Legislature(2019 - 2020)BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
02/19/2020 01:30 PM Senate JUDICIARY
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| Presentation: Legislative Affairs Agency, 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
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+ teleconferenced
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| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
SENATE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
February 19, 2020
1:31 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Senator John Coghill, Chair
Senator Peter Micciche, Vice Chair
Senator Shelley Hughes
Senator Lora Reinbold
Senator Jesse Kiehl
MEMBERS ABSENT
All members present
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
PRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY ~ 2019 LEGAL SERVICES
OVERSIGHT REPORT
- HEARD
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
No previous action to record
WITNESS REGISTER
MEGHAN WALLACE, Director
Legislative Legal Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated a PowerPoint and answered
questions during the 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report.
LINDA BRUCE, Assistant Revisor
Legislative Legal Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated in a PowerPoint and answered
questions during the 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report.
SANDON FISHER, Legislative Legal Counsel
Legislative Legal Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated in a PowerPoint and answered
questions on the 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report.
MEERA CAOUETTE, Legislative Legal Counsel
Legislative Legal Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated a PowerPoint and answered
questions on the 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report.
ACTION NARRATIVE
1:31:11 PM
CHAIR JOHN COGHILL called the Senate Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:31 p.m. Present at call to order
were Senators Reinbold, Kiehl, Hughes and Chair Coghill. Senator
Micciche joined the meeting as it was in progress.
^Presentation: Legislative Affairs Agency, 2019 Legal Services
Oversight Report
Presentation: Legislative Affairs Agency, 2019 Legal Services
Oversight Report
1:31:20 PM
CHAIR COGHILL announced a presentation by the Legislative
Affairs Agency on the 2019 Legal Services Oversight Report.
1:33:02 PM
MEGHAN WALLACE, Director, Legal Services, Division of Legal
Services, Legislative Affairs Agency, said she cannot take any
credit for the report since the agency's attorneys worked on
reviewing, summarizing, and providing the recommendations on the
report.
1:34:01 PM
MS. WALLACE reviewed slide 2, Why Do We Prepare the Oversight
Report?
square4 AS 24.20.065(a) requires that the Legislative Council
annually examine administrative regulations, published
opinions of state and federal courts and of the
Department of Law that rely on state statutes, and
final decisions adopted under the Administrative
Procedure Act (AS 44.62) to determine whether or not
(1) the courts and agencies are properly
implementing legislative purposes;
(2) there are court or agency expressions of
dissatisfaction with state statutes or the common law
of the state;
(3) the opinions, decisions, or regulations
indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes;
(4) the courts have modified or revised the
common law of the state.
square4 Under AS 24.20.065(b) the Council is to make a
comprehensive report of its findings and
recommendations to the members of the Legislature at
the start of each regular session.
1:34:53 PM
CHAIR COGHILL commented that the legislature asked for this
report.
MS. WALLACE agreed. The LAA, Legislative Legal Services no
longer reviews the regulations. In 2018, the legislature
repealed the regulation commission's authority.
1:34:56 PM
MS. WALLACE reviewed slide 3, What is in the Oversight
Report?
square4 Review of the opinions of the Alaska Supreme Court,
the Alaska Court of Appeals, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska that
rely on Alaska Statutes or interpret the Alaska
Constitution
square4 Review of formal and informal opinions of the Attorney
General that construe or interpret Alaska Statutes or
the Alaska Constitution or that might be of special
interest to the legislature
square4 A list of Alaska Statutes that, absent any action by
the 2020 Legislature, will be repealed or amended
before March 1, 2021, because of repealers or
amendments enacted by previous legislatures with
delayed effective dates
square4 Recommendations for legislative review
She said this year the legislature was already aware of the
attorney general's opinions, so they did not have to highlight
them in the report. She provided a brief summary of how the
agency conducts these reviews. The Alaska Supreme Court issues
its decisions on Fridays, she assigns the decisions to
attorneys, and the attorneys review the decisions throughout the
year. In the Interim, the attorneys will pull out cases and
prepare summaries. It takes several months to prepare these
reports.
MS. WALLACE directed members to the report. After the case
summary, the attorney makes a notation that legislative review
is not recommended, which means the division included the case
since it analyzed or interpreted a constitutional provision or
an Alaska statute, or alternatively, a recommendation for
legislative review or a qualifier that that legislative review
is not recommended unless there is something the legislature may
specifically wish to review with respect to the decision.
She said the plan today is to go through the 2019 oversight
report and highlight three cases the legislature may wish to
review, and about 15 other cases that may interest the
legislature. She explained that the attorneys read the cases but
are not the subject matter expert of the statute or subject
under discussion. She asked members to keep that in mind before
diving too deeply into a subject area.
1:38:46 PM
CHAIR COGHILL suggested that members make individual notes on
issues that may need additional briefing.
1:39:54 PM
LINDA BRUCE, Assistant Revisor, Legislative Legal Services,
Legislative Affairs Agency, Juneau, Alaska, said she would
discuss the first 8 of the 18 cases for today's hearing.
She referred to a case on slide 4, 2019 Recommendations for
Legislative Review:
square4 State v. Planned Parenthood of the Greater Northwest,
436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019) AS 47.07.068
square4 AS 47.07.068 AND 7 AAC 160.900(D)(30), WHICH
REDEFINE WHICH ABORTIONS QUALIFY AS "MEDICALLY
NECESSARY" FOR THE PURPOSES OF MEDICAID FUNDING,
VIOLATE THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION'S GUARANTEE OF EQUAL
PROTECTION.
square4 Pages 4 - 5
She said in 2014, the legislature enacted AS 47.07.068, which
redefined which abortions qualify as "medically necessary" for
the purpose of Medicaid funding, similar to the 2013 regulation.
Specifically, AS 47.07.068(a) prohibits Medicaid payment for
abortions "unless the abortion services are for a "medically
necessary" abortion or the pregnancy was the result of rape or
incest." Subsection (b) (3) defines a "medically necessary"
abortion as one that, "in a physician's objective and reasonable
professional judgment after considering medically relevant
factors ? must be performed to avoid a threat of serious risk to
the life or physical health of a woman from continuation of the
woman's pregnancy." Subsection (b)(4) then explains "serious
risk to the life or physical health."
