversight or management.
- 3) The leadership of the CDC should have demonstrated initiative in soliciting the participation of its constituents. Evidence of this activity might include frequency of public meetings, the publication of newsletters and other publicity efforts.

Targeting to Depressed Areas - The CDFC legislation requires that CDFC operate exclusively in depressed areas. The legislation defines a target area as "any area in which, according to the

most recent government census, the household income is reported to be at least 15% lower than the reported income for the Boston standard metropolitan statistical area" or "any contiguous area in which the board of directors of the particular CDC finds and publishes in accordance with statistical criteria previously established by the CDFC that substantial conditions of blight, economic depression, and widespread reliance on public assistance exist in said area."

CDFC is perhaps the only government financial intermediary that places restrictions on the location of the projects it will finance on the basis of descriptive statistical criteria. On the other hand, these criteria are not unambiguous. There is no specific measure of "average household income" in the 1970 census. The two closest approximations are "mean family income" and "median family income." (The median is a preferred descriptor of income distributions since it is not subject to bias stemming from concentrations in the low or high ends of the distribution.) The lists of eligible towns differ depending on which measure is used, and the preferred "median" excludes some of Massachusetts's most visibly depressed towns.

However, an area does not have to be a city or a town in order to qualify for CDFC financing. The legislation states that a CDC must be located in a target area that is consistent with

political boundaries." This might be a state representative district, a ward or even a precinct. Many cities that do not qualify do have sections within them that do.

C. Balancing the Interests of the Parties in Individual Projects

Any CDFC-financed project involves three organizations with different, and in some cases conflicting, aims.

Management of the venture wishes to obtain financing on the favorable terms CDFC can offer. It can be assumed that they wish to give up as few of the operating prerogatives and financial returns of conventional management as possible.

Members of the CDC want to be able to exert sufficient control over the venture to assure that the jobs it offers CDC constituents are as well-paying, secure and satisfying as possible. If the CDC itself is able to take an equity position in the venture, it will want to realize a return on its investment in order to finance its own operations or further investments.

CDFC wants to assure that the purposes of the bill are met by its investments and that it can recover its investment plus sufficient surplus to finance further operations.

All of these claims are on the same pool of funds; revenues generated by the venture.

The key to balancing these claims is the form of participation the CDC takes in the project. The six possible forms allowed by the legislation are as follows:

- a) The project is conducted by a wholly owned subsidiary of the CDC.
- b) The CDC owns a majority of the voting stock of the corporation or other organization conducting the project.
- c) The CDC owns a majority of the capital stock of the corporation or other organization conducting the project.
- d) The project is conducted by a limited-dividend corporation or other association organized under the laws of the Commonwealth to provide public benefit and which exists for a public purpose.
- e) The project is conducted by a non-profit corporation including local development corporations organized under the Small Business Act.
- f) In all other cases, adequate provision is made for reporting to the CDC, and that the CDC must approve all major transactions including but not limited to any sale, merger, dissolution, the sale or issue of substantial amounts of stock and corporate reorganization.

No one form of participation will be suitable or preferable in all cases. Particular circumstances will differ from venture to venture and CDFC will have the flexibility to consider each deal separately. In projects conducted under clauses d and e below, the forms of participation are determined by the statutes which govern federal and state programs. We focus on two types

of participation: the wholly owned subsidiary (form a) and the joint venture between a CDC and a private entrepreneur (forms b, c and f). The national CDC experience indicates that both joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries can be viable vehicles for economic development. There are different costs and benefits to the various parties from both.

Wholly Owned Subsidiaries: A wholly owned subsidiary requires that the CDC provide or hire its own management. This could limit the resources available to other activities in the community. However, by undertaking the entire financial and managerial responsibility for a venture, the CDC could develop considerable management skills, produce a product useful to its constituents, control the labor practices of the venture and retain all earnings for other CDC activities. The fact that a venture is a wholly owned subsidiary is no guarantee that the company will contribute to community goals. There have been CDC subsidiaries which have provided few benefits to local residents. Therefore, CDCFC will need to be certain that adequate safeguards of community interests are written into any investment agreements it underwrites.

Joint Ventures with Majority CDC Ownership: A joint venture requires much less CDC staff time and in-house expertise than a subsidiary. However, it also generates less earnings for the CDC and allows the CDC less control of the venture's activities. On the other hand, the prerogatives and returns given up by the CDC are generally appropriated by the venture's management, a situation which should leverage more watchful and energetic private control of the enterprise.

Forms b and c in the legislation provide for joint ventures in which the CDC owns a majority of either the voting or the capital stock. This strong CDC ownership position and the influence implied by that ownership may be sufficient to represent and protect the community's interests. The CDC would be able to share in the benefits--both earnings and employment--if the venture succeeds. Similarly, the CDC can protect the interests of the community if the venture does poorly. For instance, the CDC could determine the distribution of labor cut-backs and the proceeds from the liquidation of assets.

Joint Ventures with Minority CDC Ownership: There may be cases in which the CDC is willing to assume a minority ownership position in the venture (form f) in return for substantial employment or other benefits. In those cases, the CDC's interest can

be protected by including specific legally binding requirements in the agreement between the CDC and the entrepreneur. Examples of these requirements are as follows:

- 1) The venture must obtain the express written approval of the CDC before undertaking any expansion of operations outside the local area and before altering any of the Articles of Incorporation or By-laws.

- 2) The management agree to make reasonable efforts to hire and promote local unemployed people as long as the quality of work was not sacrificed.

It is clear that any agreement between a CDC and the venture it sponsors will require compromise by both parties, especially in regard to managerial prerogatives. It is important that CDCFC ensure that the extent of each party's prerogatives is stated as explicitly as possible in the documents of the transaction.

A final issue is the financing of the CDC's equity position if it does not have internally generated funds to purchase it outright. The functions and appropriate rewards to CDCFC and the venture management are those of the conventional financier and entrepreneur. The CDC's presence can appear to be a legal formality (to assure the publicness of the expenditure) and a political necessity (to assure that constituents and local

political leaders feel they are being involved in the expenditure of community resources). What economic justification is there for CDFC subsidizing the CDC's equity participation?

First, the CDC may offer services in packaging the deal and mobilizing community support for the venture which will accrue to the venture as pecuniary benefits. Second, the possibility of monetary returns may induce the CDC to monitor the venture's financial and social performance vigorously, helping to assure CDFC that its objectives are being accomplished. One proposal for providing this equity position is to award the CDC a "finder's fee" of 5-10% of the venture's returns, depending on the CDC's role in assembling the deal.

D. Constraints on Uses of Funds Caused by Sources

The Board's investment decisions are constrained primarily by CDFC's capital structure. For all intents and purposes, CDFC's original \$10 million bond authorization is its entire, non-renewable capitalization. The institution may seek to borrow or issue bonds to finance further operations, but here they would be constrained by market perception of the quality of the assets--the ventures--which would generate the repayment stream.

The only reliable way in which CDFC could prolong its operations is to recover its equity investment. It may sell the securities of the ventures it holds. The CDC, by statute, holds the right to first refusal for any sale of securities of the venture it sponsors. If, as is most likely, the rate of return on the ventures is below the conventionally marketable level--say 14-16%--CDC's will be the major secondary market for these securities.

Even if CDFC realizes no capital gain or some loss on these sales, in selling its interests to CDC's it will be fulfilling one of its secondary objectives, "to enhance capital ownership in depressed areas."

CDFC may try to make part of its stream of investment returns more predictable by providing financing in the form of debt or warrants. These are cash flow problems which can only be worked out as the program's operations evolve.

IV. MANAGEMENT

The nine-member CDFC Board of Directors is responsible for all investment decisions. Three of these members are state cabinet secretaries. The other six are gubernatorial appointees serving staggered terms of five years. Two are to be individuals experienced in investment finance, three are to be representatives

of CDCs from eligible target areas and the final member is to represent organized labor. It is important to notice that all interests involved in any individual CDFC deal are represented on the Board.

The staff, whose number will be determined by the volume of business CDFC receives or generates is headed by a President. This designation for the chief staff officer was chosen over "Executive Director" in order to reinforce the fact that CDFC has been designed as a business enterprise, not a social service organization. The staff will enjoy a great deal of discretion in undertaking the promotional activities necessary to generate financial opportunities and in structuring the terms of individual deals.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY

Financial - CDFC will keep standard financial accounts and will report annually to the state legislature. These reports and the books on which they are based will be audited periodically by state officials. From an operational point of view, CDFC will be held accountable for its financial performance by the constraints imposed by its capitalization. These constraints are described in Section IIID.

Social - The CDFC Board has engaged an accounting firm experienced in the operations of public authorities to design reporting and measurement systems to be used in evaluating the Corporation's progress in achieving its non-financial objectives. The consultants have been charged with designing methods to project employment, both by number and types of jobs to be created by a proposed investment. They are also developing methods by which to estimate a project's impact on tax collections and state expenditures.

Before CDFC money can be advanced to a project, the Board must find that all jobs in the enterprise will be full-time and non-seasonal, pay 150% of the minimum wage and provide medical benefits. Further statutory guidelines may be enacted after CDFC begins operations.

VI. EVALUATION

CDFC's proposed operations raise complex financial and political issues. While those issues concerning the nature of its services and targeting have been largely worked out in the CDFC statute, critical problems remain. Despite the pages of required findings and precautions in the bill, CDFC could fail to carry out its mission due to any number of managerial decisions. By investing too conservatively in too few enterprises,

CDFC would merely be displacing private market activity. If investment decisions are overly determined by political considerations and subsequently fail, CDFC will not only shorten its own life but discredit an important and controversial approach to depressed area development.

The program's success is dependent on the ability of individual CDC's to use the availability of CDFC funding to leverage the cooperation of private business ventures. The history of such attempts is predominantly one of failure with a few encouraging exceptions. One of the lessons of this experience has been that new community-based enterprises often require technical assistance if they are to succeed. The Massachusetts state government has so far made no explicit provisions for providing such services to CDFC-financed ventures. Criticism of the program from community groups has focused on this point.

Equally important for success will be the CDFC's ability to manage its limited financial resources. Choices in this matter, however, will largely be determined by the success of the ventures in which CDFC invests.

VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes - CDFC is offered as an example of a program designed to provide community development finance to depressed areas. In this regard, the two most important points of the CDFC experience are 1) that the program design was based on an analysis of the economic problems of depressed areas in Massachusetts and 2) that provisions for targeting investment, based on this analysis and the experience of similar efforts, were built into the CDFC statute.

Capitalization - CDFC's lump sum financing by general obligation bonds of the state allows it the flexibility to provide financing in a timely manner on terms suited to the individual enterprise. This form of financing also imposes the discipline of a finite pool of funds. The corporations' investments must generate a return if it is to continue operations.

Uses - The current draft of the Alaska Permanent Fund statute is seriously flawed in that it does not permit equity investments in community development projects. The long experience of CDCs in the United States demonstrates that this type of finance is necessary if community-based enterprises are to succeed.

Management - The need to balance the political interests involved in CDFC's operations is reflected in the composition

of the Board, which includes representatives of the state, the financial community and CDCs.

Accountability - Accountability for operations such as CDFC's requires, first, a set of reporting and measurement procedures to evaluate performance along financial and social criteria. Reporting conventions and criteria exist by which to judge financial performance, and CDFC has begun to develop similar procedures for judging performance on social criteria. Accountability also requires effective sanctions to unsatisfactory operations. In the case of financial performance, unwise or wasteful performance is kept in check by CDFC's finite (and rather small) capitalization. Effective sanctions in response to unacceptable performance on social criteria have not yet been developed beyond the required findings necessary for investment disbursal.

D. REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
Discussion Draft

September 14, 1977
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INTRODUCTION

The European Investment Bank (EIB) was established in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome, the charter of the European Economic Community. It is an autonomous, publicly-owned financial institution whose primary function is to lend long-term to projects promoting the balanced development of the member economies and of the Community as a whole. The Bank also guarantees a small number of loans each year.

I. PURPOSES

Statutory Goals

According to its statute, the EIB's purpose is to contribute to the "balanced and steady development of the common market" by lending to:

- a) projects for developing less developed regions;
- b) projects for rationalizing industries or for developing new activities called for by conditions arising from the establishment of the Common Market, where these projects are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States; and/or
- c) projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States.

Evolved Management Goals

These were the goals of the bank at its inception. For all practical purposes, the bank now allocates its funds among:

- projects in less developed regions of the Community (e.g., southern Italy, Ireland, northern Denmark, western France);
- projects in industrial regions where redevelopment and investment in fresh activities is called for by the decline of established industries;
- projects of special interest for the development of the Community as a whole (e.g., advanced technology, and especially energy supply and distribution systems);
- infrastructure projects of common interest to several Member States such as railways, motor ways and telecommunications; and/or
- projects involving technological and economic cooperation between enterprises in the different member States.

EIB has been directed by the European Commission, its parent organization, to assist regional development efforts, but the Bank may exercise its discretion in how to do so. In examining EIB's lending policies, capitalization and operations, we will focus on the mechanisms which facilitate the regional reallocations and employment of capital the bank is able to effect.

