LEGAL SERVICES

DIVISION OF LEGAL AND RESEARCH SERVICES
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY
STATE OF ALASKA

(907) 465-3867 or 465-2450
FAX (907) 465-2029
Mail Stop 3101

State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182
Deliveries to: 129 6th St., Rm. 329

MEMORANDUM

January 25, 2010

SUBJECT: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
(Work Order No. 26-LS1367)

TO: Representative Jay Ramras
Attn: Jane Pierson

FROM: Alpheus Bullard
Legislative Counsel

You requested a legal analysis of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558 U.S. ___ (January 21, 2010), and its effect on Alaska law.

WHAT IS MOST SIGNIFICANT

The Court held that the government cannot suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.

WHAT THE DECISION DOES NOT DO

This is a case about independent election campaign expenditures made by corporations. Because one of the statutes involved in this case and considered by the Court concerned labor unions, it also, arguably, is a case about independent election campaign expenditures made by labor unions, though that is not made explicit in the opinion. Laws regulating corporate and union contributions to candidates, party committees, and political action committees, whether direct or in-kind, are not directly affected by the ruling. Disclosure and disclaimer requirements for communications relating to elections for public office and laws requiring corporations and unions to identify the sources of money for their political activities are also unaffected.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The case involved a documentary critical of the then potential presidential candidacy of Hillary Clinton. The documentary, "Hillary: The Movie," was produced by Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation. Anticipating that it would make the documentary available within a time period prohibited under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),[1] Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United

---

[1] 2 U.S.C. § 431 *et seq.* (also known as the McCain-Feingold Act (Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81)).

States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to prevent the Federal Election Commission (FEC) from enforcing provisions of the BCRA.[2] Citizens United argued that § 203 of the BCRA[3] violated the First Amendment on its face and as applied to the documentary and its related advertisements, and that §§ 201[4] and 311[5] of the Act, relating to disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements were, as applied to the documentary, also unconstitutional.

The United States District Court denied the injunction, holding that under § 203 of the BCRA the documentary could not be shown on television in the 30 day period preceding the 2008 Democratic primaries. The court held that the BCRA prohibitions against corporate independent expenditures were constitutional, reasoning that the question had been answered by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).[6] The United States District Court held that the documentary had no other purpose than to discredit Hillary Clinton and inform viewers that she was unfit for public office, and thus the provision of the BCRA relating to electioneering communications

---

[2] Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commission, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).

[3] Section 203 of the BCRA regulates "electioneering communications." Generally, these are broadcast, cable, or satellite communications made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). Section 203 restricts corporations (other than media corporations) and labor organizations from funding electioneering communications from their general funds except under certain specific circumstances, e.g., get-out-the-vote campaigns. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).

[4] Under § 201 of the BCRA, persons who disburse an aggregate of $10,000 or more a year for the production and airing of electioneering communications are required to file a statement with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that includes the names and addresses of persons who have contributed in excess of $1,000 to accounts funding the communication. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) and (2).

[5] Under the BCRA's § 311, the entity paying for a communication that is not authorized by a candidate or the candidate's political committee, must include in the communication a statement that the organization "is responsible for the content of this advertising." See 2 U.S.C. § 441d.

[6] In McConnell, the United States Supreme Court upheld § 203 as facially constitutional, reasoning that the justifications for regulating independent corporate expenditures constituting express advocacy "apply equally" to ads that are "the functional equivalent of express advocacy." Id. at 206. The Court held that the regulation of such independent expenditures was acceptable because the government has a compelling interest in countering the kind of "corrosive and distorting effect" identified in Austin. Id. at 205.

was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, the court ruled that the Act's disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements were not unconstitutional as applied to the documentary or its advertisements.

Citizens United appealed the decision and the Supreme Court docketed the case on August 18, 2008,[7] hearing oral arguments on March 24, 2009. However, on June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to reargue the case on September 9 after submitting briefs on the larger questions of whether the Court should overrule Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)[8], that portion of McConnell 540 U.S. 93 (2003) that found § 203 of the BCRA to be facially valid, or both.

ANALYSIS

In Citizens United, 558 U.S. ___ (January 21, 2010), the Supreme Court considered (1) the validity of § 203 of the BCRA, which prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering communication"; (2) the Court's prior holding in Austin that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity; and (3) whether §§ 201 and 311 of the BCRA, which mandate disclaimer and disclosure requirements for Citizens United's ads, were constitutionally invalid.

Prohibitions on Independent Expenditures

The Court held that § 203 of the BCRA, which prohibits certain corporations and unions from using funds from their general treasuries[9] for certain independent expenditures made to influence the outcomes of elections for federal public office, was unconstitutional.[10] It

---

[7] Under § 403(a)(3) of the BCRA, the final decision of the district court in this case is "reviewable only by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States."

[8] In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan law that barred corporations from using their general treasury funds to support or oppose any state candidate, even though the spending occurred independently of that candidate's campaign operation.