MS. WALLACE said the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the
statute and the regulation imposed different requirements for
Medicaid funding eligibility upon women who choose to have an
abortion to terminate their pregnancy versus women who continue
with their pregnancy. Therefore, the Court held that the statute
violated the Constitution of the State of Alaska guarantee of
equal protection.
She said as provided in the report, "Legislative review is
recommended to consider amending AS 47.07.068 in light of this
decision."
CHAIR COGHILL said he recalls the debate.
1:41:56 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD said she cosponsored the bill and she finds
this very challenging. She asked for the definition of equal
protection.
CHAIR COGHILL said it is a question the committee will need to
answer in terms of the statute in question. He said her question
relates to the issues the Alaska Supreme Court had with the
language and not the Legislative Legal Services attorney's
interpretation.
SENATOR REINBOLD said she was interested in the definition of
equal protection.
CHAIR COGHILL explained that he does not wish to have
Legislative Legal review the entire court case. He said the goal
is to flag the issues for the committee.
1:43:35 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE joined the hearing.
SENATOR HUGHES said it is appropriate to flag this issue. She
stated that the constitutional amendment in SJR 13 would address
this issue.
1:44:43 PM
MS. BRUCE turned to the next case on slide 4:
square4 Doe v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116
(Alaska 2019) - AS 12.63.010 - 12.63.100; AS 18.65.087
THE ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT'S
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY BE
APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE OFFENDERS; THE ACT VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS, BUT THIS DEFECT MAY BE CURED BY PROVIDING
A PROCEDURE FOR OFFENDERS TO ESTABLISH THEIR NON-
DANGEROUSNESS.
square4 Pages 6 - 7
The Alaska Supreme Court considered whether the Alaska sex
offender act violated due process by requiring all sex offenders
to register without providing a procedure for them to establish
their non-dangerousness. Under the act, all sex offenders must
register every year for 15 years. However, repeat offenders or
offenders guilty of an aggravated offense must register
quarterly for life. First, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded
that Alaska is not barred by lack of jurisdiction from requiring
out-of-state offenders who are present in the state to register
under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA).
Therefore, the Court found that Doe must register under ASORA.
Next, the Court concluded that the Act violated due process. A
sex offender may hold a legitimate and objectively reasonable
privacy expectation that his conviction and personal information
will not be disseminated as it is under ASORA. The Court agreed
with the state that there was a compelling state interest in
protecting the public from sex offenders. However, the Court
determined the Act did not provide the least restrictive means
for achieving this goal. The Court concluded that the defect in
ASORA may be cured by providing a procedure for offenders to
establish their non-dangerousness. The Court specifically said
it was not invalidating the Act because it serves very obvious,
legitimate purposes.
1:46:37 PM
CHAIR COGHILL interjected that the legislature has a bill in the
Senate State Affairs Standing Committee on this subject.
1:46:41 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked if the decision talks about timeframes or
the number of hearings.
MS. BRUCE answered the decision did not discuss timeframes or
multiple hearings. It appears from the decision that just one
hearing is needed but it seems to be left to the legislature.
CHAIR COGHILL said the committee will have a chance to consider
the court's actions and the governor's solution.
1:47:39 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD said it would be helpful to know the bill
number and year that it passed. She specifically asked if it
pertained to HB 49 or if it was a different bill.
MS. BRUCE answered that it did not relate to HB 49. She said she
thought that the sex offender registry passed the legislature in
1984, but the legislature has subsequently amended it multiple
times.
CHAIR COGHILL said it would be helpful to review the specific
statute for the footnotes that identify the court decisions.
1:48:29 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD asked why the court is reviewing the decision
after 20 years.
CHAIR COGHILL answered that someone out of state complained. He
reiterated his intent for the committee to flag issues on these
cases to deal with later.
SENATOR REINBOLD said she understood. She added that the
legislature dealt with the sex offender registry last year as a
public safety issue.
CHAIR COGHILL said he anticipated responding to this issue in
committee.
1:50:06 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said he found his notes on this pertaining to an
applicant filing a new complaint to get off the sex offender
registry. He said it would be helpful for Legislative Legal to
discuss the notion of rehearing.
1:50:24 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE related his understanding that Legislative
Legal Services was giving a status report on the cases.
CHAIR COGHILL agreed. He said the goal is to flag the cases for
further committee review.
1:51:19 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE said it is difficult not to get passionate
about the cases.
CHAIR COGHILL acknowledged that each of these cases brings legal
and emotional debate.
1:51:48 PM
MS. BRUCE returned to Doe v. State. She said legislative review
is recommended to consider whether to amend the Alaska Sex
Offender Registry Act in light of this decision. As Chair
Coghill pointed out, the governor has introduced HB 228 and SB
168 to address sex offender registration.
1:52:25 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed slide 5, 2019 Recommendations for Legislative
Review:
square4 Hamburg v. State, 434 P.3d 1165 (Alaska App. 2018) -
AS 12.30.011(d)(2)
square4 THE PRE-2018 VERSION OF AS 12.30.011(d)(2), WHICH
ALLOWS THE COURT TO PRESUME THAT DEFENDANTS CHARGED
WITH CERTAIN CLASSES OF FELONIES MAY NOT BE RELEASED
ON BAIL, VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
ENTITLING DEFENDANTS TO BAIL BEFORE CONVICTION.
square4 Page 9
She said this case has to do with HB 49. The Court considered
the pre-2018 version of AS 12.30.011(d)(2), which provided that
when a defendant is charged with certain types of offenses there
is a rebuttable presumption that no conditions of bail will
guarantee the defendant's appearance at future court proceedings
and the safety of the victim and the public. The Court held that
the statute was unconstitutional under Article I, Section 11, of
the Constitution of the State of Alaska.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is recommended because the
legislature used language similar to the pre-2018 version of the
statute when it repealed and reenacted AS 12.30.011(d)(2) in HB
49. That language is now back in statute, she said.
CHAIR COGHILL related his understanding that it is
challengeable.