Lending Criteria

EIB sets lending criteria which follow from its position as a multinational, publicly-owned bank which can facilitate specific development projects through the provision of capital. These criteria are:

a) The project must further development of the Common Market. The Bank will finance capital investments which relate to well-defined, economically homogeneous projects, geared to a specific objective which can be obtained in a set period of time.

b) The project must either be implemented within the territory of the EEC or, if outside the territory, be of common benefit to all the members of the Community (e.g., an oil supply facility).

c) The project must, in the case of infrastructure, contribute to increased economic productivity or, in the case of a private enterprise, must offer prospects of a reasonable return on investment.

d) EIB financing should not replace financing available from other, particularly national, sources.

Eligible Borrowers

a) Public and private enterprises may borrow directly from the Bank provided their project meets the criteria discussed

above. EIB will finance investments by foreign corporations as long as their project is located within the EEC's territory.

b) Banks and other financial institutions may also borrow directly from the EIB to finance loans to enterprises which meet EIB's criteria. In fact, this is the method the EIB uses to make its funds available to small- or medium-sized ventures.

c) Finally, the EIB will lend to autonomous state or regional authorities, such as the German Lander, which retain certain powers under federal systems of national government.

Restrictions on Use of Funds

EIB loans may not be used

- a) to finance cash requirements of firms or working capital;
- b) to finance speculative real estate development; and/or
- c) in the case of governmental authorities, to finance state social overhead capital such as health and welfare services.

EIB will not negotiate loans below 1 million UA directly. Its funds are channeled to enterprises with such small capital needs through intermediate institutions under the "global loan program." Direct loans to projects run from 20 to 30 million UA.

Lending Terms

EIB will not lend funds equalling more than 40 percent of the value of the asset to be financed. This policy requires local promoters and financial institutions to share the risks of the enterprise and, hopefully, forces them to bring their detailed knowledge of local conditions to the careful evaluation of the project.

The terms of most EIB loans fall into the seven to twelve year range. In the case of particularly desirable infrastructure projects, it may be stretched to 20 years.

IB requires appropriate security for all its loans. Usually this takes the form of a guarantee of repayment by the state in which the project is located. Other forms of security acceptable to the Bank are:

- a guarantee from a public authority with a good credit rating;
- a guarantee from a major bank, industrial or financial group; and/or
- a claim on specific assets which are liquid enough to cover the outstanding balance at any time.

Interest rates are uniform to all borrowers across several classes of loans, defined by the currency in which they are disbursed and their repayment period.

II. SOURCE OF FUNDS/CAPITALIZATION

EIB's share (equity) capital is provided by the treasuries of the nine states comprising the EEC. The total amount of subscribed capital and the amount to be contributed by each member is determined by the Bank's Board of Governors. Capital is subscribed in the form of a pledge, a portion of which the members deposit with the Bank. These deposits plus reserves funded by EIB operating surpluses must, under statute, equal 20 percent of pledged capital; this is more than sufficient to meet EIB's debt service should its borrowers be unable to repay loans in the short term.

This "paid-in" portion has ranged from 25 percent to its current level of 15.7 percent of subscribed capital during the 19 years of EIB operations. The balance of the pledge may be called in by the Board of Directors should these funds be needed to meet Bank obligations. Thus, members are permitted free use of the greater portion of their pledge. In 1976, pledged capital amounted to 3.54 billion UA of which 557 million was paid in.

Under its statute, EIB may not have loans or guarantees outstanding in amounts greater than 250 percent of its subscribed capital. In practice, EIB has been considerably more liquid. In 1976, loans outstanding of 5.49 billion UA were held against capital and reserves of 3.96 billion. Total EIB borrowings were

4.72 UA backed by 3.54 billion in equity, for a debt/equity ratio of only 1.33.

EIB maintains this high degree of backing to ensure access, on favorable terms, to European debt markets; its low paid-in/subscribed capital ratio to minimize the burdens of participation to its members. This arrangement seems viable so long as there is no sustained period (several consecutive years) of loan defaults. In that case, EIB would have to rely on its members' ability and willingness to contribute further portions of their subscriptions in order to meet obligations.

Given EIB's financial performance, such a crisis is not likely to arise. During the past seven years, operating revenues have exceeded annual operating expenses by at least 15 percent. Instead of paying out the surplus to the member states as dividends, the EIB internalizes them to supplement its various reserve funds. The growth of these funds is traced in Table 1.

The EIB's ability to transfer its profits into these reserve funds without paying taxes has allowed the funds to grow at an impressive rate. These reserves may replace paid-in capital in accounting deposit requirements. So, even though the Bank is non-profit, it does act to the direct pecuniary benefit of the member nations by using its "profits" as reserves which decrease the need for paid-in capital. Should the reserves get large

Table 1

GROWTH IN RESERVE ACCOUNTS
1970-1976

<u>Reserves:</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Statutory	57.3	63.7	68.5	97.7	110.0	130.0	150.0
Loan Risk	56.0	64.0	71.0	105.0	118.0	143.9	174.7
Equalization	9.0	9.0	9.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0
Monetary Risk	5.0	5.0	12.5	23.0	29.0	33.5	38.4
Building	2.0	4.0	6.5	11.0	16.0	25.0	45.0
TOTAL RESERVES	129.3	145.7	167.5	249.7	286.0	345.4	421.1

enough, the Bank may be able to order increased subscriptions without calling in any capital.

The European Investment Bank acquires virtually all its loan funds on the European bond market. Although the Bank resorts mainly to the European market, it has been able to sell its debt internationally, particularly in the United States and Japan.

The issues range from a low of 6.3 million UA to a high of 239.1 million, averaging from 20 to 40 million. About 40 percent of these issues are placed privately. Since 1974, the Bank has raised more than 800 million UA per year through the sale of bonds. Virtually all the public issues are underwritten by syndicates composed of European commercial and savings banks.

The interest rates the EIB must pay are in line with its strong backing. Rates rose from about 7.0 percent in 1972 to nearly 10.0 percent in 1974, and has since declined. In fact, the Bank has just adjusted its uniform lending rates downward to reflect this movement.

The most noteworthy aspect of the EIB bonds is that they are all long-term. There are a few occasions where the Bank borrowed for less than seven years. Most issues are for at least 10 years, with some going for as long as 15 to 20. The lengths of these liabilities match that of the productive capacity of the assets EIB finances--capital intensive plant and infrastructure.

Table 2
FUNDS RAISED UP TO AND INCLUDING 1976

Year	Number	Issues			Participations by third parties in EIB loans (mil. UA)	Funds raised (mil. UA)
		Amounts (mil. UA)				
		Private issues	Public issues	Total		
1961	3	7.6	13.8	21.4	-	21.4
1962	2	-	32.3	32.3	-	32.3
1963	3	8.0	27.2	35.2	-	35.2
1964	5	13.5	53.3	66.8	-	66.8
1965	4	-	65.0	65.0	-	65.0
1966	6	24.0	114.5	138.5	-	138.5
1967	8	40.0	154.5	194.5	-	194.5
1968	13	112.5	100.0	212.5	-	212.5
1969	9	63.7	82.3	146.0	-	146.0
1970	7	66.6	102.3	168.9	-	168.9
1971	20	208.0	204.9	412.9	-	412.9
1972	19	133.4	328.6	462.0	17.5	479.5
1973	22	207.0	401.0	608.0	4.3	612.3
1974	16	704.2	121.3	825.5	-	825.5
1975	26	318.6	495.1	813.7	17.0	830.7
1976	17	221.0	510.9	731.9	17.0	748.9
1961-1976	180	2128.1	2807.0	4935.1	55.8	4990.9

The EIB has enviable access to the European bond market and is beginning to offer its issues in the American and Japanese markets. The burgeoning growth of its demand for funds, shown in Table 2, has not compromised this access. The benefits of timely access to funds, long repayment terms and favorable interest rates derived from EIB's strong backing are transferred to its borrowers.

III. USES OF FUNDS/LENDING OPERATIONS

By Sector

Over EIB's operating history, its loans, in terms of money volume, have been concentrated in infrastructure projects, predominately in energy, transportation and telecommunications. EIB has made about four times as many loans to industrial sectors as to infrastructure projects. However, total money volume of these loans was only about half of that devoted to infrastructure. Manufacturing projects have received the preponderant number of industrial loans. Table 3 summarizes this allocation pattern and Tables 4 and 5 give more complete breakdowns of historical and current activity.

By Objective

In reporting its loan activities by statutory objectives, EIB

Table 3
EIB FINANCING, 1976 AND TOTALS 1958-1976

Sector	1976			1958-1976		
	#	Amt. (mil. UA)	% of Total	#	Amt. (mil. UA)	% of Total
<u>Infrastructure</u>						
Agriculture	1	30.1	2.8	8	123.9	2.0
Water Supply	6	74.3	6.8	19	220.9	3.7
Transport	6	107.2	9.9	60	1001.2	16.7
Telecommunication	8	200.1	18.4	38	853.7	14.2
Other	-	-	-	2	16.3	0.3
Energy	18	376.5	34.7	109	1764.2	29.4
Total	39	788.2	72.6	236	3980.2	66.3
<u>Agriculture, Industry and Services</u>						
Agriculture	-	-	-	5	7.5	0.1
Industry	120	297.8	27.4	874	2004.0	33.4
Services	-	-	-	7	13.7	0.2
Total	120	297.8	27.4	886	2025.2	33.7
<u>Grand Total</u>	159	1,086	100	1122	6005.4	100.0

All figures in millions UA.

Table 4

SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF FINANCING PROVIDED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, 1958-1976

Sector	Number		Amount (million u.s.)		% of total
	Total	of which global loan allocations	Total	of which global loan allocations	
Infrastructure	236		3 980.2		66.3
Agricultural development	8		123.9		2.0
Water supply and distribution	19		220.9		3.7
Transport	60		1 001.2		16.7
Railways	14		221.8		3.7
Roads, bridges and tunnels	34		587.9		9.8
Shipping and inland waterways	8		144.9		2.4
Airlines	3		41.7		0.7
Other	1		4.9		0.1
Telecommunications	38		853.7		14.2
Other	2		16.3		0.1
Energy	109		1 764.2		29.4
(Production)	(77)		(1 243.7)		20.7
Nuclear	29		620.2		10.3
Thermal power stations	13		133.2		2.3
hydroelectric and pumped storage plant					
Development of oil and natural gas deposits	17		245.5		4.1
Solid fuel extraction	16		223.1		3.7
(Transport)	2		16.7		0.3
Transmission lines	(32)		(520.5)		8.7
Gaslines and oil pipelines	6		65.8		1.1
	26		454.6		7.6
Agriculture, industry and services	886	553	2 025.2	262.4	33.7
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	5	4	7.5	2.0	0.1
Industry (2)	874	546	2 004.0	255.9	33.4
Mining and quarrying*	18	15	12.8	6.4	0.2
Metal production and semi-processing*	77	31	553.4	22.5	9.3
Construction materials*	63	39	167.2	20.1	1.8
Woodworking	39	37	19.2	13.2	0.3
Glass and ceramics	25	13	33.2	6.9	0.6
Chemicals*	97	25	457.2	12.1	7.6
Metalworking and mechanical engineering	153	119	166.9	52.9	2.8
Motor vehicles, transport equipment	32	19	139.5	8.3	2.3
Electrical engineering, electronics	47	32	74.4	18.4	1.2
Foodstuffs	132	95	159.4	46.3	2.7
Textiles and leather	65	53	37.2	23.2	0.6
Paper and pulp*	28	23	29.6	10.3	0.5
Rubber and plastics processing	41	30	58.7	12.7	1.0
Other	14	11	6.9	3.9	0.1
Building - civil engineering	4	4	1.7	1.7	—
Global loans	39	—	141.6(3)	—	2.4
Services	7	3	13.7	1.4	0.2
Tourism	5	3	9.3	1.4	0.1
Research and Development	2	—	4.4	—	0.1
Grand Total	1 122	553	6 005.4	262.4	100.0

(1) See note 4 to Table 2, page 23.

(2) Of which basic industries (marked with an asterisk): 1 165.2 million u.s.

(3) This amount represents the unallocated portion of the global loans.

Table 5
SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF FINANCING PROVIDED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, 1976

Sector	Number		Amount (in million ECU)	
	Total	of which global loan allocations	Total	of which global loan allocations
Infrastructure	39		788.2	72.6
Agricultural development	1		30.1	2.8
Water supply and distribution	6		74.3	6.8
Transport	6		107.2	9.9
Railways	1		19.7	
Shipping and inland waterways	5		87.5	
Telecommunications	8		200.1	18.6
Energy	18		376.5	34.1
(Production)	(11)		(247.6)	
Nuclear	3		111.3	
Thermal power stations	2		33.4	
Hydroelectric and pumped storage plant	2		12.1	
Development of oil and natural gas deposits	3		60.5	
Solid fuel extraction	1		3.3	
(Transport)	(7)		(128.9)	
Gaslines and oil pipelines	7		128.9	
Agriculture, industry and services	120	86	297.8	47.5
Industry (1)	120	86	297.8	47.5
Mining and quarrying*	3	3	2.2	2.2
Metal production and some processing*	21	11	115.3	8.3
Construction materials*	8	7	7.2	3.6
Woodworking	4	3	3.8	1.4
Glass and ceramics	2	1	4.7	6.6
Chemicals*	15	8	83.7	4.2
Metalworking and mechanical engineering	14	13	2.7	6.1
Motor vehicles, transport equipment	4	3	17.1	2.0
Electrical engineering, electronics	9	8	5.3	4.6
Foodstuffs	16	15	7.7	6.0
Textiles and leather	5	5	4.4	4.4
Paper and pulp*	3	3	1.3	1.3
Rubber and plastics processing	7	4	11.9	2.1
Other	1	1	0.1	0.1
Building - civil engineering	1	1	0.6	0.6
Global Loans	7		13.7 (2)	
Grand Total	159	86	1 086	100.0

(1) Of which industries marked with an asterisk: 218.7 million ECU.

