# PROJECT CHOICES, COMMITMENTS & MIDSTREAM OPTIONS

#### Prepared for Senate Resources Committee Juneau, Alaska > February 3, 2014

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# SB138/HOA/MOU: IMPORTANT STEP IN A LONG PROCESS

Upstream	Delineate resource base, certify reserves, define production plan		
Midstream	Define pipeline path, secure right-of-way, environmental permits		
Liquefaction	Define project size, processing / gas quality, project structure		
Shipping	Decide whether to own, lease or outsource shipping to buyers		
Marketing	Define commercialization plan, secure buyers, sign contracts		
Financing	Define financing plan, secure in-house and third-party lending		
Permitting	Secure permits to construct facility, export gas		
Partners conduct front-end engineering and design studies (pre-FEED and FEED)			
They then sign engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts			
Construction starts with final investment decision (FID); usually less than 10% of CAPEX spent before FID			



## SB138/HOA/MOU: DESIRED PATH BUT MUCH STILL OPEN





## LNG PROJECTS EVOLVE: QC LNG (AUSTRALIA) CASE STUDY

	<b>FEED (JULY 2008)</b>	FID (OCTOBER 2010)	<b>JANUARY 2014</b>
Size	One train: 3-4 mmtpa Expandable to 12 mmtpa	Two trains 8.5 mmtpa	Two trains 8.5 mmtpa
Upstream	BG owned 9.9% of QGC and 20% of QGC's coal-bed methane in Surat Basin	All BG except CNOOC 5% and Tokyo Gas 1.25% in parts of Surat Basin	Gas from AP LNG; Same as FID plus CNOOC 25% in Surat and Bowen Basin
Liquefaction	T1: BG 70%, QGC 30%	T1: BG 90%, CNOOC 10% T2: BG 97.5%, Tokyo Gas 2.5%	T1: BG 50%, CNOOC 50% T2: BG 97.5%, Tokyo Gas 2.5% T3: CNOOC option for 25%
Off-take*	BG Group: 100%	CNOOC: 3.6 mmtpa* Tokyo Gas: 1.2 mmtpa* BG Group: balance	CNOOC: 8.6 mmtpa* Tokyo Gas: 1.2 mmtpa* Chubu Electric: ~0.6 mmtpa*
External Financing			JBIC: 175 mn to Tokyo Gas US EX-IM: \$1.8 billion

\* Off-take is supplemented by BG's global portfolio-not all LNG will come from Australia

SOURCE: BG GROUP DATABOOK 2008-2013 EDITIONS, INDUSTRY PRESS



#### HOW COULD ALASKA STRUCTURE THE MIDSTREAM?



### PATH OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)





PRODUCER-SOA	Minimize disputes over where value is allocated		
ALIGNMENT	Tariffs reflect value maximization across the entire chain		

THIRD-PARTYMidstream becomes an enabler for further exploration and developmentEXPANSIONExpansion principles favor development of additional transportation capacity

IN-STATEAlaskan consumers receive cost at the lowest cost possible (given adequateDELIVERIESreturns on investment)

**EXECUTION** Pipeline is delivered on time and at the lowest possible cost

CONTINUITY &Project maintains and accelerates current investment interest;MOMENTUMProject leverages work to date and is not delayed by possible litigation



## **PRODUCER ONLY: ALIGNMENT / EXPANSION WEAK POINTS**



X	PRODUCER-SOA Alignment	Significant potential for disputes over allocation of value, and optimal level for midstream tariff
X	THIRD-PARTY Expansion	Focus on commercializing producers' resources over gas belonging to third parties
X	IN-STATE Deliveries	Uncertain tariff for in-state deliveries (of SOA's gas)
$\checkmark$	EXECUTION	Strong and proven ability to execute, but midstream becoming less of a core focus for majors
?	Continuity & Momentum	Uncertainty about possibility of limitation and loss of work done to date



### **SOA EQUITY: MORE EXPANSION BIAS BUT BURDEN ON SOA**





**PRODUCERS + STATE OF ALASKA + 3RD PARTY** 

**PRODUCERS + STATE OF ALASKA** 

## MOU: EXPANSION BIAS & MOMENTUM; BUT BEST DEAL?

#### Strong alignment between producers and SOA; capital structure for rate-setting purposes **PRODUCER-SOA** $\checkmark$ appears within norm, but unclear if new bidding could have produced lower tariff ALIGNMENT **THIRD-PARTY** TransCanada will be advocate for a project structure that encourages expansion and will have $\sqrt{\sqrt{}}$ incentive to drive expansion of the infrastructure based on market interest **EXPANSION IN-STATE** SOA can use its equity-entitled capacity to carry gas to local markets at lower cost; pro- $\sqrt{\sqrt{}}$ **DELIVERIES** expansion bias further incentivizes possible in-state deliveries TransCanada brings execution knowhow and expertise, while producers reinforce cost discipline **EXECUTION** $\checkmark$ (to ensure lowest possible tariff) CONTINIIITY ନ Project maintains and accelerates investment interest and leverages work done to date $\checkmark$ MOMENTUM



**MIDSTREAM** 

– LEVERAGE AGIA (TRANSCANADA)

# BID: WILL REWARD COMPENSATE FOR COST IN TIME AND \$?

#### MIDSTREAM

√/?