MS. BRUCE answered yes.
CHAIR COGHILL said it is something the committee should review.
1:53:46 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed slide 6, Other Cases of Interest That May
Require Review:
square4 State v. Thompson, 435 P.3d 947 (Alaska 2019)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not want to allow separate
convictions for each distinct act of non-consensual
sexual penetration when either the penetrating object
or body part or the penetrated orifice has changed.
square4 Page 8
She said in this case a defendant was convicted of multiple
counts of first and second degree sexual abuse of a minor. The
disagreement was whether separate convictions could be imposed
for sexual penetration with different objects or body parts
regardless of the time period of the assault. The defendant
argued that these separate convictions should be merged into one
conviction. The Alaska Supreme Court first determined that the
same rules for merger apply to both sexual abuse of a minor and
sexual assault convictions. The Court next considered the state
and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy
and the legislative intent of the sexual abuse of a minor and
sexual assault statutes and concluded that a separate act of
penetration occurs each time the penetrated orifice or the
penetrating object or body part changes. Therefore, each of
these can support separate convictions.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not want to allow separate convictions for each
distinct act of non-consensual sexual penetration when either
the penetrating object or body part or the penetrated orifice
has changed. She stated that legislative review is not
recommended because generally it seems as if the Court followed
legislative intent and the plain language of the statute.
Nevertheless, Legal Services flagged it for the legislature's
consideration.
1:55:48 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE related his understanding that the Court
ultimately found that not merging the charges was appropriate.
MS. BRUCE answered that is correct.
CHAIR COGHILL recalled that was the legislature's intent.
1:56:16 PM
MS. BRUCE continued with the next case on slide 6:
Nelson v. State, 440 P.3d 240 (Alaska 2019).
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants a public defender's conflict to only be
imputed to others in the same office on a case-by-case
basis.
square4 Page 17
She said this case relates to rules of professional conduct. A
defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel from his
public defender. At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the
defendant was represented by a different attorney from the same
Public Defender Agency office. The defendant argued that he
should not have a public defender from the same office due to a
conflict of interest. The superior court agreed on the conflict
of interest but appointed new counsel only for any potential
appellate and post-conviction relief proceedings. On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court adopted a per se rule, under which a "mere
allegation of ineffective assistance is sufficient to create a
conflict of interest disqualifying the public defender." The
Court held that a public defender has a conflict of interest that
disqualifies that public defender from representing a defendant
when the defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel against another public defender in the same office. The
Court further held that a defendant is entitled to conflict
counsel immediately after raising an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in the context of an attempt to withdraw a plea.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants a public defender's conflict to only be imputed
to others in the same office on a case-by-case basis. Some states
do operate in this manner.
1:58:08 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD asked how these cases correlate.
MS. WALLACE explained that since there are multiple drafters of
this report, she organized the synopses based on the cases each
attorney reviewed. She pointed out that she designated on each
slide the page number on the report. For example, Nelson v.
State, just discussed, is found on page 17 of the report.
1:59:20 PM
MS. BRUCE referred to the next case on slide 6:
square4 Weston v. AKHappytime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015 (Alaska
2019) - AS 09.17.070
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants to limit evidence introduced at
trial to the amount actually paid to the medical
provider.
square4 Page 18
She said in this case a woman was seriously injured when she
slipped and fell on ice in a hotel parking lot. When the woman
later sued the hotel for negligence, the hotel sought to bar her
from introducing her original medical bills as evidence of her
damages, arguing that only the amount Medicare actually paid was
relevant and admissible. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court
allowed the injured party to introduce the full, undiscounted
medical bills at trial as evidence of the medial services'
reasonable value. However, the Court also found that evidence of
the amounts actually paid to providers for medical services
should be excluded from the jury's consideration at trial but is
subject to post-trial proceedings under AS 09.17.070 for
possible reduction of the damages award.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants to limit evidence introduced at trial to the
amount actually paid to the medical provider.
2:00:57 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed the final case on slide 6:
square4 Keeton III v. State, Dep't of Transp. and Pub.
Facilities, 441 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2019) - AS
09.55.440(a)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants to include attorney's fees and costs
in "the amount finally awarded" for purposes of awards
of prejudgment interest under AS 09.55.440(a).
square4 Pages 18 - 19
She explained that when the Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities (DOTPF) files a declaration of taking,
allowing it to take title to the property immediately, it must
deposit with the court the estimated compensation for the
taking. The landowner can appeal arguing that the amount of the
taking is greater. If the landowner succeeds in that effort, AS
09.55.440(a) allows any difference between the amount awarded
and the amount that DOT&PF placed with the court to be charged
interest at the rate of 10.5 percent annually.
MS. BRUCE said the landowner argued that the amount finally
awarded should include legal fees and costs. The Alaska Supreme
Court disagreed and held that "for purposes of awards of
prejudgment interest under AS 09.55.440(a), 'the amount finally
awarded' does not include attorney's fees and costs." It
pertains only to the fair value of the land.
She explained that the landowner still receives attorney's fees
and costs, but the interest rate is 4.5 percent.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants to include attorney's fees and costs in the
amount finally awarded for purposes of awards of prejudgment
interest under AS 09.55.440(a).