(2) Difference between the sum of the 7 global loans granted in 1976 (13.7 million ECU) and the sum of the global loan allocations (13.7 million ECU).

consolidates its three mandates (see page 1) into two classifications: projects for "regional development" and projects of common interest to several member countries. Some projects cannot be unambiguously classified and are counted in both categories. About 18 percent of all projects undertaken by EIB since it began operations have been so counted. Keeping that in mind, some 76 percent of EIB's 6 billion UA in loans have been justified on the basis of furthering the development of less developed regions. Projects of interest to several countries have been mostly in the fields of energy and transportation. Table 6 shows a more complete breakdown of loans by objective.

Global Loans

The management of EIB recognizes that small enterprises are the dominant type of industrial organization in labor-intensive sectors. These firms seldom have capital needs which match EIB's 1 million UA direct lending minimum. However, they are an important source of employment and, in certain sectors and areas, an efficient form of organization.

In order to meet these firms' needs, EIB lends to intermediate institutions, usually regional development authorities who in turn lend to small firms. The authorities are allocated a given amount and are given a finite period in which to use the funds.

Table 6

FINANCING PROVIDED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IN 1976 AND FROM 1958 TO 1976
Breakdown by Economic Policy Objective

Objective	1976		1958-1976 (*)	
	million ECU	%	million ECU	%
Regional development (1)	820.0	100.0	4 558.6	100.0
Belgium	17.9	2.2	75.1	1.6
Denmark	9.1	1.1	35.7	0.8
Germany	9.2	1.1	356.4	8.0
France	60.1	7.4	846.0	18.6
Ireland	57.4	7.0	164.1	3.6
Italy	347.1	42.3	2 200.6	48.3
Luxembourg	—	—	4.0	0.1
Netherlands	30.4	3.7	70.5	1.5
United Kingdom	238.8	29.2	786.2	17.4
Common interest to several Member Countries (2)	438.6	100.0	2 470.1	100.0
Energy	376.5	85.9	1 490.3	60.3
Thermal power stations	30.4	8.1	30.4	1.2
Hydroelectric and pumped storage power stations	42.1	11.2	141.4	5.7
Nuclear	111.1	29.4	598.6	24.2
Development of oil and natural gas deposits	60.5	16.2	258.6	10.5
Solid fuel extraction	3.3	0.9	27.9	1.1
Gaslines and oil pipelines	128.9	34.4	153.4	6.2
Transport	16.4	4.4	589.6	23.9
Railways	—	—	103.9	4.2
Roads and bridges	—	—	423.9	17.2
Shipping	16.4	4.4	40.4	1.6
Airlines	—	—	5.5	0.2
Other	—	—	4.9	0.2
Telecommunications	—	—	30.5	1.2
Other infrastructure	—	—	16.3	0.7
Protection of the environment	—	—	18.0	0.7
Industrial cooperation	25.9	6.9	213.6	8.7
Research	—	—	2.7	0.1
New technology	19.7	5.5	19.7	0.8
Modernisation and conversion of undertakings (3)	—	—	89.4	3.6
DEDUCT to allow for duplication in the case of financing justified on the basis of both objectives - 172.6			1923.3	
Total	1 086.0		6 005.4	

(1) Article 130 (a) and (c) of the Treaty of Rome.

(2) Article 130 (b) of the Treaty of Rome.

(3) Article 130 (b) of the Treaty of Rome: these projects, classified in 1976 under the heading 'Industrial cooperation', have now been included under 'Common interest to several Member Countries' by way of simplification and in view of the modest amount involved. In the 1976 Annual Report, the total amount of financing provided for projects included in the heading 'Industrial cooperation' was 133.9 million ECU, of which 99.5 million, relating to projects included in the heading 'Industrial cooperation', had now been deducted to avoid duplication: 133.9 - 99.5 = 34.4 million ECU.

Projects so financed must meet EIB criteria and be located in a specified area, usually one of the less-industrialized regions. If suitable projects cannot be found within the specified time, the loan money is restored to EIB.

In the nine years of this program's operations, 404 million UA have been allocated to various regional authorities, of which 262.4 million has actually been disbursed. EIB has withdrawn from participating national and regional financial intermediaries 11 of the 38 global loans it has made in the last eight years. Apparently these institutions were unable to find suitable investments, and EIB was intent on enforcing its lending criteria. The average size of the loan has been 474,000 UA, and most have been concentrated in depressed areas of Italy, France and Germany. Although the global loan program represents a sound concept, allowing small firms access to an expanded capital market, it comprises a very small part of EIB's total lending activity--about six percent in 1976.

The overriding impression left by this review of EIB's operations is that the Bank takes a regional approach to its lending--acknowledging the interaction of public investment and private productivity. It then cooperates with national and regional level public and private financial institutions to provide capital to directly productive enterprises.

This pattern has been particularly evident in EIB's operations in the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy), one of the most depressed regions in Europe. Over the years 1961-1972, the Bank provided 7.5 percent of all investment capital coming into the region, concentrating its investments in roads, telecommunications, energy distribution systems and capital intensive industry. I cooperated with the World Bank and Italian public and private financial institutions in encouraging coordination and planning, providing capital to finance these plans where Italian sources were insufficient.

IV. MANAGEMENT

There are three basic levels of administration at EIB. The Board of Governors is responsible for strategic decisions; ensuring that statutory directives are carried out, designating levels of subscribed capital, authorizing changes in policies conditioned on movements in exchange rates, etc. Each member state appoints one Governor. A majority of the Board, representing at least 40 percent of subscribed capital, is necessary to carry motions.

The Board of Directors is responsible for all lending and borrowing decisions. They are appointed by the Board of Governors and have renewable terms. The number of directors from each

member state is set by statute, and the larger states, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy are most heavily represented.

The Management Council, headed by a President, is responsible for seeing that the professional staff carries out the Director's decisions. The EIB retains agents and industry specialists in all member states to evaluate and monitor loans. Loan agreements are executed under the national laws of the state in which the project is located.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a minimal formal structure of reporting and sanctions by which the Board of Directors, EIB's operating decision-makers, are held responsible for their work. The Board of Governors, acting on behalf of the executive of their respective states, must approve the Directors' Annual Report. If performance is not satisfactory, Directors may be dismissed. States may further effectively censure Bank decisions by refusing to subscribe more capital. But all these measures would operate only in extreme cases of mismanagement or violation of statutory directives. In the important daily work of lending and borrowing, the Directors seem to have a free hand.

VI. EVALUATION

EIB is an operating arm of the European Commission, the central planning and policy-making body of the European Community. We have seen that EIB's major operations have been concentrated in aiding efforts to develop regions characterized by lack of industrialization (the Italian Mezzogiorno) or inefficient industries declining under the force of increased competition stemming from the lowering of trade barriers (Belgian coal regions).

The European Commission has not yet developed a Community-wide policy for coordinating the planning and finance of economic development in subnational regions. In such efforts, national authorities must take the initiative and be responsible for overseeing or executing the planning, financing and administering activities involved. Where the financing of costly industrial plant or infrastructure is involved these authorities may not be able to raise sufficient capital in a timely manner. The private or quasi-public financial systems of the several member states are set up primarily to service national needs. As yet there exists no institutional mechanism to coordinate these systems to provide the massive amounts of capital necessary to finance large-scale development projects.

EIB is designed to do just this. With its solid equity backing, it can raise large amounts of capital quickly in the inter-

national bond market on the terms necessary to finance long-lived assets such as capital intensive physical plant and infrastructure. Because EIB borrows and lends in stable currencies, some promoters in countries with weaker currencies have been unwilling to take EIB loans. They would suffer a loss if their national currency, in which they would receive the revenues generated by the asset financed, were devalued in relation to the currency in which they would have to pay off the loan. This risk is offset in many cases by the favorable interest and repayment period terms on which EIB can offer its funds. For example, Italian firms and authorities have been EIB's largest borrowers.

Real economic factors affecting a borrower's potential performance are not susceptible to EIB influence. Long and concerted effort is needed, for instance, to improve infrastructure, labor productivity and the stability of the regional population in the Mezzogiorno before it becomes a suitable location for the capital intensive facilities the EIB prefers to finance.

The Bank appears to take these considerations into account in pursuing its policies. First, it lends to infrastructure projects, where the ability to mobilize large amounts of capital is critical. Second, it will not lend more than 40 percent of the value of an asset. In a fact, its participation has been substantially less in most cases. EIB seeks to provide the incremental

amount of financing needed to implement a project which already enjoys sound national managerial and financial backing. Financial responsibility is thus not transferred from local government and business organizations whose political and economic fortunes are closely tied to the success of the projects. Unfortunately, EIB's performance, in terms of allocating capital to efficient uses, cannot be inferred from its financial success. Most of its loans are secured by guarantees from national governments. The performance of its borrowers is not reported in central documents. Due to the guarantees, poor performance does not show up as a default rate. The pattern of financial responsibility and ultimate accountability therefore corresponds to the European Commission's as yet decentralized regional development policy.

VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes: The primary way in which the European Investment Bank is relevant and important to the Alaska Permanent Fund is in the strong regional orientation of the European Investment Bank, where 63 percent of its portfolio has been invested in the development of lesser developed regions of Europe. It is important to note that although the vast percentage of its resources has been employed in regional development, only six percent of those resources have been employed through the "global loan program." The importance of that point to the Alaska Permanent Fund is that the global loan program would be most analogous to a regionalized effort in which the regional projects of the Alaska Permanent Fund were implemented through the regional and local community development corporations. This matter bears further consideration.

It is also worth noting that the European Investment Bank rarely takes more than 40 percent positions in its loans, to ensure that the risk and responsibility are borne by both local financial institutions and the private marketplace. Analogously, in Alaska, this is the intent of the present language of the Alaska Permanent Fund and in the case of regional development suggests the wise course of joint venturing with the

regional corporations and with the private marketplace in all regional loans.

Sources and Uses of Funds: There are three principal matters concerning the European Investment Bank's capitalization which are worth noting for the design of the Alaska Permanent Fund:

First, all of the earnings of the European Investment Bank have been retained for reinvestment in strengthening the capital structure of the European Investment Bank. This is a different use of retained earnings than those of either the Alaska, Inc. proposal or a proposal to use the earnings for General Fund purposes at some future date.

Second, with a strong equity base the European Investment Bank has been very successful in borrowing the substantial amount of its capital needs in European and worldwide private capital markets. This is a very important model for the Alaska Permanent Fund. In designing the Alaska Permanent Fund the \$2 to \$4 billion of oil revenues should be viewed as a paid-in equity capital base for the Alaska Permanent Fund against which it can then borrow for its lending purposes on world markets.

Third, the European Investment Bank has a nice balance of its sources and uses of funds. The majority

of the European Investment Bank's borrowings in world capital markets are for seven to ten years, to support expansion capital lending running seven to ten years. The longer infrastructure loans of 15 to 20 years are then in turn supported by borrowings in the international capital market of from 15 to 20 years.

Fourth, all of the infrastructure investing is backed by a government guarantee. In my judgment, it would be much more efficient for Alaska to do the majority of its infrastructure financing through the Permanent Fund, but backed by general revenues.

Management and Accountability: The management and accountability issues of the European Investment Bank are less relevant to the Alaska Permanent Fund.

1. BRITISH COLUMBIA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION
Discussion Draft

September 14, 1977
Page 117

I. PURPOSES

The British Columbia Central Credit Union is a private, federally-chartered financial institution owned by the credit unions of British Columbia. Established in 1944, its major function is that of a reserve bank for British Columbia's 178 credit unions. In 1970, it merged with the B.C. Credit Union League, a promotional and educational institution and has since provided a wide range of financial and administrative services to its members. Credit unions require most of these services in order to compete with other types of financial institutions for the deposits and loan business of British Columbia savers. In general, credit unions are too small to undertake the capital expenditure and staff requirements necessary to provide these customer services efficiently.

Credit Unions in British Columbia - Credit unions are deposit institutions offering a full range of customer services. Their investments tend to be concentrated in home mortgages, consumer credit and property development. They are distinguished from banks in that they are cooperatively owned by their depositors, each of whom is entitled to one vote in electing the board of directors and who may participate in membership-management meetings.

All members are required to have a "common bond," a legally construed economic association. These bonds may be of three types: community (those who live or work in a given political jurisdiction serviced by the credit union), associational (e.g., ethnic or church groups) or occupational. About one half of the credit unions in B.C. have community common bonds.

In 1975, there were 178 credit unions with 261 branch offices in B.C. These serviced some 600,000 members, about 23% of the population and composed some 23% of all deposit institution offices in the province. About one half of these offices are located in the greater Vancouver area.

The industry has grown remarkably and become more concentrated in recent years. Since 1971, membership has been growing at a compound annual rate of 11%, assets at 35%. In 1971, there were 217 credit unions holding slightly less than \$500 million in assets. In 1975, the 178 credit unions held over \$1.5 billion in assets, with half of these held by the 15 larger units. (The remaining units are extremely small, median asset size being less than \$70 million.) Credit union assets account for 10% of those held by all financial institutions in the province (20% if corporate business is excluded). Individual units are usually located within communities serviced by commercial banks and are in competition with them for deposits.

