Legislature(2017 - 2018)GRUENBERG 120
10/25/2017 08:00 AM House JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| SB54 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | SB 54 | TELECONFERENCED | |
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
October 25, 2017
8:03 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Matt Claman, Chair
Representative Zach Fansler, Vice Chair
Representative Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins
Representative Gabrielle LeDoux
Representative David Eastman
Representative Chuck Kopp
Representative Charisse Millett (alternate)
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Louise Stutes (alternate)
OTHER MEMBERS
Representative Andy Josephson
Representative Mike Chenault
Representative Dan Ortiz
Representative Justin Parrish
Representative DeLena Johnson
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 54(FIN)
"An Act relating to crime and criminal law; relating to
violation of condition of release; relating to sex trafficking;
relating to sentencing; relating to imprisonment; relating to
parole; relating to probation; relating to driving without a
license; relating to the pretrial services program; and
providing for an effective date."
- HEARD & HELD
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
BILL: SB 54
SHORT TITLE: CRIME AND SENTENCING
SPONSOR(s): SENATOR(s) COGHILL
02/10/17 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
02/10/17 (S) JUD, FIN
02/17/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
02/17/17 (S) Heard & Held
02/17/17 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
02/24/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
02/24/17 (S) -- MEETING CANCELED --
03/01/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/01/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/01/17 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
03/03/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/03/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/03/17 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
03/06/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/06/17 (S) -- MEETING CANCELED --
03/08/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/08/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/08/17 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
03/10/17 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/10/17 (S) Moved CSSB 54(JUD) Out of Committee
03/10/17 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
03/13/17 (S) JUD RPT CS 3DP 1NR NEW TITLE
03/13/17 (S) DP: COGHILL, COSTELLO, KELLY
03/13/17 (S) NR: MEYER
03/28/17 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532
03/28/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/28/17 (S) MINUTE(FIN)
03/28/17 (S) FIN AT 1:30 PM SENATE FINANCE 532
03/28/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/28/17 (S) MINUTE(FIN)
03/31/17 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532
03/31/17 (S) Heard & Held
03/31/17 (S) MINUTE(FIN)
03/31/17 (S) FIN AT 1:30 PM SENATE FINANCE 532
03/31/17 (S) -- MEETING CANCELED --
04/03/17 (S) FIN RPT CS 1DP 4NR 2AM NEW TITLE
04/03/17 (S) NR: MACKINNON, BISHOP, DUNLEAVY,
MICCICHE
04/03/17 (S) AM: HOFFMAN, OLSON
04/03/17 (S) DP: VON IMHOF
04/03/17 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532
04/03/17 (S) Moved CSSB 54(FIN) Out of Committee
04/03/17 (S) MINUTE(FIN)
04/07/17 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H)
04/07/17 (S) VERSION: CSSB 54(FIN)
04/08/17 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
04/08/17 (H) STA, JUD, FIN
05/04/17 (H) STA AT 3:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
05/04/17 (H) <Bill Hearing Canceled>
10/23/17 (S) FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION BILL - SCR 401
10/23/17 (H) FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION BILL - SCR 401
10/23/17 (H) STA REFERRAL WAIVED Y25 N12 E2 A1
10/23/17 (H) STA AT 12:30 AM GRUENBERG 120
10/23/17 (H) -- MEETING CANCELED --
10/23/17 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
10/23/17 (H) Heard & Held
10/23/17 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
10/24/17 (H) JUD AT 9:00 AM GRUENBERG 120
10/24/17 (H) Heard & Held
10/24/17 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
10/24/17 (H) JUD AT 6:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
10/24/17 (H) Heard & Held
10/24/17 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
10/25/17 (H) JUD AT 8:00 AM GRUENBERG 120
WITNESS REGISTER
JOHN SKIDMORE, Division Director
Criminal Division
Department of Law (DOL)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
GRACE ABBOTT, Staff
Representative Charisse Millett
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered a
question.
DEAN WILLIAMS, Commissioner
Department of Corrections
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
RANDALL BURNS, Director
Division of Behavioral Health
Department of Health and Social Services
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
TONY PIPER, Coordinator
Alcohol Safety Action Program
Division of Behavioral Health
Department of Health and Social Services
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
BARBARA DUNHAM, Project Attorney
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission
Alaska Judicial Council
Alaska Court System
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
JEFF EDWARDS, Director
Alaska Board of Parole
Department of Corrections
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered
questions.
SUSANNE DiPETRO, Executive Director
Alaska Judicial Council
Alaska Court System
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of SB 54, answered a
question.
ACTION NARRATIVE
8:03:02 AM
CHAIR MATT CLAMAN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 8:03 a.m. Representatives Claman, Fansler,
Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, LeDoux, and Eastman were present at the
call to order. Representative Millett (alternate for
Representative Lora Reinbold) arrived as the meeting was in
progress.
[Due to their length, some amendments discussed or adopted
during the meeting are found at the end of the minutes of SB 54.
Shorter amendments are included in the main text.]
SB 54-CRIME AND SENTENCING
8:03:42 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the only order of business would be
CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 54(FIN) "An Act relating to crime and
criminal law; relating to violation of condition of release;
relating to sex trafficking; relating to sentencing; relating to
imprisonment; relating to parole; relating to probation;
relating to driving without a license; relating to the pretrial
services program; and providing for an effective date."
CHAIR CLAMAN advised the committee that Legislative Legal and
Research Services has permission to make any technical and
conforming changes to this bill. During the hearing of
10/24/17, 9:00 a.m., meeting, the committee considered
Amendments 1 through 28: Amendment 1 was withdrawn, Amendments
2, 22, 25, 26 failed to be adopted; Amendments 3, 9, 27, 28 were
adopted, and all of the other amendments were rolled to the
bottom of the stack for possible consideration. Chair Claman
explained the amendment process.
CHAIR CLAMAN then turned the committee to Amendment 29.
8:05:25 AM
[Chair Claman and Representative Eastman discussed the amendment
process.]
8:06:02 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS moved to adopt Amendment 29,
Version 30-LS0461\N.63, Martin, 10/24/17, which read as follows:
Page 1, line 4, following "program;":
Insert "relating to peremptory challenges;
amending Rule 24(d), Alaska Rules of Criminal
Procedure;"
Page 15, following line 6:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 22. The uncodified law of the State of
Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read:
DIRECT COURT RULE AMENDMENT. Rule 24(d), Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read:
(d) Peremptory Challenges. A party who waives
peremptory challenge as to the jurors in the box does
not thereby lose the challenge but may exercise it as
to new jurors who may be called. A juror peremptorily
challenged is excused without cause. If the offense is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
each side is entitled to six [10] peremptory
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine
or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the
court may allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately
or jointly."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, following line 29:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 25. Section 22 of this Act takes effect
only if sec. 22 of this Act receives the two-thirds
majority vote of each house required by art. IV, sec.
15, Constitution of the State of Alaska."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 26"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
8:06:18 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS noted that when discussing the
criminal justice process a number of preemptory challenges are
involved, particularly in some rural court systems wherein that
number of preemptory challenges have the propensity to gum up
the works. He advised that Alaska was at six preemptory
challenges for a long period of time and a few years ago the
legislature raised that number to ten preemptory challenges for
the prosecution and the defense, while noting that 10 preemptory
challenges are well above the national median. In some rural
court systems that means flying jurors into the small community
just to be challenged, rejected, and then fly back to their
home, thereby, possibly taking days to find a jury for what can
often be a short trial. He pointed to the narrower frame of
this legislation and suggested that the conversation be
continued during the regular session via a different vehicle.
Representative Kreiss-Tomkins withdrew Amendment 29.
8:07:28 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX moved to adopt Amendment 30, Version 30-
LS0461\N.81, Glover/Martin, 10/24/17, which read as follows:
Page 2, following line 29:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 6. AS 12.55.027(g) is amended to read:
(g) A court granting credit against a sentence
of imprisonment under (d) of this section may grant
credit of not more than 120 [360] days against a total
term of imprisonment imposed for
(1) a felony crime against a person under
AS 11.41;
(2) a crime involving domestic violence as
defined in AS 18.66.990;
(3) a sex offense as defined in
AS 12.63.100;
(4) an offense under AS 11.71 involving the
delivery of a controlled substance to a person under
19 years of age;
(5) burglary in the first degree under
AS 11.46.300; or
(6) arson in the first degree under
AS 11.46.400."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 18:
Delete "sec. 15"
Insert "sec. 16"
Page 15, following line 20:
Insert a new paragraph to read:
"(1) AS 12.55.027(g), as amended by sec. 6
of this Act;"
Renumber the following paragraphs accordingly.
Page 15, line 21:
Delete "sec. 6"
Insert "sec. 7"
Page 15, line 22:
Delete "sec. 7"
Insert "sec. 8"
Page 15, line 23:
Delete "sec. 8"
Insert "sec. 9"
Page 15, line 24:
Delete "sec. 9"
Insert "sec. 10"
Page 15, line 25:
Delete "sec. 10"
Insert "sec. 11"
Page 15, line 26:
Delete "sec. 11"
Insert "sec. 12"
Page 15, line 27:
Delete "sec. 12"
Insert "sec. 13"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17"
Insert "Section 18"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 25"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
8:07:45 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX explained that Amendment 30 reduces the
maximum credit, against a prison sentence for time served under
electronic monitoring (EM), from 360-days to 120-days. She
further explained that this would only apply to felony crimes
against people, domestic violence crimes, sex offenses, delivery
of controlled substances to a person under 19-years of age,
burglary in the first degree, and arson in the first degree.
8:08:39 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT offered strong support for Amendment 30
because those individuals who committed the above-mentioned
offenses should not be allowed to receive the same credit as
folks charged with lesser crimes.
8:09:07 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX, in response to Representative Kopp,
agreed that this amendment applies to all felonies under crimes
against persons.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that Amendment 30 is geared toward a
sentence of imprisonment, except pretrial is the only time a
person would be on electronic monitoring (EM). At pretrial, he
explained, a person is presumed innocent until they had moved
through their due process procedures, had a chance to confront
witnesses, and all lawful protections were applied to that
individual. A person would only be on electronic monitoring
(EM) if they were deemed to be low-risk pretrial. In the event
the court determined there was not a single violation which
would put them back in prison, this [credit] would only be taken
off at the end of their sentence. He asked whether the
amendment was trying to say that under no circumstances, in a
pretrial and pre-conviction setting, would the court have any
discretion in letting someone out on EM, or whether the
amendment was trying to severely limit the court's discretion.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX pointed out that under current law, the
court is limited in granting EM because the language read "may
grant" up to 360 days. Amendment 30 cuts that discretion from
360 days to 120 days and, she pointed out, these are only for
the "really bad crimes," she pointed out.
8:11:54 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the credit being given
would count toward the amount of time someone would have to
serve on a sentence before being eligible for parole. He
referred to a previous discussion about time kicking in at the
end of the sentence, and if that were the case, would it kick in
at the beginning of the sentence, he asked.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX clarified that Amendment 30 does not
change current law other than change the time from 360 days to
120 days. Representative Eastman's question would equally apply
if she had reduced it to 359 days, although, she then opined
that she was not absolutely certain about her answer.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that because Amendment 30 is under AS
12.55.027, where a court grants credit for time served, the
court never comes into play about probation or earlier credit
after a sentence begins, because once a defendant is sentenced,
the defendant is put into the custody of the Department of
Corrections (DOC) and DOC makes those decisions. Therefore, he
explained, the court making a decision about credit for time
served is necessarily addressing pretrial release conditions.
For example, someone was released on EM and had no problems for
240 days, the court would be limited by Amendment 30 to grant
only 120 days of the 240 days toward the person's service of
their sentence, he explained.
8:14:50 AM
JOHN SKIDMORE, Division Director, Criminal Division, Department
of Law (DOL), answered that Chair Claman's explanation is
correct. AS 12.55.027(g) is when the court awards someone
credit against their time in jail based on the amount of time
they had been in a confining facility.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that he did not see anything
specifically dealing with electronic monitoring (EM), although
he understands that EM would be involved. He asked whether it
would be any type of confinement, including EM.
MR. SKIDMORE answered in the affirmative.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked for clarification that Amendment 30
deals with the courts, and it does not deal with any types of
days counting toward good behavior or anything similar. He
asked whether this credit comes off the sentence before
incarceration, and that after the person is incarcerated, good
time and those sorts of credits kick in.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX replied that she thinks Representative
Eastman is correct.
8:17:00 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that this discussion has been ongoing
within the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission for over two-years
and opined that there are various pretrial treatments for mental
health and substance abuse for individuals. In the event the
court decides the person is a low enough risk to be out of a DOC
facility and into treatment, the person can be on intensive
supervision in those facilities. The questions become, if a
person is under intensive EM supervision in these programs and
they are not free to do anything else in their life, should that
apply to their sentence, and whether the legislature wants
individuals in those recovery environments to have any time
taken off of the end of their sentence. After "batting this
around" for two years, he offered that the commission arrived at
no more than 360 days because the range of felony sentences,
generally, are from 5 years to 99 years. He remarked that he
does not support Amendment 30 and described it as dangerous when
the committee tries to get into all of the technical discussions
that have been considered at the commission level on these types
of issues, it is better left in its current form.
8:18:37 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN stated that he does not support Amendment 30
because some treatment programs are up to one-year in length.
For example, he offered, say a person with major drug and
alcohol problem was released to such a treatment program and
succeeded in that program after committing any of the assaults
listed, this amendment would force them back into prison.
Thereby, he stressed, undoing the very treatment criminal
justice reform is trying to encourage.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX described Amendment 30 as a judgement
call.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
8:19:23 AM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives LeDoux, Millett,
and Eastman voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 30.
Representatives Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, the adoption of Amendment 30 failed to
be adopted by a vote of 3-4.
8:20:01 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT moved to adopt Amendment 31, Version 30-
LS0461\N.67, Glover/Martin, 10/24/17, which read as follows:
Page 2, following line 29:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 6. AS 12.30.011, as repealed and reenacted
by sec. 59, ch. 36, SLA 2016, is amended by adding a
new subsection to read:
(l) If the supreme court establishes a
schedule of bail amounts or conditions of release for
misdemeanor offenses, the schedule must include a
condition providing that a correctional facility
shall, at the time of release, conduct a chemical test
of the breath of a person who has been arrested and
who is intoxicated and may detain the person until the
test result indicates that the person's breath has
less than 0.08 grams of alcohol for each 210 liters of
breath."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 17:
Delete "and"
Page 15, following line 17:
Insert a new paragraph to read:
"(6) AS 12.30.011(l), enacted by sec. 6 of
this Act; and"
Renumber the following paragraph accordingly.
Page 15, line 18:
Delete "sec. 15"
Insert "sec. 16"
Page 15, line 21:
Delete "sec. 6"
Insert "sec. 7"
Page 15, line 22:
Delete "sec. 7"
Insert "sec. 8"
Page 15, line 23:
Delete "sec. 8"
Insert "sec. 9"
Page 15, line 24:
Delete "sec. 9"
Insert "sec. 10"
Page 15, line 25:
Delete "sec. 10"
Insert "sec. 11"
Page 15, line 26:
Delete "sec. 11"
Insert "sec. 12"
Page 15, line 27:
Delete "sec. 12"
Insert "sec. 13"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17 of this Act takes"
Insert "Sections 6 and 18 of this Act take"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 25"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
8:20:06 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT described Amendment 31 as the "sober law"
and advised that it would only apply to misdemeanors because the
bail schedule only applies to misdemeanors. The amendment
allows law enforcement to hold a person until they are under the
legal limit of alcohol. She related that she would like to add
the language "or a sober adult" as a third party because it
would alleviate the constitutionality of this issue. Judges
previously allowed this practice even though the specific
language was not in statute, and this amendment codifies that
previous practice. Amendment 31 allows a judge the discretion
to hold a misdemeanant in jail until they could be released on
their own recognizance (OR), or, if they were unable to pass a
breathalyzer test they could be released to a sober third-party,
she explained. This is a tool in the toolbox for public safety
she described, and after speaking with the Alaska State Troopers
and the Anchorage Police Department, the amendment is prudent.
She related that judges were squeamish because they could not
point to the bail schedule or a statute allowing them authority
to hold an inebriated individual until they were sober.
8:23:21 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 31, on [page 1, line 10], after the language "210
liters of breath" add the language "or a sober adult."
8:23:36 AM
GRACE ABBOTT, Staff, Representative Charisse Millett, Alaska
State Legislature, noted that the language in the bail statute
read "may," and the Alaska Court System and Legislative Legal
and Research Services advised that "may" would allow for a
release to a third-party. Except, she opined, it may be
appropriate to insert, "or released to a sober ..." noting that
the word "responsible" adult was previously discussed.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Ms. Abbott to clarify the location that the
language "or a sober adult" would be inserted.
MS. ABBOTT answered that it would be "after the word breath, or
released to ..." She then clarified that it would be on line
10.
8:24:54 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN stated that Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 31,
page 1, line 10, adds the words "or released to a sober adult"
after the word "breath."
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP commented that possibly the word should be
"responsible."
8:25:40 AM
MR. SKIDMORE, in response to whether the words should be
"responsible" or "sober," advised that Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d
727 (1979) fn 9, read as follows:
Even if a bail schedule is furnished, in order to
protect the public and the arrestee, law enforcement
officials in some cases might reasonably detain an
intoxicated arrestee until he is sufficiently sober or
a responsible person arrives to take custody of him.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that when the 1979 Alaska Supreme Court
reviewed this issue, it chose the word "reasonable," which
follows precisely with this amendment.
8:26:40 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT, in response to Chair Claman, deferred to
Mr. Skidmore as to whether the word should be: responsible,
reasonable, or sober.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that he had suggested the word
"responsible" because that is the word the Alaska Supreme Court
used in Reeves; therefore, it has the least likelihood of any
sort of legal challenge.
8:27:20 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN offered the language contained in Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 31, page 1, line 10, after the word
"breath" add the language "or release to a responsible adult."
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected to the adoption of Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 31.
8:27:40 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that while it follows that a
responsible adult would necessarily be a sober adult, it is
actually broader because a sober adult would not necessarily be
responsible. For example, she said, a person could be a sober
total loser and not necessarily responsible; therefore, a
responsible person is a broader description than simply being a
sober third-party. She asked Mr. Skidmore whether she was
correct.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that some of the most interesting issues in
caselaw appear in the footnotes.
MR. SKIDMORE agreed that an individual could be sober and not
necessarily be deemed responsible, and a responsible adult could
be deemed not completely sober. He offered a scenario of one of
his daughters being arrested for something after he had had
consumed a beer or a glass of wine, he said he was unsure he was
necessarily sober, but he still considered himself to be
responsible under those circumstances. Mr. Skidmore described
that this is a policy question, and that he deferred to the word
"responsible" because that is the word the 1979 Alaska Supreme
Court used when deciding the Reeves lawsuit.
8:29:44 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked the definition of responsible.
MR. SKIDMORE reiterated that "responsible" was the word choice
made by the 1979 Alaska Supreme Court and it is up to the
committee to determine the definition of responsible. He
related that he could look at responsible as someone who had a
legal responsibility for an individual or, he offered,
responsible is someone to be trusted without a legal
responsibility for the individual that they were taking into
their care. Amendment 31 was not offered by the Department of
Law (DOL), and he only knows about this case due to the
discussions within the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission.
8:30:55 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked whether responsible had been
defined anywhere in statute because he could think of different
definitions for responsible, for example: responsible in that
moment; responsible in the last week; or responsible over their
life time. Suddenly, the legislature is directing a judge to
make this determination, and he remarked that he is against the
idea of letting a judge determine who is responsible and who is
not, such that someone was not wearing a shirt, for example. He
remarked that all kinds of issues could come from this when
directing a judge to determine who is a responsible human being.
MR. SKIDMORE clarified that setting this as a condition means
the court would simply set the condition. Whereas, he
explained, the determination of whether the person who shows up
is responsible, is a determination for the Department of
Corrections (DOC) because this occurs when the person is
released. In the event a sober or responsible person showed up,
the DOC must decide whether it could legitimately release the
inebriated individual at that moment because no one conducts an
analysis of the person's background to determine whether the
person could be trusted with the inebriant's care.
8:32:43 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER commented that Mr. Skidmore had hit on
his exact point, there is no analysis for this action and it
would come down to an employee in a correctional facility
deciding that they did not like the person who showed up and the
inebriate would not be released to their care. He related the
need for the committee to include some type of strict definition
or strict legality in the [conceptual] amendment, such as
"responsible in the sense that you are a parent or child, or
something like that." This [conceptual] amendment leaves too
much latitude for the person to "play God" as to whether the
person could be released to the individual who showed up at the
facility, he expressed.
MR. SKIDMORE offered that the committee could attempt to craft a
definition, or the DOC would likely come up with some sort of
regulation to provide guidance to its employees as to how that
would be pursued.
8:33:49 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT reiterated that this was the practice for
many years, the Anchorage Police Department (APD) and the Alaska
State Troopers (AST) used it as a tool even though it was not
codified, and it was not in the bail schedule. She referred to
Alaska Supreme Court caselaw that talks about "responsible," and
although the word is undefined, it seems to be something the DOC
officers and judges would not use as a discriminatory factor.
She reiterated that this is a public safety issue for the public
and for those people released from prison while still under the
influence. She asked whether this was an issue for the court
system, DOC, or DOL.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that from his 20 years of experience
throughout the state, he has frequently seen well respected
impose a condition of release requiring that the person is sober
before being released from prison.
This issue was raised through the work of the Alaska Criminal
Justice Commission and he noted that the courts, law
enforcement, and prosecutors have voiced their concerns. The
commission has not yet reached any decisions or recommendations,
but it is a hot topic. He pointed out that "we are always
concerned" about almost all of the state's laws and whether the
laws are being applied in some discriminatory manner because
there is always that possibility, but steps are in the system to
provide recourse if someone believes discrimination had taken
place.
8:37:55 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether Mr. Skidmore was involved with Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission subcommittee reviewing this issue.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that he is on the subcommittee, there has
been one meeting and other meetings are scheduled, and Captain
Sean Case is the chair of that subcommittee.
8:38:25 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that the only time this
definition of responsible would come into play would be after a
time of detainment and an intoxicated person was being released.
He asked whether giving the inmate the opportunity to go with a
responsible adult would be in the inmate's favor.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that Representative Eastman was correct.
The goal of Amendment 31, he explained, is to ensure that the
person being released was either sober, or that the person could
be released while intoxicated to a person who would take them
under their care.
8:39:29 AM
[Chair Claman and Representative Eastman discussed the fact that
the maker of the conceptual amendment used the word
"responsible" in Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 31.]
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the word sober has a legal
definition, and how the DOC would assess whether someone was
sober.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that there are multiple ways upon which DOC
may make that assessment, for most folks in the criminal justice
system, sober is under the .08 legal limit to drive. He then
offered the argument that a field sobriety test is a better
assessment than the alcohol breathalyzer test because alcohol
can affect different people at different levels.
8:41:39 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that the Bristol Bay jail holds a
maximum of eight people; therefore, it is important that, if
there was no other reason to hold a person, that they were
released under the legal limit of sobriety, or safely delivered
to a person offering them a safe standard of care. He suggested
that using the word "sober" is unfortunate because this
discussion is simply about a legal limit of intoxication. While
he appreciates Representative Fansler's concerns of judgment, he
advised that the DOC officers try every day to retain the
desperately needed bed space for higher-level offenders. These
officers generally exercise good judgment when delivering folks
to a person willing and able to provide a safe standard of care
to the person being released. He said he supports Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 31.
8:43:49 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS surmised that this is a new tool
in the toolbox that has not yet been field tested.
MR. SKIDMORE clarified that this practice did occur throughout
the system for many years, and during his practice in Bethel,
Dillingham, Kenai, and Anchorage, this tool was used
effectively. He explained that during the process of criminal
justice reform and looking at revising bail schedules, it was
unclear which statute gave the judges authority to impose this
particular condition, so judges stopped using that condition of
release. He reiterated that this tool has been field tested and
used successfully for over a decade, and the Alaska Criminal
Justice Commission is attempting to determine how the tool could
be utilized again, how it could be authorized, and what
statutory language could be used for that purpose.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS surmised that this conceptual
amendment is basically codifying something that informally
emerged in the criminal justice system. He asked whether any
concerns had emerged from the subcommittee, or whether any
deliberations depart from the language contained in Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 31.
MR. SKIDMORE noted that the subcommittee's scope was broader, in
that it also looks at issues regarding Title 47, how those laws
work, where people are supposed to be taking them, and under
what circumstances. The subcommittee is also looking at
intoxicated people and incapacitated people who had been
arrested, and a whole gamut of issues.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked Commissioner Dean Williams
how he sees this amendment being enacted, and whether he had
concerns about how it read as conceptually amended.
8:48:21 AM
DEAN WILLIAMS, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, related
that it is not good when an issue is grey regarding someone
making a determination as to when an inmate should be released.
His concern, he offered, is that this committee is making these
types of calls at the same time the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission subcommittee, comprised of law enforcement
representatives, the DOC, and people from mental health field,
are currently working on this problem issue. He remarked that
asking staff to determine who is responsible may sound simple,
except, he stressed, a remand facility is complicated with
things moving fast, and; therefore, staff will error on the side
of keeping someone in prison. It is important to get this
right, and he suggested giving the commission's subcommittee an
opportunity to offer the legislature a solution to this issue,
while stressing that he "totally agrees" that this is a problem.
8:50:14 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT asked Mr. Skidmore whether this amendment
would only apply to people charged with a crime and that it is
not about picking up intoxicated people. Some people may
believe a police officer can pick a person up for being
intoxicated and hold them, she said.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that this amendment applies solely to
individuals who have been arrested for a crime, it does not
authorize law enforcement to go out and pick someone up for
being intoxicated. This solely applies to people who have
committed a crime and were intoxicated at the time of committing
that crime, and the person must have sobered up before being
released, or they can be released to a responsible person. He
added that this amendment falls in line with the law of the
State of Indiana.
8:51:40 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT noted concern that the commission's
subcommittee may slowly come to a solution because that
subcommittee has many issues to consider. She suggested that
this amendment could be a placeholder in the event the
commission later offered additional recommendations. Law
enforcement advised, she related, that the more immediate this
issue is codified, better outcomes will take place. She asked
Commissioner Williams whether this policy could go into effect
and then be modified through the commission process.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that this practice was applied
inconsistently and pointed to the importance of the presiding
judges debating this particular issue. He reiterated that this
is a problem for law enforcement when making decisions as to who
is a responsible adult, and that he wants to get that right with
Representative Millett. In his position as commissioner, he
stressed that he does not want intoxicated people sitting in the
DOC facilities who have another place to go, which could be the
"sobering centers" the DOC is beginning to develop in Fairbanks.
He pointed out that different strategies are in order for
whatever resources are available in each community. The
Department of Corrections (DOC) could live with this amendment,
but he asked that the commission's subcommittee have 2-3 months
to work on the problem, and if it did not then offer the best
solution, to introduce the amendment at that time.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT countered that she does not want another
death because the legislature did not pass an amendment that
could have saved someone's life which, she stressed, is more
important than getting it right.
8:55:25 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to page 1, lines 7-8 of
Amendment 31, and noted that it read as follows:
... that a correctional facility shall, at the
time of release, conduct a chemical test of the breath
of a person who has been arrested and who is
intoxicated ...
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that he could see that language
being interpreted as someone arrested and intoxicated at the
initial time of arrest, or the person was arrested and then was
intoxicated at the time of release, or both. He asked Mr.
Skidmore to clarify the interpretation of that language.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that line 7 talks about the person at the
time of release, and line 8 talks about the person at the time
of arrest. He submitted that with both of those, the time of
release and the time of arrest, it would have to be that the
person was intoxicated at the time they were arrested, and then
also looking at the time they are released. He explained that
the language looks at that short duration of time because if
someone was arrested and not released for days later, they would
be sober. The language must have the events close in time
because the intoxication must be associated with both events.
8:58:28 AM
The committee took an at-ease from 8:58 a.m. to 9:40 a.m.
9:40:42 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN brought the committee back to questions on
Amendment 31.
9:41:17 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to line 8, "who has been
arrested and who is intoxicated ..." and asked how the
department would make that determination as to whether someone
would qualify under this language.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that currently, the protocol for
intoxicated people entering the facility is to ask the person
for compliance in terms of obtaining their blood alcohol content
(BAC).
