Legislature(2015 - 2016)Anch LIO Rm 203
09/29/2016 02:30 PM Senate FINANCE
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| Discussion of Pension Obligation Bonds | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE
ANCHORAGE LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION OFFICE
September 29, 2016
2:40 p.m.
[Note: The following meeting convened in the Anchorage
Legislative Information Office and was teleconferenced and
recorded in Juneau.]
2:40:35 PM
CALL TO ORDER
Co-Chair Kelly called the Senate Finance Committee meeting
to order at 2:40 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Senator Anna MacKinnon, Co-Chair
Senator Pete Kelly, Co-Chair
Senator Peter Micciche, Vice-Chair
Senator Click Bishop
Senator Mike Dunleavy
Senator Lyman Hoffman
Senator Donny Olson
MEMBERS ABSENT
None
ALSO PRESENT
Jerry Burnett, Deputy Commissioner, Treasury Division,
Department of Revenue; Deven Mitchell, Executive Director,
Alaska Municipal Bond Bank Authority, Department of
Revenue; Steve Kantor, Financial Advisor, Hilltop
Securities; Randall Hoffbeck, Commissioner, Department of
Revenue; Steve Kantor, Financial Advisor, First Southwest;
Financial Advisor, Pension Obligation Bond Corporation;
Mark Foster, Fiscal Study Group Member, Commonwealth North;
Representative Steve Thompson; Representative Mike
Chenault; Representative Dan Saddler; Representative Liz
Vasquez.
PRESENT VIA TELECONFERENCE
Stephen Gauthier, Government Finance Officers Association;
Representative Sam Kito.
SUMMARY
DISCUSSION OF PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS
Co-Chair Kelly relayed that the administration had proposed
issuing pension obligation bonds, and the committee was
gathered to consider the idea.
^DISCUSSION OF PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS
2:42:52 PM
JERRY BURNETT, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TREASURY DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, relayed that he was acting in the
role of Designated Chair of the Alaska Pension Obligation
Bond Corporation (APOBC). He stated that the POBC had met
the previous Monday to approve the issuance of up to $3.5
billion worth of pension obligation bonds and delegated the
responsibilities for doing the transactions to the staff.
He added that staff included Devin Mitchell, Executive
Director, Alaska Municipal Bond Bank Authority, Department
of Revenue; and the officers of the APOBC, which included
himself and the commissioner of the Department of Revenue
(DOR). He added that Commissioner Randall Hoffbeck was
attending another meeting and would be present later in the
meeting.
Mr. Burnett stated that he would go through the reasons why
the state should do a pension obligation bond, how the
administration would protect and state and the pension
system from the problems that had been raised by the
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA). The GFOA
had stated in its advisory bulletin that local governments
and states should not do pension obligation bonds.
Co-Chair Kelly wondered if there was anyone online. He
noted that Representative Kito was online. He asked for a
list of members of the APOBC.
Mr. Burnett replied that statute defined the members of
APOBC as the commissioners of DOR, the Department of
Administration, and the Department of Commerce, Community
and Economic Development. He continued that in each case,
the commissioners (if not available) had delegated the
authority to a deputy commissioner to include: himself,
John Boucher, Senior Economist, Office of Management and
Budget, Office of the Governor; and Fred Parady, Deputy
Commissioner, Department of Commerce, Community, and
Economic Development. He explained that the corporation was
established through legislation in 2008 (sponsored by
Representative Mike Hawker), at which time up to $5 billion
in bonds was authorized for issuance.
Co-Chair Kelly asked about the year the legislation was
passed. Mr. Burnett replied that it was in 2008.
2:46:40 PM
DEVEN MITCHELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ALASKA MUNICIPAL BOND
BANK AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, explained that he
would provide some background as to why the state had
unfunded liabilities and why pension obligation bonds were
being discussed. He explained that the state managed a
number of retirement systems, the two largest of which were
the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), and the
Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). He continued that the
retirement programs had three separate tiers, which were
defined benefit programs. He remarked that there was now a
retirement program in place that was a defined contribution
program. He stressed that there were still employees in the
first three tiers that were guaranteed by the constitution
and that the system was intended to be prefunded. He
remarked that the benefits were estimated through an
actuarial analysis in the late 1990s to be fully funded. He
stressed that the actuarial analysis was incorrect (after
using outdated mortality tables), resulting in an unfunded
actuarial liability. He shared that the unfunded liability
was currently $6 billion, which would pay up to $20 billion
of future benefits, due to an 8 percent return assumption
in the pension system's actuarial analysis. He remarked
that it was critical to look at the future payments, with
the exception of the $6 billion, as growing at 8 percent
per year.
Senator Dunleavy asked if Mr. Mitchell was discussing both
TRS and PERS.
Mr. Mitchell answered in the affirmative.
2:50:18 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked if the funding being discussed
included healthcare.
Mr. Mitchell answered in the affirmative. He furthered that
the Other Postemployment Benefits (OPEB) piece of the
retirement system (after deposits in 2015) was near 100
percent funded in PERS, and were slightly over 100 percent
funded in TRS as of the last approved actuarial analysis.
[Secretaries note: OPEB are benefits (other than pensions)
that U.S. state and local governments provide to their
retired employees]. He explained that the trust was split
apart into four pieces, two in TRS and two in PERS, with
one for pension and one for OPEB.
Co-Chair MacKinnon referred to a footnote by a credit
rating agency that indicated the state was $12 billion to
$14 billion in a liability position. She asked how the
reference compared to the $6 billion of unfunded liability.
Mr. Burnett responded that rating agencies applied its own
discount rate, and the $6 billion was based on the 8
percent actuarial assumed rate that the retirement board
was using. He continued that rating agencies each applied
its own rate, and the rate would result in a larger
liability than what was produced with 8 percent.
Senator Bishop remarked that there was historical
background offered, which had included a miscalculation of
the actuarial assumption. He wanted to know what cash was
available for the fund.
Mr. Burnett stated that for purposes of funding, under SB
125 and under the calculation for the employer rate, POBC
was using 8 percent. [Secretary's note: In FY 08, SB 125
converted the PERS defined-benefit plan to a cost-share
plan, like TRS, and provided for one integrated system of
accounting for all employers.]
2:52:54 PM
Senator Dunleavy asked if the current payoff amount would
be $6 billion.