2:02:57 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed slide 7, Other Cases of Interest That May
Require Review:
square4 R.C. v. State, 435 P.3d 1022 (Alaska App. 2018) - AS
47.12.120(b)(4)(A)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not want a court to consider a
minor's ability to pay restitution in juvenile
delinquency cases.
square4 Pages 24 - 25
Under this case the Court considered two different statutes. One
is AS 12.55.045(g), which prohibits trial courts from
considering a criminal defendant's ability to pay when
determining the amount of restitution in a criminal case. In
this case a juvenile argued that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the juvenile's ability to pay when it
ordered the restitution amount. On appeal, the Alaska Court of
Appeals stated that there is no provision equivalent to AS
12.55.045(g) in AS 47.12, which governs juvenile delinquency
proceedings. However, the court noted that AS 47.12.120(b)(4)
provides that a court shall order a minor and the minor's
parents to make suitable restitution following the adjudication
of a minor as delinquent. The court noted the legislative
history. It has come before the legislature multiple times and
the legislature has chosen not to amend the juvenile statutory
language similar to the criminal provision. It ultimately held
that trial courts are not prohibited from considering a
juvenile's ability to pay when setting restitution amounts in
juvenile delinquency cases.
MS. BRUCE said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not want a court to consider a minor's ability
to pay restitution in juvenile delinquency cases. She said
essentially it says that the legislature could choose to adopt
similar language to the criminal provision for juveniles.
2:04:40 PM
CHAIR COGHILL remarked that this review provides a chance to see
what the courts have done and to even consider how to handle the
effective dates.
2:05:16 PM
SANDON FISHER, Legislative Counsel, Legal Services, Legislative
Affairs Agency (LAA), Juneau, Alaska, reviewed the second case
on slide 7:
square4 Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027 (Ninth Cir. 2018) -
AS 15.13.072
square4 Legislative review is recommended if the legislature
wishes to amend the amount or manner of permissible
nonresident political contributions.
square4 Pages 13 - 14
He explained that this case challenged Alaska's campaign
contribution statutory limits on the grounds that they violate
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically: (1)
the $500 annual contribution limit on an individual contribution
to a political candidate; (2) the $500 limit on an individual
contribution to a non-political party group; (3) the annual
limits on what a political party can contribute to a candidate;
and (4) the annual aggregate limit on contributions a candidate
may accept from nonresidents of Alaska. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the first three contribution limits because
they furthered an important state interest and the limits were
closely drawn.
MR. FISHER said the Ninth Circuit struck down the aggregate
limit on nonresident contributions. Generally, a state can
impose contribution limits in order to further an important
state interest. The Alaska Supreme Court case law has said the
important state interest is preventing quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance. The Alaska Supreme Court said the
contribution limit would be upheld if the limit is closely drawn
to furthering that important state interest. In this case, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the state failed to show why an
out-of-state individual's early contribution was not corrupting
but a later contribution above the limit somehow became
corrupting. For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the
nonresident aggregate contribution limit violated the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and did not further an
important state interest.
CHAIR COGHILL said he recommended review of this case.
MR. FISHER said because the Ninth Circuit found that this fourth
campaign contribution limit is unconstitutional, the Legislative
Legal Services recommends legislative review if the legislature
wishes to amend the amount or manner of permissible nonresident
political contributions. Basically, the Ninth Circuit said the
statute is unconstitutional and unenforceable.
CHAIR COGHILL said this is a good case to flag but he has not
seen a statutory provision brought forth yet.
MR. FISHER pointed out that the contribution limits are
primarily found in AS 15.13.070 and 15.13.072.
2:07:43 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said he thinks there is a bill in the other body.
2:07:51 PM
MR. FISHER turned to the next case on slide 7:
square4 State v. Tofelogo, 444 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2019) -
AS 12.55.255(c)(18)(A)
square4 Legislative review is recommended if the legislature
does not intend for the sentencing aggravator to apply
to roommates.
square4 Pages 26 - 27
He summarized that a man killed his roommate with a large knife
while demonstrating martial arts moves. He pled guilty to
criminally negligent homicide and stipulated to the
applicability of the statutory aggravator set out in AS
12.55.155(c)(18)(A) that allows sentencing above the upper range
when a crime is "committed against a spouse, a former spouse, or
a member of the social unit made up of those living together in
the same dwelling as the defendant."
MR. FISHER said on appeal the defendant argued that the
aggravators should not apply to his case because the legislature
intended to apply to domestic violence situations. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the defendant. However, on appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding
that the plain language of the statute applied to roommates.
Legislative review is recommended if the Alaska Supreme Court's
interpretation of the aggravator is not consistent with the
legislature's intent. Basically, the question is whether the
legislature intend for the sentencing aggravator to only apply
to domestic violence situations, he said.
2:09:12 PM
MR. FISHER turned to the last case on slide 7.
square4 Michael W. v. Brown, 433 P.3d 1105 (Alaska 2018) - AS
13.26.132
square4 Legislative review of AS 13.26.132 is recommended if
the legislature wants to change the standard for
appointment of a non-parent as a guardian for a minor
child.
square4 Pages 28 - 29
He said this case involves a child, Kevin, whose parents
separated in the Lower 48. The father, Michael W., moved to New
York, and the mother, Mindy B., moved to Alaska. In 2016, Mindy
moved to Arizona to enter a rehabilitation program. From that
point forward, Kevin stayed in Alaska with his maternal
grandparents, the Browns. In 2017, the Browns filed a petition
to be appointed as the child's legal guardian and Michael W.
opposed the petition. Under AS 13.26.132, the court may appoint
a guardian for a minor if all the parental rights have been
"terminated or suspended by circumstances" or a prior court
order. The Alaska Supreme Court held that when a parent opposes
a non-parent's petition for guardianship of a minor, a court
should first apply the biological parent preferences. This is a
presumption that the parent should have custody of the child. He
reiterated that preference can only be overcome if the parental
rights have been "terminated or suspended by circumstances" or
by a prior court order.
In this guardianship situation, the Alaska Supreme Court said
that "suspended by circumstances" means "some set of
circumstances which deprives a parent of the ability to accept
the rights and responsibilities of parenthood." If the court
cannot overcome this first hurdle, it does not proceed any
further and the parent is entitled to his/her biological
preference.
If there is a set of circumstances which deprives a parent of
the ability to accept the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood, then the court considers the best interest of the
child in determining who to appoint as the guardians. Here, the
best interest of the child is not the first order of the Court's
inquiry in a guardianship dispute between a nonparent and a
parent. Legislative review of AS 13.26.132 is recommended if the
legislature wants to clarify or change the standard for
appointment of a non-parent as a guardian for a minor child.