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether this amendment would
significantly change the current protocol.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that this amendment contemplates
that the DOC would make a determination at the end of the
release process as to whether the person was competent and safe
to be released. Therefore, he answered, this amendment would
change the current protocol because it requires the DOC staff to
perform another formalized process and make a determination as
to whether to release the person.
9:43:27 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether that currently involves
conducting a BAC test and whether DOC has the authority to do
that, or would this amendment give the DOC authority it does not
currently possess.
COMMISIONER WILLIAMS replied that "the devil's in the details,"
and even though it may sound like a small thing to go back and
perform a BAC test, each time the DOC staff touches a person
admitted into the facility it requires more hours and more
people to run a busy remand facility. He noted that all of the
DOC facilities probably have the BAC devices, but the process
requires more involved time when dealing with the person.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked what is the percentage of
intoxicated people that come into the DOC facilities.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that that is a hard question for
him to answer as commissioner, but he could speak with the
remand facilities. He estimated that many people come to the
facilities intoxicated, affected by drugs, or otherwise.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Commissioner Williams that if he did not
have the statistics, he was not required to offer an estimate.
9:45:37 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that a previous public testifier
advised the committee that the state's prisons are overflowing
with drugs and people are released addicted to various
substances. He asked the percentage of people released who are
in an addicted status.
CHAIR CLAMAN reiterated that if Commissioner Williams did not
have the data, he was not required to answer.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS said that he does not know the number of
people released who are addicted to a substance, and
acknowledged a drug problem in the prison system, as in most of
the prisons in the nation.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS, in response to Representative Eastman,
answered that the DOC does not currently test for addiction when
people are released from the facility.
9:46:33 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked the reason DOC does not currently
test to determine how many addicted people are released from the
state's prisons.
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected that his question has nothing to do
with Amendment 31, and he would not allow that question.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt a conceptual amendment ...
CHAIR CLAMAN interrupted and advised Representative Eastman that
the committee is not taking conceptual amendments at this time
because the committee was still under consideration of
Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 31.
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Eastman discussed the
appropriate timing for his motion to adopt Conceptual Amendment
2 to Amendment 31.]
9:47:59 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT asked Commissioner Williams to walk
through the current practice of releasing intoxicated people,
and whether the practice is working. [Representative Millett
then cited the various instances of released intoxicated people
she had testified to previously.]
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that currently, people are
released when the bail schedule says they should be released, or
they are taken to court.
The problem in the Fairbanks case, he offered, someone was
released that should have been released under the bail schedule
because he was presumptively released on his own recognizance
release (OR). In that circumstance, even though everything was
legally correct, factually, and morally everything happened
wrong, he expressed. The DOC releases people when the bail
schedule says to release them, or when they are taken to court
and the judge orders their release, "it is very black and white
in most other cases," he explained.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT surmised that under the current system,
the DOC is releasing intoxicated people from prison.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS related that in some cases, he would guess
they were released intoxicated. As to the issue of whether or
not people were being to a responsible adult, those are the
important nuances in terms of making a safe release. The DOC
staff wants to follow the rules and laws, and they want to
clearly know when to release a person and when not to release a
person. The staff goes through great pains to find a
responsible person for the person, but at the end of the day and
under the current law, "if the law says that you get out, you're
legally able to go, they are legally able to go." Hopefully,
they do not make a second bad decision that puts them or someone
else in danger. He pointed out that at some particular time,
the correctional system has to say, "you're free to go." He
stressed that the cleaner the law and the cleaner the rules can
be made for the correctional system, the better it is for his
staff being taught "in really difficult circumstances, making
judgment calls about who someone should be released to." In
response to Representative Millett's question as to whether the
DOC is releasing intoxicated people, he answered that the DOC
probably does, "but where they go and making a determination of
that, what we focus on is whether or not it is legal for them to
be released.
9:51:54 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT noted that Commissioner Williams had
testified that the DOC is currently making the determination as
to whether a person is responsible or a third-party is
responsible. Therefore, would this amendment clarify that there
is a statute and a process in place to protect those intoxicated
individuals, and if they leave intoxicated, the DOC has a
responsible path forward to get them home safely, she asked.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS expressed complete agreement with
Representative Millett as to the nature and problem, except he
would like the Alaska Criminal Justice Committee subcommittee to
thoroughly vet the issue and look at other options, and other
states. He noted that Mr. Skidmore had just advised him that
the subcommittee is currently vetting another option, and
Commissioner Williams said he would like those options
available. He asked that the committee please not misunderstand
that this is of great concern for him as well, and he does not
want another Fairbanks case.
9:53:20 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out to Commissioner Williams that the
committee is narrowly discussing a specific conceptual amendment
about release to a responsible adult, and many of his comments
have related to the entire Amendment 31 question. He asked
Commissioner Williams to focus his comments on this specific
conceptual amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT asked whether the department was
currently making determinations about the responsible people
accepting the released individuals.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that, in certain cases, the
department was making those determinations, but as a whole, it
does not.
9:54:39 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether there was anything in the
conceptual amendment that would limit the department's ability
to craft regulations and determine the specifics under which it
applies this type of situation.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that using the language
"responsible adult" does not prohibit the department from
crafting regulations about what a responsible adult looks like
to the department.
9:55:22 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked, in the eyes of the department, how
will the department determine what is a responsible adult.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS noted that he does not like to impose
these grey areas on the staff, and the department could adopt
regulations as to a responsible adult. He explained that this
amendment creates another level of interaction in a stressful
process when someone is remanded to a facility. He remarked
that he would like to avoid the amendment's process, but that
does not mean he wants to avoid the larger issue. He is
bristling, he explained, about the manner in which the
legislature is attacking the problem and the process in which it
is being decided.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER commented that he is also bristling as
well. He then asked Commissioner Williams whether he could come
up with a bright line definition of responsible adult, or
whether this would a case where "when I'm making the
determination," his responsible adult may be a little different
than when Chairman Claman is making the decision as to a
responsible adult.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS expressed that that is exactly the issue
that causes him concern about approaching the problem in this
manner. At the end of the day, he suggested, that if there is
no other solution, this amendment might be the solution, except
Alaska is not the first state to address this issue.
9:58:02 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked that if the committee does nothing
on this amendment, when might the subcommittee ...
CHAIR CLAMAN interrupted and advised that the questions must be
directed to this conceptual amendment as to a responsible adult.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the subcommittee was
tackling the question of responsible adult.
CHAIR CLAMAN re-stated the question and asked whether the
question of responsible adult is before the subcommittee.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that he was confused because he
assumed that is what was being discussed here. The discussion
is about whether the conceptual amendment is a good thing and
noted that he had expressed his concerns as commissioner.
9:59:15 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the subcommittee is
tackling the issue of responsible adult.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that the subcommittee is addressing this
question, and that he would not call the subcommittee in to
testify. He pointed to testimony that the subcommittee is
addressing this and advised that the House Judiciary Standing
Committee would move forward.
9:59:38 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she did not know where to
go on this, because she understands where Representative Fansler
is coming from, and that she would hope "responsible adult"
could be interpreted in a common-sense manner. She offered that
it makes sense to use the word "sober" rather than responsible,
because responsible has room for problems. Although, she
offered, suppose she had had a few drinks, her BAC was over .08
and she was walking and talking, but she was trying to have
someone released to her care from jail. Clearly, she said, she
would use commercial transportation. She asked whether there
was any reason not to release the person to her care, so she see
a problem using the word "sober."
Representative LeDoux stated that she wants to do something now
because this issue has truly been identified as a problem and
advised she would like to use the amendment as a placeholder and
possibly a better description would be offered later. She
reiterated that she was unsure "whether "to go" for "responsible
adult" or "sober adult."
10:02:38 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER expressed that he would correct some of
the statements made about his previous comments. He clarified
that this is not a question of Alaska's judges because they are
not making the determination, and it is certainly not a question
about the state's correctional officers. His comments, he
stressed, point out that one of the main reasons Senate Bill 91
[passed in the Twenty-Ninth Alaska State Legislature] came into
existence was due to the inherent discrimination within Alaska's
justice system, "and we know that." The numbers bear that fact
out, "and to say that there isn't is just not factual. And, to
add in a word where we are determining something on a case-by-
case basis of who is responsible and who's not, without a
bright-line definition for it, bears out an opportunity for more
discrimination, and bears out an opportunity to get away from
exactly the things we are trying to fix." The legislature wants
to protect the public and at the same time make sure the state
has a criminal justice system that looks out for both the
prosecutorial side and the defense side. That is most important
to him, he stressed, and putting the word "responsible" in there
without knowing what it means, and hearing the reticence of
Commissioner Williams, he cannot support Conceptual Amendment 1
to Amendment 31.
10:04:10 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS advised that he also struggles
with the process in which to solve this issue. He remarked that
the lingering questions and the grey area that Commissioner
Williams cited are troubling because litigation may ensue
regarding responsible adults, and the people who are and are not
released. Adding this language may be fast and loose, he
described, and he probably will not support Conceptual Amendment
1 to Amendment 31. Representative Kreiss-Tomkins relayed his
hope that the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission would forward a
recommendation to the legislature after a thorough vetting.
10:06:00 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that Representative Fansler had
requested a bright-red line and commented that the only bright-
red line to find is simply to remove the conceptual amendment
entirely, thereby removing that option of someone being turned
over to a responsible adult. In that regard, he pointed out,
when a minor is in this situation and their parents come
calling, there is not a legal option to turn the minor over to
their parents and the minor remains in the care of the DOC.
Although, if the option is available, it turns the
responsibility over to someone other than the DOC. He supports
the conceptual amendment because that option is good to leave on
the table because "we as government, through law enforcement or
EMS have intervened in a person's life" and when contact has
been made with that person there is an assumed responsibility
for that inebriated person's care. This amendment proposes the
backend solution of making sure that at the time of release, the
state is not undoing the potentially good process.
10:09:44 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN offered concern about the conceptual amendment and
the manner in which it is applied, and he agreed with
Representative LeDoux as to how confusing this is with all of
the uncertainty. This issue is, how does a person decide the
release, which is why there is a robust process in the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission to look at this question. For those
reasons, he said, he will oppose Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 31.
10:10:23 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP interjected that he believes the committee
is doing a good job in wrestling with this issue, and that
Representative Fansler brought up a good point. He then
suggested the language, "or released to -- or released with the
consent of the defendant to a person who is willing and able to
safely provide care to that person." Therefore, he remarked,
the person is released with the consent of the defendant to a
person who is able to safely provide care to the person being
released.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT stated that this is not a political
issue, it is a public safety issue, and the legislature makes
these types of decisions in the best interests of the public.
She said she understands that the commission is working on this
issue, but a placeholder is needed because something must be
done now. It is her belief that the commission will determine
recommendations, and at that time, this language could be
amended, and she would be the first person to sponsor the
recommended language from the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission. Representative Millett withdrew Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 31 in lieu of Representative Kopp's
conceptual amendment going forward because Representative Kopp's
language is probably amenable to everyone on the committee, she
said.
10:13:39 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 2 to
Amendment 31, page 1, lines 6-7, and advised that the language
would read as follows:
... providing that a correctional facility shall,
at the time of release, [insert] "conduct a test to
determine whether a person is chemically dependent on
an illicit substance, and" [continue with] conduct a
chemical test of the breath of a person who has been
arrested and who is intoxicated ...
10:14:15 AM
The committee took an at-ease from 10:14 a.m. to 10:24 a.m.
10:24:38 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN, in response to Representative Eastman, advised
that the House Judiciary Standing Committee members are welcome
to attend the House of Representative's technical floor session
today. He advised that the committee was not taking a break,
and if Representative Eastman was not in attendance in this
committee, his Conceptual Amendment 2 to Amendment 31 would be
withdrawn.
10:25:21 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected to Conceptual Amendment 2.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to the fear of sending people to
prison because they may be released for the worse after being in
jail and noted that Commission Williams testified that DOC does
not know how many addicted individuals are being released, and
it is unknown how many people go into prison not addicted and
are released addicted. Subsequent to yesterday's testimony, he
said he was contacted by an expert familiar with the
accomplishments the State of Texas. This expert pointed out
that more people were being released from prison addicted than
there were going into prison, the steps the State of Texas took
to correct that issue, and how it directly attributed to some of
the outcomes it recently achieved, he said. In the event that
information is not before the committee at this time, it should
zero in and tackle the problems of what happens to people in
prison. Particularly, he noted, if their time in prison leaves
them medically worse off than when they entered prison.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted a constitutional issue with Conceptual
Amendment 2 to Amendment 31.
10:28:22 AM
MR. SKIDMORE explained that while he understands Representative
Eastman's goal, its location is particularly troubling because
this particular statute and Conceptual Amendment 2 to Amendment
31 discusses release as it relates to bail and this is not the
time in which a person assesses what might be going on inside
the DOC. He offered that the constitutional violation by
inserting the language here, is potentially holding someone far
longer than they could serve a sentence that is not related to
their crime. He offered serious concerns about that issue
because it discusses a person being chemically dependent, and it
does not discuss whether someone was under the influence of that
substance at the time. Therefore, the determination now is
whether or not the person has an addiction problem and assessing
that addiction problem takes a great amount of time. He
explained that even striking "they were under the influence,"
that is not the same as a breath alcohol test that can be
performed with a preliminary breath test (PBT) or a Datamaster
breath alcohol test which is accomplished within a matter of one
minute. He pointed out that this is talking about taking blood
and having to test it, which takes far longer. He clarified
that he is not saying the concept is necessarily misplaced, but
it would be in this statute.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that he would like to know how
the State of Texas solved this problem, and he wanted to assign
someone the task of making that determination so, perhaps,
Alaska can adopt the same rules. He said he would withdraw
Conceptual Amendment 2 to Amendment 31 at this time.
10:31:36 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 3 to
Amendment 31, page 1, line 10, and advised that the language
would read as follows:
... alcohol for each 210 liters of breath "or,
with the consent of the defendant, released to a
person who is willing and able to safely provide care
to the defendant."
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected for discussion.
10:32:11 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP opined that it resolves the issue of the use
of terms that could raise concerns as to any sort of
discriminatory basis, and it allows for the possibility of a
minor receiving a ride home from a parent. He stressed that he
intentionally did not use the word "custody" because the DOC is
releasing to a person who is willing and able to safely provide
care to the defendant. There will always be room for judgements
in whatever the construction of the language may be used, he
pointed out. This language gets to the intent of Representative
Millett's efforts in providing an option for someone to be
released from jail as quickly as reasonably possible by allowing
for a range of persons safely able to provide care to the
defendant, he said.
10:33:30 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked Representative Kopp to define the
word "safely."
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP opined that someone could advise the DOC
that they are "willing and able," such that the DOC officer knew
it was minus-25-degrees outside and the person did not provide a
warm vehicle. The DOC officer may advise that the defendant
could be released to that person but to return with a car or ask
another friend to provide transportation. In those situations,
he advised, the correctional officer is trying to make a
responsible decision that the transition concerns include safety
concern considerations.
10:34:38 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked why "willing and able" does not raise some of
the same concerns as "responsible" and "sober" because it still
asks the corrections officer to make a determination.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP related that in the larger picture this
highlights the state's public safety people always exercise
discretion in the course of their duties each day, they are
trusted to perform that discretion, and that discretion must be
allowed to occur. The phrase "willing and able" means that
someone is not coerced to be there. "Able" means that the
person is willing when they say they are able with nothing in
plain view that would make [the corrections officer] think that
person was not able. He described this as a common-sense
[remedy] because it gets rid of any possible pejorative use of
terms, and it puts a standard of care into the law that the
committee wants the state's public safety people to use in their
daily discretion.
10:36:27 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked Commissioner Williams
whether he had any thoughts as to Conceptual Amendment 3 to
Amendment 31.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that he prefers language such
that the persons must state they are willing and able. He
explained that in the correctional system, he still prefers that
the language is "very clean, very clear, very black and white"
as much as possible. He pointed out that the DOC is still in
the same bucket even if the language inserted is "sober" or
"responsible" or "willing and able."
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether "willing and able"
language sounded less grey than the "responsible adult"
language.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS reiterated that the language is still
grey, and the DOC still has to make the determination. In the
event the person is walking and talking, they are "able," but if
they look somewhat intoxicated, the DOC staff is still making
the determination as to whether they are "able" to care for
someone. He opined that he supposed he could write policy to
reflect, "if they say they are able, if they claim they are
able, we assume they are able." The policy could read, "as long
as he says he is willing and able, we are hands off." However,
he pointed out, that still exposes the corrections officer as to
"whether or not I'm in good intentions, right intentions" to
release someone into that circumstance. He reiterated that he
would rather try to find another angle to handle the problem the
committee wants to solve, because his staff would still have to
make a judgment as to whether someone was able to care for
another person.
10:39:35 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked Mr. Skidmore his thoughts
regarding Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that from a legal standpoint, this draft
provides more detail than just the word "responsible," it is
trying to more precisely define what "responsible" would be. He
said that he appreciates there will be "some grey" found there
as he was unsure whether any greyness could be avoided. At some
point, some type of discretion must be utilized because
otherwise "you are not left in a position that you can assess
each circumstance on a case by case basis," there must be some
discretion. Generally, he commented, things work best in that
manner, but the committee wants to provide some guidance as to
how to exercise that discretion. Whether or not this language
strikes that right balance is a policy call for this committee,
he said, and the Department of Law (DOL) is committed to work
with the Department of Corrections (DOC) to assist in any manner
possible based on the decisions of the legislature.
10:41:18 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER noted that he fully expects, even when
this amendment is resolved, that the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission subcommittee will not put aside its work on this
issue. He offered a hypothetical that the committee passes
Conceptual Amendment 3, passes Amendment 31, puts the language
in the bill, the bill passes, and it becomes law within in the
next 30-days. Except, in two-months' time the legislature
receives another recommendation from the subcommittee,
Representative Millett carries that bill to succession, thereby,
again changing the policy. Representative Fansler asked whether
those frequent changes would put undue stress on the state's
system with regard to this issue. He asked whether the frequent
changes are a minor, major, or somewhere in between, stress on
the system.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS reiterated that he wants to get this
correct out of the gate due to the DOC will training 1,800
staff, and staff in the community jails. He commented that
Alaska is one of four unified states with remand, and the remand
issue is important because remand a hazardous time for the staff
and the inmates, so he wants it right the first time out of the
gate, which is what Representative Fansler was inferring. He
remarked that in going back a second time and retraining the
staff on the "now new law" involves money and extra training
because he has to write new policy around the new law, and he
expects his staff to follow policy.
10:44:45 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked Commissioner Williams to offer
insight as to the training involved and whether there is regular
trainings for all staff, much like an attorney's requirement for
CLE training each year. He asked whether once a year everyone
in the DOC receives training, and whether that training might be
a memorandum describing policies that a commander would send
down the line, or whether the training is such that staff might
be flown out of Anchorage and Juneau to hold two-day seminars.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that training is not a two-day
seminar on this sort of issue, but whatever policy is set, he
would expect it to be transmitted down through the facilities.
In response to Representative Fansler early question, answered,
"Oh I wish that there was the regular training that we're
talking about" because part of the problems in the DOC is the
lack of training, and he explained that the training and the
lack of training situation is part of the deeper problem. Each
time there is a change in policy, the department could put out a
policy with instructions, and be certain the leadership staff
understands the policy, and they would conduct small meetings
with the staff. He remarked that it would not overwhelm the DOC
to make a policy change on this, but not only is labor and time
required, he just does not want to change the policy a second
time because it throws staff into confusion.
10:47:18 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she was bothered by the
fact that Conceptual Amendment 3 appears to be fairly simple,
and that the DOC staff must be capable of exercising some sort
of discretion about situations. She asked what sort of training
would be required to come up with a definition of, "willing and
able to safely provide care for the defendant."
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that if the "able" language
means the person is willing to state it, "I'm willing and able
to take someone" does not require much training. He stated that
he does not want a situation is, "willing and able means with
the intent of the committee is about that." He remarked that
his point is that making the policy calls in this [committee]
process is fraught with difficulty if it is changed at a later
date. In the event Conceptual Amendment 3 passes through the
legislative process, he advised that he would do everything he
could to carry it out as efficiently as possible.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that if the committee adopts Conceptual
Amendment 3, the odds are fairly high that the Alaska Criminal
Justice Commission will determine that the legislature had made
its decision. Unless this conceptual amendment became an issue
for the courts, he opined that the commission would not address
this issue. He stressed that he would not count on the
commission taking this issue up again, or at all, if the House
Judiciary Standing Committee takes action. Although, he
acknowledged, he may be incorrect, but that is what he would
generally say as a member of the commission observing the
commission's processes, and the number of issues in front of the
commission.
10:50:07 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT pointed out that Commissioner Williams
makes many discretionary and judgment calls regarding prisoners
such as, diet, recreation, segregation, medication, and related
that she has to have some faith in the system. Representative
Millett explained that the ultimate goal of Conceptual Amendment
3 is as a tool in the toolbox to keep public safety as the
utmost priority, and an avenue to get folks out of the state's
prison beds. Commissioner Williams has asked for adjustments
several times as the commissioner, and it is important to get it
right the first time and pointed out that Conceptual Amendment 3
to Amendment 31 is an avenue to not repeat the things that have
happened in the past.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS said he agrees that this conceptual
amendment is perhaps better than the current system, it is his
preference, he reiterated, to not have to go back and fix the
policy twice. In the event this is the avenue the legislature
decides to take, he reiterated that he will do everything he
can, to the best of his ability, "to make sure this goes right."
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT said that she does not want to have to
tell another family that the state released ...
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that the committee is trying to move
Amendment 31 along, and that Representative Millett had made her
position clear.
10:52:34 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she does not know whether
Conceptual Amendment 3 is perfect, but the choices are that
either everyone is released from jail, no matter how intoxicated
they are, or to keep everyone in jail who does not have someone
to pick them up, or "you come up with something which sounds
sane." She then recited the old adage, "to not let the perfect
be the enemy of the good," and commented that she supports
Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN related that Conceptual Amendment 3 to
Amendment 31 takes the state back to the purpose for a prison.
There are certain situations where someone will wind up in jail
to "sleep it off," or deal with a hangover, or deal with any
number of other things that have little connection to the reason
for confining someone in jail, he described. To the extent that
people would be better served [released to] any place outside of
jail and leaving jail for those individuals who actually need to
be confined, he said he supports Conceptual Amendment 3 to
Amendment 31.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT commented that this conceptual amendment
gets to the heart of the issue and leaves enough interpretation
for the Department of Corrections (DOC) to write a regulation
that falls back to the previous practice of 1.5 years ago. She
opined that she could not think of any lawsuits or issues around
the previous practice, and she did not think training took place
when the practice went away. Therefore, using this as a
guideline is judicious and benefits the public, and she said she
supports Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31 because it is a
common-sense conceptual amendment.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that while he appreciates the efforts of this
committee in debating this issue, for the committee to consider
the likelihood of a better remedy when letting the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission do its job, and also the likelihood
that such a remedy would be before the legislature by January
2018. For those reasons, he said, he does not support
Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31.
10:56:45 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that, in retrospect, he would not have
inserted the word "safely." As Commissioner Williams had
remarked, that is one more word that invokes an unnecessarily
high level of discretion, such that "if a person is presenting,
they are willing and able," and that it is not blindingly
obvious to the corrections officers that they "are not willing
and able to provide care to the defendant." Representative Kopp
reiterated that not inserting "safely" probably would have been
cleaner.
CHAIR CLAMAN suggested a conceptual amendment to the conceptual
amendment removing the word "safely."
10:58:00 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31, page 1, line 10, to
delete the word "safely."
10:58:02 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether there was an objection to adopting
Conceptual Amendment 1 to Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment
31. There being no objection, Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31 was adopted.
10:58:21 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that Amended Conceptual Amendment 3 to
Amendment 31, page 1, line 10, read as follows:
... alcohol for each 210 liters of breath or,
with the consent of the defendant released to a person
who is willing and able to provide care to the
defendant.
10:58:43 AM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER withdrew his objection. There being no
objection, Amended Conceptual Amendment 3 to Amendment 31 was
adopted.
10:58:58 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that Amendment 31, as amended, was before
the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether there was a constitutional
question here as to the possibility of someone being kept in
jail longer than they legally could be kept for whatever crime
they had allegedly committed.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that there should not be a constitutional
issue so long as Amendment 31, as amended, focuses on someone
who had been arrested for a crime to which alcohol was related,
and the amendment is written in that fashion. In terms of
holding someone longer, he opined, it would not be an issue
because it gets into the science of retrograde extrapolation,
and how quickly alcohol dissipates from a person's system. For
example, he said, a State of Indiana statute talks about someone
not being held any longer than 12-hours "due to retrograde
extrapolation, even if you were at a point four suggests that
the alcohol would be out of the person's system at that time."
The State of Alaska has no crimes for which someone could be
arrested, for which the maximum sentence would be less than what
this provision would allow, he explained.
11:01:45 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether it was changed yesterday,
through the adoption of her amendment, wherein disorderly
conduct now has a possible jail sentence. In her view, she
said, "this is not just for misdemeanors which involve alcohol,
this is for misdemeanor offenses." She offered a scenario
wherein the state was not allowed to put someone in jail for an
underlying citation, but the person was taken to jail because
they were extremely intoxicated, and yet the person must be
released right away. Representative LeDoux asked how that
scenario would be any different from "grabbing someone off the
street" who had not engaged in any arrestable conduct and
holding them until they sobered up. This is not a bad idea, she
said, but pointed to her concern that the constitution may
preclude it.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that her question is resolved by the fact
that for anyone arrested and held, there would have to be some
sort of probable cause determination. For instance, for most
individuals in Anchorage, that probable cause determination
happens throughout the night, and he did not believe there would
be those sorts of concerns. He opined that it does not present
those same sort of constitutional concerns Representative LeDoux
suggested.
11:04:02 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked for clarification that unless the
amendment for disorderly conduct, previously adopted in this
committee, passes in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate, there is no jailtime.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that under current law, disorderly
conduct is punishable by 24-hours in jail, and the change would
be from 24-hours to five-days in the event the previous
amendment was signed into law. He explained that Amendment 31,
as amended, would not create problems under current law.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether there is any misdemeanor in
which no jailtime is allowed whatsoever under Senate Bill 91, or
under the previous law.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that there are misdemeanor crimes which,
under current law and if SB 54 were to pass, for which there
would not be jail that was authorized as the ultimate sentence.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that if jail is not authorized
as the ultimate sentence, she asked whether there is any
constitutional problem with holding someone against their will
because they are intoxicated.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that the only crime he could think of,
under that category and a first offense, would be theft in the
fourth degree, but for the multiple offenses that would not be
the case. He remarked that he still does not think it creates a
constitutional problem because when someone is arrested and
initially held that action is not considered punishment under
caselaw, because that is a response to the probable cause the
officers have if they are given the authority to arrest someone.
That scenario does not present significant constitutional
violations because a pretrial hold is not considered punishment,
he reiterated. He has not seen many cases addressing crime for
which there was not the possibility of jail, and that may be "a
new issue that we create," he offered.
11:07:21 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT asked for clarification that "we are
establishing a condition of release," and the only time there is
a condition of release is when a person is released after being
charged with a crime. She asked Mr. Skidmore to name other
types of conditions of release that are available, such as not
drinking alcohol.
MR. SKIDMORE offered a sampling of the conditions of release
that can be imposed, as follows: not to contact someone; not go
to a particular location; stay in touch with probation; obey the
law; not consume alcohol; and to not enter establishments where
alcohol is sold.
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT surmised that this amendment falls in
line with a condition of release after someone was charged, and
it is not about picking up an intoxicated person and "using
this" to hold them. Law enforcement is not searching out
intoxicated people to use this condition of release on them, as
it cannot be used in that manner, noting that she wanted this
information made clear to the public.
MR. SKIDMORE agreed with Representative Millett and explained
that the concept of picking someone up simply due to their level
of intoxication, having not committed any criminal conduct, is
found under Title 47. There are statutes under Title 47 that
differentiate between an intoxicated person and an incapacitated
person, and the steps of what can be done to address those
individuals. He pointed out that that is one of the issues the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission subcommittee is currently
exploring, of which he is a member. That subcommittee, he
advised, has already delineated the different categories of
individuals as follows: those arrested for having criminal
conduct versus those who are simply intoxicated. The
subcommittee is considering what Alaska's law allows for the
simply intoxicated group, he said.
