HB 75-GUN VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS  1:58:02 PM CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the final order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 75, "An Act relating to gun violence protective orders; relating to the crime of violating a protective order; relating to a central registry for protective orders; relating to the powers of district judges and magistrates; requiring physicians, psychologists, psychological associates, social workers, marital and family therapists, and licensed professional counselors to report annually threats of gun violence; and amending Rules 4 and 65, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 9, Alaska Rules of Administration." CHAIR CLAMAN advised that this is the fifth hearing of HB 75 in the House Judiciary Standing Committee. In recap, Chair Claman offered that on Wednesday the committee heard from the Department of Law (DOL) and the Alaska Court System (ACS) regarding constitutional issues, how the gun violence protective order structure compares to domestic violence protective orders, the structure in existing statutes, and how the gun violence protective order compares to civil commitment motions. The committee learned the following: individuals do not have a right to counsel in a domestic violence protective order proceeding because it is a civil proceeding and not a criminal proceeding; there may not be a right to counsel on a gun violence protective order proceeding because it is also a civil proceeding and the committee will learn more about a right to counsel today; the difference between a civil commitment under Title 47 based on a civil court finding that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect and a procedure to address a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial in a criminal case; the criminal competency proceeding addresses whether a person is able to understand the proceeding against them or to assist in their own defense under AS 12.47.100 and there are no competency hearings if there are no criminal charges. CHAIR CLAMAN noted that during the last hearing, Dario Borghesan, Department of Law, indicated that he would perform research on the right to counsel in civil matters, the status of the State of Indiana law and that court's review of that particular gun violence protective order. 2:00:05 PM DARIO BORGHESAN, Assistant Attorney General, Opinions, Appeals, & Ethics Section, Civil Division (Anchorage), Department of Law, responded that on the issue of whether HB 75 would trigger the right to a court-appointed counsel, the short answer is that possibly in a relatively rare case and if they had a publicly funded attorney, there might be an obligation to provide the respondent with a court-appointed attorney. He explained that the right to court-appointed counsel typically attaches in criminal prosecutions, and HB 75 is a civil proceeding that does not entail any threat of jailtime. Typically, civil proceedings do not require court-appointed counsel; however, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that in child protection proceedings and in private child custody proceedings, if one parent has a publicly funded attorney through the Alaska Legal Services Corporation, the parent on the other side is entitled to court-appointed counsel under the Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (1979) decision and the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed that principle in 2011. As to HB 75, there is the right to parent your children and the right to bear arms. Although both are constitutionally protected rights, it does not mean that a person receives the same constitutional protections against a temporary seizure of a person's firearms, then a person would receive if there was a risk of a person's children being removed from their custody. He pointed out that those are different constitutional rights and the parties might be entitled to different judicial protections. It is important to advise, he offered, that it is "pretty rare" that the party seeking a domestic violence protective order does so with the help of an attorney. Therefore, in the case of the gun violence protective order it would also be fairly rare that someone would seek that order with the help of an attorney. He remarked that only if a person was seeking a gun violence protective order with the help of a publicly funded attorney, there might be some obligation to have court-appointed counsel on the other side. 2:03:11 PM CHAIR CLAMAN asked Mr. Borghesan to respond to the question about the State of Indiana case addressing the Indiana gun violence protective order. He commented that the committee had received a copy of the Indiana Court of Appeals opinion via email. MR. BORGHESAN answered that under Redington v. State of Indiana, 997 N.E.2d 356 (2013) decision a particular individual was observed by law enforcement to be acting strangely and potentially dangerously. The State of Indiana law enforcement obtained a warrant to remove Mr. Redington's firearms and then, ultimately received a court order removing all of his firearms from his possession. In turn, Mr. Redington challenged the Indiana statute on constitutional grounds arguing that it violated the constitutional provision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana guaranteeing the right to bear arms. The State of Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that "No," the protective order statute was constitutional and it did not violate the Constitution of the State of Indiana's right to bear arm. 2:05:03 PM CHAIR CLAMAN asked Stacie Kraly, DOL, to describe the consequences of a civil commitment pursuant to Title 47, and the full range of rights and privileges a person loses as a result of a civil commitment. 