2:11:27 PM
MR. FISHER reviewed slide 8, Other Cases of Interest That May
Require Review:
square4 Schacht v. Kunimune, 440 P.3d 149 (Alaska 2019) - AS
13.33.211
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not intend for AS 13.33.211 to apply
to all controversies between beneficial account owners
and creditors.
square4 Pages 29 - 30
He said this case involves the relationship between a creditor
and the owners of a joint checking account.
A son opened joint checking and savings accounts with his
father. A creditor of the father later levied the joint account
and obtained approximately $90,000 (essentially all of it
traceable to the son) in partial satisfaction of the creditor's
judgment against the father. The son intervened in the
collection action, arguing that the money should be returned to
him because he was the equitable owner of the funds in the
accounts.
MR. FISHER said at issue in this case is AS 13.33.211(a), which
provides that "during the lifetime of all parties, an account
belongs to the parties in proportion to the net contribution of
each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent." After reviewing this
statute, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "courts considering
a challenge by a joint account owner to a creditor's levying of
funds from a joint account presumptively must apply AS 13.33.211
and calculate the net contributions of each account owner to
determine the amount of funds subject to levy. A creditor can,
in turn, rebut the presumption that joint owners own the account
in accordance with their net contributions by providing clear
and convincing evident of a different intent."
He said legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature does not intend for AS 13.33.211 to apply to all
controversies between beneficial account owners and creditors.
He pointed out that it is important to note that this statute
applies only to disputes between creditors and joint account
owners. It wouldn't necessarily apply to a dispute between the
owners of a joint account over the ownership of the funds.
CHAIR COGHILL said it appeared to have worked the way it was
supposed to work.
2:13:18 PM
MR. FISHER turned to the next case on slide 8.
square4 Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr. Inc., 440 P.3d
224 (Alaska 2019) - AS 23.30.010(a)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wishes to modify the last injurious
exposure rule.
square4 Pages 31 - 32
He said in this case a worker had surgery on his right knee in
2004 after injuring it while working for an employer, [SKW
Eskimos, Inc.]. The employer paid all workers' compensation
claims related to the 2004 knee injury. The worker returned to
work for a different employer. In 2014, the worker again injured
the knee. The new employer disputed liability for continued
medical care, and the worker filed a written claim against
Interstate [the new employer]. The question at issue is if the
old or new employer should be held liable for the workers'
compensation claim.
MR. FISHER said this case involves the last injurious exposure
rule, which applies when successive injuries with different
employers each contribute to a worker's needs for medical care.
Prior to 2005, the rule imposed full liability on the employer
at the time of the most recent injury that bore a causal
relationship to the disability. However, in 2005, the
legislature amended AS 23.30.010. The change now requires the
Workers' Compensation Board to look at the different causes of
need for medical treatment and determine which of those causes
is the most substantial. The Court held that this statute
changed the last injurious exposure rule. Instead of looking to
the person who was the employer at the time of the last injury
related to the disability, now the board determines which injury
was the substantial cause of this disability. The board can then
impose liability on the current employer or an earlier employer,
rather than just going back to the most recent injury.
CHAIR COGHILL related his understanding that the board would
decide the proportional cause.
MR. FISHER answered not necessarily. The Court noted that the
board must pick between one or the other. The employer who is
most responsible pays in full. It specifically noted that the
statute does not apply for apportionment.
Legislative review is not recommended unless the legislature
wishes to modify the last injurious exposure rule.
2:15:46 PM
MR. FISHER reviewed the next case on slide 8:
In re Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018) - AS 47.30.700
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wants to clarify when a screening
investigation should be conducted.
square4 Pages 41 - 42
A psychologist petitioned to have a patient involuntarily
hospitalized. The superior court held a hearing on the petition
at which only the psychologist testified, and the court granted
the petition. The court relied on testimony by the psychologist
about the patient's condition before the filing of the petition
and did not conduct a screening investigation. The patient was
hospitalized under AS 47.30.700, which allows for involuntary
hospitalization upon the petition of any adult. He pointed out
that AS 47.30.705 would allow a peace officer or licensed doctor
or psychologist to swear an affidavit and have someone taken in
immediately. AS 47.37.700 allows for hospitalization after a
judge issues an order to that affect. Under AS 47.30.700, the
judge must immediately conduct a screening investigation of the
person alleged to be mentally ill or direct a local health
professional to do so.
The Alaska Supreme Court clarified that before issuing the
hospitalization order, the screening must include post-petition
interviews with the person(s) making the allegations, other
significant witnesses, and if possible, the respondent, the
person alleged to have mental illness requiring involuntary
hospitalization.
Legislative review is not recommended unless the legislature
wants to clarify when a screening investigation should be
conducted.
2:17:23 PM
CHAIR COGHILL said it sounds like the Court found an artful
solution.
2:17:49 PM
MEERA CAOUETTE, Legislative Counsel, Legal Services, Legislative
Affairs Agency, Juneau, Alaska, reviewed the final case on page
8.
Anderson v. State, 436 P.3d 1071 (Alaska App. 2018)
AS 18.66.990
square4 Legislative review is recommended if the legislature
wishes to clarify application of the term "household
member" with respect to a minor victim of sexual abuse
or wishes to amend the exceptions to the marital
privilege rules.
square4 Pages 15 - 16
She said the Court of Appeals had to interpret an exception to
the marital privileges in Rule 505(a)(2)(D) and Rule
505(b)(2)(A), the spousal immunity privilege. That rule provides
that a married person has a privilege not to be called as a
witness when their spouse is charged with a crime. However,
there are several exceptions to this privilege where the spouse
can be compelled to testify.
MS. CAOUETTE said the issue in this case was the exception for
cases where the spouse is charged with a crime of domestic
violence as defined in AS 18.66.990. Under AS 18.66.990(3), a
crime of domestic violence includes any crime against a person
under AS 11.41--which includes sexual abuse of a minor--if one
household member commits the crime against another household
member. Under AS 18.66.990(5), "household member" includes both
"adults or minors who are dating or who have dated" and "adults
or minors who are engage in or who have engaged in a sexual
relationship."
