

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Patrice Lee <patricelee3294@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 28, 2026 2:50 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** Fwd: LNG Pipeline

Please enter my comments below into public testimony/public record regarding the proposed LNG project.

Thank you,

Patrice Lee

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Patrice Lee <[REDACTED]>  
**Date:** May 24, 2026 at 11:49:37 AM AKDT  
**To:** Sen.Lyman.Hoffman@akleg.gov, Sen.Donald.Olson@akleg.gov, sen.bert.stedman@akleg.gov, Sen.Kelly.Merrick@akleg.gov, "Sen. Kiehl" <sen.jesse.kiehl@akleg.gov>, Sen.James.Kaufman@akleg.gov, Sen.mike.cronk@akleg.gov  
**Cc:** Patrice Lee <patricelee3294@gmail.com>, "Sen. Scott Kawasaki" <Sen.Scott.Kawasaki@akleg.gov>, Sen.Robert.Meyers@akleg.gov, "Rep. Mike Prax" <Rep.Mike.Prax@akleg.gov>  
**Subject:** LNG Pipeline

Dear Senators,

Having degrees in science, served on the Board of the Interior Gas Utility, including Finance Chair, and having followed energy and its vital role in Alaska and the world, I have the following thoughts for your consideration:

- An LNG pipeline project divided into three parts, suggests the entire project is not economic.
- The last thing Alaskans need is billions of dollars invested in a "stranded asset" (gigantic pipeline) which could likely be an unfinished project, or one that counts on markets that are uncertain at best.
- With Putin's Russia gas line to China in play, how does that affect our potential market?
- How easy will it be for China to receive that gas and ally with other Asian nations to purchase it?
- More Asian nations are likely to consider China's gas because they either trust or fear China more than the U.S.
- President Trump's word is worthless in the world at this time. (His retribution may be on solid ground, but his word---not so much.
- Alaska should ship our North Slope Gas to the Port of Nome and use cutters and gas tankers to bring it to Anchorage and perhaps, then to Nikiski
- Cutters and tankers are not stranded assets. They can be re-purposed, are flexible in their intended purpose, can be sold, etc.

-Alaska needs a deep Geothermal project. Near Clear Space Force is an ideal location for a 100 MW project. The specks are available but have been buried in the rush to build the megadon pipeline that is the old way of doing things. 3 years, 200 million dollars-Clean Energy, way more affordable to build and for the cost of the energy. No more reliance on volatile markets, 100 years or more of baseload power.

Wind and solar should augment deep geothermal and a practical gas plan. Either buy gas in the short term from Kitimat or ship our North Slope Gas from Nome.

The boondoggle pipeline should not hamstring future generations of Alaskans for an essentially uncontracted scheme.

-Alaskan Communities should not have to give up their economic lifelines (taxes) to support this scheme.

Thank you,

Patrice R. Lee

[REDACTED]

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2026 12:59 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Support Alaska LNG and Move Forward Responsibly

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**From:** Tyson Kroon <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 23, 2026 8:37 AM  
**Subject:** Support Alaska LNG and Move Forward Responsibly

Alaska's future is in your hands. Games need to end, it is time to do what is right and necessary for best interest of Alaska. The people you represent are demanding action, the time is now.

I believe the Alaska LNG project is one of the most important economic and strategic opportunities our state has faced in decades.

I understand and appreciate the responsibility the legislature has to protect Alaska's long-term interests. I agree that transparency matters, that negotiations matter, and that Alaska should not simply "give away the farm" on a project of this scale. Prudence is important.

But I also believe Alaska has developed a dangerous pattern of delay, over-analysis, and political gridlock that has cost our state opportunity time and time again.

At some point there must be urgency alongside caution.

The argument that this project is "not economically viable" completely misses the broader picture. This is not just about a single spreadsheet calculation or whether every detail is finalized before momentum continues. This is about long-term energy security, economic stability, jobs, industrial growth, and Alaska's future relevance in the global economy.

Southcentral Alaska already faces growing concerns around future natural gas supply. We need the gas here at home regardless of exports. The export opportunity simply transforms a critical infrastructure need into a long-term economic engine for the state.

The impacts of a project like this would extend far beyond the pipeline itself. Construction jobs, engineering, transportation, manufacturing support, ports, housing, local businesses, long-term operations, and secondary economic activity would reverberate throughout Alaska for decades. Entire new layers of economic activity would emerge around a project of this scale.

People once questioned whether the original oil pipeline was economically viable as well. Had Alaska failed to move forward then, our state would look dramatically different today.

I am not asking the legislature to abandon oversight or accountability. I am asking you to recognize that delay carries risk too. Investors and global markets will not wait forever while Alaska debates itself into paralysis.

Please continue negotiating hard. Protect Alaska's interests. Demand accountability and transparency.

But also recognize the enormous cost of failing to move.

A perfect deal on a project that never gets built does not help Alaska's future. This project MUST move forward or we will continue to see Alaskans pack their bags and go where opportunity lives.

Respectfully,

Tyson Kroon  
Wasilla, Alaska

Thank you,

*Tyson Kroon*



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## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Chuck Casper <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 01, 2026 7:58 AM  
**To:** House Finance; Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** Tee's on the Gasline

Similar to the spur line to Fairbanks, please include the installation of Tee's for future off-take connections in consideration for the tax abatement. Specifically, Tee's on the gasline for future connections to small communities and industries.

Some example locations:

- Kaktovik, community.
- North Slope, proposed Stak Energy data center.
- Anaktuvuk Pass, community.
- Brooks Range, mining prospects.
- Livengood, mining prospects.
- Nenana, community and barge operations.
- Healy and McKinley Park, community and tourist facilities. Perhaps Tee at the Healy compressor station.
- Cantwell, community and nearby mining operations.
- Talkeetna, Trapper Creek, Sunshine (combined), communities and tourist operations. Perhaps Tee at the compressor station at the Rabideux Creek, or just south.
- And other likely areas of mineral development along the gasline route.

The EIS and FERC license noted that up to 35 communities could be served by the gasline. My understanding is that Spur Lines would be the responsibility of the distribution utility.

Timing is important. It is essential that the engineering for these Tee's be accomplished in advance of, and incorporated into construction. Shutting down flow in the gasline later to install a Tee is not an option. The normal process for future off-take's for the small communities and industries are unlikely to be developed enough, and in time, to attract or be developed into "Economically Capable Entities" (per Statute). It is conceivable that some of the investment decisions may take 5 to 10 years, or more to materialize.

For Visualization: Basically, an oversized plumbing Tee, probably including a valve and blind flange (cover), and positioned above ground.

FYI: I am a retired Civil Engineer, acting as an individual, not representing any company or group. I'm involved because I think it is the right thing to do.

Thanks!

Chuck Casper  
[REDACTED]

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** LIO Anchorage  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 30, 2026 2:52 PM  
**To:** House Finance; Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Testimony on IN OPPOSITION TO:HB 2001 / SB 2001 (Special Session Gas Pipeline Volumetric Tax Acts)HB 381 / SB 280 (Regular Session Companion Tax Exemption Legislation)

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**From:** alaskaleader <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 30, 2026 11:22 AM  
**To:** House Finance <House.Finance@akleg.gov>; Senate Finance Committee <Finance.Committee@akleg.gov>; LIO Anchorage <Lio.Anchorage@akleg.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Testimony on IN OPPOSITION TO:HB 2001 / SB 2001 (Special Session Gas Pipeline Volumetric Tax Acts)HB 381 / SB 280 (Regular Session Companion Tax Exemption Legislation)

i want to make it clear my goal is to attach that pdf public testimony to all 4 bills . can u confirm receipt and that this is done? thanks

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

On Saturday, May 30th, 2026 at 10:24 AM, alaskaleader <[alaskaleader@proton.me](mailto:alaskaleader@proton.me)> wrote:

please see attached PDF testimony in opposition to **IN OPPOSITION TO:**

- **HB 2001 / SB 2001** (Special Session Gas Pipeline Volumetric Tax Acts)
- **HB 381 / SB 280** (Regular Session Companion Tax Exemption Legislation) [1]

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** KC Casort <kcasort@alaska.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 30, 2026 12:50 PM  
**To:** House Finance; Senate Finance Committee; Rep. Ashley Carrick; Rep. Frank Tomaszewski; Sen. Mike Cronk; Rep. Maxine Dibert; Sen. Scott Kawasaki; Sen. Robert Myers; Rep. Will Stapp; Rep. Alyse Galvin; Rep. Rebecca Schwanke  
**Subject:** Oppose Massive Tax Breaks for AK LNG

Hello Representatives,

I am writing today to oppose HB 381, the proposed tax cuts for Glenfarne's LNG project. There are so many issues here, which I am sure you're aware of, from the lack of transparent budgeting, to the massive investment of public funds into a private for-profit project owned by non-Alaskans, to the math simply not adding up to benefit Alaskans in any way.

Frankly, if your mega-infrastructure project can't function without MASSIVE corporate welfare, it's not feasible. That's basic business.

Alaskans are suffering under extremely high energy bills and underfunded public services, especially public education. We cannot afford the proposed tax breaks, and Glenfarne has done nothing to earn them.