2:05:46 PM STACIE KRALY, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Statewide Section Supervisor, Human Services Section, Civil Division (Juneau), Department of Law (DOL), answered that when a person is civilly committed, the most obvious consequence is the loss of their liberty interest because they are being held by court order in a psychiatric hospital for treatment and evaluation. She reiterated her previous testimony and advised that the initial period of commitment is up to 30-days and the 30-days can be extended to 90-days, and to 180-days, but at any point during that time period when the person no longer meets the commitment criteria, they must be released. She related that there are also collateral consequences to a civil commitment which include: under federal law the loss of gun rights; the social stigma of a civil commitment, and on different occasions the person may have to identify that civil commitment as a part of an application for employment or healthcare, or applied in future legal proceedings to identify that the person does have a mental illness, which is a predicate to being civilly committed; it could also be used in other proceedings such as judicial notice; and there is a potential consequence of having to pay for the services they received at [the institution]. The cost of the person's period of commitment is borne by the State of Alaska, but there is a mechanism by which the state can seek recovery of some or all of that cost if the person has insurance or a third-party recovery. Those collateral consequences of a civil commitment were discussed under In re Joan K. v. Alaska, 273 P.3d 594 (2012), she advised. 2:08:50 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Kraly to describe the difference between the civil confinement of 2-3 days versus the 30-days, 90-days, and 180-days. MS. KRALY reiterated that under the civil commitment statute there is a preliminary evaluation period which, in nomenclature common parlance, is called ex parte. An ex parte allows for a person to be taken into custody and evaluated to determine whether a civil commitment should be granted and that ex parte order expires after 72-hours. The civil commitment, she explained, is when it was determined that the person had not stabilized and truly did need additional commitment, or to be committed in order to get better. The facility has the ability to petition the court for an initial period of civil commitment of 30-days. In that circumstance, two mental health professionals and a psychiatrist identify that the person is suffering from a mental illness, is a threat to self or others, or is gravely disabled, she explained. There is then a full evidentiary hearing in front of a superior court judge or a magistrate, the person is given court-appointed counsel, and other individuals could also be appointed to assist the judge in determining whether the person met the above criteria. 2:10:24 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked the success rate, for example, the state had [committed] 100 people, how many of those people get better, what are the treatment programs, and what are the outcomes. MS. KRALY clarified that the collateral consequences only apply after the 30-day civil commitment, they do not attach during the 72-hour hold. 2:11:27 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the gun cannot be removed during the first 72-hour hold. CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that typically the guns would not go with a person [to a psychiatric hospital] so the guns would be left behind. REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD stated that that is her point, that the person loses their liberties. MS. KRALY responded that there are consequences, but the collateral consequences to which the chairman requested information only attach after the civil commitment, and the federal law that a person cannot possess or own a firearm becomes effective upon the civil commitment. When applying for a job, the application may ask whether the person has been civilly committed, and the answer does not require a "yes" unless the person had gone through a 30-day commitment hearing. The answer does not require a "yes" if the person had only gone through a 72-hour hold. 2:12:39 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether Ms. Kraly was referring to 18 USC 922(g)(1-9). MS. KRALY answered in the affirmative. 2:12:59 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that it is appropriate to discuss that code because Ms. Kraly mentioned the cite. CHAIR CLAMAN interjected that the point of hearing about civil commitments is because people have asked a lot of questions and Ms. Kraly can answer to some extent, but Ms. Kraly is not here as an expert in criminal law, she is here from the DOL civil division. 2:13:22 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she is not an expert but she can certainly read the law. MS. KRALY advised that she did not have a copy of the law in front of her and was unable to recite the sub-sections. REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she has the law in front of her. CHAIR CLAMAN asked the relevance because Ms. Kraly testified that there are federal laws requiring that a person committed to a psychiatric hospital have their guns rights taken away. He further asked whether there was anything ambiguous about that statement. 