Mr. Mitchell stated that today it would take $6 billion to
be placed in the fund to earn 8 percent until it was spent
in the future to satisfy the expected pension benefits that
would materialize.
Senator Dunleavy asked how much it would be if the full
amount owed to each individual were calculated and paid
immediately.
Mr. Mitchell asked if Senator Dunleavy meant to ask for an
amount not assuming any rate of return on the benefits.
Senator Dunleavy answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Mitchell stated that a one percent reduction in the
rate of return pushed the amount from $11 billion to about
$19 billion. He noted that the amount was not in present
value, but rather in payments. He discussed calculations
and concluded that it would require a significant amount of
additional funding if the state were to assume a zero
percent rate of return on the trust.
Senator Dunleavy asked if the amount was higher than $19
billion.
Mr. Mitchell replied that he had used a hypothetical
scenario of only a 1 percent differential, and had only
considered the cash flow. Later on in the analysis, the
payment that was projected with an 8 percent assumption was
about $11 billion. If the rate of return assumption was
reduced to 7 percent, the payment amount jumped to $19.8
billion.
Co-Chair Kelly asked for clarification on the amounts being
discussed.
Mr. Burnett stated that the state would have to pay $11
billion to replace the $6 billion if it was not paid now.
Mr. Mitchell explained that recognition of the unfunded
liability had occurred in the early 2000s. The recognition
resulted in a push by the Murkowski administration [former
Governor Frank Murkowski] for pension obligation bond
authorization, which was approved by the legislature in
2008.
2:56:39 PM
Mr. Mitchell discussed the PowerPoint, "Department of
Revenue; Presentation to Senate Finance Committee; Pension
Obligation Bond Transaction; September 29, 2016" (copy on
file).
He read from slide 2, "GFOA Pension Obligation Bond
Advisory Bulletin Concerns and POBC Mitigation":
Might Fail to Earn Bond Interest Rate
•Interest rate is the one variable POB Issuers
can control
•The lower the rate the higher the expectation of
success over the 23 year life
•The PERS and TRS have an assumed rate of return
of 8% for the prefunding of the pension trusts
•The bond interest rate is expected to be below
4.0% including all costs of issuance
POBs are Complex Instruments with Considerable Risk
•The POBC has only authorized fixed rate debt,
the most simple means of issuing bonds
•No derivatives or variable rate products are
allowed
Mr. Mitchell stated that there were many reasons not to use
pension obligation bonds, and that bonds had been used in
fiscally irresponsible ways. He explicated that it was
possible to take greater savings up front and create bigger
liability in the future. He stated that there were ways
that he considered more and less fiscally responsible to
structure a transaction. He thought what was being proposed
by the administration was as fiscally responsible as was
possible if one were to choose to do pension obligation
bonds.
Mr. Mitchell discussed the GFOA concerns outlined on slide
2. He thought the state had solved the systemic issue that
was present in tier 1 of the retirement plans. He
emphasized that the one thing that was able to be
controlled in a pension obligation bond issuance was the
cost of capital. He noted that APOBC had approved a
resolution that allowed for an interest rate up to 4.5
percent. If the trust did not receive that rate of return,
it would make things worse.
3:00:02 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche asked about Mr. Mitchell's hypothetical
scenario that included a 1 percent reduction in the rate of
return which would bring the $11 billion in liability to
$19 billion. He wondered if the rate comparison had started
with 4 percent or 8 percent.
Mr. Mitchell replied that the comparison had been made from
an 8 percent to a 7 percent rate of return. He clarified
that $6 billion was the equivalent of the $11 billion on a
present value basis. He continued that for each percent
that went down, there was a fairly linear relationship. If
the funds were only earning 6 percent, then it would
increase the payment amount by $8.8 billion. He clarified
that it would not be impacted by the bonds, which would be
paying 4 percent.
Senator Dunleavy wondered how the risk would be rated for
Alaska.
Mr. Burnett replied that over the past 30 years that the
pension funds had been in play, the funds have earned more
than 8 percent. He noted that there would be a chart later
in the presentation that would show rolling 20-year
averages every year for the previous several years, and
would reflect a rate of return that was well above 4
percent. He pointed out that the amount of money in the
pension obligation bond issue was very small (with small
risk) relative to the rest of the money in the pension
funds (with larger risk), as well as the unfunded amount.
He referred to the systematic underfunding of the system in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, created by miscalculation
of certain actuaries.
Senator Dunleavy queried that if the risk was such, why it
was not recommended that government be funded through the
same approach.
Mr. Burnett replied that the state had a debt that must be
paid, and currently the state was paying the debt with an 8
percent interest rate.
3:03:59 PM
Senator Dunleavy asked if the state was going to incur more
debt to pay of its debt. Mr. Burnett replied in the
negative, and clarified that the state would be replacing
one debt [in pension debt] with another debt.
Senator Dunleavy asked anecdotally if Mr. Burnett would
recommend that Alaskans take a mortgage out on their house
and play the market.
Mr. Burnett replied in the negative.
Co-Chair MacKinnon stressed that the pension obligation
bonds were a bonding mechanism that was affected by the
federal interest rate, and not necessarily stocks that were
moving up and down in the market. She furthered that bonds
could be invested in stocks, but the administration was
proposing something more fixed, that was not competing
directly with stocks.
Mr. Burnett explained that the proposal was to borrow money
at a fixed rate of interest in an international
marketplace, which would be sold at a fixed interest rate
over a period of 23 years. Proceeds from the bonds would be
invested along with the rest of the pension fund, using the
same asset allocation as the fund board was currently using
to invest.
Co-Chair MacKinnon stressed that the proposal was not the
same as purchasing a stock.
Mr. Burnett stated that a common concern was that often
times when people proposed use of pension obligation bonds,
it was proposed with a variable rate interest rate, with
derivatives, etc.; where there was a significant market
risk in how much was required to pay for the bonds. He
confirmed that the administration was not proposing
anything like such an idea, but rather was proposing a
simple fixed rate security.
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked about the APOBC resolution that
provided the parameters the administration was considering,
including the fixed rate and the amount of the pension
obligation bonds.
Mr. Burnett agreed to provide the information.
3:07:20 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche asked about Mr. Burnett's comments
pertaining to replacing debt. He wondered if Mr. Burnett
had been referring to trading an 8 percent debt with a 4
percent or lower debt.