11:09:47 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT asked for verification that this does not
touch Title 47.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that this does not touch Title 47, this
amendment is solely about individuals arrested for criminal
conduct [while intoxicated].
11:10:00 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Commissioner Williams whether the
DOC currently conducts any type of assessment to justify whether
someone could be released. Once a person's time of
incarceration had expired, and the DOC began the release
process, he asked whether any type of assessment or test was
performed. He suggested that it could be tests dealing with
whether it was safe to release the person, whether it was
appropriate, or whether it was reasonable to release someone at
that exact moment.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS said that he assumed the discussion was
still about Amendment 31, as amended, with regard to a remand
situation. He then asked whether Representative Eastman's
question was about the phase of custody after a person had been
arrested and the DOC now makes a determination as to whether the
person could be released while awaiting their trial.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked that Commissioner Williams limit his comments
to that phase because that is what this amendment deals with,
and anything regarding a sentenced prisoner is not the subject.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that the department does not
perform drug assessments when releasing someone out of jail.
Although, he related, there may be other processes in the course
of being release from jail, such that the court may determine
the person needs an assessment before the next hearing. The
department does not perform extensive assessments on someone on
the remand side when the person is just charged with a crime, he
said.
11:12:10 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Commissioner Williams whether Amendment 31,
as amended, has a fiscal impact on the department, and if so,
whether that fiscal impact had been determined.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS replied that he could see some small
fiscal impact, but he was not going to make this difficult for
the department if the amendment becomes law ...
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected that he was asking whether a fiscal
note would be attached.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that there may be a small fiscal
note for something, but he did not believe it would be a sizable
fiscal note.
11:15:50 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said he is inclined to support Amendment
31, as amended, because he does not want to see a repeat of the
events that took place in Fairbanks.
He said he would prefer to not go down the route of changing the
statute and to leave some discretion to the correctional
officers who decide whether to release someone. It appears a
statute is needed so correctional officers have that
empowerment, and he remarked that he does not want to wait until
next spring when a statutory change could go into effect, so he
would like Amendment 31, as amended, put forward and included in
SB 54.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP described Amendment 31, as amended, as a
common-sense, public safety first, introduction of a standard of
care and due diligence as to the State of Alaska's duty when
someone is in its custody. This amendment will have minimal
impact to the DOC, and it will, hopefully, prevent further
tragedies, he remarked.
CHAIR CLAMAN stated that his concerns with Amendment 31, as
amended, continue. He pointed out that by adopting this
amendment, the committee loses the insight it would have
received as a result of the recommendations of the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission process. People living in the rural
areas of Alaska could potentially spend long periods of time
incarcerated due to their arrest and inebriation because a
chemical test was unavailable at the facility, or the person did
not have friends in the community to care for them in their
inebriated state, he stressed. For those reasons, he pointed
out, there are still problems with this amendment and he will be
a no-vote on Amended Amendment 31.
11:18:39 AM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT related that she is hopeful the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission does not stop working on this issue
simply because the committee adopted a placeholder. She opined
that this amendment will be to the betterment of the public and
she does not want another death because the committee was
looking for perfect. She said she would appreciate the
committee's support.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
11:19:55 AM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Eastman, Kopp,
Kreiss-Tomkins, LeDoux, Millett, and Fansler voted in favor of
Amendment 31, as amended. Representative Claman voted against
it. Therefore, Amendment 31, as amended, was adopted by a vote
of 6-1.
11:21:30 AM
The committee took an at-ease from 11:21 a.m. to 11:28 a.m.
11:28:08 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 32, Version 30-
LS0461\N.64, Martin, 10/24/17, which read as follows:
Page 5, line 9, following "AS 11.46.530(b)(3)":
Insert "shall impose a sentence including
restitution as required under AS 12.55.045 and"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
11:28:19 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 32 puts the
focus on restitution and ensures that restitution will be
included when a sentence is imposed. He related that, under
Senate Bill 91, because certain crimes were reduced to no
jailtime, prosecutors are encouraged to focus their resources on
pursuing crimes that will return a possible jail sentence.
Under those circumstances, he said, some victims will not see
any restitution for their losses because there was no actual
sentence that included restitution.
11:30:58 AM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD opined that Amendment 32 reflects the
intention of the Constitution of the State of Alaska as to
paying restitution to victims. She said she supports Amendment
32.
CHAIR CLAMAN explained the committee amendment process to
Representative Reinbold.
11:31:55 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP offered his understanding that any property
crimes under sentencing of misdemeanors currently requires
restitution at sentencing. He commented that he was unsure
whether this language was duplicative because restitution is
currently mandatory under the law.
MR. SKIDMORE referred to AS 12.55.015(a)(5), which read as
follows:
(a) ... the court, in imposing sentence on a
defendant convicted of an offense, may singly or in
combination
(5) order the defendant to make restitution
under AS 12.55.045;
MR. SKIDMORE referred to 12.55.045(a) which read as follows:
(a) The court shall, when presented with credible
evidence, unless the victim or other person expressly
declines restitution, order a defendant convicted of
an offense to make restitution as provided in this
section, ...
MR. SKIDMORE advised that this statute lays out restitution.
11:33:53 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether Amendment 32 is duplicative of
current statute as it relates to pursuing restitution.
MR. SKIDMORE stated that Amendment 32 is both duplicative of
those statutes by inserting it into a particular statute, and it
has the potential to raise questions as to why the language was
not put into all of the other property statutes as well, and
this amendment only looks at theft in the fourth degree. Right
now, he said, without that, those two statutes require
restitution be looked at for all of the offenses.
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that Amendment 32 would potentially create
statutory problems with the whole criminal code.
MR. SKIDMORE suggested constructing the Alaska Criminal Code
tightly in order to avoid inconsistencies throughout the code.
He pointed out that the Department of Law takes painstaking
efforts to ensure that the code is consistent, and Amendment 32
creates an inconsistency.
11:35:32 AM
MR. SKIDMORE, in response to Representative Reinbold, explained
that theft in the fourth degree is any theft under $250.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that with the unprecedented number
of reports of thefts under $250, it would be appropriate to pay
the victims restitution.
MR. SKIDMORE reiterated that Amendment 32 does not add anything
to the toolbelt that law enforcement or prosecutors currently
use because this tool is already available in the toolbelt.
11:37:03 AM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to SB 54, [Sec. 10. AS
12.55.135(l)], page 5, lines 8-9, which read as follows:
(l) ... or criminal simulation under AS
11.46.530(b)(3) may not impose
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked for verification that everything
covered by subsection (l), that restitution is already required
in Alaska Statutes, except restitution is located in another
place in the statutes.
MR. SKIDMORE answered in the affirmative.
11:38:36 AM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that reinforcement for theft
in the fourth degree is a good idea by reinforcing and
highlighting the importance of keeping these establishments
safe. Theft in the fourth degree is rampant across Alaska and
she said she is a yes-vote on Amendment 32.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS offered appreciation for Mr.
Skidmore's comments as to the importance of maintaining
consistent and parallel statutes, and he would probably oppose
the amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN pointed out that rather than listing off
a large number of things that may not be imposed at sentencing,
Amendment 32 inserts into that long list an important reminder
that restitution shall be imposed. Whether or not Alaska's
statute book is "made more beautiful or not," is overshadowed by
the fact that Alaska has victims who are not receiving
restitution, he said.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
11:40:57 AM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Eastman and
Reinbold voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 32.
Representatives Fansler, Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, LeDoux, and
Claman voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 32 failed to be
adopted by a vote of 2-5.
11:42:02 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 33, Version 30-
LS0461\N.16, Bruce/Martin, 10/19/17, which read as follows:
Page 1, line 14:
Delete "class B"
Insert "class A"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
11:41:54 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 33 returns
conditions of release to a misdemeanor because, at that point,
the people of Alaska were receiving a better effect.
11:43:08 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP pointed out that the bill, in front of the
committee, does raise this from a violation back to a criminal
misdemeanor offense.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER offered opposition for Amendment 33
because there is currently a mechanism in SB 54 to rectify this
situation. He pointed out that this should not be promoted to a
class A misdemeanor, when this is precisely the reason for a
class B misdemeanor.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether this amendment takes the law
back to the law pre-Senate Bill 91 law, or whether it changes
provisions from the pre-Senate Bill 91 law.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that this amendment does not return the
law to where it was prior to Senate Bill 91. He explained that
prior to Senate Bill 91, violations of conditions of release
were broken into two categories: class B misdemeanor if the
underlying offense was a misdemeanor; and class A misdemeanor if
the underlying offense was a felony, and Amendment 33 would make
all violations of conditions of release a class A misdemeanor.
Theoretically, he advised, a person could be charged and
released on a class B misdemeanor, and then the person could
violate conditions of release, and now be charged with a class A
misdemeanor.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked Mr. Skidmore to repeat the law prior
to Senate Bill 91.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that the law prior to Senate Bill 91 is
similar to Amendment 35 and it separates it into both a class A
misdemeanor and a class B misdemeanor. He explained the
following: violations of conditions of release is a Class B
misdemeanor if the original offense for which the person was
released was a misdemeanor; it was a Class A misdemeanor if the
original offense for which person was released was a felony.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that Amendment 35 ...
MR. SKIDMORE interjected that he did not have Amendment 35
available, but that he recalled that there is another amendment
that has that framework set out.
11:46:23 AM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked for a description of the penalties
for class A and class B misdemeanors prior to Senate Bill 91,
what were the penalties were reduced to under Senate Bill 91,
and to offer examples.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that a class A misdemeanor prior to any
criminal justice reform was punishable by zero-days up to 365-
days. Subsequent to criminal justice reform, class A
misdemeanors were split into multiple categories: some were
still able to be sentenced zero-days up to 365-days; for others
there was an intermediate step of zero-days to 30-days for a
first and second offense; and a third offense would go from
zero-days to 365-days. He explained that the sentence for class
B misdemeanors, prior to any criminal justice reform, was zero-
days to 90-days, and after criminal justice reform it is zero-
days to 10-days.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD opined that when a defendant is released
on conditions of release they need to honor that judge, respect
Alaska's courts, and follow those rules. She said that murders
have been committed by people released on bail because they
violated conditions of release, and she supports Amendment 33
because it increases respect for the courts and reduces risk to
victims.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said that prior to Senate Bill 91, these
crimes were treated as one type of misdemeanor over another, but
under Senate Bill 91, the actual penalty was reduced. It is
important the law returns back, close to the same penalty that
existed prior to Senate Bill 91, he opined.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
11:49:55 AM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives LeDoux, Eastman,
and Reinbold voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 33.
Representatives Fansler, Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, Amendment 33 failed to be adopted by a
vote of 3-4.
11:50:30 AM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether, at any point, he could speak
to why the policy was changed as it was and speak to the
policies to increase public safety. He related that he felt,
for the benefit of the public, that it was good for people to
understand why this change occurred.
CHAIR CLAMAN answered that Amendment 35 revisits this topic in a
slightly different manner, and during that discussion would be
an opportunity for Representative Kopp to offer his comments.
11:51:23 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 34, Version 30-
LS0461\N.18, Martin, 10/17/17, which read as follows:
Page 2, following line 29:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 6. AS 12.55.090(c) is amended to read:
(c) The period of probation, together with any
extension, may not exceed
(1) 15 years for a felony sex offense;
(2) 10 years for an unclassified felony
under AS 11 not listed in (1) of this subsection;
(3) five years for a felony offense not
listed in (1) or (2) of this subsection; or
(4) three years for a misdemeanor offense
[(A) UNDER AS 11.41;
(B) THAT IS A CRIME INVOLVING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE; OR
(C) THAT IS A SEX OFFENSE, AS THAT TERM IS
DEFINED IN AS 12.63.100;
(5) TWO YEARS FOR A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE
UNDER AS 28.35.030 OR 28.35.032, IF THE PERSON HAS
PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE UNDER
AS 28.35.030 OR 28.35.032, OR A SIMILAR LAW OR
ORDINANCE OF THIS OR ANOTHER JURISDICTION; OR
(6) ONE YEAR FOR AN OFFENSE NOT LISTED IN
(1) - (5) OF THIS SUBSECTION]."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 18:
Delete "sec. 15"
Insert "sec. 16"
Page 15, following line 18:
Insert a new subsection to read:
"(b) AS 12.55.090(c), as amended by sec. 6 of
this Act, applies to probation ordered on or after the
effective date of sec. 6 of this Act for offenses
committed on or after the effective date of sec. 6 of
this Act."
Reletter the following subsections accordingly.
Page 15, line 21:
Delete "sec. 6"
Insert "sec. 7"
Page 15, line 22:
Delete "sec. 7"
Insert "sec. 8"
Page 15, line 23:
Delete "sec. 8"
Insert "sec. 9"
Page 15, line 24:
Delete "sec. 9"
Insert "sec. 10"
Page 15, line 25:
Delete "sec. 10"
Insert "sec. 11"
Page 15, line 26:
Delete "sec. 11"
Insert "sec. 12"
Page 15, line 27:
Delete "sec. 12"
Insert "sec. 13"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17"
Insert "Section 18"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 25"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
11:51:33 AM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 34 addresses
unsupervised probation for misdemeanors, it reverts to law prior
to Senate Bill 91, and deals with how the state addressed
unsupervised probation for misdemeanor offenses.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether Amendment 34 simply reverts
back to the law prior to Senate Bill 91.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that it does not revert back to the law
prior to Senate Bill 91. Amendment 34 gives a court discretion,
for any misdemeanor offense, to impose up to three-years of
probation. Prior to criminal justice reform, the ability to
have probation was 10-years, and Amendment 34 does not go back
to that level.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked, under Senate Bill 91, how long is
the amount of time offered for discretion of probation.
MR. SKIDMORE referred to Amendment 34, page 1, lines 10-15, and
noted that it talks about sentencing three-years for a
misdemeanor offense, and it offers (A), (B), and (C) categories,
such as: crimes against a person under AS 11.41 - assault; and
crimes of domestic violence under AS 18.66.990. Those are
particular crimes that are set out, he explained, as well as the
relationship of the offender and the victim. It would include
crimes such as criminal mischief, and a list of others; and
misdemeanor sex offenses. He reminded Representative LeDoux
that he had specifically cited misdemeanor offenses and not
felonies.
MR. SKIDMORE turned to page 1, lines 16-19, paragraph (5), and
explained that it lists two-years for DUI refusal, and paragraph
(6), lines 20-21, refers to one-year for all misdemeanor
offenses not listed above, such as theft and misdemeanor
criminal mischiefs. Those are the categories under Senate Bill
91, and Amendment 34 would, instead of creating all of those
categories for misdemeanors, it would treat all misdemeanors the
same with a maximum of three-years for probation.
MR. SKIDMORE, in response to Representative LeDoux, advised that
prior to Senate Bill 91, the maximum probation for a misdemeanor
was 10-years.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that Amendment 34 does not
actually go back to pre-Senate Bill 91 law.
MR. SKIDMORE answered in the affirmative.
11:56:34 AM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD offered her understanding that the
intention behind unsupervised probation for a misdemeanor with
all misdemeanors up to three-years' probation, and prior to
Senate Bill 91 it was up to 10-years' probation. Representative
Reinbold advise that "unless you bring some clarification to the
table, I will not be voting for this amendment."
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that he would prefer reverting
back to pre-Senate Bill 91 law. Except here, and in other parts
of Senate Bill 91, the legislature has removed more discretion
from judges than in any state in the country. He commented that
he would like support [from the committee] to let Alaska's
judges be judges because this state is moving dangerously close
to enacting laws that do not require judges because the
legislature has removed judgement from the situation.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
11:58:16 AM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives LeDoux, Reinbold,
and Eastman voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 34.
Representatives Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, Kopp, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, Amendment 34 failed to be adopted by a
vote of 3-4.
11:59:05 AM
CHAIR CLAMAN recessed the meeting until 10/25/17, at 1:30 p.m.
1:32:13 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting back to order at 1:32 p.m. Representatives Claman,
Fansler, Eastman and Reinbold were present at the call to order.
Representatives Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, and LeDoux arrived as the
meeting was in progress.
1:32:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 35, Version 30-
LS0461\N.19, Bruce/Martin, 10/19/17, which read as follows:
Page 1, line 14, through page 2, line 1:
Delete all material and insert:
"(b) Violation of condition of release is a
(1) class A misdemeanor if the person is
released from a charge or conviction of a felony;
(2) class B misdemeanor if the person is
released from a charge or conviction of a misdemeanor
[VIOLATION PUNISHABLE BY A FINE OF UP TO $1,000]."
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
1:32:49 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 36 deals with
class A misdemeanors and class B misdemeanors, and it reverts
the conditions of release back to the law prior to Senate Bill
91. This is important, he said, because a person in the custody
of the state was given their freedom with conditions of their
release, and if they violate those conditions, they lose their
freedom, he said. Since the passage of Senate Bill 91, a person
can maintain their freedom whether or not they maintain those
conditions. Recently, he spoke with a family awarded
restitution because all of their Christmas presents were stolen
on Christmas Eve, a condition of release was restitution, except
the defendant did not pay the restitution after being released
and they did not receive a further penalty. Under Senate Bill
91, there have been situations where a defendant was released,
did not abide by their release conditions, and relatively no
penalty was imposed, he said. The state should be sending the
message that "crime does not pay," and yet that message is
muddled because "crime is paying for criminals, and it is the
victims who are paying that price," he opined.
1:35:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked whether it was Mr. Skidmore's
understanding that Amendment 35 is in line with the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission's report as to what should be done
with violations of conditions of release.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that Amendment 35 is not in line with the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission's recommendation. The
commission discussed how to handle violations of conditions of
release, and how much time should be imposed to resolve the
issues seen in the system. The current version of SB 54 returns
violations of conditions of release to a criminal status as
opposed to only being a violation.
The five-days found in SB 54 accomplishes the goal of a class B
misdemeanor, that tool was requested by the prosecution and law
enforcement and it was recommended by the commission. Amendment
35 adjusts violations of conditions of release back to a class A
misdemeanors and class B misdemeanors. Unfortunately, he
pointed out, this amendment does not address later in the bill,
where it is also limited to five-days. Therefore, he pointed
out, this amendment would create further confusion because in SB
54, page 5, is another section that limits jailtime to five-
days, and it would be five-days regardless of whether it was a
class A misdemeanor or a class B misdemeanor. In that regard,
he remarked, this amendment would be fairly meaningless in terms
of application of how it would impact the sentences that could
be imposed.
1:38:30 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether the Department of Law (DOL) supports
the policies articulated by the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission and the policies approved in the justice reform
process. He further asked how SB 54, providing a five-day
sanction for violations of conditions of release, differ in
reducing crime and protect the public.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that, without question DOL supports the
recommendations of the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, and
that Attorney General Jahna Lindemuth sits on the commission and
voted in support of its recommendations. SB 54 returns tools to
the prosecution and law enforcement who voiced concerns about
violations of conditions of release. He explained that when
criminal justice reform initially passed, the concept was that
violations of conditions of release did not need to be a new
crime with additional time in jail. In the event someone
violated their conditions of release, the commission wanted that
person to go back before the court at a bail hearing and address
bail in the original underlying case, and everyone agreed that
was the right thing to have happen. He explained that any
criminal case has two parties, the state, and the defense and,
ethically, the court is not supposed to have contact with one
party without the other party present. In the event the
defendant is represented by counsel, the court cannot
communicate with that defendant without their counsel present.
MR. SKIMORE offered a scenario of a person charged with a DUI,
is released on conditions of release, and they then consume
alcohol. The person is arrested for that violation and they
appear in court for their bail hearing, except the court is
unwilling to take action on the case without the defendant's
counsel present. In that situation, the court does not hold the
defendant because that would be altering the conditions of
release, and it cannot do anything other than set another bail
hearing, which is not what the commission had envisioned. The
intention of the commission was to hold a person and the court
able to make decisions quickly. When this issue came back to
the commission, he explained, the solution was to re-criminalize
violations of conditions of release wherein it became a new
matter for which there was no ex parte communication or ethical
violation when the court determined the defendant would be held
on whatever conditions the judge wanted to set at that moment.
And then, he said, the court could set a bail hearing in the
original case with the defendant's counsel present, and the
court could decide whether conditions of release should be
further altered in that case. That, he explained, was the
analysis the commission adopted when it created its
recommendations contained in SB 54. The commission chose five-
days because five-days was considered a reasonable period of
time from when a person is arrested until the point in which
that bail hearing could be set, he offered.
1:43:40 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that part of the criminal justice reform
process was for swift consequences, and to not hold someone in
jail for long periods of time and thereby, undermining some
potential for not reoffending. He asked whether that was part
of the five-day recommendation, and whether that was the reason
the recommendation was incorporated as a policy matter.
MR. SKIDMORE explained the five-days was to bridge the span of
time to the point where the bail hearing could be held. For
example, he offered, if a person was released on a DUI and
committed a theft, the state did not need violations of
conditions of release as a new crime to hold that person with a
different bail because a new crime was associated with it. He
offered that the analysis was that in the event a violation of
conditions of release did not amount to a new crime, it also did
not need to have punishment greater than five-days. The
rationale being that for most of those types of violations, the
offender did not pose the type of risk to the public that
required more than five-days, and he further explained that the
types of risk requiring more than five-days are a whole new
crime in and of itself, which have its own associated penalties.
1:45:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the goals of the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission include decreasing the prison
populations and releasing sex offenders at 55 years of age.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that the committee is not discussing a sex
offender charge, this discussion is about misdemeanors.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that the commission was charged with
finding ways to decrease the state's reliance on incarceration,
so it focused on trying to reduce recidivism, and parts of the
commission's charge is public safety. He acknowledged there has
been a great deal of debate over what is, and is not, the
primary role of the commission. Attorney General Lindemuth's
standpoint is that public safety is absolutely of paramount
importance, he stressed, which has been her approach for
everything she has done with the commission, together with the
commission sharing that same goal. There certainly were letters
to the commission asking it to reduce the prison population, and
Mr. Skidmore opined that the idea was to reduce prison
population safely.
1:46:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD argued that it is not fair to say
everyone in the DOL "wholeheartedly supports the commission"
because commissions are just an advisory group and described
that they have "pretty heinous" suggestions because public
safety was not its core goal, and it had the "looney goal" of
reducing prison populations regardless of the risk to the
public. She asked whether there was a recommendation about sex
offenders released at 55-years of age, and whether public safety
was at the core of all of the recommendations.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD, in response to Mr. Skidmore, advised
that she was asking about any recommendation by the commission.
MR. SKIDMORE commented that he could not remember every single
recommendation off the top of his head, but the overarching
concern of the folks on the commission is trying to make the
criminal justice system more effective and better. There is
debate and dispute amongst folks in the public and within this
body about the focus of the commissioners on the commission. He
opined that no member of the commission was trying to reduce
public safety, and without question, Attorney General Lindemuth
did not ever attempt to reduce public safety in her votes on the
recommendations. He stressed that when he talks about the
department's position, "I really mean the department position.
I understand the attorney general leads the department, but she
has reached those decisions in consultations with other in the
department, including myself." There may be some folks working
within the Department of Law (DOL) that do not like every aspect
of criminal justice reform, he noted, but it is the department's
position that the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission's
recommendations are appropriate recommendations, particularly
when looking at SB 54.
1:49:47 PM
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Reinbold discussed the subject
of Amendment 35.]
1:50:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that a lot of deference has
been given to the commission and asked whether that deference
comes from its successes in the past that have had a positive
outcome for Alaskans. He questioned whether the state can look
to the past and ...
CHAIR CLAMAN interrupted Representative Eastman and reminded him
that Amendment 35 is his amendment, and it involves conditions
of release. He related that in previous committee hearing, the
members have had many opportunities to have discussions with the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, and this is not the forum to
have large policy questions about what the Alaska Criminal
Justice Commission has accomplished over time. Chair Claman
described that Representative Eastman, as a legislator, has had
much opportunity to learn about the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission, and that he needs to focus his questions on this
particular amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that Representative Fansler had
asked whether this is something the commission recommended. In
keeping with that, he asked, if deference is given to the
commission, why is the commission given that deference, and
whether it was based on studies projected into the future or
based on actual things that have happened that have been shown
to have good impacts for Alaskans.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that the reason some deference is
provided to commission's recommendations relating to conditions
of release, is that the commission is made up of stakeholders
across the criminal justice system. The commission investigated
this problem and decided that this specific remedy made sense,
of which was brought to the commission's attention by the
prosecution and law enforcement. He stressed that the
prosecution and law enforcement members sitting on the
commission decided this was the correct manner in which to
remedy the problem. At this point, he said, the intention is to
get those tools into the hands of law enforcement, prosecutors,
and the courts, which is why the administration supports SB 54,
and why the governor put it on the Fourth Special Session
Proclamation to consider and possibly make this tool available
as quickly as possible.
1:53:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether his response was somewhat
circular because the question was, why deference is given to the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, and the answer was that the
commission recommended it.
CHAIR CLAMAN interrupted and advised Representative Eastman that
that was not the answer Mr. Skidmore had stated. Mr. Skidmore
expressly said that the DOL was an active participant in the
commission, and it fully endorsed the recommendations.
Therefore, he pointed out, Representative Eastman was not
accurately describing Mr. Skidmore's response.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN responded to Chair Claman that his
original question was not answered, as to whether the commission
has accomplished anything that would inspire the committee to
have confidence in it, other than who sits on the commission.
MR. SKIDMORE replied that the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission
was created through Senate Bill 64 [passed in the Twenty-Eighth
Alaska State Legislature], two-years ago the commission made its
recommendations based on criminal justice reform efforts, and
Senate Bill 91 was signed into law for criminal justice reform.
He offered his opinion that not enough time has passed in order
to assess that bill overall and decide whether it had been a
success or not, and he said that [fact] has been made clear. He
explained that law enforcement, prosecutors, and the public
found that there were some responses to crime that "we thought"
were not able to utilize all of the tools that should be
utilized. Therefore, a change was requested, even though Senate
Bill 91 is still being assessed as to the successes of that
bill, and while he could not say there had been some successes,
he could not say there had been any sort of failure because it
is too early to make those determinations. He stressed that
credence should be put into this, not because this is what the
commission recommended, but rather because the people who
brought these issues up to begin with are part of the group that
said, "this is the right response, this is the way to solve the
problem."
1:56:17 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked what involvement the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission had with "the PEW Foundation, or any
money, or anything that's been sponsored in any way. If so, can
you please describe that."
MR. SKIDMORE advised that the PEW Foundation participated with
the commission during its original criminal justice reform
efforts, he has not seen any involvement in the SB 54
recommendations by the PEW Foundation, and he is unaware as to
whether the PEW Foundation is advising any members of the
commission at this moment. The PEW Foundation certainly has not
been advising Attorney General Lindemuth because that advice has
come from himself and others in the criminal division, he
stressed.
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Reinbold discussed her line of
questioning.]
1:57:36 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 1:57 p.m. to 1:58 p.m.
1:58:29 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether Attorney General Lindemuth
serves at the pleasure of the governor in carrying this "pro-
Senate Bill 91 policy," or whether she is doing this on her own
because she believes in the legislation.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that the Attorney General Lindmuth serves
at the pleasure of the governor. In terms of the
recommendations made by the commission, Attorney General
Lindemuth voted on those recommendations based upon her own
beliefs as to what is appropriate, and also based upon the
advice she received from others in the Department of Law (DOL),
including himself, he reiterated.
1:59:42 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that SB 54 does bring this back into
"criminal sanction, arrestable, holdable ..." and class B
misdemeanors are sanctionable with prison time as a new offense,
and it resolves the crime of an arrestable violation. He
pointed out that he has
arrested hundreds of offenders for violations of conditions of
release, and one of the challenges under the previous system,
was that a new misdemeanor crime brought in all of the due
processes of law. These due processes include scheduling
hearings, and evidentiary motion work back and forth between the
prosecution and the defense, which can sometimes mean it would
be three-months, four-months, or six-months down the road before
a violation of conditions of release was even properly
sanctioned. He offered a scenario that a condition of release
was no contact with felons, and this person had performed well
on parole and probation for six-months. They were then in their
yard visiting with friends and one person happened to be a
convicted felon, that is a new violation, he described. Other
than that contact with a felon, the person had committed no new
crime, yet the person went right back to jail and it would take
months to work through the system. He pointed out that [under
current law] when a person violates a condition of release, they
are immediately brought before a judge and sanctioned, thereby
offering swift and certain accountability with a chance the
person did not have to lose their employment. The whole idea
was that "we weren't getting" swift and certain accountability
in allowing a judge to determine the severity of the violation,
issue a fine, and get people's lives back into play. He
remarked that with the jailtime, [audio difficulties] making it
a criminal offense addresses the concerns of public safety, law
enforcement, and the courts. Representative Kopp stressed that
this legislation is the correct solution, and he offered his
appreciation to the sponsor of the amendment in bringing it back
in line with the recommendation of the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission.