Please keep public dollars in public hands, serving Alaskans first. Please vote NO on HB 381 or whatever bill the tax breaks become during this wasteful special session.

Sincerely,

Kasey Casort  
Fairbanks, AK 99712

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** alaskaleader <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 30, 2026 11:22 AM  
**To:** House Finance; Senate Finance Committee; LIO Anchorage  
**Subject:** Re: Testimony on IN OPPOSITION TO:HB 2001 / SB 2001 (Special Session Gas Pipeline Volumetric Tax Acts)HB 381 / SB 280 (Regular Session Companion Tax Exemption Legislation)

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please see attached PDF testimony in opposition to **IN OPPOSITION TO:**

- **HB 2001 / SB 2001** (Special Session Gas Pipeline Volumetric Tax Acts)
- **HB 381 / SB 280** (Regular Session Companion Tax Exemption Legislation) [1]

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.



May 28, 2026

**RE: HB 2001 / SB 2001 - AKLNG Tax Abatement and Recommendations for a Workable Bill**

Dear Co-Chairs and Members of the House and Senate Finance Committees:

On behalf of the Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce, we respectfully urge the Legislature to advance a workable AKLNG tax abatement bill that provides the predictability necessary to support project financing while protecting Interior Alaska's access to affordable energy.

Interior Alaska's energy needs require a practical, all-of-the-above approach that values reliability, affordability, long-term energy security, and private investment. Existing energy resources have played an important role in supporting Alaska's economy and communities for decades, and future energy policy should build on that foundation while expanding opportunities for additional supply and infrastructure.

AKLNG represents a significant opportunity to strengthen Alaska's long-term energy portfolio, but it has eluded Alaskans for decades because it remains a complex and capital-intensive project. The Legislature does not need to guarantee the project's success, but it should avoid adding uncertainty that could undermine financing or delay progress toward a final investment decision.

A completed project could provide meaningful long-term benefits, including potentially lower-cost energy, expanded energy supply, improved energy security, and new economic opportunities throughout the Railbelt. Those benefits, however, can only be realized if the project is financeable and ultimately built. A project that is never built produces no jobs, no new energy supply, no downstream growth, and no public revenue.

**Support a Financeable Tax Structure**

We support a durable and competitive tax framework that is predictable and understandable to investors, lenders, municipalities, and the public. The volumetric tax structure in HB 2001 and SB 2001 is directionally sound because it replaces uncertain property tax treatment with a predictable alternative tied to project throughput. The Legislature should maintain a structure realistic enough to support investment and long-term project viability.

**EXECUTIVE PARTNERS**

**DIAMOND**

Mt. McKinley Bank  
Denali State Bank  
NuVision Credit Union

**PLATINUM**

ConocoPhillips Alaska  
Foundation Health Partners  
Harvest Midstream  
Golden Heart Utilities  
Doyon, Limited  
Weidner Apartment Homes

**GOLD**

Design Alaska  
Usibelli Coal Mine  
Kinross Fort Knox  
Contango Ore Inc.  
First National Bank Alaska  
Malson  
University of Alaska Fairbanks  
Doyon Utilities LLC  
TOTE Maritime Alaska  
GCI  
3-Tier Alaska, Inc  
Alaska Airlines  
Northern Star Resources Limited  
US Antimony Corporation  
Holland America Group / Princess Cruise

**SILVER**

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.  
Markwood Realty  
JL Properties, Inc.  
Spirit of Alaska Federal Credit Union  
Viviamore Companies  
Alaska Railroad  
Stewart Title Company – Yukon Division  
Interior Gas Utility  
Lynden  
Ahtna Incorporated  
Sourdough Fuel/Petro Star  
Exclusive Paving/University Redi-Mix  
Global Credit Union  
Tower Hill Mines-Livengood Gold Project  
Santos, Ltd.  
Everts Air Cargo, Everts Air Alaska  
MAC Federal Credit Union  
Santina's Flowers & Gifts  
TDL Staffing Inc.  
Golden Valley Electric Association  
FNSB Riverside Division  
Freegold Alaska Inc.  
Gene's Chrysler Dodge Jeep RAM  
Northrim Bank

**Avoid Separate Municipal Tax Carve-Outs or Side Agreements**

The bill should avoid provisions allowing separate municipal tax negotiations or carve-outs outside the abatement framework. The purpose of the legislation is to create a uniform structure that can be evaluated by project sponsors and financing parties. Municipal carve-outs would reintroduce the uncertainty the bill is intended to resolve. If the Legislature determines that municipal revenue tools are appropriate in the future, those provisions should be made effective after the project is financed, constructed, and operating — when the economics are clearer, and the project no longer faces the same threshold financing risk.

**Preserve the Fairbanks Spur Line Provision**

We appreciate the inclusion of provisions that require a Fairbanks spur line and systemwide tariff treatment so that Interior Alaska can realistically access the project's benefits. Without a rolled-in or systemwide mechanism, spur line costs could become prohibitively expensive for Interior consumers. This provision is critical and should be preserved.

**Keep the Bill Focused**

We encourage the Legislature to keep HB 2001 and SB 2001 narrowly focused on creating a durable, financeable tax framework for AKLNG and preserving meaningful in-state access to the project's potential energy benefits. Unrelated policy provisions or unnecessary complexity will only reduce the likelihood of project advancement.

Interior Alaska businesses and families continue to face some of the highest energy costs in the country. The Chamber encourages a balanced approach that supports affordability, reliability, investment certainty, and a diverse energy portfolio for Alaska's future.

Thank you for your consideration and your work on this important issue.

Sincerely,

**GREATER FAIRBANKS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE**



Katie Yarrow  
President & CEO



Lisa Putnam  
Board Chair

Cc: Honorable Governor Mike Dunleavy, State of Alaska  
Kati Capozzi, President and CEO, Alaska Chamber  
Membership, Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce  
Interior Delegation

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Kathy Toms [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2026 8:53 AM  
**To:** Sen. Lyman Hoffman; House Finance; Senate Finance Committee; Sen. Donny Olson; Sen. Bert Stedman; Sen. Kelly Merrick; Sen. Jesse Kiehl; Sen. James Kaufman; Sen. Mike Cronk  
**Subject:** Gas line

Dear Members of the Finance Committee,

I am writing to share my perspective on the Alaska LNG project and the critical need for a predictable and competitive tax regime. Previous discussions in the Senate Resources Committee consistently ignored four critical realities:

- Local Economic Growth: A stable energy source is the most effective way to grow Alaska's economy and increase household wealth, which in turn boosts business presence and tax revenues.
- The "Tax" Penalty: Any tax levied on this project is a direct transfer of wealth away from Alaskans. It increases property taxes and utility costs, further burdening constituents already struggling with high energy bills.
- Global Competitiveness: The global market prioritizes price over Alaska's internal tax structures. High tax revenue extraction makes Alaska LNG uncompetitive against rivals like Canada.
- False Equivalence: Importing LNG is not a substitute for the pipeline. Imports do not provide gas to Fairbanks or northern locations, nor do they offer the physical hedge against market volatility that a pipeline provides. Furthermore, the pipeline enables enhanced oil recovery through CO2 re-injection—increasing state revenue in a way that imports cannot.

It is encouraging to see this legislation move to the Finance Committees. You now have the opportunity to create project certainty by approving a tax structure that ensures predictability and global competitiveness, without the burden of excessive "impact payments."

Alaskans, our national peers, and global markets are watching. You have the chance to secure low-cost, reliable natural gas for generations. If the Finance Committees repeat the delays and hurdles of the Senate Resources Committee, this project will not happen, and the state will realize zero tax benefits.

I urge you to be diligent and efficient in your efforts to secure Alaska's energy future.

Best regards,

Kathy Toms

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Michael Jones <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2026 12:04 AM  
**To:** House Finance; Senate Finance Committee; Sen. Lyman Hoffman; Sen. Donny Olson; Sen. Bert Stedman; Sen. Kelly Merrick; Sen. Jesse Kiehl; Sen. James Kaufman; Sen. Mike Cronk; Michael Jones  
**Subject:** Support: Alaska Gasline Project

Honorable Members of the Senate Finance Committee,  
Honorable Members of the House Finance Committee,

I observed in the past legislative session where the Senate Resources Committee demonstrated an absolute lack of leadership for ALASKANS. That committee was transparent in its efforts to do anything possible to undermine the AKLNG (Gasline) project and prevent it from going forward. We all saw it.

Consistent with my April 16, 2026, and May 7, 2026 written testimony correspondence to the Senate Resources Committee, I am writing to reiterate my previous counsel: **Prioritize speed, define benefits as statewide, craft competitive tax structures, and act as a facilitator.**

Discussions before that committee consistently ignored four critical realities:

1. **Local Economic Growth:** A stable energy source is the most effective way to grow Alaska's economy and increase household wealth. Household wealth increases business presence which increases tax revenues.
2. **The "Tax" Penalty:** Any tax levied on this project is a direct transfer of wealth away from Alaskans. It increases property taxes and utility costs, further burdening constituents who are already struggling with high heating and electricity bills.
3. **Global Competitiveness:** The world market is indifferent to Alaska's internal tax structures or O&M costs; it cares only about price. By seeking to extract maximum tax revenue, the Resources committee was making Alaska LNG uncompetitive against rivals like Canada.
4. **False Equivalence:** it was mentioned numerous times in the Senate Resources Committee that simply importing LNG is a direct substitute for the pipeline project. It is not. Importing LNG on the Kenai Peninsula does nothing to bring natural gas to Fairbanks and other locations to the north. Additionally, the pipeline acts as a physical hedge against world markets that can charge

“whatever the market can bear” if Alaska were to become dependent on LNG imports. Finally, it’s my understanding that this project may provide for enhanced oil recovery through CO2 re-injection. Increased oil production translates into increased revenues for the state. This isn’t possible in an LNG import scenario.

