HJR 3 - CONST AM: BUDGET RESERVE FUND APPROPS. 1:22:53 PM CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the first order of business would be HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3, Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to appropriations from the budget reserve fund. REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN ROKEBERG, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor, relayed that HJR 3 proposes to place before the voters the question of whether to repeal subsections (b) and (c) of Section 17, Article IX, of the Alaska State Constitution; Section 17 pertains to the Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund (CBRF), which was established in 1990 by the Sixteenth Alaska State Legislature. In 11 out of the subsequent 13 fiscal years, he remarked, the legislature has needed the three-quarter vote required for appropriations from the CBRF in order to balance the budget. He opined that subsections (b) and (c) of Section 17, while intended to restrict spending, have not actually worked to that effect but have instead resulted in increasing the budget; additionally, subsection (b) is complicated, has been misunderstood and litigated, and has caused significant difficulties, historically, as to its purpose. [Subsections (b) and (c) of] Section 17 have failed their public purpose, he concluded, and should therefore be repealed. 1:25:42 PM CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that no one else wished to testify, close public testimony on HJR 3. REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked whether HJR 3 works together with legislation sponsored by Representative Harris. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG offered his belief that the two pieces of legislation are not compatible; HJR 3 maintains the CBRF, and he strongly supports this concept as sound public policy. He went on to say: I believe we need a fund - that's been voted on by the people and established by the people - to allow the legislature to have funds available to balance the budget, when needed, and additionally allow the administration to use the shock-absorber effect and the cash flow available for cash management purposes. I believe the administration, over the past several years, has testified to the fact that the State of Alaska uses approximately $400 million a year and they draw from the funds for their cash management purposes, because of the ebb and flow of cash flow within the state coffers. So in perpetuity we're going to need a relatively large amount of available cash in order to even meet our daily cash flow requirements. And this ... fund has been used for that purpose. It's saved us significantly because we haven't had to utilize such devices as tax-anticipation notes to go out and finance cash flow requirements, which is quite common in many states and ... is allowable under our constitution. So we literally would have to borrow money to meet our daily cash flow requirements, without the fund. So the fund in and of itself has a significant public purpose and I support the fund. It's only those provisions of that fund that give weight [to], or require, the three-quarter vote to access the funds for budgeting purposes that I believe that we should repeal. REPRESENTATIVE GARA offered his understanding that in past years, the minority has used the three-quarter vote requirement to increase education funding, and said he is concerned that without the leverage offered via the three-quarter vote requirement, the minority will no longer be able to get extra funding for education. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG opined that any policy formations on the part of the legislature should be based on merit, not on a constitutionally constructed "leverage." He added: I think that's the point of this resolution. Why should we create a constitutional mechanism to give one group within the legislature additional leverage, which historically is not found in most other legislatures. There are a few states - there's a report from the "Alaska Budget Report" - that have supermajority requirements for budgeting, ... [and] even such conservative groups at the Cato Institute [think] that that might help reduced spending. Well, there was study done in California, apparently, that verifies, I believe, the position of most Alaskans, recognizing that it tends to increase spending rather than decrease it. But in terms of specific use of the leverage mechanism as to a specific area of spending - and you sited education needs - I don't believe that that's appropriate. You seem to make the statement that but for the leverage, that funding would not have been forthcoming. I take exception to that, significantly. You could say that ... any bargaining was artificially constructed for the mere purpose of gaining the vote, whether or not it ultimately would have had the actual impact in the budget or not. Absent that leverage, I suspect and believe the legislature would act appropriately and fund the needed amounts of educational monies. As a matter of fact, this year, the legislature, in the House, has enacted a $70 million K-12 educational budget appropriation without the leverage ... [or] requirement of the three-quarter vote. And you can debate whether that's adequate or inadequate, [but] the fact is, it's historically one of the highest amounts ever appropriated, and not affected at all by the leverage mechanism. 1:31:33 PM REPRESENTATIVE GARA disagreed with Representative Rokeberg, adding: We don't have a three-quarter vote this year. There are members of your party that have come to us and asked us to use our leverage to get the "fifty-one twenty" amount, the amount that we just determined was appropriate. Without the three-quarter vote, though, we're stuck at "forty-nine nineteen." And that's exactly the circumstance where ... I think it's important to have the leverage as a minority party. To move up education funding to the point where you can actually make some progress, I think, would happen this year if we had the three-quarter vote. We've had enough majority members come to us who (indisc. - coughing) join us for the " fifty-one twenty" vote on the floor, but I think would if we had the three- quarter vote. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied: I believe Representative Gara makes my case. If you in fact had 21 votes to meet that purpose, you could prevail within the body of the House. You wouldn't have to have the supermajority vote, then, so conversely it works against you. That's the curious thing about it. ... And you also indicate that without the leverage of a three-quarter vote this year you're not able to extort a policy position using the minority leverage mechanism. ... That again makes my case. REPRESENTATIVE GARA remarked, "Just not able get adequate education funding." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG pointed out that adequacy is in the eye of the beholder. "I'm looking at this from a constitutional, overall, more-global macro-view, if you will; you're bringing it down to a specific point, which is all well and good, but I think you give substance to my argument by even acknowledging on the record that you're using it for this purpose," he concluded. 1:33:34 PM CHAIR McGUIRE surmised, then, that Representative Rokeberg is of the belief that when the [three-quarter vote] requirement was originally passed, the idea was that it would restrain state spending. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG concurred with that summation, that the requirement would make access to the additional funding more difficult and thereby create more fiscal discipline. But that has not been the case, he opined, since the way it's been used, more money is actually spent, and so its very purpose is defeated. CHAIR McGUIRE suggested setting HJR 3 aside. REPRESENTATIVE GARA offered his belief that without the three- quarter vote, the minority party won't be able to "extract some sort of equity for their own districts." He asked why he should be comfortable that HJR 3 will ensure party equity with regard to [capital projects]. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG noted that historically, until two years ago, there were no monies available to majority members for their districts, whereas minority members received "tens of millions of dollars" for various projects. Therefore he would argue that the minority benefited significantly while the majority "got zero." REPRESENTATIVE GARA remarked, "The majority gets their money in the regular budget process, and then it's only with the three- quarters vote that the minority ever gets any projects in their districts." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG disagreed, and opined that appropriations to districts have been based on merit and have been justifiable; for example, the school deferred maintenance list, produced by the Department of Education and Early Development (DEED), has taken precedence. He offered his view that the legislature has shown a markedly nonpartisan allocation of funds, though he acknowledged that certain chairs of certain committees have sometimes arranged for [larger] allocations for their districts. 1:39:14 PM REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON opined that Representative Rokeberg makes good points, and remarked on some of the funding allocations made last year to certain districts in Anchorage. REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON moved to report HJR 3 out of committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes. REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected. He said: If we're going to give up the three-quarters vote, to protect ourselves and allow some sort of fairness between parties so that one party doesn't take all the money, I would like something in the [Alaska State] Constitution that says the majority party can only take so much more capital money than the minority party, so that we don't have sort of this "money- feed." I proposed some language yesterday that said: "On average, you shouldn't allow the majority party, per district, to take more than ... 20 percent than the minority takes." It seemed a little bit cumbersome, but I would ask you, if you're going ask us to give up ... the tool that we have to ask for equity, then I would ask you to think about something that would allow us to retain at least some measure of equity in the future so that all the money doesn't end up in republican districts, and [so] we don't have what happened last year, which was this $125,000 allocation that just went to majority members. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG pointed out that $11 million was paid specifically to minority projects as a result of what he characterized as the leverage mechanism. He added: I think the ultimate leveler ... between minority and majority, whoever maintains that power, is something that in the House the voters speak to every two years. To put additional superstructures, either in the [Alaska State] Constitution or in statute, I think is inappropriate. You're taking the dynamic away by binding future legislators about what they do, and which is a constitutional violence, in my opinion. CHAIR McGUIRE indicated that Representative Gara's suggested [language change] seems attractive to her because she has seen all of the minority members receive millions of dollars in the past while her district didn't receive anything until just last year. She remarked, however, that she agrees that "we shouldn't be micromanaging it when it comes to a constitutional amendment." 1:42:53 PM REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, in response to a question, said he objects [to the motion to report the resolution from committee], adding that he thinks it is important to protect the rights of the minority in this particular case. He referred to language in the sponsor statement that says, "If those in the minority have the goal of budget reduction, the three-quarter vote provides them with little or no power," and opined that such is not true; rather, the three-quarter vote requirement can provide even more power to a conservative minority. 1:44:38 PM A roll call vote was taken. Representatives McGuire, Anderson, Coghill, Kott, and Dahlstrom voted in favor of reporting HJR 3 from committee. Representatives Gruenberg and Gara voted against it. Therefore, HJR 3 was reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee by a vote of 5-2.