Distribution of assets - There has been a sharp rise in the demand for housing in B.C. due to the migration of large numbers of young families. Consequently, the credit unions' assets have become concentrated in home mortgages. In 1971, they composed 62% of the \$400 million in loans outstanding. In 1975, they composed 76% of the \$1,280 million in loans outstanding. Other credit union assets include municipal, provincial and federal government securities and consumer loans.

Liabilities - The main source of funds to credit unions is the deposits of members. Credit unions offer term and demand accounts as well as retirement and home owner savings plans. The latter two types of deposits have grown at a remarkable compound annual rate of over 100% in the past four years. Of the \$1,409 million on deposit in 1975, 36% were in demand and 64% were in term accounts.

Liquidity - Credit unions are required by law to maintain liquidity reserves with a bank, a central credit union or in qualifying federal government securities equal to 10% of deposits shares and borrowings. Virtually all British Columbian credit unions maintain their reserves and surplus in B.C. Central. In recent years, aggregate Loan/Deposit ratios for the industry have exceeded 90%. The credit unions as a whole, then, have

demanded funds from other sectors of the capital market. This borrowing and the cash management involved have been handled by B.C. Central. B.C. Central's functions within the credit union system and its mediating role between the system and the outside capital market is the subject of the following sections.

B.C. Central Operations

Financial - B.C. Central's main financial function is to provide individual credit unions with funds sufficient to meet local loan demand when local deposits prove inadequate. These funds are provided in the following forms:

- non-restricted reserve credit lines equal to 10% of the credit union shares and deposits for use only in meeting any net reduction in shares and deposits due to increased loan demand;
- restricted and non-restricted credit lines to credit unions equal to four to six times a credit union's monthly cash flow for operational purposes. Approved lines of credit under these first two provisions equaled \$262 million in 1975;
- term loans to credit unions to finance office buildings and credit union mortgage loans;

- emergency loans through the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Actual borrowings by credit unions from B.C. Central have grown rapidly in recent years from \$26.1 million in 1971 to \$91.8 million in 1975, reaching a high of \$108 million in the tight money market of 1974. Credit union credit line and loan requirements are worked out annually in consultation with B.C. Central's financial staff on the basis of financial statements, loan records and cash flow projections.

Credit union deposits are not covered by the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation. Insurance of deposits is handled by another central institution, the Credit Union Share and Deposit Guarantee Fund. The Fund is administered by a five member Board of Directors, three of whom serve on the B.C. Central Board. The Fund, which stood at \$13 million in 1975, is capitalized by annual assessment of member credit unions. The Board of the Fund may intercede directly in the operations of individual credit unions experiencing financial difficulties and may grant financial assistance where deemed necessary.

B.C. Central provides other important financial services to its members. These include centralized check clearing, bad debt collection, investment management for retirement and home ownership saving plans and secondary marketing of credit union

mortgages. The last service is another form of increasing member liquidity.

Non-financial services - B.C. Central's most important non-financial service is the provision of on-line teller terminal data processing to handle deposit and loan transactions in local offices. In 1975, this system covered one-half of all credit union offices. The savings in time and cost effected by this system increase credit union ability to compete with other deposit institutions. Other nonfinancial services provided for the most part on a fee basis are economic forecasting, personnel recruitment, printing and supply purchase, collection assistance, data processing and systems development, market research, facilities design and planning, education, advertising and public relations, legal counsel, housing development and travel services. B.C. Central also provides financial services to British Columbia's 108 cooperatives.

II. SOURCES OF FUNDS/CAPITALIZATION

Equity - B.C. Central's major source of equity is the sale of shares to member credit unions. In 1975, members held 6.26 million shares with a par value of \$31.3 million, all of which was paid in to B.C. Central. B.C. Central is required by law to maintain a 10/1 debt/equity ratio. Their debt consists

of deposits and borrowings; equity of membership shares, retained earnings and provisions for dividends. Despite rapid recent growth of deposits in the credit union system and consequently in B.C. Central's deposits, its debt/equity ratio was a fairly conservative 5.7 in 1975.

Deposits - B.C. Central's deposits are comprised of the liquidity reserves and surplus funds of its members. As credit union deposits have grown, so has B.C. Central's; from \$49.7 million in 1971 to \$195.8 million in 1975. These developments are illustrated in Table I. B.C. Central also receives one-half the total in the Credit Union Share and Guarantee fund as deposits. In 1975, this amounted to \$6.2 million. Central pays interest on all deposits, which composes its largest capital expense. See Table 3.

Borrowings - Because credit unions' lending activity has outstripped their deposit base in recent years, they have been demanders of funds from sources outside their system. These demands are mediated by B.C. Central. To finance loans to credit unions, B.C. Central borrows from Canadian, US and foreign banks and has established non-restrictable credit lines with three of the largest Canadian commercial banks. Borrowings vary greatly from year to year depending on the level of deposits

FIGURE I
Credit Union Financial System in British Columbia

December 31, 1975




TABLE I

Summary Statistics for B.C. Central Since 1971

(000's except where indicated)

	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971
ASSETS					
Liquid Assets	\$127,885	\$ 61,824	\$ 64,408	\$ 50,541	\$35,626
Loans to members	91,823	108,973	56,705	45,371	26,177
Total assets	243,290	193,225	141,721	109,027	67,807
LIABILITIES					
Notes payable	4,500	12,490	13,150	23,519	5,643
Members' Deposits	195,817	145,048	101,685	66,389	49,679
Members' Shares	31,300	24,815	18,317	12,746	9,153
INCOME AND EXPENDITURES					
Income	27,175	19,938	12,768	7,296	4,916
Expenses (financial)	18,941	13,906	8,032	3,962	2,706
Net Income	2,299	1,621	1,103	1,343	1,008
Dividends per share	35¢	35¢	35¢	30¢	30¢
Percent Growth in Assets	25.9%	36.3%	30.0%	60.8%	29.7%

and loan demand at the local level. See Table I, "Notes Payable," for the level of debt outstanding in recent years.

Income - B.C. Central derives between 80 and 85% of its income from interest payments on loans and returns on investments in securities. The split between loan interest and investment income varies from year to year, depending on loan demand from members. Other sources of income are service charges, fees for services to members and membership dues. Gross income has grown from \$4.9 million in 1971 to \$27.2 million in 1975.

III. USES OF FUNDS/INVESTMENTS

Reserve Requirements - B.C. Central is required to maintain liquidity reserves in cash or short term assets equal to 20% of its deposits and commercial paper liabilities. In 1975, it held \$48.3 million in such assets; 23.5% of its deposits and market liabilities. See Table II.

Loans and Investments - B.C. Central's longer term uses of funds are concentrated in loans to members and investments in securities. The flow of loans to members varies from year to year, depending on demand. Interest rates are adjusted to B.C. Central's borrowing terms, and a spread of 1/2% is permitted by law.

B.C. Central invests primarily in high yield, short term notes of Canadian corporations. Other securities held include Canadian Governments, Canadian corporate bonds, bonds of co-operatives and shares in other credit unions and cooperatives.

Operating Expenses - All expenses involved in providing B.C. Central's many services--salaries, materials and rents--are paid out of B.C. Central's operating income. After-tax earnings, having subtracted financial and administrative expenses, came to \$2.29 million in 1975. Of this, \$1.87 million was distributed as dividends to members. (The current dividend on membership shares is 7%.) Retained earnings at the end of 1975 totaled slightly over \$3 million. See Table III for a complete breakdown of income and expenses. See Figure I for a schematic representation of the relationships described above.

IV. MANAGEMENT

The strategic management policies of B.C. Central are set by a 14-member Board of Directors elected by the member credit unions. Day-to-day management of the institution is handled by a managerial staff of 80 (total staff - 180) in three divisions: Administration and Finance, Services and Development.

Each division is headed by a manager and is further subdivided along functional lines.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY

B.C. Central is a privately owned institution and is subject to no special forms of government oversight or control. Its operations are inspected annually by the federal Superintendent of Insurance office. On the provincial level, Central's operations are monitored by the Department of Consumer Affairs to ensure that consumer and mortgage credit practices accord with department guidelines and provincial usury laws.

VI. EVALUATION

B.C. Central has performed its function of helping a system of small depository units operate effectively and grow in highly competitive and quickly changing local markets. The most remarkable feature of B.C. Central is that it invests primarily within the system from which it draws its funds. Of its \$173 million in loans and investments outstanding in 1975, 50% were directly in cooperatives and credit unions. Another 36% were held in very short term corporate notes for cash management purposes and could presumably be converted to cash should there be a sudden increase in membership loan demands. Thus,

virtually all credit union deposits remain within the system.

B.C. Central's importance as a promotional institution should also be noted. Competition for deposits demands timely and cost-efficient customer service as well as professional promotional activity and well-trained personnel. These are functions which all but the largest credit unions could not afford to undertake on their own.

VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes: B.C. Central, as noted in the July 11, 1977 report, is the best model of a cooperatively owned state central bank capable of providing deposit and lending services to those rural areas too small for full commercial banking services. It has the twin advantages of insuring local, cooperative ownerships sensitive to local needs on the one hand. On the other hand, it provides aggressive centralized capital and management services to ensure that each village receives the most sophisticated economic development assistance possible.

It is also important to note that British Columbia's economy, geography and demography is not unlike Alaska's.

Sources of Funds: B.C. Central's equity comes from the local member cooperative banks or credit unions. It is owned

and governed by local users. As noted in the July 11, 1977 report, the Permanent Fund could initially capitalize the state central bank, and then arrange to transfer ownership to the local cooperative banks. This could be along lines used to devolve ownership of the Farm Credit System from the Federal Government to local users. For a description of that procedure, see II.

Regionalization Models and Options in this Report

B.C. Central's debt is raised in international capital markets, based on its strong equity base and sound management. The Alaska Permanent Fund and its affiliated Alaska State Central Bank could do the same.

Uses of Funds: B.C. Central is a model of a strong central organization capable of raising international capital to support effective local economic development under effective local control.

Management: B.C. Central is governed by its local user institutions and attracts extremely able and aggressive central management.

Accountability: B.C. Central is fully accountable to its local member cooperative banks. The Alaska Permanent Fund could ensure that it is equally accountable to public purposes.

TABLE II
Consolidated Balance Sheet
1975

ASSETS

Cash and Demand Deposits	\$35,296,728
Short Term Deposits, due 1976-1979 (callable notice 1 - 15 days)	13,000,000
Investments	81,680,246
Loans	91,823,385
Mortgages Receivable	15,165,509
Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest	4,099,861
Land, Buildings and Equipment	2,224,522
	<u>\$243,290,251</u>

LIABILITIES

Notes Payable and Deposit Balances	\$200,317,269
Accounts Payable, Accruals, and Outstanding Acceptances	6,495,372
Deferred Income Taxes	215,400
Provision for Dividends	1,875,595
Retained Earnings	3,086,610
Members' Shares	31,300,005
	<u>\$243,290,251</u>

TABLE III

Income and Expense Statement - 1975

INCOME

Loan interest	\$ 7,745,411
Investment income	15,096,769
Service charges and sundry	1,340,040
Fees for services to members	2,643,521
Members dues	349,007
	<u>27,174,748</u>

DIRECT EXPENSES

Interest on deposits	14,393,292
Interest on borrowings	4,123,399
Service charges and sundry	423,963
	<u>18,940,654</u>

INCOME LESS DIRECT EXPENSES

8,234,094

ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES

5,803,650

EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES

2,430,444

Income taxes - deferred

131,609

NET EARNINGS FOR THE YEAR

2,298,835

Retained earnings - beginning of year

2,659,631

Dividends

4,958,466

1,871,856

RETAINED EARNINGS - END OF YEAR

\$ 3,086,610

I. PURPOSES

The Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (German Cooperative's Bank or DG Bank) is the central reserve bank of the vast West German cooperative system. Founded as the Deutsche Genossenschaftskasse, a cooperatively-owned financial institution, shortly after World War II, it was reorganized as a corporation and renamed the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank in 1972.

DG Bank is the apex institution of a three-tiered system which holds 13% of all deposits in German financial institutions. The base of the system is composed of some 6,400 small banks and building societies which service the members of agricultural, industrial and trade cooperatives, as well as unaffiliated depositors. Ten regional cooperative banks provide liquidity management, auditing, check clearing and investment services to the base. DG Bank provides similar services to the regional banks. This system and DG Bank's place in it are described below.

Cooperatives in Germany

Structure of the Movement - After World War II, the German cooperative movement was organized into four sectors, each with its own credit system and network of regional and national unions.

The four sectors are agriculture, industry, consumers coops and non-profit housing finance societies.

By far the largest of these sectors is agriculture. In 1971, more than 1.8 million farmers were members of one or more of the 12,590 local societies. 1,650 marketing and supply co-operatives, 4,300 trade cooperatives and 12 centralized cooperatives with 1,500 branches or depots were engaged in the buying and selling of goods and achieved a total turnover of \$6.4 billion.* In addition, there were in 1971, 4,780 specialized cooperatives with 29 affiliated regional federations. The agricultural credit coops take deposits from and finance the fixed and working capital requirements of their members.