[9] Prior to the ruling, to spend money on "electioneering communications" under federal law, corporations and unions were required to establish political action committees (PACS) that had a separate legal identity from the corporation or union. PACS could receive limited donations from employees, shareholders, or organization members. Now, after the Citizens United decision, corporations and unions may spend money directly from their treasuries on independent expenditures to influence elections for public office.

[10] While § 203 of the BCRA applied equally to corporations and unions, independent expenditures made by unions were not an issue before the Court, and it is not explicit in the ruling that the BCRA's independent expenditure prohibition is lifted for unions.

determined that prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures are an impermissible "ban on speech," id. at 22, and that political speech does not lose First Amendment protection "simply because its source is a corporation," id. at 26.[11]

The Court held that the case could not be decided in an examination of the relevant provisions of the BCRA alone, because the fundamental legal rationale underlying the challenged provisions of the Act was itself unjustified by a sufficient governmental interest.[12] The Court held that this rationale, identified in Austin, the prevention of "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas," id. at 660, is inconsistent with the protections offered speech and speakers by the First Amendment.[13]

Precedent Overturned

The Court overruled Austin, and those portions of McConnell that upheld the BCRA's restrictions on independent expenditures made by corporations and labor organizations. It did so holding that "no sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations[,]" and "[g]overnment may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 50.[14]

---

[11] Of less immediate consequence, in the absence of acknowledgement by the Court of any permissible First Amendment distinctions between corporate and natural persons, the case raises questions relating to whether corporations' newly realized equality under the First Amendment will affect (1) the constitutionality of existing prohibitions against corporate contributions to candidates in elections for public office and (2) other corporate related constitutional jurisprudence. These remain for future litigation.

[12] "When constitutional questions are 'indispensably necessary' to resolving the case at hand, 'the court must meet and decide them.'" Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. at 4 of Roberts, C.J. (concurring opinion), quoting Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11, 558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J.).

[13] The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ."

Given the Court's interpretation of the requirements of the First Amendment, existing distinctions between "express advocacy" versus "issue advocacy" and "independent expenditures" versus contributions to candidates are less clear. Citizens United does not address these distinctions, but the logic underlying the decision suggests that they may soon be revisited.

[14] In addition to overturning Austin, the Court dismissed arguments that independent corporate expenditures in elections for federal office give rise to corruption or its appearance (Citizens United at 41 - 45) and that the government has a compelling interest

Disclosure and Disclaimer Requirements
The Court upheld the BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements which were applied to the documentary (§§ 201 and 311 of the Act), holding that such requirements "may burden the ability to speak, but they 'impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,' [Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)] and 'do not prevent anyone from speaking,' McConnell, [540 U.S.] at 201." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 51. Citing Buckley and McConnell, the Court held that these requirements bear a substantial relation to the government's interest in ensuring that the electorate is able to evaluate the arguments to which it is being subjected, and that Citizens United did not demonstrate that the requirements imposed a chill on the organization's (or the organization's members') speech or expression. Id. at 51 - 56.

EFFECT ON ALASKA LAW
1. Under existing AS 15.13.067 (who may make expenditures in an election for candidates for elective office) and AS 15.13.135 (independent expenditures for or against candidates), only individuals, groups, and nongroup entities, as these terms are defined under AS 15.13.400, are permitted to make independent expenditures supporting or opposing candidates in elections under AS 15.13.[15] The terms "individual," "group," and "nongroup entity" are defined at AS 15.13.400. Together, these provisions effectively prohibit independent expenditures by for-profit corporations, and are likely to be interpreted by a court as unconstitutional in light of this decision.[16]

2. For-profit corporations are currently prohibited from making independent expenditures for or against candidates in elections under AS 15.13. Because of that, existing state statutes relating to (1) disclosure of expenditures, (2) limitations on expenditures, (3) identification of communications, and (4) filing of reports[17] under AS 15.13 do not currently account for independent expenditures and communications by for-profit corporations. Given the silence of our state statutes, and the likelihood that our existing

---

in regulating corporations' independent expenditures to protect dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech. (Citizens United at 46 - 47).

[15] Under AS 15.13.010(a), AS 15.13 applies to elections for governor, lieutenant governor, a member of the state legislature, a delegate to a constitutional convention, and a judge seeking judicial retention, and to elections for municipal office in municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 inhabitants unless the municipality has exempted itself from the provisions of the chapter.

[16] These statutes remain the law for the State of Alaska. If left unchanged, will they be enforced? The state could attempt to enforce them; however, enforcement would likely be quickly curtailed once the aggrieved party petitioned the state's courts.

[17] See AS 15.13.040, AS 15.13.082, AS 15.13.090, and AS 15.13.110.

statutes will not be enforced following the Court's holding in Citizens United, there are now no limits on independent expenditures made by for-profit corporations and no statutory disclosure, identification, or reporting requirements for these expenditures.

If I may be of further assistance, please advise.

TLAB:plm
10-035.plm