It is a blessing to see the Gasline project legislation removed from the Senate Resources Committee where they clearly had every incentive to look for ways to shut the project down rather than helping to improve Alaska’s energy future. The ball is now in the court of the Finance Committees. You have the opportunity to create certainty in this project by approving a tax regime (without hundreds of millions of dollars of false “impact payments”) that provides predictability and competitiveness on the world stage.

Alaskans are watching. Canadians are watching. The rest of the United States is watching. World consumers of LNG are watching. World competitive suppliers of LNG are watching. You have the opportunity to secure low cost, secure supplies of natural gas for Alaskans for generations to come. If the Finance Committees behave like the Senate Resource Committee, you will blow this opportunity and you will secure **zero** tax benefits because the project will not happen.

Be diligent in your efforts—that doesn’t mean waste time. The Senate Resources Committee already did that.

Michael L. Jones  
Homer Resident

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2026 1:12 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Please move the AKLNG legislation out of committee

-----Original Message-----

From: lhajdukovich@me.com <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2026 9:43 PM  
To: Sen. Donny Olson <Sen.Donny.Olson@akleg.gov>  
Subject: Please move the AKLNG legislation out of committee

Dear Senator Olson,

I am writing about the gas line legislation that is before the House and Senate finance committees this week. I'm writing as a private citizen of Fairbanks, where I've lived my entire life.

So many Alaskans see the current work of the legislature as one of generational importance.

In Fairbanks we have been under the heavy burden of high energy costs for so long we almost don't know any better. It affects every aspect of our lives — heating our homes, schools, businesses, government, construction costs, university, military, air quality and PM2.5. It is slowly diminishing our population and the ability for our kids and grandkids to live here.

I understand that the gas line would take time to come online to actually help us. But there is no mistake, THIS IS OUR FUTURE. This is clean burning energy of which we have an abundance, which we can use and export. This is the moment we've been waiting for and the moment in which we have the ability to help ourselves. PLEASE don't let this opportunity pass because we can't agree on challenging questions and issues. Compromise happens when neither side is completely happy.

I encourage you to work things out with the boroughs and municipalities affected. Listen to their concerns, find solutions. Listen to the concerns of Glenfarne and those who would take the risk to make this project happen and find workable compromises. Argue the points on behalf of the state and local governments, but remember if this thing doesn't happen the state and local governments get nothing from it.

These are tough decisions, but each of you have been given the responsibility to make these decisions for all of us. Please move this legislation to a vote and encourage your fellow legislators to support the gas line.

Alaskans are pulling for you — and counting on you.

Thank you for your time.

Leslie Hajdukovich  
[REDACTED]  
Fairbanks

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2026 1:01 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Tax Relief for the Gas Line

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Joy Sharpe <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2026 4:50 PM  
**To:** Sen. Donny Olson <Sen.Donny.Olson@akleg.gov>  
**Subject:** Tax Relief for the Gas Line

Dear Honorable Senator Olson,

Why do so many privately developed large projects in our state “require” tax relief of one form or another? You will probably respond that these projects have critical benefits for the state. But the result of this attitude has been a perennially under-funded state government.

Near as I can tell, the viability of the gas line hasn’t been demonstrated. You haven’t gotten the necessary information on what its viability looks like, or even if it is a critical need for Southcentral Alaska.

I suggest you end this special session until you are provided with current assessments of cost, necessity, and international customers. Our Governor should not be rewarded for pushing a project that doesn’t have enough public data to allow proper consideration. It seems that right now the blind are leading the blindfolded.

The gas line should never had state ownership participation. Tax relief smells like corruption. I’d like to see the state divest its ownership.

I also consider the veto of the retirement bill to be corrupt hostage-taking.

Sincerely,  
Jon Sharpe  
Anchorage, Alaska

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2026 12:59 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Another Gas Line Alternative

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Joy Sharpe <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 23, 2026 2:47 PM  
**To:** Sen. Donny Olson <Sen.Donny.Olson@akleg.gov>  
**Subject:** Another Gas Line Alternative

Dear Honorable Senator Olson,

There's another option to the expensive gas line that should have more consideration: Transporting North Slope gas by ice-breaking tankers.

Reasons why this should work:

1. It would eliminate overland construction and require only one docking/loading facility near producing wells.
2. Russians have been doing this successfully from their Arctic Ocean ports.
3. Distribution to whoever buys the gas around the world would require no trans-shipping.
4. Service to the rail belt would be uncomplicated, with a receiving port in Anchorage, Nikiski, or the Mat-Su, and distribution by train.
5. Year-round shipping would be possible thanks to arrival of the new Coast Guard ice breakers being built, thanks to our congressional delegation.
6. Property taxes along the overland route would be eliminated.

Sincerely,

Jon Sharpe  
Anchorage AK

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Monday, June 01, 2026 12:54 PM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Anchorage Fiscal Impacts of the LNG Pipeline  
**Attachments:** ACDA Halcyon Fiscal Housing Gap Study.pdf; HCI AK LNG ANC Fiscal Gap Presentation-050726 Final.pdf

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**From:** Klouda, Nolan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 1, 2026 12:31 PM  
**To:** Klouda, Nolan <Nolan.Klouda@anchorageak.gov>  
**Subject:** Anchorage Fiscal Impacts of the LNG Pipeline

Greetings Legislators,

As the Special Session on the gasoline tax bill progresses, I'm reaching out to share some important analysis about project impacts on the Municipality of Anchorage. The Anchorage Community Development Authority, a municipal entity, commissioned the attached report completed by economist Jonathan King of Halcyon Consulting.

Mayor LaFrance strongly supports the gasoline as a transformational project for energy security and the state economy. She is grateful for the hard work legislators are putting in to ensure that the benefits and impacts of the project are addressed fairly and thoughtfully.

From an impact standpoint, the analysis shows that the expected influx of new workers and their families will raise the cost of providing services like public safety, transit, parks and recreation, and street maintenance. Due to reliance on property taxes and the structure of the municipal tax cap, these costs will exceed new revenues. As the report explains:

Anchorage will face a complex challenge under current projected project conditions. The arrival of the AK LNG labor will create significant demand for new services inside the MOA. If the MOA wants to keep per capita service levels constant then it must increase spending. Under this assumption the MOA is likely to face a significant fiscal gap created by several factors including the project's concentration of population effects in Anchorage, the absence of taxable project property, a tax structure that responds slowly to rapid growth and only allows for increased property tax revenues through new construction, a pre-existing housing shortage, and a likely lag between the arrival of new residents and the development of new housing.

Over a nine-year period, King estimates the gap between increased costs and new revenues to be between \$25M and \$170M, depending on how much new housing gets built and added to the tax base.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Nolan



anchorage  
community  
development  
authority



# Housing and Economic Impact Report

The Alaska LNG Project

“Meeting Anchorage’s Attainable Workforce Housing  
Demand”

May 2026

Prepared For ACDA  
By  
Jonathan King  
Consulting Economist



May 18, 2026

To Interested Stakeholders:

The Anchorage Community Development Authority (ACDA) commissioned the attached research prepared by Halcyon Consulting to evaluate the housing and fiscal impacts associated with the Alaska LNG Pipeline project and related economic activity in Anchorage. Consistent with ACDA's mission to support municipal goals through innovation, public-private partnerships, sound planning, and the study of real estate conditions, this analysis was prepared to better understand the housing and economic implications associated with a project of this scale.

The study concludes that existing housing shortages, combined with rising construction costs and limited inventory, could significantly constrain the ability of Anchorage to accommodate large-scale workforce growth without additional housing production. The report recognizes that while Anchorage is projected to experience a significant share of project-related population growth, many of the broader housing and workforce pressures identified in the report have implications for communities throughout Alaska.

As part of the broader discussion, ACDA has sought innovative public-private financing tools intended to help lower construction borrowing costs and encourage workforce and attainable housing development. Among them is the Alaska Housing Accelerator Program, a revolving loan model that would leverage public and private financial partners to support housing production while preserving public capital through loan financing rather than grants.

It's important to recognize that no single agency or institution can independently solve Anchorage and Alaska's housing challenges. Addressing current and projected housing demand will require continued coordination among state and local governments, financial institutions, housing organizations, and private-sector development partners. At this point, the conversation should not be about whose job it is to innovate — it should be about how we innovate together.

ACDA strongly supports the Alaska LNG Project and its importance to the Anchorage economy and long-term energy future of Alaska. This analysis is intended to support ongoing discussions regarding housing readiness, economic development planning, and the infrastructure necessary to support the sustained growth the Alaska LNG Project will bring to our city.