2:14:03 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that it is important that people understand how the federal law works with this because the discussion is about civil confinement, a federal rule comes into play ... CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative to read the statute and the committee would then move on. 2:14:16 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to 18 USC 922(g)(1-9), which read as follows: 18 USC 922(g)(1-9) prohibits the following from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) who is a fugitive from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); (4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution; (5) who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))); (6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; (7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his citizenship; (8) who is subject to a court order that (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or (9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 2:15:58 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Kraly whether it is true that civil confinement interacts with this code and whether they are related to one another. CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that her questions have been asked and answered, and her reading of the United States Code makes clear that Ms. Kraly had referred to paragraph (4) and she does not need to answer that question because Representative Reinbold answered it for herself. 2:16:27 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to the collateral consequences Ms. Kraly had offered and asked whether there were further collateral consequences. MS. KRALY answered that "that a pretty exhaustive list of the collateral consequences" was identified by the Alaska Supreme Court in the In re Joan K. matter. REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that these collateral consequences would not attach to an ex parte 72-hour hearing. MS. KRALY answered that Representative Eastman was correct. 2:17:02 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that he was finding it difficult to understand whether Ms. Kraly was saying that the collateral consequences would not interact with an ex parte 72-hour hearing. MS. KRALY explained that she had been discussing the collateral consequences for employment and reiterated that a person would not have to disclose that they were subject to an ex parte 72- hour hold petition on an employment application. There is the social stigma and potentially the financial consequences of the 72-hour hold, and those two collateral consequences may attach to a 72-hour hold or an ex parte proceeding. A person must be civilly committed in order for the remaining collateral consequences to attach and a civil commitment does not occur until a 30-day petition is filed, she reiterated. 2:18:25 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Ms. Kraly to help him understand how that would work where someone took away a person's gun rights and their prospective employer asked whether they had ever been (audio difficulties). He further asked why the person does not have to disclose that information, and whether there is some legal protection that no one can come after the person if they lie and say they had not been involved in such a hearing. MS. KRALY said she was unsure she understood Representative Eastman's question. REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered a scenario that if a person is party to an ex parte hearing and, for example, the person was a recipient of protective order request, they attended the hearing, and the judge decided that was a frivolous request, but at a future date a prospective employer asked whether the person had ever been party to that type of hearing. He noted that Ms. Kraly had testified that the person would not have to disclose that situation because it is an ex parte 72-hour hearing. He asked whether the law is giving the person an opportunity to lie to their prospective employer or whether there is some other protection so that the disclosure does not become affected. CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out to Representative Eastman that his question has the whole process completely convoluted and confused. He presented an example wherein someone had requested an ex parte request to institutionalize a person regarding concerns about the person's mental state, and by being an ex parte hearing, the person is not present. In the event someone had related their concern that there was a problem with a person, the court would issue an ex parte order without the person present, which is what ex parte means in Latin. The contested hearing is for the 30-day commitment in which the person would have a right to be present and a right to counsel. He explained that the 30-day hearing is where the collateral consequences would attach, and if the person was committed based upon the judge's findings, the person would have to report that situation to a prospective employer. By the simple nature that the person is not party to an ex parte proceeding, there is nothing for the person to report, he pointed out. MS. KRALY responded that Chair Claman was correct. 2:21:04 PM [CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Eastman discussed the rulings of the chair.] 