The industrial and trade cooperatives perform similar functions, and are active primarily as central material purchasers for their members. They were serviced by 624 coop banks in 1971.

Consumer and non-profit housing coops (central purchasing agents for the residential construction industry) comprise a relatively small part of the system.

The breakdown of local financial institutions servicing these sectors in 1971 was as follows:

*All monetary figures in the text are given in dollars, converted from DM at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the figure was reported. This is done for ease of comprehension. Figures in Tables I and II are presented in DM, where a sense of proportion is more important than absolute totals.

Agriculture	5,680
Industry	668
Housing and Consumer	45
Total	6,393


The system also includes 10 mortgage banks unaffiliated with cooperative societies.

Recent trends in total units and membership are illustrated in Figure I. Overall, the graphs show increasing membership and concentration, especially in the two most important sectors, agriculture and credit. Concentration has mostly been achieved through the merger of two units.


Despite these mergers at the local level, the cooperative system maintains the most extensive branching system of any sector of the German financial market, and its units are incredibly small. In 1971, there were 18,665 coop bank branches, compared to 14,506 for savings and 5,428 for commercial banks. In terms of aggregate balance sheet totals, the cooperatives are behind both the other sectors. The average balance sheet total for the banks serving industrial coops was \$23.3 million; for those servicing agricultural customers, only \$3.7 million.

These changes at the primary level have affected the structure and operations of the regional cooperative banks. Each merger of two local units tends to reduce deposits with the regional banks, because the compensatory movements of


FIGURE I
Cooperatives and Their Membership in the
Federal Republic of Germany



Primary Cooperatives - Total



Cooperative Banks




Trade and Service Cooperatives

FIGURE I (continued)



Consumer Cooperatives




Cooperative Building Societies

FIGURE II

The German Cooperative Financial System (1971)

Figures in billions of dollars (US) at the
then-prevailing exchange rate



liquid funds increasingly take place within the new unit, instead of passing through the central institution. The percentage of customers' deposits held by the local cooperative banks at their affiliated regional bank has therefore been declining. Also, larger local cooperative banks usually make heavier demands on their regional banks, on which they depend for long-term funds to finance expansion in the volume of lending.

This situation has led to the need for larger units at the regional level, capable of maintaining larger balances of loanable funds and providing services such as check clearing where economies of scale can be realized. Since 1968, the parallel regional systems of the various primary cooperative sectors have been in the process of consolidation, and the number of regional cooperative banks has fallen from 18 to 10. Of these, seven have reorganized as corporations able to sell shares to the general public. These regional banks, in turn, rely on DG Bank for depository, liquidity management and other essential services. The financial interrelationships of this system, from local depositors to DG Bank are shown schematically in Figure II.

Sources of Funds - The source of funds to the local system is the deposits of members. The local coops offer a full range of deposit accounts and instruments: checking and savings

accounts, negotiable and non-negotiable savings certificates. These last instruments are issued for terms of 7 years and their proceeds are earmarked for term lending to medium-sized firms.

Uses of Funds - Besides consumer, home mortgage and business loans to members, coop banks undertake a number of lending and investment activities. These include construction financing, term loans to other credit cooperatives and industrial customers and leasing.

DG Bank Operations - DG Bank provides financial and non-financial services to the regionals in order to help them facilitate these local activities. Such tasks performed jointly by DG Bank and the regionals include check clearing, centralized electronic transaction procession, property broking, secondary mortgage marketing, advertising, personnel training, and the placement of reserve and surplus funds in investments outside the cooperative system. This last function is reserved primarily to DG Bank. They underwrite and market domestic and foreign corporate equities and securities of various governments and public authorities.

II. SOURCES OF FUNDS/CAPITALIZATION

Equity - DG Bank is capitalized by the purchase of shares. Of the \$134.5 million in paid-in equity in 1975, some 75% was

held by the regional banks. The rest was held by corporate and institutional investors outside the cooperative system. The current dividend on shares is 8%.

Deposits - DG Bank's main source of deposits is the regional banks' reserve and surplus. Of the \$7.92 billion on deposit in 1975, \$5.36 billion was attributable to the regionals. Other banks and corporations provided the balance of the deposits. DG Bank pays interest on these deposits at prevailing rates, and these interest payments compose their largest financial expense. The volume of deposits in the entire system has risen rapidly in recent years.

Borrowings - When necessary to increase its base of loanable funds, DG Bank will raise money on the European bond market through issue of its own bonds. In 1975, it had \$832 million outstanding--down from recent years due to the simultaneous increase of deposits and decrease of loan demand within the coop system.

Income - Net interest payments on loans compose by far the largest portion of DG Bank's income, some 86% of the \$606.5 million in 1975 gross earnings. Other sources of income include that from investments and securities, commissions and fees and miscellaneous sources amounting to \$11.8 million.

III. USES OF FUNDS/INVESTMENTS

Because loan demand in the sectors from which the cooperative system draws its deposits--agriculture, small business and middle-income individuals--has fallen in recent years, DG Bank has had to find uses for its investible funds outside the cooperative system. Some 57% of its \$7.5 billion in loans outstanding in 1975 were to banks outside the cooperative system. Another 26% were to non-bank, corporate customers, leaving 17% to be channeled back to the regional banks. Over 70% of these loans were for terms of less than four years.

Unlike American banks, German banks are not restricted from engaging in equity and underwriting transactions involving corporate securities, and they may own subsidiaries directly instead of through a holding company. All these activities figure prominently on DG Bank's balance sheet. Of the \$1.24 billion in investments held by the bank, 46% are in corporate bonds, many of which DG Bank underwrote. Three percent was held in other securities, mostly corporate equities, 12% in shares of subsidiaries and 39% in Treasury notes.

DG Bank's underwriting business is substantial. In 1975, it underwrote 17 large issues, mostly for German public authorities and political units. The Bank also participated

in 47 other issues as guarantors for various private and public entities.

DG Bank held equity interest in over 50 other financial institutions, including the seven regional banks reorganized as corporations. Among the Bank's wholly-owned subsidiaries is the Deutsche Genossenschafts-Hypothekenbank, one of Germany's largest mortgage banks, several closed-ended mutual funds and several foreign subsidiaries engaged in placing DG funds in investments abroad. DG Bank also owns 19 and 50%, respectively, of the shares of the two leasing firms whose services they broker to the regional banks.

Thus, using the very sparse information provided in DG Bank's annual reports and including accounts which may register holdings outside as well as within the cooperative system, it appears that only 18.6% of DG Bank's investments are in the cooperative system.

IV. MANAGEMENT

The top level of management is the Managing Board, composed of five members elected by representatives of the regional banks and cooperative unions. DG Bank does not report the breakdown of managerial responsibility between its various divisions. Nor do they present any overriding management policies besides

a commitment to helping local credit cooperatives achieve a greater market share.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY

DG Bank is a privately-owned corporation and thus enjoys almost total freedom in its investment and liability-generating policies. It is restricted only insofar as it must obey laws designed to protect depositors.

VI. EVALUATION

DG Bank's major purpose is to help the thousands of tiny financial units which compose the cooperative credit system remain competitive with other sectors of the German financial system characterized by larger units. Banks in these other sectors tend to deal in larger blocks of money and thus have lower unit transactions costs. DG Bank and its regional affiliates seem to do this job well. From 1973 to 1975, the share of deposits in all German banks held by cooperatives increased from 11 to slightly more than 13%.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of DG Bank's operations is the extent to which it invests outside the cooperative system, especially when compared to the British Columbia Central Credit Union. Such a comparison is misleading, however, in that the

real economic conditions in the two institutions' deposit markets may be entirely different. Young families are heavily represented among the British Columbian cooperatives' members. Their demand for large mortgage loans is high, and they tend to keep little in savings. Thus, their central bank must channel funds from outside the system to its member units if they are to continue to compete for loan business.

DG Bank is the lead institution of a complex system financing many types of economic activity. Its managers claim and behave as if loan demand is declining in these sectors. An analysis of these sectors and a critique of DG Bank's lending policy is impossible given the paucity of information on these activities available in secondary sources and the Bank's own tight-lipped reporting policies. Management may be doing its members a service by investing outside the system if that is where their funds can earn the greatest return.

However, one of the Bank's financial policies does seem to be a disservice to the member cooperatives. This is the selling of shares by both the regional banks and DG Bank to investors outside the cooperative system when liquidity appears to exist among the individual cooperatives to buy these shares. Thus, earnings on the deposits contributed by the units at the base of the system (and ultimately their members) are siphoned off

to outside investors through the payment of dividends. According to our own calculations based on information given in DG Bank's annual reports, these payments outside the system amounted to 18.9% of the Bank's net earnings in 1975.

VII. RELEVANCE TO THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND

Purposes: DG Bank provides an important counterpoint to BC Central. It shows what happens to a similarly constituted cooperative development bank when it matures in a mature industrial economy.

Sources and Uses of Funds: DG Bank is no longer wholly owned by its users. It now is a net exporter of funds---not only out of local cooperatives, but out of Germany.

Management and Accountability: DG Bank is increasingly less accountable to its local cooperatives. It manages its funds similar to a large multi-national bank.

TABLE I

Balance Sheet - 1975

	DM Million
ASSETS	
Cash and Bills Receivable	627.4
Due from Regional Cooperative Banks	3,198.3
Due from Other Banks	
Less Than Four Years	9,852.9
Four Years and Over	909.5
Treasury Bonds	1,313.1
Bonds and Notes	1,625.5
Other Securities	117.8
Loans and Advances to Non-Bank Customers	
Less Than Four Years	3,324.9
Four Years and Over	1,459.6
Due from Public Authorities - Equalization	
Claims	86.9
Own Bonds Held for Trading Account	38.0
Fiduciary Transactions	165.2
Investments in Subsidiaries and Affiliates	413.0
Premises and Equipment	45.1
Other Assets	107.6
Total Assets	<u>23,284.8</u>
LIABILITIES	
Deposits of Regional Cooperative Banks	13,381.9
Deposits of Other Banks	
Less Than Four Years	3,528.4
Four Years and Over	1,683.9
Deposits of Non-Bank Customers	1,192.5
Bonds and Notes Issued	2,302.1
Fiduciary Transactions	165.2
Other Liabilities	283.5
Capital Stock	366.6
Reserves	355.0
Profit After Transfer to Reserves	25.7
Total Liabilities	<u>23,284.8</u>
Endorsement Liabilities	417.8
Guarantees	1,694.7

TABLE II
Income and Expenses - 1975

	DM '000
INCOME	
Interest Earned	1,305,936.6
Income from Securities and Investments	159,911.1
Commissions and Fees	18,741.5
Other Income Including Adjustment of Special Reserves	29,471.3
Total Income	<u>1,514,060.5</u>
EXPENSES	
Interest Expense	1,272,019.7
Commissions	1,813.7
Depreciation, Provisions, Transfer to Special Reserves	32,048.8
Staff Expenses	34,542.4
Other Operating Expenses	23,918.2
Taxes	19,192.4
Other Expenses	4,852.5
Total Expenses	<u>1,388,387.7</u>
NET INCOME	125,672.8
Transfer to Reserves	100,000.0
PROFIT AFTER TRANSFER TO RESERVES	<u>25,672.8</u>

II. REGIONAL MODELS AND OPTIONS

REGIONAL MODELS
Discussion Draft

September 14, 1977
Page 149

International and Domestic Patterns

International development banking provides a pattern for regionalizing the Alaska Permanent Fund which is strikingly paralleled in a number of publicly-sponsored American development finance systems. In each instance a three-tiered arrangement has evolved with these common elements:

First, a government-sponsored development bank or fund which oversees the whole system.

In the middle, regional development banks or corporations which are more sensitive to local differences and act as a bridge between local needs and national or state resources.

At the bottom, local development corporations or banks with a great deal of autonomy and flexibility to respond to local needs and differences.

This essential three-tiered pattern is found in the international development banking system headed by the World Bank, in sophisticated national development banking systems in Third World countries such as those of Brazil, Mexico and India, and in regional development banking systems of developed countries of Europe such as France or Italy. The same pattern is followed in publicly-sponsored American credit systems such as the Farm Credit system and the Federal Home Loan bank system.

It is no coincidence that this pattern repeats itself in such a range of settings. The advantages of this pattern are elementary, sensible, and obvious.

In each instance, the system is publicly-sponsored and accountable but independently operated by an experienced, career-minded professional staff. Both capital and management are organized on a long-term basis and initial public investment is used to generate larger amounts of private capital from the private capital market.

Just as international and domestic experience provides us with important parallels, each gives us a better understanding of different aspects of the overall structure and organization which could help define the Alaska Permanent Fund as a development bank capable of supporting the quite different regional economic needs of different areas of Alaska.

For instance, international development banking systems are superior to American development finance systems in the provision of infrastructure financing and venture capital. By definition two major American credit systems, the Farm Credit system and the Federal Home Loan bank system, do not provide either long-term infrastructure finance or essential venture capital to new enterprise. Venture capital is essential to the development of rural regions of Alaska and lower-income

communities in those regions, as it is in Africa, Asia or Latin America.

Just as the international development banking systems help us understand the basic capital formation instruments for development banking systems, particular American experience in structuring financial institutions gives us a set of basic guidelines for constructing the regional units of the Alaska Permanent Fund. After looking at the evolution of international experience, it is worth taking a close look at the specific legal, financial and organizational mechanisms used by successful American development finance systems.

