HJR 15-CONST. AM: VOTES NEEDED FOR VETO OVERRIDE    3:51:03 PM CO-CHAIR FIELDS announced that the final order of business would be HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 15, Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to actions upon veto. 3:51:17 PM KEVIN MCGOWAN, Staff, Representative Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins, on behalf of Representative Kreiss-Tomkins, prime sponsor of HJR 15, relayed that the proposed constitutional amendment would lower the veto override threshold for appropriation bills from three-fourths of legislators - 45 votes - to two-thirds of legislators, or 40 votes. He said that currently veto overrides of non-appropriation bills in Alaska require two-thirds of legislators. He stated that HJR 15 would create a uniform veto override vote threshold for appropriation and non-appropriation bills. He maintained that Alaska's threshold is disproportionate to every other U.S. state and territory; it is the highest threshold. 3:52:26 PM JOSIAH NASH, Intern, Representative Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins, on behalf of Representative Kreiss-Tomkins, prime sponsor of HJR 15, relayed that Alaska is the only state in the union with a three-fourths veto override vote threshold for appropriation bills. Every other state has a two-thirds, three-fifths, or simple majority vote threshold. He referred to a graphic summary [not included in the committee packet] of the information provided to the committee on veto override vote thresholds by state [Table 98-6.22 Vote Required to Override a Veto of Selected Types of Bills, National Conference of State Legislatures]. He said that 38 states have a two-thirds threshold, 6 have a three-fifths threshold, and 5 have a simple majority threshold; that leaves Alaska as the only state with a high three-fourths vote threshold. 3:53:28 PM CO-CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS stated that he introduced the proposed resolution before there had been any vetoes in the last budget cycle [fiscal year 2020 (FY 20)]. He offered that the veto override vote threshold in the Alaska State Constitution is an anomaly, and through the proposed resolution, he is seeking to avoid the "train wreck coming down the tracks." He relayed that despite varying points of view on the budget last year [2019] and on whether the vetoes should have been overridden, Alaska is "way out of line" from the rest of the country. He said that the Alaska Territorial Legislature had a two-thirds veto override vote threshold for all measures - appropriations and non-appropriations. He offered that in the minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, there was a great deal of discussion on this issue and two camps of thinking. The "three- fourths camp" won by a vote in the Alaska Constitutional Convention; however, the very concerns put forth by those advocating for a two-thirds vote have existed throughout history in Alaska whenever the legislative branch of government has sought to put a check on the executive branch of government. He offered that having a three-fourths threshold essentially gives the executive branch and its administration a blank check to execute its agenda and vision through the "veto pen." He suggested that if an environmental governor two terms from now wanted to end the mining industry in Alaska and line-item veto the Division of Mining, Land, and Water in the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) budget, that governor would likely be able to do that because the override veto threshold is so incredibly high. Regardless of the person [at the top of] the executive branch and the administration, there is a clear imbalance in the separation of powers in Alaska, and HJR 15 seeks to re-balance the separation of powers. 3:56:28 PM REPRESENTATIVE STORY expressed her belief that it is important to have public input on the proposed resolution. CO-CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS relayed that whenever a constitutional framework has two different override thresholds - one for appropriation measures and one for non-appropriation measures - it inherently creates constitutional ambiguity about what constitutes an appropriation and what does not. A uniform flat override threshold avoids that ambiguity. He mentioned that in the '90s, then Governor Tony Knowles vetoed a bill from the legislature that gave the University of Alaska a large land grant. The legislature mustered a two-thirds vote to override the veto, but not a three-fourths vote. Governor Knowles rejected the override calling the legislation an appropriation bill. The legislature contended that it was not an appropriation bill and sued the governor. The Alaska Supreme Court found in favor of the legislature. He concluded that not having a flat uniform threshold, but having two categories of override thresholds, creates ambiguity, and it's the lawyers who profit. REPRESENTATIVE SHAW asked for confirmation that at the Alaska Constitutional Convention, the threshold was originally two- thirds vote for all measures. CO-CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS responded that the Alaska Territorial Legislature - before statehood - had a flat two-thirds threshold. At the Alaska Constitutional Convention there was debate on the topic; some delegates advocated for two-thirds, some for three-fourths. The three-fourths camp won the debate. REPRESENTATIVE SHAW mentioned that Article II, Section 16, of the constitution was amended in 1976 and asked for the specifics of that amendment. CO-CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS answered that he did not know but would have that information at the next hearing. CO-CHAIR FIELDS indicated HJR 15 would be held over.