Mr. Burnett responded in the affirmative.
Vice-Chair Micciche again referred to the concept of
replacing debt, and asked if Mr. Burnett had been referring
to up to $3.5 billion versus the $20 billion or so that was
already invested.
Mr. Burnett agreed, and stated that there was already a
huge debt on the pension system.
Co-Chair Kelly invited Representative Saddler to ask a
question at the table.
Representative Saddler wondered if the $3.5 billion in
pension obligation bond issues would meet 100 percent of
the pension obligation, or if there was a risk of
overfunding that might result in increased benefits for
retirees.
Mr. Mitchell replied that the sizing would depend somewhat
on what the market would bear, and it was unknown exactly
how much of the potential authority would be sold. He
furthered that it would be a range of $2.3 billion to $3.3
billion. At the $2.3 billion mark, the corporation would
plan to make a $980 million deposit into TRS, which would
fund it to 90 percent. There would be a smaller deposit of
approximately $1.3 billion to PERS that would fund it to
approximately 80 percent. If there was a larger transaction
of $2.3 billion in to PERS, the system would be funded to
90 percent. He continued that at 90 percent, there was an
expectation of having some positive years and not being
over funded in the short term. He remarked that a primary
benefit of the PERS transaction was that if the actuarial
assumptions were borne out, it would eliminate the state's
payment on behalf of the other employer's payments.
Co-Chair Kelly asked for Vice-Chair Micciche to restate his
earlier questions.
Vice-Chair Micciche announced that that the state was
already covering the debt at an 8 percent interest rate,
and pondered that Mr. Burnett was talking about replacing
the debt with another debt at an interest rate of 4 percent
or under.
Mr. Burnett replied in the affirmative.
Vice-Chair Micciche reiterated that the state had a similar
arrangement with obligation bonds on $20 billion already
invested, versus the proposed bonds (up to $3.5 billion) on
the books.
3:11:23 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon challenged that local municipalities had
an obligation to pay its debt that had been incurred in the
system, while the state would be removing the debt by the
investment. She thought the proposal was a policy decision,
and that the state would clean up all of the pension
liability based on the POB proposal. She agreed that 100
percent of the state's liability rested in the TRS system.
She referred to Representative Saddler's question about the
possibility of overfunding and expanding benefits, and
wondered why the state would put up to $2.5 billion in the
PERS system when the state was not 100 percent responsible
for the system.
Co-Chair Kelly invited Representative Thompson to ask a
question.
Representative Thompson asked if the state went from
funding 90 percent to 100 percent of its obligation, if it
meant the municipalities involved in the system would
expect rates to go down. Conversely, he wondered if the
rates would go up if the following year there was less
funding.
Mr. Burnett replied that the APOBC, in structuring the
proposal, had been very concerned with going below the 22
percent that municipalities currently paid. He relayed that
the group was basing its decisions on a reading of the law,
in which the municipalities continued to pay at 22 percent,
and therefore continuing to make payments into the system
to reduce the unfunded liability. He continued that by
funding to the 90 percent, and to an allowable level, the
rate would be about 25 percent if the municipalities were
paying their share of the current payment (with no payment
on behalf).
Mr. Burnett continued, stating that if the pay rate was
left at 22 percent, in the early years the municipalities
would be paying to help with the unfunded liability and
reducing the state's exposure.
3:14:48 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon thought there was pressure on
legislators through an administrative policy to have the
municipalities come to cities asking to lower the
contribution rate. She emphasized that the municipalities
had played a part in getting the state into the position it
was in with unfunded liability. She pointed out that the
state had put up $3 billion in cash to try and help with
the problem.
Mr. Burnett agreed, and remarked that the state had done an
incredible job relative to the municipalities. He referred
to discussions with a variety of city attorneys, finance
officers, and managers; and universally they had preferred
to leave the 22 percent contribution rate in place rather
than a variable rate in the future. He thought the
continuity of the rate would make for a more stable system.
He commented that the current law would allow for the
continuity, but perhaps could be strengthened.
Mr. Mitchell clarified that if the $2.3 billion was put in
the trust the actuarial analysis would produce an employer
contribution requirement below 22 percent, and would be
closer to 17 percent or 18 percent. The law (as reviewed by
the Department of Law, the legislative attorney, and the
municipal attorney) stated that a 22 percent contribution
rate was not only a floor but a ceiling. Consequently, even
though the actuarially determined rate would drop, the
municipalities would still pay 22 percent. He explained the
possible fluctuation of the rate, and stated that by
maintaining the 22 percent rate, it was expected that the
rate would never have to go above 22 percent in the future.
He summarized that the municipalities would wind up paying
a share of the unfunded liability, whereas with a "rate
holiday" they would not.
3:18:20 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon understood, but stressed that if the
administration went forward there would be pressure on the
legislature to reduce the cap from 22 percent because some
municipalities would argue they were paying more than
necessary, even though the state had been paying on behalf
for years.
Mr. Mitchell replied that if municipalities started asking
for a rate reduction, they would need to be aware that it
would create future liability.
Senator Dunleavy referred to previous comments about
investing in the market and interest rates. He asked for
Mr. Burnett to discuss the investment of proceeds.
Mr. Burnett explained that investment proceeds would be
invested by the Alaska Retirement Management (ARM) Board,
in exactly the same way that it was investing money for
PERS and TRS.
3:20:04 PM
Senator Dunleavy asked if the board was investing in the
stock market.
Mr. Burnett conveyed that the board was investing in the
stock market, private equity real estate, other alternative
investments, and bonds.
Co-Chair Kelly surmised that if the state went to bonding,
the funds went to the ARM board, and were no longer
available to the legislature.
Mr. Burnett concurred.
Co-Chair Kelly remarked that there was no way to reap any
benefit from the money (beyond paying pension obligation
debt) if there was difficult financial times in the future.
He discussed the use of potential savings in the period of
time that payments to the pension fund went down. He
thought bonding would put the state in a more difficult
position in the future unless conditions turned out to be
favorable.