International Models

One of the most appropriate transferable lessons from international development banking experience is that a network is necessary in order to support regional economic development--not a single, monolithic institution. This is especially true where regional and ethnic distances are great, where infrastructure is inadequate, and where sensitivity to local needs must be particularly acute.

The evolution of the international development banking system into a geographically decentralized and functionally differentiated worldwide system was neither wholly planned nor

conscious. It simply evolved to fit the rising needs of various developing countries and regions of the globe.

For instance, early on, the World Bank began to recognize the value of working through local intermediary development banks, since they were much more sensitive to local practices and, in many cases, more likely to make sound financial judgments about loans and investments. The World Bank group began to work with existing national development banks and to sponsor the creation of a worldwide network of national private development finance corporations in a host of Third World countries.

Second, in large and complex countries with large geographic areas and significant regional differences, we can observe a tendency to complement this international decentralization with an intranational regional decentralization to subnational institutions. In one study of 209 development banks, nearly 40 percent were located in 10 countries--Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, and Venezuela--each of which has developed extensive, decentralized and regionalized development banking systems.

Third, this pattern repeats itself once again in the sophisticated and elaborate regional development banking systems which have been organized in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

At the base of each system is the fundamental unit--the local development bank or corporation which serves to broker the risk between the local entrepreneur and the outside sources of capital. Between the local development corporation and the apex of the system there is often a regional development bank or corporation which mobilizes its own capital for local use and may be required to broker-finance between the local and the top institutions. At the higher levels in any event there is also a careful elaboration of different infrastructure and equity "windows" to provide more discrete forms of capital for specialized purposes. Figure 1 provides a highly abstract and stylized version of the institutional relationships among the World Bank, multinational regional development banks, and local national institutions on the one hand, and national development banking institutions, regional and local development corporations on the other hand.

An American Parallel: The Farm Credit System

The Farm Credit system has evolved as a highly sophisticated, publicly-sponsored but user-owned development finance system like the international development banking network. It has unfolded gradually since its establishment in 1916, assuming new functions and becoming more decentralized in response to

the credit needs of farmers. Today the federal Farm Credit Board and the Farm Credit administration operate at the financial level, while twelve district Farm Credit Boards at the regional level serve hundreds of constituent associations and cooperatives at the local level. The functional diversity of this system is reflected in twelve federal Land Banks serving 594 constituent Federal Land Bank Associations, twelve Federal Intermediate Credit Banks working with 442 local production credit associations, and twelve banks for cooperatives serving constituent farmers in cooperatives. This arrangement provides three different functional "windows" of credit to member farmers and ranchers in each of the twelve regional Farm Credit Boards.

The Farm Credit grid system, then, parallels the international development banking patterns both in its geographic decentralization of decision making and its separation of different functions. The pattern of geographic decentralization is repeated again in other American financial networks such as the Federal Home Loan bank system and, of course, the Federal Reserve system. These important domestic parallels not only confirm international experience; they also provide us with proven, workable, legal, financial and organizational precedents for a regionalized Alaska Permanent Fund.

The Farm Credit system has, for example, developed two structural attributes worth noting and using in constructing a regionalized Alaska Permanent Fund. In a characteristically American fashion, on December 31, 1968, the Farm Credit system became 100 percent user-owned with retirement of the original federal government capital investment in the system. Part of each farmer's loan purchases stock ownership in the capital structure of the banks and associations. Member farmers elect the Board of Directors of the Federal Land Bank Association, production credit associations, and cooperatives; the Boards of the associations and cooperatives in turn elect the District Farm Credit Board and make nominations to the President for the federal Farm Credit Board (see attached Figure 2).

The local users govern the system by electing or nominating each governing board in the system. The local users eventually repurchase the ownership of the system from the federal government with a small percentage of the proceeds received from the system. This user governance and eventual user ownership is a critical precedent for establishing local cooperative banking institutions in communities in the state too small to properly support a full-service bank.

Second, the private capital market finances the \$8 billion debt of the Farm Credit system through the sale in the bond

market of consolidated federal Farm Loan bonds. "Consolidated" is primarily what they are: thousands of individual farm mortgages, crop loans and farm equipment loans which have been put together by the Farm Credit system for resale in the private capital market. The private capital market supplies the bulk of the funds used, not the Treasury. On the other hand, the Treasury's standby credit is assurance to the market that the government stands behind the obligation, even though there is no direct government guarantee. I similarly feel that with the huge paid-in capital base of the Alaska Permanent Fund it will similarly be possible to sell many such packaged private obligations in consolidated bonds in the marketplace with the standby backing of the Alaska Permanent Fund itself.

Unlike virtually all international development banking systems, the Farm Credit system has not developed an affiliated venture capital corporation. As a result, the Farm Credit system is precisely that--a 100 percent debt financing system which is no longer able to respond adequately to the needs of those low-income farmers and lesser-developed regions of the country which it was originally set up in the 1920's to serve. Nor has it been able to be effective in its original purpose of seeking to end farm tenancy by making landowners out of sharecroppers. Credit does not make owners, only debtors. The

banks for cooperatives, for example, usually limit facility loans to not more than 60 to 40 percent of the value of the security offered by the cooperative, and expect the balance to be financed by the association's permanent or long-term capital. This is fine for a wealthy cooperative that has built up sizable membership equity, but it is not very helpful to low-income cooperatives whose members by definition have no equity and, therefore, whose cooperative is ineligible for a loan from the bank for cooperatives.

It is for this reason that I have argued strongly in my memorandum to the committee of July 11, 1977 that the community development provisions of the Alaska Permanent Fund legislation should provide for equity investment as well as debt and guarantees, just as with productive private enterprise.

Other Domestic Models

The pattern for establishing and operating the Farm Credit system is paralleled in other major American financing systems such as the Federal Home Loan bank system. In each instance there is one initial large public capital stock purchase by the Treasury, which starts the system. After that the system pays its own way except for relatively small periodic appropriations to cover non-recoverable infrastructure and social overhead

capital costs. Eventually the Treasury stock is repaid and completely replaced by user-owned stock. For example, the initial \$75 million of Treasury stock that started the Federal Home Loan bank system in 1933 was fully retired by 1950, just as was the Farm Credit system.

With strong debt to equity ratios most of these same systems have been able to raise the substantial body of their capital on the private market through secondary marketing operations with strong paid-in equity capital backup.

FIGURE 1.





FIGURE 2


THE FEDERAL CREDIT SYSTEM

CENTRAL



Appoints


CENTRAL



12 appointed by
Pres. from nominee
of each district, one
by Secretary of Agriculture

REGIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC

(1 for each of 12 Districts)



REGIONAL
FUNCTION




FEDERAL
LAND
BANK

FEDERAL
INTERMEDIATE
CREDIT BANK

BANK
FOR
COOPS

2 elected from
each "avenue", one
appointed by FCS
governor

LOCAL
FUNCTION



"First Ave." "Second Ave." "Third Ave."

The Boards of Directors of the Federal Land Bank Associations, Production Credit Associations, and Cooperations are elected by member farmers.

In Summary: A Range of Options for Regionalization Available
to the Alaska Permanent Fund

The experience of domestic and international development banks points out that the Alaska Permanent Fund has a number of specific options that might be used for purposes of regionalization. Specifically, the Alaska Permanent Fund might make local regionalized investments through: independent regional or local development banks or corporations; affiliates; subsidiaries; user-owned local institutions; branches; or some flexible combination of the above developed on an ad hoc basis. Each of these will be briefly referred to below.

Independent regional or local development banks or corporations: The World Bank and the European Investment Bank are both examples of institutions which primarily operate by making loans to and through independent regional and local intermediaries. Analogously, the Alaska Permanent Fund might make all regional investments to or through Alaskan regional and local community development corporations.

Affiliates: The French Crédit National finances its regional development through affiliated Regional Development Corporations. It has a substantial although not controlling stock interest in each of these SDRs. The predominant equity interest is held by local financial and development institutions with a greater sensitivity to local needs and conditions.

Subsidiaries: To the best of our knowledge, no development banks within the United States or overseas operate through their regional development programs through wholly-owned subsidiaries. On the other hand, many development banks, including the World Bank and the D.G. Bank, do use wholly-owned subsidiaries in order to undertake specialized functional financing activities such as equity investment.

User-owned local development banks or corporations: As we have extensively documented, the Farm Credit System, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the British Columbia Central Credit Union, and the D.G. Bank are all institutions which are user-owned at both the regional and central level by local, cooperatively-owned development banks.

Branches: The Federal Reserve System and the British Finance for Industry are two central financial institutions which operate their regional activities through branches.

A flexible, ad hoc approach: The National Enterprise Board and the Canada Development Corporation are two large national development banks which have taken a needs-oriented ad hoc approach to regionalization. The National Enterprise Board, for instance, has recently established branches in Liverpool and Newcastle in order to get a better sense for how they could intervene in regional economic development. The Canada Development

Corporation has a sole branch in Vancouver in order to be more responsive to the regional economic development needs of western Canada and is undertaking its venture capital program through investments in affiliated privately-owned venture capital companies.

Our purpose in this regionalization paper, as in each of the sections of this second report, is to suggest a number of options which can then begin to be tailored to fit the specific purposes, needs and political economy of Alaska in designing the Alaska Permanent Fund. Based on the response of the legislature, this paper may also raise a number of follow-up questions which deserve further attention.

III. THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE

The question of assuring the accountability of the Permanent Fund management to the electorate, legislature and executive to carry out its public purposes is probably the single most important issue before the Special Permanent Fund Committee. In this final section of the report, we begin to suggest some measures by which the management of public enterprises such as the Alaska Permanent Fund may be held accountable for their performance. Because this is such a central issue, our aim in this section is simply to introduce the problem and begin to suggest some of the options available to ensure public accountability. We will detail some of the tradeoffs involved and cite specific cases from domestic and international experience.

It is important to point out at the beginning that the record is generally not a good one. In more cases than not, public accountability has been sacrificed for market efficiency. The task of overseeing the Permanent Fund to ensure that its public purposes are carried out will not be an easy one. Our sense is that this introductory discussion will raise many more questions that the Committee will want to consider between now and December 31, 1977. By "accountability" we mean the effectiveness

of the mechanisms by which the government seeks to assure that the managers of a public enterprise invest public resources in order to maximize the benefits to the ultimate providers of the funds. In the case of the Permanent Fund, those providers are the people of Alaska.

In some respects, the position of Alaskans in this enterprise is analogous to that of an investor in a private firm. The active investor gathers as much information as possible about the firm in which he invests. Using this information, he forms an independent judgment on appropriate management policies. He then seeks to have these judgments acknowledged and effected by participating in shareholders' meetings and by voting his shares. If, after these measures are exhausted, he is dissatisfied with managerial performance, he will seek to impose sanctions on the firm's operations by voting out management or, more likely, by withdrawing his money from the firm. In all these activities he is motivated by the principle of maximizing his benefit from the investment--his short-run money profit.

The benefit Alaskans expect from the Permanent Fund, however, is a good deal more complicated and long-lived than that sought by the private capitalist. Certainly, short-run financial results must be considered, but the idea behind the Alaska Permanent Fund is to convert non-renewable mineral resources into renewable

capital resources which benefit the Alaskan economy and Alaskans. These investments could generate many types of public costs and benefits. A small sample of costs Alaskans would seek to avoid includes degradation of the environment and social dislocation caused by the boom-bust nature of certain enterprises. Benefits might include wider participation of Alaskans in the management and wealth generated by business enterprises and the improvement of human services.

Experience has demonstrated that publicly-capitalized investment banks tend to operate solely under commercial profit-maximization criteria unless they are compelled to do otherwise through various forms of government direction and control. Our basic problems, then, are: 1) How is the substance of these directions to be determined? and 2) How are they to be enforced?

It is likely that no stable consensus can be reached on the proper mix of objectives for the Permanent Fund. Rather the Fund has many constituencies, each with different and often conflicting economic interests and with differential access to the political and economic means by which to have these interests effected.

To design the institutions surrounding the Permanent Fund as if the consensus mentioned above existed, as if it were the Fund's only task to interpret these objectives in its investment policy, may be virtually impossible, based on the experience of others.

Rather, the design of the Permanent Fund must provide a forum in which conflicts of interest can be aired and resolved on a continuing basis.

These conflicts are likely to arise at two points in the continuing operation of the Permanent Fund: first in the formulation of investment criteria and then in the application of those criteria. Those affected by these processes must have a chance to influence each of these sets of decisions. They must then have the means by which to review how these decisions are implemented.

In our investigations of the institutions profiled in Section I and other public enterprises we shall note, we have identified four stages in the accountability process. Two may be classified as forums in which the decisions mentioned above are made, two as means by which these decisions are implemented. In practice, these processes are carried on simultaneously.

Specifically, these stages are:

1) Setting of Goals and Priorities: The essential questions here are: Who sets the goals and how are they phrased in legislation, statutory directives, or guidelines?

2) Formulation of Measurement and Reporting Procedures: Goals are given operational substance by the establishment of measures to evaluate management performance. The issues here are: the relevance and quality of the measurements, the form in which

this information is presented, and who gets the information?

3) Governance: Public Inputs into Operating Decisions:

In most public enterprises, the elected government usually has a variety of formal and informal means of influencing day-to-day operating decisions. The enterprise's various constituencies also have such means. The important issues here are: Whose interests are made known to the Board? How and at what point in the decision-making process are they made known? What influence do they actually exert on the institution's operating decisions?