She reviewed the facts of this case. A high school music teacher
was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor
based on allegations of repeated sexual encounters with a 15-
year-old student. The teacher's wife asserted her spousal
immunity privilege to not testify against her husband. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the student was a "household member"
under AS 18.66.990(5) because the teacher and student dated and
were engaged in a sexual relationship. The court made this
finding based on the student's grand jury testimony. Although
the student was not legally able to consent to sexual activity
with an adult, she believed they were dating and viewed their
sexual relationship as consensual according to grand jury
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that the crime of domestic
exception to the spousal immunity applied and the defendant's
wife could be compelled to testify.
She said legislative review is recommended if the legislature
wishes to clarify application of the term "household member"
with respect to a minor victim of sexual abuse if the court's
interpretation is inconsistent with the legislature's intent or
to consider adding a specific exception to the marital privilege
rules for a crime against any child regardless of the child's
relation to either spouse. The court noted that other
jurisdictions have adopted this type of exception to the marital
privileges rules, but no such exception exists under Alaska law.
2:20:40 PM
CHAIR COGHILL said the Court of Appeals is giving the
legislature a hint on how to remedy the issue.
MS. CAOUETTE responded that the Court noted it was trying to
honor the legislature's intent to broaden who may be considered
as a victim of domestic violence, but it noted that this case
might be easier to resolve in another jurisdiction with a
specific exception for a crime against any child.
CHAIR COGHILL said the legislature will be dealing with sexual
assault issues so perhaps a bill related to Title 18 will be
coming through. He suggested the committee keep this in mind.
2:21:15 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD requested that, during a future hearing, the
committee also discuss marital privilege. She said she finds it
astonishing that a teacher's wife would not want to testify.
CHAIR COGHILL responded that many court cases have astonishing
facts. Some of it is how people act and some is how the rule of
law intersects with that action. That's why the legislature
continually reviews and rethinks some of these things. He
concurred that it was difficult to imagine that kind of reaction
and flagged the case for committee review.
2:22:16 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the first case on slide 9, Other Cases of
Interest That May Require Review:
square4 Alaska Spine Ctr., LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. LLC,
440 P.3d 176 (Alaska 2019) - AS 18.07.031
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wishes to clarify the meaning of "same
community" within the context of the AS 18.07.031(c)
exemption to AS 18.07.031(a).
square4 Pages 30 - 31
She said in this case the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the
meaning of "same community" within the context of AS 18.07.031.
That statute requires a healthcare facility to obtain a
certificate of need (CON) from the Department of Health and
Social Services (DHSS) before beginning construction that will
exceed a cost of $1,000,000. Under AS 18.07.031(c), DHSS may
grant an exemption from the CON requirement to an existing
ambulatory surgery facility that plans to relocate within the
same community as long as the facility does not increase the
services it offers. The statute does not define the term "same
community," which is why the Court was asked to interpret it.
DHSS granted an exemption to Alaska Spine Center (Alaska Spine),
an Anchorage facility that sought to relocate to Wasilla, after
determining that Wasilla and Anchorage are within the same
service area and therefore considered the same community.
The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that neither the plain
language of the statute nor the legislature history support
DHSS's determination that Anchorage and Wasilla are in the same
community. In reaching this determination, the Court noted that
Anchorage and Wasilla are each part of distinct local
governments, are located 44 miles apart, have separate school
districts, police forces, and elected officials, have independent
hospitals, and have no tax overlap. The Court further reasoned
that the term "service area," defined in DHSS regulations as the
"the geographic area to be served by the proposed activity,
including the community where the proposed activity will be
located," is clearly broader than the term "community." The Court
therefore determined that the terms could not be considered
synonymous.
She said in this case legislative may wish to review this case
to consider defining the term "same community."
CHAIR COGHILL offered his view that the Court got pretty close
to where the legislature would have gotten.
MS. CAOUETTE said one thing to note is that the Court did make
the decision but did not actually define the term. She suggested
that there could be future litigation.
2:24:38 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the next case on slide 9:
Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contractors, LLC, 440 P.3d
283 (Alaska 2019) - AS 23.30.128
square4 Legislative review is not recommended, unless the
legislature wishes to limit the reconsideration
authority of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals
Commission to its final decisions on the merits.
square4 Pages 32 - 33
She said in this case the Alaska Supreme Court considered
whether under AS 23.30.128, the Alaska Workers' Compensation
Appeals Commission can only reconsider its final decisions. That
statute describes the appeal proceedings of the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Commission.
MS. CAOUETTE explained that in this case, a party [Warnke-Green]
asked the Commission to reconsider its attorney's fees decision
and the Commission denied the request, stating that it was only
authorized to reconsider its final decision on the merits of the
appeal. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that while AS
23.30.128(f) addresses reconsideration of Commission decisions,
the statute "is silent about reconsideration of any decisions
other than the final decisions on appeal described in subsection
(e)." The Court considered AS 23.30.128(d), which authorizes the
Commission to "affirm, reverse, or modify a decision or order
upon review and issue other orders as appropriate." The Court
reasoned that the authority in subsection (d) gives the
Commission broad authority to reconsider its non-final decisions
and that doing so is a "necessary part of adjudication" and
advances the legislative intent to give individuals seeking
review of board decisions the same procedural rights that they
would otherwise receive in superior court. The Court therefore
held that the Commission has authority to reconsider its non-
final decisions because such authority is "necessarily incident"
to its authority to issue other orders as appropriate under AS
23.30.128(d).
CHAIR COGHILL related that there is a bill before the
legislature on whether to keep the Commission or allow the
superior court to handle workers' compensation appeals.
SENATOR REINBOLD said she is skeptical of that bill and when she
sees this type of case, she wonders why the legislature would
consider abolishing the Commission.