2:21:28 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that during the last hearing the committee did not receive a definitive answer as to the situation of two people appearing at the courthouse at the same time with (audio difficulties) maybe a marriage dispute, that the judge could not choose to hear "both of those, you know, parties together individually in those respective petitions." Therefore, if the committee was not able to receive a firm answer that ex parte means that there is no way for a person to be involved, he would like to go under the possibility that someone could appear at a 72-hour proceeding. CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that Representative Eastman had changed his topic from a civil commitment under Title 47, which is what Ms. Kraly was discussing. Representative Eastman's questions to Ms. Meade during the last hearing were with regard to domestic violence protective orders. He further pointed out that that is not an area in which Ms. Kraly had provided testimony. He asked Representative Eastman to limit his questions to Ms. Kraly's expertise as to Title 47, civil commitments. 2:22:35 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered a scenario wherein a person is the recipient of an ex parte 72-hour hold request, and a prospective employer asks whether they were involved in a 72- hour hold and asked how it is that the person does not have to disclose that 72-hour hold and he asked whether the law read that he is permitted to lie to his prospective employer and the person could not be legally affected. CHAIR CLAMAN added "With respect to Title 47." MS. KRALY pointed out that she is not an employment lawyer and is not able to answer Representative Eastman's specific questions as to the consequences of not disclosing. Although, she pointed out, as Chair Claman previously explained, when an ex parte 72-hour hold is granted, it is exactly as Chair Claman identified, the proceeding is ex parte and the person is not involved. She reiterated that a mental health professional, a friend of the family, a doctor, or a psychiatrist contacts the judicial officer, explains the circumstances and why they believe that the person is mentally ill, is a threat to self or others, or is gravely disabled. Under that scenario, she offered, the judge can determine, based upon the evidence offered ex parte, that there is enough evidence for the person to be held for 72-hours to determine whether the person is truly mentally ill, truly a threat to self or others, or is truly gravely disabled. Under those circumstances, she reiterated, the person would not have the due process that would normally be afforded to a person to rebut or protect their liberty interests. Therefore, she further reiterated, that sort of information should not generally be required to be disclosed because the person did not have a chance to defend themselves in those proceedings. It is the 30-day commitment that becomes a collateral consequence because the person had the entire array of due process wherein the person was in front of a judge with their appointed counsel, the person's counsel can cross-examine, present their own witnesses, and defend against the petition alleging that the person is mentally ill, a threat to self or others, or is gravely disabled, she explained. 2:25:21 PM REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether Ms. Kraly is aware of any provision of law that would limit a prospective employer from being able to ask these types of questions dealing with an ex parte hearing setting. CHAIR CLAMAN added, "Within the Title 47 context." MS. KRALY said that she was not able to answer that question. 2:25:48 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to gun violence protective orders and surmised that questions could be asked "because she said something about ex parte and I think it's really important to get clarification there." CHAIR CLAMAN reiterated that Ms. Kraly is available to discuss Title 47 civil commitments with an ex parte component. Representative Reinbold could ask questions regarding ex parte hearings in the civil commitment context, Ms. Kraly is not here to testify about either domestic violence protective orders or the proposed gun violence protective orders, which is a different subject in the area of Ms. Kraly's expertise. 2:26:28 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that with the ex parte proceeding, the person receives no representation and cannot defend themselves, "it went to the immediate family member who can petition and then it's reporting the evidence and then it - it says on this chart, 'expires 20-days unless ..." CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that Representative Reinbold was asking questions about the gun violence protective order, which is the proposal of this statute. He further reiterated that Ms. Kraly is available to discuss civil commitments under Title 47, and this particular proposal has nothing to do with civil commitments. Ms. Kraly was asked to testify in order that the committee could understand the differences and she is not here to answer questions about the bill. 2:27:08 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said, "Basically, you were talking very specifically about ex parte" and mentally ill. She related that she was not sure whether Ms. Kraly had used the words "and" or "or" when describing the commitment criteria. CHAIR CLAMAN advised that Ms. Kraly could answer in the context of Title 47, as she had answered the question three times and this is the last time she would answer that question. MS. KRALY reiterated that in order to be civilly committed, under AS 47.30, the judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill, and is a threat to self or others, or is gravely disabled. 2:28:30 PM CHAIR CLAMAN advised Kaci Schroeder, Department of Law, that the bill contains language on page 4, referring to "less restrictive alternatives." 