Sincerely,



Mike W. Robbins  
Executive Director  
Anchorage Community Development Authority



**Building Our City's Future**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas Pipeline (AK LNG) Project will transport natural gas from the North Slope to in-state markets in Interior and Southcentral Alaska and, in its full configuration, to international export markets via a liquefaction facility on the Kenai Peninsula. The project's physical components form a single integrated system that spans nearly the length of the state. On the North Slope, a Gas Treatment Plant at Prudhoe Bay will use three process trains to remove impurities and capture carbon dioxide for reinjection. An approximately 800-mile, 42-inch-diameter mainline pipeline will carry treated gas south to Nikiski on the Kenai Peninsula. While none of the project components will physically reside within the boundaries of the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA), the municipality will experience a sizeable portion of the project's socio-economic effects, particularly population growth.

As currently proposed, the pipeline, in combination with the structure of the MOA's tax limit calculation ordinance, will create a significant structural fiscal gap for the municipality. The structural gap will form as the project drives new population growth in the MOA and subsequent demand for new services (see Table 1). The municipality's ability to adjust total revenues to service costs is limited by its tax limit calculation, which caps new revenue based on the consumer price index, population growth, and the value of new construction added to property tax rolls. Additionally, the municipality lacks a fast-reacting tax like a sales tax, which new residents would start contributing to from the moment they arrive in the city and start spending. Even in the most optimistic revenue scenario, which assumes that 100 percent of the new population occupies new housing, the MOA will face a structural deficit in the first six years of the project. Avoiding a deficit likely means seeking new tax revenue outside the tax limit calculation, modifying the tax limit calculation, or receiving project impact payments from the state or project owners.

Table 1 Summary of Project Effects

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Annual Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
Incremental Service Costs (\$M)	6.4	13.2	18.7	24.8	28.6	32.3	33.3	32.4	33.3
0% Housing, Inc. Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	1.3	3.0	5.5	7.7	9.6	11.2	12.0
0% Housing, Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)	-6.6	-13.0	-17.3	-21.8	-23.1	-24.6	-23.7	-21.1	-21.3
100% Housing, Inc. Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	7.4	15.5	23.2	31.2	36.8	42.0	43.7
100% Housing, Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)	-6.6	-13.0	-11.3	-9.3	-5.4	-1.1	3.5	9.6	10.4

Source: Halcyon Consulting, Inc., 2026. Negative values indicate service costs exceeding additional property tax capacity.

The remainder of this document provides a deeper discussion of the project's fiscal implications for the MOA and a detailed discussion of the role the municipality's tax structure plays in creating the predicted fiscal gap.

## PURPOSE

The Anchorage Community Development Authority (ACDA) retained this analysis to quantify, based on existing research, the fiscal effects of the proposed Alaska Liquified Natural Gas Pipeline (AK LNG) on the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA).<sup>1</sup> As proposed, AK LNG will bring thousands of new residents into Anchorage during the project's construction phase, and the MOA's existing revenue mechanisms cannot keep pace with the costs those residents will create.<sup>2</sup> The analysis quantifies the fiscal gap between those costs and those revenues to give ACDA the data it and the MOA need to negotiate effects mitigation with AGDC and the State of Alaska and to prioritize infrastructure and housing investment.

## METHODS AND KEY REFERENCES

This analysis relies on four publicly available data sources, each serving a distinct purpose.<sup>3,4,5</sup> The 2017 Resource Report 5 (RR5) provides the most detailed cost and revenue modeling for the Municipality of Anchorage. The 2020 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) provides the most current population effect estimates. The 2024 Wood Mackenzie Economic Viability Assessment provides updated project scope and capital cost data. The Anchorage Municipal Charter and Code provide the tax limit framework that constrains municipal revenue growth.<sup>6,7</sup>

The analysis applies four methods to these sources; it:

- Reviews the project's socioeconomic data across all three planning documents;
- Describes the fiscal gap created by the intersection of population effects, Anchorage's geographic role as the project's logistics hub, and the municipality's tax structure;
- Adjusts historical cost projections by the Consumer Price Index and removes electric utility costs to reflect the 2020 sale of Municipal Light and Power;<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Final Report Instructions, Anchorage Community Development Authority, 2025.

<sup>2</sup> This report specifically does not address non-fiscal benefits of the project such as local business revenue, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Alaska LNG Project, Resource Report No. 5, Socioeconomics, Docket No. CP17-000, April 14, 2017 (RR5), pp. 5-159 to 5-160.

<sup>4</sup> Alaska LNG Project, Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), Volume 2, 2020, pp. 4-622 to 4-628.

<sup>5</sup> Wood Mackenzie, Economic Viability Assessment and Economic Value of Alaska LNG Project, Phase 1, Interim Draft, September 12, 2024, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Voters established the tax limit calculation through a charter amendment, and the calculation can only be changed by citizen vote.

<sup>7</sup> Anchorage Municipal Charter 14.03 and Anchorage Municipal Code 12.25.040; Anchorage Tax Limit Calculation, 2025 Revised Budgets, TAX-1.

<sup>8</sup> Municipality of Anchorage completed the sale of Municipal Light and Power to Chugach Electric Association on October 30, 2020.

- Places these adjusted projections in the context of Anchorage’s current housing shortage and the municipality’s stated goal of increasing its housing stock.

## AK LNG PROJECT BACKGROUND

The AK LNG Project will transport natural gas from the North Slope to in-state markets in Interior and Southcentral Alaska and, in its full configuration, to international export markets via a liquefaction facility on the Kenai Peninsula.<sup>9</sup> The project has evolved through multiple major planning iterations, each of which has further refined the project’s timeline and scope.

The 2017 RR5 and the 2020 FEIS analyzed a full-scope project: a gas treatment plant on the North Slope, an approximately 800-mile mainline pipeline, and a liquefaction and export facility at Nikiski. The estimated construction period spanned approximately eight years with project-driven population effects persisting into a ninth year after the construction workforce departs. The 2020 FEIS analyzed the same general scope and refined the population modeling with updated data, producing the most current estimates of population effects on Anchorage and other communities.

The current iteration, advanced by AGDC and its development partners, takes a phased approach. Phase 1 focuses on the gas pipeline from the North Slope to Southcentral and Interior Alaska, with an estimated capital expenditure of \$10.8 billion in 2024 dollars.<sup>10</sup> The phased approach does not significantly affect Anchorage’s role as the project’s management and logistics center.

## ANCHORAGE’S COMPLEX FISCAL/SERVICE CHALLENGE

Anchorage will face a complex challenge under current projected project conditions. The arrival of the AK LNG labor will create significant demand for new services inside the MOA. If the MOA wants to keep per capita service levels constant then it must increase spending. Under this assumption the MOA is likely to face a significant fiscal gap created by several factors including the project’s concentration of population effects in Anchorage, the absence of taxable project property, a tax structure that responds slowly to rapid growth and only allows for increased property tax revenues through new construction, a pre-existing housing shortage, and a likely lag between the arrival of new residents and the development of new housing.

The MOA has an alternative to the fiscal gap which is to create a service gap. It chooses, or is forced via lack of capacity, to not spend the money needed to maintain per capita services and allows per capita services to fall below current standards. The analysis recognizes that in fiscally constrained environment where budgets must balance that this alternative is a real possibility. That said, the framing of this analysis is around fiscal effects and so the analysis presumes a constant provision of per capita services.

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<sup>9</sup> Wood Mackenzie, September 2024, p. 27. Phase 1 pipeline: 765 miles, 42-inch diameter.

<sup>10</sup> Wood Mackenzie, September 2024, pp. 14-16. Phase 1 pipeline capex estimated at \$10.769 billion (2024 US\$).

## POPULATION EFFECTS WILL CONCENTRATE IN ANCHORAGE

Anchorage will absorb the largest share of the project’s population effects among all communities. The FEIS estimates that by Year 7 of construction, an additional 9,820 residents will have relocated to Anchorage.<sup>11</sup> That figure represents a 3.4 percent increase over the municipality’s 2024 population of roughly 288,000. Project management and support activities will headquarter in Anchorage, and the MOA will serve as the project’s primary logistical and supply center.<sup>12</sup> Overall, Anchorage accounts for just over half of the total statewide increase throughout the construction period (see Table 1).

Table 2 Estimated Increase in Resident Populations During Construction

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Project Laborforce-AK	4,000	8,200	11,400	14,800	16,900	18,700	19,200	18,700	n/a
Project Laborforce-ANC	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9,260
Portion Residing in ANC	57%	55%	54%	54%	53%	52%	51%	49%	n/a

Source: FEIS, Volume 2, Table 4.11.1-5, p. 4-628. Project Year 9 (2035) holds the Anchorage population increment stable at Project Year 8 levels after active construction ends.

Note: 1) This analysis uses FEIS Project Year 1 as calendar year 2027. 2) 2017 RR5 presumes a nine-year project cycle. The 2020 FEIS uses an eight-year project cycle. This analysis uses the FEIS’ population estimates but maintains the nine-year frame of 2017 RR5 as it is useful for showing the fiscal effects of the project.