2:26:48 PM
CHAIR COGHILL reiterated that the Commission can currently
adjudicate cases, but there is a question on whether to continue
with that process.
2:26:56 PM
MS. CAOUETTE said in this case the legislature may wish to
review this case if it did not intend for the Commission to have
the authority to reconsider its non-final decisions.
2:27:08 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the next case displayed on slide 9:
Black v. Whitestone Estates Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n,
446 P.3d 786 (Alaska 2019) - AS 34.08.470(h)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature wishes to relieve unit owners that have
actual knowledge of an assessment of the obligation to
pay that assessment if it is omitted from a statement
provided under AS 34.08.470(h).
square4 Pages 36 - 37
MS. CAOUETTE said in this case the Alaska Supreme Court
considered AS 34.08.470(h), which provides that a condominium
association "shall furnish to a unit owner a statement setting
out the amount of unpaid assessments against the unit" upon
request and the statement "is binding on the association, the
executive board, and each unit owner." The Court considered
whether the statute relieves the unit owner of the obligation to
pay an assessment that is omitted from the statement when the
owner has actual knowledge of the assessment. In this case a
condominium owner couple requested a statement of unpaid
assessments and then argued that they were not obligated to pay
a special assessment because it was omitted from the statement.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that the legislative
history of AS 34.08.470(h) showed an intent to protect unit
owners by ensuring they could readily obtain information about
their liability and preventing the association from collecting
assessments of which the owners have no knowledge. The Court
reasoned that when an owner has actual knowledge of an
assessment, the protection provided by AS 34.08.470(h) is
unnecessary. The Court concluded that "[i]t would be contrary to
the purpose of AS 34.08.470 to allow a unit owner who already
knows about an assessment to use its omission from a statement
provided by the association as a means to relieve himself or
herself of the obligation to pay it." She said the legislature
may want to review this case if it intends for the statute to
relieve a unit owner of the obligation to pay that assessment if
it is omitted from a statement even if the owner has actual
knowledge of the statement.
2:28:47 PM
CHAIR COGHILL said this reminds members of the importance of the
details when they review lengthy bills.
2:29:02 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD relayed that a condo association in her
district suffered significant damage from the earthquake and
many owner are losing their condominiums. She asked whether she
would be the staff attorney to talk to about this issue.
MS. CAOUETTE answered no.
2:29:36 PM
MS. WALLACE suggested she speak to Terry Bannister in
Legislative Legal Services.
2:29:56 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the last case listed on slide 9:
Adkins v. Collens, 444 P.3d 187 (Alaska 2019) - AS
45.50.537(a)
square4 Legislative review is not recommended unless the
legislature intended to allow "full reasonable
attorney fees" to be calculated based on a contingency
fee agreement.
square4 Page 39
MS. CAOUETTE said in this case the Alaska Supreme Court
considered how "full reasonable attorney fees" should be
calculated under Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act (UTPA) and whether the calculation may be based
on a contingency fee agreement. The UTPA is codified in AS
45.50, and under AS 45.50.537(a) a prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to full reasonable attorney fees, which is not defined
in the statute. In determining the amount of attorney fees, the
superior court concluded that "full reasonable attorney fees"
under AS 45.50.537(a) could be defined by the contingency
agreement executed by the plaintiff and his counsel. The Alaska
Supreme Court held that Alaska courts should instead employ the
"modified lodestar" method in calculating "full reasonable
attorney fees" under AS 45.50.573(a). Under the modified
lodestar method, a court should first determine the baseline
lodestar amount by multiplying the reasonable number of hours
worked by a reasonable hourly rate and then the court may
consider a variety of factors to determine whether to adjust the
calculated amount. The Court therefore concluded that the
superior court's calculation of attorney fees based on the
contingency fee agreement did not constitute "full reasonable
attorney fees" under AS 45.50.537(a). The legislature may want
to review this case if the court's method of calculating
attorney fees is inconsistent with the legislature's intent.
CHAIR COGHILL said it sounds like the Court got it right, but
someone may wish to review it.
2:31:49 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD asked if any authority reviews and regulates
attorney fees because she did not consider any of the attorney
fees she has encountered as reasonable.
MS. CAOUETTE answered yes. She said Rules of Professional
Conduct would have a rule considering reasonable attorney fees.
The issue is that the term was used in the statute with no
explanation of what that term means or how to define it. The
[Alaska Supreme Court] was forced to look to other jurisdictions
to see how that was handled under similar Consumer Protection
Acts.
CHAIR COGHILL said it was good to flag, but it sounds like the
Court found a methodology that was reasonable.
2:32:41 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said he was curious how the term lodestar was used
to determine the baseline amount of attorney fees.
MS. CAOUETTE responded she researched the term but was not able
to find an explanation.
2:33:22 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed slide 10, Delayed, Repeals, Enactments or
Amendments:
Laws enacted in 2008
square4 Ch. 15, SLA 2008, sec. 2 -- Capstone Avionics
Revolving Loan Fund - certain provisions repealed
July 1, 2020
Laws enacted in 2013
square4 Ch. 10, SLA 2013, sec. 34 -- Oil and Gas
Competitiveness Review Board - certain provisions
repealed February 28, 2021
Laws enacted in 2014
square4 Ch. 61, SLA 2014, secs. 16, 22, and 23 -- Tax
Credits and Indirect Expenditures - certain
provisions repealed or amended December 31, 2020
square4 SB 130 (relating to AS 43.75.075 and 43.75.130(f)
only)
Laws enacted in 2015
square4 Ch. 3, SLA 2015, sec. 6 -- School Bond Debt
Reimbursement - certain provisions repealed July
1, 2020
square4 HB 106
MS. BRUCE directed attention to page 1 in the 2019 Oversight
Report. She said she complied the delayed amendments and repeals
that take affect between February 29, 2020 and March 1, 2021.