2:28:42 PM KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law, noted that "less restrictive alternatives" is an area in which Ms. Kraly could respond. CHAIR CLAMAN noted that in this particular bill there is reference on page 4, line 13 that "less restrictive alternatives" have been tried and were ineffective. He asked whether that is a question for Ms. Kraly to answer. MS. KRALY responded that she performed research as to "less restrictive alternatives" and the term is used in approximately 15-16 different places in state law. There is no statutory definition of "less restrictive alternatives" and in the big scheme of things it is a fact specific question that would be evaluated by the agency, but in most cases, it would be evaluated by the judicial officer. For example, this comes up in civil commitment hearings, and before the person can be committed for up to 30-days, the criteria and predicate for commitment must be established. There must also be an evaluation that there are "no less restrictive alternative than placement in a secure psychiatric hospital." In doing so, she explained, it must be established on an evidentiary basis with the judge as to whether there is a means to provide care, custody, keep the person safe, the community safe, or keep them from harming themselves by not putting them into the hospital. In that regard, could the person go to, for example, the Juneau Alliance for Mental Health (JAMHI) Health & Wellness housing in Juneau, whether there is enough support at JAMHI housing that the person did not need to be civilly committed, can the person remain in their own home, can they remain in their parent's home, can they go to a non-locked secure facility for possible substance abuse treatment, and so forth. It must be established with the judge that an array of services had been considered and were discounted for purposes of maintaining health, safety, and welfare, she explained. When reviewing how "less restrictive alternatives" is used in other provisions in state law, she offered that the same sort of concept comes up, as to whether all of the other circumstances had been qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated in order for the judge to determine what has to happen in this circumstance because there are no less restrictive alternatives. In the context of a mental commitment, it would mean something that is less restrictive than being placed in a psychiatric hospital, she explained. 2:31:57 PM CHAIR CLAMAN asked, in the context of HB 75, that would mean some less restrictive alternative than removing a person's firearms. MS. KRALY answered that Chair Claman was exactly correct, it would be a fact specific analysis to present to the court to advise that all of these other alternatives, such as locking the guns, removing the guns, and putting them in another place, had been considered. There could be an array of less restrictive alternatives potentially presented to the court for the court to ultimately determine whether those were sufficient to maintain the safety of the situation, she related. 2:32:32 PM CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that the less restrictive alternatives in HB 75, page 4, would be specific to the less restrictive alternatives for the guns at issue rather than removing the guns. MS. KRALY noted that that is how she read the bill. 2:32:56 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the fact specific analysis (audio difficulties) more restrictive has to work. For example, it may be less of a burden to the state if the neighbor with a locked safe, locks up the person's guns, rather than law enforcement confiscating the guns. She commented that she was trying to think of effective and less burdensome alternatives for the state and possibly more comfortable alternatives "for the accused." (Audio difficulties throughout this testimony." MS. KRALY answered that that is exactly the type of evidence that would be presented to a judge. The judge would evaluate whether they believed locking a person's guns in a neighbor's locked safe was an appropriate disposition, such that the gun violence protective order was not necessary because the guns were safe. CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative Reinbold that in the evidentiary context, what would more likely arise would be that "the person came to the court and said, 'I asked this person in my house 'Can I put your guns in the next-door neighbor's gun safe because I think you are a risk to yourself?' And, the person said, 'You can't -- no, I won't let you put the guns in the neighbor's gun safe.' So, the likelihood is that you're not going to get someone in court saying, 'the guns from the neighbor's gun safe' you are going to get the person saying, 'I tried to get them in the neighbor's gun safe and they wouldn't agree.'" 2:34:48 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether an amendment should be proposed that would make certain this was an option, or whether the court would automatically determine whether there are any effective options other than law enforcement seizing the guns and the state having to manage the guns. MS. KRALY responded that she is not in any position to make a recommendation on amendments. She offered her belief that the manner in which the statute is crafted, such as the requirement that the judge engage, identify, and make a finding as to whether there are no less restrictive alternatives, meets those needs because the judge would have to make a specific finding as to that evidence, she explained. 2:35:54 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the judge automatically must see the least restrictive options. MS. KRALY related that that is how she reads the bill. CHAIR CLAMAN added that that is what the bill clearly requires. 