2:02:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said she is aware of murders, domestic
violence, and sexual assault that has taken place due to
violations of conditions of release. She commented that these
people are released right after being charged with a crime and
they had not had the rehabilitation or the help they needed,
which makes the victims more vulnerable. Everything possible
must be done to protect the public, she stressed, and making it
a "class A misdemeanor with their "get out of jail free" is not
much to ask." She said that she is a yes-vote on Amendment 35.
2:03:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN advised that Amendment 35 does not change
the penalty for misdemeanors, but it does classify violations of
conditions as written in the law prior to Senate Bill 91. He
noted that the focus has been on who is on the commission, what
the commission recommended, and that Attorney General Lindemuth
recommended this or that, thereby, focusing more on egos rather
than on those individuals impacted by this issue on the ground.
He related that the people on the ground are saying this does
not work, which is why it needs to be addressed, and Amendment
35 is about the impact to people, not about who recommended it,
he noted.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
2:04:35 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Reinbold, LeDoux,
and Eastman voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 35.
Representatives Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, Amendment 35 failed to be adopted by a
vote of 3-4.
2:05:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 36, Version 30-
LS0461\N.20, Bruce/Martin, 10/20/17, which read as follows: [The
text of Amendment 36 is listed at the end of the 10/25/17
minutes of SB 54.]
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
2:05:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 36 rolls back
the clock on driving under the influence (DUI), and refusal to
submit to a chemical test, and returns to the law prior to
Senate Bill 91. He stressed the importance of this amendment
because the reduction of penalties under Senate Bill 91 have not
had a good effect, and the legislation has been in effect long
enough to experience that result, he opined. There is no need
to wait any longer for other portions of Senate Bill 91 to kick
in to realize that some of its provisions need to go back to
something that at least worked, even if it was not perfect, he
said.
2:06:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that this state has serious
alcohol problems and many people are killed by DUI drivers. She
said she is a yes-vote on Amendment 36 for public safety.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered that the state needs to go back
to what worked in the past, and DUI drivers are not an area
where the state should subject its citizens to trial and error
tests.
2:07:31 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 2:07 p.m. to 2:10 p.m.
2:10:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that there appears to be sections in
Amendment 36 that actually repeal the additional hoops required
for the restoration of a driver's license. Under Senate Bill
91, the law added required periods of successful driving,
successfully completing court ordered treatment, and several
other requirements on the path to the restoration of a license.
Previously, a person could "flat time out" their revocation,
serve their 90-days, and they were then eligible to have their
driving license restored. Under Senate Bill 91, the legislature
decided the person must perform additional requirements for the
restoration of their license. He asked Mr. Skidmore whether
Amendment 36 inadvertently removes those hoops.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that the first thing that jumped out at
him was, page 1, line 6, AS 28.35.030(k), the DUI statute
regarding punishment for DUI drivers. Under Senate Bill 91, a
change was made as to how the penalty for how driving under the
influence would be carried out, such that, the imprisonment
required under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section shall be
served and it inserts the language "at a community residential
center." That language was in the law prior to criminal justice
reform efforts, and Amendment 36 basically goes through what
occurred under Senate Bill 91 and reverses the language as it
relates to punishment for driving under the influence (DUI). In
layman's terms, he explained, previously for a DUI a person
could serve at a community residential center (CRC) or on
electronic monitoring (EM). Under the criminal justice reform
efforts, it read that service would be on EM, or if EM was not
available, the location would be at the discretion of the
commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC).
2:14:15 PM
MR. SKIMORE then turned to Amendment 36, Sec. 18, page 2, lines
27-31 and page 3, lines 1-25, which discusses licenses, and
advised that the DUI statute, AS 28.35.030(o) discusses
licenses. Amendment 36 appears to alter the ability of a person
to have their license restored, and he said that he did not
believe it was placed in the law under the efforts of criminal
justice reform, but he was unsure. He related that he could
only say that Amendment 36 would make it more difficult for a
person to have their license restored after receiving a
conviction for a DUI. Although, he commented, he had not had a
chance to compare this language to other statutes to determine
whether there are other potential implications, but he recalled
discussions about trying to make it easier for a person
convicted of a DUI to have their license restored due to the
importance of that license and their livelihood, and such.
Amendment 36, as written, appears to take some of that ability
away, but he could not speak to the sponsor's intent and he was
unsure whether that was something Representative Eastman had
requested.
2:16:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether old law was being removed here
because the section being removed required: a person to have
driven successful for three-years under a limited driver's
license privilege; complete a court ordered treatment program or
rehabilitative program as identified in statute; and no
violations of refusal of a chemical test, DUI, or similar law
convictions, since their license was revoked. These are the
practical steps that include a three-year period that a person
who has served their time in jail would go through, but part of
the issue, he related, is that Amendment 36 would remove those
steps, and say, "Regardless, there is no path back."
MR. SKIDMORE then corrected a previous statement he had made,
and referred to Senate Bill 91, Sec. 109, pages 66-67, where it
did add this language that is being removed. Therefore, he
explained, Amendment 36 does just roll back what happened under
Senate Bill 91. Although, he added, it does not change the
analysis he gave regarding what the restoration of the license
does, and it does not in any manner contradict Representative
Kopp's comments about the restoration of the license.
2:18:51 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to the language being removed in Amendment
36, page 3, and asked Mr. Skidmore to explain its reasoning in
terms of the process one would go through to have their license
restored, how it would improve public safety, and how it would
improve rehabilitation for those convicted of a DUI.
MR. SKIDMORE, in response, offered an antidote that previously,
he had hired a gentleman to paint his house who performed
"fabulous work" and that he enjoyed his work without question.
This person was convicted of a DUI and he was not able to have a
license himself, despite the fact he had been sober for a number
of years, he still could not drive. Mr. Skidmore advised that
he lives "a ways out of town," and anytime he asked the painter
to work on his house, the gentleman had to get someone else to
drive him out, which was inconvenient. Therefore, he had
difficulties always making it to Mr. Skidmore's house and to all
of his other jobs, so despite starting a business himself, that
business ultimately failed, and the gentleman fell back into the
addiction and suffered as the result of not being able to get
his license restored. Although, he acknowledged, he could not
say whether that gentleman would not have fallen back into
addiction if he had had his license, that is an example in his
personal life of someone prosecuted, convicted for DUI, and had
appropriate sanction placed upon him. Unfortunately, he
related, when it came to trying to get his license back, the
process was so onerous that it had a negative impact on that
gentleman, his business failed, his job was lost, and the people
he employed lost their jobs. The language under Senate Bill 91
was designed to try and let a person get back on their feet
faster and, he expressed, the language is written in a manner
that still maintains public safety.
2:21:18 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the Juneau Police
Department (JPD) is a member of the Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that the JPD representative retired and
that seat was replaced by a representative from the Anchorage
Police Department (APD).
2:21:38 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked the reason a representative from
the JPD was not currently a member of the Alaska Criminal
Justice Commission.
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected and reminded Representative Reinbold
that she knows perfectly well that the governor appoints the
members on the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission because she
voted for or against the statute which read there would be one
member from public safety and the commissioner of the Department
of Public Safety is on the commission.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD advised that she had asked to be on the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission as the legislative
representative.
2:22:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked, under Senate Bill 91, whether
someone's license could be restored if they were involved in a
drunk driving incident and killed or seriously injured another
individual.
CHAIR CLAMAN, for clarification purposes, asked whether
Representative LeDoux was asking about alcohol related vehicular
homicides or any vehicular homicides.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX advised that she was asking about alcohol
related vehicular homicides and any vehicular homicides.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that the language under Senate Bill 91
would not return a license under those circumstances because it
is "not an automatic." He explained that a statute under Title
28.15 discusses a court's authority to revoke a driver's license
when an individual had committed a crime other than simply a
DUI, and the crime involved the use of a vehicle. He referred
to Representative LeDoux's example of a person being killed as a
result of a motor vehicle collision and advised that the charge
would not necessarily be a DUI, it that may be an additional
charge in that case. There would be a charge for manslaughter,
criminally negligent homicide, or murder in the second degree,
or any one of those other crimes. As the result of the
conviction of one of those other crimes, the court is authorized
to revoke a person's driver's license. The above-mentioned
statute sets out the length of time that could occur, but that
would not be impacted by this particular provision. Amendment
36 is solely regarding DUIs because it is specifically contained
within the DUI statute and it discusses the return of a driver's
license when convicted of a DUI. This amendment would have no
impact on the ability for someone to have their driver's license
restored if it was revoked by the court as a result of a
different charge for which the person was convicted, he
explained.
2:25:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to the provision under Senate
Bill 91 that allows for the restoration of licenses and asked
whether it only involves those third DUIs where someone has lost
their license for a horrendous amount of time due to their last
DUI.
MR. SKIDMORE referred to Amendment 36, Sec. 18, AS 28.35.030(o),
page 2, lines 27-31, and page 3, lines 1-25, and paraphrased as
follows:
AS 28.35.030(o) is amended to read:
(o) Upon request, the department shall review a
driver's license revocation imposed under (n)(3)
[which, he explained is the section that is a felony
DUI] of this section and
[(1)] may restore the driver's license if
(1)[(A)] the license has been revoked for a
period of at least 10 years;
(2)[B] the person has not been convicted of
a criminal offense since the license was revoked [he
explained that that is the way the law currently reads
... or, excuse me] of a driving related offense since
the license was revoked; and
(3)[C] the person provides proof of
financial responsibility;
MR. SKIDMORE advised that the provision goes on to read "shall
restore" and it lists out conditions. The discussion is about a
felony DUI and how a person could have their license restored.
He noted that under his previous personal example, the painter
had been convicted of a felony DUI and, under this law, would
have been eligible to have his license restored.
2:27:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to AS 28.35.030(o) under
Amendment 36, and asked, "does this eliminate this amendment ...
the discretion of the judge to reinstate the driver's license
under any circumstance."
MR. SKIDMORE explained that subsection (o) does not refer to
when the judge is restoring the license, this section and all of
this discussion is about when the Division of Motor Vehicles
would restore the license. He further explained that a driver's
license revocation can be longer than ten years, and subsection
(o) allowed a license to be restored after a period of at least
10 years in which it was revoked.
MR. SKIMORE then referred to Amendment 36, page 3, lines 4-25,
and paraphrased as follows:
(2) shall restore the license if
(A) the person has been granted limited
license privileges ... and it quotes another statute
AS 28.15.201(g), and has successfully driven under
that limited license for three-years without having
limited license privileges revoked;
... it goes on to (B) to give another option.
(B) the person has successfully
completed a court order treatment program ...
... it goes on to (C)
(C) the person has not been convicted
of a similar violation ...
... it goes on to (D)
(D) the person is otherwise eligible
...
MR. SKIDMORE explained that the provision is trying to provide
greater flexibility of things that can occur when the Division
of Motor Vehicles, not a judge, would return the license.
2:29:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to the language "shall restore
the driver's license," and asked why Mr. Skidmore's painter did
not go to the Division of Motor Vehicles and ask that his
driver's license be restored. The gentleman could have had a
limited license allowing him to drive to his various job sites,
rather than starting to drink again, she commented.
MR. SKIDMORE related that he could not speak to all of the
circumstances involved for the painter, his point was that the
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission was trying to make it easier
for someone to have their license restored.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that the commission was not
trying to provide the Division of Motor Vehicles with greater
flexibility, but rather to tie the hands of the Division of
Motor Vehicles by using the words "shall restore" as opposed to
subparagraph (o), which offers a lot of flexibility.
MR. SKIDMORE related that the Division of Motor Vehicles
(indisc.) to make it easier for a person to have their license
restored. He commented that that may be viewed as reducing the
discretion of the Division of Motor Vehicles, but he was not
comfortable answering that it gave the division less discretion.
His understanding, he noted, was that it was meant to be easier
for a person to have their license restored after certain
conditions were met.
2:31:48 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether Mr. Skidmore was familiar with
circumstances, prior to the criminal justice reform process, in
which people with 10-year license revocations were able to have
their licenses restored within those 10-years, or whether they
typically had to wait until the 10-year revocation period had
ended.
MR. SKIDMORE said he could not answer that question.
2:32:40 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN opined that the goal of the existing statute, under
Senate Bill 91, was to make it more reliable. He pointed out
that having a fairly articulated method for the restoration of a
driver's license is a positive step in trying to keep people
working in their communities, and he would be no-vote.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted the difficulty in attempting to
provide a livelihood outside of prison without a driver's
license. He opined that the problem arises when someone who
would otherwise be in prison is put on the street, "and then,
you then argue that because they are on the street, that the
penalties that they would have encountered in jail" now is an
argument for why the legislature should make it easier on
criminals. He further opined that the focus should not be on
making it easier on criminals when convicted of a DUI because
they forfeit some of their rights in that regard, and this
amendment does not do anything more than go back to what was
previously working.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
2:34:21 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives LeDoux, Eastman,
and Reinbold voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 36.
Representatives Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, Kopp, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, Amendment 36 failed to be adopted by a
vote of 3-4.
2:34:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 37, Version 30-
LS0461\N.21, Glover/Martin, 10/19/17, which read as follows:
Page 14, lines 23 - 28:
Delete all material and insert:
"(21) develop and implement, or designate,
in cooperation with other state or local agencies, an
alcohol safety action program that provides alcohol
and substance abuse screening, referral, and
monitoring services to persons who have been referred
by a court in connection with a charge or conviction
of a misdemeanor involving the use of a motor vehicle,
aircraft, or watercraft and alcohol or a controlled
substance, referred by a court under [AS 04.16.049,
04.16.050,] AS 28.35.028 [, 28.35.030, OR 28.35.032,]
or referred by an agency of the state with the
responsibility for administering motor vehicle laws in
connection with a driver's license action involving
the use of alcohol or a controlled substance;"
Page 15, line 7:
Delete "and"
Page 15, line 8, following "12.55.125(e)(4)(D)":
Insert "; and AS 47.37.130(h)(3)"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
2:35:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 37 deals with
the Alaska Statewide Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP), and
noted that he had heard that there were many good things in the
ASAP prior to Senate Bill 91. This amendment reverts back to
pre-Senate Bill 91 "language in statute dealing with limiting
impositions of ASAP removed for the ASAP program."
2:36:31 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP referred to SB 54, page 12, line 2, AS
47.37.040, and surmised that it refers to the Department of
Health and Social Services and ASAP.
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to SB 54, AS 47.37.040(21), page 14, lines
23-28, and asked what was wrong with the language that Amendment
[37] fixes.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN answered that the program was not broken
and it did not need to be fixed, so "rather than pursue this
effort," it is time to go back to what was working well.
2:38:32 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER pointed out that Amendment 37 reforms who
goes into the ASAP program, and if that is the case, the program
remains the same, here it is just entering in folks that need to
go into ASAP. Representative Fansler asked Representative
Eastman if he could speak to his comment.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN replied, "Not really, we're talking
about" when ASAP is imposed upon a particular person and being
removed from that program. He said he was not aware whether
that part of the program had changed much since ASAP was
created, it goes back to how the program was created.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she brought this issue to the
table in June, due to complaints that ASAP was underutilized.
Amendment 37 was drafted to address these complaints by "beefing
up ASAP" and increasing its coordination with different
departments so more people are served under the program.
2:40:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS said he would like to hear Mr.
Skidmore's perspective as to the thinking behind the original
change that this amendment would repeal, and whether there would
be a cause for concern about the implementation of that change
to ASAP under Senate Bill 91.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that Representative Kreiss-Tomkins
question was partly directed to the language in SB 54 regarding
AS 11.71.050 because when just looking at Senate Bill 91, there
is not the amendment that is located in SB 54.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS noted his appreciation for Chair
Claman's clarification.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that Amendment 37 looks at ASAP, and SB
54, page 14, line 25, inserts language that a person may be
referred to ASAP under AS 11.71.050(a)(4), the statute that
makes it a crime to possess drugs. He explained that that
change is in SB 54 currently, and he was unsure how this
amendment alters that "because it has eliminated the referral
for that reason." He confirmed that this simply changes the
language back to the way things were prior to Senate Bill 91.
He advised that Amendment 37 reverses the change made under
Senate Bill 91, page 109, and reverts to the original language.
The reason for the change made in Senate Bill 91, was a concern
that the alcohol safety action program (ASAP) was stretched too
thin and the ASAP should focus on its core mission of looking at
driving under the influence cases as opposed to being used in
every assault case, and every other type of case involving
alcohol or substance abuse. He advised that the program had a
wide perspective and the language in Senate Bill 91 put the
focus on DUIs, and a Senate amendment in SB 54 changed the
language slightly in that people convicted of a misdemeanor
possession of drugs need to have an assessment. Amendment 37
reverts it back to that wide perspective group and rather than
just focusing on DUIs and people in possession of drugs, this
amendment returns it to anyone the court convicts and decides to
send to the ASAP. In terms of what impacts it may cause, he
said he could only answer as to the legal aspect of the
legislation.
2:45:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER said that he does not know why the
amendment would read "Delete all material and insert" and then
it has deletion marks for AS 04.16.040, 04.16.050, and
28.35.030.
CHAIR CLAMAN opined that it was an effort to show how the
language was changed from what is in SB 54.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER argued that his point is that it is not
in SB 54 in that manner.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that as he read the amendment, it first says,
"can be referred for alcohol and substance abuse screening and
monitoring," but it then limits it to "in connection with a
charge or conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of a
motor vehicle ..." Then, he explained, the amendment deletes
the AS 04.16. references, and AS 28.35 references, thereby, only
the DUI statute AS 28.35.028 reference remains. He explained
that he read Representative Eastman's amendment to mean that,
even though there is reference to substance abuse referrals,
someone convicted of misdemeanor misconduct involving a
controlled substance in the fourth-degree could not be referred
to the ASAP for treatment evaluation of that misdemeanor
conviction.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN pointed out that the conjunction "or" is
used several times throughout the amendment, and the amendment
itself does not touch the final "or," which is after the
reference to "AS 28.35.028. So, you have 'by a court' under
that statute or referred by an agency of the state with
responsibility,' and so forth." He related that a person could
be sent to the ASAP in another manner other than that specific
statute.
2:48:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD advised that this amendment was offered
earlier on the floor of the House of Representatives. Mr.
Skidmore stated that it did broaden the scope with the intention
that more people could be referred, and one of the concepts
under Senate Bill 91 was for people to receive treatment. She
reiterated that the intention was to broaden the scope, and she
was unsure whether the drafting was correct.
2:49:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to Amendment 37, page 1, lines 6-
8, which read as follows:
(21) ... in connection with a charge or
conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of a
motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft and alcohol or
a controlled substance, referred by a court ...
2:50:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether the language "and alcohol or
a controlled substance" would mean every case in which they were
referred, or just if they are prosecuted in connection with a
misdemeanor involving the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or
water craft. She offered a scenario of someone charged with a
misdemeanor involving a motor vehicle, aircraft, or water craft,
not involving alcohol or drugs, and that she could not tell by
this amendment whether they would be referred to the ASAP.
MR. SKIDMORE noted that due to the drafting questions, it makes
sense to review enacted Senate Bill 91, page 109, lines 22-31,
and he advised that the amendment exactly reverses the change
under Senate Bill 91. The underlined and bold language is
exactly what is found in Senate Bill 91 and; therefore, nothing
new has been added in any manner. From his standpoint, he said,
prior to the passage of Senate Bill 91, the ASAP was utilized
for misdemeanor crimes for which someone had been under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the crime. Under Senate
Bill 91, the language directed that the ASAP would only be
utilized for DUIs; and the language in SB 54 directs that the
ASAP would be utilized for DUIs and possession of drugs.
Criminal justice reform made possession of drug crimes
misdemeanors, and the concern was that no one was monitoring
these various individuals, so that language was added into SB
54. He reiterated that Amendment 37 takes it back and makes the
language as broad as possible for any crime in which alcohol or
a controlled substance could receive the ASAP referral.
2:53:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that if one of the intentions of
Senate Bill 91 was to spend money on treatment rather than
incarceration, she asked why the ASAP language should not be
opened to include anyone who committed a crime involving alcohol
or drugs.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that his testimony solely reflects the
legal analysis of Amendment 37, and he reiterated his
understanding that the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission's
recommendation was based on trying to narrow the focus of the
ASAP due to a concern that it was stretched too thin, and that
it actually covered everything it needed to cover. As to the
underpinnings of Representative LeDoux's question, he said he is
not the best person to answer.
2:55:20 PM
RANDALL BURNS, Director, Division of Behavioral Health,
Department of Health and Social Services, responded that Mr.
Skidmore is correct, this amendment language returns the
functions of the ASAP to the language prior to the passage of
Senate Bill 91. There was much discussion in the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission about the adequacy of resources for
ASAP given that various judges were referring individuals guilty
of a crime beyond just those with a DUI, thereby spreading the
ASAP too thin. He acknowledged that he could not offer any
numbers off the top of his head, and that the administrator of
that program, Tony Piper, was in Denver, Colorado. The ASAP
program certainly had not received any increases in its budget
for some time, he offered.
2:58:05 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS noted that Amendment 37 is all
about the operational issues of the ASAP, which makes it
difficult to cast an informed vote or consider the amendment
without the necessary information. He asked that the committee
hear from someone who could speak to the effectiveness of ASAP
because perhaps, prior to criminal justice reform and despite
good intentions, the program was set so thin that it was not
effective.
MR. BURNS apologized for not having that information and
remarked that the ASAP program has been considered an effective
program and is considered highly beneficial to the individuals
participating in the program. Unfortunately, he related, he did
not have data at his fingertips as to the numbers regarding a
person's particular charge, such as being charged with a motor
vehicle, aircraft, or water craft, crime.
2:59:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER related that he was still confused about
several aspects of the amendment wherein it is great to say that
the ASAP is an amazingly effective and efficient program, but
then multiply by ten the number of people who would partake in
this program and pointed out that if there was not a proper
subsequent growth in the size of the program, that effectiveness
and efficiency would suffer greatly. A fiscal note is not
attached, he noted, and presumed that the committee would want
the percentage of folks administering the program, and the
percentage of folks actively guiding the program. He asked Mr.
Skidmore to explain the differences between proposed SB 54 and
the amendment, as to who is eligible for the program.
3:02:39 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP pointed out that "this is narrowly talking
about referrals for vehicle related substance offenses," and not
all substance offenses. He referred to Amendment 37, page 1,
lines 6-7, and paraphrased as follows: "... in connection with
the charge or conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of a
motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft and alcohol or a
controlled substance." Therefore, he remarked, there must be a
charge or a conviction of a misdemeanor offense involving
alcohol, or a controlled substance, with the use of those
vehicles, and noted by deleting motor vehicle, aircraft, or
watercraft, that it would apply to all offenses.
CHAIR CLAMAN remarked that there is comfort on the committee
that this amendment only involves those people convicted of
offenses involving motor vehicles, aircrafts, or watercrafts.
The amendment does not involve someone charged with just
possession of drugs as a misdemeanor, which is the statute
referenced in SB 54.
3:04:17 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER noted that Mr. Skidmore had broken down
what Senate Bill 91 did, what SB 54 proposed, and what Amendment
37 proposed, and he offered that he was conflicted about Mr.
Skidmore's descriptions. In his view, he remarked, this
amendment appears to be more limiting than the current version
of SB 54 because the amendment has connection with the charge or
conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of a motor craft,
aircraft, or motor craft. He offered his belief that that
limiting factor now eliminates the situation wherein someone
could be walking down the street and be charged with possession
of a schedule 1A narcotic, as listed in AS 11.81. He asked
whether his thinking was correct in that the amendment is
actually less than SB 54 is currently proposing.
MR. SKIDMORE said that he understands precisely what
Representative Fansler described. He explained that his
testimony related to practice, such that, referrals were being
made to the ASAP for an assault in the fourth degree, or some
other crime, when the statute did not authorize that referral,
and he could only say that that was what was happening in
practice. Thereby, coming to the same legal standpoint as
Representative Fansler because he does not see anything
authorizing a person convicted of those crimes in this
amendment, the way the statute was previously written. The
language in SB 54 sets the appropriate balance of where things
should be, it specifically authorizes the ASAP for DUIs and
possession of drugs that are now a misdemeanor, which was not in
law prior to Senate Bill 91. Senate Bill 54 recognizes the
changes in Senate Bill 91, and the language prior does not
recognize those changes. He said that he agrees with
Representative Fansler in that when he reads this statute, the
authority cannot be seen for that broader set of referrals that
were occurring in practice. He remarked that he could not say
now whether there is another statute that does that as he would
have to look through the statutes.
3:06:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked whether the committee could confirm
that if it does pass SB 54 as currently written, the committee
would get the broader range without taking the risk of throwing
this back into the traditional practice.
MR. SKIDMORE clarified that if SB 54 passes, it would allow
referrals for DUIs, refusal of a breathalyzer test, and
misdemeanor possession of drugs, and the legislation would not
authorize that wider practice of referring any other misdemeanor
crime to the ASAP. For example, he does not see anything
authorizing the referral of a person to the ASAP who was
convicted of assault in the fourth degree while under the
influence of alcohol. He advised that he does not see that
authorization in SB 54, he did not see that authorization under
Senate Bill 91, and he was unsure whether he saw that
authorization prior to Senate Bill 91. Although, he pointed
out, that practice was occurring prior to Senate Bill 91.
3:08:42 PM
MR. BURNS advised that Tony Piper, ASAP section lead, was online
and he would have more information around the operation of the
ASAP and its fiscal issues.
MR. BURNS, in response to Representative Kopp, advised that the
Department of Health and Social Services has had an opportunity
to review Amendment 37, and the amendment had been discussed but
a fiscal note had not yet been developed.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Tony Piper whether he would
support Amendment 37, explaining that its intention was to
broaden its scope to get more people into the program, and asked
whether the amendment would take the committee back to the law
prior to Senate Bill 91.
3:10:39 PM
TONY PIPER, Coordinator, Alcohol Safety Action Program, Division
of Behavioral Health, Department of Health and Social Services,
answered that this bill expands the ASAP to allow drug
possession, but all of the other offenses are still related to
driving offenses.
CHAIR CLAMAN explained that Representative Reinbold was asking
about Amendment 37, which does not include the drug offenses
listed in SB 54. He asked that Mr. Piper direct his response to
Representative Reinbold's question on Amendment 37.
MR. PIPER responded that this would not change the current
practice, it would only expand it slightly and it would not
bring it back to the prior practice.
3:11:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD explained that the intention of
Amendment 37 was to broaden [the scope] and take it back to pre-
Senate Bill 91, where the practice was broader with more
referrals.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that the intention of the amendment is to
return to the language prior to Senate Bill 91 and expand the
number of people [to be assessed]. Mr. Piper's testimony
indicates that the practice was not following the statute, which
was more expansive than what the statute allowed.
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that the intention of the amendment is to
expand the number of people referred to the ASAP, and there was
the practice of not following the statute because the practice
was more expansive than what the statute allowed. This
amendment does not bring the committee back to past practice as
a matter of statute, and the question then becomes "which of
these two, page 14, paragraph 21 versus Amendment 37 paragraph
21," at least as a matter of the plain language of the statute,
will provide more referrals to the ASAP, the language of
Amendment 37, or the language of SB 54, page 14.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that, from a purely legal technical
reading, what is in SB 54, page 14, lines 23-28 provides greater
use of the ASAP authorized by statute. He said he does not
believe that going back to where the state was before with the
language, gets the state back to the same practice because the
practice overtook the statute, wherein the court made referrals
for things not authorized by statute. Therefore, he opined, as
to the problem of trying to get broader, he does not believe
going back to the original language accomplishes that goal,
although he does understand its intent.
3:14:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that she knows Governor Bill
Walker does not want a single amendment to this bill, "I want a
second opinion because I'm not sure that -- I'd just like to ask
the drafting, ok."
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD, in response to Chair Claman's question
as to whether she wanted to get Legislative Legal and Research
Services to provide, she answered "absolutely."
CHAIR CLAMAN said he would try to get Legislative Legal and
Research Services on the telephone.