Mr. Burnett thought Co-Chair Kelly had stated things
correctly, but clarified that under current accounting
rules on credit analysis, payments to the pension funds
were considered like bonds sold to an outside investor. He
continued that if the legislature failed to pay a payment
of the Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL) to the
pension fund, it would be seen as an extreme credit
negative; similar to if the state failed to pay the bond
payments. He stated that the pension obligations had to be
paid, because it was a contractual item in the
constitution. He clarified (not as a recommendation) that
defaulting on an obligation to an outside entity was a
better result to the state than not paying the unfunded
liability directly to the pension trust.
3:23:40 PM
Co-Chair Kelly identified that the state had the ability to
pay or reduce payments to the state assistance in the hope
that it would buy some time. He emphasized that if the debt
was turned into a bond payment, the state would no longer
have the same flexibility.
Mr. Burnett stated that the bond payment only limited the
ability to reduce state assistance, as it would still have
an extreme credit negative if not paid.
Co-Chair Kelly clarified that he was referring to the
state's ability to pay its bills.
Mr. Burnett expressed understanding. He stated that the
administration believed that the savings in cash flow made
the transaction worthwhile.
Mr. Mitchell added that Co-Chair Kelly was correct in that
the bonds would limit the state's options, but some
optionality would be retained. The state would still be
paying 22 percent payroll as an employer, over the required
amount and thereby retaining some flexibility. The state
would retain a payment on behalf of payments in the TRS
system, because of the lower floor. He thought Co-Chair
Kelly had made a valid point, and agreed that the state
would be giving up some flexibility under the bond
scenario.
Senator Dunleavy asked about reinvesting proceeds after
selling bonds. He asked for an explanation of what would
happen if there was a one percent return on investment over
the life of the bond.
Mr. Mitchell replied that under the scenario, the state
would pay more than it earned.
Mr. Burnett added that the state would also be earning one
percent on the rest of the balance in the pension system,
so the payments on behalf would go to an unsustainable
level and the system would be broken.
Senator Dunleavy asked if the pension obligation bonds were
a gamble.
Mr. Burnett stated that it was a gamble to have a funded
pension system and assume that it will have enough funding.
Senator Dunleavy asked if it was a gamble to predict what
the stock market would do on the following day.
Mr. Burnett answered in the affirmative.
3:26:47 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon referred to when the administration was
considering restructuring the permanent fund, and relayed
that the legislature had reviewed rates of return. She
thought 8 percent, prospectively, was too high according to
financial markets and credit rating agencies. She thought
that there could be a difference of $8 billion on a 1
percent assumption. She referred to the 20-year rate
retrospective that was mentioned earlier, and acknowledged
that there had been rates above 8 percent. She referred to
Senator Dunleavy's earlier comments about a zero percent
interest rate in Japan, and wondered when it would be
possible to observe real rates of return.
Mr. Burnett stated that the actuarial assumption was a
rolling 20 year experience, and the administration had
provided a 7 percent scenario for the committee to
consider. He continued that the ARM board reviewed the
actuarial rate of return on a four-year basis, and the
following year the rate would be reviewed. When the review
was done, the rate could be different than 8 percent. He
was not sure of the outcome, and recalled that at the last
review, the rate was left at 8 percent. The actuary had
done a lot of analysis, and the state's financial advisor
(Callan Associates) had considered the rate to be within a
reasonable range. He thought the average rate for public
pensions in the United States was around 7.5 percent.
Mr. Burnett continued, and relayed that he had seen the
analysis of the Permanent Fund Protection Act, and thought
that rates in the range of 6.9 to 7.25 had been examined.
He relayed that Callan Associates had calculated that two-
thirds of time, the pension fund would produce somewhere
between a minus 4 percent and a 20 percent return in the
next year. He relayed that there was a new asset allocation
and analysis every year. He continued that the rate could
be less than 8 percent in the future. If the rate was 7
percent, the cash flow under the current plan would equate
to another $8.8 billion over the next 23 years, to amortize
the unfunded liability. If the state sold pension bonds, it
would reduce the $8.8 billion by about $1.5 billion.
3:31:36 PM
Co-Chair Kelly invited Representative Saddler to ask a
question.
Representative Saddler discussed the investment principal
of not trying to time the market. He wondered if there was
a way to ameliorate the cost by having a slower pace of
investment or dollar cost averaging.
Mr. Burnett stated that there were a number of methods to
consider, and was not sure what the ARM board would choose
to do. He assumed that the ARM board chief investment
officer Gary Bader had looked at all possibilities as to
the decision to put the funds into the current asset
allocation, or to "bleed the funds in" over a period of
time. He confirmed that the decision would be made as a
policy matter by the ARM board and staff.
Mr. Mitchell furthered that it would take quite a while to
put $3 billion to work, even if one wanted to put it in
right away.
Senator Bishop queried as to how many other states had also
made a pension obligation bond transaction, and with what
results.
STEVE KANTOR, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, HILLTOP SECURITIES, stated
that there had been several other states that had completed
a similar type of transaction, and the transaction being
proposed was "uniquely Alaskan." He opined that the
proposal had different aspects to it that made it both more
conservative, and also a little bit safer than some of the
other transactions. He discussed a recent large transaction
done by the State of Kansas; and mentioned that additional
similar transactions had taken place in the states of New
Jersey, Illinois, and Oregon.
3:33:26 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked if the state would be penalized if
there were lower than expected rates of return in the early
year.
Mr. Kantor replied that, evaluating the transaction over
the 23-year period, it was less advantageous to have lower
interest rates in the beginning than the end. The more the
state earned up front, the more it could use to build the
fund up. He thought the transaction could withstand lower
interest rates in the beginning because the state had the
ability to continue to earn rates over time, and it was an
average calculation rather than a one-year calculation.
Co-Chair Kelly remarked that he had gleaned from
presentations regarding pension unfunded liability that it
was almost impossible to recover from failed initial
investments. He thought Co-Chair MacKinnon had valid
concerns and remarked that some of the impacts on the fund
were not reparable.
Senator Dunleavy referred to passage of the bill that
authorized pension obligation bonds in 2008, and the amount
of time needed to recover from negative financial impacts.
RANDALL HOFFBECK, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
noted that the rolling 20-year average incorporated the
"meltdown" Senator Dunleavy mentioned, as well as the
.dotcom financial crisis, and rates of return were still in
the 7 percent range.
Co-Chair Kelly asked for clarification.
Commissioner Hoffbeck repeated that he was discussing a 20
year average of rates of return.