4) Operating Sanctions: What can an elected government do if it is dissatisfied with the results the management of a publicly-capitalized enterprise achieves? The most frequently available formal sanctions are the replacement of management and the withholding of funds from the agency. There are informal sanctions as well, such as publicity of mismanagement.

In the case of dismissal of management, the issues are: How and for what reasons can management be removed?

In the case of control of funds, some of the issues are: The source of funds and the conditions on which they are provided, who controls the funds once they are pooled for agency use, and the conditions under which the sanction of withholding funds can be exercised?

At each of the four stages, democratic elements of the

process must be traded off against the operating requirements of an efficient investment bank, i.e., the ability to make independent investment decisions and effect those decisions in a timely and flexible manner.

At each stage, outside control can range from zero to a level at which the operations of the agency are totally disrupted. Each level of control is characterized by a set of costs and benefits. In reviewing the four stages outlined above, we will present examples of mechanisms which have been used. They will be ranked from lowest to highest by the degree to which they effect management's deviation from standard commercial investment criteria. Finally, we will begin to suggest the nature and incidence of the costs and benefits of each strategy examined.

A. Setting of Goals and Priorities

Historically, the determination of goals and their definition in legislation has been the least important element in the accountability structure of public enterprise. In terms of enabling legislation itself, provisions for capitalization, organizational powers and management selection have had a much greater impact on the performance of these enterprises. The outcome of informal political and economic power struggles among the enterprises' various constituencies and principals has been more important to the active operation of development banks.

The goals of public banks are found in the opening sections of their enabling legislation. Seldom, however, do they represent the results of legislative deliberation. Bills are generally drafted by individuals who have some interest in the successful and continuing operation of the entity they are creating, and legislative attention is usually directed toward the operational aspects of the draft. In a few cases, the goals and objectives of development banks have been publicly debated, but, as in the case of the Canada Development Corporation, this does not assure that the public interest will be served.

The legislated purposes of most public enterprises tend to be more exhortatory than directive, legalisms intended to justify the use of public funds. In the case of authorities producing a good or service, the purpose is to do so efficiently; in the case of a public investment bank, it is to encourage the development of productive enterprise in the jurisdiction.

There are good reasons for leaving the statement of purpose vague, which have to do mainly with the legislative process: It is easier to build legislative consensus, easier to change operational direction to fit changing economic conditions, and harder to make small changes in language as the bill proceeds to enactment which substantially changes the intent.

Still, attempts have been made to formulate goals so that

they are useful as guideposts to management and criteria for managerial performance. Usually this entails relating goals to specific measurable achievements and administrative procedures in the legislation.

In most cases, the legislated goals of public enterprises or banks have had little bearing on their actual operations. This condition breaks down into two sets of conceptually separable experiences: In the first, management has found it convenient as well as legally and politically possible to evade its statement of purpose, undertaking operations for which the institution was not designed or refusing to undertake mandated functions. In the second, the statement of purpose has been so vague or founded on faulty analysis that the management has effectively been given a free hand.

Examples of the first type of experience occur most frequently in public authorities providing a good or service. Instances of selective adherence to statement of purpose arise in the history of the Port of New York Authority (PNYA). Established in 1921, the PNYA was charged with "developing terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce." After a decade of unsuccessfully and unprofitably attempting to rationalize rail-sea connections, the Authority was allowed to acquire three motor vehicle bridges and the Holland Tunnel from other authorities.

These facilities were highly successful financially, and the Authority justified their continuing ownership of the bridges by claiming the revenues they generated were necessary to meet Authority bond contracts.

The PNYA used this same tactic in reverse in the Fifties and Sixties to resist public pressure to assume the ownership and management of the region's undercapitalized and unprofitable commuter rail system. Maintaining that the projected deficits of such operations would prevent them from executing bond contracts in good faith, the Authority's management withstood this pressure to undertake its mandated purpose for over a decade. A compromise was reached in the late Sixties when the Authority took over the most heavily-used portion of the commuter network in return for the approval of the Governor of New Jersey to use PNYA funds to build the World Trade Center. Many analysts view the Center as a speculative real estate transaction only peripherally related to the Authority's purposes. The commitment of substantial funds to the Center has in turn precluded the Authority's taking a significant role in the rail lines.

A similar instance can be found in the now-infamous case of Robert Moses' Triborough Bridge Authority. Its legislated purposes were solely to construct and operate the Triborough Bridge until it was paid off. However, through the imaginative use of

bonding power, bond contract drafting and the subtle use of clauses in the powers sections, the Authority's life and latitude in operations were enormously extended.

The statement of purpose for most public development banks fall into the second category outlined above: they are too inclusive to effectively direct managerial policy. The Canada Development Corporation is a prime case in point. In the CDC profile we noted how management's interpretation of the Corporation's goals threatened the achievement of the public purposes of the institution. This interpretation was permitted, however, by the CDC Act's statement of corporation objectives. These read:

"The objects of the company are;

- a) to assist in the creation or development of businesses, resources, properties and industries of Canada;
 - b) to expand, widen and develop opportunities for Canadians to participate in the economic development of Canada through the application of their skills and capital;
 - c) to invest in the shares or securities of any corporation owning property or carrying on business related to the economic interests of Canada; and
 - d) to invest in ventures or enterprises including the acquisition of property likely to benefit Canada;
- and shall be carried out in anticipation of profit and in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole."

These objects permit virtually any investment activity so long as it is profitable. They offer no priorities. More

importantly, only in the case of expanding investment opportunities do they provide an occasion for the application of quantitative measurements to some recognized standard of achievement. CDC's financial participation has led to the creation of only one new enterprise so far and has done little to open up investment opportunities for the greater number of Canadians. Yet this result is perfectly compatible with the Corporation's goals.

The British National Enterprise Board's statutory purposes, while broadly stated, are more amenable to measurement than CDC's and could thus become the basis of an accountability process. The purposes of the Board, as listed in the Industry Act of 1975, are:

- "a) to develop or assist the economy of the UK (or any part of the UK),
- b) to promote industrial efficiency and international competitiveness; and
- c) to provide, maintain or safeguard productive employment."

The first purpose is so broad as to accommodate any action the Board wishes to take within its extensive powers. The second two, however, are expressions of economic phenomena for which accepted empirical measurements exist. Industrial efficiency can be measured by cross-national comparisons of costs within sectors and the changes in profitability of individual firms; international

competitiveness by changes in the volume of export sales. The provision or maintenance of employment is similarly measurable, with differing degrees of sophistication.

The Community Development Finance Corporation Act goes one step beyond providing measurable goals by relating the goals to a specific set of problems described in the Act. Thus, the bill performs a clarifying function usually reserved to committee reports, and reduces the possibility of misinterpreting the goals in their implementation. The essential elements of the findings preceding the statement of purpose are:

- 1) that a substantial and persistently low level of employment and economic activity exists within certain areas of the state;
- 2) that it is beyond the ability of the government to correct these conditions solely through the exercise of regulatory power;
- 3) that it is beyond the ability of the private sector to counter these tendencies without capital assistance;
- 4) that Community Development Corporations have made substantial improvements in these areas, but cannot continue to do so without public provision of investment funds.

These findings all point directly to the purpose of the institution, which is to "increase the number of development projects in decadent substandard and blighted areas" through the agency of CDCs. The findings also militate against any alternative reading of the Act which might permit evasion of the administrative procedures outlined in the Act.

Such a specific set of findings, tied to specific objectives,

administrative procedures and reporting requirements, is one way of making the legislation statement of goals more meaningful.

F. Formulation of Measurement and Reporting Procedures

Public accounting is an essential element of governmental control over the activities of a public enterprise. This exposure forces management to keep operations in line with what is expected of them, and this pressure can work in anticipation of government censure as well as retrospectively.

Overseers of the Alaska Permanent Fund are interested in the social as well as financial achievements of the institution. On the financial side, public enterprise must be held to the highest standards of financial disclosure now universally applied to private enterprise. On the other hand, universally recognized measurement and reporting procedures have not yet been developed for social impacts. Many of the items presented for consideration by Singer and Mollenkopf in "After the Oil is Gone" are not amenable to quantification or comparison with unlike outcomes. This problem is treated in that useful paper, and we will not discuss it further here. Rather, we will note some practices used by some development banks to measure non-financial results, and comment on their appropriateness to the Permanent Fund.

Finally, accounts are inherently incomplete in that they

show only what has already happened--and not always very accurately. If an institution is expending public money, it should be concerned with the social choices it faces and present these choices to its overseers. We will look at some of the attempts public investment banks have used to address this problem through cost-benefit analysis and various other types of projection techniques and discuss their applicability to contemplated Permanent Fund operations.

Financial Reporting

Given the geographic and cultural distance from the institutions we have noted, it is difficult to evaluate the accuracy or fairness with which they represent their performance in annual reports. It must be noted, however, that management of public as well as private firms is motivated to present its accomplishments in the most favorable light.

What, then, is presented besides the usual balance sheet, income and expense statement, and report of changes in capital? One of the most important and useful parts of the annual report, usually required by national corporation laws, is separate reports on the activities of subsidiaries, major loan recipients or subdivisions. Consolidated financial records may conceal cross-subsidations, multiple accounting of depreciation of a given

asset and, most importantly, the true cause of poor performance, whatever it may be. This has been the case with the Small Business Administration's loan guarantee program. For years, the high loss rate of this program had been attributed by the SBA to instability in the small business sector. Investigation of the program by the General Accounting Office, however, revealed that poor administration and intentional disregard of program guidelines were responsible for a large percentage of loan losses.

For the most part, the degree of detail in the reports varies by who gets them. Usually the funding source has privileged access. For example, the report of agency financial operations in Connecticut Development Authority bond prospectuses are much more thorough and scrupulous than the report which goes to the Commissioner of Commerce. Similarly, the British Cabinet Secretary overseeing the operations of the National Enterprise Board may requisition all operating records. Generally, the legislature and the public must accept annual reports prepared by the enterprise and occasional ad hoc investigative reports as their sole sources of information on the financial activities of the enterprise. In the institutions we have noted, these vary greatly in the detail and usefulness of disclosure--from vague accounts for CDC, to quite detailed accounts for NEB.

Social Reporting

Few of the investment banks reviewed make any use of social performance accounting. CDC, NEB, and EIB make no specific provisions for reporting even easily measurable social indices such as total employment of the firms in which they invest. NEB lists environmental impact and encouragement of worker participation in management as criteria for investment, but they provide no benchmarks, measurements or reporting schedule by which to evaluate projects, prospectively or retrospectively, along these dimensions. The Connecticut Development Authority reports total employment of the firms it finances, but this is an utterly inadequate measure of its performance in creating or maintaining jobs. As with all expenditures of publicly-raised funds, it is the marginal addition to some stock (such as employment) rather than the gross size of that stock which is the barometer of performance. Proposed CDFC economic impact indices, described in that institution's profile, are somewhat more sophisticated but still do not address the "with/without" problem in evaluating the benefits of social programs. In other words, would any of the benefits have been realized anyway even if CDFC had not made the investment?

Projections

Projections are necessary to evaluate investment projects,

especially when there are several competing for the same pool of funds. CDFC is contemplating a simple projection procedure: applying its social accounting procedures to the business plan projections of investment applicants. Thus CDFC will have a two-track set of projections--for both financial and social returns, both of which will be subject to post audit.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

More elaborate methods of project evaluation have been developed by the World Bank and its national affiliates. These address the divergence of market and social valuations of the costs and benefits which can be anticipated from various large-scale capital investment projects. These divergences are usually caused by such factors as monopoly domination of markets, state regulations and externalities. The method is essentially one of cost-benefit analysis in which all quantities are reduced to monetary terms, as described in John Mollenkopf's paper.

These types of analysis are expensive due to their enormous requirements for data and skilled analysis. Therefore, they are usually applied only to large projects such as capital-intensive industrial plants or infrastructure which require massive fixed investments. There are some institutional benefits to offset these expenses. Such studies are usually carried out by consultants

in cooperation with local officials and managers. Thus, some permanent, resident expertise in this kind of analysis can be developed. Also, data developed for one study may be used to analyze subsequent projects.

In summary, again, the record to date of detailed financial reporting by development banks is mixed, at best, and social indices are virtually nonexistent.

C. Governance: Public Inputs into Operating Decisions

The most important factors affecting the results achieved by public enterprises have been the structure and dynamics of the day-to-day decision-making. For each institution reviewed, there has been a complex web of attachments, interests and attitudes which are brought to bear on each type of operating decision. For each institution these circumstances are different.

We can begin to analyze this experience by identifying the groups of players involved in the operation of all public enterprises and the nature of the relationships between the groups. We will then explore examples of these relationships, focusing on elements of democratic or at least pluralistic control.

The four basic groups with whom we are concerned are:

- 1) Elected officials and their appointed ministers or secretaries: This group is usually (but not always) statutorily

responsible for the oversight of the public enterprise. Their degree of involvement in day-to-day activities of the enterprise is slight--generally by design. After all, the enterprise's very existence is premised on its carrying out social purposes without the full expenditure of effort by the government itself. Elected and appointed officials are lumped together here because their tenures tend to be coterminous.

2) The Board of Directors is usually the ultimate authority for all decisions concerning the sources and uses of funds and setting the overall strategy for the enterprise. They generally serve finite, overlapping terms which may or may not be renewable.