2:36:11 PM CHAIR CLAMAN referred to HB 75, [Sec. 6. Sec. 18.65.845], page 8, lines 4-5, which read as follows: In AS 18.65.815 - 18.65.840, "immediate family member" means a spouse, child, stepchild, parent, or stepparent. CHAIR CLAMAN asked Kaci Schroeder, Department of Law, whether there was a particular reason it was limited to those individuals and why there would be limits on more people being identified, such as grandparents or domestic unmarried partners. He asked whether it was simply a choice made by the drafter. 2:36:58 PM KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law, responded that the reason it is defined in this manner would be a question for the drafter or the sponsor. The Department of Law (DOL) views this as solely in the hands of the legislature as to how it wants to define that provision. 2:37:12 PM CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether there are other statutes that allow these types of requests, other than those listed in this particular statute. MS. SCHROEDER answered that the department had not looked at that issue, there are other statutes in the state code that define household member, and those definitions are broader, but it is not the same terminology of "immediate family member." 2:37:34 PM CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether the domestic violence protective orders use a definition of household member or does it actually list the individuals. MS. SCHROEDER responded that it is household member. CHAIR CLAMAN asked who is determined to be a household member under the domestic violence protective order statute in contrast to this statute. MS. SCHROEDER referred to AS 18.66.990(5), which read as follows: (5) "household member" includes (A) adults or minors who are current or former spouses; (B) adults or minors who live together or who have lived together; (C) adults or minors who are dating or who have dated; (D) adults or minors who are engaged in or who have engaged in a sexual relationship; (E) adults or minors who are related to each other up to the fourth degree of consanguinity, whether of the whole or half blood or by adoption, computed under the rules of civil law; (F) adults or minors who are related or formerly related by marriage; (G) persons who have a child of the relationship; and (H) minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in (A) - (G) of this paragraph; 2:39:50 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Schroeder to describe what this bill does that is not already in federal or state statutes. MS. SCHROEDER replied that she cannot speak to that question and she could only speak to the state criminal aspects of HB 75. 2:40:10 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Schroeder what she could speak to on this bill. MS. SCHROEDER answered that this bill establishes a gun violence protective order that is a civil proceeding and it is not something within which the criminal division would be involved. However, she said, under this bill, the violation of the order would become a crime which is when the criminal division would get involved and potentially prosecute for the violation of the protective order. She added that that would be the extent of the criminal division's involvement. 2:40:37 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked why this would be a civil proceeding and not a criminal proceeding. MS. SCHROEDER answered that protective orders, in general, are civil proceedings because the state is not involved, it is one party against another party. The violation of those orders generally, whether it be a domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking protective order, is a crime wherein the state is involved so it is a criminal matter. 2:41:08 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked when the United States Code, that she previously read, is invoked in this whole process. MS. SCHROEDER advised that that question is outside of her area of expertise as she practices solely in state criminal law. 2:41:46 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the United States Code previously referenced, is applicable in the department and for Alaskans. Representative Reinbold commented that "I would say yes." CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out to Representative Reinbold that Ms. Schroeder does not need to answer that question because the federal law applies to everyone. The authority to prosecute federal law is given solely to the federal government and state prosecutors do not have authority to prosecute federal crimes, which has been the law of the land for centuries. 2:42:21 PM REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that there is currently a "big movement" wherein the Anchorage Police Department is working with the Alaska State Troopers and is also working with the federal government on all of the crime taking place in the state. It appears that, at some point, the USC cite would be invoked and she asked, at what point would the criminal division invoke this USC cite if collaborating. CHAIR CLAMAN ruled that he would not ask Ms. Schroeder to answer that question, if the FBI, APD, the Alaska State Troopers cooperate, they make decisions about where folks will be charged. There will be crimes charged in federal court that have multi-agency obligations and they are charged only with federal crimes in federal court. The same is true with the cooperation between the state and the FBI in what becomes state prosecutions wherein the person is charged with state crimes in state courts because the particular codes are jurisdictional, he said. [HB 75 was held over.]