Co-Chair MacKinnon expressed concern with the possibility
that the market was currently in a bubble and while it was
advantageous to sell, it was not currently advantageous to
buy stock.
Mr. Kantor stated that there was a lot of conjecture as to
what would happen. He pointed out that there was a point at
which the stock market had risen unexpectedly and defied
expectations. He mentioned market unpredictability, and
emphasized the focus on the long term in the context of the
proposed POB transaction.
3:37:46 PM
AT EASE
3:42:25 PM
RECONVENED
Co-Chair Kelly wanted to advance through the slides of the
presentation, and asked members to hold questions until
later in the meeting.
Commissioner Hoffbeck stated that he wanted to focus on two
slides. He thought the first slide addressed many of the
concerns that had been expressed about pension obligation
bonds, and would discuss why the administration's proposal
was different than some of the objections maintained. He
conveyed that the last slide would show relevant numbers.
3:43:38 PM
Mr. Mitchell returned to slide 2, "GFOA Pension Obligation
Bond Advisory Bulletin - Concerns and POBC Mitigation":
Potentially Uses Debt Capacity
•With implementation of GASB 68 the portion of
the unfunded actuarially assumed pension
liability in PERS and TRS annual payment that is
funded by the State has been added to the State's
balance sheet as a debt
•The concept of soft liability versus hard
liability is no longer viable
•The POBC issue will replaces the existing
liability
POBS may Defer Principal Payment or Extend Repayment
•The POB payments are based on the latest
actuarial analysis with no extension of
amortization
•Annual payments will be level after a 2-4 year
ramp up period, creating budget stability and
pushing savings into the future
•All annual payments are tailored to be less than
the current actuarial analysis projects
Rating Agencies May View POBs Negatively
•The POBC has structured the bonds as
conservatively as possible
•The POBC transaction is expected to be neutral
to positive for the State's rating
Mr. Mitchell noted that the administration had tried to
mitigate the negative view of pension obligation bonds by
avoiding the first four points on the slide. He emphasized
that the administration had tried to structure the bond
proposal as fiscally responsible as possible to avoid any
potential for a negative rating viewpoint. He discussed the
viewpoint of rating agencies, which considered unfunded
pension liabilities to be the same as any other debt.
Mr. Mitchell turned to slide 7, "Cash Flow Benefit - Rate
of Return Sensitivity." He noted that the following two
slides would show modelling of the base case scenario as
well as the maximum case scenario as a comparison of the
potential state payment after a transaction with an 8
percent return. The base case scenario was at $2.3 billion
total principal amortization; and the max case was at $3.3
billion, which would constitute the full 90 percent of
funding in both TRS and PRS.
Mr. Mitchell continued discussing slide 7, and noted that
the principal amortization column reflected the payments
the state would be making as of today. He pointed out that
the potential cash flow benefit at the 8 percent return
level on the max case scenario generated just under $3
billion of cash flow relief. He continued that in FY 18,
there would be a $50 million reduction, in part due to a
mismatch between the budgetary expectation and the latest
actuarial analysis that had not yet been transferred to the
Office of Management and Budget or the Division of
Legislative Finance. He continued that in FY 19, the
benefit dropped to approximately $1.6 million and then grew
to $404 million in FY 39. He suggested that the table
illustrated budget stabilization rather than a short-term
benefit.
3:47:09 PM
Mr. Mitchell drew attention to the "Potential Cash Flow
Benefit - 7 percent Return" column on the far right of
slide 7. He noted that the 7 percent return diminished the
total budgetary relief to $1.8 billion. He stated that the
administration would pursue the transaction. He reiterated
that there were additional slides to provide backup, and
thought comparing slide 8 and slide 9 was particularly
useful.
Mr. Mitchell looked at slide 8, "State Payment Breakdown (8
percent Return)." He drew attention to the total of $11
million at the top of the 'Existing State Assistance
Payment' column of the left hand table. He compared it to
the $19 billion total of the '7 percent Return State
Assistance Payment' column on slide 9; and compared the
'Cash Flow Benefit' column totals of the two slides. He
thought the benefit of the proposed transaction was
apparent. He pointed out savings in FY 39.
Co-Chair Kelly asked if Mr. Mitchell had run numbers on a 6
percent return scenario.
Mr. Mitchell answered in the negative. He elaborated that
the analyst that had worked on the numbers being presented
had indicated that the results were fairly linear, and
therefore it was possible to estimate a 6 percent rate of
return based on the existing information.
3:49:45 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche remarked that financial liability was
always a risk. He understood that anything above the rate
of the issuance of the bond was a benefit to the state.
Mr. Mitchell agreed that there would be a benefit; and it
would be the difference between the 4 percent cost of
capital (that the state would still be paying), and the
4.15 annualized rate of return that the state would earn on
the invested assets.
Vice-Chair Micciche queried the odds that selling bonds
would not reduce the existing 8 percent level of liability
risk.
Mr. Mitchell stated that historical 20-year rolling
averages would indicate a statistically near 100 percent
likelihood of success. He added that there was always a
risk in historical performance.
3:51:23 PM
Representative Saddler referred the charts on slide 8 and
slide 9, and asked about the state's retirement obligation.
Mr. Mitchell clarified that the numbers in the "Existing
State Asst. Payment" column reflected the portion the state
paid on behalf of the employers (including the state). He
clarified that the figures were not representative of the
22 percent of payroll that the state (and other employers)
paid as an employer.
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked if the administration had
structured a direct cash payment in order to look at the
cost savings.
Mr. Burnett stated that the payment depended upon the
source of funds. He continued that the administration was
not aware of a source of funds that was not going to be
needed for budgetary purposes for other reasons, that was
available and not earning more than 4 percent. He thought
the only source of funds that was not necessary to use was
taking money from the permanent fund earnings reserve
beyond what would otherwise be taken out. He thought a
cash-to-cash analysis would work if the state had a large
balance someplace in a fund that was not invested long
term.
Senator Dunleavy pointed out that although the department
was moving ahead with its plans and was authorized by law,
the legislature was under no obligation to fund the bonds
being considered. He wondered if the administration would
move forward if there were not enough legislators
supportive of appropriating the funding.