The first repeal was enacted in 2008 for the Capstone Avionics
Revolving Loan Fund. This fund and program will be repealed on
July 1, 2020. The program allows the Department of Commerce,
Community and Economic Development (DCCED), to make loans for
the purchase and installation of capstone avionics equipment to
the owner of an aircraft that logs a substantial percentage of
flight hours in the state. The Capstone Avionics program is
designed to improve tracking and safety on planes. It allows
pilots to have a moving map video display screen with additional
information. It also allows air traffic control to know the
precise location of a downed aircraft. She noted that the
governor's proposed budget includes an appropriation of the
balance of that fund on June 30 to go to DCCED for the Alaska
Development Team (AKDT). She said the balance is a little less
than $3 million. If the fund is not appropriated this year and
the fund is repealed on July 1 as provided in 2008, that money
will lapse into the general fund.
CHAIR COGHILL recalled the discussion about the Capstone
Avionics program. Alaska had so many aircraft incidents that the
state took measures to improve tracking and flight integrity. He
said he is unsure if those issues are resolved, but this will be
a question for the legislature.
2:35:58 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the next item on slide 10, laws enacted in
2013, related to the Oil and Gas Competitiveness Review Board,
[listed on page 1 of the report]. These statutes will be
repealed on February 28, 2021. This board collects, and reviews
information related to oil and gas in the state and makes
recommendations to the legislature. The board's final written
findings and recommendations to the legislature are due on
January 31, 2021.
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the next item on slide 10, laws enacted in
2014, related to Tax Credits and Indirect Expenditures that are
scheduled to be repealed. She reviewed the statutes, including
AS 43.75.035 and AS 43.75.130 (f) relating to the salmon and
herring product development tax that will be repealed on
December 31, 2020. She noted that SB 130, currently before the
Senate Resources Standing Committee extends these provisions and
repeals them on January 1, 2026.
MS. CAOUETTE referred to AS 43.77.040, which allows a taxpayer
who harvests a fishery resource under the provisions of a
Community Development Quota to claim a credit for certain
approved contributions to a nonprofit corporation. This statute
will be repealed on December 31, 2020. She stated that AS
43.77.050(b) will be amended on December 31, 2020 to remove a
reference to the previous statute.
2:38:18 PM
MS. BRUCE reviewed the next item on slide 10, laws enacted in
2015. Some provisions related to school bond debt reimbursement
restrict bond debt reimbursement for school bonds by a
municipality between January 1, 2015 and July 1, 2020. These are
currently scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2020. HB 106 is
currently in the Senate Finance Committee that would extend
these provisions to July 1, 2025.
2:38:54 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD asked if the laws enacted in 2013 related to
the Oil and Gas Competitiveness Review Board correlated to SB
21.
MS. CAOUETTE answered yes.
2:39:40 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed slide 11, Delayed, Repeals, Enactments or
Amendments:
Laws enacted in 2016
square4 Ch. 54, SLA 2016, sec. 23 -- School
Accountability - certain provisions repealed July
1, 2020
Laws enacted in 2018
square4 Ch. 101, SLA 2018, secs. 3, 8, 13, 18, 23, 28,
32, and 34 -- Education Tax Credits - certain
provisions amended December 31, 2020 and January
1, 2021
Laws enacted in 2019
square4 Ch. 18, SLA 2019, secs. 1 - 4 -- Prescription
Drugs - certain provisions amended March 1, 2020
square4 Ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, secs. 123 - 129 and 131 --
Crimes and Criminal Procedure - certain
provisions enacted or amended January 1, 2020,
July 1, 2020, and September 1, 2020
2:40:05 PM
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed the laws enacted in 2016. She said AS
14.07.175 is scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2020, which
relates to the development of a statewide assessment plan and
review of education laws and regulations.
She reviewed laws enacted in 2018. She said various statutes
relating to education tax credits were scheduled to be amended
on January 1, 2021. This would change the amount of the credits
to 50 percent of contributions of cash and equipment accepted
for certain educational purposes. She explained that the
educational tax credit computations for contributions will be
changed to 50 percent on and after January 1, 2021.
MS. CAOUETTE reviewed laws enacted in 2019. She said two session
laws (SLA) are scheduled to be amended. The first one, Senate
Bill 44, related to prescription drugs. Several provisions will
be amended on March 1, 2020 to allow physician assistants to
diagnose a patient and prescribe medication to a patient without
conducting a physical examination under certain circumstances.
She said this authority was passed several years ago for
physicians and last year physician assistants were added.
2:41:33 PM
MS. CAOUETTE said HB 49, related to crimes and criminal
procedure, would amend and enact certain statutes on January 1,
2020 relating to sexual assault examination kits. It would amend
and enact statutes on July 1, 2020 relating to tracking and
reporting data on felony sex offenses. It would amend a statute
on September 1, 2020 relating to a person's duty to report harm
to a child if the harm appears to be the result of a sex
offense.
CHAIR COGHILL recalled that regulations needed to be implemented.
2:42:34 PM
MS. WALLACE reviewed slide 10, Historical Oversight Reports are
available on the Internet at https://intranet.akleg.gov/legal-
services/index.php?ou1=Legal%20Services&&bid=legal.
She related that after each legislative session, the agency
prepares a summary of legislation that passed the legislature
and that report is also available on the intranet.
2:43:34 PM
SENATOR HUGHES asked if Legislative Legal ever updates the
previous oversight reports to reflect any subsequent changes the
legislature may have made to clarify legislative intent and show
that the legislature followed up on Legislative Legal
recommendations.
MS. WALLACE replied the agency does not currently track that but
the legislature could add it to the agency's responsibilities.
She said that information is easily ascertained and any members
who had questions could contact the agency to find out if a
specific statute was further amended.
2:45:28 PM
CHAIR COGHILL highlighted that reviewing the Legislative Legal
Services oversight reports provides an opportunity to hear how
the court has interpreted bills that the legislature has passed
and to ask questions. He added that he was reluctant to add any
additional responsibilities to the agency.
2:49:10 PM
There being no further business to come before the committee,
Chair Coghill adjourned the Senate Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting at 2:49 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 oversight report presentation Feb 18 2020.pptx |
SJUD 2/19/2020 1:30:00 PM |