3:15:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that if the committee wanted to
go back to past practices as opposed to past statute, she
suggested simply taking out the phrase on Amendment 37, page 1,
line 7, "a motor vehicle, aircraft, or water craft and" and
leave "connection with a charge or conviction of a misdemeanor
involving alcohol or a controlled substance, referred by a court
...." She asked Mr. Skidmore whether that would get the
committee back to past practices even though it would not be
past statute.
MR. SKIDMORE answered in the affirmative.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that he would accept that
suggestion as a conceptual amendment.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked that someone make a motion to table Amendment
37 and put it at the back of the stack and try to figure it out
during one of the breaks.
3:16:49 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked Representative Reinbold, after
hearing her suggestion and Mr. Skidmore's response, whether this
solves the problem and would no longer like to speak with
Legislative Legal and Research Services.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that it would be helpful for
the committee to have a clear mind, and the reason for the
language regarding alcohol with boats is because a lot of people
use those vehicles to get to work. Also, she said, when a
person is under the influence, a vehicle involved in an accident
can hurt someone, which is a reason for the variety of vehicles.
3:17:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER move to table Amendment 37 and put it at
the end of the stack of amendments. There being no objection,
the amendment was tabled.
3:18:12 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 3:18 p.m. to 3:36 p.m.
3:36:16 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 38, Version 30-
LS0461\N.22, Glover/Martin, 10/17/17, which read as follows:
Page 10, following line 27:
Insert new bill sections to read:
"* Sec. 16. AS 28.15.291(a) is repealed and
reenacted to read:
(a) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
if the person
(1) drives a motor vehicle on a highway or
vehicular way or area at a time when that person's
driver's license, privilege to drive, or privilege to
obtain a license has been canceled, suspended, or
revoked in this or another jurisdiction; or
(2) drives in violation of a limitation
placed on that person's license or privilege to drive
in this or another jurisdiction.
* Sec. 17. AS 28.15.291(b) is repealed and
reenacted to read:
(b) Upon conviction under (a) of this section,
the court
(1) shall impose a minimum sentence of
imprisonment
(A) if the person has not been previously
convicted, of not less than 10 days with 10 days
suspended, including a mandatory condition of
probation that the defendant complete not less than 80
hours of community work service;
(B) if the person has been previously
convicted, of not less than 10 days;
(C) if the person's driver's license,
privilege to drive, or privilege to obtain a license
was revoked under circumstances described in
AS 28.15.181(c)(1), if the person was driving in
violation of a limited license issued under
AS 28.15.201(d) following that revocation, or if the
person was driving in violation of an ignition
interlock device requirement following that
revocation, of not less than 20 days with 10 days
suspended, and a fine of not less than $500, including
a mandatory condition of probation that the defendant
complete not less than 80 hours of community work
service;
(D) if the person's driver's license,
privilege to drive, or privilege to obtain a license
was revoked under circumstances described in
AS 28.15.181(c)(2), (3), or (4), if the person was
driving in violation of a limited license issued under
AS 28.15.201(d) following that revocation, or if the
person was driving in violation of an ignition
interlock device requirement following that
revocation, of not less than 30 days and a fine of not
less than $1,000;
(2) may impose additional conditions of
probation;
(3) may not
(A) suspend execution of sentence or grant
probation except on condition that the person serve a
minimum term of imprisonment and perform required
community work service as provided in (1) of this
subsection;
(B) suspend imposition of sentence;
(4) shall revoke the person's license,
privilege to drive, or privilege to obtain a license,
and the person may not be issued a new license or a
limited license nor may the privilege to drive or
obtain a license be restored for an additional period
of not less than 90 days after the date that the
person would have been entitled to restoration of
driving privileges; and
(5) may order that the motor vehicle that
was used in commission of the offense be forfeited
under AS 28.35.036."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 17:
Delete "and"
Page 15, line 18, following "Act":
Insert ";
(7) AS 28.15.291(a), as repealed and
reenacted by sec. 16 of this Act; and
(8) AS 28.15.291(b), as repealed and
reenacted by sec. 17 of this Act"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 20"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 20"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17"
Insert "Section 19"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 26"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
3:36:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN pointed out that Amendment 38 reverts
back to pre-Senate Bill 91 law and deals with a first-time
offense of driving with suspended license by reinstating the 10-
day active jailtime, and a second conviction would have a $500
fine with 80-hours of community work service. The amendment is
limited to dealing with first time driving with a suspended
license, and the appropriate penalties for the number of times
the person is convicted.
3:38:30 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked what the reasoning was behind Sec. 16 in
proposed SB 54, what changes are made in Amendment 38 compared
to SB 54, and how the amendment changes the policies reflected
in SB 54.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that Amendment 38 is not in any way shape
or form part of SB 54 because there were no changes proposed in
SB 54 that address driving with a suspended license. Amendment
38 adds a new section that would reverse what happened in the
criminal justice reform efforts previously, to driving with a
suspended license. The legal analysis was the question of
whether driving with a suspended license was a crime for which
the commission thought folks needed to go to jail, and it was
determined that most driving with a suspended license is not
based on a criminal conduct, but rather based on the points
people receive on their licenses. The commission recommended
that only those sections related to DUIs should remain a crime,
and the others would be turned into violations, he said. Senate
Bill 54 does not alter any of that framework in any way shape or
form, he reiterated, but Amendment 38 takes the language back to
the law as it existed prior to any criminal justice reform for
criminalizing all of that conduct, including establishing the
mandatory minimums for the various types of conduct.
3:41:00 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that under Senate Bill 91, if a person was
convicted of driving while intoxicated and then drove a car
while on that suspension of their license, they would face a
mandatory 10-day jail sentence for driving with a suspended
license under current law. Chair Claman offered a scenario,
under current law, wherein he had a prior DUI and his license
was suspended due to that DUI, and while driving sober to paint
Mr. Skidmore's house, he was stopped by law enforcement. He
asked whether that would be a 10-day mandatory jail sentence
under current law.
MR. SKIDMORE answered, "No."
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Mr. Skidmore to describe the penalty under
current law.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that under current law, it is not less
than 10-days with 10-days suspended if the person had not
previously been convicted of a similar offense. In the event a
person was previously convicted of a similar offense, it would
be 10-days.
3:42:55 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that Amendment 38 would go back to the
place in which a person with points on their license not related
to a DUI related suspension, would face jailtime for being
arrested on a points suspension as opposed to having a DUI
suspension.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that previous law read that if a person's
license was suspended for points as opposed to a DUI, and it was
a first-offense driving with license suspended (DWLS), the
mandatory minimum was 10-days with 10-days suspended and 80-
hours of community work service. In the event the person had
previously been convicted of DWLS, it was 10-days. Mr. Skimore
referred to Amendment 38, page 1, lines 13-16, and paraphrased
as follows:
(A) is the 10-days with 10-days suspended and 80-
hours of community work service - that's points and
not a DUI for a first.
(B) line 17-18 is the person has previously been
convicted, then it is 10-days in jail is the mandatory
minimum,
(C) lines 19-23 and on ... (C) is where you now
are talking about if the person has had their driver's
license suspended as the result of a DUI, you'll find
the penalty is on page 2, line 1, that indicates it's
20-days with 10-days suspended, 10-days to serve, it
also talks about a $500 fine, and it also talks about
community work service.
(D) And then, if you have a previous conviction
for DUI, DWLS, now it goes up to 30-days, and I'm at
lines 9 and 10, of page 2, of Amendment 38.
MR. SKIDMORE suggested thinking of DWLS as points. A DUI-
related suspended license is "suspended time 10 with 10, 80
hours of community work service, it goes up to 10-days unless
you are dealing with a DUI, in which case it is 20-days with 10-
days, the fine, and the community work service, or a previous
DUI, now it goes up to 30-days."
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Commissioner Dean Williams whether
he had just returned from Norway.
3:46:00 PM
COMMISSIONER DEAN WILLIAMS, Department of Corrections, answered,
"Yes."
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked what he learned about DUIs and how
the people of Norway handle DUIs.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS advised that he could not because he was
not looking into the legal descriptions of all of Norway's laws,
he was looking at its conditions of confinement and focusing on
what happens behind the walls.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD recommended that Commissioner Williams
look into Norwegian laws regarding DUIs because it has some of
the toughest penalties for DUIs. She asked the purpose for
Commissioner Williams to look at the conditions inside the
Norwegian jail.
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Reinbold discussed the purpose
of Amendment 38.]
3:48:02 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked what problems were present with the existing
laws regarding driving with license suspended (DWLS), what was
the purpose in terms of public safety and improving the whole
process by the changes in Senate Bill 91.
3:48:38 PM
BARBARA DUNHAM, Project Attorney, Alaska Criminal Justice
Commission, Alaska Judicial Council, Alaska Court System,
answered that the purpose behind the changes in Senate Bill 91
for driving with suspended license (DWSL) was part of the
broader effort of focusing state resources on violent offenders
and the more dangerous offenders. She explained that the
commission recommended separating out the driving with suspended
license (DWSL) based on a DUI or a refusal of a breathalyzer
test, and licenses suspended for other reasons. The reason
being that the commission believed the DUI based revocations
were more serious, and the license suspensions for those other
types of infractions were not as serious and should not be
categorized as a crime but rather a violation similar to a
speeding ticket.
3:49:51 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether that determination was research-based
data analysis for that recommendation.
MS. DUNHAM responded that it was based on the Alaska Criminal
Judicial Commission's findings that, generally, people with such
low-level charges tend to be low-risk. Putting those people in
jail could actually have a criminogenic effect, meaning that it
could make them more likely to recidivate once they were
released from jail.
3:50:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that Mothers Against Drunk Drivers
would think that someone who killed their teen-ager while
driving under the influence was violent. She asked Ms. Dunham,
as attorney for the commission, whether she would take
responsibility for the failure of public safety that the people
on the street are reporting.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Ms. Dunham that she could answer the
question with respect to driving with license suspended.
MS. DUNHAM replied that she should have been more specific
because this particular recommendation has to do with licenses
suspended or revoked, not with a DUI itself. The commission
recognizes that a DUI itself is a serious crime, she advised.
3:51:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she thought Mr. Skidmore
advised that this did not apply when licenses were suspended due
to DUIs. She asked whether she misunderstood Mr. Skidmore.
MR. SKIDMORE asked whether Representative LeDoux was asking
about the amendment, or about the previous law and how it
affected DWLS.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX answered both.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that, under current law, a person who has
their license suspended as the result of a DUI is a crime, and
the mandatory minimums for that crime are lower than what they
had been previously. Amendment 38 increases the mandatory
minimums, but under either scenario, it is still a crime. In
the event a person's license is suspended due to points on their
license, rather than a DUI, under current law that is no longer
a crime or something that results in a person going to jail.
Instead, he advised, a fine is assessed, similar to a speeding
offense. Under Amendment 38 and previous law, it turns DWLS
assessed due to points on a license back into a crime and it
imposes mandatory minimums as well, he explained.
MS. DUNHAM said that she agreed with Mr. Skidmore's explanation.
3:54:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Mr. Skidmore to explain points
versus a DUI and offered a scenario of driving 120 mph in
downtown Anchorage, and whether that would fall into the points
category or into the crime category.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that if a person drives over the speed
limit, it results in a speeding ticket and points are
associated. He said that Representative Eastman's scenario of
driving 120 mph in downtown Anchorage where the speed limit is
most likely 25-35 mph, would likely result in a charge of
reckless driving, reckless endangerment, potentially an assault
if someone had been placed in danger, and a number of other
crimes. He explained that in the event a person was driving on
the Glenn Highway with a speed limit 65 mph, and they drove 75-
80 mph, that would be a speeding ticket with points associated.
A number of other driving infractions can result in points, but
he was not familiar with the process because he prosecutes
crimes. In the event the points reach a certain amount, that
can cause a license to be suspended, he said.
3:57:01 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether there was a way to determine
how many points and violations "this is likely to be" because it
probably is not a person running a red light.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX, in response to Mr. Skidmore's request for
clarification of her question, asked how many times a person can
commit various infractions and accumulate points before the
person loses their license.
MR. SKIDMORE recommended that a law enforcement officer or
someone from the Division of Motor Vehicles answer her question
because he does not know if there is a single infraction that
would result in a sufficient number of points.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX offered a scenario of a person approaching
the number of points required to have their license suspended in
2017, and then possibly five-years pass with good driving. She
asked whether there was ever a time those accumulated points
were deleted, and the person then started from the beginning.
MR. SKIDMORE said that he does not know the timing on the
accumulation of points.
4:00:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP explained that if a person accumulates more
than 12 points in one-year, they are in a suspended license
status. He offered that when young people get in trouble,
generally they have received one racing ticket by accelerating
from zero mph to 60 mph with another vehicle in a 35-mph zone,
for example, that is racing, and it is 10 points. That person's
next speeding ticket, even if it is in a 4-point range of 10-mph
or less under the limit, that would put the person in a
suspended status. He described that where youth get into
trouble is the vicious cycle of having their first suspension
because it is tough to ever get out of that cycle while trying
to get themselves to school or to their job. He advised that a
person does accrue two to three points a year in order to delete
those points from their record. He remarked that people can go
into suspended license status such that they may have a
traumatic event in their life and miss a payment to their
insurance company and someone runs into their car. It is then
discovered they are in a non-insured status and are officially
suspended and if they are caught driving, that is a misdemeanor.
He commented that many people would look at that circumstance
and ask whether jail was appropriate versus jail being
appropriate for DUI offenders driving after that type of
criminal offense. That is the public policy call being
discussed here, what is appropriate for the various ways a
person can be in a suspended license status, he pointed out.
4:03:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether Representative Kopp's
example of racing would be considered reckless driving.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP answered that reckless driving is considered
an extreme indifference to a standard of safety to themselves or
others, and racing could take place just between two vehicles on
a dark and stormy night with no other people present except the
police officer who saw it take place. That is considered
competitive driving against another vehicle, and reckless
driving is a class A misdemeanor with 10-points on the person's
license, a DUI is 10-points on a person's license.
4:04:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether Amendment 38 deals with
license revocation and driving on a suspended license for people
who have been convicted of a DUI, and whether it also deals with
people who are driving on a suspended license because they
accumulated too many points.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that this amendment deals with both
categories.
4:05:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether there was a way to bifurcate
this amendment and separate section 16 from section 17.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX, in response to Mr. Skidmore, explained
that she would like to impact the license revocation in
connection with the DUI.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that existing law addresses driving with
license suspended for a DUI, it is a crime today and a crime
under the criminal justice reform provisions. The question this
amendment raises is, should the non-DUI suspensions be
criminalized again, which they were prior to criminal justice
reform. He pointed out that there are different penalties here
for the DUI suspension than the penalties that are law today.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX stated that that is what she would like to
address. She said she supports the portion of Amendment 38
dealing with the penalties for driving while license suspended
(DWLS) due to a DUI. She remarked that she does not want to
change the law with respect to the DWLS when the penalty is just
points.
4:07:49 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that the committee is at an interesting place
and asked whether the members want to make this committee a
committee of drafters in which it tries to draft and re-draft
and rewrite every amendment or take Amendment 38 as it was
offered. In the event Amendment 38 is not exactly what the
committee wants, it can vote Amendment 38 down and ask
Legislative Legal and Research Services to draft another
amendment and submit it to the House Finance Committee or on the
floor of the House of Representatives. At some point, he asked,
whether the committee needs to start crafting language on every
amendment which appears to be the habit of the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX responded that the members in this
committee may be crafting language due to the limitation on the
time period for amendments. She pointed out that she believes
in vetting amendments in committee as opposed to on the floor of
the House of Representatives. She explained that she was "just
trying to figure out" whether there was an easy way to reach her
intended goal, although she was unsure whether Amendment 38 had
the votes necessary to be adopted, and it may be a moot point.
4:09:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that Representative LeDoux's
intention is an improvement to Amendment 38, and he supports
that improvement.
CHAIR CLAMAN said he would entertain a conceptual amendment that
essentially removed any language criminalizing a non-DUI
suspension of a driver's license. Amendment 38 would be
conceptually amended to read that it had the penalties for DUI
suspensions reflected in the amendment, but none of the
penalties for non-DUI suspensions. He remarked he was not
offering the conceptual amendment and Legislative Legal and
Research Services would draft the actual language in the bill.
4:11:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 38, of which increases the penalties for driving while
license revoked (DWLS) for a DUI-related crime, and it does not
increase the penalties for DWLS when solely related to points.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS objected.
4:12:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS said that he somewhat echoes Chair
Claman's thoughts, and he was unsure the reason the committee
was in this position was quite what Representative LeDoux had
presented. He explained that if the committee was serious about
these amendments, the amendments could have been circulated far
earlier than the deadline rather than waiting up until the
deadline and "grabbing different parts" of the amendments out
via one, two, or three conceptual amendments. As far as the
amendment process, he remarked that he is inclined to consider
each amendment as presented unless there was a clear-cut issue
to consider, and on those process-based grounds, he opposes the
adoption of Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 38.
4:13:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD stressed that DUIs and DWSL are
important with huge impacts on people and possibly costing the
life of a child. Representative Reinbold then discussed the
amendment process. She asked whether DUI crimes had increased
since the implementation of Senate Bill 91, and whether data was
available as to the risk of people driving under the influence
of marijuana, or any substance.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that the committee was under discussion
and the committee is debating the conceptual amendment. He
advised that she has three-minutes under discussion, and not the
one-minute under questions.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that Chair Claman is on the
Alaska Criminal Judicial Commission and he should know what DUI,
wrecks, increased risk, and casualty data was available.
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Eastman discussed the process
of Amendment 38.]
CHAIR CLAMAN, in response to Representative Reinbold's questions
as to DUIs, explained that Amendment 38 deals with DWLS and not
driving while intoxicated. He commented that he has seen
elderly individuals have their licenses suspended because they
did not sit for their driving test, and referred to a well-
known, elderly woman living in Juneau who, back in the day, had
her license suspended and had to spend 10-days in jail. It is
vital, he stressed, that when the suspension is not related to a
DUI suspension, that those suspensions not be categorized as
criminal violations that can alter a person's life. In terms of
the DUI components, in his view, the existing law adequately
addresses strong penalties, although, he noted, interest had
been voiced in possibly increasing those penalties. Amendment
38 is not the avenue to increase the penalties, and he urged a
no-vote on Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 38.
4:19:41 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX remarked that the fact that Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 38 is taking place now, is not the
fault of anyone. This committee is performing as the House
Judiciary Standing Committee is supposed to perform, by
discussing the amendment. Initially, she remarked, she would
probably would have supported the entire amendment, but after
listening to Representative Kopp's explanation about the points
system, she realized that she did not want to support the entire
amendment. This discussion is about bifurcating the amendment,
she said.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS maintained his objection.
4:21:02 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Kopp, LeDoux,
Eastman, and Reinbold voted in favor of the adoption of
Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 38. Representatives Kreiss-
Tomkins, Fansler, and Claman voted against it. Therefore, the
adoption of Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 38 passed by a
vote of 4-3.
4:21:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP stated that he is not prepared to support
Amendment 38, as amended, until the Department of Law (DOL)
explains the DUI suspensions and penalties under current law.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that under AS 28.15.291, a person charged
with first offense driving with license suspended, cancelled, or
revoked as a result of a DUI is 10-days with 10-days suspended;
a subsequent offense would be 10-days without 10-days suspended,
so 10-days to serve.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP surmised that, under current law, it is a
class A misdemeanor on the first offense, it is arrestable, and
the person must go before a judge. Except, he offered, the
first offense is not a mandatory jail sentence. He asked Mr.
Skidmore whether he had said 10-days suspended.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that a first offense is a minimum of 10-
days with 10-days suspended, meaning probation, but a court
could impose a different penalty for the class A misdemeanor.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether it was possible to receive
jailtime on a first offense.
MR. SKIDMORE answered, "Yes."
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP referred to Representative Reinbold's
earlier question and asked whether, under current law, the DOL
is aware of any increase in drivers driving on revoked licenses
due to DUI-related revocations versus the law prior to Senate
Bill 91.
MR. SKIDMORE stated that he is unaware of any problems in that
regard, but they may be out there someplace. He said that he
has no statistics, he has not heard from law enforcement or
prosecutors that there has been an increase of drivers driving
on revoked licenses as a result of DUI-related revocations.
4:24:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that, under current law, the
penalty is 10-days with 10-days suspended and asked what the
penalty would be under Amendment 38, as amended.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that 10-days with 10-days suspended is the
minimum under current law; under Amended Amendment 38, the
mandatory minimum would be 20-days with 10-days suspended, 10-
days to serve, $500 fine, and 80-hours of community work
service. Although, he reiterated, a court could impose a higher
penalty.
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that, under current law, a second offense
for a DUI suspension would have a mandatory minimum of at least
10-days and the judge could impose a higher penalty.
MR. SKIDMORE answered in the affirmative.
CHAIR CLAMAN further surmised that, under current law, a judge
could impose the exact sentence required under the "old law,"
such that the judge has the discretion to order someone on their
first offense to serve 10-days, $500 fine, and 80-hours of
community work service. Nothing under current law removes the
judge's discretion to impose a higher penalty, he asked.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that Chair Claman was correct, nothing
limits a judge's discretion, this is solely about mandatory
minimums and nothing more.
4:26:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Skidmore how many times people
drive DUI until they are caught, and how many times people are
caught before they are convicted.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that he has no way of knowing how many
times someone may drive under the influence before they are
caught. The statistics reveal that for most people charged with
a DUI, 95-percent are convicted of a DUI. Although, he offered,
infrequently a case could be resolved as a reckless driving or a
different offense, adding that another consideration would be
the number of times people are tried for a DUI and the jury
returned a "not guilty" verdict.
4:28:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked how often judges impose the minimum
penalty.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that in his experience in dealing with
DWLS and DUIs, 95-98 percent of the cases have the mandatory
minimums imposed.
4:29:06 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD offered surprise that Mr. Skidmore did
not have any data as to the risk because DUIs are serious, and
that adding the extra element of drugs, alcohol, or marijuana is
another risk. She referred to the DUI 10-day minimum, and asked
whether earned credit, discretionary parole, and one-third time
for good behavior, is considered.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that this relates to DWLS and not to DUIs
or any alcohol-related offenses.
MR. SKIDMORE expressed that he has no clue as to where he would
start to research the question of how many times a person may
commit a crime before they are caught.
CHAIR CLAMAN said that Representative Reinbold's second question
related to whether there was any probation or parole good time
credit related to a 10-day sentence.
MR. SKIMORE answered that he did not know off the top of his
head how time accounting evaluates those sentences. A provision
in law says that if the person serves more than three-days, they
are eligible for good time, but he did not know how that
provision of law is impacted by a mandatory minimum, and he said
it would take him about 20-30 minutes to review the statutes.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD specifically requested that information.
4:32:20 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that for the same reasons he mentioned
earlier, for the first-time offender having a suspended sentence
without jailtime is reasonable. In the event a person had acted
egregiously, the judge has the discretion to impose a longer
sentence, and existing statute effectively addresses those
concerns. He stated that he does not support Amendment 38, as
amended.
4:32:47 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted the importance of recognizing that
the statutory language of 20-days in jail with 10-days
suspended, actually means a week in jail due to the three-day
credit for good time. He opined that the previous penalty was
appropriate, and by reducing that penalty, the legislature is
not adequately communicating with the public.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
4:34:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked that the committee receive the
information she had requested from Mr. Skidmore prior to voting.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that the committee is voting.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she would be a yes-vote on
Amendment 38, as amended, and asked for the information she had
previously requested.
4:34:28 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Reinbold, LeDoux,
and Eastman voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 38, as
amended. Representatives Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, and
Claman voted against it. Therefore, the adoption of Amendment
38, as amended, failed to be adopted by a vote of 3-4.
4:35:07 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 4:35 p.m. to 4:42 p.m.
4:42:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD related that Mr. Skidmore advised that
good time credit does apply [to a 10-day sentence].
4:42:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 39, Version 30-
LS0461\N.23, Glover/Martin, 10/19/17, which read as follows:
[The text of Amendment 39 is listed at the end of the 10/25/17
minutes of SB 54.]
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
4:42:52 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 39 focuses on
the proper manner in which to deal with inflation as it relates
to theft. This amendment changes the language under Senate Bill
91 and returns it to the language prior to Senate Bill 91, he
advised.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether this amendment reclassifies
the crime of theft in any manner.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN responded that the drafter would have to
answer Representative Kopp's question because he could not
recall discussing that issue with the drafter or seeing that in
the amendment. He explained that that was not his intent for
Amendment 39, and he does not need to reclassify the crime of
theft to accomplish his goal.
4:45:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER referred to Amendment 39, page 2, lines
13-16, and page 3, lines 11-15, and noted that new rules are
placed in the amendment rather than simply rolling back to the
"adjusted for inflation" language.
4:46:19 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that it goes back to the
language that existed previous to Senate Bill 91, which is a
portion of theft in the third degree, and on page 3, it is
simply a class A misdemeanor. He opined that the drafter took
two of his requests and put them into the same amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP pointed out that there has been legal advice
that inflation proofing could be an issue and the bill appears
to do more than that. He said he tends to agree that inflation
proofing, as far as the value one day and then five-years later
changing that value after it has been reassessed, can be
problematic. He asked Representative Eastman whether he has a
separate [amendment], or whether this was an all or nothing
amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN replied that this amendment is what the
drafter was able to provide in a short period of time, and he
did not anticipate that issue being included in this particular
amendment. He said that he does not object to simply removing
that language to make it a straight-forward issue, which is
"simply reverting to the inflation proofing language and
removing that so that it reflects pre-Senate Bill 91 language."
At another time the committee could deal with the $250 amount
going back to pre-Senate Bill 91, he offered.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether Representative Eastman would like a
conceptual amendment deleting everything in Amendment 39 except
the language that specifically removes the inflation adjustment
provisions in current law.
4:49:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN replied that he does not need to be the
person to offer that conceptual amendment now.
4:49:32 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 4:49 p.m. to 4:50 p.m.
4:50:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether she could make a conceptual
amendment motion to bifurcate the two portions of this
amendment. In that manner, the committee could vote on the
value of the property and past offenses, and then the committee
could vote on the inflation proofing issue, thereby, voting on
the two separate issues.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said he would support that conceptual
amendment because that was his goal when speaking with the
drafter and trying to separate out the two issues.
4:51:40 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 4:51 p.m. to 4:54 p.m.
4:54:47 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX moved to adopt Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 39 which would remove all of the language regarding
inflation proofing.
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that Conceptual Amendment 1 would remove
all of the language "adjusted for inflation as provided in AS
11.46.982." In the event Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 39
was adopted, Amendment 39 would have zero impact on the existing
law that inflation proofs this level of offenses, and instead
Amendment 39 would just be looking at the penalty provisions,
and what class of criminal conduct was involved or "violations
of those."
4:55:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER noted that possibly the word "remove" is
the wrong word because Amendment 39 currently removes the words
on page 1, lines 6-7, and throughout Amendment 39. He explained
that it removes "[, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS
11.46.982,]," and Representative LeDoux's conceptual amendment
adds that language back in - take away the removal, and it now
read: "the value of the property or services adjusted for
inflation as provided in AS 11.46.982 is $1,000, or more, but
less than $25,000."
4:56:42 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN commented that Representative Fansler was not being
inconsistent with Representative LeDoux's intent, it was just
the manner in which Amendment 39 was written. He read: "This
statute is amended to read:" and explained that it then gave the
full language of the statute. Thereby, he pointed out,
technically, Representative Fansler is correct because the
"adjusted for inflation as provided in AS 11.46.982" should
remain in the amendment rather than be removed. It is the same
effect of Representative LeDoux's goal of having inflation
proofing ...
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX interjected that her goal is to delete
every reference, so the committee was not voting on inflation
proofing.
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that Representative LeDoux did not want to
change the inflation proofing ...
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX clarified that she does not want to change
current law as it relates to inflation proofing, and hopefully
Legislative Legal and Research Services would understand what
she was trying to accomplish.
CHAIR CLAMAN opined that Legislative Legal and Research Services
will understand her goal, but that he also believes
Representative Fansler is correct. Due to the manner in which
this amendment was written, it would actually include inflation
proofing language rather than remove it. The point of
Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 39 is that inflation
proofing would still be the law if Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 39 was adopted.
4:58:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected to Conceptual Amendment 1 to
Amendment 39.
4:58:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether keeping the language in
the amendment was correct, or whether removing the language was
correct.