Commissioner Hoffbeck hoped the legislature would support
the action, and thought it was a good business decision to
make. He furthered that the reason the topic had come back
up was due to the fact that the cost of debt had dropped so
far. He emphasized that the pension obligation was
constitutionally required to be paid; and thought the
pertinent question was whether the state wanted to pay the
debt at 8 percent, or at 4 percent. He opined that there
was an opportunity to reduce long-term costs, and the state
should take it.
3:55:10 PM
Senator Dunleavy discussed balancing risk. He discussed a
prediction that interest rates would maintain or drop, and
wondered if the situation was time sensitive or if the
state could wait to have a larger discussion to include
more members. He commented that the transaction involved a
large sum of money, there were no guarantees, and there
were inherent risks. He reiterated his question to ask if
the administration would go forward with the proposal if
there was limited support.
Commissioner Hoffbeck expressed concern that without
support, failing to move forward with the bonds would raise
the cost of the debt. He thought if there was verbal non-
support from the legislature (which put concerns in the
market on the appropriation), it would increase the cost of
the bond issuance and cost the state money. He indicated
that the issue of legislative support would be weighed when
the administration was making the decision to move forward
with the proposal. He stipulated that if the department
could not get a good deal for the state, it would not move
forward.
Senator Dunleavy communicated that the legislature was
under an obligation to ask as many questions as possible.
He thought that if the questions raised the rates, it would
be the concern of the administration.
Commissioner Hoffbeck clarified that he had stated that in
moving forward, the department would need to consider the
impact legislative support would have on the cost of the
bond issuance.
Co-Chair Kelly thought it was important to state that the
committee was on the record, even if it was not acting on
legislation at the moment. He recommended that the
administration take time to work through the issue with the
legislature so that it did not mistakenly say anything on
the record that could possibly impact the state's bond
record.
Commissioner Hoffbeck shared a concern that when the
administration had originally considered the pension
obligation bonds over the previous summer, rates had been
approximately 3.5 percent; and current rates had risen to
3.8 percent. He thought there was indications that the
market was starting to rise.
3:59:37 PM
Co-Chair Kelly asked about slide 10, "Financing Schedule,"
and wondered why marketing in the United States was on the
schedule after marketing in Asia and Europe. He wondered if
there was anything in particular to know about the time
frame listed on the slide.
Commissioner Hoffbeck answered in the negative, and relayed
that the administration had realized that it was necessary
to increase the number of investors that purchased State of
Alaska bonds. He continued that the administration's goal
was to secure up to 100 new investors. He stated that it
was more convenient to go through the United States toward
the end of the financing schedule.
Vice-Chair Micciche looked at the principle of $3.5
billion, and wondered why there was an 8 percent interest
rate. He wondered if the administration had investigated a
lower fixed interest rate that presented some savings to
the state but at a lower level of risk than going out for
bonding.
Mr. Mitchell asked if Vice-Chair Micciche had been
referring to the actuarial rate of return of 8 percent, and
wondering why the administration did not have a lower
target rate.
Vice-Chair Micciche answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Mitchell expanded that the actuarial rate had most
recently been 8.25 percent and had diminished to 8 percent.
He continued that if the actuarial assumption was
decreased, it would increase the unfunded liability. He
referred back to the differing state assistance payment
amounts as reflected on slides 8 and 9, which had changed
with a 1 percent reduction in the assumption of a rate of
return.
4:02:26 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche recalled that Mr. Mitchell had stated
that the difference was linear, and pondered that a 6
percent rate of return could add another $8 billion to the
state assistance payment.
Commissioner Hoffbeck discussed the risk involved in the
proposed transaction; and suggested that if the bonds were
sold at a 4 percent return, the state could only achieve a
3.75 percent rate of return over the twenty year period
being examined. He asserted that the resultant loss of a
quarter of a percent could be considered a rounding error
compared the larger issue of funding the pension fund if
the state only achieved a 3.75 rate of return.
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked if the aforementioned 23-year time
period was an expected plan closure date. She inquired if
the administration was engaging in due diligence by
providing the credit rating agencies an opportunity to
question the administration about the proposal and prevent
another downgrade in the state's credit rating.
Mr. Mitchell conveyed that meetings with the credit
agencies had already occurred, and the administration
expected to have feedback from the agencies the following
day or early in the subsequent week.
Co-Chair MacKinnon asked if Mr. Mitchell would be notifying
the Finance Committees upon receiving the feedback.
Mr. Mitchell explained that if the credit agencies did not
view the proposed transaction as the administration
suspected, it would have to reevaluate the proposal. He
furthered that the administration expected the proposal was
subject to an appropriation pledge; and used the Anchorage
jail, the Goose Creek Correctional Center, and the Alaska
Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC) housing facility as
examples. The facilities listed had all been subject to
appropriation commitments of the state; under which the
state annually committed to appropriate money.
4:05:16 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon clarified that the transactions being
considered were taxable.
Mr. Mitchell answered in the affirmative.
Co-Chair MacKinnon mentioned reading about cities that had
taken on pension obligation bonds, gone bankrupt, and had
later regretted decisions related to pension obligation
bonds and poor initial returns.
Co-Chair MacKinnon queried the impacts on the other states,
and wondered how the monetary amount of the proposed
transaction compared to those in other states. She remarked
that American pension systems were in trouble, and thought
it was fascinating that the State of Illinois was issuing
pension obligation bonds when it could not make pension
payments. She wondered if there were other states or cities
that had been successful over a long period of time in the
same scenario that was being contemplated by the
administration.
STEVE KANTOR, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, FIRST SOUTHWEST; FINANCIAL
ADVISOR, PENSION OBLIGATION BOND CORPORATION,
communicated that the transaction was sized to be "uniquely
Alaskan." He elaborated that there had been pension
obligation bonds that had been larger, and pension bonds
that had been smaller; and due to the economies of scale,
the goal was to maintain 90 percent funding. He was
confident that the state could sell more bonds if needed.
He thought cities such as Detroit, Michigan; and Stockton,
California had structured their bond deals to get all of
the potential savings up front in a way that had magnified
the problem when things did not go as planned. He thought
there was a responsible way to structure the transaction.
Mr. Kantor continued, suggesting that the State of Alaska
had taken the opposite approach to that of the
aforementioned cities. He reported that a rating agency had
expressed that it had never seen a pension bond structured
as conservatively. He emphasized that the proposed
transaction had been structured to maximize the benefit to
the state, while minimizing the risk.