## A TAX STRUCTURE THAT CANNOT RESPOND QUICKLY

While Anchorage will absorb more than half of the statewide population effects, the Municipality possesses almost none of the oil and gas property that generates substantial revenue for other boroughs. In addition to the absence of taxable oil and gas property, Anchorage’s tax structure creates a revenue timing problem for the municipality. The MOA uses tax limit calculation (AKA, the tax cap) established by Anchorage Municipal Charter Section 14.03 and Anchorage Municipal Code 12.25.040:<sup>13</sup>

*The formula begins with the prior year’s property tax collections plus selective ancillary taxes (automobile, tobacco, motor vehicle rental, fuel excise, and payments in lieu of taxes), removes one-time exclusions, and adjusts the resulting base by three factors: the five-year average change in*

<sup>11</sup> FEIS, Volume 2, Table 4.11.1-5, p. 4-628.

<sup>12</sup> FEIS, Volume 2, p. 4-624. Anchorage serves as a major supply center, approximately 27 miles from the nearest project facility.

<sup>13</sup> Anchorage Municipal Charter § 14.03 caps the total municipal tax that can be levied each fiscal year. The cap grows each year by a percentage set by two five-year averages: the change in population and the change in the Consumer Price Index for Anchorage. Charter § 14.03 excludes from the cap debt service, new construction, judgments and legal settlements, voter-approved levies, and emergency ordinances adopted under Charter § 10.03. Anchorage Municipal Code § 12.25.040 outlines how this calculation is made every year.

*the Consumer Price Index, the five-year average change in population, and the assessed value of new taxable property added in the last year.*

The MOA's challenge is that new residents will demand municipal services upon arrival: police, fire, roads, water, wastewater, and schools.<sup>14</sup> The cost of these service demands will materialize immediately. The revenue side operates on a fundamentally different timeline. The MOA does not have a general sales tax—a type of tax that adjusts rapidly to population and economic conditions. At the same time, the MOA's selective taxes on fuel, tobacco, motor vehicle rentals, and marijuana generate modest revenue and respond modestly to population growth. In the 2025 tax limit calculation, these non-property taxes totaled approximately \$84.4 million, compared to \$355.4 million in property taxes collected.<sup>15</sup> In short, 80 percent of the MOA's tax revenue comes from property taxes.<sup>16</sup>

Property taxes are slower than consumption taxes to respond to changes in population and the MOA's property tax response rate is further slowed by the municipality's tax limit calculation in three ways:

- The tax limit calculation uses a five-year average of the population growth rate. The current growth rate has been negative for several consecutive years (negative 0.30 percent in 2025).<sup>17</sup> The project's population effects will need to overcome that negative baseline before the population adjustment begins adding to the allowable tax base.
- The CPI adjustment also uses a five-year average, which means it responds slowly to rapidly increasing prices.<sup>18</sup>
- Lastly, the calculation only allows for new tax revenues associated with new construction value. Constructing new homes will require the housing market to recognize the increase in demand, decide to respond, and build new homes, a process that can take years.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, the tax limit calculation does not allow any additional revenues if new residents absorb existing housing even if that absorption drives the values of existing homes higher.

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<sup>14</sup> The analysis recognizes that water and wastewater are ratepayer-funded services through AWWU. As AWWU is municipally owned, this analysis aggregates those effects into the municipal total as was done in the 2017 RR5. A more detailed analysis would likely separate these effects out from direct municipal effects.

<sup>15</sup> Anchorage Tax Limit Calculation, 2022 through 2025, TAX-1 worksheets.

<sup>16</sup> Property taxes represent 57.4% of all general government revenue including taxes, fees, fines, PILTS, and other payments per the MOA's 2026 Operating Budget.

<sup>17</sup> Anchorage Tax Limit Calculation, 2025, Step 3, Line 20. Five-year average population growth was -0.30 percent.

<sup>18</sup> Anchorage Tax Limit Calculation, 2025, Step 3, Line 21. Five-year average CPI change was 3.10 percent.

<sup>19</sup> AK LNG could result in new non-commercial and industrial construction and/or the renovation of existing properties. No models exist of these induced effects or predict the split between new and renovated construction. However, the tax limit calculation treats new or renovated value for commercial and industrial properties the same as the value for residential properties.

These revenue constraints become more consequential in the context of the MOA’s existing pre-project housing shortage. In April 2025, the MOA announced the “10,000 Homes in Ten Years” initiative.<sup>20</sup> The municipality believes that it needs approximately 1,000 new or rehabilitated-to-useable dwelling units per year to address current pre-project shortfalls in availability, affordability, and quality. The MOA has identified the housing shortage as an impediment to workforce retention, an accelerant of homelessness, and a contributor to population decline. Market data confirm the shortage of available units. ACDA is currently conducting a formal housing study, which will provide additional insight into the relative tightness of the local housing market.

In addition to the municipality’s baseline need, the project will put additional demands on an already constrained housing market. Presuming 2.5 persons per housing unit, the annual demand for new units reaches approximately 900 units in each of the first two project years, falls to roughly 350 to 700 units per year in mid-construction, and approaches zero late in the construction period as the project workforce stabilizes (see Table 1).<sup>21</sup> Over the last decade, Anchorage permitted between 288 and 588 residential buildings per year.<sup>22</sup> At that pace, the municipality would need six to twelve years of 100 percent of issued permits converting to completed units to produce the 3,570 units the project will demand in what is essentially a 6-year window.<sup>23</sup>

Table 3 Anchorage Resident Population and Housing During Construction

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Cumulative New Anchorage Pop.	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9260
Population Increase/Year	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
Implied New Housing Demand (Units)	904	904	672	716	380	348	4	-	-

Source: Halcyon Consulting, Inc. estimates using FEIS, Volume 2, Table 4.11.1-5, p. 4-628. Project Year 9 (2035) holds the Anchorage population increment stable at Project Year 8 levels after active construction ends.

## FISCAL GAP MODELING

The analysis updates the fiscal modeling found in the 2017 RR5. This update shows that even if 100 percent of the increased population attributable to the project end up in new housing, the

<sup>20</sup> Alaska Public Media, “Anchorage mayor lays out strategy to build 10,000 homes,” April 10, 2025; Anchorage Daily News, “Mayor LaFrance lays out policy measures to push Anchorage toward building 10,000 Homes in Ten Years,” April 10, 2025.

<sup>21</sup> Derived from FEIS, Volume 2, Table 4.11.1-5, p. 4-628 (incremental Anchorage population by project year) divided by the modeling assumption of 2.5 persons per housing unit. See Anchorage\_TaxCap\_FEIS\_2yr\_Lag\_Final.xlsx, Inputs & Sources tab.

<sup>22</sup> Anchorage Daily News, “How will Anchorage hit 10K homes in 10 years? Q&A with new community and economic development director,” February 8, 2026. Editor’s note: “Anchorage building permits have ranged from 288 to 588 permits granted between 2015-2025, according to the municipality’s development services permit dashboard.”

<sup>23</sup> 3,570 units divided by the 288 to 588 annual permit range. Calculation assumes no concurrent baseline housing demand. Because the Municipality already faces a pre-existing shortage and the mayor’s “10,000 Homes in Ten Years” initiative contemplates 1,000 new units per year for non-project demand alone, the actual production burden on a per-year basis would exceed this range.

MOA would need to spend nearly \$25 million more on providing equivalent per-capita services during the project period than it will be allowed to collect in revenue under its tax limit calculation. If 100 percent of the new population uses existing housing, the fiscal gap grows to over \$170 million during the project period.<sup>24</sup> Closing the fiscal gap will require the MOA to change its revenue structure or seek impact payments from the State of Alaska or the project’s proponents.

The updated fiscal modeling uses the FEIS population projections for Anchorage with Project Year 1 set to calendar year 2027 (see Table 3).<sup>25</sup> On the cost side, the analysis derives per-capita incremental costs from RR5 by dividing the 2024 column expenditures by the cumulative 8,940 population addition for that year, producing a base rate of \$2,628 per person in 2024 dollars. The analysis then inflates these per-capita costs each year by Anchorage CPI (actual rates for 2022 through 2025, with 3.0 percent annual adjustments assumed from 2026 forward) and multiplies this amount by cumulative project population to produce annual incremental service costs. The analysis excludes electric utility costs entirely to account for the October 30, 2020, sale of Municipal Light and Power to Chugach Electric Association.<sup>26</sup><sup>27</sup>

Table 4: Projected Incremental Population Growth and Aggregate Cost Increases by Project Year

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Cumulative Population	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9,260
Annual Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
CPI Index (2024 = 1.00)	1.08	1.11	1.14	1.18	1.21	1.25	1.29	1.32	1.36
New Service Costs (\$000s)	6,420	13,227	18,687	24,708	28,587	32,310	33,313	32,356	33,326

Sources: FEIS Volume 2, Table 4.11.1-5, p. 4-628 (population); RR5 Table 5.4.2-56, p. 5-229 (per-capita base rate of \$2,628 in 2024 dollars, excluding electric). CPI: actual 2022-2025, 3.0 percent assumed from 2026 forward.