**PRODUCER-SOA** 

ALIGNMENT

PRODUCERS + STATE OF ALAS

PRODUCERS + STATE OF ALASKA + 3RD PARTY

- LEVERAGE AGIA (TRANSCANADA)

FRMINATE AGIA & LAUNCH RID

#### Strong alignment between producers and SOA; new bid could lead to a lower tariff, but it could also lead to a higher one; low investor interest could also slow down entire process Third party will have incentive to drive expansion of the infrastructure based on market interest,

- THIRD-PARTY EXPANSION
   Third party will have incentive to drive expansion of the infrastructure based on market interest, but would likely have less influence over current negotiations
   IN-STATE SOA can use its equity-entitled capacity to carry gas to local markets at lower cost; pro-
  - **DELIVERIES** expansion bias further incentivizes possible in-state deliveries
  - EXECUTION
     Third party would presumably bring execution knowhow and expertise, while producers would reinforce cost discipline (to ensure lowest possible tariff)
  - CONTINUITY &
     Uncertainty about possibility of limitation and loss of work done to date; HOA negotiations could

     MOMENTUM
     slow down in anticipation of new bidding process and license award



# SOA NEEDS TO CAREFULLY WEIGH KEY QUESTIONS

What compensation might the SOA have to pay and what intellectual property will Alaska LNG retain? Will the HOA process slow down if the midstream is tied in litigation?

What are the odds that a new selection process will deliver better terms than those available today? To what extent was the AGIA process representative of the industry's interest in an Alaskan pipeline? *Would a new tariff offset absence from negotiating table; reduced momentum; cost to dissolve AGIA?* 

	PRODUCERS	PRODUCERS + State of Alaska	PRODUCERS + State of Alaska + Transcanada	PRODUCERS + State of Alaska + 3rd Party
PRODUCER-SOA ALIGNMENT	×	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	√/?
THIRD-PARTY EXPANSION	×	?	$\sqrt{}$	$\checkmark$
IN-STATE DELIVERIES	×	$\checkmark$	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$
EXECUTION	$\checkmark$	√/?	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
CONTINUITY & MOMENTUM	?	?	$\checkmark$	×





# **APPENDICES**

- FUNDAMENTALS OF LNG BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS FOR ALASKA
- NATURAL GAS MARKET OUTLOOK

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Before co-founding *en*alytica, Janak led the Upstream Analytics team at PFC Energy, focusing on fiscal terms analysis and project economic and financial evaluation, data management and data visualization.

Janak has modeled upstream fiscal terms in all of the world's major hydrocarbon regions, and has built economic and financial models to value prospective acquisition targets and develop strategic portfolio options for a wide range of international and national oil company clients. He has advised Alaska State Legislature for multiple years on reform of oil and gas taxation, providing many hours of expert testimony to Alaska's Senate and House Finance and Resources Committees.

Prior to his work as an energy consultant, Janak advised major minerals industry clients on a range of controversial environmental and social risk issues, from uranium mining through to human rights and climate change. He has advised bankers at Citigroup and policy-makers at the US Treasury Department on the management and mitigation of environmental and social impacts in major projects around the world, and has undertaken macroeconomic research with senior development economists at the World Bank and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Janak holds an MA with distinction in international relations and economics from from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a BA with first-class honors from the University of Adelaide, Australia.



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Nikos Tsafos has a diverse background in the private, public and non-profit sectors. He is currently a founding partner at *en*alytica. In his 7 ½ years with PFC Energy, Nikos advised the world's largest oil and gas companies on some of their most complex and challenging projects; he also played a pivotal role in turning the firm into one of the top natural gas consultancies in the world, with responsibilities that included product design, business development, consulting oversight and research direction.

Prior to PFC Energy, Nikos was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC where he covered political, economic, and military issues in the Gulf, focused on oil wealth, regime stability and foreign affairs. Before CSIS, he was in the Greek Air Force, and prior to his military service, Nikos worked on channeling investment from Greek ship-owners to Chinese shipyards.

Nikos has also written extensively on the domestic and international dimensions of the Greek debt crisis. His blog (Greek Default Watch) was listed as one of "Europe's Top Economic Blogs" by the Social Europe Journal, and his book "Beyond Debt: The Greek Crisis in Context" was published in March 2013.

Nikos holds a BA with distinction in international relations and economics from Boston University and an MA with distinction in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).



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