4:09:05 PM
Co-Chair Kelly invited Representative Saddler to comment.
Representative Saddler mentioned the effect of various
financial activities on the state's bond rating. He asked
to what extent the issuance of the $3.5 billion would
affect the state's bond rating for general obligation bonds
and debt capacity.
Mr. Mitchell explained that there would be some impact on
debt capacity, but explained that state already had the
obligation on its balance sheet. He considered that it was
a matter of the rating agencies following through with
rhetoric regarding how the agencies analyzed pension
obligations that were on one's balance sheet. He opined
that it would be difficult for the agencies to penalize the
state for refinancing an existing obligation in a
responsible fashion.
Mr. Mitchell continued, mentioning the size of the
transaction and the state's outstanding $800 million in
general obligation debt. He discussed issuing $3 billion
subject to appropriation obligation to the State of Alaska
through a public corporation. He explained that the APOBC
would have feedback on the subject later in the week, and
reiterated that if the group received unexpected feedback
it was likely the transaction would have to be put on hold.
He discussed different rating levels, and how the state not
being downgraded from an "AA" rating category would cause
the cost of capital to go up.
Representative Saddler commented that he had attended a
meeting with Commonwealth North, at which the Alaska's
Liquid Natural Gas (AKLNG) project was discussed. He
wondered if there would be any possible advantage to the
state to gaining the bond issue with anything else that
might have to do with financing of the natural gas
pipeline.
Mr. Kantor disclosed that he was also the financial advisor
to the state for the AKLNG project for the Department of
Revenue. He noted that one potential advantage was
introducing the State of Alaska and the appropriation
credit to a much broader base of international investors.
He pondered that the funding amounts being discussed for
the AKLNG project were quite significant, and would require
additional investors to be able to invest in the project.
He thought that by getting parties comfortable with the
state and being able to tell the story of the state's
credit, the proposed transaction could smooth the way for
going ahead with marketing for the AKLNG project.
Representative Saddler clarified that Mr. Kantor was
referring to financing in the context of the state's
reputation.
Mr. Kantor answered in the affirmative.
4:12:52 PM
AT EASE
4:18:10 PM
RECONVENED
STEPHEN GAUTHIER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
(via teleconference), relayed that he had been asked to
explain the policy position that the Government Finance
Officers Association (GFOA) had taken. He explained that
GFOA was the professional association of finance officers
in the United States and Canada, and had about 18,000
members from all states and most local governments. He
thought it was understandable why pension obligation bonds
were attractive, and acknowledged the opportunity for
earnings and budget relief through the transaction. He
continued and stated that GFOA had taken a position against
pension obligation bonds as an association was that the
bonds frequently fail. He furthered that until 2009, most
pension obligation bonds failed. He qualified that
currently there were more successful such bond ventures
than not, although the endeavor was still risky. He added
that pension obligation bonds often attracted governments
that were in the least position to take such risks.
Mr. Gauthier continued discussing GFOA's position on
pension obligation bonds, and highlighted reasons for the
advisory bulletin referenced by Mr. Burnett. He discussed
borrowing money and reinvesting at a higher rate of
interest; and pointed out the long-term nature of bonds. He
emphasized that relying on a guarantee of investing at the
same rate was problematic over time. He referred to the
variable nature of markets. He asserted that there were
complications in reinvesting refinancing. He explained that
very often it was possible to get monies but there were
factors that would affect how it could be reinvested.
Mr. Gauthier relayed that often pension obligation bond
financial arrangements involved underlying factors such as
swaps and derivatives, which carried more risk than was
usually imagined. He discussed complications with debt
management, noting that pension obligation bonds lowered
legal debt margin by taking accounting liability and
turning it into an actual debt obligation. He continued
that with taxable bonds there was (unlike regular tax-
exempt bonds) often no call provision. He mentioned that
sometimes GFOA had observed pension obligation bond
arrangements would frequently backload principal payments,
and often over a longer period than the amortization would
have been for the underlying unfunded obligation.
Mr. Gauthier discussed possible political issues
(especially in states with strong unions); and had found
that when pensions looked better, people looked for
increases in benefits. He used the example of the City of
Detroit, which had also used pension obligation bonds. He
found it ironic that on the surface pension programs [after
pension obligation bonds] looked healthy, because the debt
had been moved elsewhere. He concluded that pension bonds
did not solve the pension problem for rating agencies,
which were fundamentally looking for a comprehensive
solution to include funding policies and other details. He
mentioned rating agencies' concern about a long-term plan.
He summarized that it was possible that the proposed
transaction would be successful, but that it was the
position of GFOA that the risks of pension obligation bonds
typically outweighed the benefits on most occasions.
4:23:01 PM
Co-Chair MacKinnon wondered if Mr. Gauthier was present
when the administration showed a slide that indicated the
structure of its proposal was much different than other
pension obligation bond transactions; in the sense that the
proposal was not taking up-front savings and there was
fixed liability.
Mr. Gauthier indicated that he had not heard the comments
related to the slide. He stated that theoretically the risk
was that money would be lost after not being able to invest
at a higher rate than the debt. He was not sure how to
guarantee having the appropriate rate of return.
Co-Chair MacKinnon agreed that the state could not
guarantee the rate of return, but wanted to know if Mr.
Gauthier had considered the administration's position that
the state had a closed plan with a fixed liability.
Mr. Gauthier acknowledged that a closed plan did change
some things, and could be considered "less of a moving
target." He was not sure of the plan details and was
hesitant to comment on it.
Co-Chair MacKinnon remarked that from the administration's
perspective, the proposed transaction was more
comprehensive than other cities or pension plans that had
considered pension obligation bonds. She continued that the
transaction being considered was fixed for a time frame of
23 years, and although the state had a little more control
of variables, the rate of return could not be guaranteed.
Mr. Gauthier summarized that the rate of borrowing was
always fixed, but if for any reason the market changed and
it was not possible to invest at a higher rate, the state
would lose money.
4:25:35 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche characterized Mr. Gauthier's comments
as blunt and not necessarily quantified. He asked if the
comments were weighed against the 8 percent that the state
was currently paying in interest. He asked about the
factors influencing the failure of pension obligation bond
endeavors in earlier years.