On the revenue side, the analysis applies the current tax limit ordinance framework, assumes the municipality taxes to the cap in all projection years (consistent with 2022 through 2025 actuals where under-cap room ranged from \$1.2 million to \$299), and uses an average mill rate of 16.145 per the 2024 Municipal millage.

<sup>24</sup> As a reminder, the MOA is not allowed to deficit spend. Thus, in practicality any unmet fiscal gap likely results in per-capita service cuts.

<sup>25</sup>RR5, Table 5.4.2-56, Estimated Net Difference Between Municipality of Anchorage Population-Based Expenditures and Revenues During Project Construction, pp. 5-229 to 5-230.

<sup>26</sup>RR5, Table 5.4.2-56, p. 5-229. Electric enterprise expenditures ranged from \$204,000 in Year 1 to \$3,630,000 in Year 8.

The analysis examines two scenarios:

- Under Scenario 1 (0 percent new housing), new tax amounts are allowed only for population and CPI effects within the existing tax cap formula, with no new construction value entering the tax rolls.
- Under Scenario 2 (100 percent new housing), project population occupies newly constructed housing at 2.5 persons per unit and \$390,000 per unit (1,200 square feet at \$325 per square foot)<sup>28</sup>, generating new construction value that enters the tax limit calculation outside the cap. This scenario presumes that the MOA can add value of new housing to the tax limit calculation two years after the population arrives in Anchorage.

As population in both scenarios is the same, the scenarios share estimates of the additional cost of providing services to the project-associated population. Prior analyses estimate that Anchorage’s population is expected to grow by nearly 2,300 each year in the first and second project years before slowing to between 1,700 and 1,800 in the third and fourth project years and then dropping to 850 to 1,000 new residents in years five and six. This study estimates that the MOA’s cost of providing services will increase by \$6.4 million in the first year and peak at roughly \$33 million per year in years five, six, seven, and eight. The new population factor in the tax cap turns positive in Project Year 2, when the MOA is allowed to collect \$0.2 million in new revenue (a point at which the MOA will already have spent over \$19.5 million on additional service demands. The amount of new revenue allowed, just from the population growth factor, reaches nearly \$10 million in the last two years of the project timeline (see Table 4). The takeaway is that the population growth factor in the MOA’s tax limit calculation never allows the MOA to actually pay for the increased costs of new population without help from the most important factor, the allowance for new construction values.<sup>29</sup>

Table 5 Anchorage Annual Incremental Service Costs and Population Growth

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Cumulative Population	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9,260
Annual Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
New Service Costs (\$000s)	6,420	13,227	18,687	24,708	28,587	32,310	33,313	32,356	33,326
New Tax Cap Revs. (\$000s)	-188	204	1,268	2,828	5,048	6,938	8,521	9,660	9,983

Source: Halcyon Consulting, Inc. 2026. Negative values indicate service costs exceeding additional property tax capacity.

<sup>28</sup> The analysis adjusts constructions costs upward by the presumed 3 percent CPI growth.

<sup>29</sup> An important secondary factor to note here is the effect of a rising local property tax base on the MOA’s required minimum contribution to its local school district. For every \$100 of increased property tax base the required minimum contribution goes up by 2.65 mills or \$0.0265. This requirement is an increased cost that occurs in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 but is not quantified in this analysis.

Under Scenario 1 (0 percent New Housing), the analysis presumes that 100 percent of the project-related population finds housing in the MOA’s existing housing or within new housing construction that is already part of the municipality’s baseline trends. Table 4 above is the Scenario 1 summary table, absent the minor effects of CPI growth and growth in ancillary revenues. Including CPI and ancillary revenues, the conclusion remains the same: without new housing the tax limit formula never permits the municipality to generate sufficient new revenue to cover the project’s incremental costs across the nine-year analysis period (see Table 5). The cumulative deficit totals approximately \$172.6 million, and Scenario 1 revenue capacity reaches only 36 percent of incremental service costs by Project Year 9.

Under Scenario 2 (100 percent new housing), of the project-related population receiving new housing outside of existing construction trends, the Municipality reaches fiscal balance in Project Year 7, when new construction tax revenue combines with population and CPI effects to generate \$36.8 million in additional property tax capacity against \$33.2 million in projected costs (see Table 5). Importantly though, the MOA remains in cumulative deficit through the project period with a net nine-year deficit of \$23.2 million.<sup>30</sup>


Table 6 Summary of Fiscal Gap by Scenario and Project Year (\$ Thousands)

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Annual Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
Incremental Service Costs (\$M)	6.4	13.2	18.7	24.8	28.6	32.3	33.3	32.4	33.3
0% Housing, Inc. Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	1.3	3.0	5.5	7.7	9.6	11.2	12.0
0% Housing, Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)	-6.6	-13.0	-17.3	-21.8	-23.1	-24.6	-23.7	-21.1	-21.3
100% Housing, Inc. Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	7.4	15.5	23.2	31.2	36.8	42.0	43.7
100% Housing, Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)	-6.6	-13.0	-11.3	-9.3	-5.4	-1.1	3.5	9.6	10.4

Source: Halcyon Consulting, Inc. 2026. Negative values indicate service costs exceeding additional property tax capacity.

<sup>30</sup> A midpoint scenario where the MOA only experiences new construction equivalent to what is needed for 50 percent of the workforce results in a \$100 million net fiscal gap.

Figure 1. Annual Fiscal Gap by Project Year and Scenario



Source: Halcyon Consulting, Inc. 2026. Negative values indicate service costs exceeding additional property tax capacity.

The analysis acknowledges that neither Scenario 1 nor Scenario 2 is realistic in its assumptions about how project-related population growth will find housing. Invariably, new residents of the MOA find homes in a mix of existing and new units. The scenarios are useful in illustrating that a municipality unprepared for the project’s projected housing effects, which is to say one that did nothing to accelerate current housing growth, will face very significant structural deficits similar to that modeled in Scenario 1. A municipality that prepared for the coming demand by working to accelerate housing growth beyond the current efforts to address status-quo needs will face significant early financial pressures but could mitigate the worst effects of Scenario 1. The analysis also notes that even under Scenario 2, which mitigates the worst fiscal effects of Scenario 1, the MOA would still face a project period of structural deficit of nearly \$25 million unless it changes its tax structure or receives project impact payments from the state or the project owners.

## SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Under project conditions, the MOA faces the dual challenges of simultaneously housing nearly 10,000 new residents and trying to close the revenue gap under the strictures of the tax limit

calculation. Optimizing solutions to one of these challenges at a time can make meeting the other challenge harder. For example, if a municipality wants to house 10,000 new workers across the economic spectrum it will not solely build \$800,000 single-family homes. It will build an array of housing units focusing particularly on multi-family housing which will be useful to its population during and after the project period. However, that type of housing has a lower value per square foot and lower value per person housed and thus does less to close the fiscal gap under the tax limit calculation. This analysis presumes that the MOA focuses on building those multi-family units and the net effect is that the MOA would have to build 107 percent of actual expected new housing demand to make the revenue calculations fiscally neutral. On the other hand, if the MOA focused on building higher value 2,000 square foot single-family homes, it only needs to build roughly 60 percent of the expected units, but then 40 percent of the expected workforce is looking for homes in already stressed housing market. Thus, it is possible to avoid fiscal gap under the tax limit calculation, but only if the MOA builds higher value housing that runs the risk of not meeting the needs of your new workforce and the existing population.<sup>31</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

As currently proposed, the AK LNG Pipeline will likely create a significant and difficult-to-avoid fiscal gap for the Municipality of Anchorage. Under Scenario 2 (100 percent new housing), the Municipality faces a maximum annual deficit of approximately \$13.0 million in Project Year 2 and a cumulative nine-year deficit of nearly \$25 million. Under Scenario 1 (no new housing), the deficit persists throughout the entire analysis period, peaking at \$24.5 million in Project Year 6 and accumulating to more than \$170 million over nine years. The value of new housing alone, which also meets the needs of the new labor force, is extremely unlikely to shift the tax limit calculation enough to allow the MOA to avoid a structural deficit. Avoiding a deficit likely means seeking new tax revenue outside the tax limit calculation, modifying the tax limit calculation, or receiving project impact payments from the state or project owners.

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<sup>31</sup> The challenges of adapting to construction of multi-generational infrastructure project in Alaska are well-documented. The 2017 RR5 records that Fairbanks absorbed law enforcement, medical, and educational service demand during TAPS construction well before any tax revenue from the expanded base arrived, and the impact aid response was characterized as "too little, too late". The same sequencing risk applies to Anchorage with AK LNG because the Municipality will host direct, indirect and induced workers before the project generates any local tax revenue. In 2025 the MOA proposed an Anchorage Housing Accelerator Fund as a direct response to current housing challenges and as a solution the timing problem. The proposed accelerator fund would deliver units inside the construction window because below-market construction loans cut the most common cause of project stalls. As proposed, the fund places capital exactly where most stalled projects fail, at the construction-phase underwriting step. Given the documented challenges of the housing market, the MOA will likely need interventions like the proposed fund if it is to avoid the adverse effects of not having enough housing, the fiscal gap, or the risk of self-building workforce housing.