MR. SKIDMORE advised that he is not a drafter with Legislative
Legal and Research Services, but both members are trying to say
the exact same thing. Ultimately, he explained, all of the
statutes discussing inflation proofing are removed from the
amendment. The only text in the amendment would be Section 2,
without the inflation proofing, he explained that it is just
adding in the bold and underlined language, and in Section 4,
adding the bold and underlined language. He opined that that is
how the amendment would look.
5:00:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX replied, "That's what I want to do."
CHAIR CLAMAN noted his understanding that Representative LeDoux
likes inflation proofing, and for inflation proofing to be part
of this statute, if amended, to change the penalties.
MR. SKIDMORE confirmed that it is currently part of the statute.
Therefore, he said, Representative LeDoux does not want it as
part of the amendment because she is not trying to change the
statute.
CHAIR CLAMAN argued that the problem is the way this amendment
read, and he paraphrased as follows: "Section is amended to
read:" and it is "not picking language in and out." In the
event the desire is to have inflation proofing part of the
statute, it needs to be in the proposed amended version.
MR. SKIDMORE said that he agrees with Chair Claman and
explained: which is why there is nothing in Section 1, Section
1, as a section, does not need to exist; Section 2, as a
section, does need to exist; Section 3, as a section, does not
need to exist; Section 4, as a section, does need to exist;
Section 5, as a section, does not need to exist; "going through
the others, those don't need to exist." He said that in getting
to Chair Claman's point, "Then, you have to adjust Section 2,
and Section 4, to add back in the language of: 'adjusted for
inflation proofing ...' which is what Representative Fansler was
talking about, and what Representative LeDoux wants to keep."
All of those other sections disappear, and herein lays the
semantics the committee was lost in, he remarked.
CHAIR CLAMAN said he would not argue the point because it is
clear that Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 39 still makes
inflation proofing the law. There should be no confusion and
the committee does not need to determine the proper way to draft
the conceptual amendment because its intent is as clear as day.
5:02:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked for clarification that if a
member wanted inflation proofing in the statute, they would vote
yes on the conceptual amendment.
CHAIR CLAMAN answered that Representative Kreiss-Tomkins was
correct.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection to Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 39.
5:02:06 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Kreiss-Tomkins,
LeDoux, Fansler, Eastman, Kopp, and Claman voted in favor of the
adoption of Conceptual Amendment 1 to Amendment 39.
Representative Reinbold voted against it. Therefore, Conceptual
Amendment 1 to Amendment 39 was adopted by a vote of 6-1.
5:04:01 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that Legislative Legal and
Research Services made a mistake by including inflation proofing
and the $250 theft in the amendment and proposed putting the two
issues into two separate amendments. She asked whether
Amendment 39, as amended, deals solely with theft in the fourth
degree of $250.
MR. SKIDMORE explained the two provisions currently in front of
the committee, AS 11.46.140(a) and AS 11.46.220(c), are actually
recidivist provisions. Those two provisions mean that if a
person had been convicted twice within the last five-years, and
they were facing a third charge, that third charge could be
charged at the higher level of theft in third degree, a class A
misdemeanor rather than a class B misdemeanor, under Sec. 2, AS
11.46.140(a). He advised that AS 11.46.220(c) deals with
concealment of merchandise, and he referred the committee to
Amendment 39, as amended, page 3, lines 11-15, wherein if a
person is convicted twice of that same crime in the preceding
five-years, and was now facing a third charge, the provision
allows it to be prosecuted as a class A misdemeanor rather than
a class B misdemeanor.
5:06:55 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Ms. Dunham how this amendment differs from
the language in SB 54, and its amendments, involving repeated
theft.
MS. DUNHAM noted her understanding that Chair Claman's question
was the difference between Amendment 39, as amended, and the
language in SB 54 currently.
CHAIR CLAMAN answered that she was correct because petty theft
provisions are in SB 54.
MS. DUNHAM explained that the provisions in SB 54 do not change
the theft in the fourth-degree statute, but there are provisions
that do raise the penalties for repeated theft in fourth-degree
crimes. She opined that it was five-days suspended for the
first offense; five-days [to serve] for the second offense; and
10-days [to serve] for the third offense after the person had
previously been convicted for the first and second offenses.
The difference with this provision is that it would add another
way to be convicted of theft in the third degree, such that the
person charged with theft in the fourth degree would actually
get bumped up to theft in the third degree if it was their third
charge, she offered.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked the reasons the Alaska Criminal Judicial
Commission recommended moving away from escalating into class A
misdemeanors and class C felonies for repeat offenses of class B
misdemeanors, to take the approach reflected in SB 54.
MS. DUNHAM responded that this amendment was discussed in some
form at the Alaska Criminal Judicial Commission and in keeping
with its previous findings and research, the commission decided
that people stealing at this level of property theft tended to
be less of threat, they are non-violent offenders, and ideally,
they are people who should be able to rehabilitate without
jailtime. She offered that the commission also heard testimony
from members of the public, the Department of Law (DOL), and the
Department of Public Safety (DPS), that there should be some
sort of escalating penalty provision for those offenders of
theft in the fourth-degree, but possibly not something that
rises to the level of a class A misdemeanor as opposed to the
class B misdemeanor.
5:11:36 PM
MS. DiPETRO, in response to Chair Claman, advised that she had
nothing to add to Ms. Dunham's informative response.
5:11:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX requested a description of concealment of
merchandise as opposed to theft.
MS. DUNHAM offered an example of a person in Walmart who put a
small item in their coat and were caught with that item before
leaving the store, technically that is not theft, it is
concealment of merchandise.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX referred to Amendment 39, as amended, and
asked why concealment is a felony, and when the property is
stolen that it is a misdemeanor theft.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that both actions are class A
misdemeanors. The distinction between theft and concealment of
merchandise is if the person actually takes the property and
leaves the store versus merely concealing the property while in
the store. Theft in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor,
and the concealment of merchandise statute begins by talking
about a class C felony, and then it lists a value. He then
pointed to Amendment 39, as amended, page 3, line 6, and read as
follows: "a class A misdemeanor if" so, it would be a class A
misdemeanor under those circumstances.
5:14:26 PM
[Chair Claman and Representative Reinbold discussed time
limits.]
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Dunham "Where does the buck
stop," whether it stops with the commission or with the
legislators because retailers are frustrated due to the
provision of $250 for theft. She further asked why the
commission recommended no jailtime and left it as a violation
with little suspended time.
[CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative Reinbold that the committee
prefers to use more civil terms and less inflammatory language.
MS. DUNHAM commented she could only speak to the intention
behind a limited jail sentence for low-level crimes, such as
theft in the fourth degree. The intention, she explained, is
that for many of these low-level offenders, by putting them in
jail it would more likely cause them to commit more crimes upon
their release. The intention was to avoid that increase in
recidivism and avoid creating more victims in the future. That
being said, she stressed that these provisions were never
intended to have no consequences as there is nothing in the
commission's recommendations, or in Senate Bill 91, or in SB 54
that would in any manner limit the investigation of theft crimes
or the prosecution of theft crimes.
5:17:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD described that currently it is basically
a catch and release system, and many people that steal have
major drug issues, which can end in violence. She argued that
theft can turn violent and putting these people in jail offers
retailers a reprieve, it offers law enforcement the feeling of
success, and it increases safety in the department stores. She
re-asked where the buck stops, and whether the governor stands
behind the commission's initial recommendations.
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Reinbold discussed Ms. Dunham
answer as to where the buck stops.]
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Ms. Dunham whether her answer would change to
the question Representative Reinbold asked, and from the answer
Ms. Dunham previously offered.
MS. DUNHAM responded that her answer would not change and
pointed out that she is the project attorney for the commission
and she could not speak for its members.
5:20:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP commented that the Amendment 39, as amended,
re-introduces a recidivist provision into the law which is
basically a look-back of five-years, and explained that SB 54
includes the same for class A misdemeanors. The discussion is
with regard to the value of the property being less than $250,
and a person being convicted for two or more misdemeanors within
five-years. Under current law, class B misdemeanants can serve
up to 10-days, and under SB 54, the same person can serve up to
10-days. In other words, he explained, in order to qualify for
the class A misdemeanor of "theft here, under theft third," a
person must have been convicted twice to earn their right to a
class A misdemeanor where they then could be sentenced up to 90-
days for this type of offense. The look-back provision is a
value tool, he described, because a person has to work to earn
that class A misdemeanor in that they reoffended two or more
times within five-years. The language of SB 54 is similar
because it has a recidivist provision, and class B misdemeanors
do have a range of zero to 10-days; therefore, there is not a
lot of difference in how the law would be applied in its working
practice. Except, he reiterated, the amendment ensures that a
person with this behavior would ultimately receive a class A
misdemeanor if convicted of this offense two or more times
within five-years, but the application of the law is similar to
SB 54, he said.
5:23:33 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether this goes back to pre-
Senate Bill 91.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP opined that he recalls the law having a
look-back provision, but he was unsure.
5:24:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that he had heard from the
public and law enforcement that it is good to have rungs on a
ladder and slowly walk up to stiffer and stiffer penalties.
Although, he said, the offender will never climb the ladder even
though they are still engaged in criminal behavior if there are
no resources, no incentive, and no priority to sentence on the
first rung on the ladder, something less than $250. Amendment
39, as amended, is part of a larger effort to ensure that when
there is repeat criminal behavior, it results in a sentence.
Thereby, explained, giving the offender an opportunity to at
least be on that progressive ladder.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
5:25:33 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Eastman, Reinbold,
Kopp, and LeDoux voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 39,
as amended. Representatives Fansler, Kreiss-Tomkins, and Claman
voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 39, as amended, was
adopted by a vote of 4-3.
5:26:17 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN recessed the House Judiciary Standing Committee
until 7:15 p.m.
7:37:53 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting back to order at 7:37 p.m. Representatives Claman,
Fansler, Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, LeDoux, Reinbold, and Eastman
were present at the call to order.
CHAIR CLAMAN turned the committee to Amendment 40.
7:38:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN advised that because Amendment 40 is
similar to a previously discussed amendment, he would withdraw
Amendment 40.
7:39:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 41, Version 30-
LS0461\N.25, Glover/Martin, 10/19/17 which read as follows: [The
text of Amendment 41 is listed at the end of the 10/25/17
minutes of SB 54.]
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
7:39:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 41 removes
certain post-Senate Bill 91 provisions for discretionary parole
and reverts back to the law prior to the passage of Senate Bill
91.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that, for purposes of this particular
amendment, the committee previously adopted an amendment that
essentially did away with administrative parole. He offered his
presumption that if this amendment were to be adopted,
references to administrative parole would be removed as a matter
of drafting, and it would not require a conceptual amendment.
7:40:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Skidmore to describe the pre-
Senate Bill 91 statutes and the post-Senate Bill 91 statutes
regarding discretionary parole.
MR. SKIDMORE deferred to Jeff Edwards, Director of the Parole
Board.
7:41:05 PM
JEFF EDWARDS, Director, Alaska Board of Parole, Department of
Corrections, responded that Amendment 41 removes the geriatric
parole provisions and removes parole eligibility for a certain
class of offenders enacted under Senate Bill 91. Prior to the
enactment of Senate Bill 91, most sex offenders were not
eligible for discretionary parole and the amendment falls in
line with that theory. He referred to Amendment 41, AS
33.16.210(a), Sec. 23, page 4, lines 27-31 and page 5, line 1,
early termination for parole supervision, and advised that
Senate Bill 91 mandated that offenders on parole for one-year
were eligible for early termination, and Amendment 41 changes
that to two-years. Senate Bill 91 generally mandated that most
everyone sentenced to 181-days, or longer, would be eligible to
apply for discretionary parole, and the amendment somewhat
limits that provision, he offered.
7:43:04 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD described discretionary parole as a new
type of parole added to Senate Bill 91, and asked Mr. Edwards to
explain discretionary parole.
CHAIR CLAMAN explained to Representative Reinbold that
discretionary parole was not a new concept in Senate Bill 91.
MR. EDWARDS answered that discretionary parole has been around
for quite some time. Once inmates become eligible,
discretionary parole is an avenue for inmates to present their
case before the Alaska Board of Parole for early release. There
are some legal and technical provisions that make folks eligible
or not eligible, he explained, in order to give inmates an
opportunity to seek early release from incarceration via a
transitional program or via electronic monitoring/crisis
recovery centers (CRC). He explained that it is an interview-
based process for an inmate to ask for early release.
7:44:19 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD requested a description of discretionary
parole for sex offenders under Senate Bill 91.
CHAIR CLAMAN rephrased the question and asked Mr. Edwards to
explain whether there was a change to the provisions for
discretionary parole for sex offenders prior to, and after the
enactment of Senate Bill 91.
MR. EDWARDS responded that it did change through Senate Bill 91
by expanding eligibility for a certain class of sex offenses.
Currently, he advised, unclassified sex offenses and class A
felony sex offenses are not eligible for early release on
discretionary parole. He further advised that current law
expanded eligibility for class C felonies and class B felonies
for sex offenses by becoming "eligible by one-half," wherein
inmates would have to serve one-half of their sentence before
becoming eligible for parole.
7:45:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that Senate Bill 91 expanded
the eligibility for sex offenders for early release. She asked
Mr. Edwards to describe geriatric parole prior to current law,
and whether the actions of Amendment 41 take the law back to the
exact law prior to Senate Bill 91.
MR. EDWARDS advised that Sec. 18 through Sec. 21 of Amendment 41
were non-existent prior to Senate Bill 91 because there were no
provisions for geriatric parole. Geriatric parole was created
under Senate Bill 91, and it essentially allows for, and
targeted, elderly inmates who were aging out of the system and
becoming increasing expensive to house in a hard bed due to
their age and the medical conditions that go along with aging.
He referred to Amendment 41, Sec. 18, AS 33.16.090(a)(2), page
1, lines 18-21, which read as follows:
(2) IS AT LEAST 60 YEARS OF AGE, HAS SERVED
AT LEAST 10 YEARS OF A SENTENCE FOR ONE OR MORE CRIMES
IN A SINGLE JUDGMENT, AND HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY OR A SEXUAL FELONY AS DEFINED IN
AS 12.55.185].
MR. EDWARDS pointed out that the provision read that the inmate
must have actually served 10 years of their sentence, and the
provision eliminated unclassified felonies or a sexual felony on
sex offences. The parole board attempted to locate this
category of inmate within the institutions of the Department of
Corrections (DOC) and it did not find many inmates, although, it
is believed that some inmates may qualify under this provision
in the future.
7:47:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to Amendment 41, page 2,
regarding one-fourth time, and requested a description of
discretionary parole under that provision.
[MR. EDWARDS was suddenly disconnected from the telephonic
connection.]
7:48:08 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 7:48 p.m. to 7:55 p.m.
7:55:18 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to Amendment 41, AS 33.16.090(b)(4), page
2, lines 23-25, and asked that Mr. Edwards explain how this
provision applies if Amendment 41 is adopted, and how a similar
situation is treated under current law.
MR. EDWARDS explained that under current law, all class A
felonies, class B felonies, and class C felonies are eligible
for discretionary parole at one-fourth; the inmate must serve
one-fourth of their sentence whether it is their first, second,
or third time felony. He explained that inmates must serve one-
fourth of their sentence before they can apply for discretionary
parole, or that early release provision he previously discussed,
which is expansive of pre-Senate Bill 91 eligibility. Prior to
Senate Bill 91, eligibility for discretionary parole was narrow
in scope, and for the most part, it only afforded first-time and
potentially second-time felons eligibility. Under current law,
the provision was expanded to include class A [felonies], and
whether it is a third-time and fourth-time felony does not
matter, they would be eligible to apply at one-fourth of their
sentence.
7:57:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Edwards to repeat how this
expands to class A felony, class B felony, and class C felony,
no matter how many convictions an inmate served.
MR. EDWARDS explained that her repeated information is accurate
because people sentenced under class A felonies, class B
felonies, class C felonies, are eligible for discretionary
parole at one-fourth of their sentence. Mr. Edwards used the
example that the presumptive sentencing range for a second-time
class A felony is eight to twelve years, and say a person
received an eight-year sentence, that inmate would be eligible
to apply for early release after two-years. He pointed out that
that provision does not, in any manner, obligate the parole
board to release the inmate after two-years, it solely obligates
the parole board to conduct a hearing for early release.
7:58:32 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD requested a few example of class A
felonies and class B felonies.
CHAIR CLAMAN reminded Representative Reinbold that his office
distributed a five-page DOL handout depicting class C felonies,
which was much discussed in this committee. He asked Mr.
Skidmore to described three class A felonies and three class B
felonies.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that class A felonies include: assault in
the first degree, manslaughter, arson in the first degree; and
class B felonies include: assault in the second degree, theft in
the first degree, and burglary.
8:00:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that as to a class A felony,
class B felony, and class C felony, people can offend multiple
times, serve only one-fourth of their sentence, and be eligible
for discretionary parole. She asked whether that was at the
discretion of the three members of the parole board.
MR. EDWARDS clarified that the parole board is made up of five
members representing various geographical regions around the
state, and its members are appointed by the governor. These
five members are tasked with reviewing each of the cases,
reading all of the documentation and materials, conducting "as
best we can" a face-to-face interview which oftentimes includes
the victims and their families, and the inmate, and the decision
is made.
8:01:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD described that a class C felony was
horrible with no prior convictions and no jailtime, and now with
the discretionary parole and the five-member board, that answers
why crime is out of control. This provision is damaging to
public safety, demoralizing to law enforcement, and a slap in
the face to judges when a parole board can overrule a judge.
She then continued her description of Senate Bill 91.
[CHAIR CLAMAN admonished Representative Reinbold to choose more
respectful words in her questions and statements.]
8:03:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked Mr. Skidmore whether sexual
predators are eligible for discretionary parole under Senate
Bill 91.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked that Mr. Skidmore answer that question as to
Senate Bill 91 as amended by proposed SB 54, because issues
regarding sex offenders were added to SB 54. He asked that Mr.
Skidmore combine those two because the debate is whether to
amend SB 54, which does change some of the issues regarding sex
offenders and eligibility for parole.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked that Mr. Skidmore answer her
question as to Senate Bill 91 as it now stands, and under SB 54
assuming it is passed.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that Senate Bill 91 expanded eligibility
for parole to only class C felony level sex offenses; not to the
class A felonies or unclassified felonies. Senate Bill 54
addresses the frequency of parole hearings and it does not
change the crimes under which an inmate is eligible for parole.
Amendment 41 changes the law back to where it was prior to
Senate Bill 91 because the statutes found in the amendment are
an exact reversal of those statutes under Senate Bill 91.
8:05:39 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked exactly what type of conduct arises
to a class B felony or class C felony sex crime.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that he will focus on sexual assault and
sexual abuse of a minor because they are in degrees: sexual
assault in the second degree is a class B felony, and there are
multiple subsections: engaging in sexual contact without consent
as opposed to penetration is sexual assault in the second degree
versus the first degree; and there a number of different
provisions that talk about different relationships with folks,
but that is the primary example for a class B felony. Sexual
assault in the third degree is classified as a class C felony,
it is sexual contact when the offender knows the victim is
mentally incapable, incapacitated, or unaware the sex act is
being committed. Also, he said, the types of offenses
classified as a class C felony for sexual assault are as
follows: when the offender is employed at a state correctional
facility and engages in penetration with someone in the custody
of the Department of Corrections (DOC); subsection (3) talks
about engaging in sexual penetration with someone 18 or 19 years
of age in the custody of the Department of Health and Social
Services (DHSS); and a legal guardian dealing with juveniles.
8:08:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she was beginning to get
the picture of the sorts of things classified under Senate Bill
91 as class B and class C felonies, in which people are eligible
for discretionary parole. She asked whether, under Amendment
41, those people would no longer be eligible for discretionary
parole.
MR. SKIMORE deferred to Mr. Edwards.
MR. EDWARDS referred to Amendment 41, Sec. 19, page 3, lines 21-
27, and advised that it removes that provision for eligible sex
offenders.
8:10:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX related that she is attempting to
determine whether currently, under geriatric parole, it is just
about anything except an unclassified felony or a sexual felony
as defined under AS 12.55.180(5). She asked whether that
includes all sexual crimes or just certain sexual felonies.
MR. EDWARDS opined that he believes it does apply to all sex
offenders.
CHAIR CLAMAN referenced AS 12.55.185(16), and paraphrased as
follows:
(16) "sexual felony" means sexual assault in the first
degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree,
sex trafficking in the first degree, sexual assault in
the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the
second degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor,
distribution of child pornography, sexual assault in
the third degree, incest, indecent exposure in the
first degree, possession of child pornography, online
enticement of a minor, and felony attempt, conspiracy,
or solicitation to commit those crimes.
8:12:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX, after noting that information, asked Mr.
Skidmore what other sexual crimes are out there.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that sexual abuse of a minor in the third
degree is not included in this definition of a sexual felony,
and it is a class C felony.
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked what conduct is considered sexual
abuse of a minor.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that, according to the chart disbursed
amongst the members, it is sexual touching.
MR. SKIDMORE referred to AS 11.41.423 and advised that it deals
with an individual who is 17 years of age, or older, and they
engage in sexual contact with a person 13, 14, or 15 years of
age when there is at least a four-year age difference between
the two individuals.
8:14:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP referred to the practice of parole prior to
Senate Bill 91 and asked when an offender for a class C felony
sexual abuse of a minor, who met the elements of Mr. Skidmore's
description, would become eligible to be heard before the parole
board.
MR. EDWARDS replied that in most instances, the parole board
would not have heard that case, and he would have to perform a
comparable analysis on those pre-Senate Bill 91 sentencing
structures. He reiterated that many of those inmates were not
eligible due to their class of felony and stressed that to
comment on that would be in error because the parole board did
not hear those sex offense cases.
8:16:02 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP surmised that, broadly speaking, the inmate
was not eligible for parole if it was a felony sex offense.
MR. EDWARDS answered in the affirmative.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP noted that under Senate Bill 91, there is a
new provision allowing a parole board to conduct a hearing on
such a case. He asked whether there had been any examples of a
sex offender reoffending on the public as a result of the parole
board's action in releasing an inmate under this new law.
MR. EDWARDS advised that he could not recite a specific case,
and to keep in mind that these changes began on January 1, 2017.
Many of these class B felonies will receive sentence ranges in
excess of years and years, and the parole board has not yet seen
or interviewed this class of felony. He clarified his previous
statement and explained that the parole board has convened sex
offense cases, but not on the specific sex offense.
He explained that if an inmate had multiple cases for which they
were serving incarceration time, the board may be interviewing a
sex offender, but the inmate was not interviewed by the parole
board on the sex offense case. He further explained that if
there was a sex abuse of a minor case plus a robbery case, those
become consecutive cases and the inmate would have to serve out
their first sentence on the sex offense, and then the parole
board would see them on the robbery case. Therefore, there are
cases where the parole board would see sex offenders, but they
were not eligible on the sex offense cases. It gets confusing,
but this becomes a time accounting calculation where certain
groups become eligible. Under Senate Bill 91, the parole board
expects to see more specific stand-alone sex felonies,
particularly class B felonies and class C felonies, when inmates
become eligible after serving one-half of their sentence, he
said.
8:18:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP surmised that inmates have to serve one-half
of their sentence, and he thought inmates had to serve one-
fourth of their sentence.
MR. EDWARDS explained that class B and class C sex offense
specific felonies are eligible at one-half of their sentence,
and the eligibility for one-fourth of an inmate's sentence are
for non-sex felony cases.
8:18:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP thanked Mr. Edwards for the clarification
and noted that this law has been in effect just short of 10
months. He surmised that Mr. Edwards could not point to an
instance where someone who had served one-half of their
sentence, was granted parole, and then re-offended on the
public.
MR. EDWARDS verified that he could not recall any specific case
meeting those requirements.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP pointed out that the committee just learned
that an inmate must serve one-half of their sentence before they
are eligible for a parole hearing under discretionary parole.
He asked Mr. Skidmore whether the Department of Law (DOL) is
aware of any case wherein the parole board granted this parole
and it resulted in a re-offense on a member of the public as a
result of the enactment of this law.
MR. SKIMORE responded that he is not aware of any case meeting
Representative Kopp's criteria.
8:20:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP asked whether Mr. Skidmore was familiar with
a case approximately four years ago wherein a 19-year old man
returned from Afghanistan and had sexual relations with his
girlfriend who, unbeknownst to him, was 15-years old. She
became pregnant at 16 years of age, and his defense was that he
thought she was 17 years of age. He went to prison "under this"
and he is now a registered sex offender. In the event this
young man came up for parole, under current law, how many years
would he have to serve after his conviction of having sex with a
15-year old girl when 19 years of age. He asked Mr. Skimore
what the range of the sentence would be, and the length of the
sentence he would have to serve under those circumstances.
MR. SKIMORE answered that he was not familiar with this
Fairbanks case and that answering the hypothetical requires
looking at a number of different factors. Plus, he related that
he did not know the presumptive range off the top of his head,
which is where he would have to start. In the event the
discussion is about someone convicted of a class B felony or
class C felony sex offense, under current law, they would have
to serve at least one-half of their sentence before they could
even be considered for parole. He stressed that being eligible
for consideration of parole is not the same as being released on
parole, and just because an inmate is eligible for the hearing
does not mean the parole board would determine that the inmate
could be released at that time. The DOL prosecutors are almost
never involved in parole hearings, he advised.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP advised that he was reviewing the law and
trying to think of a case that would apply in that situation to
determine how long someone would be incarcerated before they
were eligible for even their first hearing.
8:23:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Mr. Edwards how comprehensive the
information was that the parole board would receive when someone
had gone through the parole board process, was granted parole,
and then charged with another offense. He asked whether Mr.
Edwards was confident he would receive that information, and how
quickly he would receive that information.
MR. EDWARDS answered that in the event an individual violates
their discretionary parole under Representative Eastman's
example, the parole board would be notified and tasked with
handling a violation hearing. In that violation hearing, the
parole board would go through the process and determine whether
guilt or innocence was involved, and in the event, there was a
finding of guilty, it would impose a sanction. He stated that
the [violations hearing] happens quickly, and the parole board
would be notified almost immediately via the violation process.
8:25:41 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked Mr. Skidmore to speak to the
discretion that exists at sentencing (indisc.) discretionary
parole under current law.
MR. SKIDMORE noted that Representative Kreiss-Tomkins referenced
a judge's discretion to limit discretionary parole when the
court imposes a sentence and answered that judges do have the
ability to limit discretionary parole, but there are certain
findings judges must make to limit discretionary parole.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that the statute is AS 12.55.115.
8:27:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER opined that the idea of discretionary
parole after one-fourth of a sentence had been served was not
revolutionary because it was already being applied in some
cases, and Senate Bill 91 expanded discretionary parole to
repeat offenders.
MR. EDWARDS advised that Representative Fansler was correct, the
percentages may have changed slightly, but the concept is the
same.
8:28:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER referred to Amendment 41, and asked
Commissioner Williams whether rolling back discretionary parole
would potentially have massive fiscal consequences, and whether
any numbers were available on that issue.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that certain assumptions were
made on the DOC's budget, money has already been taken out, and
there are fiscal impacts. He related that it is difficult to
know exactly what that looks like, because not much time has
passed in order to determine what the new change to the law has
accomplished. As Mr. Edwards pointed out, some of these cases
have not come up yet so it is hard to gage, but it is safe to
say without a doubt, he stressed, that there will be a fiscal
impact on the department if any of these provisions are rolled
back.
8:30:04 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that Amendment 41 would do away with the
geriatric parole and asked what the potential savings is with
geriatric parole moving forward.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS related that he was unaware whether there
had been any cases yet with regard to geriatric parole, but the
thought around those elderly people who committed a crime early
in their life, represent little risk toward the end of their
senior years. Certain inmates have high costs associated with
them, and the hope was for the discretion to move some of these
folks out of the prison system. Those elderly inmates will not
necessarily be released from prison, he stressed, it simply
allows the parole board the discretion to consider them because
some of these inmates cost the state a great deal of money
toward the end of their years. The legislature wants to use the
state's dollars wisely and if someone represents little risk, of
which the parole board analyzes, that is the goal of the new
law.