3) The Professional Staff carries out the policies of the Board, policies which they generally propose to the Board. Their initiative in promotion and competence in administration has the single greatest impact on the overall performance of the enterprise. Generally, they prepare the analyses on which the Board makes its decisions. Their attachments to the enterprise tend to be of longer standing than any of the other groups, a situation which enhances their power considerably. Also, they are closest to the enterprise's constituencies at all levels of decision.

4) Constituents: By constituents we mean those groups in the general public which have organized, regular dealings with the enterprise. These groups include firms which do business

with the enterprise either as clients or as providers of goods and services, citizen action groups, community development corporations, labor unions, etc.

The important relationships among these groups are:

a) Elected Government to the Board: Who appoints the Board? How is the tenure of the Board related to that of government officials? Are there government officials with voting power on the Board? Are there required consultations between members of the government and the Board?

b) Constituents to the Board: How are the interests of constituents represented to or on the Board?

c) Professional Staff to Board and Constituents: Whose interests does the staff tend to promote? Are they under effective control by anyone?

Relationship of the Government to the Board

With the comic exception of some of Robert Moses' one-member authorities, the Boards of public enterprises are appointed by the Chief Executives of the political jurisdictions in which they operate. The Chairman, if he is designated as such by the Chief Executive, generally serves at that official's pleasure and is often a cabinet member. Such is the case with most state development authorities. As pointed out in the CDA profile, this

situation carries costs as well as benefits. In addition to the benefits of coordination of Authority activity with executive promotional and overall economic policy, staff may be pressured to undertake loans which are politically useful, but financially unsound. In Maine, for instance, the Commissioner of Commerce, as Chairman of the Main Guarantee Authority, pushed through the approval of a guarantee on a \$12 million loan to a sugar beet processing factory. This enterprise quickly went bankrupt, and the state was able to recover only 15 percent of its money through liquidation. It was later discovered that the Commissioner of Commerce had financial connections to the project.

This situation (of top staff being subordinated to the Board) is reversed at the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which services the metropolitan Boston area. There, the five-man Board is chaired by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who serves at the pleasure of the Governor. The other four directors serve simultaneous four-year terms coterminous with the Governor's. Their powers are limited and mostly advisory. Massachusetts' Secretary of Transportation, who framed these regulations, justified the authority structure by claiming it was necessary to provide "a stronger basis for holding the Commonwealth's chief executive accountable to the legislature and the people of the region and state for the use of the state funds for

the MBTA." This provision does make the CEO an easy target in times of crises. On the other hand, it tends to strengthen the Governor's ability to direct the agency when public attention is not directed towards it.

In Europe, especially in France, government representatives on the boards of public and mixed enterprises are generally granted veto power over Board decisions involving the raising or expenditure of capital. This power has usually been used to delay the implementation of controversial decisions until they can be worked out between the management of the enterprise and its supervising Ministry.

The relationship between the government and the public enterprise can take other forms. For instance, these might consist of required consultations for various types of transactions or activities, the submission of reports and auditing by some agency within the government designed specifically for that purpose. In general, these controls are seldom exercised. They do not play an important role in the operations of any of the institutions reviewed except the NEB. The relationship between NEB and the Secretary of State for Industry is described extensively in that institution's profile.

Relationship of Constituencies to the Board

The interests of an enterprise's constituencies are most effectively represented to the Board by direct membership on it. Frequently, the distribution of directors among constituencies is dictated by the enabling legislation. This is not the case with CDC, and all 19 of its voting members are business executives. Certainly this provides no counterbalance to the profit-maximizing policies of that institution's management.

The distribution of Board membership is usually designed to accommodate political conflicts which are anticipated to arise in the operation of the enterprise. Thus the NEB, which is charged with making nationalized industries more efficient, is composed of six representatives of business firms, three representatives of labor unions, and an economic consultant. Similarly, the Board of CDPC is composed of three cabinet secretaries, two financiers, three representatives of community development corporations, and a representative of organized labor.

While such an approach to Board composition seems to be a logical strategy for dealing with political conflict, the record of this strategy has been ambiguous or worse. In Yugoslavia, where workers, union officials, management and consumers' representatives sit on the Boards of industrial enterprises, most observers report that management practices have not changed signif-

icantly in the directions desired by the workers. In Germany, the similar Mitbestimmung system has long been recognized as an instrument for the cooptation of labor. The record to date of non-expert representation on the Boards of development banks is, unfortunately, filled with more hope than effect.

The Role of Staff

The staff of a public enterprise generally outlasts its directors. Like most bureaucracies, it tends to operate in its own best interest. This is an area of public affairs which is virtually undocumented, but Jameson Doig's article on the PNYA provides some substance for the average social scientist's suspicions.

The Authority's top management is appointed by the Board and can serve indefinite terms. During the Sixties, the average length of company experience among the top staff officers was 30 years.

Realizing the threat to PNYA solvency posed by public pressure to acquire commuter lines, Doig reports that the staff orchestrated an elaborate resistance which included lobbying of the state legislatures, both directly and through favored contractors, wide-scale publicity campaigns and influencing a purportedly independent study committee formed by the state legislature to investigate the problem.

Such overreaching may be countered by the imposition of civil service or other personnel and conduct regulations on the staff. This tactic has its costs, since sufficiently skilled personnel will not be attracted by civil service salary scales and may be put off by complicated hiring procedures. The Connecticut Development Authority has experienced this difficulty. So has SBA in much more severe fashion. The real power in SBA resides in the regional officer positions, which are appointive. The regional financial officers may override loan decisions made at lower levels. Lately, there have been several documented cases of political uses of SBA funds by persons in the regional offices over the objections of the district level loan officers.

Professional staff competence is the most important element in determining the performance, financial and otherwise, of all the development banks reviewed for this report. For the most part, the top staff consists of men experienced in banking who have been able to transfer their experience and judgment to the public sector with considerable financial success. In general, they tend to reject the idea of being bound by the social consequences of their investments, claiming the institution will accomplish nothing unless it maintains its financial credibility. Statements to this effect have been made publicly and privately by the executive directors of CDC and CDA. The directors of EIB

and NEB have explicitly pledged themselves to the accomplishment of social goals, such as the rationalizing of industry and the provision of employment opportunities. So far, however, they have not discovered a framework for bending their organization's energies to those purposes.

D. Operating Sanctions

There are essentially two types of operating sanctions which can be imposed on the management of a public enterprise. One is the removal of responsible personnel; the other is the control of the flow of funds to the enterprise. These sanctions are imposed only after an enterprise's problems have reached crisis proportions.

Removal of Personnel

In public enterprises, the government can remove Directors only, usually only for cause. Where such action has been taken or threatened, it has usually been in response to evidence of financial failure or personal abuse of corporate power on the part of Directors. This is the case with current investigations of the private use of Authority facilities by Directors of the PNYA. Edward King, former Chairman of the Board of the Massachusetts Port Authority, was removed by Governor Dukakis for policy reasons. King had been openly antagonistic towards citizens' groups seeking

a noise-prevention curfew on Logan Airport, which was one of the key factors. This is, however, the exception that proves the rule.

Control of Funds

There are two basic types of capitalization for public enterprises. One is essentially private. Investment funds are raised through the sale of securities backed by the revenues of the bank and often guaranteed or leveraged by the tax revenues of the political unit of which it is a subdivision. The second is the direct provision of tax revenues to the enterprise under various conditions set by the government. Our investigation provides no clear indication of which type of financing is the most effective in holding an enterprise financially or socially accountable. However, we will review the evidence before us for each type.

Private Market Finance

The experience of PNYA and the commuter lines has demonstrated that reliance on the bond market--even the claim of such a reliance--can be used by an Authority to delay or refuse action on a potentially desirable and widely demanded social project.

On the other hand, recent experience of public authorities has discredited the frequently-heard claim that dependence on the

bond market imposes "market discipline" on the management of public enterprise. For example, by the time the New York state legislature refused to bail out the Urban Development Corporation in February of 1975, the agency had run up over a billion dollars in debt it could not cover from operating revenue. It was estimated that the state would have to put up \$240 to \$320 million simply to complete projects UDC had left unfinished. Investors had counted on the political power of UDC's management and had largely ignored its internal finances once the Corporation had been cleared by the rating agencies. The arbitrariness of this particular system is well-documented by John Peterson in The Rating Game.

Still, the use of bonds can work and can effectively redistribute capital if the institution is prudently managed. This is the case of the European Investment Bank and B.C. Central, whose financial operations are described in the profiles section. CDA's Umbrella Bond Program is another good example of the redistributive possibilities of using private market finance. Here, the Authority performs the function of evaluating the prospective risk and return of lending to small- and medium-sized firms for institutional and individual investors in market securities. It has thus opened up a hitherto untapped source of funds for its borrowers. Ultimately, the market discipline of this system is under-

mined by the extensive backing the state offers the program. Its success to date has been due primarily to high-quality management.

Financing Through Tax Revenues

Control over the provision of state revenues to public investment banks ranges from nil to finicky. At the bottom of the scale is CDC, to whom the Canadian government has provided a block initial capitalization of nearly \$300 million. This policy has assured CDC's virtual freedom from any type of control or accountability.

At the upper end of the scale, NEB's investment funds are provided on an annual basis, and their release must be justified to the Secretary by three-year plans covering both financial and non-financial aspects of the firms designated to receive funds. So far, the Secretary's office has shown little regard for the social aspects of NEB-financed enterprise.

The Small Business Administration relies on periodic Congressional appropriations to finance its lending and guarantee operations. This method of funding imposes costs in that it is cumbersome and time-consuming. Theoretically, it should yield benefits in terms of increased oversight of agency operations. However, the sheer number of loans SBA makes and the complexity of the decentralized administration of the program have made

Congressional oversight impossible. As we have noted, as late as 1974 it was assumed by the SBA's observers that its high loss rate on guaranteed loans was due to chronic instability in the small business sectors. A 1975 study of a large sample of SBA loan records revealed that many guarantees were made for reasons other than to finance the expansion of small business facilities. Over 20 percent of the loans guaranteed were used to pay off existing debt, and of these about one-quarter were to firms which did not meet minimum standards of creditworthiness.

Contrasting the NEB and SBA experiences, one might reasonably conclude that executive oversight may be more rigorous than legislative oversight.

CDFC's capitalization demonstrates a compromise between the lack of control inherent in CDC's capitalization and the complex, potentially disruptive day-to-day supervision of NEB's flow of investment funds. CDFC has been granted a modest, non-renewable sum of \$10 million which it may use as it sees fit within the administrative process laid out in the legislation. The legislature, in providing this form of capitalization, has essentially recognized the experimental nature of the program. If this experiment turns out to be successful, on financial, political, or social terms, the state legislature may choose to augment the original capitalization. The technical details and consequences of CDFC's capitalization are fully explained in its profile.

The problem with most financial sanctions is that they come into play only after the damage of mismanagement has been done. Continuous governmental control over an enterprise's flow of funds imposes costs in terms of limiting public bank's investing flexibility. The benefits, in terms of use of funds which corresponds to government policy or statutory mandate, have not yet materialized in practice.

E. Conclusion

The problem of holding public enterprises accountable for their performance is largely unsolved. Total accountability is neither possible nor efficient; public supervision itself is costly, and it can damage as well as promote performance in the public interest. The contribution of specific institutional structures and prescribed administrative procedures is largely unpredictable.

The workings of accountability systems is further complicated by the fact that public enterprises themselves control information on plans and operations. Past experience has shown that concerned officials have had to undertake extraordinary measures to get enough information to understand what is really going on in these enterprises. If this kind of vigilance were constantly maintained, the purpose of having the public enterprise

would be undermined. Generally, public enterprises are set up to relieve the government of a portion of the costs of administering some area of responsibility which, like assistance to productive economic activity, should generate enough surplus to finance the institutions set up to pursue this purpose.

On the financial side, the success of public banks has depended for the most part on the honesty and competence of their staff. Most public financial institutions rank high on these dimensions when compared to state-owned industrial or service firms. A set of acknowledged reporting conventions and simple criteria of success exist for the financial operations of public banks. These have been developed in the private sector and transferred intact, through the importation of management, to the operations of public financial institutions. As assets and profits mount, management's position becomes more secure, its decisions less open to question and influence by the government and its various constituencies.

On the other hand, public banks have been relatively unsuccessful in taking the social consequences of their activity into account. It must be said that they face substantial problems in doing so even if they are committed to the effort. First, reporting conventions and performance criteria are at a primitive stage of development and are subject to a great deal of controversy.

Second, management tends to be unfamiliar with what has been done in the field.

Social costs and benefits generated by an enterprise are distinguished from the phenomena that show up in its balance sheets mostly because they are not given a money value in the market. Still, the realization of these benefits or the minimization of costs requires that money be spent or that certain income-generating activities be restricted. This is a form of redistribution of the economic product of the enterprise which requires a political decision on the form the benefits and costs are to take and how they are to be distributed.

Therefore, the Permanent Fund must provide a forum in which the range of choices can be exposed and conflicting interests heard. It must then provide a means by which to assure that the decisions reached are carried out, especially when this implies a deviation from conventional commercial practice. Here the record of public enterprise is, to date, unfortunately quite uninformative. In such an enterprise, the framers of the Alaska Permanent Fund must follow their state's tradition; they must be pioneers.