# The Anchorage Fiscal Gap

Fiscal effects of the Alaska LNG Pipeline on the Municipality of Anchorage

**Prepared for Anchorage Community Development Authority**

Halcyon Consulting, Inc. | May 2026 (Final)

# Executive Summary

- AK LNG construction will drive significant population growth in Anchorage;
- The Municipality of Anchorage's (MOA) revenue collection authority will likely be unable to keep pace with new service costs because of the tax limit calculation;
- Projected fiscal gap over the 9-year project period:
  - ~\$25M deficit if 100% of new residents occupy newly built housing;
  - ~\$170M deficit if 100% of new residents occupy existing housing;
- Closing the gap requires new revenue, a modified tax cap, reducing per capita service, or impact payments.

# Purpose of the Analysis

- Quantify the fiscal effects of the AK LNG project on the MOA;
- Equip ACDA and the MOA to negotiate effects mitigation with AGDC and the State;
- Inform infrastructure and housing investment priorities
- Built on four publicly available sources:
  - 2017 Resource Report 5 — cost and revenue modeling;
  - 2020 Final Environmental Impact Statement — population effects;
  - 2024 Wood Mackenzie Economic Viability Assessment — scope and costs;
  - Anchorage Municipal Charter & Code — tax limit framework.

# The AK LNG Project

- ~800-mile, 42-inch mainline pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Nikiski;
- Currently a 2-phase focusing first on internal and then external consumption.
- ~8-year construction window; effects extend into a 9th year;
- No facilities, but the MOA is the project/population hub.



# Population Growth & Service Costs

If built AK LNG will bring significant number of new workers/residents to Anchorage. Providing services to these new residents will cost (tens of) millions each year.

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Cum. Population Growth	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9,260
Ann. Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
CPI Index (2024 = 1.00)	1.08	1.11	1.14	1.18	1.21	1.25	1.29	1.32	1.36
New Service Costs (\$M)	6.4	13.2	18.7	24.7	28.6	32.3	33.3	32.3	33.3

# The Tax Cap: How the Calculation Works

- Established by Anchorage Municipal Charter §14.03 and 12.25.040;
- Formula starts with prior-year property tax + ancillary taxes (auto, tobacco, vehicle rental, fuel, PILT);
- Removes one-time exclusions, then adjusts the base by three factors:
  - 5-year average change in the Consumer Price Index;
  - 5-year average change in population;
  - Assessed value of new taxable property added in the prior year;
- Property tax = 80% of MOA tax revenue (\$355.4M of \$439.8M in 2025);
- MOA has no general sales tax — no fast-reacting revenue source.

# Why the Cap Cannot Keep Pace

- 5-year averages smooth out — and delay — every adjustment:
  - Population growth is currently negative (-0.30% in 2025);
  - Project growth must first overcome that negative baseline;
  - CPI factor uses a 5-year rolling average — slow to reflect price spikes;
- The cap requires new taxable value on the rolls to allow new revenue:
  - Existing-home value increases do not raise the cap except via CPI effects;
  - Building new homes can take years to permit and complete;
- Higher value homes bring more taxable value, but they likely aren't what the workforce population will need.

# Implied Housing Demand

- Scenario 1- 0 percent new housing. Presumes all new residents (see below) end up in existing housing. New revenues under the tax cap come from CPI and population.
- Scenario 2- 100 percent new housing. All new residents (or their equivalent) occupy new housing at 2.5 individuals per unit, 1,200 sq. ft average, \$325/sq. foot construction cost.

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Cumulative New Anchorage Population	2,260	4,520	6,200	7,990	8,940	9,810	9,820	9,260	9,260
Population Increase/Year	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
<b>Implied New Housing Demand (Units)</b>	<b>904</b>	<b>904</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>

# The Fiscal Gap at Two Extremes

Component	PY 1	PY 2	PY 3	PY 4	PY 5	PY 6	PY 7	PY 8	PY 9
Annual Population Growth	2,260	2,260	1,680	1,790	950	870	10	-560	0
Incremental Service Costs (\$M)	6.4	13.2	18.7	24.8	28.6	32.3	33.3	32.4	33.3
Scenario 1 Inc. Cap Allowed Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	1.3	3.0	5.5	7.7	9.6	11.2	12.0
<b>Scenario 1 Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)</b>	<b>-6.6</b>	<b>-13.0</b>	<b>-17.3</b>	<b>-21.8</b>	<b>-23.1</b>	<b>-24.6</b>	<b>-23.7</b>	<b>-21.1</b>	<b>-21.3</b>
Scenario 2 Inc. Cap Allowed Rev. Capacity (\$M)	-0.2	0.2	7.4	15.5	23.2	31.2	36.8	42.0	43.7
<b>Scenario 2 Net Fiscal Gap (\$M)</b>	<b>-6.6</b>	<b>-13.0</b>	<b>-11.3</b>	<b>-9.3</b>	<b>-5.4</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>10.4</b>

# Sensitivities

- If the MOA is only able to build 50 percent of the estimated needed units, the fiscal gap is ~\$100 million over nine years.
- The analysis results are highly sensitive to the total value of property built for new housing.
  - Building modest size, mid-level housing (the kind the community is most likely to need) means that the MOA would need to build 107 percent of the projected needed housing units to cover cost.
  - Increasing the size of those homes to 2,000 square feet, instead of 1,200 square feet, means that the MOA covers costs under the tax cap if it builds just 60 percent of the required homes. Of course, that leaves 40 percent of the new residents to find housing in existing units.
- The modest homes most likely needed by a new construction workforce are less likely to cover the costs of servicing those homes under the tax cap.

# Conclusions & Path Forward

- AK LNG creates a structural fiscal gap of ~25M to ~\$170M over 9 years;
- New housing value fully closes the fiscal gap only if you build bigger, more valuable homes that may not be work force appropriate.
- Housing is critical. Building the homes workers need at a price they can afford helps workers and the MOA.
- Paths to close the gap (alone or in combination):
  - New tax revenue outside the tax limit calculation;
  - Modify the tax limit calculation to better track project growth;
  - Impact payments from the State of Alaska or AGDC / project owners;
  - Make housing construction financially more viable so that you can close as much of the structural gap as possible.

## Testimony on AK LNG Project\_House Finance Committee 5/30/2026

I have lived in Alaska for over 50 years (Anchorage, Pedro Bay, Wasilla). I am a Civil Engineer; I have worked in Anchorage for a consulting engineering firm and on the North Slope for ARCO Alaska at Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk fields, starting in 1979. I have retired in Alaska and now live in Wasilla.

My comments are an engineer's prospective and I have waited for today's testimony to play out prior to adding my 2 cents worth:

- I support HB 381 as long as the **Fairbanks spur line remains in the legislation and the project is economic**. I agree more with the Senate version for tax incentives.
- You need more facts (not hyperbole) prior to finalizing legislation for tax relief.
- This 11<sup>th</sup> hour push to provide an equivalent volumetric **90% property tax reduction to make the project financeable leads me to question its economics** when the project was a go financially in December 2025.
- Glenfarne has either used a bait and switch strategy or found something very significant they previously overlooked. Alternatively, they could just be padding the cost estimate if they are just now at Cost Estimate Level 4/5. In my opinion, the Legislature needs to pressure them on this issue. In fact, I question Glenfarne as a viable investor/partner in thos project They have no relevant experience that I can see.
- I heard testimony from businesses and individuals stating that the Legislature should not be digging into Glenfarne's financial business or contracts. Asking for facts on estimated costs and risks for the project is your job before endorsing any tax relief, in my opinion.
- The two phase plan for the project without nailing down estimated costs, revenue and final energy costs to the consumer is very high risk. Phase 1 gas flow is likely to be 10% of capacity for the 42" line and compression equipment. The pipeline tariff for the oversized Phase 1 project (pipe, equipment and overhead) will be high. If Phase 2 never happens for whatever reason, the state and Alaskan consumers will be stuck with relatively expensive gas. We need to know what range that cost to consumers might be.
- I am concerned that Glenfarne has not publicly shared any information on upstream costs for the project from the producers; likewise they have shared nothing on memorandums of understanding for buyer contracts. This will measure the risk for Phase 2.
- The producers were using the produced gas for reservoir pressurization and removing the high-value natural gas liquids they can stream to Valdez in TAPS last I heard. The gas is not valueless to them as it is produced. They may have changed their mind on monetizing it in gaseous form since the 2015 proposed project.
- I heard several commenters imply that you need to move this legislation forward with whatever tax relief is asked because we need "cheap" gas and the jobs the project will provide or we will get zero. I disagree. In my opinion, if this project is so fragile economically that the only way to get it is to blindly approve tax relief, we should stop right now. We can pause until the facts and

data are more reliable and transparent so we don't get a project that simply burns cash and does not get completed. Zero is better than that, and we as a State have a history.

- On property tax relief: I remember the mess we had in the late 70's with the influx of workers and scam artists that overloaded our infrastructure, police, healthcare and other local government services..
- I also heard that we need to include or negotiate guarantees on price caps for the gas. I don't know how this could work. We can't count on Glenfarne operating at a loss to meet those guarantees. Maybe add an insurance policy to the project?
- I know a little about oil and gas projects from my work with ARCO Alaska and BP. It was a rare project that came in on/under budget and schedule. Projects doubling cost were **not** rare. A good lesson is to review the original estimates for TAPS and the final costs for the oil line.
- We should not overlook other options: costs to import LNG can be determined with relative accuracy compared to a North Slope pipeline gas. The potential for finding more gas in Cook Inlet is also possible, although probably riskier.
- I hope you can get more current, fact-based information on costs and rates from Glenfarne to help this legislation go forward. Remember SB21: **words and promises are cheap**; we will be stuck with any compromises you make if the project proceeds.