8:31:26 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked about the costs associated with people on
dialysis, and how much money the DOC would save by finding a
different place to hold those people.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS offered the example of a person who the
DOC just moved out-of-state, who is serving a long sentence and
is a dialysis patient. The DOC is currently saving $35,000 per
month on one patient, and there are several patients, he
advised. The $35,000 amount is real money and it goes into
being almost $500,000 for one patient. He offered that the
State of Colorado took one patient and the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) took another patient, and some of those folks
can be traded out to other states due to the high health care
costs in this state.
8:32:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether geriatric parole had
been implemented in other states, and if so, what was their
record of accomplishment, and whether any re-offenses had
occurred by someone released under geriatric parole.
8:33:36 PM
SUSANNE DiPETRO, Executive Director, Alaska Judicial Council,
Alaska Court System, responded that she could not cite off the
top of her head which other states have geriatric parole, but
there certainly are other states. As to the underlying idea of
geriatric parole, statistics have shown that people age out of
criminal behavior, and few people beyond the age of 50 or 55
continue to engage in criminal behavior because almost everyone
desists at that point. Therefore, as these prisoners age their
medical costs, paid by the state, typically increase, and these
inmates are typically low-risk to the public due to their
advanced age, she noted. She explained that geriatric parole is
the mechanism by which these inmates can be considered, and the
parole board can determine whether the public would be safe with
their release. She then deferred to Mr. Edwards.
MR. EDWARDS added that numerous states certainly have this
mechanism for release targeting the aging population and that
many states describe the release as compassionate release.
8:35:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to the fiscal impact when
dealing with whether to reverse the expanded discretionary
parole under Senate Bill 91 and asked the sort of fiscal impact
there would be in the instances where an inmate is not released.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN, in response to Commissioner Williams,
re-asked whether there is a fiscal impact "if we are reducing
the number of parole hearings that are being conducted for that
population of inmates that is not released at that particular
hearing, but maybe in the future they would be, but for that
hearing, they are not.?"
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS opined that if his question is that the
DOC is saving money by not having as many parole hearings, he
supposed there would potentially be a little bit of savings if
that was the basis of Representative Eastman's question.
8:37:28 PM
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS, in response to Representative LeDoux,
answered that he is almost 60 years of age, and he does not
consider himself "very elderly."
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX pointed out that Commissioner Williams had
said geriatric parole was used for "very elderly prisoners"
aging out of the system and said she does not consider the
cutoff point of 60 years of age as "very elderly."
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX pointed out that people say "60 is the new
40" so the idea of geriatric parole is supposed to be for those
people who have one foot in the grave and another foot on a
banana peel. Some people may consider 60 years of age to be
old, but it is not for a great number of people, and she asked
whether she was correct.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS offered that he understands Representative
LeDoux's point, but some 60-year-old people are far more elderly
than their stated age due to health issues. The idea is
discretion, and he would like the parole board to have the
discretion to consider the facts because he sees the cost
drivers of these individuals who represent little risk to the
public, he said.
8:40:42 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX pointed out that the language in Senate
Bill 91 does not talk about people with significant health
issues, but rather, anyone over the age of 60 years can be
considered. She referred to the savings of an inmate on
dialysis being released from prison and argued that if they are
released from prison they will probably be on welfare and
Medicaid. She commented that while it may be a savings to the
Department of Corrections, it is not necessarily a savings to
the state.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS noted that there could be some debate
about whether a person believes Medicaid is a savings to the
state and how much of a savings, but certainly if that person is
in prison versus being out of prison, it is a direct cost to the
state and the DOC is picking up every dime. As to someone being
on Medicaid, he commented that everyone pays taxes and the
reality is that if they are Medicaid eligible it is absolutely
saving money in the state's budgets. He agreed that it is
costing someone somewhere, but in terms of saving the state
actual dollars, having people on Medicaid outside of the
institutions, even in half-way houses, saves the state money.
8:42:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she was under the
impression that when Medicaid was expanded, it would pick up
some of the costs of the inmates in prison.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS explained that the state does receive some
Medicaid benefit when someone is in the hospital beyond 24
hours. Prior to the Medicaid expansion, the department paid for
all hospital stays, and now the department saves a great deal of
money when those individuals are admitted for longer than 24-
hours, he explained.
8:43:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the DOC had implemented
regulations for Senate Bill 91.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS advised that he knows the department is
issuing regulations on probation conditions, and he was unsure
where the regulations were exactly, but the department issues
regulations on a regular basis.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to the "Regulatory Impact
Transparency Act passed in 2014" and advised that regulations
are supposed "to do the impact of the private sector," and
advised she will be looking carefully at those impacts to the
private sector. Medical costs are involved for victims and the
victims' families and those impacts need to be put into the
regulations written for Senate Bill 91. She related that the
committee is making uninformed decisions today, and "we have one
parole board person on there that is not recalling something ...
he can't recall anybody that's been released." She added that
the committee must make decisions relying on one political
appointment by the governor, "who loves this Senate Bill 91 for
the most part."
8:46:52 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked who would be held accountable.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS advised that the parole board is an
infinite parole board and he does not control its discretion,
its members are appointed by the governor, and the parole board
is tasked with an assignment based upon the law.
8:47:18 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP opined that his former boss, Chief of Police
Dan Morris, recently rotated off of the parole board and he
described Chief Morris as the epitome of a "tough on crime guy."
He asked whether Commissioner Williams could recall an incident
that the parole board came under fire for an action it made, and
whether the Alaska Board of Parole is dropping the ball.
Representative Kopp commented that usually the governor comes
under fire for a parole board's action when releasing an inmate.
He reiterated his questions as to whether the parole board had
dropped the ball and criminals were running loose and creating
mayhem due to the parole board's bad decisions, and whether
Commissioner Williams was aware of any incidents.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded, "No, I'm not." He then
stressed that the parole board is probably the most risk adverse
group of individuals he has ever met. Wherein, he has seen
inmates at their end of life phase that were not allowed out of
jail on parole. To be frank, the parole board is so risk
adverse that he has tried to remind it to review how the
statutes are interpreted to determine whether there could be any
way the inmates in the last two to three months of their life
could be released from prison versus the department assuming all
hospice care. He reiterated that the parole board is an adverse
risk group, it is professional, it provides full reports, and
Mr. Edwards is an excellent director. The parole board manages
a high work load and that is probably why he could not recall
one incident that had occurred, certainly not during his tenure,
he remarked.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP pointed out that Commissioner Williams
addressed the heart of this committee's questions.
8:50:10 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Ms. DiPetro to compare Amendment 41 and the
criminal justice reform discretionary parole package that is
part of the criminal justice reform bills. He asked her to
explain the real issues Amendment 41 presents in terms of costs
to the Department of Corrections (DOC), being smart on spending,
and continuing to be tough on crime.
MS. DiPETRO explained that she is trying to follow the
amendments remotely and noted that she had previously spoken to
the provision regarding geriatric parole. The idea around
geriatric parole or compassionate release is that,
statistically, once a person reaches the age of 50 or 55 years
of age, they tend to desist with their criminal behavior and age
out of their criminal behavior no matter their health issues.
Sometimes, she offered, people get excited about the word
"geriatric" and she does not look at geriatric parole as people
being old, but actually aging out of their criminal activity.
8:53:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Commissioner Williams whether he
was familiar with Jerry Active killing two people and raping a
baby on the same day he was released.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that he was loosely familiar with
the case, but he did not have the facts.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD reiterated cases she previously
described wherein the offender had a previous history. She
advised that this state spends the highest amount of money per
capita and possibly some of the money is not properly
prioritized. This parole" is deceptive because an inmate will
only serve one-third of their sentence, and discretionary parole
and geriatric parole broadens parole to sex offenders. She
asked how the public is protected when sex offenders, with
multiple offenses, can get out on discretionary parole.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS responded that he did not know where to
begin because Representative Reinbold had made certain
suppositions to which he did not agree. As to "this reference
to this parole board," he offered his belief that the parole
board having discretion is a good thing, and he is, of course,
concerned about safety. Unfortunately, no one can do anything
about the terrible victimization that has occurred in the past,
but as commissioner, he related that he is trying to dedicate
the DOC to do something about the recidivism re-offense rate,
"which is terrible in this state, and which has become a
priority of mine." Commissioner Williams stressed that he is
very concerned about public safety as the commissioner,
especially when the recidivism rate is 65-70 percent every year.
Putting the right people in jail and getting the right people
jobs with a place to live is certainly a safety issue because a
good portion of crimes are committed by the people who are
released from prison.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS said that he disagrees with Representative
Reinbold's supposition that discretionary parole is not a public
safety minded issue. Of course it is, he expressed, because
many types of conditions are put the parolee and they are not
free to do whatever they like when granted parole. First of
all, he explained, an inmate is not granted parole simply
because they are granted a hearing, and secondly, there are
tremendous conditions placed upon people to be certain they are
getting a job and finding a place to live. Unless the state
intends to build more and more prisons, he remarked, having some
of these tools is absolutely critical for public safety.
8:57:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD argued that for many criminals, their
job is thievery and the DOC is releasing them to create havoc
multiple times a day on Alaska's businesses. This bill deals
with discretionary parole and victims, and businesses want to
know who to hold accountable for bad judgment. She described
recidivism as criminals who commit a crime 100,000 times, and as
long as they stay under $250, they can continue stealing, that's
recidivism.
CHAIR CLAMAN opined that Representative Reinbold's question was
"who can the public hold accountable?"
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS answered that he supposed any number of
people could be held accountable in these departments, the
governor appoints the parole board and hold the parole board
accountable. Except, he reiterated, this parole board is a
professional organization with a history of good decisions and
he has not seen "an obvious clunker come from them." Although,
he said, it is possible it may make a mistake, the reality is
that it is a studied good process and a necessary process. In
the event parole was unavailable, serious consequences would
evolve into building another prison to house those inmates not
released on parole. These stated issues are directly related to
public safety because once a person is released with absolutely
no controls over them, public safety would not be provided, he
argued.
8:59:40 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER pointed out that during this meeting, in
some cases, the same questions have been asked multiple times,
and he asked that those answers be skipped because the committee
had spent 1.5 hours on one amendment. The accountability
questions have now been answered at least three or four times,
so he is good on that answer. He then turned to Mr. Edwards
noting that there are more parole hearings under Senate Bill 91
and offered concern about the rates. He asked whether there is
a greater tendency by the parole board to suddenly be more
lenient and whether the rates were moving up, or whether,
statistically, the rates are remaining the same for the granting
of parole.
MR. EDWARDS responded that the parole board's rates are fairly
steady and advised that the hearings have increased 147 percent
with the parole board's granting of parole percentages remaining
steady. Mr. Edwards stated, for the record, that as to the
parole board's recidivism rates, once the board decides to
release someone on discretionary parole, its rates are in the
southern end of 5 percent.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Mr. Edward to repeat his last statement.
MR. EDWARDS reiterated that for discretionary release, the
parole board's recidivism rate is, ballpark number, at the
southern end of 5 percent. The process is selective, and he
stressed that simply because an inmate is eligibly heard by the
parole board, that does not mean the inmate is released. The
parole board is aware that certain inmates belong in prison, and
its members take their decisions seriously through an exhaustive
review from the inmate's birth until the time of the hearing.
Recently, he advised, a legislative audit determined the parole
board to be "very positive" as to the extensive tasks it
performs which is all inclusive with the victims, public safety,
prosecutors, and judges in its process. The parole board is not
concerned with the rising number of hearings, and he reiterated
that its recidivism rate remains steady while its release rate
remains steady.
9:02:52 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS stated a point of order. He
advised that he feels uncomfortable with aggressive questions
directed toward the witnesses and testifiers that do not contain
question marks, or even rhetorical question marks. Especially,
he stressed, if the committee is spending this amount of time on
a single amendment and, from his perspective, devolving into
exchanges with testifiers and experts that are not respectful.
He stated, "I feel compelled to call the question because it
doesn't seem as though this committee is conducting itself with
the decorum that I would have expected it." As to the process,
he said that he does not want to call the question, but he will
in the future if it appears as though that "is all we have left
to ask." Representative Kreiss-Tomkins reiterated that he is
not calling the question at this point, but that he wanted to
share his thoughts with the committee.
CHAIR CLAMAN ruled that the point of order was well taken and
agreed that the committee is debating the bill by asking
questions of people available to provide information. In the
event the committee cannot stay focused on the matters that
require answers, it would be appropriate for someone to call the
question, he advised.
9:04:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP expressed that the case of geriatric parole
had been highlighted as an example of the system running amuck.
He stressed that State v. Jerry Active, [3DI-09-00031 CR, 2009]
was prior to the passage of Senate Bill 91, and it had nothing
to do with the parole board.
MR. EDWARDS answered that he could not remember the specifics of
the case.
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP stated, for the record, that he wanted to
highlight that not a single case in recent memory could be
identified wherein the Alaska Board of Parole had dropped the
ball and put the public's safety at risk. He expressed that,
"It is very wrong to insinuate otherwise, and it inflames public
passion, and we want to talk about what is in the public safety
interests, not about anything else."
9:06:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted his expectation that if a person
violated their conditions of release they would "probably end up
right back in the slammer," but that is far from the case. A
person is paroled under certain conditions, and he requested a
description of the enforcement of those conditions.
MR. EDWARDS answered that there are statutorily mandated
conditions that apply to everyone on supervision, there is also
an opportunity for a single board member to review a case file
on each case and impose "supplemental parole conditions"
directly related to the case, the risk, and the needs associated
with the folks released on parole. Statutorily, he advised,
there is a requirement that some people be mandatorily released
with certain imposed parole conditions, and the Division of
Probation and Parole is tasked with enforcing the conditions
imposed by the parole board. Senate Bill 91 introduced
supervision standards and empowered the Division of Probation
and Parole to informally or formally deal with violations
quickly and swiftly via a specifically designed sanction matrix,
and if the violation is serious enough, the person could be
remanded back to jail, he explained. There are a number of
different avenues for the enforcement of these conditions, and
he stressed that enforcement is taken seriously. Mr. Edwards
reiterated that the parole board does review each case file and
it can impose supplemental conditions, for example, if someone
was identified as a gang member, the parole board would impose a
condition that the parolee was not to associate or have any
contact with known felons, and specifically no associated gang
members.
9:09:33 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX asked whether sex offenders ever grow out
of being a sex offender.
COMMISSIONER WILLIAMS stated that he was uncomfortable answering
that question, wherein many people in his department perform a
lot of work in this area. The University of Alaska, Results
First, conducted a study of sex offenders for seven years out,
and the study outcome was that, within the classes of criminals
that recidivate, the [sex offender] recidivism rate was quite
low. He related that there are mixed opinions as to whether sex
offenders ever grow out of being a sex offender.
9:11:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD reiterated her complaints against Senate
Bill 91, her concerns about the victims' families, mistakes made
by judges and parole boards. She said that the reports showed
that Jerry Active was released due to a parole board, and that
sexual assault is painful to go through. She said that
discretionary parole "scares me to death" and "maybe you guys
can just say that the parole board is just perfect because of
one appointed member that has no recollection." She stressed
that victims must watch the parole board over and over again and
can never heal. The sex offender cannot completely get rid of
their behavior, that is a huge risk to the public, and she urged
a yes-vote on the amendment.
9:14:03 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS commented that geriatric parole
appears to have a lot of logic because it is based on the
evidence. Evidence and data has shown that older people are
low-risk because they age out of criminality and it would be a
mistake to take that tool of discretion away from the parole
board, especially since there are no counter-factual or counter-
examples to prompt the committee to remove this tool. The
questions about how young or old a 60-year old person is, are
immaterial because the point is that older people are less
likely to be criminals. It does not make sense to him to
reverse the provisions when the data and evidence is clear, and
he said he is opposed to Amendment 41.
9:15:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KOPP stated, for the record, the Active case had
to do with probation and it never had anything to do with the
parole board. He expressed the importance of the committee
having the accurate facts, and the extreme importance that the
committee members are not "fast and loose" with data when making
important decisions. He stressed that, "The parole board was
never at fault in that case, it had nothing to do with the
parole board," and noted that Mr. Skidmore was nodding his head
in the affirmative. Representative Kopp re-enforced the
importance that "the committee must be very careful about
inflammatory false statements that cause people to come to wrong
conclusions."
9:16:29 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER apologized to the experts and witnesses
who testified because the committee has had a considerable lack
of decorum, and he "very much agrees" with the comments of
Representative Kreiss-Tomkins during his point of order, and he
also "agrees very much" with the comments of Representative
Kopp. He expressed that the committee had devolved into a
situation where it is now "playing for political theater," which
is exactly the wrong thing to do, and it is embarrassing. The
House Judiciary Standing Committee should be better than that,
this is not a place or time to try to score political points or
win re-elections. Representative Fansler stated, "If that's
what we're going to do, then that's not what I want to be a part
of. I didn't come here to make decisions that aren't based on
facts, that aren't based on analysis. I came here to do what's
best for the state, and what's best for my constituents."
Clearly, he pointed out, the system was broken prior to Senate
Bill 91 and the legislation has not been given a chance.
Rolling back discretionary parole and geriatric parole is just
an attempt to go back to that broken system. The state needs to
get a better Alaska, and the evidence and data bears out that
the way not to get to a better Alaska is to find criminals, put
them in a cell, and throw away the key. If that were the case,
he noted, the legislature might as well re-instate the death
penalty, and "on your first strike, get rid of you." The is
goal is for rehabilitation, a better society, breaking the cycle
of violence, breaking the cycle of sexual assault, and breaking
the cycle of childhood trauma that works its way through the
generations. He acknowledged that he is loath to follow the
State of Texas in any situation except this situation because it
was able to accomplish criminal justice reform. When you get
down to it, he pointed out, a majority of the complaints
directed toward the legislature are based upon the confluence of
several factors: an opioid crisis; public safety not being
funded as it needs to be funded; treatment programs not being
funded as they need to be funded; not funding the prosecutor's
office; and not funding the public defender's office. It is
imperative that Amendment 41 fail, it is imperative that as the
House Judiciary Standing Committee moves through the voluminous
amount of amendments and the ensuing debate on SB 54 itself,
that the committee act in a professional manner and show each
other their deserved respect, he expressed.
9:19:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she somewhat takes issue
with the idea that anyone who comes to the opposite conclusion
on some of these issues is engaged in political theater and is
simply attempting to run for re-election in this committee. She
related that she is willing to believe there are heartfelt
feelings on both sides of this issue.
9:20:36 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN remarked that it is in the interests of this
committee to try to exercise fair decorum, use the best words
possible, and maintain a civilized debate on these issues while
recognizing that in private quarters a person may choose more
passionate words. Amendment 41 is more than what has been
termed "geriatric parole," it is attempting to undo one of the
core tenants of the "tough on crime, smart on sentencing, and
saving costs for Alaska" concept. This committee could go down
a path in which more and more prisons could be built, lengthen
prison sentences, lock more and more people up, put more of
Alaska's society in prison, and never let them out of prison.
He stated, "that might make some people safer, it will break up
families, it will break up our communities, it will do more to
undermine our state moving forward as a place Alaskans can be
proud of," than what criminal justice reform has done in terms
of people being released on probation or parole after serving
their sentence. Probation and parole, and specifically the key
component of parole, is working, he then pointed to the
undisputed report from the director of the parole board that the
recidivism rate on people released on parole is 5 percent. That
figure is unbelievable, he described, because the State of
Wyoming has the second lowest recidivism rate nationwide at 25
percent. The parole board is doing an unbelievable job, and he
suggested putting more people in front of the parole board, so
it could make these tough decisions that will be, tough on
crime, smart on spending, and keep Alaska from building more
prisons. The committee can do better than adopting an amendment
such as Amendment 41, by investing in the control and treatment
of people released from prison under the tight conditions of
release and, thereby, less likely to be a danger to the public.
For all of those reasons, he stated, he is opposing Amendment
41.
9:23:05 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN related displeasure with having only 60
seconds to respond to any comments a committee member may offer.
He said he does believe it is fair to call that a debate, and he
does not think it serves the purpose of the committee because
this entire discussion has been off on something that is not
important. The discussion has been whether the parole board is
making the right decisions and the financial impact to the
department. Whereas, he related, the discussion should have
been on the impact to the public, and especially victims, due to
the expansion of a series of paroles. Mr. Edwards, himself,
advised that the parole board's rates of parole have not
changed, but the amount of hearings have tripled in size.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER maintained his objection.
9:24:17 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Reinbold, LeDoux,
and Eastman voted in favor of the adoption of Amendment 41.
Representatives Kopp, Kreiss-Tomkins, Fansler, and Claman voted
against it. Therefore, Amendment 41 failed to be adopted by a
vote of 3-4.
9:24:52 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 9:24 p.m. to 9:31 p.m.
9:31:32 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN moved to adopt Amendment 42, Version 30-
LS0461\N.26, Glover/Martin, 10/20/17, which read as follows:
Page 1, line 4, following "program;":
Insert "relating to eligibility for temporary
assistance;"
Page 15, line 7:
Delete "and"
Page 15, line 8, following "12.55.125(e)(4)(D)":
Insert "; and AS 47.27.015(i)"
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER objected.
9:32:01 PM
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Eastman discussed the amendment
process.]
9:33:01 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that Amendment 42 repeals the
eligibility for a drug felon to obtain temporary assistance in
the form of food stamps. This amendment reverts back to a time
when drug felons were not eligible after receiving a drug
conviction, he said.
9:33:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN, in response to Representative Fansler,
advised that he believes the amendment reverts back to pre-
Senate Bill 91 language.
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER noted to Ms. DiPetro that the denial of
food stamps [for drug offenders] was eliminate in Senate Bill 91
under some type of consensus, and he asked her to describe how
and why the commission came to this recommendation.
MS. DiPETRO responded that this recommendation was offered by
the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission working committee, Brenda
Stanfill is the chair of that working committee who works with
victims in the Fairbanks community. This working committee
looks at helping individuals with criminal records, who want to
travel down the right path by removing barriers that may keep
them from becoming productive members of society, she explained.
The exact issue of a drug felon's ability to receive food stamps
and/or public assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), was discussed and she advised that the working
group's recommendation was that drug felons were eligible to
receive public assistance benefits so long as they complied with
their extensive probation conditions, worked on their
rehabilitation, and worked on reforming their lives.
9:36:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE FANSLER asked whether there were any statistics
or data behind the idea of providing avenues for programs, such
as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to the folks
in this situation under certain conditions.
MS. DiPETRO answered that the working group heard from members
of the community who had advised that this was a problem for
them, it is something that has been done in other states, and it
has been beneficial. The information presented to the committee
by various Alaskans was that it would be helpful, she advised.
9:39:15 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether Representative Eastman was seeking to
remove AS 47.27.015, which specifically allows a person to apply
for public assistance, and whether his intent is to not allow
the person that opportunity.
CHAIR CLAMAN, in response to Representative Eastman's question,
answered that he had cited AS 47.27.015(i), and the citation is
found in Amendment 42, page 1, line 8. He asked whether
Representative Eastman was seeking, through the amendment, to
repeal that section of the statutes.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that the word "and" is being
deleted and to insert the language, "this reference to the
statute." He advised that the only language being deleted is
the word "and."
CHAIR CLAMAN explained that by inserting the statute, what
happens in SB 54, Sec. 22, page 15, lines 7-8, is that
Representative Eastman is actually repealing the statutes that
are listed. He asked whether that is what Representative
Eastman was doing with this amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN explained that his intention with this
amendment is to revert to previous status wherein once a person
had been convicted of that type of felony, that person could not
apply for food stamps.
9:41:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX surmised that Amendment 42 goes back to
pre-Senate Bill 91 law, wherein a person convicted of a drug
offense could not apply for food stamps.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN answered that Representative LeDoux was
correct.
9:42:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LEDOUX commented that she would understand this
amendment better if there was a law on the books that said, "no
one who had ever committed a crime could apply for food stamps"
because at least that would be consistent. Especially since,
currently, a person convicted of rape, incest, murder, and all
sorts of other crimes can apply for food stamps, she expressed.
Quite frankly, she stressed, "somebody who has committed
multiple murders is probably worse than somebody who's been
convicted of a drug offense," and remarked that she just does
not understand the rationale behind Amendment 42 at all.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN commented that it is important to
remember that post-Senate Bill 91, "the last time I checked,
when you go to apply for food stamps, there is up to a 60-day
wait. He related that he would like to "see ways of addressing
that" and in the past it limited those who committed crimes,
such as drug offenses, from being eligible for that program.
While there is probably a more elegant way of putting the focus
on drug crimes, he said that he would withdraw Amendment 42.
9:45:50 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD related that the committee chairman or
chairwoman sets the tone of the committee, and it appears there
were undertones regarding political theater, et cetra, "and
certain people were talking certain ways to certain presenters,
and things like that. I also find it very appalling when I'm
undermined by my colleagues, when I feel like I'm being unfairly
scrutinized. We're not talking to the amendment, you're talking
about individuals being disrespected, being -- claim that it's
for political points. Sometimes people got caught up with their
egos who was technically right or wrong, maybe they were trying
to score political points with the parole board, or the
governor, or somebody, when I was reading a specific article in
a newspaper. And, sometimes the newspaper, by God, they got a
tough job. Media is a tough job. They got confused between the
parole board, the parole officer, et cetra, et cetra, et cetra.
Well, I think it's also just absolutely critically important
that just because we have a difference of opinion, we don't have
to attack the message -- the person who is saying the message,
and falsely accusing them of things when certain individuals ...
I was with four murder victims last night, their parents, and I
have made them commitments and promises. The bottom line with
this Jerry Active case, he had a conviction in 2009, he was
released from jail, within a few hours there was an older couple
babysitting a two-year old, the woman was raped, the baby was
raped, and both the elderly couples were murdered in Alaska.
The victims want to know who the heck in government let this
person out. It's an answer we want to know and I'm so tired of
the egos and the technicalities here. The bottom line is that
Alaskans are not safe in many, many cases and we need to fix
that."
9:47:56 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that, specifically with regard to the
Jerry Active case, there was testimony from the parole board, as
well as the commissioner of the Department of Corrections, that
Jerry Active was not released on parole. It is undisputed that
he was someone who had been released consistent with the length
of his sentence, and he was on mandatory probation because he
had finished serving his sentence. The parole board was not
involved in the release of Jerry Active in any manner
whatsoever. Representative Kopp made that statement, and it is
accurate to say that "you said more than once, that the parole
board was involved in his release. And so, in instances like
that, I think it's important that we actually are appropriate in
listening to the information we've learned and respond to that
appropriately." Everyone in Alaska, he expressed, recognizes
the tragedy of the Jerry Active case. Chair Claman advised that
he heard from prosecutors, and people in the executive branch,
that how he was sentenced to the length of time he was sentenced
to, was frustrating to everyone but it had nothing to do with
the parole board. That does not mean that people cannot ask
questions and get answers to those questions, but it is
appropriate that the committee members remember that part of
their job is to actually find the facts, and when they learn the
facts, to respond appropriately.
[SB 54 was held over.]
9:50:48 PM
ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was [adjourned] at 9:50
p.m.
AMENDMENTS
The following amendments to SB 54 were either discussed or
adopted during the hearing. Shorter amendments are provided in
the main text only.
Amendment 36 30LS0461\N.20, Bruce/Martin, 10/20/17
Page 1, line 3, following "license;":
Insert "relating to restoration of a driver's
license;"
Page 10, following line 27:
Insert new bill sections to read:
"* Sec. 16. AS 28.35.030(k) is amended to read:
(k) Imprisonment required under (b)(1)(A) of
this section shall be served at a community
residential center or by electronic monitoring at a
private residence [UNDER AS 33.30.065]. If electronic
monitoring is not available, imprisonment required
under (b)(1)(A) of this section may [SHALL] be served
at another appropriate place determined by the
commissioner of corrections [A PRIVATE RESIDENCE BY
OTHER MEANS DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTIONS. A PERSON WHO IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF
IMPRISONMENT REQUIRED UNDER (b)(1)(A) OF THIS SECTION
BY ELECTRONIC MONITORING AT A PRIVATE RESIDENCE MAY
NOT BE SUBJECT TO A SEARCH OF THE PERSON'S DWELLING BY
A PEACE OFFICER OR A PERSON REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER THE
ELECTRONIC MONITORING UNDER AS 33.30.065(a), EXCEPT
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE]. Imprisonment required under
(b)(1)(B) - (F) of this section may be served at a
community residential center or at a private residence
if approved by the commissioner of corrections.