Mr. Gauthier reiterated that he was not aware of any
details pertaining to the proposed transaction, but rather
had been asked for a general recommendation from GFOA on
the use of pension obligation bonds. He stated that the
bonds were only as good as the assurance that the purchaser
would not be stuck with a higher interest rate on the
bonds. He reminded the committee that the bonds, because
they were taxable, were over a longer term than municipal
or callable bonds. He thought the question of whether to
move forward with the bonds could be reduced to a
prudential judgement of whether the state was satisfied
with the bond earnings projection.
Vice-Chair Micciche thought there had been factors present
in other pension obligation bond transactions that had
caused earlier failures. He noted that Mr. Gauthier had
stated that the market had improved in recent years. He
understood that there was differences in various market
factors, but thought Mr. Gauthier's statements had been
more based on the risk of the earlier years than current
conditions. He inquired as to what conditions that resulted
in more failures in earlier years.
Mr. Gauthier referred to dramatic changes in the market in
2008, and referred to a number highs and lows in the market
in the years preceding 2008. He reiterated that with
pension obligation bonds, the state would be borrowing and
reinvesting for a long period of time, and therefore
everything was dependent on the market performance. He
referred to a quantitative research study from Boston
College. He reiterated that it was not possible to have
guarantees for investing at a higher rate over a long term.
4:29:41 PM
MARK FOSTER, FISCAL STUDY GROUP MEMBER, COMMONWEALTH NORTH,
shared that he was retired, and was very interested in the
proposed POB transaction. He was formerly the chief
financial officer of Anchorage School District, and had a
fair amount of exposure to the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board (GASB) and pension accounting. He had
developed some background information on the proposal for
Commonwealth North, and wanted to share information about
the returns that had been generated by pension obligation
bonds by other states or municipalities.
Mr. Foster discussed pension obligation bonds, noting that
other entities had enjoyed good returns for certain periods
of time, but that had become negative in other years. He
referred to a table entitled "Pension Funding Ratios by
State" from the Boston College Center for Retirement
Research (copy on file), and highlighted data on pension
bonds issued by other states. He referred to data that
indicated the bonds began to look like good investments in
recent years, where there was increased liquidity that
helped to push asset prices up.
4:33:08 PM
Mr. Foster discussed historical net returns on pension
obligation bonds, and a period of time when there was
qualitative easing. He cautioned against using the
information as a basis for decision making. He encouraged
the administration and committee to review economic
literature looking at "headwind" in the economy that had
the potential to diminish the returns relative to the
historic records. Additionally, he cautioned against
looking to the past to estimate what future returns would
be. He pointed out economic headwinds such as an aging
population and the associated costs. He reported that many
records suggested low growth and slow growth returns would
drop below 5 percent.
Mr. Foster continued, and thought there was clearly anxiety
about whether the bonds might have the potential to
increase the interest rate and cost of financing beyond
just the pension. He considered it could have an impact on
state and local financing for other capital infrastructure.
He continued that if it was possible to get a favorable
determination, it would be great; but if not, he considered
that the bonds could have significant risk to
infrastructure going forward.
4:37:04 PM
Senator Dunleavy asked what Mr. Foster thought of the idea
of issuing over $3 billion in pension obligation bonds.
Mr. Foster stated that if the risk could be diminished,
with assurances that there would not be a negative impact
on other debt costs (state or local); he thought the bonds
were "a decent bet." He relayed that he was conservative in
his projections, and thought the earnings should be
estimated in the 5 percent range rather than 7 percent or 8
percent.
Senator Dunleavy inquired what would happen if the
administration moved forward with the transaction without a
guarantee that the legislature would appropriate the funds.
He wondered how the appropriation would be structured;
whether it would go in the supplemental budget, in the
appropriation bill, or as a stand-alone item. He conveyed
that he was in the position of needing to be convinced that
the proposed transaction was a good idea. He was unsure
about the need for quick action, and he was not sure how
many good outcomes had come from moving quickly on an item
of such magnitude. He expressed skepticism about the
proposal.
Senator Kelly invited Representative Vasquez to comment.
Representative Vasquez referred to slide 8 and slide 9 [of
the PowerPoint presentation given by Mr. Mitchell], and
remarked that the projected scenarios using a 7 percent and
8 percent rate of return did not seem realistic. She would
have liked to have seen projections using 6 percent, 5
percent, and even a 4 percent rate of return. She discussed
the cost of bond issuance and thought there should be more
information on the matter. She noted that there was no
historic perspective being presented on the returns the
corporation had gained in its investments.
Co-Chair Kelly asked that the administration respond to
Representative Vasquez, as well as the Co-Chairs of House
Finance, with the information she requested.
4:41:33 PM
Vice-Chair Micciche thanked Mr. Foster for his testimony,
which he thought encapsulated the periods of growth and
negative returns from 1992 to 2009. He referred to a
document provided by the director of the Legislative
Finance Division. The document had shown that in order to
have negative returns over a 25 year period, it was
necessary to stack the period of negative returns. He
referred to discussion and testing of another investment
option earlier in the year, which had found that the
stacking had never occurred. He requested the
administration to respond to the other testifiers in the
meeting and consider the presentations that had been made.
Co-Chair Kelly agreed with Senator Micciche and requested
that the administration respond to the other presentations.
He thought there were some unanswered questions to address.
Co-Chair Thompson asked that responses from the
administration be shared with the House Finance Committee.
Co-Chair Kelly agreed.
ADJOURNMENT
4:43:25 PM
The meeting was adjourned at 4:43 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| DOR Presentation to Senate Finance - POB Transaction - 9 29 16.pdf |
SFIN 9/29/2016 2:30:00 PM |
Pension Obligation Bonds |
| LFD Informational Paper 16-1 POB (1).pdf |
SFIN 9/29/2016 2:30:00 PM |
Pension Obligation Bonds |
| GFOA Advisory - Pension Obligation Bonds 92916.htm |
SFIN 9/29/2016 2:30:00 PM |
Pension Obligation Bonds |
| ProPublica - Bet Big, Then Go Short.htm |
SFIN 9/29/2016 2:30:00 PM |
Pension Obligation Bonds |
| POBC Pension Obligation Bond Corporation Resolution.pdf |
SFIN 9/29/2016 2:30:00 PM |
Pension Obligation Bonds |