I could go on, but I probably am over my 2 minutes. Thanks for sticking with this the first month of summer!

Regards,

Barry Santana

## Doniece Gott

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**From:** Sen. Donny Olson  
**Sent:** Monday, June 01, 2026 9:37 AM  
**To:** Senate Finance Committee  
**Subject:** FW: Follow up of Testimony in regard to the special session starting Thursday - in favor of the gas line

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**From:** Irene Quednow <irene.quednow@pm.me>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 30, 2026 4:54 PM  
**To:** Rep. Bryce Edgmon <Rep.Bryce.Edgmon@akleg.gov>; Rep. Jubilee Underwood <Rep.Jubilee.Underwood@akleg.gov>; Rep. Frank Tomaszewski <Rep.Frank.Tomaszewski@akleg.gov>; Rep. Louise Stutes <Rep.Louise.Stutes@akleg.gov>; Rep. Andi Story <Rep.Andi.Story@akleg.gov>; Rep. Will Stapp <Rep.Will.Stapp@akleg.gov>; Rep. Rebecca Schwanke <Rep.Rebecca.Schwanke@akleg.gov>; Rep. Calvin Schrage <Rep.Calvin.Schrage@akleg.gov>; Rep. Dan Saddler <Rep.Dan.Saddler@akleg.gov>; Rep. Justin Ruffridge <Rep.Justin.Ruffridge@akleg.gov>; Rep. Mike Prax <Rep.Mike.Prax@akleg.gov>; Rep. David Nelson <Rep.David.Nelson@akleg.gov>; Rep. Elexie Moore <Rep.Elexie.Moore@akleg.gov>; Rep. Genevieve Mina <Rep.Genevieve.Mina@akleg.gov>; Rep. Donna Mears <Rep.Donna.Mears@akleg.gov>; Rep. Kevin McCabe <Rep.Kevin.McCabe@akleg.gov>; Rep. Chuck Kopp <Rep.Chuck.Kopp@akleg.gov>; Rep. Andy Josephson <Rep.Andy.Josephson@akleg.gov>; Rep. DeLena Johnson <Rep.DeLena.Johnson@akleg.gov>; Rep. Nellie Jimmie <Rep.Nellie.Jimmie@akleg.gov>; Rep. Ky Holland <Rep.Ky.Holland@akleg.gov>; Rep. Rebecca Himschoot <Rep.Rebecca.Himschoot@akleg.gov>; Rep. Sara Hannan <Rep.Sara.Hannan@akleg.gov>; Rep. Carolyn Hall <Rep.Carolyn.Hall@akleg.gov>; Rep. Andrew Gray <Rep.Andrew.Gray@akleg.gov>; Rep. Alyse Galvin <Rep.Alyse.Galvin@akleg.gov>; Rep. Neal Foster <Rep.Neal.Foster@akleg.gov>; Rep. Zack Fields <Rep.Zack.Fields@akleg.gov>; Rep. Bill Elam <Rep.Bill.Elam@akleg.gov>; Rep. Ted Eischeid <Rep.Ted.Eischeid@akleg.gov>; Rep. Maxine Dibert <Rep.Maxine.Dibert@akleg.gov>; Rep. Julie Coulombe <Rep.Julie.Coulombe@akleg.gov>; Rep. Mia Costello <Rep.Mia.Costello@akleg.gov>; Rep. Ashley Carrick <Rep.Ashley.Carrick@akleg.gov>; Rep. Jeremy Bynum <Rep.Jeremy.Bynum@akleg.gov>; Rep. Robyn Frier <Rep.Robyn.Frier@akleg.gov>; Rep. Jamie Allard <Rep.Jamie.Allard@akleg.gov>; Rep. Sarah Vance <Rep.Sarah.Vance@akleg.gov>; Sen. James Kaufman <Sen.James.Kaufman@akleg.gov>; Sen. Elvi Gray-Jackson <Sen.Elvi.Gray-Jackson@akleg.gov>; Sen. Jesse Bjorkman <Sen.Jesse.Bjorkman@akleg.gov>; senator.matt.clayman@akleg.gov; Sen. Mike Cronk <Sen.Mike.Cronk@akleg.gov>; Sen. Forrest Dunbar <Sen.Forrest.Dunbar@akleg.gov>; Sen. Cathy Giessel <Sen.Cathy.Giessel@akleg.gov>; Sen. Lyman Hoffman <Sen.Lyman.Hoffman@akleg.gov>; Sen. Scott Kawasaki <Sen.Scott.Kawasaki@akleg.gov>; Sen. Jesse Kiehl <Sen.Jesse.Kiehl@akleg.gov>; Sen. Kelly Merrick <Sen.Kelly.Merrick@akleg.gov>; Sen. Robert Myers <Senator.Robert.Myers@akleg.gov>; Sen. Donny Olson <Sen.Donny.Olson@akleg.gov>; Sen. Bert Stedman <Sen.Bert.Stedman@akleg.gov>; Sen. Gary Stevens <Sen.Gary.Stevens@akleg.gov>; Sen. Löki Tobin <Sen.Loki.Tobin@akleg.gov>; Sen. Bill Wielechowski <Sen.Bill.Wielechowski@akleg.gov>; Sen. Robert Yundt <Sen.Robert.Yundt@akleg.gov>; Sen. Cathy Tilton <Sen.Cathy.Tilton@akleg.gov>; senator.george.rausher@akleg.gov; representative.steve.st.claire@akleg.gov; Rep. Garret Nelson <Rep.Garret.Nelson@akleg.gov>; ella.ede@glenfarnecompanies.com  
**Subject:** Follow up of Testimony in regard to the special session starting Thursday - in favor of the gas line

Dear Representatives & Senators,

Earlier today I testified before the House Finance committee in favor of the gas line. Thank you for the committee members for taking time out of their Saturday to listen. I wanted to add a few things to my testimony.

One of the 'hang-ups' seems to be how much money to get for the State of Alaska from this project. Let me make a point that several testifiers made today as well in one form or another: even if Alaska would get absolutely no revenue from this project (which is not the case) it would still get a huge economic boom from the jobs provided by the construction and maintenance of the project and the support services. And even if 40% of the direct jobs would be going to people from outside, that would leave 60% of jobs for Alaskans, plus the support industry jobs (which are more likely to stay mostly local). But if the project is killed, Alaska gets ZERO / NOTHING / NADA. That is not managing the resources of our state for the maximum benefit of its people. Zero is no benefit at all.

On a side note, I find it interesting and quite hypocritical that people (including legislators) who have moved up to Alaska in recent years to shape our policies according to their outside progressive agenda now all of a sudden have a concern about outside influence in the workforce. Do they realize that they just disqualified themselves? If outside influence is a concern to somebody that has moved to Alaska in the last 5-10 years then maybe that somebody should move back to the lower 48 and let us long-term Alaskans shape our own policies.

When I attended kids camp there was a saying we had. "Announcements, announcements, announcements - to be talked to death, to be talked to death - what a terrible way to die." I would like to rephrase that after 38 meetings about this project in this legislative session: "Meetings, meetings, meetings - to be talked to death, to be talked to death - what a terrible way to die." It is time to move forward!

And lastly, for full disclosure, I copied Ella Ede from Glenfarne Companies on this email. I have no affiliation with Glenfarne in any way, shape or form, but I want them to hear from us everyday Alaskans directly rather than what you tell them Alaska people are saying, especially since it is extremely hard for working people to participate in hearings that are scheduled during the day during the week.

Respectfully,

Irene Quednow

On Wednesday, May 20th, 2026 at 8:04 AM, Irene Quednow <[irene.quednow@pm.me](mailto:irene.quednow@pm.me)> wrote:

Good morning Representatives & Senators,

The legislature has had it's issues for many years now, but in the last couple of days it has truly become a clown show. You were able to give Alaska a state vegetable but you were not able to give us a gas line. What a total misinterpretation of priorities!

I urge you strongly to pass legislation to get the gas line built in a way that will not kill the desire of these private firms to bring development and jobs and income to Alaska, not to mention gas.

And on a side note: did it occur to you that if the gas line is built and Alaska has additional income that we actually might be able to retire the roughly 6 billion dollars in debt we have from the last round of defined benefits and might be able to afford offering new defined benefits? Stop spending Alaska into oblivion without creating new income sources.

And for those of you who have voted against the defined benefit bill, upheld the governor's veto, and have fought to get the LNG project going - thank you! Keep up the good fight.

Irene Quednow  
Anchorage

"The world needs men (and women) who will not be bought or sold. Men (and women) who in their inmost souls are true and honest. Men (and women) who do not fear to call sin by its right name. Men (and women) whose conscience is true to duty. Men (and women) who will stand for what is right though the heavens fall." Ellen Gould White (words in parenthesis added by myself)