Imprisonment served at a private residence must
include electronic monitoring [UNDER AS 33.30.065 OR,
IF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IS NOT AVAILABLE, BY OTHER
MEANS AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTIONS]. The cost of imprisonment resulting from
the sentence imposed under (b)(1) of this section
shall be paid to the state by the person being
sentenced provided, however, that the [. THE] cost of
imprisonment required to be paid under this subsection
may not exceed $2,000. Upon the person's conviction,
the court shall include the costs of imprisonment as a
part of the judgment of conviction. Except for
reimbursement from a permanent fund dividend as
provided in this subsection, payment of the cost of
imprisonment is not required if the court determines
the person is indigent. For costs of imprisonment that
are not paid by the person as required by this
subsection, the state shall seek reimbursement from
the person's permanent fund dividend as provided under
AS 43.23.065. While at the community residential
center or other appropriate place, a person sentenced
under (b)(1)(A) of this section shall perform at least
24 hours of community service work. A person sentenced
under (b)(1)(B) of this section shall perform at least
160 hours of community service work, as required by
the director of the community residential center or
other appropriate place, or as required by the
commissioner of corrections if the sentence is being
served at a private residence. In this subsection,
"appropriate place" means a facility with 24-hour on-
site staff supervision that is specifically adapted to
provide a residence, and includes a correctional
center, residential treatment facility, hospital,
halfway house, group home, work farm, work camp, or
other place that provides varying levels of
restriction.
* Sec. 17. AS 28.35.030(l) is amended to read:
(l) The commissioner of corrections shall
determine and prescribe by regulation a uniform
average cost of imprisonment for the purpose of
determining the cost of imprisonment required to be
paid under (k) of this section by a convicted person.
[THE REGULATIONS MUST INCLUDE THE COSTS ASSOCIATED
WITH ELECTRONIC MONITORING UNDER AS 33.30.065.]
* Sec. 18. AS 28.35.030(o) is amended to read:
(o) Upon request, the department shall review a
driver's license revocation imposed under (n)(3) of
this section and
[(1)] may restore the driver's license if
(1) [(A)] the license has been revoked for
a period of at least 10 years;
(2) [(B)] the person has not been convicted
of a [DRIVING-RELATED] criminal offense since the
license was revoked; and
(3) [(C)] the person provides proof of
financial responsibility [;
(2) SHALL RESTORE THE DRIVER'S LICENSE IF
(A) THE PERSON HAS BEEN GRANTED LIMITED
LICENSE PRIVILEGES UNDER AS 28.15.201(g) AND HAS
SUCCESSFULLY DRIVEN UNDER THAT LIMITED LICENSE FOR
THREE YEARS WITHOUT HAVING THE LIMITED LICENSE
PRIVILEGES REVOKED;
(B) THE PERSON HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A
COURT-ORDERED TREATMENT PROGRAM UNDER AS 28.35.028 OR
A REHABILITATIVE TREATMENT PROGRAM UNDER
AS 28.15.201(h);
(C) THE PERSON HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF A
VIOLATION OF AS 28.35.030 OR 28.35.032 OR A SIMILAR
LAW OR ORDINANCE OF THIS OR ANOTHER JURISDICTION SINCE
THE LICENSE WAS REVOKED;
(D) THE PERSON IS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE TO
HAVE THE PERSON'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES RESTORED AS
PROVIDED IN AS 28.15.211; IN AN APPLICATION UNDER THIS
SUBSECTION, A PERSON WHOSE LICENSE WAS REVOKED FOR A
VIOLATION OF AS 28.35.030(n) OR 28.35.032(p) IS NOT
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT COMPLIANCE AS REQUIRED UNDER
AS 28.35.030(h) OR 28.35.032(l); AND
(E) THE PERSON PROVIDES PROOF OF FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY].
* Sec. 19. AS 28.35.032(o) is amended to read:
(o) Imprisonment required under (g)(1)(A) of
this section shall be served at a community
residential center, or if a community residential
center [PRIVATE RESIDENCE BY ELECTRONIC MONITORING
UNDER AS 33.30.065. IF ELECTRONIC MONITORING] is not
available, at another appropriate place as determined
by the commissioner of corrections [IMPRISONMENT UNDER
(g)(1)(A) OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE SERVED AT A PRIVATE
RESIDENCE BY OTHER MEANS AS DETERMINED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS. A PERSON WHO IS SERVING A
SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT REQUIRED UNDER (g)(1)(A) OF
THIS SECTION BY ELECTRONIC MONITORING AT A PRIVATE
RESIDENCE MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO A SEARCH OF THE
PERSON'S DWELLING BY A PEACE OFFICER OR A PERSON
REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING UNDER
AS 33.30.065(a), EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE.]
Imprisonment required under (g)(1)(B) - (F) of this
section may be served at a community residential
center or at a private residence if approved by the
commissioner of corrections. Imprisonment served at a
private residence must include electronic monitoring
[UNDER AS 33.30.065 OR, IF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IS
NOT AVAILABLE, SHALL BE SERVED BY OTHER MEANS AS
DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS]. The
cost of imprisonment resulting from the sentence
imposed under (g)(1) of this section shall be paid to
the state by the person being sentenced provided,
however, that the [. THE] cost of imprisonment
required to be paid under this subsection may not
exceed $2,000. Upon the person's conviction, the court
shall include the costs of imprisonment as a part of
the judgment of conviction. Except for reimbursement
from a permanent fund dividend as provided in this
subsection, payment of the cost of imprisonment is not
required if the court determines the person is
indigent. For costs of imprisonment that are not paid
by the person as required by this subsection, the
state shall seek reimbursement from the person's
permanent fund dividend as provided under
AS 43.23.065. While at the community residential
center or another appropriate place, a person
sentenced under (g)(1)(A) of this section shall
perform at least 24 hours of community service work. A
person sentenced under (g)(1)(B) of this section shall
perform at least 160 hours of community service work,
as required by the director of the community
residential center or other appropriate place, or as
required by the commissioner of corrections if the
sentence is being served at a private residence. In
this subsection, "appropriate place" means a facility
with 24-hour on-site staff supervision that is
specifically adapted to provide a residence, and
includes a correctional center, residential treatment
facility, hospital, halfway house, group home, work
farm, work camp, or other place that provides varying
levels of restriction."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 11, following line 27:
Insert a new bill section to read:
"* Sec. 24. AS 33.30.065(a) is amended to read:
(a) If the commissioner designates a prisoner to
serve the prisoner's term of imprisonment or period of
temporary commitment, or a part of the term or period,
by electronic monitoring, the commissioner shall
direct the prisoner to serve the term or period at the
prisoner's residence or other place selected by the
commissioner. The electronic monitoring shall be
administered by the department [OR BY A PRIVATE
CONTRACTOR APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
AS 33.30.011(10)(B)] and shall be designed so that any
attempt to remove, tamper with, or disable the
monitoring equipment or to leave the place selected
for the service of the term or period will result in a
report or notice to the department."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 26:
Delete "and"
Page 15, line 27, following "Act":
Insert ";
(8) AS 28.35.030(k), as amended by sec. 16
of this Act; and
(9) AS 28.35.032(o), as amended by sec. 19
of this Act"
Page 15, following line 27:
Insert a new subsection to read:
"(c) AS 28.35.030(o), as amended by sec. 18 of
this Act, applies to revocation of a driver's license,
privilege to drive, privilege to obtain a driver's
license, or an identification card or driver's license
occurring on or after the effective date of sec. 18 of
this Act."
Reletter the following subsection accordingly.
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 22"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 22"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17"
Insert "Section 21"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 29"
AMENDMENT 39 [30-LS0461\N.23, Glover/Martin, 10/19/17]
Page 1, following line 5:
Insert new bill sections to read:
"* Section 1. AS 11.46.130(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of theft in the
second degree if the person commits theft as defined
in AS 11.46.100 and
(1) the value of the property or services
[, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or more but less than
$25,000;
(2) the property is a firearm or explosive;
(3) the property is taken from the person
of another;
(4) the property is taken from a vessel and
is vessel safety or survival equipment;
(5) the property is taken from an aircraft
and the property is aircraft safety or survival
equipment;
(6) the value of the property [, ADJUSTED
FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or
more but less than $1,000 and, within the preceding
five years, the person has been convicted and
sentenced on two or more separate occasions in this or
another jurisdiction of
(A) an offense under AS 11.46.120, or an
offense under another law or ordinance with similar
elements;
(B) a crime set out in this subsection or
an offense under another law or ordinance with similar
elements;
(C) an offense under AS 11.46.140(a)(1), or
an offense under another law or ordinance with similar
elements; or
(D) an offense under AS 11.46.220(c)(1) or
(c)(2)(A), or an offense under another law or
ordinance with similar elements; or
(7) the property is an access device.
* Sec. 2. AS 11.46.140(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of theft in the
third degree if the person commits theft as defined in
AS 11.46.100 and
(1) the value of the property or services
[, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or more but less than $1,000;
or
(2) [REPEALED]
(3) [REPEALED]
(4) the value of the property is less than
$250 and, within the past five years, the person has
been convicted and sentenced on two or more separate
occasions in this or another jurisdiction of theft or
concealment of merchandise, or an offense under
another law or ordinance with similar elements.
* Sec. 3. AS 11.46.150(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of theft in the
fourth degree if the person commits theft as defined
in AS 11.46.100 and the value of the property or
services [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is less than $250.
* Sec. 4. AS 11.46.220(c) is amended to read:
(c) Concealment of merchandise is
(1) a class C felony if
(A) the merchandise is a firearm;
(B) the value of the merchandise [,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,]
is $1,000 or more; or
(C) the value of the merchandise [,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,]
is $250 or more but less than $1,000 and, within the
preceding five years, the person has been convicted
and sentenced on two or more separate occasions in
this or another jurisdiction of
(i) the offense of concealment of
merchandise under this paragraph or (2)(A) of this
subsection, or an offense under another law or
ordinance with similar elements; or
(ii) an offense under AS 11.46.120,
11.46.130, or 11.46.140(a)(1), or an offense under
another law or ordinance with similar elements;
(2) a class A misdemeanor if
(A) the value of the merchandise [,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,]
is $250 or more but less than $1,000; or
(B) [REPEALED]
(C) the value of the merchandise is less
than $250 and, within the preceding five years, the
person has been convicted and sentenced on two or more
separate occasions of the offense of concealment of
merchandise or theft in any degree, or an offense
under another law or ordinance with similar elements;
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the merchandise [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED
IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than $250.
* Sec. 5. AS 11.46.260(b) is amended to read:
(b) Removal of identification marks is
(1) a class C felony if the value of the
property on which the serial number or identification
mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or more;
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property on which the serial number or
identification mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or more but less
than $1,000;
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the property on which the serial number or
identification mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than $250.
* Sec. 6. AS 11.46.270(b) is amended to read:
(b) Unlawful possession is
(1) a class C felony if the value of the
property on which the serial number or identification
mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or more;
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property on which the serial number or
identification mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or more but less
than $1,000;
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the property on which the serial number or
identification mark appeared [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than $250.
* Sec. 7. AS 11.46.280(d) is amended to read:
(d) Issuing a bad check is
(1) a class B felony if the face amount of
the check is $25,000 or more;
(2) a class C felony if the face amount of
the check [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or more but less than
$25,000;
(3) a class A misdemeanor if the face
amount of the check [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS
PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or more but less
than $1,000;
(4) a class B misdemeanor if the face
amount of the check [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS
PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than $250.
* Sec. 8. AS 11.46.285(b) is amended to read:
(b) Fraudulent use of an access device is
(1) a class B felony if the value of the
property or services obtained is $25,000 or more;
(2) a class C felony if the value of the
property or services obtained [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or
more but less than $25,000;
(3) a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property or services obtained [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than
$1,000.
* Sec. 9. AS 11.46.295 is amended to read:
Sec. 11.46.295. Prior convictions. For purposes
of considering prior convictions in prosecuting a
crime of theft under AS 11.46.130(a)(6) or
11.46.140(a)(4) or in prosecuting the crime of
concealment of merchandise under AS 11.46.220(c),
(1) a conviction for an offense under
another law or ordinance with similar elements is a
conviction of an offense having elements similar to
those of an offense defined as such under Alaska law
at the time the offense was committed;
(2) a conviction for an offense under
Alaska law where the value of the property or services
for the offense was lower than the value of property
or services for the offense under current Alaska law
is a prior conviction for that offense; and
(3) the court shall consider the date of a
prior conviction as occurring on the date that
sentence is imposed for the prior offense.
* Sec. 10. AS 11.46.360(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of vehicle theft
in the first degree if, having no right to do so or
any reasonable ground to believe the person has such a
right, the person drives, tows away, or takes
(1) the car, truck, motorcycle, motor home,
bus, aircraft, or watercraft of another;
(2) the propelled vehicle of another and
(A) the vehicle or any other property of
another is damaged in a total amount [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] of $1,000 or
more;
(B) the owner incurs reasonable expenses as
a result of the loss of use of the vehicle, in a total
amount [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] of $1,000 or more; or
(C) the owner is deprived of the use of the
vehicle for seven days or more;
(3) the propelled vehicle of another and
the vehicle is marked as a police or emergency
vehicle; or
(4) the propelled vehicle of another and,
within the preceding seven years, the person was
convicted under
(A) this section or AS 11.46.365;
(B) former AS 11.46.482(a)(4) or (5);
(C) former AS 11.46.484(a)(2);
(D) AS 11.46.120 - 11.46.140 of an offense
involving the theft of a propelled vehicle; or
(E) a law or ordinance of this or another
jurisdiction with elements substantially similar to
those of an offense described in (A) - (D) of this
paragraph.
* Sec. 11. AS 11.46.482(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of criminal
mischief in the third degree if, having no right to do
so or any reasonable ground to believe the person has
such a right,
(1) with intent to damage property of
another, the person damages property of another in an
amount [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] of $1,000 or more;
(2) the person recklessly creates a risk of
damage in an amount exceeding $100,000 to property of
another by the use of widely dangerous means; or
(3) the person knowingly
(A) defaces, damages, or desecrates a
cemetery or the contents of a cemetery or a tomb,
grave, or memorial regardless of whether the tomb,
grave, or memorial is in a cemetery or whether the
cemetery, tomb, grave, or memorial appears to be
abandoned, lost, or neglected;
(B) removes human remains or associated
burial artifacts from a cemetery, tomb, grave, or
memorial regardless of whether the cemetery, tomb,
grave, or memorial appears to be abandoned, lost, or
neglected.
* Sec. 12. AS 11.46.484(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of criminal
mischief in the fourth degree if, having no right to
do so or any reasonable ground to believe the person
has such a right,
(1) with intent to damage property of
another, the person damages property of another in an
amount [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] of $250 or more but less than $1,000;
(2) the person tampers with a fire
protection device in a building that is a public
place;
(3) the person knowingly accesses a
computer, computer system, computer program, computer
network, or part of a computer system or network;
(4) the person uses a device to descramble
an electronic signal that has been scrambled to
prevent unauthorized receipt or viewing of the signal
unless the device is used only to descramble signals
received directly from a satellite or unless the
person owned the device before September 18, 1984; or
(5) the person knowingly removes,
relocates, defaces, alters, obscures, shoots at,
destroys, or otherwise tampers with an official
traffic control device or damages the work on a
highway under construction.
* Sec. 13. AS 11.46.486(a) is amended to read:
(a) A person commits the crime of criminal
mischief in the fifth degree if, having no right to do
so or any reasonable ground to believe the person has
such a right,
(1) with reckless disregard for the risk of
harm to or loss of the property or with intent to
cause substantial inconvenience to another, the person
tampers with property of another;
(2) with intent to damage property of
another, the person damages property of another in an
amount [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN
AS 11.46.982,] less than $250; or
(3) the person rides in a propelled vehicle
knowing it has been stolen or that it is being used in
violation of AS 11.46.360 or 11.46.365(a)(1).
* Sec. 14. AS 11.46.530(b) is amended to read:
(b) Criminal simulation is
(1) a class C felony if the value of what
the object purports to represent [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or
more;
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of
what the object purports to represent [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $250 or
more but less than $1,000;
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of
what the object purports to represent [, ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than
$250.
* Sec. 15. AS 11.46.620(d) is amended to read:
(d) Misapplication of property is
(1) a class C felony if the value of the
property misapplied [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS
PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is $1,000 or more;
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property misapplied [, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS
PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,] is less than $1,000.
* Sec. 16. AS 11.46.730(c) is amended to read:
(c) Defrauding creditors is a class A
misdemeanor unless that secured party, judgment
creditor, or creditor incurs a pecuniary loss [,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,]
of $1,000 or more as a result of the defendant's
conduct, in which case defrauding secured creditors is
(1) a class B felony if the loss is $25,000
or more;
(2) a class C felony if the loss [,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AS PROVIDED IN AS 11.46.982,]
is $1,000 or more but less than $25,000."
Page 1, line 6:
Delete "Section 1"
Insert "Sec. 17"
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, lines 7 - 8:
Delete all material and insert:
"* Sec. 38. AS 11.46.980(d), 11.46.982;
AS 11.66.130(b), 11.66.135(b); AS 12.55.125(e)(4)(B),
12.55.125(e)(4)(C), and 12.55.125(e)(4)(D) are
repealed."
Page 15, following line 12:
Insert new material to read:
"(1) AS 11.46.130(a), as amended by sec. 1
of this Act;
(2) AS 11.46.140(a), as amended by sec. 2
of this Act;
(3) AS 11.46.150(a), as amended by sec. 3
of this Act;
(4) AS 11.46.220(c), as amended by sec. 4
of this Act;
(5) AS 11.46.260(b), as amended by sec. 5
of this Act;
(6) AS 11.46.270(b), as amended by sec. 6
of this Act;
(7) AS 11.46.280(d), as amended by sec. 7
of this Act;
(8) AS 11.46.285(b), as amended by sec. 8
of this Act;
(9) AS 11.46.295, as amended by sec. 9 of
this Act;
(10) AS 11.46.360(a), as amended by sec. 10
of this Act;
(11) AS 11.46.482(a), as amended by sec. 11
of this Act;
(12) AS 11.46.484(a), as amended by sec. 12
of this Act;
(13) AS 11.46.486(a), as amended by sec. 13
of this Act;
(14) AS 11.46.530(b), as amended by sec. 14
of this Act;
(15) AS 11.46.620(d), as amended by sec. 15
of this Act;
(16) AS 11.46.730(c), as amended by sec. 16
of this Act;"
Renumber the following paragraphs accordingly.
Page 15, line 13:
Delete "sec. 1"
Insert "sec. 17"
Page 15, line 14:
Delete "sec. 2"
Insert "sec. 18"
Page 15, line 15:
Delete "sec. 3"
Insert "sec. 19"
Page 15, line 16:
Delete "sec. 4"
Insert "sec. 20"
Page 15, line 17:
Delete "sec. 5"
Insert "sec. 21"
Page 15, line 18:
Delete "sec. 15"
Insert "sec. 31"
Page 15, line 21:
Delete "sec. 6"
Insert "sec. 22"
Page 15, line 22:
Delete "sec. 7"
Insert "sec. 23"
Page 15, line 23:
Delete "sec. 8"
Insert "sec. 24"
Page 15, line 24:
Delete "sec. 9"
Insert "sec. 25"
Page 15, line 25:
Delete "sec. 10"
Insert "sec. 26"
Page 15, line 26:
Delete "sec. 11"
Insert "sec. 27"
Page 15, line 27:
Delete "sec. 12"
Insert "sec. 28"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 34"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 34"
Page 15, line 30:
Delete "Section 17"
Insert "Section 33"
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 40"
AMENDMENT 41 [30-LS0461\N.25, Glover/Martin, 10/19/17]
Page 11, following line 12:
Insert new bill sections to read:
"* Sec. 18. AS 33.16.090(a) is amended to read:
(a) A prisoner sentenced to an active term of
imprisonment of at least 181 days and who has not been
released on administrative parole as provided in
AS 33.16.089 may, in the discretion of the board, be
released on discretionary parole if the prisoner
[(1)] has served the amount of time
specified under (b) of this section, except that
(1) [(A)] a prisoner sentenced to one or
more mandatory 99-year terms under AS 12.55.125(a) or
one or more definite terms under AS 12.55.125(l) is
not eligible for consideration for discretionary
parole;
(2) [(B)] a prisoner is not eligible for
consideration of discretionary parole if made
ineligible by order of a court under AS 12.55.115;
(3) [(C)] a prisoner imprisoned under
AS 12.55.086 is not eligible for discretionary parole
unless the actual term of imprisonment is more than
one year [; OR
(2) IS AT LEAST 60 YEARS OF AGE, HAS SERVED
AT LEAST 10 YEARS OF A SENTENCE FOR ONE OR MORE CRIMES
IN A SINGLE JUDGMENT, AND HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY OR A SEXUAL FELONY AS DEFINED IN
AS 12.55.185].
* Sec. 19. AS 33.16.090(b) is amended to read:
(b) A prisoner eligible under (a) [(a)(1)] of
this section who is sentenced
(1) to a single sentence under
AS 12.55.125(a) or (b) may not be released on
discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the
mandatory minimum term under AS 12.55.125(a) or (b),
one-third of the active term of imprisonment imposed,
or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever is
greatest;
(2) to a single sentence within or below a
presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125(c), (d)(2) -
(4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i) [AS 12.55.125(i)(1) AND
(2)], and has not been allowed by the three-judge
panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for
discretionary parole release, may not be released on
discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the
term imposed, less good time earned under
AS 33.20.010;
(3) to a single sentence under
AS 12.55.125(c), (d)(2) - (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i)
[AS 12.55.125(i)], and has been allowed by the three-
judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for
discretionary parole release during the second half of
the sentence, may not be released on discretionary
parole until
(A) the prisoner has served that portion of
the active term of imprisonment required by the three-
judge panel; and
(B) in addition to the factors set out in
AS 33.16.100(a), the board determines that
(i) the prisoner has successfully completed
all rehabilitation programs ordered by the three-judge
panel that were made available to the prisoner; and
(ii) the prisoner would not constitute a
danger to the public if released on parole;
(4) to a single enhanced sentence under
AS 12.55.155(a) that is above the applicable
presumptive range may not be released on discretionary
parole until the prisoner has served the greater of
the following:
(A) an amount of time, less good time
earned under AS 33.20.010, equal to the upper end of
the presumptive range plus one-fourth of the amount of
time above the presumptive range; or
(B) any term set under AS 12.55.115;
(5) to a single sentence under any other
provision of law may not be released on discretionary
parole until the prisoner has served at least one-
fourth of the active term of imprisonment, any
mandatory minimum sentence imposed under any provision
of law, or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever
is greatest;
(6) to concurrent sentences may not be
released on discretionary parole until the prisoner
has served the greatest of
(A) any mandatory minimum sentence or
sentences imposed under any provision of law;
(B) any term set under AS 12.55.115; or
(C) the amount of time that is required to
be served under (1) - (5) of this subsection for the
sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been
the only sentence imposed;
(7) to consecutive or partially consecutive
sentences may not be released on discretionary parole
until the prisoner has served the greatest of
(A) the composite total of any mandatory
minimum sentence or sentences imposed under any
provision of law, including AS 12.55.127;
(B) any term set under AS 12.55.115; or
(C) the amount of time that is required to
be served under (1) - (5) of this subsection for the
sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been
the only sentence imposed, plus one-quarter of the
composite total of the active term of imprisonment
imposed as consecutive or partially consecutive
sentences imposed for all crimes other than the
primary crime.
[(8) TO A SINGLE SENTENCE UNDER
AS 12.55.125(i)(3) AND (4), AND HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED
BY THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL UNDER AS 12.55.175 TO BE
CONSIDERED FOR DISCRETIONARY PAROLE RELEASE, MAY NOT
BE RELEASED ON DISCRETIONARY PAROLE UNTIL THE PRISONER
HAS SERVED, AFTER A DEDUCTION FOR GOOD TIME EARNED
UNDER AS 33.20.010, ONE-HALF OF THE ACTIVE TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED.]
* Sec. 20. AS 33.16.100(a) is amended to read:
(a) The board may authorize the release of a
prisoner [CONVICTED OF AN UNCLASSIFIED FELONY WHO IS
OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE UNDER AS 12.55.115 AND
AS 33.16.090(a)(1)] on discretionary parole if it
determines a reasonable probability exists that
(1) the prisoner will live and remain at
liberty without violating any laws or conditions
imposed by the board;
(2) the prisoner's rehabilitation and
reintegration into society will be furthered by
release on parole;
(3) the prisoner will not pose a threat of
harm to the public if released on parole; and
(4) release of the prisoner on parole would
not diminish the seriousness of the crime.
* Sec. 21. AS 33.16.130(a) is amended to read:
(a) The parole board shall hold a hearing before
granting an eligible prisoner special medical or
discretionary parole. The board shall also hold a
hearing if requested by a victim under procedures
established for the request for a prisoner eligible
for administrative parole. A hearing shall be
conducted within the following time frames:
(1) for prisoners eligible under
AS 33.16.100(a) [OR (f)], not less than 90 days before
the first parole eligibility date, unless the prisoner
is eligible for administrative parole;
(2) for all other prisoners, not less than
30 days after the board is notified of the need for a
hearing by the commissioner or the commissioner's
designee."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 11, following line 21:
Insert new bill sections to read:
* Sec. 23. AS 33.16.210(a) is amended to read:
(a) The board may unconditionally discharge a
parolee from the jurisdiction and custody of the board
after the parolee has completed two years [ONE YEAR]
of parole. A discretionary parolee with a residual
period of probation may, after two years [ONE YEAR] of
parole, be discharged by the board to immediately
begin serving the residual period of probation.
* Sec. 24. AS 33.16.210(b) is amended to read:
(b) Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the
board may unconditionally discharge a mandatory
parolee before the parolee has completed two years
[ONE YEAR] of parole if the parolee is serving a
concurrent period of residual probation under
AS 33.20.040(c), and the period of residual probation
and the period of suspended imprisonment each equal or
exceed the period of mandatory parole."
Renumber the following bill sections accordingly.
Page 15, line 7:
Delete "and"
Page 15, line 8, following "12.55.125(e)(4)(D)":
Insert "; AS 33.16.100(f), and 33.16.100(g)"
Page 15, line 28:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 22"
Page 15, line 29:
Delete "sec. 18"
Insert "sec. 22"
Page 15, following line 29:
Insert new subsections to read:
"(d) The following sections apply to parole
granted on or after the effective date of those
sections for conduct occurring on or after the
effective date of those sections:
(1) AS 33.16.090(a), as amended by sec. 18
of this Act;
(2) AS 33.16.090(b), as amended by sec. 19
of this Act;
(3) AS 33.16.210(a), as amended by sec. 23
of this Act; and
(4) AS 33.16.210(b), as amended by sec. 24
of this Act.
(e) AS 33.16.100(a), as amended by sec. 20 of
this Act, applies to parole granted on or after the
effective date of sec. 20 of this Act, for conduct
occurring before, on, or after the effective date of
sec. 20 of this Act."
Page 15, line 31:
Delete "sec. 24"
Insert "sec. 30"
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SB54 ver N 10.23.17.PDF |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM HJUD 10/26/2017 9:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Sponsor Statement ver N 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Sectional Summary ver N 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Summary of Changes (ver. A to ver. N) 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Bill Contents ver N 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 ACJC Recommendations 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Alaska Criminal Justice Commission Annual Report 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Bill Presentation 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 ACJC Presentation 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Supporting Document-Letters of Support 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Supporting Document-Letter ACLU 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Supporting Document-Letter City and Borough of Juneau 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Opposing Document-Letter CUSP 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Additional Document-DoL Recommendations to ACJC (January 9, 2017) 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Additional Document-DoL C Felonies in AS 11 Affected by SB 91 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 SB 91 |
| SB54 Additional Document-DoL Memo - State Sentencing (May 19, 2017) 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Amendments #1-22 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM HJUD 10/26/2017 9:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Additional Document-Leg Legal Memo on Amendment #1 (N.32) 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM HJUD 10/26/2017 9:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Amendments #23-28 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM HJUD 10/26/2017 9:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Amendments #29-48 10.24.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM HJUD 10/26/2017 9:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Fiscal Note DPS-DET 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Fiscal Note LAW-CRIM 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Fiscal Note DHSS-PS 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Fiscal Note JUD-ACS 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |
| SB54 Fiscal Note DOC-IDO 10.23.17.pdf |
HJUD 10/23/2017 1:00:00 PM HJUD 10/24/2017 9:00:00 AM HJUD 10/24/2017 6:00:00 PM HJUD 10/25/2017 8:00:00 AM |
SB 54 |